Strategic Change for NATO: Incremental Response from an Organizational Perspective
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Abstract LEGREE, LAWRENCE FREDERICK. Strategic Change for NATO: Incremental Response From an Organizational Perspective. (Under the direction of Dr. Roland Stephen) In his article on the persistence of NATO after the Cold War, Robert McCalla frames the following question: How do alliances respond to changing strategic circumstances? The focus of this project is to explore McCalla’s question from an organizational perspective. The thesis details the following chain of logic: NATO is an institution that possesses bureaucratic characteristics and these characteristics can be understood through theories of organizations. Specifically, the manner in which NATO is evolving is consistent with the descriptive theory of incrementalism. Political-military policy formation that provides the substance to the debate over NATO’s future is described in terms of an incrementalist model to demonstrate that change to the structure and role of NATO will take place under predicable circumstances. Policy makers within the organizational and institutional regime of NATO continue to adapt to new missions that are congruent with patterned expectations. The predominant finding is that NATO shows evidence of change under the mechanism of incrementalism. This mechanism will remain a valid model for future determinations of NATO’s persistence. Strategic Change for NATO: Incremental Response From an Organizational Perspective by Larry LeGree A thesis submitted to the Graduate Faculty of North Carolina State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts Political Science Raleigh 1999 APPROVED BY: ___________________________ _______________________ Dr. Andrew Taylor Dr. William Boettcher Associate Professor of Political Science Associate Professor of Political Science North Carolina State University North Carolina State University ________________________________ Dr. Roland Stephen Chair of Advisory Committee Associate Professor of Political Science North Carolina State University Biography The author is an active duty Lieutenant in the United States Navy. He graduated with a Bachelor of Science degree in Control Systems Engineering from the United States Naval Academy in Annapolis, MD in 1991. Following service onboard USS SCOTT (DDG 995), he completed nuclear power training before serving onboard USS ENTERPRISE (CVN 65). Lieutenant LeGree received a Masters in Public Administration from North Carolina State University in May, 1998. He is currently pursuing coursework through the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island and will report onboard USS JOHN YOUNG (DD 973) in August of 1999 as the Combat Systems Officer. iii Table of Contents List of Tables . v List of Figures . .vi Why NATO Endures: Several Perspectives . .1 Institutions and Organizations . 8 Organizational and Institutional Dynamics . .8 Bureaucratic Expansion and Organizational Survival . .12 Organizational Incrementalism. 19 The Theory of Incrementalism. 20 The Utility of an Incremental Approach. 25 The Best Environment for Successive Limited Comparisons. .28 NATO and Incrementalism. .31 Analysis. .31 The Decision Matrix and NATO. .36 Institutional Engagement and NATO’s Small States. 39 Conclusion. 44 Source Material. 45 iv List of Tables Table 1: Summary of arguments for NATO’s persistence . 36 v List of Figures Figure 1: Policy Decision Matrix . 28 Figure 2: Policy Decision Matrix for NATO . 37 vi Why NATO Endures: Several Perspectives In Robert McCalla’s work regarding the persistence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) after the Cold War, the question of NATO in a post-Cold War security environment is analyzed.1 He reviews the premises and weaknesses of neorealist, organizational and international institutionalists theories in their application to NATO and draws conclusion about the future of the alliance. By pointing out the shortfalls of neorealist theory, McCalla argues that organizational explanations for NATO’s persistence have merit. In particular, the mechanism of adaptation is advanced as a key feature that allows regimes and international organizations to modify their goals and objectives. The direction taken in this paper is to expand on McCalla’s discussion about NATO and adaptation using theories from the study of organizations. The initial conditions under which NATO formed bear little relation to the prevailing conditions under which it endures. Since the implosion of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, few security analysts envision the need to fight the European continental tank war of the past. Indeed, the leaders of NATO have focused on new threats, such as those posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the destabilizing effects of ethnic instability, and the role of NATO in out-of-area operations. The important question, as posed by McCalla, becomes examining the form of NATO after the Cold War in light of changed strategic circumstances. Political complexity, alliance dynamics and national interests obviate a simple answer to this question. Although there is some consensus on the future missions and roles of NATO, there remains no firm consensus on how to achieve these goals. Some view 1 NATO as a measure of insurance against the revival of Russian power. Others see NATO as a vehicle for politically acceptable German involvement in Europe. Alternatively, NATO is viewed as a means for exporting stability and ensuring democratic development in the new democracies of central Europe, and as an instrument for developing multilateral responses to new security issues in and beyond Europe’s borders.2 For now, collective defense remains at the core of the alliance. However, conventional wisdom argues that collective defense may lose its primacy as the future security architecture of Europe is redefined in the next century. Given these conflicting premises, the task of determining NATO’s response to changed strategic circumstances requires a framework from which to begin analysis. Robert Koehane has stated that every good political scientist should start any analysis from a standpoint of self-interest.3 In this spirit, self-interest provides an excellent starting point for examining existing arguments about NATO’s persistence. A common explanation for the formation of the NATO alliance is the balance of power concept. This concept takes the premise that states enter into alliances4 and coalitions with other states to prevent domination by a stronger state. States enter into arrangements because greater influence is to be had by joining the weaker side of an alliance (conceivably, the weaker side needs more help and is likely to allow greater concessions to new members). Furthermore, a dominant power makes for a less reliable ally because incentives to maintain good standing are asymmetrical. Balance of power is made easier when 1 McCalla, Robert B., “NATO’s persistence after the Cold War,” International Organizations,50,3,Summer 1996. 2 For a presentation of the challenges of articulating a new mission for NATO, see Sloan, pp. 19-23. 3 Remark made during a presentation at North Carolina State University on 26 Oct 1998. 4 Using Stephen Walt’s definition of an alliance as a formal or informal relationship of security cooperation between two or more sovereign states. 2 common cultural values exist and objectives are shared.5 The story of the Cold War receives straightforward application from this perspective. Bandwagoning behavior is the opposite concept. States ally with the stronger side for defensive reasons to ensure survival or from a desire to share in the success of the strong state. Both of these ideas, balance of power and bandwagoning, tend to orient around capabilities. Another well-known explanation to explain the persistence of NATO follows from this idea. Stephen Walt suggests states ally to balance against threats rather than against power alone. The safe course from an individual state perspective is to equate capabilities with intentions. This is a variation to the conventional balance of power idea, in which states evoke balancing or bandwagoning behavior based on geostrategic factors. Walt develops the idea that “balancing” and “bandwagoning” deserve revision beyond pure considerations of power into the realm of perceptions of power and the attendant threat of such power. States enter into alliances and coalitions, not out of pure power considerations, but out of threat perceptions.6 Threat perceptions drive state behavior and illuminate reasons why some states evince bandwagoning behavior while others seek to maintain the balance of power. Such a theory readily explains the behavior of states during the Cold War, but does little to anticipate the form an alliance may take once the threat perception is diminished or absent. A further prevalent explanation for NATO’s continuance is that survival, the most fundamental interest, drives alliance behavior. Indeed, the unacceptable costs of nuclear war ensure NATO’s unique founding and continuance. Applications of game theory weigh this variable heavily when determining possible outcome pairs. One would expect 5 Carr & Infantis, p. 106. 6 See Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances. 3 a multiple play strategic dilemma game to eventually approach an optimal condition. However, the costs of nuclear war as envisioned by strategists during the Cold War simplified the number of possible outcomes. NATO’s options were in fact limited by the threat of a nuclear exchange during the Cold War. The standard assumption in game theory