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European Security Forum a Joint Initiative of Ceps and the Iiss EUROPEAN SECURITY FORUM A JOINT INITIATIVE OF CEPS AND THE IISS RUSSIA AND THE WEST ESF WORKING PAPER NO. 16 MAY 2004 WITH CONTRIBUTIONS BY MICHAEL EMERSON IRINA KOBRINSKAYA EUGENE B. RUMER ISBN 92-9079-492-5 © COPYRIGHT 2004, CEPS & IISS CENTRE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE EUROPEAN FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES POLICY STUDIES Place du Congrès 1 ▪ B-1000 Brussels, Belgium Arundel House ▪ 13-15 Arundel Street, Temple Place Tel: +32 (0)2.229.39.11 ▪ Fax: +32 (0)2.219.41.51 London WC2R 3DX, United Kingdom www.ceps.be ▪ E-mail: [email protected] Tel. +44(0)20.7379.7676 ▪ Fax: +44(0)20.7836.3108 www.iiss.org ▪ E-mail: [email protected] Russia and the West Working Paper No. 16 of the European Security Forum Contents From an Awkward Partnership to a Greater Europe? A European Perspective MICHAEL EMERSON 1 Russia and the West A Russian Perspective IRINA KOBRINSKAYA 14 New Challenges and Opportunities for the US and the EU in the 21st Century Which Place for Russia? An American Perspective EUGENE B. RUMER 20 From an Awkward Partnership to a Greater Europe? A European Perspective With a Post-Script Written after the Russian Presidential Election of 14 March Michael Emerson* ussia and the EU talk in their summit communiqués about their strategic partnership, but it seems like an awkward partnership. The relationship is not that bad, certainly R not life-threatening, but it is not that good either. There is the inevitability of a complex relationship, given proximity and massive complementarity in trade, yet there are huge differences in how the two parties view Europe and the world, and how they behave internationally. The complementarity factor in trade and lifestyle services is a bedrock that binds both parties in a stable relationship at a primary level. Russia exports oil, gas and other energy-intensive materials, which the EU buys in exchange for smart manufactured goods, holidays and secondary residences in the sun for the new Russian middle classes. Young Russians want a normal place in the modern world, both Western and European. All of this is positive, fundamental and durable. It makes a huge change for the better after the dreary decades of ideological hostilities and deadly strategic security threats. But even this complementarity leaves Russia uneasy, since it has developed a big case of the Dutch disease. The strength of oil and gas exports brings a high exchange rate that exacerbates the non-competitiveness of Russian manufacturing sectors. Russian politicians grumble about their country becoming just a raw-materials producer, and the new business leaders lobby hard for retaining high tariff protection, along with low gas prices for industry. This leads to frictions with the EU over trade policy and continuing blockage over Russia’s accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO). As foreign policy actors, the two entities are totally different animals. The EU is a vegetarian elephant and Russia is the bear that at times cannot resist growling out of bad humour and intimidating its smaller neighbours. Russia sees its former empire continuing to contract, seemingly relentlessly. The EU sees its quasi-empire growing, almost out of control. The EU is seen as normatively attractive in international relations, but is still more of a framework organisation than a foreign policy actor – lacking in discipline as a single force. Russia under President Vladimir Putin has become a much more coherent presence in international relations after the chaotic period of former leader Boris Yeltsin, yet it often lacks normative attractiveness for its neighbours. These fundamentals are today reflected in recent papers being exchanged by parties on both sides. On 9 February, the European Commission published a remarkably frank document on the state of the EU-Russian relationship, containing much internal self-criticism as well as 1 complaints directed at Russia. * Senior Research Fellow, CEPS, Brussels. 1 European Commission (2004), Communication of the Commission to the Council and European Parliament on relations with Russia, COM(2004)106, Brussels, 9 February (retrievable form www.europa.eu.int). | 1 2 | MICHAEL EMERSON For its part, Russia has transmitted an unpublished but much publicised list of 14 technical complaints in relation to EU enlargement, while Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov published an implicit reply to the Commission at a more strategic level (see Annex Box A.1). The EU’s self-criticisms. The recent Commission document comes in the aftermath of Silvio Berlusconi’s EU presidency and the summit with Russia in November 2003, which was hugely embarrassing. Mr Berlusconi improvised, clowning at the press conference as President Putin’s self-appointed advocate, clearing him of any criticism over either Chechnya or the Mikhail Khodorkovsky affair. Earlier, Mr Berlusconi had made speeches advocating Russia’s accession to the EU. But for the rest of the EU this was no joke, either on form or substance. With regard to form, the EU was revealing its incoherence at the top political level, coming after the searing split over Iraq earlier in the year. On substance, there was an apparent erosion of the EU’s priority attachment to fundamental political values. Even setting aside the ephemeral frivolities of Mr Berlusconi’s presidency, for President Putin there is apparently a problem of understanding how the EU works. A story is circulating about a fairly recent meeting between Mr Putin and the leader of a small EU state that has traditionally had a strong relationship of trust with Russia. At this bilateral meeting, Mr Putin asked why the EU institutions seemed to be so difficult to deal with, compared to his bilateral relationships with many EU leaders. The reply was that Mr Putin should not be surprised, since the member state leaders were so often inclined to make vague and friendly promises for things for which they no longer had competence at the bilateral level (e.g. visas and trade). The Commission’s document is partly about these internal issues, referring to the need to “clearly draw ‘red lines’ for the EU, positions beyond which the EU will not go”. Various other phrases repeat the same language: “to defend EU interests vigorously” and “discussing frankly Russian practices that run counter to universal and European values” along with “the need for increased coordination and coherence across all areas of EU activity – sending clear, unambiguous messages to Russia”. The self-criticisms are all the more justified, since there is a basic commonality of interest among the EU member states over Russia. This subject is nothing like the Iraqi affair, where the divisions were real and fundamental. The chances of the EU improving the coherence of its policy over Russia are therefore quite good and the institutional improvements of the proposed constitution – including the appointment of an EU foreign minister – could be especially useful, given the latent unity of EU interests. Moscow’s policy. What is Russia’s foreign policy, in particular towards Europe? The official answer is found in the recent press article by Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, which stresses the objective of creating a genuinely strategic partnership that is not impaired by various outstanding problems (which are listed in the article and reviewed later in this paper), nor diverted from the long-term strategic objectives. Independent analysts have the task of decoding or commenting on these official positions, which is done from a Russian standpoint by Dmitri Trenin (see extracts from his recent article in Box 1). Mr Trenin sees a form of 21st century Realpolitik evolving, rather than a values- driven strategy, and a foreseeable concentration of effort on the near-abroads (‘Operation CIS’), which in his view will mean growing competition with the EU. For the US, the strategy will be one of “limited partnership and local rivalry”. RUSSIA AND THE WEST | 3 Box 1. Moscow’s Realpolitik by Dmitri Trenin Relations with the West are not an ideological imperative, but an external resource for economic modernization. The elite think in terms of a 21st century Realpolitik as a combination of geopolitics and geo- economics with military might thrown in for good measure. Ideological preferences of governments and values of societies do not play a decisive role. ‘Integration’ implies promoting contacts with the international community in general, not absorption by one part of it. Membership of the European Union is out of the question. Russian- European relations are mostly restricted to trade and economic contacts and political debates over human rights and civil liberties. The Kremlin has made up its mind with regard to the United States: limited partnership and local rivalry. Russia accepts the need for self-restriction and concentration on vital interests. The major objective in the near future will come down to rearranging post-Soviet territory and establishing a centre of power under Russia's aegis. This new strategy may be called ‘Operation CIS’. Expansion of Russian capital into the former Soviet republics and Russia’s transformation into an economic magnet is a major factor in establishing the new centre of power. Establishing a common economic zone and a regional security framework with some former Soviet republics is a strategy for the next 20-25 years. All CIS countries will retain their sovereignty (Belarus may be the exception). Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, and countries of the southern Caucasus are ‘nearby foreign countries’ for the European Union. Russia’s active policy in the CIS will result in direct rivalry with the European Union over the future of these countries. Establishing a Russian centre of power will mean some serious sorting out of issues with the United States and the European Union. It will not be easy, but Russian leaders must prevent a confrontation with the West at all costs.
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