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1 Adorno, Foucault, and the End of Progress Amy Allen Department Of 1 Adorno, Foucault, and the End of Progress Amy Allen Department of Philosophy Women’s and Gender Studies Program Dartmouth College DRAFT – October 15, 2014 Unlike Habermas, Honneth, and Forst, the thinkers of the first generation of the Frankfurt School were extremely skeptical about the idea of historical progress, to say the least. In his ninth thesis on the philosophy of history, Walter Benjamin famously depicted progress as the storm that blows in from Paradise and irresistibly propels the angel of history into the future. With his back to the future, the angel of history faces the past and “sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet.”1 Following Benjamin, though only up to a point,2 Adorno pithily encapsulates this view of progress in his lectures on History and Freedom: the only progress we can discern in history goes from “the slingshot to the megaton bomb” and progress in this sense “may well provoke satanic mockery” (HF, 159). Moreover, for Adorno, the catastrophe of AuschwitZ “makes all talk of progress towards freedom seem ludicrous” and even makes the “affirmative mentality” that engages in such talk look like “the mere assertion of a mind that is incapable of looking horror in the face and that thereby perpetuates it” (HF, 7). Importantly, as I pointed out in chapter one, Adorno doubted not that progress in the future was possible but rather that any sense could be made of the claim that progress in the past is actual, and he was extremely critical of the ways in which belief in the latter becomes a kind of blind faith or ideological mystification that stands in the way of attempts to achieve the former. This is what motivates his paradoxical sounding claim that “progress occurs where it ends” (P, 150). 2 Adorno’s skepticism about any and all backward looking claims about historical progress is shared by one of the other great historico-philosophical thinkers of the late twentieth century, Michel Foucault. Already in his first major philosophical work, the History of Madness, Foucault announced his intention to write a history that would “remove all chronology and historical succession from the perspective of a ‘progress’, to reveal in the history of an experience, a movement in its own right, uncluttered by a teleology of knowledge or the orthogenesis of learning. The aim here is to uncover the design and structures of the experience of madness produced by the classical age. That experience is neither progress nor a step backward in relation to any other” (HM, 122). Foucault’s skepticism about claims to progress was motivated less by a moral reaction to the horrors of the twentieth century – though clearly there is a moral sensibility at work in his analyses of the ways in which progress in the human sciences is predicated upon the exclusion of madmen, social deviants, homosexuals and other ‘abnormals’ – than by the philosophical point, also made by Adorno, that traditional conceptions of historical progress presuppose a suprahistorical, atemporal point of view that we now know to be a metaphysical illusion. In this sense, both Foucault and Adorno can be understood as attempting to break out of – at least a certain interpretation of – Hegelian philosophy of history and its closely related conception of dialectics. And yet Foucault, like Adorno, remained firmly committed throughout his career to the basically Hegelian thought that philosophy – understood as a project of critique – is a historically situated endeavor, that philosophy consists in a critical reflection on our historical present that makes use of conceptual tools that are themselves the products of history. In this sense, both thinkers can be understood as attempting to think through the possibilities for a thoroughly historicized understanding of critical 3 philosophy once we no longer have recourse to the notion of the Absolute, that is to say, to think through Hegel but also beyond him. For these reasons, and others that will be explored in this chapter, Foucault can and should be thought of as Adorno’s other “other son.”3 Precisely because of their skepticism about progress, Adorno and Foucault are often read as offering a negative philosophy of history, a Verfallsgeschichte, conservative story of history as a process of decline and fall that is, as Habermas put it, “insensitive to the highly ambivalent content of cultural and social modernity” (PDM, 338). Habermas maintains that Adorno and Foucault follow NietZsche in collapsing the distinction between validity and power, and that this leads them to a totaliZing critique or abstract negation of the normative content of Enlightenment modernity.4 In what follows, I counter this interpretation and argue that the critiques of progress found in Adorno and Foucault are in the service of a broader project of immanent critique that aims not at an abstract negation of the normative inheritance of modernity but rather at a fuller realiZation of that inheritance. In other words, the critique of progress need not result in a totaliZing critique of modernity but rather can be understood as part and parcel of an immanent critique of modernity that aims to compel those who have inherited the project of the enlightenment to live up to its own normative ideals of freedom, inclusion, and respect for the other. I should emphasiZe at the outset, however, that my aim here is neither to compare Adorno and Foucault – though I will of course point out some commonalities and some differences along the way – nor is it to synthesiZe them – though I will be weaving together some of their insights. Rather, the aim of this chapter is to recover some of the insights of Adorno’s philosophy of history and his moral philosophy read in conjunction with 4 Foucault’s early work on history to construct an alternative framework for thinking through the relationship between history and normativity. I also hope to press these insights into the service of addressing some of the problems, diagnosed in previous chapters, that contemporary critical theory has encountered in its attempt to ground normativity in either a deflationary, pragmatic, and contingent but still broadly speaking Hegelian account of historical progress or a neo-Kantian conception of practical reason. This may seem like a strange or quixotic project since not only is it often assumed that Adorno and Foucault had totaliZing negative philosophies of history that were tied to romantic and ultimately conservative attempts to reclaim some mythic past, it is also often assumed that neither thinker makes a serious contribution to normative theoriZing. Adorno’s overwhelming negativism and his cultural pessimism are thought to place him outside ethics, and Foucault’s paranoia about power and his cryptonormativism are said to render him normatively confused.5 I hope that this chapter will give the reader some reasons to re-think this received wisdom regarding these two thinkers, but I won’t be attempting a full scale reconstruction of either much less both of their positions on morality or ethics here, since such a project would require a separate book. In the case of Foucault, I have attempted to reconstruct his normative position in some of my previous work;6 in the case of Adorno, I will lean on some excellent recent reconstructions of his normative project.7 As I said, my main focus here will be on mobiliZing some of Adorno and Foucault’s insights to construct an alternative to the Hegelian and Kantian accounts of the relationship between normativity and history that have been put forward by Habermas, Honneth, and Forst. 5 I begin in sections one and two by briefly reconstructing the alternative histories of Enlightenment modernity presented in Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment and Foucault’s History of Madness. I read these two texts alongside one another – and in conjunction with each thinker’s methodological reflections on the philosophy of history – not only because these texts offer the best account of why their authors are skeptical of the idea that European modernity is the result of a story of historical progress but also because both texts sketch out what I will call, following Adorno’s use of this term, a determinate negation of Hegelian philosophy of history. That is to say, both texts focus on an issue that was central to Hegel’s philosophy of history, namely the historically emergent relationship between reason and power, and they do so from within a historiciZed version of the Kantian project of critique – that is, from within a broadly speaking Hegelian philosophical framework. However, both texts engage in this historicized version of Kantian critique while steadfastly refusing to take up the kind of teleological or progressive reading of history that these authors took to be central to Hegel’s version of dialectics. However, this does not mean that these texts should be read – as they often are – as negative philosophies of history that trade on a naïvely romantic vision of some mythic past. Rather, as I argue in section three, an alternative methodology for the philosophy of history can be found in the work of Adorno and Foucault. This methodology weaves together vindicatory and subversive genealogies – and, as such, it reconstructs history as a story of both progress and regress – in the service of a distinctive genealogical aim: a critical problematiZation of our present historical moment. Moreover, this problematiZation of our historical present aims not at a totaliZing refusal of the 6 normative content of modernity but rather at a fuller realiZation of that content, in particular, the norms of freedom and respect for the other. The Dialectic of Progress: Adorno and the Philosophy of History8 The Dialectic of Enlightenment opens with a thunderbolt: “Enlightenment, understood in the widest sense as the advance of thought, has always aimed at liberating human beings from fear and installing them as masters.
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