Sir William Cook, Placing Them in the Wider Context of Government Science
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The Hidden Persuaders Government Scientists and Defence in Post-war Britain A thesis submitted to Imperial College, London for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, January 2011 Alexandros-Panagiotis Oikonomou Centre for the History of Science, Technology and Medicine, Imperial College, London Abstract This thesis is the first systematic treatment of the role of scientists in the highest levels of decision and policy making in the British government. Its focus is on the crucial defence sector during the period from the end of the Second World War and up to the 1960‟s. It shows the strong influence of a number of career government scientists in the formulation of Britain‟s post-war defence policy and their crucial role in the making of two particular decisions, focusing on nuclear delivery systems. The thesis offers a number of correctives to the standard image which is prevalent in the bulk of the literature and offers a set of arguments that extend and re-enforce recent trends in the historiography, both of 20th century Britain and the history of science. It argues that the key scientists in relation to government were not external to the system, expert academics who enter government to offer their, usually critical, point of view (as in the case of the famous Sir Solly Zuckerman), but career scientific civil servants, nursed in the workings of Whitehall and the machinations of government and with broad experience in running large R&D projects. It analyses in detail the careers of the two most important among them, namely Sir Frederick Brundrett and Sir William Cook, placing them in the wider context of government science. It also argues, contrary to the view that post-war defence policy was driven mainly by inter-service rivalries, that the Defence Research Policy Committee of the Ministry of Defence became an important new element in the bureaucratic game in the 1950‟s. On the one hand, it shows that its chairman and Chief Scientific Adviser to the Minister, Sir Frederick Brundrett, was much more influential than has been recognised in the 1957 Defence White Paper and its focus on R&D, nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. On the other hand, Sir William Cook, the „father of the British H-bomb‟, was able to exert significant and at times decisive influence in the decisions to acquire the Polaris nuclear delivery system from the United States and to jump start its indigenous improvement programme, the Chevaline. 2 Contents Abstract.........................................................................................................2 List of Tables.................................................................................................7 Lists of Charts...............................................................................................7 List of Abbreviations......................................................................................8 Acknowledgements......................................................................................11 CHAPTER 1: Introduction..................................................................................................12 1.1 “They‟ve been there for years”...........................................................12 1.2 Starting Points: The British State, Scientists and Defence................15 1.3 British Defence...................................................................................18 1.4 Science, Scientists and the State.......................................................22 1.5 The Thesis .........................................................................................36 1.6 Sources...............................................................................................41 CHAPTER 2 Britain‟s Post-war Elite Defence Scientists, 1946-1964...............................43 2.1 Introduction..........................................................................................43 2.2 Prosopography of Elite Defence Scientists..........................................47 2.2.1 Education....................................................................................47 2.2.2 Career.........................................................................................52 2.2.3 Prestige.......................................................................................58 3 2.2.4 Fields of Expertise and Career Patterns in Government............64 2.2.5 The Athenaeum...........................................................................72 2.3 The Outsiders.......................................................................................74 2.4 Concluding Remarks............................................................................80 CHAPTER 3: The Lives and Careers of Sir Frederick Brundrett and Sir William Cook......85 3.1 Introduction...........................................................................................85 3.2 Sir Frederick Brundrett..........................................................................87 3.2.1 Early Life......................................................................................87 3.2.2 Early Career: World War I and the Inter-War Period...................88 3.2.3 World War II.................................................................................93 3.2.4 Post-War I: The Royal Naval Scientific Service..........................99 3.2.5 Post-War II: The ministry of Defence.........................................103 3.2.6 Retirement.................................................................................106 3.3 Sir William Cook..................................................................................106 3.3.1 Introduction................................................................................106 3.3.2 Early Life....................................................................................108 3.3.3 Early Career I: the „Cook Camera‟.............................................110 3.3.4 Early Career II: Rockets.............................................................111 3.3.5 Post-War I: The Guided Projectile Establishment (Westcott)....115 3.3.6 Post-War II: Royal Naval Scientific Service...............................119 3.3.7 Nuclear Knight I: The H-Bomb...................................................120 3.3.8 Nuclear Knight II: The United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority.....................................................................................122 3.3.9 Ministry of Defence....................................................................124 3.3.10 Retirement.................................................................................125 3.4 Concluding Remarks...........................................................................126 4 CHAPTER 4: The Defence Research Policy Committee (DRPC) and the Ministry of Defence in the 1950‟s..................................................................................130 4.1 Introduction.........................................................................................130 4.2 The Committee...................................................................................131 4.2.1 Origins and Place in the Ministry of Defence: Continuity and Channels of Authority....................................................................131 4.2.2 Composition..................................................................................142 4.2.3 The Defence Research Policy Staff..............................................143 4.2.4 Function.........................................................................................146 4.3 Concentrating Influence in the Ministry of Defence............................151 4.3.1 Institutional Control: The Importance of the Defence Research Policy Staff and the Chairman of the Staff....................................152 4.3.2 DRPC Vs Ministry of Supply..........................................................161 4.3.3 The Ministry of Defence, the Bomb and Guided Weapons..........172 4.3.4 Control of Committees...................................................................184 4.3.5 The Ministry of Defence and Nuclear Intelligence........................185 4.4 Concluding Remarks...........................................................................190 CHAPTER 5: Scientists and Defence Policy in the 1950‟s................................................194 5.1 Introduction.........................................................................................194 5.2 Defence policy in the 1950‟s...............................................................199 5.3 Brundrett and the MoD scientific lobby in the 1950‟s..........................201 5.3.1 Research and Development Priorities and Harold Macmillan......201 5.3.2 Active Lobbying.............................................................................208 5.3.3 Brundrett and the Treasury............................................................214 5.4 The 1957 White Paper on Defence.....................................................217 5.5 Concluding Remarks...........................................................................220 5 CHAPTER 6: Nuclear Weapons Policy in the 1950‟s and 1960‟s......................................226 6.1 Introduction: Brundrett, Cook and Zuckerman in 1958.......................226 6.2 Nuclear Weapons Delivery Systems...................................................228 6.2.1 Brundrett and the Royal Navy‟s Nuclear Ambitions......................228 6.2.2 Cook and Zuckerman: Polaris.......................................................241