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The Missile Gap Controversy Author(S): Roy E The Missile Gap Controversy Author(s): Roy E. Licklider Source: Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 85, No. 4 (Dec., 1970), pp. 600-615 Published by: The Academy of Political Science Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2147598 Accessed: 05-05-2016 01:29 UTC Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://about.jstor.org/terms JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. The Academy of Political Science, Wiley are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Political Science Quarterly This content downloaded from 128.59.222.12 on Thu, 05 May 2016 01:29:36 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms The Missile Gap Controversy * ROY E. LICKLIDER Douglass College Rutgers University The disputes surrounding the formation of military policy are not famous for their clarity, yet, even so, the contro- versy over the missile gap stands out as a muddled issue. The con- troversy arose in the late 1950S as a result of intelligence esti- mates that between 1960 and 1964 the Soviet Union might have more intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) operational than would the United States. Assuming the existence of a missile gap, opponents of the Eisenhower administration argued the existence of a deterrence gap, that Soviet supremacy in ICBMs was so great that the American strategic forces could be eliminated in a single massive attack. Administration spokesmen generally conceded the missile gap but denied a deterrence gap on the grounds that the American strategic forces were too numerous and varied to be eliminated by a single attack and that the leaders of the Soviet Union were aware of this fact. We now know that the administration's contention that a mis- sile gap did not necessarily imply a deterrence gap was never tested, since the missile gap itself never developed. Therefore it * I acknowledge with gratitude the assistance of Bruce M. Russett, Morton H. Halperin, and especially H. Bradford Westerfield. Volume LXXXV Number 4 December 1970 600 This content downloaded from 128.59.222.12 on Thu, 05 May 2016 01:29:36 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms THE MISSILE GAP CONTROVERSY | 6oi is almost impossible to evaluate the question of the deterrence gap, and we shall not endeavor to do so here-although, as the administration quite rightly pointed out, this rather than the mis- sile gap was the relevant issue. The missile gap was the result of a deliberate decision by the Eisenhower administration. The United States had many more strategic bombers than did the Soviet Union.' However, the Rus- sians had recognized before the United States did the importance of the ballistic missile as a delivery system for hydrogen wea- pons,2 and they appeared to be ahead in developing this new weapon which might neutralize the American advantage in manned aircraft. It was obvious that the United States, to meet the challenge, would have to develop a ballistic missile; the question was what kind and how many. The choice was between rockets powered by liquid or by solid fuels. The liquid-fuel missile could be operational first, but the solid-fuel missile would be less expensive, have a much faster re- sponse, and be easier to transport and harden. It was decided to develop both types as rapidly as possible but to produce only a minimum number of liquid-fuel rockets, concentrating produc- tion on the more efficient solid-fuel missiles. The problem was that if the Soviet Union concentrated on producing liquid-fuel ICBMs, it appeared that the USSR could achieve temporarily a large numerical advantage before the United States would begin to introduce its solid-fuel Minutemen and Polaris weapons in 1963 and 1964; this period of potential danger became known as the missile gap. The determination of production figures for the United States thus depended on estimates of Soviet production, estimates of varying reliability. The national intelligence estimates were made by the US Intelligence Board composed of representatives from the major intelligence agencies. These estimates were usually con- cerned with capabilities-how many missiles the Soviet Union 1 For a summary of the strategic force strengths during this period of the United States and the Soviet Union, see Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Walter C. Clemens, Jr., and Franklyn Griffiths, Khrushchev and the Arms Race: Soviet In- terests In Arms Control and Disarmament 1954-1964 (Cambridge, Mass., 1966), 93-98. 2 Allen Dulles, The Craft of Intelligence (New York, 1963), 163. This content downloaded from 128.59.222.12 on Thu, 05 May 2016 01:29:36 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 602 I POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY could produce if it mobilized all available resources. Unfortunately Russian capabilities were thus compared with American produc- tion, a comparison obviously exaggerating Russia's apparent strength. On the other hand, nothing else could be used to make projections of Soviet strength far into the future, which had to be done for items with long lead times, such as missiles. Despite a great deal of public interest in the issue (in the late 11950S it was a major political question), not much solid informa- tion is available. What is disquieting about this debate is that the stands taken by op- posing spokesmen cannot be verified by any known facts. The fig- ures on past, present and future missile production, by this country and the U.S.S.R., are in the first place military "secrets" and in the second place, especially as regards future production, only estimates of greater or less reliability.... It all boils down to a matter of confi- dence in the one who makes the interpretation.3 A great deal of testimony was given to various congressional committees, but the published records are something less than helpful, as shown by this fragment of typical testimony on the relative ICBM strength of the United States and the Soviet Union: Senator CANNON. For a total of (deleted) ballistic missiles. At that time, Russia will have had a capability of (deleted) in (de- leted) but you do not know how many in (deleted). General WHITE. That is correct. Senator CANNON. Now, if I summarized your testimony correctly, you say we will have no (deleted) in the time that Russia will have the (deleted) ICBMs. How many Atlas missiles will we have in (de- leted) ? General WHITE. (Deleted) and (deleted) by end of fiscal year 1962.4 Thus the observer confined to open sources must utilize, not the national intelligence estimates themselves nor the congressional testimony of experts about these estimates nor even usually the direct reports by congressmen, but journalistic reports based on "Debate Over Missiles," Commonweal, LXIX, Feb. 20, 1959, p. 532. 4US, Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Preparedness Inves- tigating Subcommittee, Hearings, 86th Cong., ist Sess., 1959, p. 105. This content downloaded from 128.59.222.12 on Thu, 05 May 2016 01:29:36 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms THE MISSILE GAP CONTROVERSY | 603 leaks and rumors about this testimony. The unreliability of such material is obvious. In the early 1950S, the United States became concerned about the Russian development of ballistic missiles. According to Allen Dulles, then director of the Central Intelligence Agency, this con- cern was primarily responsible for the initiation of the U-2 over- flights in 1955, and after 1956, photographs from the U-2 became available, furnishing much needed "hard" intelligence upon which later estimates were based.5 In 1956 Trevor Gardner, former Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Research and Development, testified that reliable data indicated that the Soviet Union had been forging ahead of the United States in missile development since 1953.6 The CIA had established in Turkey powerful radar sets able to monitor Soviet missile test firings at least by 1957, when the Soviets first claimed to have tested an ICBM.7 However, despite this early activity, it is fair to say that real public con- cern dates from the fall of 1957, when the Soviet Union an- nounced in quick succession the firing of an ICBM and the launch- ing of Sputnik, the first artificial satellite. For the first time the American public suddenly realized that the Soviet Union had developed a technology comparable to their own. Immediately serious questions were raised: whether a possible technological missile lag existed, whether the United States was two or three years behind the Soviet Union in missile and space technology development. Administration spokesmen and supporters denied the lag.8 Allen Dulles was called to testify on the subject before the Pre- paredness Investigating Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Ser- vices Committee, chaired by Senator Lyndon Johnson and includ- ing among its members Senators Stuart Symington of Missouri and Henry Jackson of Washington. Immediately the problem of secrecy arose, for Dulles apparently followed his usual policy of 'Dulles, 195-96, 164. 'US, Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on the Air Force, Hearings, Airpower, 84th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 1137. "Goldwater on the Gap," New Republic, CXLVIX, Dec. 21, 1963, p. 5. 'New York Times, Oct. 5, 1957, p. i;
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