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The Jihadi Threat to Indonesia Fighters Without Borders

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The Jihadi Threat to Indonesia Fighters Without Borders OBJECTIVE ·· RELEVANT ·· RIGOROUS || JUNE/JULYFEBRUARY 20202018 · VOLUME 13,11, ISSUE 26 FEATURE ARTICLE FEATURE ARTICLE A VIEW FROM THE CT FOXHOLE A VIEW FROM THE CT FOXHOLE TheFighters Jihadi Without Threat Brigadier General LTC(R) Bryan Price Borders Dagvin Anderson Forecastingto Indonesia new trends in the Iran threat network foreign operations Commander, Former Director, U.S. Special Operations Command Africa KirstenMatthew E. SchulzeLevitt Combating Terrorism Center FEATURE ARTICLE Editor in Chief 1 "Fighters Without Borders"—Forecasting New Trends in Iran Threat Paul Cruickshank Network Foreign Operations Tradecraft Matthew Levitt Managing Editor Kristina Hummel INTERVIEWS EDITORIAL BOARD 9 A View from the CT Foxhole: Brigadier General Dagvin R.M. Anderson, Colonel Suzanne Nielsen, Ph.D. Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command Africa Jason Warner Department Head Dept. of Social Sciences (West Point) 15 A View from the CT Foxhole: An Interview with an Official at Europol's EU Internet Referral Unit Brian Dodwell Amarnath Amarasingam Director, CTC Don Rassler ANALYSIS Director of Strategic Initiatives, CTC 20 The Cyber Threat from Iran after the Death of Soleimani Annie Fixler CONTACT Combating Terrorism Center 30 "Breaking the Walls" Goes Global: The Evolving Threat of Jihadi Prison U.S. Military Academy Assaults and Riots 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall Bennett Clifford and Caleb Weiss West Point, NY 10996 Phone: (845) 938-8495 Following the January 3, 2020, U.S. drone strike that killed Islamic Revo- Email: [email protected] lutionary Guard Corps Quds Force chief General Qassem Soleimani, there Web: www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/ is significant concern that Iran may seek to retaliate against U.S. interests in the Middle East, and possibly even in the U.S. homeland. In our feature article, Matthew Levitt SUBMISSIONS forecasts that “Iran and the foreign legion of Shi`a proxies at its disposal are likely to employ new types of operational tradecraft, including deploying cells comprised of operatives from various proxy The CTC Sentinel welcomes submissions. groups and potentially even doing something authorities worry about but have never seen to date, Contact us at [email protected]. namely encouraging Shi`a homegrown violent extremist terrorist attacks.” Annie Fixler assesses Iran will likely not order a major intensification of cyber operations against The views expressed in this report are the United States to avenge Soleimani per se, because “claiming credit [to make clear any attack is in those of the authors and not of the U.S. retaliation] also removes plausible deniability, which is one of the benefits of cyberattacks in the first Military Academy, the Department of the place.” Instead, she argues, the state-sponsored cyber threat from Iran will continue along its current Army, or any other agency of the U.S. elevated trajectory, driven to a significant degree by the Iranian regime’s desire to hit back because Government. of U.S. sanctions. Our feature interview is with Brigadier General Dagvin Anderson, Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command Africa. In our second interview, conducted by Amarnath Amarasingam, an Cover: A supporter of Lebanon's Iran-allied official at Europol’s EU Internet Referral Unit outlines how in November 2019, the unit coordinated Hezbollah movement with a Farsi inscription with messaging platforms, including Telegram, to carry out a major takedown of Islamic State chan- reading "Revenge Severely" written on her nels online. palm, holds a picture of Qassem Soleimani, At a time of continued concern over the security risk posed by the thousands of Islamic State fighters detained in northern Syria, Bennett Clifford and Caleb Weiss assess the global threat posed commander of the Quds Force of the Iranian by jihadi attacks on prisons and jihadi riots inside prisons. They document how from West Africa to Revolutionary Guard, who was killed in a U.S. Southeast Asia, targeting prisons systems in this way has continued to be a priority for the Islamic airstrike in Baghdad, as she attends a mass State and other jihadi groups. “In planning these types of attacks,” they write, “jihadis are interested rally and a televised speech by Hezbollah in restoring their force size, releasing incarcerated jihadi leaders or specialists, and/or creating a Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah. propaganda win.” (Marwan Naamani/picture alliance via Getty Paul Cruickshank, Editor in Chief Images) FEBRUARY 2020 CTC SENTINEL 1 “Fighters Without Borders”—Forecasting New Trends in Iran Threat Network Foreign Operations Tradecraft By Matthew Levitt death what he aspired toward but failed to achieve in life. Anoth- The threats to U.S. interests in the Middle East, and pos- er departure is more strategic— further solidifying the network of sibly in the U.S. homeland, increased in the wake of the Shi`a militant groups Soleimani quilted together under the Quds January 3, 2020, U.S. drone strike that killed Islamic Rev- Force. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has described the olutionary Guard Corps Quds Force chief General Qassem Quds Force as Tehran’s “fighters without borders,” but given the Soleimani and Iraqi Shi`a militia commander Abu Mahdi Quds Force’s control of this network of Shi`a foreign fighters, the al-Muhandis. While the primary overt objective of Iran term more aptly applies to the Quds Force and the Shi`a militant networks under its control.4 Hezbollah has already stepped in to and its proxies post-Soleimani will likely be to push all help guide Iraq’s various Shi`a militias, at least temporarily.5 Other U.S. military forces out of Iraq and the region, they will changes will likely be tactical, increasingly focused on trying to en- undoubtedly also want to avenge Soleimani’s death. And hance operational security and the potential to carry out terrorist as Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah has made clear, all operations with reasonable deniability. Iranian proxy militant groups will be expected to play their This article focuses on the areas of tactical adjustment that the parts in this campaign. When they do, Iran and the foreign Quds Force, Hezbollah, and other Shi`a militant groups might legion of Shi`a proxies at its disposal are likely to employ make to enhance their international terrorist attack capabilities. new types of operational tradecraft, including deploying First, the article explains why U.S. authorities are so animated by cells comprised of operatives from various proxy groups the potential threat of a terrorist attack against U.S. interests, possi- and potentially even doing something authorities worry bly in the homeland, following the Soleimani drone strike. Second, about but have never seen to date, namely encouraging it forecasts and assesses in turn two specific lines of operational ef- fort that authorities fear Iran and its proxies (led by the Quds Force Shi`a homegrown violent extremist terrorist attacks. and Hezbollah) are developing for future operations: (a) Deploying teams including non-Iranian and non-Leba- peaking in the wake of the January 3, 2020, U.S. drone nese Shi`a militants from around the world and representing strike in Baghdad that killed the commander of Iran’s a variety of Iranian proxy groups to carry out international Quds Force, Major General Qassem Soleimani, Hez- terror operations at Iran’s behest; and bollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah made clear that the response to the Soleimani assassination would (b) Developing and encouraging a terrorist trend common in be carried out by the full range of Shi`a militant groups beholden the world of Sunni extremism but not yet seen in the context S 1 to Iran far into the future. In the post-Soleimani era, Nasrallah of Shi`a extremism—Shi`a homegrown violent extremism intimated, operations by Iran and its web of proxy groups would (HVE). also deviate from traditional tactics. “Whoever thinks that this dear martyrdom will be forgotten is mistaken, and we are approaching The Threat to the United States a new era,” he said.2 U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies long assessed that To be sure, much of the established modus operandi honed over Iran and its proxy groups were unlikely to carry out an attack in the years of training and practice by the Quds Force and Hezbollah U.S. homeland, unless the United States took direct action under- will continue to feature prominently in Iranian and Iranian proxy mining their interests. operations.3 But Nasrallah’s vague pledge to modernize begs the For example, a 1994 FBI report, issued in the wake of the Hez- question: What might be expected of a “new era” of international bollah bombing targeting the AMIA Jewish community center in operations carried out by Iran and its proxy forces? Buenos Aires a few months earlier, downplayed the likelihood of One difference from past operations is opportunistic—priori- Hezbollah attacking U.S. interests, unless the United States took tizing the effort to push U.S. forces out of the Middle East. Iran actions directly threatening Hezbollah. “The Hezbollah leadership, will likely leverage Soleimani’s assassination to achieve with his based in Beirut, Lebanon, would be reluctant to jeopardize the rel- atively safe environment its members enjoy in the United States by committing a terrorist act within the U.S. borders,” it assessed. Dr. Matthew Levitt is the Fromer-Wexler fellow and director of The “However, such a decision could be initiated in reaction to a per- Washington Institute’s Reinhard Program on Counterterrorism ceived threat from the United States or its allies against Hezbollah and Intelligence. He has served as a counterterrorism official with interests.”6 the FBI and Treasury Department, and is the author of Hezbol- In 2002, the FBI informed the Senate Select Committee on In- lah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God.
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