HATE SPEECH AND BEYOND: TARGETING THE GULEN MOVEMENT IN TURKEY
TURKEY TASK FORCE
RETHINK PAPER 16 June 2014
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CONTENTS
1 Summary
3 Özet
5 Introduction
7 Part I Hate Speech in the Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights
8 Limitations on freedom of expression and hate speech
9 Three categories of abuse of freedom of expression
11 How is hate speech defined?
17 Part II The Gülen Movement as the Target of Hate Speech
17 Expressions by Prime Minister Erdogan targeting the Gülen movement
20 Applying the standards of the ECtHR: Do Prime Minister Erdogan’s expressions constitute hate speech?
28 Assessment
30 Part III Beyond Hate Speech
32 Mass hatred
33 Expressions of other leading figures of the ruling party
34 Expressions of media and journalists 38 Expressions of the general public
39 Boycotting the Gülen movement
39 Two elements worsening mass hatred
41 Dangers of mass hatred: Example of Gezi protestors
43 Legitimacy of boycott calls: German example and ECtHR case law
45 Realizing contents of hate speech through governmental powers
50 Conclusion Hate Speech and Beyond: Targeting the Gülen Movement in Turkey
Summary
On December 17, 2013, a graft probe alleging corruption among some members of the cabinet became public. Immediately thereafter, the Gülen movement (a.k.a. Hizmet), one of the largest faith-based communities in Turkey, became the target of offensive statements by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Erdoğan is one of the most influential political figures in the history of Turkey, and he has shaped the last decade of Turkish politics. From the standpoint of human rights law, there is little doubt that some of the prime minister’s statements are fundamentally incompatible with the principles underlying the concept of human rights. Some of these expressions, indeed, amount to prima facie hate speech as understood by the European Court of Human Rights, the jurisdiction of which is already accepted by Turkey.
According to the European Court of Human Rights, any language which spreads, incites, promotes or justifies hatred based on intolerance, including racial and religious intolerance, is considered to constitute hate speech and is unworthy of protection under the guarantees of freedom of speech. As a matter fact, if the element of hatred is detectable at first sight, the European Court of Human Rights defines such language as abuse of freedom of expression. In this regard, some of the language used by Prime Minister Erdoğan to describe the Gülen movement - i.e. “perverts”, “hashashins”, “traitors”, “spies”, “worse than Shiites”, “leeches” and “a terrorist organisation” - do indeed constitute prima facie hate speech.
A government leader’s perpetration of hate speech is unprecedented for Strasbourg jurisprudence. In case law in the European Court of Human Rights, there is not a single case in which a High Contracting Party to the European Convention on Human Rights has been convicted for failing to sanction individuals using hate speech, let alone for perpetrating hate speech itself. However, the expressions of the Turkish prime minister exhibit so much seriousness and vehemence that they tend to extend beyond the already existing contours of hate speech as drawn by the European Court of Human Rights. Not only did Mr. Erdoğan blatantly insult the movement, but he also encouraged the masses to do the same, and actually succeeded in creating mass hatred towards the Gülen movement. In the process, he put out a boycott call to exclude the Gülen movement from the layers of social life that led to repercussions among his supporters. In tandem with the boycott call, he declared that he would use the powers of the government to discriminate against the Gülen movement and started a “witch hunt.” For these reasons, in light of ECtHR case law, it is hard, if not impossible, not to consider Prime Minister Erdoğan’s expressions targeting the Gülen movement as unprecedented prima facie hate speech.
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Özet
17 Aralık 2013 gününde, bazı kabine üyelerine karşı yürütülen yolsuzluk soruşturması günyüzüne çıktı. Bunun hemen akabinde, Gülen ya da Hizmet hareketi, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Başbakanı Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’ın hakaret içeren söylemlerinin hedefi haline geldi. Erdoğan, Türkiye tarihinin en önemli siyasal figürlerinden birisidir ve son on yıla mührünü vurmuştur. İnsan hakları hukuku açısından, Başbakan’ın bazı söylemlerinin, insan hakları kavramının altını çizen ilkelerle temelden uyuşmazlık gösterdiği konusunda şüphe yoktur. Hatta, bazı ifadeler, ilk değerlendirmede, yetkisi Türkiye tarafından da tanınan Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi açısından nefret söylemine karşılık gelmektedir.
Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesine göre, ırka ve dine dayalı hoşgörüsüzlük de dahil olmak üzere, genel olarak hoşgörüsüzlüğe dayalı nefreti yayan, tahrik ve teşvik eden ya da meşrulaştıran her türlü dil, nefret söylemine karşılık gelmektedir. Bu türlü ifadeler, ifade özgürlüğünün koruması altında değildir. Hatta, nefret unsuru daha ilk bakışta farkedilebiliyorsa, Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi, bu tür söylemleri, ifade özgürlüğünün kötüye kullanımı olarak değerlendirmektedir. Bu açıdan bakıldığında, Başbakan Erdoğan’ın Gülen hareketini kastederek kullandığı dil – mesela “sapıklar”, “haşaşiler”, “hainler”, “ajanlar”, “Şiilerden daha kötüler”, “sülükler”, “terörist organizasyon” – ilk değerlendirmede nefret söylemini teşkil etmektedir.
Strasburg yargısı açısından, bir hükümet liderinin nefret söylemini kullanması daha önce görülmemiş bir şeydir. Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesinin içtihadında, Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesine taraf olan bir ülkenin, nefret suçu işlemek bir yana, nefret söylemini kullanan bireyleri cezalandırmadığı tek bir dava yoktur. Bununla birlikte, Türkiye başbakanının ifadeleri o kadar ciddi ve ağırdır ki, Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesinin nefret söylemine ilişkin belirlediği çerçevenin dışına taşmaktadır. Erdoğan sadece harekete hakaret etmekle kalmamış, kitleleri de buna teşvik etmiş ve sonuçta Gülen hareketine karşı kitlesel bir nefretin oluşmasını sağlamıştır. Bu süreç içerisinde, Gülen hareketini toplumsal tabakalardan tecrit etme amacıyla bir boykot çağrısı yapmış, bu çağrı, kendisini destekleyen kitlelerde yankı bulmuştur. Boykot çağrısıyla eş zamanlı olarak, devletin bütün gücünü Gülen hareketine karşı kullanacağını belirtmiş ve kendi ifadesiyle bir “cadı avı” başlatmıştır. Bütün bu nedenlere bakarak, Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi içtihadı ışığında, Başbakan Erdoğan’ın Gülen hareketini hedef alarak kullandığı ifadelerin ilk izlenimde nefret söylemi olarak değerlendirilmemesi, imkansız olmasa da, son derece zordur.
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4 Hate Speech and Beyond: Targeting the Gülen Movement in Turkey
Introduction
Since the unfolding of the corruption investigation that began on December 17, 2013, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has been overtly targeting the Gülen movement (a.k.a. Hizmet), one of the largest faith based movements in Turkey,1 by persistent use of expressions which seem to constitute hate speech judging by the standards developed in case law in the European Court of Human Rights. As a matter of fact, targeting of the Gülen movement began in the last quarter of 2013 over an educational dispute and accelerated immediately after the beginning of the corruption investigation, in which three cabinet members were accused of taking bribes, facilitating money laundering and distribution of benefits to foreign nationals. Since then, thanks to relentless accusations by Prime Minister Erdoğan, the Gülen movement has been relegated in the minds of many to the status of being the usual suspects, of many, if not all, malevolent activities in Turkey. Even when the actual perpetrators of a crime are just nothing What really matters, in more than a mystery to state authorities, the context of this Prime Minister Erdoğan has not hesitated to study, is that a group declare the Gülen movement guilty.2 of people inspired and motivated by their While Erdoğan’s targeting of the Gülen movement resembles to hate speech, his faith seems to have expressions also carry other consequences. become a victim of First, due to the extraordinary popular support expressions of what for him, Erdoğan’s offensive language about appears to be prima the Gülen movement paved the way for instigation of mass hatred against the Gülen facie hate speech. movement. Moreover, while Prime Minister Erdoğan is aggressively targeting the movement, he is also calling on the nation to take action against the Gülen movement. He is actively encouraging a boycott against all establishments affiliated with the movement, and he has publicly declared that the powers of the Turkish government will also be utilized arbitrarily in this boycott.
What really matters, in the context of this study, is that a group of people inspired and motivated by their faith seems to have become a victim of expressions of what appears to be prima facie hate speech. Hence, the purpose of this study is to find out whether the expressions of Prime Minister Erdoğan
1 Helen Rose Fuchs Ebaugh, The Gülen Movement(Springer, 2010). Page 44 2"No Perpetrators Found but ‘Parallel Structure' Behind Wiretappings, PM Argues," Cihan News Agency, 2 May 2014. [http://en.cihan.com.tr/news/No-perpetrators-found-but-parallel-structure- behind-wiretappings-PM-argues_2081-CHMTQyMjA4MS8xMDA1]
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actually amount to hate speech as defined by the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR” hereafter), the first and most authoritative international judicial organ tasked with the protection of human rights.
Part I of this study will explore the contours of hate speech in detail as defined by the ECtHR. At this stage, it is necessary to explain why Strasbourg jurisprudence is selected as a measure of value, when Turkey: (a) Has already incorporated mechanisms into its domestic law with the purpose of fighting hate speech; and (b) Has already ratified other international human rights conventions that combat hate speech, such as International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.
First, some hate speech mechanisms, such as Article 122 of Turkish Criminal Code, were recently incorporated into domestic law, but the Turkish judiciary has not yet developed consistent case law for their implementation. Additionally, any Turkish domestic law proscription has to be in accordance with the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR” hereafter) at all times, as the ECHR has precedence over Turkish law. With regard to the second point, unlike many other international human rights monitoring organs, the ECtHR is a fully developed international judicial organ, judgments of which are indisputably binding for 47 European states, including Turkey. No other international convention is as effective as the ECHR at this stage. Additionally, the guarantees provided by the ECHR inspire heightened awareness in Turkey. As a matter of fact, these expressions will certainly be brought before the ECtHR in several years, rather than any other international human rights monitoring organ. Also, the responsive character and birth of the ECtHR at the end of a brutal era of hate crimes render ECtHR case law all the more relevant.
Part II of the study will first provide detailed narration of the expressions used by Prime Minister Erdoğan. Thereafter, the criteria developed by the ECtHR in defining the constituents of hate speech will be applied to these expressions so as to analyze whether they really amount to hate speech. Part III will explain how a possible judgment of the ECtHR regarding the expressions of Prime Minister Erdoğan might extend beyond existing case law and definitions of the hate speech on two grounds: The true potential of the expressions of Prime Minister Erdoğan in the creation of mass hatred, and the blatant and arbitrary utilization of governmental powers accompanying the expressions of hate speech.
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Part I Hate Speech in the Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights
Article 10 of the ECHR Convention Freedom of expression
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.
Freedom of expression enjoys a remarkable status in ECHR jurisprudence, as the ECtHR places freedom of expression at the very center of democratic values by defining it as “one of the preconditions of a functioning democracy”3 and “one of the essential foundations of” a democratic society.4 In this regard, the Court has taken advantage of every opportunity to expand the protections provided by Article 10 of the ECHR, which guarantees the right to freedom of expression. According to the Court, any form of expression ought to be protected under the umbrella of freedom of expression.5 This is why all kinds of expression, regardless of medium is used in their dissemination (including paintings6, books,7 films8, radio interviews9, etc.), are to benefit from the protection of this right. With regard to the contents of speech, the ECtHR is principally of the opinion that
3 Özgür Gündem v. Turkey, ECtHR, 16 March 2000, Application no. 23144/93 para. 43 4 Handyside v. The United Kingdom, ECtHR, 7 December 1976 Application no. 5493/72 para. 49 5 Müller and Others v. Switzerland, ECtHR, 24 May 1988, Application No. 10737/84 para. 27 6 Idem 7 "Handyside v. The United Kingdom." 8 Otto-Preminger Institute v. Austria, ECtHR, 20 September 1994, Application No. 13470/87 9 Barthold V Germany, ECtHR, 25 March 1985, Application No. 8734/79
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there is no inherent limitation to determine contents of speech. Accordingly, expressions about politics10, separatism11, pornography12, or even hatred13 enjoy protection under Article 10. In this regard, any idea or information of any kind, even if offensive, shocking or disturbing, is worthy of protection in accordance with the guarantees of Article 10 of the ECHR.14
Limitations on freedom of expression and hate speech
While it should be acknowledged that very wide protection is afforded to freedom of expression in ECtHR jurisprudence, nevertheless, it is not an absolute and unconditional right. Enjoyment of freedom of expression is subject to certain limits which are defined in the second paragraph of Article 10 of the ECHR.15 In this regard, hate speech falls far outside the scope of protection guaranteed by the right to freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 10 of the ECHR. That is because hate speech is in many cases, in the account of the ECtHR, not considered as a form of enjoyment of freedom of expression but as an abuse of freedom of expression prohibited by Article 17 of the Convention. Accordingly, as Article 17 states:
Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the Convention.
The establishment of the Council of Europe and the creation of the Strasbourg court was a response to atrocities that took place before and during World War II. This is a reflection of militant democracy, a lesson Europeans learned the hard way. Up to now, the European human rights protection system has managed to protect itself and prevent dissemination of hatred in Europe with the help of the reflexes it developed, such as the aforementioned abuse clause. Even a superficial examination of the case law of the ECtHR, at this point, suffices to
10 Castells v. Spain, ECtHR, 23 April 1992, Application no. 11798/85 11 Erdoğdu v. Turkey, ECtHR, 15 June 2000, Application no. 25723/94 12 Wingrove v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, 25 November 1996, Application No. 17419/90 13 Jersild v. Denmark, ECtHR, 23 September 1994, Application No. 15890/8 14 "Otto-Preminger Institute v. Austria." 15For a detailed explanation on the limitation procedures set out in Article 10(2), see: A. R. Mowbray A. R. Mowbray, Cases, Materials, and Commentary on the European Convention on Human Rights(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). Chapter 10; D. J. O'Boyle Michael Warbrick Colin Harris, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights(Oxford: Oxford university Press, 2009). Chapter 11; Robin C. A. Ovey Clare Jacobs Francis Geoffrey White, Jacobs, White and Ovey : The European Convention on Human Rights(Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). Chapters 14 and 18
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reveal the fact that the responsive character of the Strasbourg court has not lost its vitality.
Three categories of abuse of freedom of expression
According to case law, it would be accurate to name three categories of expression that constitute abuse of freedom of speech:16 Negationism, hate speech,17 and totalitarian views. In the first category, any remarks that question the existence of the Holocaust or the evil of the Nazi regime are deemed unworthy of protection18 because they clearly contradict “clearly established historical facts.”19 However, it is necessary to mention that such a strict approach is only valid for Holocaust denials.20
Similarly, the Court has also adopted a very strict approach towards hate speech, which forms the second category of abuse of freedom of speech. Any remarks that spread, incite, promote or justify hatred against any particular group are deemed unworthy of protection. Linking all Muslims with terrorism,21 spreading hatred against foreigners,22 declaring a particular ethnic group as the source of all evil in a given country,23 spreading serious and prejudicial allegations against a specific group in society,24 and insulting a specific group of people in the
16 Anne Weber lists three categories of abuse of freedom of speech: totalitarian doctrines, negationism and racial hate speech. See Anne Weber, Manual on Hate Speech(Strasbourg: Council of Europe Pub., 2009). pages 24-27; Mario Oetheimer , on the other hand, lists only two: Holocaust denials and racial hate speech. See Mario Oetheimer, "Protecting Freedom of Expression: The Challenge of Hate Speech in the European Court of Human Rights Case Law," Cardozo journal of international & comparative law 17, no. 3 (2009). 17 As a matter of fact, the other two categories of abuse of freedom of expression also fall under the definition of hate speech. In this regard, the term “hate speech” refers to any kind of hate speech that cannot be described as negationism and defense of totalitarian views. About inconsistent use of the term “hate speech” in case law, see T. McGonagle, "A Survey and Critical Analysis of Council of Europe Strategies for Countering "Hate Speech"," The content and context of hate speech : rethinking regulation and responses (2012). page 464 18 Witzsch v. Germany, ECtHR, 13 December 2005, Application no. 7485/03 (dec) 19 Gerd Honsik v. Austria, Eur. Comm. HR, 28 October 1997, Application No. 25062/94 ; Marais v. France, Eur. Comm. HR, 24 June 1996, Application No. 31159/96 (dec); Garaudy v. France, ECtHR, 24 June 2003, Application no. 65831/01 (dec) 20 Perinçek v. Switzerland, ECtHR, 17 December 2013, Application no. 27510/08 21 The ECtHR explained that “… linking the group as a whole with a grave act of terrorism, is incompatible with the values proclaimed and guaranteed by the Convention, notably tolerance, social peace and non-discrimination.” Norwood v. The United Kingdom, ECtHR, 16 July 2003, Application no. 23131/03 (dec) 22 Glimmerveen and Hagenbeek v. The Netherlands, Eur. Comm. HR, 11 October 1979, Application no. 8348/78 (dec) 23 Pavel Ivanov v. Russia, ECtHR, 20 February 2007, Application no. 35222/04 (dec) 24 Le Pen v. France, ECtHR, 20 Aril 2010, Application no. 18788/09 (dec)
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population25 can be shown as examples of abuse of freedom of speech that constitute hate speech.
The Court displays a somewhat different attitude towards expressions in favor of totalitarian doctrines, which is the third category of abuse of freedom of speech. As seen above, even merely vocalizing opinions that fall under the first two categories of abuse of freedom of speech is deemed to contradict the values underpinned by the Convention and hence no protection is ever afforded to such expressions. However, for the Court, only expressions falling under the first two categories above are categorically incompatible with the values adopted by the Council of Europe. When it comes to expressions defending systems that are not considered to be compatible with the Convention's underlying values, in the account of the Court, as long as such expressions can be seen as contributions to public and political debates26 and as long as no evidence exists of an actual or even remote danger that disorder would be triggered,27 such opinions might be tolerable in a democratic society.28 Otherwise, the Court does not hesitate to regard such acts of expressions as abuse of freedom of speech.29
The issue of how Article 17 as approached and implemented by the ECtHR also deserves some attention at this point. According to case law, applications to the ECtHR regarding expressions that prima facie constitute abuse of freedom of expression are declared to be inadmissible, as they are ratione materiae incompatible within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. Such inadmissibility decisions are “strongly content-based, with little to no attention being paid to contextual factors.”30,31 If no abuse of freedom of speech is spotted
25 Seurot v. France, ECtHR, 18 May 2004, Application no. 57383/00 (dec) 26 Gündüz v. Turkey, ECtHR, 14 June 2004, Application no. 35071/97 27 Vajnai v. Hungary, ECtHR, 08 October 2008, Application no. 33629/06 28 Compare " Witzsch v. Germany."; Also compare Gerrman Communist Party v. Germany, Eur. Comm. HR, 20 July 1957, Application no. 250/57 (dec)( “Whereas even if 11 could be proved that the Party's present activity is directed towards the seizure of power solely through the constitutional means afforded to it in the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, this would in no sense imply that the Party had renounced its traditional objectives…”) and The United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey, ECtHR, 30 January 1998, Application no. 19392/92 (“Accordingly, in the absence of any concrete evidence to show that in choosing to call itself “communist”, the TBKP had opted for a policy that represented a real threat to Turkish society or the Turkish State, the Court cannot accept that the submission based on the party’s name may, by itself, entail the party’s dissolution.”) 29 See Refah Partİsİ and Others v. Turkey ECtHR, 13 February 2003, Application no. 41340/98 ; Hizb Ut- Tahrir and Others v. Germany, ECtHR, 12 June 2012 Application no. 31098/08 (dec) ;Vona v. Hungary, ECtHR, 9 July 2013, Application no. 35943/10 ; Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov v. Russia, ECtHR, 14 March 2013, Applications nos. 26261/05 and 26377/06 30 Hannes Voorhoof D. Cannie, "The Abuse Clause and Freedom of Expression in the European Human Rights Convention : An Added Value for Democracy and Human Rights Protection?," Netherlands quarterly of human rights 29, no. 1 (2011). 31 Article 17 is also called “guillotine provision”, as it immediately excludes expressions from the guarantees of Article 10 without assessment of the merits. Françoise Tulkens, "When to Say Is to
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at first glance, only then does the ECtHR move on to examination of the merits and decides whether the expression in question can be subject to restrictions under Article 10(2).32 However, when the Court engages in the procedures set forth in Article 10(2), the function of which is to allow the Court to decide whether interference with freedom of expression is justifiable in a democratic society, the abuse clause is not considered as irrelevant by the ECtHR at all. That is because, at this stage, the Court employs the abuse clause as a supplementary tool in the application of the limitation procedures under Article 10(2).33 Hence, even if an expression is considered to fall within the ambit of Article 10(1), it does not mean the expressions in question do not incite hatred or constitute hate speech, by default.34
How is hate speech defined?
The Court decides whether or not an expression constitutes hate speech on a case-by-case basis. In a given application, the main point that the Court focuses on is whether such speech can be regarded as tolerable and acceptable in a democratic society. In so doing, the main criterion employed by the Court is whether the expression in question incites, spreads, promotes, or justifies any form of hatred based on intolerance, including religious35 and racist36 intolerance. If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, then such expressions shall not be afforded protection in a democratic society. It is necessary to note that, in the Court’s account, not just direct calls to violent acts or other offences are necessarily required to classify an expression as hate speech. “Attacks on persons committed by insulting, holding up to ridicule or slandering specific
Do: Freedom of Expression and Hate Speech in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights," Freedom of expression : essays in honour of Nicolas Bratza (2012). Instead of applying Article 17 as a guillotine provision, some critics are in favor of reviewing hate speech related cases entirely under Article 10. Antoine Buyse, "Dangerous Expressions: The Echr, Violence and Free Speech," International & Comparative Law Quarterly (2014). For more critical analysis of the case law see D. Keane, "Attacking Hate Speech under Article 17 of the European Convention on Human Rights," Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 25, no. 4 (2007).; Stefan Sottiaux, ""Bad Tendencies" in the Ecthr's "Hate Speech" Jurisprudence," European constitutional law review 7, no. 1 (2011).; Roger Kiska, "Hate Speech: A Comparison between the European Court of Human Rights and the United States Supreme Court Jurisprudence," Regent University Law Review 25, no. 107. 32 Under Article 10(2), in determining whether an interference to freedom of expressions is justifiable, the ECtHR applies a three-fold inquiry. In this test the ECtHR questions lawfulness of interference, legitimate aim pursued by interference and necessity of interference in a democratic society. 33 “The Court will rule on the application of Article 17 in the light of all the circumstances of the case. It will accordingly begin by considering the question of compliance with Article 10, whose requirements it will however assess in the light of Article 17” Lehideux and Isorni v. France, ECtHR, 23 September 1998, Application no. 24662/94 para. 38 34 Vejdeland and Others v. Sweden, ECtHR, 9 February 2012, Application no. 1813/07 ; Féret v. Belgium, ECtHR, 16 July 2009, Application no. 15615/07 35 "Norwood v. The United Kingdom." 36 "Pavel Ivanov v. Russia."
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groups of the population”37 are also considered to be tantamount to hate speech.
As already explained, the Court assesses whether an expression constitutes hate speech on a case-by-case basis. In determining the contours of hate speech, the Court takes several factors into consideration:38
. The purpose of the person who made the statement . Content of the expression in question . Context in which the statement is made39
It will be helpful to briefly examine how each of these factors affects the judgments of the ECtHR in case law.
The purpose of the person who made the statement
Any prima facie intention to publicly defend or disseminate hatred towards a particular group of people will render an act or an expression unworthy of protection.40 In the Jersild judgment, for example, a television presenter shot a documentary about a racist group in Denmark, known as the Greenjackets; as a natural consequence, the documentary contained a lot of blatantly racist remarks about foreigners. However, the ECtHR clearly stated that it was indisputable that the purpose behind broadcasting such racist remarks was not racist at all, as the main purpose was to inform the public about racist movements in society. On the other hand, as the remarks of the Greenjackets were purely racist, the Court explained, these remarks undoubtedly could not enjoy protection under the guarantees of freedom of expression. Similarly, in Féret v. Belgium, the employment of slogans such as “Stand up against the Islamification of Belgium” and “Send non-European job-seekers home” by a political party leader was considered to constitute hate speech. The Court explained that the purpose of Mr Féret was to gain popularity among less knowledgeable members of the
37 "Féret v. Belgium." 38 This systemic approach adopted from Anne Weber. See: Weber, Manual on Hate Speech. For example, Françoise Tulkens lists “intention” amongst the contextual factors, see: Tulkens, "When to Say Is to Do: Freedom of Expression and Hate Speech in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights." 39There is another factor taken into consideration by ECtHR and that is “nature and seriousness of interference”. However, there seems to be no reason to examine this factor in the context of this research since there is no interference to anyone’s right to freedom of expression as the next chapter will explain. For an analysis of this factor, see: Weber, Manual on Hate Speech. page. 59 40 “Those activities, whose compatibility with Article 11 of the Convention will be the subject matter of a review on the merits… do not reveal prima facie any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention …or any prima facie intention on the applicant’s part to publicly defend or disseminate propaganda in support of totalitarian views …” "Vona v. Hungary."para. 38
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public by igniting hatred against foreigners. In another case, Lehideux and Isorni,41 the Court contended that the expressions in question could not be considered abuse of freedom of expression, as the complainants did not have any sort of racist agenda. The Perinçek,42 Garaudy,43 Vona44 and Soulas45 cases can also be examined in the same vein to see the role of the intention of the speaker in determining whether expressions in question constitute abuse of freedom of speech.
Content of the expression in question
According to the ECtHR, in principle, any speech with any content can enjoy protection under the guarantees of Article 10. However, expressions with specific contents, such as political speech 46 or expressions relating to public interest,47 enjoy a much more favorable and wider margin of protection. At this point, such wide protection covers not only expressions made by politicians,48 but also speech that criticizes politicians49 or the government.50 Additionally, it is crucial to draw attention to a distinction made by the Court with regards to types of expression. Accordingly, a distinction exists “between statements of fact and value judgments. While the existence of facts can be demonstrated, the truth of value judgments is not susceptible of proof.”51 Therefore, value judgments are provided with a heightened level of protection. However, a heightened level of protection under no circumstances means absolute protection. This being said- be it in the field of politics, relating to public interest, expression of a fact, or expression of a value judgment - expressions which incite, spread, promote, or justify any form of hatred based on intolerance or expressions which insult specific groups of the population cannot be afforded protection by the Strasbourg court.
Context of the expression in question
Context bears a vital role in deciding whether a speech contains remarks that incite hatred or insult specific groups of society. As a matter of fact, the relevant context might have bearing on the intention of the speaker and the content as well. However, in any case, if contents of an expression are blatantly intended to
41"Lehideux and Isorni v. France." 42 "Perinçek v. Switzerland." 43 "Garaudy v. France." 44 "Vona v. Hungary." 45 Soulas and Others v. France, ECtHR, 10 July 2008, Application no. 15948/03 46 Erbakan v. Turkey, ECtHR, 6 July 2006, Application no. 59405/00 47 Giniewski v. France, ECtHR, 31 January 2006 Application no. 64016/00 ; "Perinçek v. Switzerland." 48 Mehdi Zana v. Turkey (No:2), ECtHR, 06 April 2004, Application no. 26982/95 49 Lingens v. Austria, ECtHR, 8 July 1986, Application no. 9815/82 50 İncal v. Turkey, ECtHR, 9 June 1998, Application no. 22678/93 51 Oberschlick v. Austria (No. 2), ECtHR, 1 July 1997, Application no. 20834/92 para. 33
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publicly defend or spread hatred, in practice the ECtHR pays very little, if any, attention to contextual factors. Yet, several factors, such as the identity/role of the person who makes the speech,52 the existence of ongoing debates on the subject of the expression in question in society and/or the contribution made by the expression in question to such a debate, 53 the target audience and dissemination of the expression in question, 54 the impact of the statement,55 the profile of the people who are the targets of the statements in question,56 and the existence of imminent and present danger57 are to be considered, although not exclusively, in the attempt to assess the context in which the expression in question is made. A brief illustration of case law will be beneficial in understanding the holistic approach taken by the Court in the assessment of the context.
In the Erbakan judgment,58 for instance, with regards to the categorization of voters as “believers” and “non-believers” prior to a municipality election, the Court emphasized that the avoidance of dissemination of intolerance is crucially important for a politician. By the same token, in the Zana judgment,59 expressions of sympathy for the Kurdish separatist terrorist organization, the PKK, by the former mayor of Diyarbakır, the biggest city in southeast Turkey ,whose population is dominantly Kurdish, was considered to incite violence as it would “exacerbate an already explosive situation in that region.”60 It should not be disregarded that as a politician the applicant, Mr Zana, enjoys extended protection. However, the possible impact and influence of his remarks as an eminent political actor in the eyes of the society, especially on the Kurdish population, was also of great significance in assessing the statements of Mr Zana as constituting hate speech. The Incal case61 provides an excellent comparison at this point. Mr Incal, who was also a politician, distributed leaflets regarding injustices committed against Kurdish people. Since the content of the leaflet did not incite hatred or violence, in the Court’s account, this case could not be seen as comparable to the Zana case. According to the Court, Mr Incal was not “in any way responsible for the problems of terrorism in Turkey, and more specifically in İzmir”, 62 a city that suffered relatively less from terrorism, while the remarks of
52 See "Erbakan v. Turkey.", "Lingens v. Austria.", " Oberschlick v. Austria (No. 2)." 53 See "Giniewski v. France.", "Lehideux and Isorni v. France." 54 See Purcell and Others v. Ireland, Eur. Comm. HR, 16 April 1991, Application no. 15404/89 (dec); "Seurot v. France." 55 Zana v. Turkey, ECtHR, 25 November 1997, Application no. 18954/91 ; "İncal v. Turkey." 56 "Vejdeland and Others v. Sweden."; "Perinçek v. Switzerland."; "Vajnai v. Hungary." 57"Gündüz v. Turkey.", "Erbakan v. Turkey."; "Refah Partİsİ and Others v. Turkey ". 58 "Erbakan v. Turkey." 59"Zana v. Turkey." 60 Ibid. para 60 61 "İncal v. Turkey." 62 Ibid. para. 58
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Mr Zana “coincided with murderous attacks carried out by the PKK on civilians in southeast Turkey, where there was extreme tension at the material time.”63
In assessing the possible impact of an expression in question, the Court also pays attention to the medium used to disseminate the expression. In this regard, it is acknowledged that the impact of expressions broadcast by radio and television is more powerful, more influential and more immediate64 in comparison to print media. Yet again, the power of print media cannot be compared to that of expressions such as painting,65 poetry66 and satire.67 Similarly, in Strasbourg jurisprudence, it is clear that the assessment of whether an expression constitutes hate speech may vary if the intended target is a well-informed audience68 or pupils in a school.69
Contribution to public or political debates bears vital importance for the proper comprehension of the context in which the statements in question are made. In the Giniewski case,70 for instance, a newspaper article accused Christianity of preparing the grounds for the Holocaust. According to the Court, such a statement cannot be considered to incite hatred because with such remarks, the writer of the article “contributed to a discussion of the various possible reasons behind the extermination of the Jews in Europe, a question of indisputable public interest in a democratic society.”71 Similarly, the Court, in the Perinçek case,72 concluded that the denial of an Armenian genocide cannot amount to hate speech, as Mr Perincek “had engaged in speech of a historical, legal and political nature which was part of a heated debate.”73
In such cases, the profile of the respondents to the expression in question is also of crucial importance. In principle, “[t]he limits of acceptable criticism are accordingly wider as regards a politician as such than as regards a private individual.”74 What follows is that, when it comes to criticism of religious or racial minorities or specific groups in the population, the scope of the protection afforded to freedom of expression may shrink even more after a careful and
63 "Zana v. Turkey." para. 59 64 "Purcell and Others v. Ireland." 65 Vereinigung Bildender Kunstler v. Austria, ECtHR, 25 January 2007, Application no. 68354/01 66 The ECtHR explains that poetry is “a form of artistic expression that appeals to only a minority of readers” ibid.; Karatas v. Turkey, ECtHR, 8 July 1999, Application no. 23168/94 para. 49 67 Eon v. France, ECtHR, 14 March 2013, Application no. 26118/10 68 "Jersild v. Denmark." 69 "Seurot v. France."; "Vejdeland and Others v. Sweden." 70 "Giniewski v. France." 71 Ibid. para 51 72 "Perinçek v. Switzerland." 73 Ibid. para 112 74 "Lingens v. Austria."para 42
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holistic examination of the context.75 Yet, in any case, such groups “cannot reasonably expect to be exempt from all criticism.”76 As the Court explains, specific groups in the population, such as religious groups, “must tolerate and accept . . . even the propagation by others of doctrines hostile to their faith.”77
75 İ.A. v. Turkey, ECtHR, 13 September 2005, Application no. 42571/98 76 "Otto-Preminger Institute v. Austria." para. 47 77 Ibid.
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Part II The Gülen Movement as the Target of Hate Speech
As there is not a universally accepted definition of what hate speech is,78 Part I attempted to demonstrate the definition of and legal practice concerning the concept of hate speech developed by the ECtHR. The approach developed by the ECtHR in hate speech-related cases, as analyzed in Part I, resembles the definition of pornography explained by Justice Stewart: “I know it when I see it.”79 Therefore, in order to see whether expressions of hate speech targeting the Gülen movement actually exist according to the standards developed by the ECtHR, this section will first exhibit numerous expressions of Prime Minister Erdoğan targeting the Gülen movement and then apply the standards developed by the ECtHR to these expressions to see whether they constitute hate speech.
Expressions by Prime Minister Erdogan targeting the Gülen movement
December 17, 2013, will be long remembered in Turkish politics, as it launched an unprecedented chain of events. Details of an ongoing graft probe became public.80 Among other public figures, the sons of three ministers were arrested that day, and four of the cabinet members were associated with corruption. Prime Minister Erdoğan remained silent for a day after the graft probe shook the country. Then, on December 18, 2013, in a press conference, Erdoğan declared that the graft probe was a "very very dirty operation" aimed at toppling his government.81 In his account, this probe was carried out by a gang with connections abroad.82 He also explained that this gang was acting as a sovereign being within the structure of the state, with no respect for or compliance with the hierarchical rules and procedures of that state. In other words, this gang had already established a state within the state. 83 Soon, the prime minister adopted the term “parallel state” to define this entity. As he explained:
78 European Court of Human Rights, "Hate Speech" Fact Sheet, July 2013 http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Hate_speech_ENG.pdf. 79 Concurring opinion of Justice Potter Stewart in Jacobellis v. Ohio 378 U.S. 184 (1964), 80 "New Details Revealed About Turkey’s Ongoing Graft Probe," Hurriyet Daily News, 18 December 2013. [http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/new-details-revealed-about-turkeys-ongoing-graft-probe- .aspx?pageID=238&nID=59792&NewsCatID=341] 81 "Başbakan Erdoğan'dan Yeni Açıklama," Hürriyet Gazetesi, 18 December 2013. [http://www.cnnturk.com/turkiye/basbakan-erdogandan-yeni-aciklama] 82 "Power Struggle Racks Erdogan Government in Turkey", http://edition.cnn.com/2013/12/19/world/europe/turkey-graft-probe/. 83 Ece Toksabay Ayla Jean Yackley, "Turkish Prime Minister Faces Biggest Threat of His Rule" http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/20/us-turkey-corruption-idUSBRE9BJ1AI20131220.
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“Those who want to establish a parallel structure alongside the state, those who have infiltrated the state institutions . . . we will come into your lairs and we will [destroy] these organizations within the state.”84
Only days later, one of the advisors of the Prime Minister Erdoğan, also a Member of Parliament, clarified who actually was referred to by the term “parallel state”: the Gülen movement.85 Accordingly, as repeated many times by Prime Minister Erdoğan on many other occasions, members of the Gülen movement had infiltrated the state and established their own hierarchy as if they were a sovereign state.
After the graft probe became public, the Gülen movement became the primary topic in Prime Minister Erdoğan’s speeches. In his view, members of the Gülen movement are “perverts”,86 “tape editors”,87 and “twitterers.”88 Additionally, he also stated that those people are “hashashins”89 (a medieval cult of assassins), “worse than Shiites”, 90 “viruses”, 91 “traitors”, 92 “spies”, 93 “spy rings”, 94 and members of a terrorist organization.95 In a rally, he also accused the Gülen movement of blackmailing the president of Turkey:
84 "Investigation Secrecy Lifted as Turkish Government Slams Police for Hiding Corruption Operation," Hürriyet Daily News, 22 December 2013. [http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/investigation-secrecy-lifted-as-turkish-government-slams- police-for-hiding-corruption-operation-.aspx?pageID=238&nID=59953&NewsCatID=341 ] 85 Yalçın Akdogan, "Ellerinde Nur Mu Var, Topuz Mu?," Star Gazetesi, 27 December 2013. [http://haber.stargazete.com/yazar/ellerinde-nur-mu-var-topuz-mu/yazi-820061] 86 "Başbakan: Bunlar Sapık, Bunlar Kasetçi, Montajcı, Tweetçi!," Radikal Gazetesi, 10 March 2014. [http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/basbakan_bunlar_sapik_bunlar_kasetci_montajci_tweetci- 1180572] 87 Ibid. 88 Ibid. 89 "PM Erdoğan’s Remarks on Hizmet Stir Animosity," Today's Zaman, 24 January 2014. [http://www.todayszaman.com/news-337584-pm-erdogans-remarks-on-hizmet-stir-animosity.html] 90 "Erdogan on Gülenists: They Are Worse Than Shiites", http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=5d6_1394749319. 91 "PM Says State Will Fight against ‘Virus’ in Its Midst," Daily Sabah, 11 January 2014. [http://www.dailysabah.com/nation/2014/01/11/pm-says-state-will-fight-against-virus-in-its-midst] 92 "Erdoğan: Bu Ne Cesaret, Bu Aşağılık Faaliyetin Hesabını Soracağız," Star Gazetesi, 16 February 2014. [http://haber.stargazete.com/politika/erdogan-bu-ne-cesaret-bu-asagilik-faaliyetin-hesabini- soracagiz/haber-844046] 93 "Başbakan’dan Hizmet Hareketi'ne 'Casus' Suçlaması," Zaman Gazetesi, 29 March 2014. [http://www.zaman.com.tr/politika_basbakandan-hizmet-hareketine-casus- suclamasi_2208005.html] 94 "Turkish PM Erdoğan Slams Gülen Movement as ‘Spy Ring Entering the Ruler’s Harem’," Hürriyet Daily News, 24 March 2014. [http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-pm-erdogan-slams-gulen- movement-as-spy-ring-entering-the-rulers-harem.aspx?pageID=238&nID=64044&NewsCatID=338] 95 Ibid.
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“They're busy [fighting] the prime minister. Why should they also be busy with the president now? But they wiretapped him, too. When it is time, they will release those tapes. These people are assassins, montage-makers, a gang, an organization that amounts to a terrorist group”96
Initially, in the discourse he developed against the Gülen movement, Erdoğan distinguished the executives of this dangerous organization97 from the remaining members of the “Gülenist organization”, “sincere people”, in his own words, who reached beyond the continents with the love of service.” 98 He also advocated, on numerous occasions, a boycott against the Gülen movement. He additionally explained that the Gülen movement sucked the blood of the nation like “leeches.” As a matter of fact, there is an important difference between leeches and the Gülen movement because, as Prime Minister Erdoğan explains, “[l]eeches are more virtuous: leeches suck dirty blood, while they suck clean blood…”99
Additionally, Prime Minister Erdoğan also stated in a rally that he is “suspicious of their [the Gülen movement] faith [in Islam].”100 In his account:
“For them [the Gülen movement] hypocrisy is legitimate, lying is legitimate, slandering is legitimate, sedition is legitimate. In other words, every possible means is justifiable [for them] to reach the goal, to reach the purpose. This is not a religious organization; this is not a religious community at all. This is a completely political organization that does everything, including espionage.”101
Prime Minister Erdoğan seems not only to have denied the Gülen movement a religious identity, but also appears to have actively encouraged others to do the same. In a live television broadcast, for example, a journalist attempted to ask a question Erdoğan while referring to the Gülen movement as a “community” in a religious sense. However, Erdoğan strongly warned the journalist not to refer to
96 Ibid. 97 "Erdoğan'dan Gülen Cemaatine: Türkiye Hasımlarının Maşasıdır", http://www.cnnturk.com/haber/turkiye/erdogandan-gulen-cemaatine-turkiye-hasimlarinin-masasidir 98 Ibid. 99 Ayla Jean Yackley, "Turkish Parliament Votes to Shut Schools Run by Erdogan Rival" http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/03/01/uk-turkey-corruption-idUKBREA2005520140301. 100 "Erdoğan: İnançlarından Şüphe Ediyorum", http://www.yirmidorthaber.com/Dunya/erdogan- inanclarindan-suphe-ediyorum/haber-854622. 101 [translated by the author] "Başbakan Erdoğan: "İnternette Yeni Düzenlemeler Yapılacak"", http://www.cnnturk.com/haber/turkiye/basbakan-erdogan-internette-yeni-duzenlemeler-yapilacak.
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them as a “community”, but as an (illegal) organization.102 After the prime minister’s intervention, the journalist then used the terms “movement” and “group.” Yet again, Erdoğan insisted that the journalist call them an (illegal) organization.103
Applying the standards of the ECtHR: Do Prime Minister Erdogan’s expressions constitute hate speech?
It should be admitted that, at the very least, it is unusual to hear the above- mentioned expressions from a politician in a modern democracy. Hence, they stand a very good chance of making their way to Strasbourg. However, it should be noted that the role of the ECtHR is “subsidiary to national systems safeguarding human rights“.104 According to the principle of subsidiarity, the duty of protecting human rights first and foremost lies with the states. Once all the domestic remedies have been exhausted, only then can a human rights violation be brought to the attention of the ECtHR.105 At this point, a number of civil libel actions have been brought against Prime Minister Erdoğan by individuals associated with the Gülen movement.106,107 Currently, no legal proscription aiming to combat hate speech has been invoked against Prime Minister Erdoğan by state authorities.
There are, at this stage, two possibilities as to how the designated expressions of Prime Minister Erdoğan may be heard before the ECtHR. In the first case scenario, the domestic hate speech safeguards will be enforced at some point and the designated expression of the prime minister will be sanctioned under Turkish domestic law. In the second case scenario, this language will not be treated as hate speech by Turkish authorities and no sanctions will be applied. In the first scenario, the issue could be brought before the ECtHR by Prime Minister Erdoğan himself, while in the second, the applications could be lodged by the victims of hate speech. This nuance is important because in the first case scenario, the application of Prime Minister Erdoğan to the ECtHR may face the
102 During the program Prime Minister Erdoğan actually used the word “örgüt” (“organization”). This word has a negative connotation in Turkish and mostly used with reference to illegal criminal organizations. 103 "Erdoğan and Ak Party Deputies Split over Hate Speech against Hizmet," Today's Zaman, 16 March 2014. [http://www.todayszaman.com/news-342190-erdogan-and-ak-party-deputies-split-over- hate-speech-against-hizmet.html] 104 Kudla v. Poland, ECtHR, 26 October 2000, Application no. 30210/96 para. 152 105 Article 35(1) of ECHR states that: “The Court may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally recognised rules of international law, and within a period of six months from the date on which the final decision was taken.” 106 "Erdoğan'a 'Haşhaşi' Davası," Milliyet Gazetesi, 20 January 2014. [http://siyaset.milliyet.com.tr/erdogan-a-hashasi-davasi/siyaset/detay/1824680/default.htm] 107 There are also a number of private tort cases brought against Prime Minister Erdoğan. However, these are civil libel cases filed by Fethullah Gülen, himself.
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danger of being rejected with an immediate inadmissibility decision. However, in the second case scenario the ECtHR would most likely assess the merits of the application. Nevertheless, in either situation, the essence of the approach of the ECtHR would remain the same. As case law demonstrates, if the ECtHR receives any applications regarding the expressions mentioned above, it will focus its attention on three main aspects to determine whether the language in question constitutes hate speech: (a) the purpose of the statements; (b) the content of the expressions; and (c) the context in which the statements were made
The purpose of statements of Prime Minister Erdoğan
The purpose of contributing to live public and/or political discussions108 and journalistic works aiming to reach a well-informed audience109 can, in the account of the ECtHR, in some cases justify the use of a harsh language or derogatory remarks against a particular group. Can Prime Minister Erdoğan be considered as acting to realize a justifiable, legitimate purpose? Are his expressions actually aiming only at participation in public and/or political discussions? Or do they only seek to inform the public?
In an attempt to understand the intentions behind these expressions, some other expressions of Prime Minister Erdoğan will be helpful. In a speech addressing members of the AKP Parliament at the Grand National Assembly for the first time following local elections, Erdoğan stated that “the people [of Turkey] entrusted them [the ruling party] with the duty to fight against the agents of the Gülen movement”,110 and on another occasion, he added that he “will clear the state of those hashashins.”111 Prime Minister Erdoğan also made it crystal clear that, referring to the Gülen movement, he will show no mercy112 and no “tolerance to such networks.”113,114
108 See "Giniewski v. France.", "Perinçek v. Switzerland." 109 See "Jersild v. Denmark." 110 "PM Lauds Poll Results, Slams Gülen," Daily Sabah, 09 April 2014. [http://www.dailysabah.com/politics/2014/04/08/pm-lauds-poll-results-slams-gulen] 111 "'Cumhurbaşkanımla Görüşüp Değerlendireceğiz'", http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25511389. 112 "Turkish PM to Show ‘No Mercy’ to ‘Group’ Behind Graft Probe," Hürriyet Daily News, 14 January 2014. [http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-pm-to-show-no-mercy-to-group-behind-graft- probe.aspx?pageID=238&nID=61045&NewsCatID=338] 113 "Full Text: Turkish PM Erdoğan's Post-Election 'Balcony Speech'," Hürriyet Daily News, 31 March 2014. [http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/full-text-turkish-pm-erdogans-post-election-balcony- speech.aspx?pageID=238&nID=64341&NewsCatID=338] 114114 In all fairness, Prime Minister Erdoğan also specified that process of combing them out will be carried out “within the law”.(ibid.) However, for what it’s worth, he also declared that Turkey and Syria were actively in “a state of war”(ibid.) in the same speech, a remark which the Minister of Foreign Affairs had to correct two days later.("Davutoğlu Clarifies Erdoğan's Syria War Remarks", http://en.cihan.com.tr/news/Davutoglu-clarifies-Erdogan-s-Syria-war-remarks_4008- CHMTM5NDAwOC80.)
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Of course, in principle, Prime Minister Erdoğan can always claim the presence of an intention to start a new public debate or contribute to an already existing one about the Gülen movement. However, the expressions mentioned above invalidate such a defense. Additionally, the wording of those expressions- leeches, traitors, viruses, etc. - can hardly be regarded suitable for starting or contributing to a public debate on a subject concerning public interest in a democratic society.115 By the same token, asserting an intention to only inform the general public would also be unconvincing, at the very least.116
One possible ground of defense would be available to Erdoğan at this point. He could claim that in his speeches he targeted only specific individuals within the Gülen The expressions of movement who perpetrated illegal activities, Prime Minister not the entirety of the movement. However, Erdoğan mentioned in the prime minister seems to have quite clearly this study, therefore, demonstrated in his speeches that this is not at all the case. The live television broadcast cannot be considered during which he interfered with the journalist’s to be in pursuit of any use of the term “movement” in describing the of the legitimate aims Gülen movement, for example, might suffice that could potentially to explain the point that the entirety of the Gülen movement was actually targeted. If this be accepted by the was not the case, why would Erdoğan ECtHR. advocate a boycott against the educational institutions established by the Gülen movement?117 To conclude, the expressions of Prime Minister Erdoğan mentioned in this study, therefore, cannot be considered to be in pursuit of any of the legitimate aims that could potentially be accepted by the ECtHR.
Content of the expressions of Prime Minister Erdoğan
It has long been established that any idea or information of any kind can and should enjoy the guarantees provided under Article 10 of the ECHR, even if they are shocking or disturbing. There is no question that the expressions mentioned in the previous section are shocking and disturbing. However, there is genuinely more to it, because some of the language incites, spreads, promotes, or justifies hatred based on intolerance. And the rest is “insulting, holding up to ridicule or
115 Cp. "Vejdeland and Others v. Sweden." 116 Cp. "Jersild v. Denmark." 117 ""Çocuğu Yok, Anlamaz!"," Habertürk Gazetesi, 28 February 2014. [http://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/925497-cocugu-yok-anlamaz-]
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slandering specific groups of the population.”118 For these very reasons, these expressions should, according to case law, be deemed hate speech.
It is true that politicians and journalists, as a necessity of the jobs and duties they perform in the society, enjoy wider freedom of expression. However, in the examples above, in order to consider these expressions under the protection of freedom of speech, this very right has to be accepted as an absolute right, which is definitely not the case in the theory and practice of human rights law in any jurisdiction. In the Oberschlick case,119 for example, a journalist was considered to enjoy wider protection under Article 10 when he called a politician an “idiot” who explained that Nazi soldiers fought for peace and freedom in World War II and said people should be grateful to them. The ECtHR concluded that the term “idiot” was proportionately covering “indignation knowingly aroused”120 by the politician himself. By way of drawing a resemblance from the Oberschlick case, one cannot help but wonder what it would take for the Gülen movement to deserve to be called “leeches”, “viruses”, “hashashins”, etc. if those expressions were to be justified in Strasbourg.
In this regard, Pavel Ivanov v Russia 121 serves as an appropriate tool for comparison. Pavel Ivanov, a Russian citizen who is the owner and publisher of a monthly newspaper with a circulation of 999 copies, authored a series of articles in which he called for the exclusion of Jews from social life. From his point of view, the reasons for such a call were more than compelling. First and foremost, as he asserted, the Jews were nothing but a source of evil in Russia. They were the root of many problems in the Russian community. Additionally, he continued, Jews were carrying out a conspiracy against the Russian people; he also ascribed Fascist ideology to the Jewish people. The ECtHR, at this point, did not hesitate to conclude that:
Such a general and vehement attack on one ethnic group is in contradiction with the Convention's underlying values, notably tolerance, social peace and non-discrimination.122
Hence, the statements of Pavel Ivanov were declared to constitute blatant abuse of freedom of expression. To get back to the matter at hand, in Turkey, the Gülen movement has been depicted in only a six-month period as evil, at least by the virtue of being “worse than Shiites”, among many other accusations, by Prime Minister Erdoğan, similar to the accusations of Pavel Ivanov that declared the
118 "Vejdeland and Others v. Sweden." para. 55 119 " Oberschlick v. Austria (No. 2)." 120 Ibid. para 34 121 "Pavel Ivanov v. Russia." 122 Ibid.
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Jews to be evil.123 To reiterate, some of the expressions mentioned in the previous section demonized the Gülen movement and accused it of carrying out a conspiracy against the Turkish state. The accusations of Mr Ivanov targeting Jewish people, from a legal standpoint, appear to be completely indistinguishable from the accusations by the prime minister targeting the Gülen movement. Additionally, some of Erdoğan’s accusation fall into the category of statements of fact, such as “terrorist organization” 124 or having “dark connections with abroad”,125 which would oblige Prime Minister Erdoğan to prove his accusations. However, up until the publication of this study, no factual basis has been provided by Erdoğan to support his allegations. A similar assessment was carried out by the ECtHR when French politician Le Pen declared Muslims were a threat to the national security of the French. The ECtHR declared that his unproven allegations were abuse of freedom of expression.126 The rest of the expressions mentioned in the previous section simply insulted and slandered the Gülen movement, which is another justified reason for the ECtHR to “favor combating racist speech in the face of freedom of expression exercised in an irresponsible manner.”127 Therefore, in light of ECtHR case law, it is quite difficult for a European human rights lawyer not to deem such expressions hate speech under Article 17 of the Convention.
Context in which Prime Minister Erdoğan made his statements
Theoretically, context might have bearing on both the purpose of the speaker and the contents of the statements in question. However, the contents of the expressions blatantly constitute hate speech, and they are prima facie intended to defend or spread hatred against the Gülen movement. So in any case, the ECtHR would pay very little attention, if any, to contextual factors. However, for the purposes of this study, the circumstances in which the aforementioned statements were made should also be examined carefully. The analysis of the contextual factors will only serve to demonstrate the level of vehemence and seriousness of the situation.
123 Case law reveals that Holocaust denials receive a different treatment than denials of other historical events. However, unlike case law concerning negationist views, hate speech case law demonstrate that it does not matter for the ECtHR against which group hatred is incited by expressions in question. In this regard, North Africans, Muslims, Jewish people, homosexuals have already received protection against expressions of hate speech in Strasbourg. In this specific case, there is no apparent reason to deny the Gülen Movement from the status of hate speech victims. 124 "Erdoğan'dan Gülen Cemaatine: Türkiye Hasımlarının Maşasıdır". 125 "Erdoğan'dan Cemaate Çok Ağır Sözler!", http://www.internethaber.com/erdogan-cemaate-cok- agir-sozler-666695h.htm. 126 See "Le Pen v. France." 127 "Vejdeland and Others v. Sweden." para.55
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Identity/Status of the person who made the statements in question
By 2014, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had been holding the office of prime minister for 11 years, the second longest term for a prime minister in the history of Turkey. He is indeed a very successful politician who has won every election in which he competed in the last two decades. He and his party drew 45% of the votes at local elections on March 30, 2014.128 Erdoğan has so much a popularity and influence that he can even organize rallies in other countries.129 In addition to his popularity among Turkish people, his worldwide influence cannot be underestimated.130 Dissemination, target audience and impact of the expressions in question
Some of the speeches of Prime Minister Erdoğan that are subject to examination in this study were actually broadcast live by more than a dozen national television channels. This fact alone is sufficient to give an outsider an idea of the extent of coverage given to the expressions of Erdoğan by the media. Based on such a widespread Some of the speeches of dissemination, it is only fair to conclude that Prime Minister the target audience was simply the general Erdoğan that are public, which includes anyone and everyone, 131 subject to examination including children and less knowledgeable members of the public.132 At this point, it is hard in this study were to imagine anyone, even in the remotest actually broadcast live corners of rural Turkey, from school children to by more than a dozen pensioners, who is unaware of and uninformed national television about the allegations and accusations of Prime channels. Minister Erdoğan regarding the Gülen movement.
As a matter of fact, far-reaching dissemination of the expressions in question does not actually make any difference in the assessment of these expressions. This is because the ECtHR is of the opinion that the dissemination of hate speech to a smaller or larger audience is irrelevant.133 For the Court, hate speech is hate speech no matter how many
128 Hümeyra Pamuk; Nick Tattersall, "Erdogan Targets Enemies after Poll Triumph" http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/31/us-turkey-election-idUSBREA2R12X20140331. 129 Emre Peker; Harriet Torry, "Turkey Leader Rallies Voters—in Germany" http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304626804579362562423638286. 130 In 2010, for example, the Time Magazine declared him to be amongst the 100 most influential people of the world. See: "The 2010 Time 100", http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/completelist/0,29569,1984685,00.html.. Similarly, according the annual periodical the Muslim 500, he is the sixth most influential person in the Muslim world in 2013/2014 See: "The Top 50", http://themuslim500.com/2013-2/the-top-50. 131 Cp. "Seurot v. France."; "Vejdeland and Others v. Sweden." 132 Cp. "Féret v. Belgium." 133 " Witzsch v. Germany."
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people hear it. The stickers on the rear window of Mr Norwood constituted no less hate speech than the expressions of Le Pen, just because the stickers could be seen by many fewer people than could hear Mr Le Pen’s statements.134 Therefore, it should be admitted that such a wide dissemination only serves to aggravate the disastrous nature of the expressions in question.
By the same token, it would be unreasonable to conclude that such widely disseminated expressions by one of the most eminent figures in the history of Turkish politics would have no impact on society. 135 Only after the Gülen movement became the target of such allegations and insults did some practical consequences occur. For example, teachers at schools established by the Gülen movement were beaten.136 In another case, a demonstration with a sprinkle of violence was held by the supporters/members of the ruling party in front of the premises of a television station close to the Gülen movement.137 Yet again, linking these expressions to acts of violence is unnecessary as far as ECtHR case law is concerned. In Norwood, for instance, the ECtHR did not need to establish any acts of violence committed against the Muslim population as a result of posters displaying the phrase “Islam out of Britain” to conclude that such posters constituted hate speech . Similarly, in the Féret,138 Le Pen,139 Ivanov,140 Seurot141 cases, the ECtHR did not inquire into the existence of violence at all to declare that those expressions already constituted hate speech. Likewise, the existence of violent acts which are causally linked to the expressions examined in this study are not at all necessary. However, to demonstrate the vehemence of the situation, it is important to keep in mind the fact that some acts of violence took place that can reasonably be linked to the expressions in question.
Contribution to a public and/or political debate
It is undeniable that, beginning in the last quarter of 2013, numerous public and political debates about the Gülen movement have frequently been the subject of general public attention. So much so that, at some point, the Gülen movement
134 In fact Mr Norwood claimed that his posters had not any possibility of having an effect of any sort inciting violence or hatred as he lived in “a rural area not greatly afflicted by racial or religious tension and there was no evidence that a single Muslim had seen the poster” "Norwood v. The United Kingdom." Yet, the ECtHR did hesitate to conclude existence of hate speech. 135 Cp. "Zana v. Turkey." 136 Orhan Yıldırım, "Korkulan Oldu, Nefret Söylemi Erzurum’da Şiddete Dönüştü," Zaman Gazetesi, 9 March 2014. [http://www.zaman.com.tr/gundem_korkulan-oldu-nefret-soylemi-erzurumda-siddete- donustu_2203926.html] 137 "Provokatörler Seçim Arabasıyla Kapıya Dayandı," Zaman Gazetesi, 16 March 2014. [http://www.zaman.com.tr/gundem_provokatorler-secim-arabasiyla-kapiya-dayandi_2205276.html] 138 "Féret v. Belgium." 139 "Le Pen v. France." 140 "Pavel Ivanov v. Russia." 141 "Seurot v. France."
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became the leading topic for political debates. It is almost impossible to think of a politician, columnist or political commentator who has not expressed an opinion on the Gülen movement. However, the great majority of the people, including politicians and journalists, have done so without inciting hatred or slandering the movement. As has already been explained, expressions examined in this study contain a selection of words that can hardly be considered suitable for a contribution to public and political debates. As case law demonstrates, if the contents of expressions are distinguishable as prima facie hate speech at first sight, it does not really matter if the expressions in question actually relate to a live public or political debate. The issue of immigration, for example, has been a matter of heated public and political debates for decades in Europe. Yet, contribution to public and political debates on the issue of immigration and the increasing presence of Islam in Europe was not considered by the ECtHR to be a justification for the expressions in question in cases such as Le Pen142 and Norwood.143
The profile of the people who are targets of the statements in question
The target of the above-mentioned expressions in this study is the Gülen movement. Some academics define it as “a civil faith-based movement”,144 “a faith-based movement”,145 “faith-inspired civil society movement”,146 “the largest faith-based movement in Turkey”,147 or “the largest religious movement in Turkey.” 148 Similarly, several years ago Turkish law enforcement agencies categorized it as a religious group.149 Some other academics, on the other hand, while acknowledging its religious identity, describe it as a threat to Western civilization, for example by calling it “Islam's Trojan Horse.”150 The important
142 "Le Pen v. France." 143 "Norwood v. The United Kingdom." 144 Ian Williams, "A Movement in Counter-Point: The Significance of the Fethullah Gulen Movement as a Global Educational and Inter-Religious Model of Social and Religious Change-a Uk Perspective" (paper presented at the Proceedings of the conference Islam in the age of global challenges: Alternative Perspectives of the Gulen Movement, November, 2007). ; 145 John L Esposito and Ihsan Yilmaz, "Transnational Muslim Faith-Based Peacebuilding: Initiatives of the Gülen Movement," European Journal of Economic and Political Studies 3(2010). 146“It evolved from a faith-based community (“cemaat”) into a faith-inspired civil society movement” Gürkan Çelik, The Gülen Movement : Building Social Cohesion through Dialogue and Education(Delft: Eburon, 2010). Page 50 ; 147 Ebaugh, The Gülen Movement. Page 44 148 Graham E. Fuller, The New Turkish Republic : Turkey as a Pivotal State in the Muslim World(Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2008). 149 Orhan Erdemli, Today's Zaman, 23 March 2014 Is Hizmet being subjected to genocide? [https://www.todayszaman.com/news-342832-is-hizmet-being-subjected-to-genocideby-orhan- erdemli-.html] 150 Paul Stenhouse, "Islam's Trojan Horse?: Turkish Nationalism and the Nakshibendi Sufi Order," Quadrant 51, no. 12 (2007). For a comprehensive list of negative descriptions of the Gülen
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point to be highlighted here is that the Gülen movement has a religious or faith- related identity. However, at this point, it needs to be noted that Prime Minister Erdoğan declared that it is not a religious movement but a political group.151
It is true that members of the Gülen movement have raised their voices about subjects of political debates. For example, the last time they got involved in political debates was when shutting down private preparatory schools became a heated subject of politics. However, it seems inadequate to label a movement as a political group and neglect its religious character simply because it raises, be it frequently or rarely, concerns about political issues. On those grounds, if one is to assume that the Gülen movement is a political group, then the Church of England also has to be assumed to be a political organization, not a religious one. This is because the Church of England defends the right of Christians to intervene in politics.152 It follows is that the Archbishop of Canterbury, the leader of the Church of England, must be considered a political rather than religious leader, since as he frequently gets involved in political issues such as energy costs.153 Hence, just because it is politically active, it is not actually possible to deny that the Gülen movement has a religious identity. At the end of the day, there is no doubt that, be it a religious or political, one very specific and tangible group of people has become the target of expressions of hate speech. At this stage, labelling it as a political group cannot suffice to justify using expressions of hate speech.154
Assessment
Based on this detailed examination, it would only be fair to conclude that the expressions of Prime Minister Erdoğan mentioned in this study constitute prima facie hate speech. Of course, neither the Gülen movement nor any other group in the society is exempt from criticism. However, it has to be admitted that there is
Movement see: Dogan Koç, Strategic Defamation of Fethullah Gülen : English Vs. Turkish(Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, Inc., 2012). 151 "Başbakan Erdoğan: "İnternette Yeni Düzenlemeler Yapılacak"". 152 Martha Linden, "Archbishop of Canterbury: I'm Told to Stick to God When I Intervene in Politics," The Independent, 13 November 2013. [http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home- news/archbishop-of-canterbury-im-told-to-stick-to-god-when-i-intervene-in-politics-8937233.html] 153 Paul Cahalan Jonathan Petre, "Archbishop Damns Energy Price Hikes in Controversial Attack: 'Firms Must Show Generosity...Not Just Maximise Their Profits'," Daily Mail, 19 October 2013. [http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2467854/Archbishop-Justin-Welby-damns-energy-price- hikes-controversial-attack-Firms-generosity--j] 154 It needs to be noted that a long lived suspicion exists in all parts of the Turkish society against the Gülen Movement, for example see: "Profile: Fethullah Gulen's Hizmet Movement", http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-13503361. The founder of the movement, Fethullah Gülen, has actually been brought before the judiciary for these accusations and acquitted. Hence, from a legal perspective, there is no alternative but to treat such opinions only as suspicions and rumors. As a matter of fact, to an extent, most of the hate speech examples examined in this study seem to be nothing but only amplified versions of these suspicions and rumors.
28 Hate Speech and Beyond: Targeting the Gülen Movement in Turkey
a huge gap between the expressions examined in this study and acceptable criticism in a democratic society. For this very reason, in order to comply with their obligations under the ECHR, Turkish national authorities must make sure that the guarantees incorporated in Turkish domestic law with the purpose of combatting hate speech are effectively implemented against Prime Minister Erdoğan. Therefore, these expressions should be sanctioned under Turkish domestic law. If not, when an application regarding any of these expressions hits the registry of the ECtHR, the ECtHR would certainly not hesitate to declare these expressions as hate speech, in other words, abuse of freedom of expression. However, with regards to the expressions of the leading figures in the ruling party, especially those of Prime Minister Erdoğan, there is a good chance that the possible judgment of the ECtHR might be different from those already existing in case law. This is mainly because the existing definition and practice of case law concerning hate speech is simply not adequate to cover the situation created by the remarks of Prime Minister Erdoğan in Turkey, due to the plain fact that the trouble existing in Turkey moves beyond just hate speech.
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Part III Beyond Hate Speech
“Our tragic experience in the last century demonstrates that racist and extremist opinions can bring much more harm than restrictions on freedom of expression. Statistics on hate crimes show that hate propaganda always inflicts harm, be it immediate or potential. It is not necessary to wait until hate speech becomes a real and imminent danger for democratic society.”155
Judge Yudkivska, in her concurring opinion in the Vejdeland judgment, touches upon a key feature of hate speech cases in Strasbourg jurisprudence. In no case in which the ECtHR reached a verdict that the expressions in question constituted hate speech were the victims in any real and present danger. In these cases, people who performed hate speech tried to incite and promote hatred against a particular group, but none of them had the means to achieve their aims. Of course, they could individually seek recourse to violent acts, but their aims were primarily to create mass hatred and mass reactions towards their target groups. In Ivanov v Russia,156 for example, Mr Ivanov did not have any chance of excluding Jewish people from Russian society. He could only disseminate his ideas to a limited number of people, as only 999 copies of his newspaper were circulated. In Norwood v Great Britain157 and Seurot v France,158 the applicants, although clearly expressing that they were disturbed by the presence of, respectively, Muslims and North Africans in their countries, chasing Muslims and North Africans out of their counties was not actually a possibility. In fact, Mr Norwood was able to spread his message only to the people who could physically see his car’s rear window, while Mr Seurot disseminated his views in a school bulletin. In Vejdeland v Sweeden, 159 homosexuals were not under any real threat, created by the distribution of 100 leaflets in a high school. Although these hate speech examples had the potential to stir things up in relatively small circles, they did not pose any real threat to the entirety of the groups targeted by these expressions of hate speech.
In Feret v Belgium160 and Le Pen v France,161 however, things were a little different because the perpetrators of the hate speech were politicians. Hence, by definition, they were heard by much larger groups. This was especially true in Le
155 Concurring of opinion of Judge Ganna Yudkivska in "Vejdeland and Others v. Sweden." para. 11 156 "Pavel Ivanov v. Russia." 157 "Norwood v. The United Kingdom." 158 "Seurot v. France." 159 "Vejdeland and Others v. Sweden." 160 "Féret v. Belgium." 161 "Le Pen v. France."
30 Hate Speech and Beyond: Targeting the Gülen Movement in Turkey
Pen v France, because Mr Jean-Marie Le Pen was a very active and influential figure in French politics. As the chairman of the French National Front party he had competed for presidency several times. In 2002 and 2007, he gained the support of, respectively, 18% and 10% of the French electorate. Therefore, when he made his anti-Muslim remarks in 2003, his message had the potential to reach a majority of the French electorate. Judging by the general support and sympathy he received given from the general public, the ECtHR rightfully concluded that he was “certainly capable of giving a negative image, and even disturbing, the ‘Muslim community’ as a whole.”162
On the other hand, none of the perpetrators in the hate speech cases heard by the ECtHR had the opportunity to utilize state powers to enhance and realize the contents of their messages. Even Le Pen, the most influential perpetrator of hate speech in If the expressions of ECtHR case law, did not have the luxury of Prime Minister utilizing any governmental powers to realize Erdoğan became the contents of his speech. Let alone being subject to an somehow supported by the state, he was actually sanctioned by state authorities for application to the adopting hate speech. It should be noted that ECtHR, a government all the hate speech-related applications would, for the first time brought before the ECtHR concerned either a in the history of the claim that the state sanctioned an expression which was not hate speech163 or the state did ECtHR, be accused of not sanction expressions of hate speech.164 actually perpetrating Until mid-2014, no application has ever been hate speech per se. received by the ECtHR which complained that a particular state has actually perpetrated hate speech.
However, if the expressions of Prime Minister Erdoğan became subject to an application to the ECtHR, a government would, for the first time in the history of the ECtHR, be accused of actually perpetrating hate speech per se. And such an application is bound to be differentiated from the rest of existing hate speech case law for two reasons. The first reason is that the hate speech discourse adopted by Prime Minister Erdoğan has actually achieved the production a flagrant mass hatred towards the Gülen movement. Secondly, Prime Minister Erdoğan definitely has all the powers of the state at his disposal to realize the contents of the discourse of his hate speech, as he has already openly expressed.
162 Ibid. 163 "Pavel Ivanov v. Russia." 164 Aksu v. Turkey, ECtHR, 27 July 2010, Applications nos. 4149/04 and 41029/04
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Mass hatred
Being exposed to hate speech is already a sufficiently negative and unwanted experience. Even so, it is not comparable to the case of being subject to hate speech by the prime minister of one’s country, which categorically inflicts much worse consequences. As a matter of fact, the dire consequences suffered, at this point, escalate to a whole different level if the name of the country is Turkey and the name of the prime minister is Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Such an escalation is merely a direct consequence of circumstances in Turkey, the success of Prime Minister Erdoğan’s political career, and support given to him by the people of Turkey.
Even in his early career, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan received unprecedented attention and support from the Turkish people. When he was removed from the mayoralty of Istanbul by a court decision and imprisoned for reciting a poem at a rally, he received a myriad of support letters in prison.165 His kindness in responding to each and every one of those letters in his own handwriting did nothing but strengthen his popularity. He is one of the very few politicians, if there are any others at all, who recorded an album containing his recitation of several poems, which sold more than a million copies.166 Such sympathy and support from the public brought him to victory in the 2002 election, which was held after an economic crisis. Since then he has become the long-sought leader of the conservative majority of Turkey, and roughly half of the population has not withheld its support from him. After 2002, he consolidated his popular support and won five more elections and two referendums. Not long after he won his first general election victory, partly due to his religious sensitivities, he became a popular and important political figure for Muslims worldwide.
Such a remarkable political career and immense popular support, however, can only render the expressions examined above all the more dangerous. It would be incomprehensibly illogical to assume that Erdoğan’s expressions of hate speech would have no consequences or echo in society, especially when they are so widely disseminated. Starting in October 2013, Prime Minister Erdoğan had already very clearly distanced himself from the Gülen movement due to the dispute about shutting down private preparatory schools. However, when he publicly accused the Gülen movement of treason and attempting to topple his government in the second half of December 2013, millions plainly supported him in his struggle with the Gülen movement, as the latest election results show. When he accused the Gülen movement of treason at dozens of rallies, tens of
165 "Hapisteyken Mektup Yazmıştı," Sabah Gazetesi, 20 October 2010. [http://www.sabah.com.tr/Gundem/2010/10/20/erdogan_hapisteyken_mektup_yazmisti] 166 "Erdoğan Şiir Albümü Çıkaracak," Yeni Şafak Gazetesi, 16 February 2010. [http://yenisafak.com.tr/Aktuel/?i=241909]
32 Hate Speech and Beyond: Targeting the Gülen Movement in Turkey
thousands of people applauded him and booed the “traitors.” Millions watched, heard and read his expressions through the media and hundreds of thousands of people, maybe even millions, visibly demonstrated their support for Erdoğan in his fight against the Gülen movement through different types of social media. Just on Twitter, for example, millions of tweets were posted repeating and adding to his expressions of hate speech. To do this topic justice, a detailed illustration of the support he found in Turkish society should be provided, starting with the statements of leading figures in the AKP.
Expressions of other leading figures of the ruling party
Zafer Çağlayan, one of the former cabinet members accused of corruption, made a statement quite similar to that of a week before by Prime Minister Erdoğan that depicted the Gülen movement as “worse than Shiites.” Çağlayan said, “I would understand if a Jew, an atheist, a Zoroastrian would do all these things to us. Shame on them, if these things are done by those who claim to be Muslim. How can a Muslim do this?”167 Deputy Prime Minister Bülent Arınç claimed that the Gülen movement dared to bluntly threaten and blackmail Prime Minister Erdoğan face-to-face in his office.168 On another occasion, Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu, after a recording of a secret meeting of state officials leaked to the internet, immediately blamed the Gülen movement for secretly taping the meeting.169 It was also striking that Mr Davutoğlu gave voice to this accusation in a local elections rally during which the leader of the Gülen movement was symbolized with a jacket, in scarecrow style, with many accusations fastened to it.170 Minister of Internal Affairs Efgan Ala accused the Gülen movement of making huge profits off the graft probe at the expense of the general public. He claimed that the Gülen movement had bought up U.S. dollars from the market only a few days before the police raids took place on December 17, at a time when the price of the dollar had not peaked, and made a $2 billion profit.171 He also added, to make his claim more convincing, that his accusation was based on solid evidence.172 In the aftermath of these claims, no one was charged for threatening and blackmailing Prime Minister Erdoğan; Davutoğlu admitted that
167 "Çağlayan: I Would Understand If Jews, Atheists Were Behind Graft Probe," Today's Zaman, 9 March 2014. [http://www.todayszaman.com/news-341557-caglayan-i-would-understand-if-jews- atheists-were-behind-graft-probe.html] 168"Who Threatened Erdoğan?," Today's Zaman, 5 March 2014. [http://www.todayszaman.com/news-341192-who-threatened-erdogan.html] 169 "Davutoğlu Meydan Okudu," Sabah Gazetesi, 28 March 2014. [http://www.sabah.com.tr/Gundem/2014/03/28/davutoglu-meydan-okudu] 170 "Konya'da Öyle Bir Gülen Ceketi Ortaya Çıktı Ki...", http://www.internethaber.com/konyada-oyle- bir-gulen-ceketi-ortaya-cikti-ki...-654438h.htm. 171 "Gov't Attempts Vigilantism to Sink a Private Bank," Today's Zaman, 19 January 2014. [http://www.todayszaman.com/news-336961-govt-attempts-vigilantism-to-sink-a-private-bank.html] 172 "Efkan Ala: Piyasada Dolarları Kim Topladı," Yeni Şafak Gazetesi, 29 December 2013. [http://yenisafak.com.tr/politika-haber/efkan-ala-piyasada-dolarlari-kim-topladi-29.12.2013-598380]
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his claim was nothing but his personal opinion.173 The Central Bank of Turkey refuted the claims of the Minister of Interior Affairs. 174 Even so, at the end of the day, a clear image of the Gülen movement was inscribed in the perception of the society: They are sinister and dangerous. Depiction of such a malicious image of the Gülen movement by the prime minister and other ministers paved the way for members of the AKP to increase the level of accusation leveled against the Gülen movement. A member of the executive board of the AKP declared that the lives of the people of the Gülen movement should be turned into a living hell.175
Expressions of media and journalists
Unsurprisingly, such harsh expressions from the prime minister and other influential figures in the AKP found immediate support from the media. As a matter of fact, in some cases, the media was literally obliged to adopt this offensive language against the Gülen movement.176 Since December 17, 2013, news items slandering the Gülen movement have become a daily routine for part of the Turkish press.177 The media reported that the Gülen movement had a long list of immoral and illegal activities. One news item reported that, on the orders of Fethullah Gülen, followers of the Gülen movement were forced to pray to God that Prime Minister Erdoğan would drop dead.178 It was reported that this ritual was also obligatory for innocent young students who were attending schools established by the Gülen movement in Saudi Arabia.179This information was dubious, to say the least, since in fact no schools had been established by the
173 "Fm Davutoğlu Tones Down Allegations over Leaked Syria Audio," Today's Zaman, 18 April 2014. [http://www.todayszaman.com/news-345551-fm-davutoglu-tones-down-allegations-over-leaked- syria-audio.html] 174 "Central Bank Data Disprove Interior Minister's Rigging Claims," Today's Zaman, 5 January 2014. [http://www.todayszaman.com/news-335807-central-bank-data-disprove-interior-ministers-rigging- claims.html] 175 "Ak Party Politician Sparks Hatred against Hizmet Movement," Today's Zaman, 15 April 2014. [http://www.todayszaman.com/news-344784-ak-party-politician-sparks-hatred-against-hizmet- movement.html] 176 See supra note 103 177 Audio-visual media, at this stage, played a very important and influential role. However, due to the extremely time consuming nature of tracking and examining each and every broadcast, this study focuses its attention to print media. The combined daily circulation of seven pro-government national newspapers- Sabah Gazetesi, Star Gazetesi, Türkiye Gazetesi, YeniŞafak Gazetesi, Takvim Gazetesi, Akşam Gazetesi, Yeni Akit Gazetesi- news items and columns of which are examined in this study exceeds over 1.000.000 in April 2014. For exact circulation numbers of each newspaper see: "İstanbul, Nisan 2014 Tiraj Raporu", http://www.bik.gov.tr/istanbul/nisan-2014-tiraj-raporu/. To note the seriousness of the situation, the combined number of negative news items targeting the Gülen Movement published by these seven newspapers is 232 only between April 1 2014 and June 1 2014. 178 "Beddua out Deaddua In!," Takvim Gazetesi, 13 February 20104. [http://www.takvim.com.tr/Guncel/2014/02/13/beddua-out-deaddua-in] 179 Murat Kelkitlioğlu, "‘Paralel Yapı‘Nın Dinleme Ağı," Akşam Gazetesi, 12 February 2014. [http://www.aksam.com.tr/yazarlar/murat-kelkitlioglu/paralel-yapinin-dinleme-agi/haber-284345]
34 Hate Speech and Beyond: Targeting the Gülen Movement in Turkey
Gülen movement in Saudi Arabia.180 Among many other allegations, the media accused the Gülen movement of blackmailing university students by using inappropriate photos;181 recording and leaking sex tapes featuring several Turkish parliament members;182 establishing a highly secret espionage system formed only by janitors; 183 wiretapping all the communications in Turkey from an underwater base that could accommodate 60 people;184 establishing a secret terrorist organization, called “Ötüken”;185 and being involved in the coup d’état that toppled the Morsi government in Egypt.186
Since December 17, Only a very small fraction of the columnists 2013, news items who wrote in pro-government media during slandering the Gülen this period displayed any kind of reaction to 187 movement have the speeches made by the government or to the news items. 188 Instead, many of them become a daily routine joined the choir against the Gülen movement. for part of the Turkish As a matter of fact, devotion and allegiance to press. the government and Prime Minister Erdoğan by a number of journalists reached such a level that some happily contended that they were not journalists, but Tayyibists (devoted supporters of Prime Minister Erdoğan).189 Many columnists also adopted an aggressive tone that closely resembled that of the government in the fight against the Gülen movement, and directed a variety of insults and accusations toward the movement. To begin with, for some the
180 "'Başbakan'ın Ölmesi Için Beddua' Iddiası Alçaklıktır," Zaman Gazetesi, 14 February 2014. [http://www.zaman.com.tr/medya_basbakanin-olmesi-icin-beddua-iddiasi-alcakliktir_2199459.html] 181 Mehmet Özmen, "‘Uygunsuz Fotoğrafları Şantaj Için Kullanıyorlar’," Yeni Akit Gazetesi, 21 March 2014. [http://www.yeniakit.com.tr/roportaj/uygunsuz-fotograflari-santaj-icin-kullaniyorlar-67.html] 182 "Mhp’ye Paralel Komplo! İhsan Barutçu Star'a Konuştu," Star Gazetesi, 21 February 2014. [http://haber.stargazete.com/politika/mhpye-paralel-komplo-ihsan-barutcu-stara-konustu/haber- 846276] 183 "Paralel Istihbarat Kapıcılardan Alındı," Akşam Gazetesi, 8 April 2014. [http://www.aksam.com.tr/guncel/paralel-istihbarat-kapicilardan-alindi/haber-298150] 184 Abdurrahman Erzurum, "Dinleme Olayı Ile Ilgili Skandal Iddia! Deniz Altından Dinleniyoruz" http://www.ajanshaber.com/dinleme-olayi-ile-ilgili-skandal-iddia-deniz-altindan-dinleniyoruz- haberi/52362. 185 "Suikastlarda Paralel Izi Var," Akşam Gazetesi, 14 April 2014. [http://www.aksam.com.tr/siyaset/suikastlarda-paralel-izi-var/haber-299585] 186 "Mısır Darbesinde Derin Örgüt Izleri," Akşam Gazetesi, 22 April 2014. [http://www.aksam.com.tr/guncel/misir-darbesinde-derin-orgut-izleri/haber-301744] 187 Sibel Eraslan, "Rahmet Günlerinde Nedir Bu Intikam Çağrısı?," Star Gazetesi, 18 April 2014. [http://haber.stargazete.com/yazar/rahmet-gunlerinde-nedir-bu-intikam-cagrisi/yazi-871512] 188 "Akşam Gazetesinde 'Ötüken' Istifası," Radikal Gazetesi, 14 April 2014. [http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/aksam_gazetesinden_otuken_istifasi-1186537] 189 Hakan Albayrak, "Tayyipçi Olduğumu Zaten Ilan Etmemiş Miydim?," Star Gazetesi, 22 March 2014. [http://haber.stargazete.com/yazar/tayyipci-oldugumu-zaten-ilan-etmemis-miydim/yazi-858964]
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Gülen movement is just a puppet of international actors,190 although the answer to the question of who these international actors are varies from one journalist to another. Columnists claimed that a variety of entities -- The Vatican,191 the United States,192 the European Union,193 Israel,194 Jewish lobbies,195 neo-cons,196 international Zionism,197 the Iraq-Damascus Islamic State,198 MOSSAD,199 MI5,200 the CIA, 201 the FBI, 202 the Moon Cult, 203 the Freemasons, 204 the Rockefeller family,205 and the Sephardi chief rabbis of Israel206 -- are either employers or partners of the Gülen movement. Members of the Gülen movement were
190 Emin Pazarcı, "Cemaat’in Boyunu Aşar Bu Iş," Akşam Gazetesi, 27 December 2013. [http://www.aksam.com.tr/yazarlar/emin-pazarci/cemaatin-boyunu-asar-bu-is/haber-272142] 191 This article was written even before Prime Minister Erdoğan publicly targeted the Gülen Movement. Mehtap Yılmaz, "Gülen Cemaati- (İslami+İnsani)=Gülenizm!," Yeni Akit Gazetesi, 28 November 2013. [http://www.habervaktim.com/yazar/62436/gulen-cemaati- islamiinsanigulenizm.html] 192Hasan Karakaya, "Nerede İsrail, Orada Cemaat... Bunlar “Tesadüf”(!) Mü?," Yeni Akit Gazetesi, 23 December 2013. [http://www.yeniakit.com.tr/yazarlar/hasan-karakaya/nerede-israil-orada-cemaat- bunlar-tesaduf-mu-4138.html]; Abdurrahman Dilipak, "Amerika’nın Şemsiyesi Altında Gölgelenirken," Yeni Akit Gazetesi, 28 January 2014. [http://www.yeniakit.com.tr/yazarlar/abdurrahman-dilipak/amerikanin-semsiyesi-altinda- golgelenirken-4624.html] 193 "Saflar Netleşirken," Yeni Akit Gazetesi, 17 January 2014. [http://www.yeniakit.com.tr/yazarlar/abdurrahman-dilipak/saflar-netlesirken-4476.html] 194 Abdülkadir Selvi, "Hocaefendi'nin Wall Street Journal Tercihi Kime Mesaj?," Yeni Şafak Gazetesi, 24 January 2014. [http://yenisafak.com.tr/yazarlar/AbdulkadirSelvi/hocaefendinin-wall-street-journal- tercihi-kime-mesaj/49969] 195 Mehtap Yılmaz, "Bankasya Fedaileri!," Yeni Akit Gazetesi, 5 February 2014. [http://www.yeniakit.com.tr/yazarlar/mehtap-yilmaz/bankasya-fedaileri-4731.html] 196 Prof. Dr. Mazhar Bağlı, "Bir Istihbarat Örgütü Olarak Cemaat," Yeni Şafak Gazetesi, 15 January 2014. [http://yenisafak.com.tr:999/yorum-haber/bir-istihbarat-orgutu-olarak-cemaat-16.01.2014- 607800] 197 Ahmet Varol, "Baronlar Balon Çıktı," Yeni Akit Gazetesi, 3 April 2014. [http://www.yeniakit.com.tr/yazarlar/ahmet-varol/baronlar-balon-cikti-5488.html] 198 Hakan Albayrak, "Cemaat, Ümmete Saldırıyor!," Star Gazetesi, 11 January 2014. [http://haber.stargazete.com/yazar/cemaat-ummete-saldiriyor/yazi-828127] 199 Nusret Çiçek, "Zaman Ve Sermaye," Yeni Akit Gazetesi, 13 March 2014. [http://www.habervaktim.com/yazar/64103/zaman-ve-sermaye.html] 200 Abdurrahman Dilipak, "Cemaat Yanlış Yapıyor!," Yeni Akit Gazetesi, 19 December 2013. [http://www.yeniakit.com.tr/yazarlar/abdurrahman-dilipak/cemaat-yanlis-yapiyor-4081.html] 201 Ergün Diler, "Gizli Gerçek," Takvim Gazetesi, 17 March 2014. [http://www.takvim.com.tr/Yazarlar/ergundiler/2014/03/17/gizli-gercek] 202 It needs to be noted that this is a news item, not a column. "Fbi-Gülen Örgütü Ortaklığı," Takvim Gazetesi, 10 April 2014. [http://www.takvim.com.tr/Guncel/2014/04/10/fbigulen-orgutu-ortakligi] 203 Hasan Karakaya, "Cfr’den, Moon’a... Fethullah Gülen’in Esrarengiz Ilişkileri!," Yeni Şafak Gazetesi, 1 January 2014. [http://www.yeniakit.com.tr/yazarlar/hasan-karakaya/cfrden-moona-fethullah- gulenin-esrarengiz-iliskileri-4259.html] 204 Ergün Diler, "Paralel Kim!," Takvim Gazetesi, 18 March 2014. [http://www.takvim.com.tr/Siyaset/2014/03/18/paralel-kim] 205 "Gülen'in Seçimi," Takvim Gazetesi, 12 March 2014. [http://www.takvim.com.tr/Siyaset/2014/03/12/gulenin-secimi] 206 "Görüşme," Takvim Gazetesi, 20 March 2014. [http://www.takvim.com.tr/Siyaset/2014/03/20/gorusme]
36 Hate Speech and Beyond: Targeting the Gülen Movement in Turkey
declared to be pornsters,207 sneaky,208 putschists,209 tape editors,210 companions of Israel,211 rebelling against the Turkish state in the name of Israel,212 a foreign threat,213 a threat to national security,214 hashashins,215 worse than hashashins,216 perpetrators of the Dink murder,217 bandits,218 snakes,219 parasitic ivy,220 and the people who altered the rules of Islam.221 The Gülen movement was equated with an illegal criminal organization, 222 a gang, 223 a junta, 224 and an intelligence organization.225 It was also argued that this movement was the sole perpetrator of all the illegal phone tapings226 that had recently taken place in Turkey, as they had infiltrated to the very depths of a GSM company.227 Interestingly, members of the Gülen movement who are actually university students were caught red-
207 Hakan Albayrak, "Pornocular," Star Gazetesi, 19 December 2013. [http://haber.stargazete.com/yazar/pornocular/yazi-818082] 208 Emin Pazarcı, "Paralel, Sinsi Ve Kaypak," Akşam Gazetesi, 26 January 2014. [http://www.aksam.com.tr/yazarlar/emin-pazarci/paralel-sinsi-ve-kaypak/haber-279753] 209 Mustafa Karaalioğlu, "O Rektörün Ve O Grubun Trajedisi," Star Gazetesi, 16 April 2014. [http://haber.stargazete.com/yazar/o-rektorun-ve-o-grubun-trajedisi/yazi-870362] 210 Ibid. 211 Ibid. 212 Hakan Albayrak, "İsrail Adına Kendi Hükümetine Başkaldıranlar," Star Gazetesi, 21 December 2013. [http://haber.stargazete.com/yazar/israil-adina-kendi-hukumetine-baskaldiranlar/yazi-819034] 213 İbrahim Karagül, "Cemaat Önce Dış Güç Oldu, Şimdi De Dış Tehdit Oluyor," Yeni Şafak Gazetesi, 6 February 2014. [http://yenisafak.com.tr/yazarlar/IbrahimKaragul/cemaat-once-dis-guc-oldu-simdi-de- dis-tehdit-oluyor/50179] 214 Kurtuluş Tayiz, "Umutsuz Bir Savaş..." Akşam Gazetesi, 13 March 2014. [http://www.aksam.com.tr/yazarlar/kurtulus-tayiz/umutsuz-bir-savas/haber-291960] 215 Cem Küçük, "Haşhaşilerle Mücadele Yeni Başlıyor!," Yeni Şafak Gazetesi, 16 January 2014. [http://yenisafak.com.tr/yazarlar/CemKucuk/hashasilerle-mucadele-yeni-basliyor/48710] 216 Ibid. 217 Hilal Kaplan, "Dink Cinayetinde Paralel Kuşkular," Yeni Şafak Gazetesi, 24 January 2014. [http://yenisafak.com.tr/yazarlar/HilalKaplan/dink-cinayetinde-paralel-kuskular/4997] 218Hasan Karakaya, "Millet Her Şeyi Affeder Ama Ihaneti Affetmez!," Yeni Akit Gazetesi, 2 February 2014. [http://www.yeniakit.com.tr/yazarlar/hasan-karakaya/millet-her-seyi-affeder-ama-ihaneti- affetmez-4687.html] 219 Ergün Diler, "Yılan!," Takvim Gazetesi, 24 March 2014. [http://www.takvim.com.tr/Siyaset/2014/03/24/yilan] 220 Hasan Karakaya, "Bugün “Ağaç, Çiçek Ve Kuş”Ları Yazmak Istiyorum!," Yeni Akit Gazetesi, 22 January 2014. [http://www.yeniakit.com.tr/yazarlar/hasan-karakaya/bugun-agac-cicek-ve-kuslari- yazmak-istiyorum-4541.html] 221 Serdar Arseven, "Evangelist/Kalvinist Taktikler!.." Yeni Akit Gazetesi, 7 February 2014. [http://www.yeniakit.com.tr/yazarlar/serdar-arseven/evangelistkalvinist-taktikler-4751.html] 222 Hilal Kaplan, "Bu Örgüt Değilse, Örgüt Nedir?," Yeni Şafak Gazetesi, 21 March 2014. [http://yenisafak.com.tr/yazarlar/HilalKaplan/bu-orgut-degilse-orgut-nedir/50902] 223 Ahmet Varol, "İktidar Kavgası Mı Türkiye’ye Savaş Mı?," Yeni Akit Gazetesi, 5 April 2014. [http://www.yeniakit.com.tr/yazarlar/ahmet-varol/iktidar-kavgasi-mi-turkiyeye-savas-mi-5517.html] 224 Cem Küçük, "Bu Saatten Sonra Barış Olmaz!," Yeni Şafak Gazetesi, 6 January 2014. [http://yenisafak.com.tr/yazarlar/CemKucuk/bu-saatten-sonra-baris-olmaz/46716] 225 Bağlı, "Bir Istihbarat Örgütü Olarak Cemaat." 226 Tayiz, "Umutsuz Bir Savaş...". 227 Rasim Ozan Kütahyalı, "Paralel Örgütün Gsm Operasyonları," Sabah Gazetesi, 18 March 2014. [http://www.sabah.com.tr/Yazarlar/kutahyali/2014/03/18/paralel-orgutun-gsm-operasyonlari]
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handed trying to “infiltrate” state-funded student dormitories using their student identities.228 But the most creative by far was the claim that there was a resemblance between the Gülen movement and the aliens from the Matrix films, even though the entire trilogy was all about machines and computers with not a single reference to aliens.229
Expressions of the general public
The discourse developed against the Gülen movement by Prime Minister Erdoğan, leading figures of the AKP, and pro-government media also found immediate support from the AKP electoral base. Obviously, it is not possible to infer that everyone who voted for the AKP supported and embraced the hate speech discourse. However, it would be illogical to claim that the general public remained neutral or did not develop any hostility against the Gülen movement. The reaction of the general public can be vividly observed through social media. Following the expressions of Prime Minister Erdoğan, hundreds of thousands of tweets slandering, ridiculing and accusing the Gülen movement were posted on Twitter. It is not possible to mention each and every one of these tweets within the scope of this study due to their volume, and of course it is not possible to declare that all of them are hate speech. However, just mentioning some of the “hashtags”230 under which thousands of tweets were posted might give a sufficient feeling for the offensive character of the tweets posted about the Gülen movement. Here are some direct translations of the most offensive hashtags:
“Gülen organization are traitors” (#gülenörgütüvatanhainidir); “parallel treason” (#paralelihanet);231 “fairy tale corruption super-duper treason” (#YolsuzlukBahaneİhanetŞahane); “deep ear Pennsylvania” (#DerinKulakPensilvanya);232 “the code of CIA-maat (#CIAmatinSifresi);233 “Gülen terror organisation” (#Gülenterororgutu);
228 Murat Kelkitlioğlu, "Cemaat Okullarındaki Öğrencilere Müjde!," Akşam Gazetesi, 20 March 2014. [http://www.aksam.com.tr/yazarlar/murat-kelkitlioglu/cemaat-okullarindaki-ogrencilere- mujde/haber-293751] 229 Sevilay Yükselir, "Paralel Devlet Ve Matrix Filmi," Sabah Gazetesi, 14 January 2014. [http://www.sabah.com.tr/Yazarlar/yukselir/2014/01/14/paralel-devlet-ve-matrix-filmi] 230 A hashtag, as used in social networking websites, is a word or phrase preceded by a hash mark (#), used within a message to identify a key word or topic of interest and facilitate a search for it. "Hashtag", http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/hashtag. 231 The phrase “parallel” refers to the Gülen Movement. 232 Pennsylvania here refers to the Gülen Movement as the leader of the Gülen Movement resides in Pennsylvania, U.S.A. 233 “CIAmaat” is combination of words “CIA”, the Central Intelligence Agency, and “Cemaat”, which means “community” in Turkish referring to the Gülen Movement.
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“Hashashi” (#Haşhaşi);234 “No friends with Fettushi” (#FettuşidenDostOlmaz)235
Despite the unusual and extremely offensive nature of the above mentioned expressions of leading figures of the AKP, journalists and general public, declaring each and every one of them to be hate speech would be unsound and unhealthy speculation, which would be incompatible with the methodology followed by the ECtHR. Yet again, their unusually offensive nature cannot go unnoticed, even if they are not to be declared hate speech right away. In any case they do serve as a sufficient basis to conclude that the expressions of Prime Minister Erdoğan -- aside from being blatant hate speech -- came to have another meaning: His expressions actually resulted in distinctive mass hatred targeting the Gülen movement.
Boycotting the Gülen movement
As shocking as it may sound, the role played by Prime Minister Erdoğan in the creation of such mass hatred of the Gülen movement is much more threatening and direct than has already been portrayed in this study, which is bad enough per se. Not only did he demonize a particular group of people, but he also openly called on the nation to take action against the Gülen movement. Erdoğan called on the public to boycott any institutions established by members of the Gülen movement. Such a call to boycott a group of people just because of their identity is not only morally wrong but also defined and prohibited as a hate crime under the Turkish Criminal Code.236 Yet, following Prime Minister Erdoğan’s call for boycotts, a Twitter account with almost 150,000 followers posted a very detailed list of institutions and businessmen who were claimed to be members of the Gülen movement.237 The names of these “traitors” have been in circulation on the Internet since mid-March, 2014.
Two elements worsening mass hatred
In an attempt to understand the extent and possible consequences of this mass hatred, there are two factors in particular that have to be taken into consideration. First, the Gülen movement has been active in all parts of Turkey, including the southeast provinces. In this region of Turkey, there is an evident presence of a pro-Kurdish militant organization, the PKK. It is well-known that the
234 A hashtag with reference to Prime Minister Erdoğan’s referral to the Gülen Movement as Hashashins, a medieval order that gained political influence through assassinations. 235 “Fettushi” is a slang either referring to the leader of the Gülen Movement or members of the Gülen Movement. 236 See Article 122 of Turkish Criminal Code. 237 See 127 tweets posted by GİZLİARŞİV(@GizliArsiv) on 19th of March 2014. [https://twitter.com/GizliArsiv]
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PKK has for long considered the Gülen movement to be an enemy; in due course, they organized lethal attacks on the movement’s institutions238 and members.239 The call by PKK leaders to boycott the educational institutions established by the Gülen movement,240 although it predates the boycott called by Prime Minister Erdoğan, is an important point to be considered in understanding the possible reach of mass hatred against the Gülen movement. In this regard, being boycotted by both the prime minister of a country and by the leaders of a terrorist organization that has an undeniable presence in the same country can only sound intimidating and frightening.
The second factor to which special attention needs to be paid is that Prime Minister Erdoğan is such an important political figure that his voice can easily be heard outside the borders of Turkey. His expressions of hate speech actually have the potential to create prejudice and mass hatred against the Gülen movement even on an international level. In an interview with PBS talk show host Charlie Rose, Prime Minister Erdoğan clearly had the opportunity to create worldwide prejudice against the Gülen movement, as he expressly claimed that these people posed a threat to U.S. security.241 Additionally, given the fact that Erdoğan is a very popular leader among Muslims worldwide, at some point his accusations are likely to be echoed throughout the Muslim world. Being “traitors”, 242 “hashashins”, 243 “under service of other countries”, 244 or having “dark connections with abroad” 245 are only some of the examples of Erdoğan’s accusations that have the potential to create repercussions against the Gülen
238"Pkk Supporters Storm Student Dormitory in Southeast Turkey," Today's Zaman, 9 April 2014. [http://www.todayszaman.com/news-344212-pkk-supporters-storm-student-dormitory-in-southeast- turkey.html]; "Pkk Attack on Student Dormitory Outrages Nation," Today's Zaman, 29 May 2011. [http://www.todayszaman.com/news-245553-pkk-attack-on-student-dormitory-outrages- nation.html]; "Şırnak'ta Camii Ve Dershanelere Pkk Molotoflarıyla Saldırdılar", http://gundem.bugun.com.tr/cami-ve-dershaneye-pkk-molotofu-haberi/739091.; "Dershaneye Silahlı Saldırı," Sabah Gazetesi, 1 November 2012. [http://www.sabah.com.tr/Gundem/2012/11/01/dershaneye-silahli-saldiri]; 239 "Pkk Target Imam Shot Dead after Prayer," Today's Zaman, 24 August 2010. [http://www.todayszaman.com/news-219879-100-pkk-target-imam-shot-dead-after-prayer.html]; "Outlawed Pkk after Imams Who Advocate Nonviolence," Today's Zaman, 8 September 2010. [http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-221272-100-outlawed-pkk-after-imams-who-advocate- nonviolence.html] 240 "Fehman Hüseyin: Cemaat Dershanelerine Çocukları Göndermeyin," Bugün Gazetesi, 2 December 2013. [http://gundem.bugun.com.tr/cocuklari-gondermeyin-haberi/881748] 241 “These elements which threaten the national security of Turkey cannot be allowed to exist in other countries because what they do to us here, they might do against their host" Gülşen Solaker, "Turkey's Erdogan Calls on U.S. To Extradite Rival Gulen" http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/29/us-turkey-erdogan-idUSBREA3S0A120140429. 242 "Erdoğan: Bu Ne Cesaret, Bu Aşağılık Faaliyetin Hesabını Soracağız." 243 "PM Erdoğan’s Remarks on Hizmet Stir Animosity." 244 Vahap Munyar, "Zarrab Hayırsever Aslan Saf Ve Dürüst," Hürriyet Gazetesi, 26 December 2013. [http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/25443835.asp] 245 "Erdoğan'dan Cemaate Çok Ağır Sözler!".
40 Hate Speech and Beyond: Targeting the Gülen Movement in Turkey
movement among Muslim populations. Being accused of treason by a popular Muslim leader cannot be taken lightly, taking into account the fact that the Gülen movement has a presence all over the world, even in regions where elements of extremist Islam are, at least partially, dominant, such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia.
Dangers of mass hatred: Example of Gezi protestors
To some extent, mass hatred towards the Gülen movement has taken its toll in Turkey. Several teachers working in educational institutions affiliated with the Gülen movement are reported to have been beaten simply because of who they were. Additionally, demonstrations with a pinch of violence also took place in front of the premises of institutions established by the Gülen movement. However, this mass hatred did not turn into widespread violence. This is surprising because only several months before the Gülen movement became the target of mass hatred, Turkey experienced first-hand the consequences of a mass hatred catastrophe. Starting in June 2013, another group of people was made the target of mass hatred by Prime Minister Erdoğan: Gezi protestors. Among other things, Gezi protesters were accused of being “a bunch of looters”, 246 “vandals”247 and tools of foreign powers248 by Prime Minister Erdoğan himself, which turned the Gezi protestors into a group of people who were loathed by a sizeable chunk of the population.249
246 Ruth Sherlock, "Turkey: Erdogan Brands Protesters 'Extremists' and 'Looters'," The Telegraph, 3 June 2013. [http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/turkey/10096762/Turkey-Erdogan- brands-protesters-extremists-and-looters.html] 247 "Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Dismisses Turkey Protesters as Vandals," The Guardian, 9 June 2013. [http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/09/recep-tayyip-erdogan-turkey-protesters-looters- vandals] 248 "Turkish Intelligence Looking into 'Foreign Links' to Taksim Protests: PM," Hürriyet Daily News, 3 June 2013. [http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-intelligence-looking-into-foreign-links-to- taksim-protests-pm-.aspx?pageID=238&nID=48097&NewsCatID=338] 249 In the early days of the Gezi protests, for example, Prime Minister Erdoğan stated that “[t]here is 50 percent of [the country who voted for the ruling Justice and Development Party - AKP], and we can barely keep them at home [and prevent them from coming onto the streets for counter- protests]. But we have called on them to calm down,” "Turkish PM Gets into Row with Reuters Reporter over Taksim Protests," Hürriyet Daily News, 3 June 2013. [http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-pm-gets-into-row-with-reuters-reporter-over-taksim- protests.aspx?pageID=238&nid=48101] 15 days later, Prime Minister Erdoğan explained that ““Social media was prepared for this, made equipped. The strongest advertising companies of our country, certain capital groups, the interest rate lobby, organizations on the inside and outside, hubs, they were ready, equipped for this.” "Turkish Prime Minister Vows to Increase Police Force," Hürriyet Daily News, 18 June 2013. [http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-prime-minister-vows- to-increase-police-force.aspx?pageID=238&nID=49006&NewsCatID=338]
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After being declared “looters” and accused of having foreign links by the prime minister, Gezi protestors were actually attacked by their fellow citizens; some were severely beaten and others were actually killed.250 At one point, Gezi protesters were actually chased down the streets by their fellow citizens, who were waving scimitars in their hands.251 One example will suffice to demonstrate the extent and consequences of mass hatred. This mass hatred against anyone who could be related to the Gezi protests made itself visible at around the time of Berkin Elvan’s burial ceremony. Elvan was a 14-year-old boy who passed away after being in a coma for 269 days after being hit on the head by a tear gas canister shot by the police during the Gezi protests. His family explained that on the day he was shot, he was only on his way to the grocery store to buy bread. However, Prime Minister Erdoğan declared that the deceased boy had connections with terrorist organizations, and immediately after his death his mother was booed by thousands at a rally.252 The tensions got so high in the neighborhood where he was killed that half the residents of the neighborhood stood all-night guard, because they were afraid that their neighbors would attack and Several months before slaughter them all. At the same time, the other half of the neighborhood was living in fear that the Gülen movement their neighbors would attack their places of became the target of worship, and hundreds of police officers were mass hatred, Turkey in the neighborhood to prevent any further 253 experienced first-hand incidents. the consequences of a During and after the Gezi protests, Prime mass hatred Minister Erdoğan paved the way to mass catastrophe. hatred against the Gezi protesters by simply declaring them to be looters, vandals and extremists.254 However, since the Gezi front
250 "Hrft: Fact Sheet on Gezi Park Protests as of July 16th", http://www.fidh.org/en/europe/turkey/hrft-fact-sheet-on-gezi-park-protests-as-of-july-16th-13688. 251 "Police Intervene on İstiklal Avenue against Protesters Gathering to Re-Enter Gezi," Hürriyet Daily News, 6 July 2013. [http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/police-intervene-on-istiklal-avenue-against- protesters-gathering-to-re-enter-gezi.aspx?pageID=238&nID=50131&NewsCatID=341]; "Police Intervene in Ankara as Another Machete-Wielding Man Threatens Protesters," Hürriyet Daily News, 11 July 2013. [http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/police-intervene-in-ankara-as-another-machete- wielding-man-threatens-protesters.aspx?PageID=238&NID=50477&NewsCatID=341] 252 Seda Sezer, "Erdogan Links Dead Turkish Teenager to 'Terrorist' Groups" http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/15/us-turkey-protests-idUSBREA2E0A820140315. 253 Ismail Saymaz, "Okmeydanı Kimseye Mezar Olmasın," Radikal Gazetesi, 24 March 2014. [http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/okmeydani_kimseye_mezar_olmasin-1182818] 254 In this regard, Beşir Atalay, Deputy Prime Minister, bluntly blamed Jewish Diaspora for conspiring against Turkey in Gezi protetests. "Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Denies Remarks on 'Jewish Diaspora'," Hürriyet Daily News, 2 July 2013. [http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish- deputy-prime-minister-denies-remarks-on-jewish-diaspora- .aspx?PageID=238&NID=49858&NewsCatID=338]
42 Hate Speech and Beyond: Targeting the Gülen Movement in Turkey
was so wide, what basically happened was that roughly half the country hated the other half and vice versa. However, in the present case, the target of the mass hatred, the Gülen movement, is a particularly small group of people compared to the Gezi protestors. Although there has not been any widespread violence against the Gülen movement, in light of the Gezi protests, the potential dangers of such mass hatred should not go unnoticed.
Legitimacy of boycott calls: German example and ECtHR case law
Can a boycott call by a prime minister be justifiable and legitimate in a democratic society? Although the ECtHR provides an answer in Willem v. France,255 in assessing the legitimacy of a boycott call, at this point, a brief illustration of two judgments of the German Federal Constitutional Court will be helpful.256 In this regard, German case law deserves rightful attention, as boycott calls were analyzed for the first time from a human rights law point of view in Europe by the German Federal Constitutional Court.257 In the legendary Lüth case,258 in 1950, Eric Lüth, a journalist, put out a call to boycott a new film by Veit Harlan, a famous director of the Nazi Era, due to Mr Harlan’s previous career. Mr Harlan brought a civil case against Mr Lüth to prevent him from promoting a boycott against him. In a nutshell, after weighing the freedom of expression of Mr Lüth against the economic interests of Mr Harlan as guaranteed by the German Constitution, the German Federal Constitutional Court concluded that such a boycott was under the protection of freedom of expression as guaranteed by the German Constitution. More than a decade later, in the Blinkfuer case,259 the German Federal Constitutional Court developed its Lüth judgment. In Blinkfuer, Axel Springer, one of the leading companies in the German publishing market, sent a letter to all newspaper dealers calling on them to stop selling any media that disseminated television and radio schedules of East Germany. The letter also implied that the company “will consider whether they can justify continuing business relationships with”260 dealers who still continued selling such media. The Blinkfuer Magazine filed a tort complaint against the publishing house. When the issue went before the German
255 Willem v. France, ECtHR, 16 July 2009, Application no. 10883/05 256 The German approach is of course not binding on Turkey. Nevertheless, the German approach at this point is hardly distinguishable from the approach of the ECtHR. 257 It is possible to bring American boycott call cases- such as Naacp v. Claiborne Hardware, U.S. Supreme Court, 458 U.S. 886 (1982).- to attention, too. However, the state action doctrine as applied in American constitutional jurisprudence would render such an attempt in vein purely because European human rights law has a different take on horizontal application of human rights. 258 BVerfGE 7, 198 (1958) Available at: [https://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/centers/transnational/work_new/german/case.php?id=136 9] 259 BVerfGE 25, 256 (1969) Available at: [http://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/centers/transnational/work_new/german/case.php?id=650] 260 Ibid.
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Federal Constitutional Court, the publishing house claimed that they had only exercised their freedom of expression as modeled on the Lüth judgment. However, the German court distinguished Blinkfuer from Lüth on the basis that the boycott call in Blinkfuer was accompanied by an economic threat, which stripped the newspaper and magazine dealers of their freedom of choice. Therefore, Axel Springer’s boycott call could not enjoy protection under the guarantees of freedom of expression.
Some 50 years after the Lüth judgment, the ECtHR found a chance to judge the legitimacy of a boycott call in Willem v. France.261 In this case, Mr Willem, the mayor of Seclin, a municipality in northern France, in a town council meeting in the presence of journalists, explained his intentions to order city catering services to boycott foods produced in Israel, fruit juices in particular, as a reaction against the policies of the Israeli Prime Minister at the time, Ariel Sharon. Due to concerns raised by the public, he then repeated his call in a letter released on the official municipality website. The mayor of Seclin was sentenced by French authorities for inciting discrimination. When the dispute was brought before the Strasbourg court, the ECtHR first placed strong emphasis on the importance of freedom of expression. Then, the court underlined the fact that the mayor of Seclin was not sentenced because of his expressions, which were clearly declared to be under the protection of the guarantees of Article 10 of the ECHR, but because he arbitrarily encouraged municipal services to carry out a positive act of discrimination against a particular group of people.262 The ECtHR also stated that the letter posted on the website of the municipality of Seclin aggravated the discriminatory character of the position of the mayor of Seclin, which was confirmed by the use of polemical terms.263 Therefore, the ECtHR concluded that no violation of Article 10 was committed by the French state in the particular case.
As these judgments clearly demonstrate, boycott calls clearly benefit from free speech guarantees, both in German and Strasbourg jurisprudence. However, Prime Minister Erdoğan’s boycott calls are definitely distinguishable from what is defined as legitimate boycott calls in the Lüth, Blinkfuer and Willem judgments. First, Mr Lüth called for a boycott against a person purely because of that person’s career and actions in the past, and Mr Willem called for a boycott against products of a particular state for political reasons. However, Prime Minister Erdoğan called for a boycott against a particular group of people, not on the grounds of any legitimate or justifiable reason, but only because of who they are. Second, Mr Lüth did not implement any measures to force others to support his boycott call, unlike the Axel Springer publishing house. On the other hand,
261 "Willem v. France." 262 Ibid. para. 38 263 Ibid. para. 36
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Prime Minister Erdoğan, similar to the Axel Springer publishing house, clearly stated that whoever did not take his side in the fight against the Gülen movement would not go unnoticed.264 Even if such a direct emphasis is not made, a boycott call by a very popular and powerful prime minister already carries the potential to insinuate such a threat to third parties. Additionally, Prime Minister Erdoğan had already stated that, similar to the mayor of Seclin, state authority and power would be used to discriminate against the Gülen movement. Therefore, even if Prime Minister Erdoğan’s boycott call was not accompanied with blatant hate speech expressions, this boycott call could not possibly receive any protection under the guarantees of free speech.
Realizing contents of hate speech through governmental powers
Successful demonization of a particular group in a given society through the persistent utilization of hate speech is already a very grave and unprecedented situation in the history of the Council of Europe. Yet, increasing the seriousness of the situation by mobilizing state powers for this very purpose can only be defined as ultimate wrongdoing in Strasbourg jurisprudence, given the historical background that gave birth to the ECtHR. In the light of Strasbourg case law, it would be completely inaccurate to claim any dearth of incidents in which particular groups were discriminated against by member states of the Council of Europe. However, no member state of the Council of Europe has ever attempted to defend and insist on any unjustifiable discrimination when they were caught red-handed, let alone when such discrimination was publicly advertised and encouraged by state authorities in tandem with hate speech.
Prime Minister Erdoğan did what would precisely be branded as unacceptable in in any democratic society: He made it crystal clear that a particular group in society, the Gülen movement, was to be treated unfavorably by the state while he continued to use prima facie expressions of hate speech against them. He admitted that the actions of the government amounted to a “witch hunt” targeting the Gülen movement, while he reiterated his accusations of treason.265
264 “Anyone who is negligent in this struggle will betray this nation. Anyone who takes steps back, [or] intends to compromise and forget what has happened in the past will put a black mark on the trust of our people. Anyone who keeps silent by showing no reaction or who bows to threats and blackmail will go down in history as they are,” "Erdoğan Says His Gov't Will Carry out ‘Witch Hunt'," Today's Zaman, 11 May 2014. [http://www.todayszaman.com/news-347529-erdogan-says-his-govt- will-carry-out-witch-hunt.html] 265 “It is argued that the fight against the parallel structure [referring to the Gülen Movement] has turned into a ‘witch hunt’. Yes, my friends, if reassigning those [officials] committing treason is called a ‘witch hunt,’ then yes, we perform a ‘witch hunt,’ rest assured. We will act accordingly as we dig up people committing all kinds of provocative actions while they occupy offices. If we do not do that we will be committing treason against this country ourselves. I told my ministers repeatedly that we have to follow them step by step. This is not a simple struggle. Therefore I tell you my dear friends: You will tell us about them, wherever they are whoever they are. I am telling
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In the same speech, as the prime minister of Turkey, he addressed every citizen, including state officials, calling on them to spy on the Gülen movement so that the government could act accordingly.266,267 Unfortunately, this is not a one-off incident. Erdoğan expressed his wish on several occasions that the Gülen movement be treated unfavorably by state authorities.
In his speech at the Erzurum rally, Prime Minister Erdoğan stated that he would not let members of the Gülen movement rent halls from the state for their events.268 Indeed, after these remarks, the Gülen movement was not allowed to use state halls on some occasions.269 By the same token, businesses owned by members of the Gülen movement were raided by tax inspectors and the police270 while the media reported it as an operation against the “parallel state.”271 On another occasion, mining permits owned by a businessman close to the Gülen movement were cancelled,272 an act which would be declared illegal by the administrative courts,273 only a week after the Prime Minister Erdoğan targeted the mining facility.274 In another incident, a member of the Turkish Parliament and a former AKP member, Muhammed Çetin, a known sympathizer of the Gülen movement, was treated unfavorably and eventually was asked to leave the plane
this to all my citizens: You will tell us so that we will act accordingly. Look, I am speaking clearly; I mean I am telling it to all my mayors, all my regional representatives [of the AKP]… … Fighting against the parallel structure has become an unshakeable mission for the AKP… Everybody shall know that fighting against the parallel structure is a mission of the state, not individuals; it is also the policy of the AKP. We shall accept it like this. AKP, which is the party of the nation and established by the nation, together with the state, will continue fight against the parallel structure that threatens the nation and the country at all costs.” [translated by the author] "Herkes Konumunu Haddini Bilecek", http://www.aa.com.tr/tr/manset/326351--basbakan-erdogan-istisare- toplantisinda-konusuyor. 266 Ibid. 267 In all fairness, Prime Minister Erdoğan also added that they would act lawfully. However “witch hunt” and remaining within the confines of law are mutually exclusive. Because discrimination against a particular group of people on the ground of their identity by state authorities is a clear human rights violation as prohibited by Article 14 of the ECHR. 268 “They won’t be able to organize the Turkish Olympics anymore. That’s over now. Renting a hall from us … The subject is closed,”,” ‘No ; "Başbakan Erdoğan’ın Erzurum Mitingi’nde Yaptığı Konuşmanın Tam Metni", http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/basbakan-erdoganin-erzurum- mitinginde-yaptigi-konusmanin-tam-metni1/61370#1. 269 Behram Kılıç, "Herkes O’nu Kazandi," Aksiyon Dergisi, 28 April 2014. 270 Toygun Atilla, "Kaynak Holding’e Baskın," Hürriyet Gazetesi, 28 March 2014. [http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/26092467.asp] 271 "Paralel Yapının 2 Numarası Kaçtı," Sabah Gazetesi, 28 March 2014. [http://www.sabah.com.tr/Gundem/2014/03/28/paralel-yapinin-2-numarasi-kacti] 272 "Koza Altın'a Şok Karar," Hürriyet Gazetesi, 31 December 2013. [http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/25477294.asp] 273 "Koza Altın Tekrar Üretime Başlıyor," Hürriyet Gazetesi, 10 January 2014. [http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/25539429.asp] 274 "Başbakan Erdoğan: Güçlenerek Çıkarız," Radikal Gazetesi, 21 December 2013. [http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/basbakan_erdogan_guclenerek_cikariz-1167342]
46 Hate Speech and Beyond: Targeting the Gülen Movement in Turkey
by Turkish Airlines,275 a company partially owned by the Turkish state.276 At a later date, the president of Turkish Airlines stated on a television program that they might not sell tickets to Muhammed Çetin anymore.277 In another incident, Turkish Airlines withdrew $300 million before its expiry term from a bank that was established by the members of the Gülen movement, waiving a profit- sharing loss of $10 million,278 when the government started a run on the bank.279 In another example of arbitrary use of government powers against the Gülen movement, Mahir Zeynalov, an Azerbaijani national married to a Turkish citizen working at Today’s Zaman, was deported from Turkey by law enforcement authorities with no apparent reason.280
As the Gülen movement is active in over 150 countries, Prime Minister Erdoğan also actively tried to get other governments to treat it unfavorably. He admitted that in a meeting with the president of Azerbaijan he warned the Azerbaijani
275 With regards to the Turkish Airlines being a private actor actions of which are subject to private law, an objection might be raised. The test applied in Radio France and Others v. France, ECtHR, 23 September 2003, Application no. 53984/00 (dec) to determine capacity of the national radio broadcaster Radio France to apply to the ECtHR can be applied here as well, only this time to determine whether the perpetrator is state or not. With regards to the issue of whether Turkish Airlines is to be treated as a representative of the Turkish State, one cannot fail to notice the nexus between the Turkish Airlines and Turkish government. See: “…the Court takes the view that the liquidator may be regarded as a representative of the State… Even if the liquidator is a private person, in view of the nature of his duties and the fact that he is authorized by the domestic courts to discharge them, the Court is not persuaded that the State could avoid responsibility by delegating its obligations to this person” Kotov v. Russia, ECtHR, 14 January 2010, Application no. 54522/00 para. 52 However, in any case, any discussions on the applicability of the Strasbourg jurisprudence in this instant will be in vein. Because, Turkish state will be held liable for the discriminatory actions of the Turkish Airlines before the ECtHR due to its positive obligations emerging from the ECHR, even if Turkish Airlines is not to be treated as a representative of the Turkish State. Cp. Eweida and Others v. The United Kingdom, ECtHR, 15 January 2013, Application no. 48420/10 For illustrations of the application of the nexus test in the American jurisprudence also see: Evans v. Newton, 382 US 296(1966).; Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co, 457 US 922(1982).; Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts of Philadelphia, 353 US 230(1957).; Powe v. Miles, 407 F. 2d 73(1968).; Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co, 419 US 345(1974). 276 "Turkish Airlines Tries to Force Former Ak Party Deputy to Leave Plane," Today's Zaman, 23 February 2014. [http://www.todayszaman.com/news-340173-report-turkish-airlines-forces-former- ak-party-deputy-to-leave-plane.html] 277 "Turkish Airlines Blacklisting Critical Deputy Violates Constitutional Right," Today's Zaman, 15 April 2014. [http://www.todayszaman.com/news-344722-turkish-airlines-blacklisting-critical-deputy- violates-constitutional-right.html] ; "O Vekile Artık Bilet Yok," Milliyet Gazetesi, 15 April 2014. [http://siyaset.milliyet.com.tr/o-vekile-artik-bilet-yok/siyaset/detay/1867241/default.htm] 278 "Main Opposition Brings Plans to Sink Bank Asya to Parliament," Today's Zaman, 19 January 2014. [http://www.todayszaman.com/news-337030-main-opposition-brings-plans-to-sink-bank-asya-to- parliament.html] 279 "Turkey: The Erdogan-Gulen Showdown," Financial Times, 18 March 2014. [http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1b1d4ea0-ab8e-11e3-8cae-00144feab7de.html#axzz31ZVzr5e5] 280 "Azerbaijani Journalist for Today’s Zaman Leaves Turkey 'under Deportation Threat'," Hürriyet Daily News, 7 February 2014. [http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/azeri-journalist-for-todays-zaman- leaves-turkey-under-deportation-threat.aspx?PageID=238&NID=62143&NewsCatID=341]
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leader about the dangers of the Gülen movement.281 On another occasion, he tasked Turkey’s ambassadors to discredit the Gülen movement abroad, as he told the ambassadors that “[t]he true face of this organization should be clearly unveiled abroad as well.”282 Although it is possible to add more to this list, these should suffice to show the arbitrary ill treatment of the Gülen movement by the Turkish state.283
In this regard, the actions of Turkish state authorities also clearly deserve a detailed examination in the context of Article 14 of the ECHR, the provision that prohibits arbitrary discrimination.284 However, such an examination falls outside the scope of this research. With regard to the freedom of expression, the most comparable case in Strasbourg jurisprudence is Willem v France285. Yet the expressions of Prime Minister Erdoğan examined in this study differ from and are worse than those questioned in the Willem judgment on three grounds, even though the expressions of Mr Willem were already not compatible with the ECHR. First, Mr Willem made a boycott call completely based on political motives. In putting out a boycott call against food products produced in Israel, he did not extend his boycott to Jewish people. No accusation, neither before domestic courts nor before the ECtHR, was brought against him linking his boycott call to anti-Semitism or incitement to hatred. Second, his boycott call did not create any repercussions in the public services provided by the municipality of which he was the president. In other words, the discrimination that he promised to put into effect was not actually realized through implementation of state powers. Finally, the boycott call made by Mr Willem was not accompanied with expressions of hate speech against Jewish people or even against citizens of Israel. For these
281 Selçuk Şenyüz, "Cemaat Dosyası Verdi," Hürriyet Gazetesi, 5 April 2014. [http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/26157088.asp] 282 "PM Erdoğan Tasks Ambassadors with Fighting against ‘Treacherous Plot’," Hürriyet Daily News, 15 January 2014. [http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/pm-erdogan-tasks-ambassadors-with-fighting- against-treacherous-plot.aspx?pageID=238&nID=61109&NewsCatID=338] 283 For example see: "Despite Protests, Ministry Carries on Questioning at Schools, Dorms," Today's Zaman, 17 March 2014. [http://www.todayszaman.com/news-342351-despite-protests-ministry- carries-on-questioning-at-schools-dorms.html]; Murat Yetkin, "Erdoğan Escalates Elimination of Gülenists from State," Hürriyet Daily News, 3 May 2014. [http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/erdogan-escalates-elimination-of-gulenists-from- state.aspx?pageID=449&nID=65930&NewsCatID=409]; "Police Officer Reassigned for Attending Dershane Picnic," Today's Zaman, 28 April 2014. [http://www.todayszaman.com/news-346385- police-officer-reassigned-for-attending-dershane-picnic.html]; "Cadı Avı, Intihara Sürükledi," Zaman Gazetesi, 3 June 2014. [http://www.zaman.com.tr/gundem_cadi-avi-intihara- surukledi_2221916.html];"Academic Freedom at Universities under Growing Threat," Today's Zaman, 4 May 2014. [http://www.todayszaman.com/news-346827-academic-freedom-at-universities-under- growing-threat.html] 284 For more information on Strasbourg jurisprudence on discrimination see: Mowbray, Cases, Materials, and Commentary on the European Convention on Human Rights. Chapter 16; Harris, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights. Chapter 15; White, Jacobs, White and Ovey : The European Convention on Human Rights. Chapter 24 285 "Willem v. France."
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reasons, the expressions of Prime Minister Erdoğan amount to an unprecedented form of hate speech accompanied by exploitation of governmental powers.
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Conclusion
It is often said that law is politics just under another name. With the birth of modern human rights law, however, this is only partially true in Europe. Ever since particular groups of people were declared “bacilli” and arbitrarily persecuted by state authorities, Europeans have decided to put some red lines in place that politics cannot cross. The European Convention on Human Rights was created in the first place for this very purpose.
In this regard, the founders of the ECHR wanted to make sure that the unspeakable atrocities they suffered would remain in the pages of history books. As case law demonstrates, the European Court on Human Rights, in accordance with the impetus behind the creation of the ECHR, has adopted a strict approach to tackling incitement of hatred in Europe. In light of Strasbourg jurisprudence, the expressions of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan do not seem to comply with the values underlying the ECHR, notably tolerance, social peace and non-discrimination. Although he did not use the exact term “bacillus”, he declared the Gülen movement to be “viruses”,286 “traitors”,287 “perverts”,288 “hashashins”289 (assassins), “spies”,290 “terrorist organization.”291 Not only did he blatantly insult the movement, but he also encouraged the masses to do the same, and actually succeeded in creating mass hatred towards the Gülen movement.292 In the process, he put out a boycott call to exclude the Gülen movement from the layers of social life that led to repercussions among his supporters.293 In tandem with the boycott call, he declared that he would use the powers of the government to discriminate against the Gülen movement and started a “witch hunt.”294 For these reasons, in light of ECtHR case law, it is hard, if not impossible, not to consider Prime Minister Erdoğan’s expressions targeting the Gülen movement as unprecedented prima facie hate speech.
Unfortunately, the Gülen movement is only the most recent victim of the Turkish prime minister’s blatant expressions of hate speech. Only a year ago, another portion of Turkish society, the Gezi protestors, was also demonized, so much so
286 "PM Says State Will Fight against ‘Virus’ in Its Midst." 287 "Erdoğan: Bu Ne Cesaret, Bu Aşağılık Faaliyetin Hesabını Soracağız." 288 "Başbakan: Bunlar Sapık, Bunlar Kasetçi, Montajcı, Tweetçi!." 289 "PM Erdoğan’s Remarks on Hizmet Stir Animosity." 290 "Başbakan’dan Hizmet Hareketi'ne 'Casus' Suçlaması." 291 "Erdoğan'dan Gülen Cemaatine: Türkiye Hasımlarının Maşasıdır". 292 See pages 34- 293 See page 42 294 "Turkish PM Erdoğan Vows ‘to Sterilize’ Gülen Movement ‘by Boiling or Molecularizing’," Hürriyet Daily News, 11 May 2014. [http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-pm-erdogan-vows-to- sterilize-gulen-movement-by-boiling-or- molecularizing.aspx?pageID=238&nID=66327&NewsCatID=338]
50 Hate Speech and Beyond: Targeting the Gülen Movement in Turkey
that people lost their lives after they were declared to be “looters.”295 When other expressions of Prime Minister Erdoğan -- such as the ones declaring Shiites,296 foreigners297 and atheists298 bad -- and expressions of other leading figures of the AKP government -- such as the ones declaring Jews299 and some other groups300 bad – are taken into consideration, it would be fair to conclude that Turkey suffers, at the very least, from an institutional lack of willingness to fight hate speech.
In light of ECtHR case law, the aforementioned expressions of Prime Minister Erdoğan constitute prima facie hate speech and hence they should not enjoy any protection provided by the ECHR. At this stage, there may be two possible scenarios. First, since it is incumbent on Turkish authorities to close all avenues for such expressions to exist in Turkish social life, domestic hate speech guarantees would be invoked and expressions of Prime Minister Erdoğan would be defined and treated as hate speech. However, judging by the fact that expressions of hate speech are actually made by the very people who are supposed to enforce domestic hate speech guarantees in the first place, the first option does not seem to be realistic. Therefore, by default, the second case scenario is more likely to take place, in which the expressions of the Turkish prime minister will be treated as hate speech. In this case, the Turkish state could gain the distinction of being the very first state to be found guilty by the ECtHR of perpetrating hate speech, and possibly actions even beyond hate speech, since the establishment of the Council of Europe.
295 Sherlock, "Turkey: Erdogan Brands Protesters 'Extremists' and 'Looters'." 296 "Erdogan on Gülenists: They Are Worse Than Shiites". 297 "Erdogan Accuses Cnn Reporter of Spying," Daily Sabah, 3 June 2014. [http://www.dailysabah.com/nation/2014/06/03/pm-erdogans-strong-reaction-to-cnn-reporter]; "Der Spiegel Withdraws Reporter after Death Threats over Soma Disaster Story," Hürriyet Daily News, 20 May 2014. [http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/der-spiegel-withdraws-reporter-after- death-threats-over-soma-disaster-story.aspx?pageID=238&nID=66746&NewsCatID=339] 298 ““We opened a boulevard in Ankara on Monday [Feb. 24] despite the [protests of] leftists, despite those atheists.” "Turkish PM Erdoğan Calls Protesters Atheists, Leftists, Terrorists," Hürriyet Daily News, 28 February 2014. [http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-pm-erdogan-calls- protesters-atheists-leftists-terrorists.aspx?PageID=238&NID=63068&NewsCatID=338] 299 "Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Denies Remarks on 'Jewish Diaspora'." 300 Sedat Ergin, "Ermeni Olmak Suç Mu?," Hürriyet Gazetesi, 24 August 2012. [http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/21292053.asp] ; "Ex-Economy Minister's 'Jews, Zoroastrians or Atheists Attacked Gov't' Remarks Raise Concerns," Hürriyet Daily News, 9 March 2014. [http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/ex-economy-ministers-jews-zoroastrians-or-atheists-attacked- govt-remarks-raise-concerns.aspx?pageID=238&nID=63372&NewsCatID=338]
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52