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Hate Speech and Beyond: Targeting the Gulen Movement in Turkey

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Hate Speech and Beyond: Targeting the Gulen Movement in Turkey HATE SPEECH AND BEYOND: TARGETING THE GULEN MOVEMENT IN TURKEY TURKEY TASK FORCE RETHINK PAPER 16 June 2014 The Rethink Institute is an independent, not-for-profit, nonpartisan research institution devoted to deepen our understanding of contemporary political and cultural challenges facing communities and societies around the world, in realizing peace and justice, broadly defined. The Institute pursues this mission by facilitating research on public policies and civic initiatives centering on dispute resolution, peace building, dialogue development, and education. Toward these goals, the Institute sponsors rigorous research and analysis, supports visiting scholar programs, and organizes workshops and conferences. © Rethink Institute. All rights reserved ISBN: 978-1-938300-22-6 Printed in the USA Rethink Institute 750 First St., NE, Suite 1125 Washington, DC 20002 Phone: (202) 842-2026 [email protected] This publication can be downloaded at no cost at www.rethinkinstitute.org CONTENTS 1 Summary 3 Özet 5 Introduction 7 Part I Hate Speech in the Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights 8 Limitations on freedom of expression and hate speech 9 Three categories of abuse of freedom of expression 11 How is hate speech defined? 17 Part II The Gülen Movement as the Target of Hate Speech 17 Expressions by Prime Minister Erdogan targeting the Gülen movement 20 Applying the standards of the ECtHR: Do Prime Minister Erdogan’s expressions constitute hate speech? 28 Assessment 30 Part III Beyond Hate Speech 32 Mass hatred 33 Expressions of other leading figures of the ruling party 34 Expressions of media and journalists 38 Expressions of the general public 39 Boycotting the Gülen movement 39 Two elements worsening mass hatred 41 Dangers of mass hatred: Example of Gezi protestors 43 Legitimacy of boycott calls: German example and ECtHR case law 45 Realizing contents of hate speech through governmental powers 50 Conclusion Hate Speech and Beyond: Targeting the Gülen Movement in Turkey Summary On December 17, 2013, a graft probe alleging corruption among some members of the cabinet became public. Immediately thereafter, the Gülen movement (a.k.a. Hizmet), one of the largest faith-based communities in Turkey, became the target of offensive statements by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Erdoğan is one of the most influential political figures in the history of Turkey, and he has shaped the last decade of Turkish politics. From the standpoint of human rights law, there is little doubt that some of the prime minister’s statements are fundamentally incompatible with the principles underlying the concept of human rights. Some of these expressions, indeed, amount to prima facie hate speech as understood by the European Court of Human Rights, the jurisdiction of which is already accepted by Turkey. According to the European Court of Human Rights, any language which spreads, incites, promotes or justifies hatred based on intolerance, including racial and religious intolerance, is considered to constitute hate speech and is unworthy of protection under the guarantees of freedom of speech. As a matter fact, if the element of hatred is detectable at first sight, the European Court of Human Rights defines such language as abuse of freedom of expression. In this regard, some of the language used by Prime Minister Erdoğan to describe the Gülen movement - i.e. “perverts”, “hashashins”, “traitors”, “spies”, “worse than Shiites”, “leeches” and “a terrorist organisation” - do indeed constitute prima facie hate speech. A government leader’s perpetration of hate speech is unprecedented for Strasbourg jurisprudence. In case law in the European Court of Human Rights, there is not a single case in which a High Contracting Party to the European Convention on Human Rights has been convicted for failing to sanction individuals using hate speech, let alone for perpetrating hate speech itself. However, the expressions of the Turkish prime minister exhibit so much seriousness and vehemence that they tend to extend beyond the already existing contours of hate speech as drawn by the European Court of Human Rights. Not only did Mr. Erdoğan blatantly insult the movement, but he also encouraged the masses to do the same, and actually succeeded in creating mass hatred towards the Gülen movement. In the process, he put out a boycott call to exclude the Gülen movement from the layers of social life that led to repercussions among his supporters. In tandem with the boycott call, he declared that he would use the powers of the government to discriminate against the Gülen movement and started a “witch hunt.” For these reasons, in light of ECtHR case law, it is hard, if not impossible, not to consider Prime Minister Erdoğan’s expressions targeting the Gülen movement as unprecedented prima facie hate speech. 1 Turkey Task Force 2 Hate Speech and Beyond: Targeting the Gülen Movement in Turkey Özet 17 Aralık 2013 gününde, bazı kabine üyelerine karşı yürütülen yolsuzluk soruşturması günyüzüne çıktı. Bunun hemen akabinde, Gülen ya da Hizmet hareketi, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Başbakanı Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’ın hakaret içeren söylemlerinin hedefi haline geldi. Erdoğan, Türkiye tarihinin en önemli siyasal figürlerinden birisidir ve son on yıla mührünü vurmuştur. İnsan hakları hukuku açısından, Başbakan’ın bazı söylemlerinin, insan hakları kavramının altını çizen ilkelerle temelden uyuşmazlık gösterdiği konusunda şüphe yoktur. Hatta, bazı ifadeler, ilk değerlendirmede, yetkisi Türkiye tarafından da tanınan Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi açısından nefret söylemine karşılık gelmektedir. Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesine göre, ırka ve dine dayalı hoşgörüsüzlük de dahil olmak üzere, genel olarak hoşgörüsüzlüğe dayalı nefreti yayan, tahrik ve teşvik eden ya da meşrulaştıran her türlü dil, nefret söylemine karşılık gelmektedir. Bu türlü ifadeler, ifade özgürlüğünün koruması altında değildir. Hatta, nefret unsuru daha ilk bakışta farkedilebiliyorsa, Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi, bu tür söylemleri, ifade özgürlüğünün kötüye kullanımı olarak değerlendirmektedir. Bu açıdan bakıldığında, Başbakan Erdoğan’ın Gülen hareketini kastederek kullandığı dil – mesela “sapıklar”, “haşaşiler”, “hainler”, “ajanlar”, “Şiilerden daha kötüler”, “sülükler”, “terörist organizasyon” – ilk değerlendirmede nefret söylemini teşkil etmektedir. Strasburg yargısı açısından, bir hükümet liderinin nefret söylemini kullanması daha önce görülmemiş bir şeydir. Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesinin içtihadında, Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesine taraf olan bir ülkenin, nefret suçu işlemek bir yana, nefret söylemini kullanan bireyleri cezalandırmadığı tek bir dava yoktur. Bununla birlikte, Türkiye başbakanının ifadeleri o kadar ciddi ve ağırdır ki, Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesinin nefret söylemine ilişkin belirlediği çerçevenin dışına taşmaktadır. Erdoğan sadece harekete hakaret etmekle kalmamış, kitleleri de buna teşvik etmiş ve sonuçta Gülen hareketine karşı kitlesel bir nefretin oluşmasını sağlamıştır. Bu süreç içerisinde, Gülen hareketini toplumsal tabakalardan tecrit etme amacıyla bir boykot çağrısı yapmış, bu çağrı, kendisini destekleyen kitlelerde yankı bulmuştur. Boykot çağrısıyla eş zamanlı olarak, devletin bütün gücünü Gülen hareketine karşı kullanacağını belirtmiş ve kendi ifadesiyle bir “cadı avı” başlatmıştır. Bütün bu nedenlere bakarak, Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi içtihadı ışığında, Başbakan Erdoğan’ın Gülen hareketini hedef alarak kullandığı ifadelerin ilk izlenimde nefret söylemi olarak değerlendirilmemesi, imkansız olmasa da, son derece zordur. 3 Turkey Task Force 4 Hate Speech and Beyond: Targeting the Gülen Movement in Turkey Introduction Since the unfolding of the corruption investigation that began on December 17, 2013, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has been overtly targeting the Gülen movement (a.k.a. Hizmet), one of the largest faith based movements in Turkey,1 by persistent use of expressions which seem to constitute hate speech judging by the standards developed in case law in the European Court of Human Rights. As a matter of fact, targeting of the Gülen movement began in the last quarter of 2013 over an educational dispute and accelerated immediately after the beginning of the corruption investigation, in which three cabinet members were accused of taking bribes, facilitating money laundering and distribution of benefits to foreign nationals. Since then, thanks to relentless accusations by Prime Minister Erdoğan, the Gülen movement has been relegated in the minds of many to the status of being the usual suspects, of many, if not all, malevolent activities in Turkey. Even when the actual perpetrators of a crime are just nothing What really matters, in more than a mystery to state authorities, the context of this Prime Minister Erdoğan has not hesitated to study, is that a group declare the Gülen movement guilty.2 of people inspired and motivated by their While Erdoğan’s targeting of the Gülen movement resembles to hate speech, his faith seems to have expressions also carry other consequences. become a victim of First, due to the extraordinary popular support expressions of what for him, Erdoğan’s offensive language about appears to be prima the Gülen movement paved the way for instigation of mass hatred against the Gülen facie hate speech. movement. Moreover, while Prime Minister Erdoğan is aggressively targeting the movement, he is also calling on the nation to take action against the Gülen movement. He is actively encouraging a boycott against all establishments affiliated
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