Assessment of U.S.-Soviet Detente: Philoso Phies of Action and Reaction
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University Microfilms International 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor. Michigan 481OG USA St. John's Road, Tyler's Green High Wycombe, Bucks, England HP10 8HR MASTERS THESIS 13-11,007 SEABOLD, Walter G. AN ASSESSMENT OF U.S.-SOVIET DETENTE: PHILOSO PHIES OF ACTION AND REACTION, The American Univeslty, M.A., 1977 Political Science, international law and relations University Microfilms International,Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 AN ASSESSMENT OF U.S.-SOVIET DETENTE; PHILOSOPHIES OF ACTION AND REACTION by Walter G. Seabold Submitted to the Faculty of the School of International Service of The American University in partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts International Studies: International Relations/RIS: USSR Signatures of Committee ^ Chairman: Date Date 1977 The American University Washington, D.C. 20016 THE AMERICAII UüîVùRuiïY LlK'AZï si si TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION............................................. 1 Chapter I. DETENTE: AN OVERVIEW OF PERSPECTIVES, DEFINITIONS, AND CA U S E S .......................................... 4 II. THE PHILOSOPHY OF DETENTE ............................. 29 Marxism in Soviet Domestic and Foreign Policy From the American Perspective From the Soviet Perspective III. THE COURSE OF DETENTE: JANUARY 1975-JUNE 1977 . 68 Foreign Policy Aspects of Secretary Brezhnev's Report to the Soviet 25th Party Congress, February 24, 1976 IV. THE FUTURE OF DETENTE ................................. 97 Obstacles to Detente Factors Favorable to Detente The Impact of Ideology on Detente Prospects for Detente BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................... 115 11 Introduction The impetus for this study came out of a question put to Dr. Thomas T. Hammond of the University of Virginia during his lecture to the Soviet-East European Research Colloquium at George Washington University during Fall 1975. Dr. Hammond's lecture explored changing Soviet attitudes toward detente with the United States and the West while, at the same time, being confronted with problems and dilemmas about supporting revolutions and national liberation movements through out the lesser developed countries. Dr. Hammond noted some of the varying interpretations for the apparent duality in Soviet rhetoric and action in international affairs. The two extremes concerning detente were: 1) that detente is merely a trick or feint by the Soviets and that they are doing all they can to promote revolutions and communist takeovers in less developed countries at the expense of the United States and the West; or 2) the Soviets have really lost their revolutionary elan, and detente will eventually actually change the nature of Soviet policies both internally and internationally, The truth, of course, according to Dr. Hammond, lies some where in between. To be sure, there have been great variations in Soviet foreign policy, not only in the present day, but historically as well. Dr. Hammond listed a number of factors which may enable students of detente foreign policy to better understand the directions and motivations for Soviet foreign policy and detente. Dr. Hammond contended that the most important factor in the Soviet formulation of foreign policy is the interplay between (or versus) the Soviet national interest and the requirements of the communist ideology. The national interest and welfare and maintenance of the Soviet Union and its leader ship is most probably the top priority, but the Soviets do not feel that they can neglect in any way the ideological justification for their actions in international affairs. Indeed, at times, the Soviets seem almost paranoid in provid ing ideological explanations for their actions internationally, as well as internally. This raised questions and doubts about how long the Soviet Union could keep up the duality aspect of their foreign policy, especially under the pressures of detente with the United States, in which the Soviets become much more exposed in policy terms and questions to criticism from their "enemy." My question to Dr. Hammond concerned this problem of the dual nature of Soviet foreign policy and the images associated with it. In fact, there are several questions which can be raised in this context, which I hope to explore in this study. If the dual nature of Soviet foreign policy is seen as contradictory (as it usually is in the West), then it seems that an understanding and either an unconscious or conscious application of Marxian dialectics and the Marxist-Leninist philosophy can account for the duality in Soviet foreign policy, Such an application would enable the Soviets to keep up the dual nature of pronouncements and actions on the international scene. In other words, is detente specifically, or can detente be considered, part of an overall plan for Soviet policy makers, in historical contradiction to traditional Soviet non planning in foreign affairs, while the rest of Soviet life is fairly rigidly planned? To what extent does the Marxist dialectic and philosophy influence ideological justification for actions in Soviet foreign policy? The dialectical nature of communist development has been cited and used throughout Soviet history internally. How does the dialectical philosophy help to explain foreign policy and, if it does help, what implications for current and future perceptions and policies about detente can we deduce for both the Soviet Union and for the United States in pursuing the policy of detente with the Soviet Union? The above questions briefly outline the perspective I wish to explore in this study. A comment on the scope of the study would be fruitful at the outset. Even if ideology is applied in a fully manipulative way, at the minimum, it provides the vehicle and the language of Soviet policy, involving recognition of that ideology as the framework to understanding and explaining reality. The nature of this study is to be based in philosophy and any conclusions reached will most likely be speculative. First, I wish to explore the issues of detente and will provide a recounting and analysis of the course of detente from January 1975 to the first months of the Carter Administration in 1977. Included in this will be an analysis of the foreign policy aspects of General Secretary Brezhnev's report to the Soviet 25th Party Congress in February 1976. Next, I will explore the Soviet philosophy and perceptions and definitions of detente, and how these compare with the attitude of the United States. Lastly, I will attempt to make some speculative conclusions on the prospects for detente in the realm of future Soviet-American relations. Chapter I . Detente; An Overview of Perspectives, Definitions, and Causes. Soviet Perspective on Detente In international affairs the Soviet Union presents a paradox; its military power is enlarging to the point of achieving nuclear parity with the United States, yet in recent years the energy expended in foreign policy has given the appearance of being carefully measured. Power thrusts were more subtle and unobtrusive than those under Khrushchev, though the commitment to the goals of Communism was never less intense. As Professor Petrov observed, "Since the fall of Khrushchev, the trend of Soviet policies has been away from international revolutionary activism and toward building up Russia’s own strength and influence as a global power.In turn, Petrov quotes Roman Kolkowicz who wrote : "The Brezhnev regime seems to have assessed Khrushchev's policies in the Third World negatively and, abandoning the ’optimistic' premises of that policy, seeks to follow a policy of 'realism'. This implies a more careful, orderly and prudent assessment of the costs — gains involved in the economic, military and political initiatives in the Third World. It suggests a 2 policy that is at once tougher as well as more prudent." With a few exceptions, a modified retreat from globalism appears to have been a characteristic of Soviet foreign policy during the Brezhnev era. Both the adventurism and the rhetoric of the Khrushchev era are notably absent. Changing power relationships in the world, the mistakes and excesses of Khrushchev, the awareness of pressing internal economic problems. and the character of the present leadership seem to have imposed a certain conservatism, even caution, in foreign policy.