Understanding China's Politics, Economic Policy Makers and Policy
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LE 19Ème CONGRÈS DU PARTI COMMUNISTE CHINOIS
PROGRAMME ASIE LE 19ème CONGRÈS DU PARTI COMMUNISTE CHINOIS : CLÔTURE SUR L’ANCIEN RÉGIME ET OUVERTURE DE LA CHINE DE XI JINPING Par Alex PAYETTE STAGIAIRE POSTDOCTORAL POUR LE CONSEIL CANADIEN DE RECHERCHES EN SCIENCES HUMAINES CHERCHEUR À L’IRIS JUIN 2017 ASIA FOCUS #46 l’IRIS ASIA FOCUS #46 - PROGRAMME ASIE / Octobre 2017 e 19e Congrès qui s’ouvrira en octobre prochain, soit quelques semaines avant la visite de Donald Trump en Chine, promet de consolider la position de Xi Jinping dans l’arène politique. Travaillant d’arrache-pied depuis 2013 à se débarrasser L principalement des alliés de Jiang Zemin, l’alliance Xi-Wang a enfin réussi à purger le Parti-État afin de positionner ses alliés. Ce faisant, la transition qui aura vraiment lieu cet automne n’est pas la transition Hu Jintao- Xi Jinping, celle-ci date déjà de 2012. La transition de 2017 est celle de la Chine des années 1990 à la Chine des années 2010, soitde la Chine de Jiang Zemin à celle de Xi Jinping. Ce sera également le début de l’ère des enfants de la révolution culturelle, des « zhiqing » [知青] (jeunesses envoyées en campagne), qui formeront une majorité au sein du Politburo et qui remanieront la Chine à leur manière. Avec les départs annoncés, Xi pourra enfin former son « bandi » [班底] – garde rapprochée – au sein du Politburo et effectivement mettre en place un agenda de politiques et non pas simplement des mesures visant à faire le ménage au cœur du Parti-État. Des 24 individus restants, entre 12 et 16 devront partir; 121 sièges (si l’on compte le siège rendu vacant de Sun Zhengcai) et 16 si Xi Jinping décide d’appliquer plus « sévèrement » la limite d’âge maintenant à 68 ans. -
China's Corn Policy Shifting Into Producer Compensation System
China’s corn policy shifting into producer compensation system: from price support to direct payment April 1st, 2017 Norinchukin Research Institute Co., Ltd. RUAN Wei, Research Counselor ■Abstract China embarked upon a full-fledged marketization of the economic system at the beginning of the 21st Century, in which Chinese authorities introduced a price support policy for farmers with income transfer being accompanied in order to realize a balanced growth of agriculture with non-agricultural sectors as well as to boost food production in the country. Increases in farmers’ income and food production were concurrently achieved by raising the support prices. At the same time, however, this has brought about a reversal of price difference between imported grains and domestically produced ones. In addition, lower tariff rates on imported grains, which China committed itself at its accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), also caused a rapid inflow of imported cheap grains to the Chinese market. Domestically produced grains lost competiveness in the market, which has resulted in piling unsold grains as government’s reserves up to an unprecedented level. Since the year of 2014, China began to change its policy for soybean and corn producers from price support programs to direct payment programs such as a target price system (or deficiency payment) and a producer compensation system. Some effects, including price declines of domestically produced grains and curbed imports, have been already confirmed. Concurrently, however, these policy changes have caused decreases in producers’ profits and an amount of domestic production as well. This paper will focus on China’s producer compensation system applied for corn producers. -
Xi Jinping's 'New Era' – Continuities and Change
No. 88 February 2020 Xi Jinping’s ‘New Era’ – Continuities and Change Anurag Viswanath Singapore based China Analyst and Adjunct Fellow, Institute of Chinese [email protected] supplemented with the addition of ‗Xi Jinping Thought‘ and ‗New Era‘ at the beginning and In post-1978 China, moderniser par excellence at the end. China‘s transformation is evident in Deng Xiaoping‘s ‗reform and open door‘ Xi‘s 2020 New Year Speech, with China‘s per (gaige and kaifang) defined China‘s political capita GDP reaching $10,000 in 2019. In 1978, and economic terrain. In 2020, forty odd years when China was on the cusp of reforms, it was after Deng‘s reforms, observers wonder if ‗the $156. Indeed, the Chinese themselves say reform era, launched by Deng Xiaoping in ‗Under Mao, the Chinese people stood up 1978, is over‘ (Minxin Pei: 2018). China has (zhan qilai); under Deng, the Chinese people changed, with far-reaching changes under got rich (fu qilai); and under Xi, the Chinese President Xi Jinping. Xi has gifted China with people are getting stronger (qiang qilai)‘ a new guiding ideology ‗Xi Jinping: Thought (Susan Shirk, 2018:27)2. on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era‘ codified in the constitution by the Xi‘s rise in 2012 coincided with China sealing th Second Plenum of the 19 Party Congress in its place as the world‘s second largest economy January 2018. Xi has introduced no less than (in 2010). The decade had seen much 300 reforms that have signalled changes and optimism about China‘s aggregate economy departures in ‗every aspect of the party, surpassing that of America in 2025 (Muhlhahn, 1 government, economy, military and society‘ 2019:167)3. -
Translated List of 19Th CC Full Members (204) 乙晓光ding
Translated list of 19th CC Full Members (204) 乙晓光 Ding Xiaoguang 丁来杭 Ding Laihang 丁学东 Ding Xuedong 丁薛祥 Ding Xuexiang 于伟国 Yu Weiguo 于忠福 Yu Zhongfu 万立骏 Wan Lijun 习近平 Xi Jinping 马飚 Ma Biao (Zhuang ethnic group) 马兴瑞 Ma Xingrui 王宁 Wang Ning (Armed Police) 王军 Wang Jun 王勇 Wang Yong 王展 Wang Zhan 王毅 Wang Yi 王小洪 Wang Xiaohong 王玉普 Wang Yupu 王正伟 Wang Zhengwei (Hui ethnic group) 王东明 Wang Dongming 王东峰 Wang Dongfeng 王尔乘 Wang Ercheng 王志民 Wang Zhimin 王志刚 Wang Zhigang 王沪宁 Wang Huning 王国生 Wang Guosheng 王建武 Wang Jianwu 王晓东 Wang Xiaodong 王晓晖 Wang Xiaohui 王家胜 Wang Jiasheng 王蒙微 Wang Mengwei 尤权 You Quan 车俊 Che Jun 君力 Jun Li 巴音朝鲁 Ba Yinchaolu (Mongolian ethnic group) 巴特尔 Ba Teer (Mongolian ethnic group) 艾力更•依明巴海 Ailigeng Yimingbahai (Uighur ethnic group) 石泰峰 Shi Taifeng 布小林 Bu Xiaolin ( Mongolian ethnic group) 卢展工 Lu Zhangong 白春礼 Bai Chunli ( Man ethnic group) 吉炳轩 Ji Bingxuan 毕井泉 Bi jingquan 曲青山 Qu Qingshan 朱生岭 Zhu Shengling 刘奇 Liu Qi 刘雷 Liu Lei 刘鹤 Liu He 刘士余 Liu Shibu 刘万龙 Liu Wanlong 刘奇葆 Liu Qibao 刘国中 Liu Guozhong 刘国治 Liu Guozhi 刘金国 Liu Jinguo 刘结一 Liu Jieyi 刘振立 Liu Zhenli 刘家义 Liu Jiayi 刘赐贵 Liu Cigui 刘粤军 Liu Yuejun 齐扎拉 Qi Zhala (Tibetan ethnic group) 安兆庆 An Zhaoqing (Xibo ethnic group) 许勤 Xu Qin 许又声 Xu Yousheng 许达哲 Xu Dazhe 许其亮 Xu Qiliang 阮成发 Ruan Chengfa 孙志刚 Sun Zhigang 孙金龙 Sun Jinlong 孙绍骋 Sun Shaocheng 孙春兰 Sun Chunlan (Female) 杜家毫 Du Jiahao 李屹 Li Yi 李希 Li Xi 李斌 Li Bin (Female, Government office) 李强 Li Qiang 李干杰 Lin Ganjie 李小鹏 Li Xiaopeng 李凤彪 Li Fengbiao 李玉赋 Li Yufu 李传广 Li Chuanguang 李纪恒 Li Jiheng 李克强 Li Keqiang 李作成 Li Zuocheng 李尚福 Li Shangfu 李国英 Li Guoying 李桥铭 -
U.S. Strategic Objectives in Asia
Openness in Asia is attainable without American primacy, but it is far from guaranteed. —MIRA RAPP-HOOPER Chapter 9 | From Primacy to Openness 105 From Primacy to Openness: U.S. Strategic Objectives in Asia Mira Rapp-Hooper he United States no longer possesses military-strategic primacy in Asia, and a combination of structural Tfactors and Communist Party of China (CCP) regime intentions mean it is unlikely to recoup it soon. Despite this condition, much remains to be determined about the strategic landscape in Asia, and Washington retains significant ability to shape it. The United States reserves an abiding interest in ensuring that Asia is not dominated by a hostile hegemon in whole or in part and must hedge against this possibility by ensuring that China does not establish a closed regional sphere of influence. In the service of this strategic objective, the United States should seek to keep Asia open, preserving freedom of action for regional states, an open global commons, the free flow of information, and positive interstate cooperation. An open Asia will require a significant U.S. military presence and demands a credible defense strategy. It also calls for significantly improved coordination on sub-conventional threats among U.S. agencies and with foreign partners. Finally,it depends on economic, technological, and domestic investments, without which the United States cannot credibly preserve a viable balance of power. Openness in Asia is attainable without American primacy, but it is far from guaranteed. Before proceeding, a definition of the term “primacy” is appropriate. Primacy is the condition of being the most powerful state in a global or regional system, including on military dimensions, albeit one against whom discrete military challenges may still be possible. -
Newsletter 2020 No.4 Update:2020/02/26
Newsletter No.4 February 21, 2020 Prospects & Perspectives The limitations and adverse effects of the Chinese model of governance are clear for all to see. If the CCP cannot find a way to implement institutional reform, COVID-19 could well sound the death-knell for the CCP’s authoritarian system. Picture source: 龐興雷, 《中國政府網》, <http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2020-02/15/content_5479271.htm>. Reflections on the Chinese Model of Governance in Relation to the Spread of COVID-19 By Wen-hsuan Tsai N ovel Coronavirus (hereafter referred to as COVID-19, the name Newsletter No.4 February 21, 2020 given to it by the World Health Organization) continues to spread rapidly across China and the entire world. On 1 January 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) convened a second emergency meeting and announced its decision to classify COVID-19 as a “public health emergency of international concern.” According to data from China’s National Health Commission, by 21 February, there had been 75,465 confirmed cases of COVID-19 in China, 2,236 of which had resulted in death. Worldwide, across twenty-seven countries, including China, 76,712 cases had been confirmed and there had been a total of 2,246 deaths. The gravity of the epidemic is evident from the fact that over 80 cities in China have adopted “lock-down” (fengbishi guanli 封閉式管理) measures. Status Discussion A deliberate cover-up by local officials during the early stages of the epidemic is the main reason COVID-19 has spread so rapidly. The first case was reported to have been detected in Wuhan on 2 December 2019 (although it could have been even earlier). -
F REIGN TRADE the Export-Import Bank of China: Want to Be the Best in a Better World
MAR. 2012 No. 520 Sponsored by CCPIT Since 1956 CHINA’S F REIGN TRADE The Export-Import Bank of China: Want to Be the Best in A Better World SPECIAL REPORT China’s Agricultural Technology Underway SURVEY China’s Pharmaceutical Market Eyes Rapid Growth Jaclyn Tsai, Founder of Lee, Tsai & Partners 国内邮发代号:80-799 国际邮发代号:SM1581 国内刊号:CN11-1020/F 国际刊号:ISSN0009-4498 http://www.ccpit.org • POLICIES China pledges deeper economic reforms earlier, the smallest gain since 2009, according to the General Administration of Customs. New measures will be introduced The Ministry of Commerce has predicted to boost consumption, especially for that a slowdown in the country’s export growth vehicles and electrical appliances, as could continue at least into the first quarter of export demand weakens, China Daily 2012 with a “more severe” outlook. reported. “This year in China will be all about try- With tax rebate policies on ve- ing to ensure a soft landing,” said Jim O’Neil, hicles and appliances having expired chairman of Goldman Sachs Asset Manage- or due to expire, “new measures are ment. in the pipeline” to boost consumption, “Growth, under downward pressure from said Huang Hai, former assistant min- weakening exports and a fall in government- ister of commerce and member of the sponsored investment, will have to be led by economic and trade policy consulting committee affiliated to the Ministry of Com- stronger personal consumption if the economy merce. is to grow by more than 8 percent.” “The Ministry of Commerce has drafted a proposal to continue the stimulus It was agreed at the annual Central Eco- programs in the coming few years, but in different ways, and they are expected to nomic Work Conference in December that Chi- cover vehicles and those related to real estate, say household appliances,” Huang told na will be committed to expanding domestic China Daily in an interview. -
Chinese Theological Review: 29 Chinese Theological Review: 29 I
Chinese Theological Review [Vol. 29, 2018] This page was generated automatically upon download from the Globethics.net Library. More information on Globethics.net see https://www.globethics.net. Data and content policy of Globethics.net Library repository see https:// repository.globethics.net/pages/policy Item Type Journal volume Publisher Foundation for Theological Education in South East Asia (FTESEA) Rights All rights reserved Download date 27/09/2021 18:15:12 Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12424/170580 Chinese Theological Review: 29 Chinese Theological Review: 29 i Volume 29 Chinese Theological Review: 29 ii ©Foundation for Theological Education in South East Asia All rights reserved. Published 2018 Printed in Hong Kong ISSN 0896 – 7660 Cover Calligraphy : Xu Rulei Cover Design : Lois Cole The Chinese Theological Review is a publication of the Foundation for Theological Education in South East Asia Editorial and subscription: Publisher: Janice Wickeri, Editor Dr. H.S. Wilson Executive Director FTESEA Chinese Theological Review 140 West Highland Avenue c/o SKH Ming Hua Philadelphia, PA 19118 Theological College USA Glenealy, Central Hong Kong www.ftesea.org e-mail: [email protected] [email protected] Back issues available iii CHINESE THEOLOGICAL REVIEW 29 CONTENTS From the Editor v The Tenth National Chinese Christian Conference 2018: China Christian Council National Committee of the Three-Self Patriotic Movement of Protestant Churches in China Board of Supervisors Tenth National Chinese Christian Conference Initiative -
New Zealand's Strategic Challenge
FEATURE New Zealand’s Strategic Challenge Responding to China’s New Interventionist Foreign Policies* MAIA BAKER ew Zealand and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have maintained a mutually beneficial rapport since the countries first established diplo- matic relations in 1972. Access to Chinese markets has been essential to NNew Zealand’s prosperity over the last half-century, while New Zealand played a key role in supporting China’s economic opening to the rest of the world. Since Pres. Xi Jinping’s accession to power in 2012, however, China’s actions in New Zealand and around the world have drawn scrutiny from intelligence agencies, media, academicians, and politicians. Increasingly powerful, ambitious, and per- haps insecure, China now wields an array of coercive and subversive techniques to support its domestic and foreign policy objectives abroad. Although New Zea- land’s relationship with China will only grow in importance over the coming de- cades, Beijing’s strategic aims and methods pose a multifaceted threat that must be addressed. Wellington should respond to this challenge by adopting a more mature and comprehensive approach to national security and the growing threat from China. This new approach should include three strategic lines of effort: safe- guarding New Zealand’s democratic institutions, preserving its economic base, and supporting regional stability within the South Pacific. This challenge can best be understood when placed within the context of China’s strategic objectives and the strategic approach with which Beijing pursues them. In addressing the par- ticular challenges that China poses to New Zealand, best practices can be drawn from other Western democratic states such as Australia, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada. -
Post 19Th Party Congress: Xi the King of China
APS INSIGHTS Tan Kong Yam 14 November 2017 th Post 19 Party Congress: Xi the King of China “He has iron in his soul.” —Lee Kuan Yew, the late Prime Minister of Singapore, on Chinese President Xi Jinping before he assumed the Presidency (2012) US President Donald Trump has hailed Chinese President Xi Jinping following the 19th Party Congress as the king of China. He is not far wrong. In order for investors to have a good grasp of China, it is important to understand one man well― Xi Jinping. His life, his rise to power and his China dream. The Precarious Rise to Power When Xi Jinping first rose to power in November 2012, he was a compromise candidate. The Communist Youth League (CYL) faction under former President Hu Jintao was pushing for Li Keqiang. Backing Bo Xilai was the extremely powerful Jiang Zemin faction, which had built a huge patronage network by tolerating corruption and protecting certain interests. The network was particularly powerful in the military, the party and the internal security system. Xi emerged as a compromise candidate acceptable to both factions. The chief strategist of the Jiang faction, Zeng Qinghong, admitted that Xi was selected because he was acceptable to all. Xi’s father Xi Zhongxun was the Vice Premier (1954-65), one of Mao Zedong’s Long March veterans and also one of the first generation of leaders of the People’s Republic of China. His honesty and integrity were well known in the party. In contrast, Bo Xilai’s father Bo Yibo was well known to have been the sort to throw stones on those who had fallen into the well. -
SPF China Observer China Observer Project Web Collection (March to August 2018)
Research Report SPF China Observer China Observer Project Web Collection (March to August 2018) https://www.spf.org/spf-china-observer/en/ Research Report SPF China Observer “China Observer” Project Web Collection (March to August 2018) About this Publication There have been visible signs of improvements in Japan-China relations since the second half of 2017. Looking at the press coverage of the visit to China of Mr. Toshihiro Nikai of the Liberal Democratic Party in December 2017, it could be seen that China was seeking to improve relations with Japan. Since the start of 2018, this movement to improve Japan-China relations has become even more substantial. That same year, a Japan, China and Korea Summit was held in Tokyo on May 9, for the first time in two and a half years, and Prime Minister Abe signaled his intention to have a summit meeting with President Xi Jinping on the occasion of the “Eastern Economic Forum” held in Vladivostok, Russia in September. He further noted that he was planning a visit in October. There is no question about the momentum towards the improvement of relations between Japan and China as we marked the 40th anniversary of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and China in 2018. Probably behind this move to seek improved relations with Japan is China’s desire to balance strong pressure from the United States over the trade imbalance and other economic issues. Furthermore, the concentration of power within China to President Xi Jinping and the increased caution surrounding this has impacted its policy towards the United States and has also influenced the effectiveness of the pressure that is being applied by the United States. -
The Development of Chinese International Relations Theory and Implications for China’S Foreign Policy
World Order with Chinese Characteristics: The Development of Chinese International Relations Theory and Implications for China’s Foreign Policy By Stephen N. Smith A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Affairs in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy In Political Science Carleton University Ottawa, Ontario ©2020, Stephen N. Smith vi Abstract This dissertation critically examines the development of Chinese International Relations theories in the wake of China’s rise, the perception of international order held by China’s Communist Party and government elites and scholars, and the mutual implication and constitution of domestic ideas and foreign policy. The question at the heart of this project is: How do Chinese international relations scholars understand international order and how is this related to China’s approach to international order? In answering this question, this dissertation will argue that social conditions shape the development of international relations scholarship according to locally meaningful ideologies. In making this claim, I argue against the field of international relations as a universal discipline engaged in the objective analysis of an autonomous realm of global politics. Instead, I argue that as a socially conditioned body of knowledge, international relations theory is fundamentally a discourse about who and what the nation is and what its role in global politics should be. For the case used in this dissertation - China and the development of Chinese theories of IR - this has involved a reconstitution of China’s role in international and regional order in an attempt to breakaway from Western discourses and ascribe a new locally meaningful identity to the nation and its relation to others.