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M. BENINGA Paul-Crescent, Dr. MANGA ESSAMA Déflorine Grâce, Dr. MOGBA Zéphirin Jean Raymond PERSISTENCE OF THE CRISIS IN THE : UNDERSTANDING IN ORDER TO ACT

M. BENINGA Paul-Crescent, Dr. MANGA ESSAMA Déflorine Grâce, Dr. MOGBA Zéphirin Jean Raymond

PERSISTENCE OF THE CRISIS IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UNDERSTANDING IN ORDER TO ACT Translated from French by Diom Richard Ngong [email protected]

Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Yaounde (), 2018. Tel. 00 237 222 21 29 96 / 00 237 222 21 52 92 B.P. 11 939 Yaounde / Fax: 00 237 222 21 52 74 E-mail : [email protected] Site : www.fes-kamerun.org Editorial design by PUA : www.aes-pua.com ISBN: 978-9956-532-06-1

Any commercial use of publications, brochures or other printed materials of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung is strict- ly forbidden unless otherwise authorized in writing by the publisher This publication is not for sale All rights reserved No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photo print, microfilm, translation or other means without written permission from the publisher TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS …………………………………….....…………………………………………….....……………...... …………………………………….....………….…...... ……...... 5

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS……………………………………………….....……………...... ………………………………………...... ……………...... 6

INTRODUCTION …………………………………….....……………...... ………………………...... ………………….....……………...... …………………………………….....……………...... 7

CHAPTER I: ACTORS OF INSTABILITY IN THE CAR: INTEREST AND DISINTEREST

IN SUSTAINABLE PEACE…………………………………….....……………...... ……………………………….....……………...... ……………………………………...... ……………...... 9

1- Internal actors: interests, motives, and ability to act or to harm …………………………………….....……...... ………...... 9

a- Political and security actors …………………………………….....…...... …………...... 9

b- Military and paramilitary actors: Defense and security forces and armed groups ...... 10

c- Other actors .…………………………………….....…………….…………………………………….....……………...... …………………………………….....……...... ………...... 12

2- External actors …………………………………….....……………...... …………………………………….....……………...... …………………………………….....……...... ………...... 13

a- State actors …………………………………….....……………...... …………………………………….....……………...... …………………………………….....…....…………...... 13

b - Intergovernmental organizations involved in the crisis ……………………………………...... ……………...... 16

CHAPTER II: DYNAMIICS OF THE CONFLICT IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC:

A STATE IN FRAGILITY!…………………………………………………………….....……………...... …………………………………….....……………...... …………….....……………...... 19

1- Factors perpetuating the crisis: is the CAR a “failed” State or a “State in Fragility”? ………...... 20

a- The internal vulnerability of the country …………………………………………………….....……...... …………………….....……………...... 20

b- Splintering of armed groups and worsening of intercommunity tensions …….....……………...... 20

c- Absence of a collective memory …………………………………….....……………...... …………………………………….....……...... ……...... 21

2- Recommendations …………………………………….....……………...... …………………………………….....…...... …………...... 22

a- To the government to enable it to restore State authority throughout the country ...... 22

b- To political parties …………………………………….....……………...... …………………………………….....……………...... ……………………….....……………...... 24

c- To civil society …………………………………….....……………...... …………………………………….....……………...... ………………………………….....……………...... 24

d- The international and African communities should …………………………………….....…………………….....……………...... 24

BIBLIOGRAPHY ………………………………………………….....……………...... …………………………………….....……………...... ……………………….....……………...... 25

Persistence of the crisis in the Central African Republic: understanding in order to act

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS and writer on the crisis in the Central African Republic (Une Centrafrique au bord du dése- This publication is the outcome of research spoir-2015) and Dr. MANGA ESSAMA Déflo- and a security dialogue commissioned by the rine Grâce, Associate Researcher in CREPS/ Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) in April 2017. The UYII, who drafted this publication. dialogue brought together security experts Finally special thanks go to the former Resi- from the Central African Republic to examine dent Representative, Mrs. Susanne STOLLRE- ways to help the country to put an end to the ITER and the Coordinator of the Peace and persistent crisis. These experts were drawn Security Programme, Mrs. Susan BAMUH from universities, civil society, the media and APARA, for the enormous amount of time political parties. The Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and work they put in to organize the work- would like here to thank them sincerely for shops, follow up the activities and publish this their individual and collective contributions. study. We would also like to thank Dr. MOGBA Zéphirin Jean Raymond, Associate Professor Mr. Friedrich Kramme-Stermose from the University of , M. BENINGA Resident Representative Paul-Crescent, Researcher in political sciences FES Cameroon and Central Africa

5 M. BENINGA Paul-Crescent, Dr. MANGA ESSAMA Déflorine Grâce, Dr. MOGBA Zéphirin Jean Raymond

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND sory Mission in the Central African Republic ABBREVIATIONS EUFOR: European Union Forces FACA: Forces Armées Centrafricaines AEF: (Armed forces of the Central African Repub- APRD: Armée populaire pour la Restaura- lic) tion de la République et de la Démocratie FOMUC: Force Multinational de la CEMAC (Popular Army for the Restoration of the Re- (CEMAC Multinational Forces) public and Democracy) GDP: Gross domestic product AU: African Union IGO: Intergovernmental Organization BONUCA: The United Nations Peace-build- IMF: International Monetary Fund ing Support Office in the Central African Re- KNK: Kwa Na Kwa (work and work only) public MICOPAX: Peace Consolidation Mission in CAR: The Central African Republic the Central African Republic CEMAC: Economic and Monetary Commu- MINURCA: The United Nations Mission in nity of Central African States the Central African Republic DDRR: Disarmament, Demobilization, Re- MISCA: The International Support Mission habilitation and Reintegration to the Central African Republic DRC: Democratic Republic of Congo NGO: Non -governmental organization ECCAS: Economic Community of Central OPEX: external operation African States UN: United Nations EU: European Union EUMAM: European Union’s Military Advi-

6 Persistence of the crisis in the Central African Republic: understanding in order to act

INTRODUCTION The Central African Republic has had limit- ed experience with democratic institutions. The Central African Republic has experi- Most political institutions in the country are enced repeated sociopolitical crises since either considered illegitimate or illegal. So, the tragic death of its founder, Barthélémy instead of elections, many actors believe that Boganda, the year before the county’s inde- the best way to power is through mutiny, re- pendence. Today there is a general tendency bellion and military takeovers. Indeed, there by foreign observers and analysts who are have been five coup d’états so far (1965, not conversant with the history of this coun- 1979, 1981, 2003 and 2013). All of this is try, to simply ignore or minimize this aspect the direct result of the failure to forge a na- of the political background of the CAR. This tion based on the rule of law with a united has resulted in poor understanding of the people, common history and culture. The diachronic and holistic causes of the identity failure of the judicial system, which is almost crises, and of the recurrent cycles of violence nonexistent outside the capital, Bangui, has this country has been experiencing through created an atmosphere of impunity that has the years. led to small scale wars and terrible atrocities. It should be recalled that Boganda had not It should be noted that knowing the history finalized his political vision to turn the Cen- of the country is necessary for the under- tral African Republic into a nation that would standing of these repeated crises. Resistance truly unite the colonies of the French Equato- to colonial rule and to slave trade by Muslim rial Africa (AEF). His sudden death in a plane Peul in the 19th Century, led to a culture of crash on 29 March 1959 when the country confrontation and self-defense that can be was still under French colonial rule prevent- seen even today in the form of village mili- ed the people of the Central African Republic tias. The Anti-Balaka is simply a manifesta- from realizing his dream of building a nation tion of this culture. To these internal causes, that could provide its people with access to others have been added. These are rivalries, food, housing, health and education. Also, ambitions, geopolitics and geo-strategies he had not had the time to fully develop his to demonstrate economic prowess. Men- political vision or to build a politically savvy, tion should also be made of the influence enlightened and dynamic team that could of and other emerging petroleum replace him. His sudden death was thus a countries within the Central African sub re- double blow to the Ubangui people, particu- gion ( under Bongo, under Idriss larly to the young and inexperienced leaders Déby and Congo under Sassou). There was who were thus forced to inherit a complex some short-lived hope when Faustin Arch- situation that was far beyond their capabili- ange TOUADERA was elected president of ties. From that time on, the CAR spiraled into the Republic in 2016. This hope was quickly chaos and a long period of instability that dashed by the resurgence of violence and has lasted well over 50 years. insecurity in the country.

7 M. BENINGA Paul-Crescent, Dr. MANGA ESSAMA Déflorine Grâce, Dr. MOGBA Zéphirin Jean Raymond

The numerous armed groups in the various were both followed by a sharp increase in parts of the country, which have more or rape and other sexual abuses. In 2015, some less replaced government armed forces, 693 women were raped, and in the first six have contributed to the permanent climate months of 2016 alone 501 women, includ- of fear and insecurity. ing 81 minors, suffered the same fate. This At the socioeconomic level, the amount bleak security situation resulted in 500.000 needed to provide security, basic social ser- displaced persons and 70.000 refugees. vices and life saving food security for some However, at the end of 2015, there were 1.6 million people in 2017 was estimated at just 450.000 displaced persons, a number 399.5 million US dollars (UNOCHA report, that further dropped by 14.27% by end of 2016). The discovery of new resources and a September 2016 to 384.884. On the oth- chronically weak government have fostered er hand, the number of refugees fleeing to corruption and a ferocious struggle for con- neighboring countries increased by 2.24%, trol over precious stones and other natu- going from 442.069 in July 2015 to 467.960 ral resources. Currently, the CAR is twenty persons in September 2016. This situation times poorer than it was 40 years ago. In was further aggravated by food insecurity, the 1970s, the country had 460 industrial violation of human rights, enrolment of child enterprises, but today there are barely ten of soldiers, rape, extrajudicial killings, etc. Since them. In 1970, the CAR had one university then, the country has been experiencing re- with 1000 students, today, it still has one current multidimensional crises (political, university with more the 20 000 students. security, economic, social, humanitarian, That same year, per capita income stood at etc.) with regional and international reper- more than 400 USD, now it is below 100 cussions. USD. Strangely this deteriorating situation All the local and international initiatives that does not seem to bother anyone. The vari- have been implemented so far to help the ous regimes that have succeeded each other country have not had the expected results. every 10 years or so, all seem to be looking Even the dozen or so international peace- to development partners for solutions to the keeping missions to the CAR have failed to enormous challenges facing the country. All bring peace to the country. This publication of them have constantly turned to the World identifies the various actors, their involve- Bank, the IMF, the European Union, and the ment in the crisis and the factors that have UN or to Paris for solutions to the country’s led to these recurrent cycles of violence. It day to day problems. makes recommendations that if implement- The takeover by François BOZIZE and his ed, could lead to lasting peace in the Central armed rebellion in 2003, and by the Sele- African Republic. ka coalition of in 2013,

8 Persistence of the crisis in the Central African Republic: understanding in order to act

CHAPTER I: ACTORS OF ing, motivating or encouraging the citizens INSTABILITY IN THE CAR: of the country to fight for change that can INTEREST AND DISINTEREST IN bring about lasting peace. A culture of cor- SUSTAINABLE PEACE ruption, impunity and lack of transparency permeates the entire political structure, and The conflict in the CAR has been fueled and has rendered the system incapable of fully aggravated by the interests and involvement carrying out its responsibilities and providing of internal actors, some foreign countries much needed public services to its citizens. and international organizations. Political leaders in the country are incapable of managing crises and political change. All 1- Internal actors: interests, motives, political changes have almost always led to and ability to act or to harm violence, corruption, nepotism, hatred and insecurity. The conflict in the CAR involves actors from The intellectual elite in the CAR have been different sociological backgrounds, often so politicized that they have ceased to be with conflicting or sometimes overlapping a source of enlightenment and knowledge. political and, or financial interests. They have failed abjectly in their duty to pro- These numerous actors can be classified ac- vide the population, the political class and cording to the nature of their activity. These those in power with objective analyses of include: political and security actors, military the nation’s social ills, to enable them to un- and paramilitary actors, as well as other enti- derstand and find appropriate solutions. The ties within the political system of the Central lure of instant gratification, power and riches African Republic. has blunted the ability of these intellectuals, and made them incapable of proposing cre- a- Political and security actors ative solutions. Their goals and approaches The political and security actors promoting to politics are completely at variance with instability in CAR are members of the ruling the legitimate aspirations of the citizens of political class and of the opposition. the country. Unholy alliances between the The political elite have always had full con- various political actors (government and trol and enjoyed almost unlimited political armed opposition) in the country have made power in the country. These elite include matters significantly worse and rendered the the President of the Republic, Members of search for solutions even more complex. Government and officials ranking as: senior The political opposition has always tried to officials, functionaries in the central admin- act as a counterweight to the government. istration, politicized intellectuals and top Unlike the armed opposition, they have al- military brass. Unfortunately, none of these ways sought to gain power through the bal- political elite in the CAR has been able to lot box and not through arms. Even though emerge as a leader capable of truly influenc- this is to their credit, it must be pointed out

9 M. BENINGA Paul-Crescent, Dr. MANGA ESSAMA Déflorine Grâce, Dr. MOGBA Zéphirin Jean Raymond

that even this political opposition has its own ka with Muslims and the Anti Balaka with weaknesses. These shortcomings are often Christians and non Muslims. Some civil soci- rooted in the selfish desire of most opposi- ety actors and the media, especially foreign tion leaders to gain power or put their per- media also played a role in promoting such sonal interests at the forefront. Worse, many tensions. political parties in the CAR, which identify either with the ruling party or with the op- b- Military and paramilitary actors: Defense and security forces and armed position, do not have a political platform or groups a clear and convincing vision for a nation with a united people. All of them have failed There is urgent need to improve the securi- to provide a performance framework that ty situation in the Central African Republic, can be used to evaluate their actions. This especially with the current surge in violence is compounded by their inability to strategi- in Bangui and in the rest of the country. So cally translate their rhetoric into action. The far, there is no official security force that the civilian political opposition relies on patron- State can use to protect the population. The age rather than on its own ability to take ini- existence of numerous armed groups has tiative. Because of their inability to propose a made it virtually impossible for the govern- viable alternative to the ruling party or to de- ment to build a strong and legitimate secu- velop the political awareness of the people, rity force. opposition parties share responsibility for The Security and Defense Forces (SDF) that the crisis in the country. As in most African do exist are paradoxically at the root of polit- countries, the proliferation of political parties ical instability and social conflict in the CAR. in the CAR reflects the inability of political Many rebel leaders are either former soldiers leaders to develop a vision, or common plat- of the Forces armées centrafricaines (the form that can bring people together. Most armed force of the Central African Republic often, people join parties because of their - FACA) or members of the political elite. The ethnic or tribal relations with the party lead- security problems in the CAR can therefore ers. During the 2014 and 2015 elections for also be traced to the collapse of the securi- example, there were 69 duly registered po- ty sector. The FACA is often in conflict with litical parties, with 21 others in the process the country’s regimes because all presidents of registration. All these parties were unable have tried at one time or the other to impose to stop the Seleka and its leader DJOTODIA their preferred military leader on it, most of- from seizing power through violence and ten from their ethnic group. Should tribalism sowing terror in the country. Even after the be a method of governance? Is it not possi- takeover by the Djotodia regime, the politi- ble to gain trust and political authority simply cal class continued to promote social tension through the impartial management of the by pitting communities and religious groups various ethic and tribal groups in the coun- against each other. They identified the Sele- try? These questions are not naïve. When

10 Persistence of the crisis in the Central African Republic: understanding in order to act

you look at the political and security history fouth, another controversial figure who of the CAR, the answers to these questions played a role in Samba-Panza’s transitional become obvious: governing through tribal- government. Also, President Bozize’s party ism and favoritism has had harmful conse- Kwa na Kwa (KNK work and work only) sup- quences on the population and the country. ported the Anti Balaka, who were retaliating The armed political opposition, as opposed against the Seleka which had removed him to the “democratic opposition”, refers to from power in 2013. political parties that have their own armies. Today armed groups are considered a nor- These are parties with a two-faced policy, mal part of the political and security set up one face legal and the other illegal, hidden of the country. Indeed violence is seen as the and always threatening. As far back as 1981, fastest way to gain power, and politicians such a party was involved in the bomb at- have consistently used such armed groups tack on a cinema club in Bangui. This party to get to power or, when in power, to fight was against the regime that bandits and other small criminal groups in was seen as being propped up by France. remote parts of the country. Today, the com- Again, the Rassemblement démocratique position of these groups is changing con- centrafricain (RDC) of André Kolingba played stantly. They are often made up of self de- a significant role in the rebellions of 1996 fense militia, highway robbers, and former and 1997 and in the coup attempt against members of the security and defense force. President Ange-Félix Patasse on the 21 of Armed groups have been at the forefront of May 2001. The latter himself helped to set numerous rebellions, mutinies and coups in up the Armée Populaire pour la Restauration the country. At least 14 armed groups were de la République et la Démocratie (APRD), in identified between 2002 and 2017. 2009, which was led by Jean-Jacques Dema-

Source: jeuneafrique.com Centrafrique-JeuneAfrique.com 2013

11 M. BENINGA Paul-Crescent, Dr. MANGA ESSAMA Déflorine Grâce, Dr. MOGBA Zéphirin Jean Raymond

Before 2012, the armed opposition was not protect them in the absence of State security very interested in carving out territories for institutions. Others even assumed judiciary themselves. This changed with the over- functions and started acting as procureurs throw of President Bozize in 2013. Taking and local magistrates, demanding pay- advantage of the vacuum in some regions of ment for legal services. This further eroded the country, armed groups suddenly started the legitimacy of official State institutions. occupying such spaces to consolidate their (National recovery and Peace building Plan influence. By 2014, Seleka, Anti-Balaka and 2017-2021) the LRA controlled vast territories within the The priorities of the State and interests of country. In the areas under their control, these armed groups are thus frequently at they performed functions that fell under the odds. This is made even more complex by the purview of the State such as mining, selling fact that these armed groups are constant- diamonds and collecting taxes on agricultur- ly breaking up and forming alliances with al and commercial activities. Cattle breeders breakaway factions form other groups. This were either killed or had their cattle stolen, has made it difficult to untangle the under- sometimes as many as 1 500 cattle per week. lying factors so as to find solutions to end That is about 750 million FCFA per week or 3 the crisis. billion per month, or 36 billion per year. They also set up road blocks to extort money from c- Other actors road users, with nearly 40 road blocks on the Under the category “other actors”, we have road between Bangui and Bambari alone. civil society organizations, religious leaders, At each road block road users had to pay a sects and the youth. All these actors have toll according to their social standing. Timber at one time or the other, depending on the trucks moving from the south to the west political regime in place, played a role in the paid between 150 000 to 200 000 FCFA per violence in the CAR. Civil society in the CAR truck on such road blocks. is split between those trying to foster a dem- A phenomenon also appeared that can only ocratic and peaceful society, and those that be described as “unholy or incestuous alli- are merely positioning themselves for well ances”. This is the implosion/breakdown, paid and influential administrative and po- and re-composition/reconstruction of new litical posts. The many civil society organiza- alliances between factions with sometimes tions have not been able to suggest viable opposing objectives. As a result of internal solutions to the problems facing the people wrangling, some well-known armed groups of the Central African Republic. The vast ma- like the Seleka and the Anti-Balaka split into jority of these organizations are based in the factions, and some of these factions linked capital, Bangui. They have all failed to either up with factions from other militia, or with promote a change of mentality or to edu- whole militia groups that were being paid cate the population on democracy and so- by local communities, or business entities to cial communication. Many of them have no

12 Persistence of the crisis in the Central African Republic: understanding in order to act

solutions to the pressing challenges facing them into armed groups, militias and politi- the nation as a whole. These shortcomings cal movements. (Karako, Balawa, COCORA, might be due to the often heterogeneous COAC, Anti Balaka, Seleka). Also, many of sociological backgrounds, and sometimes these idle and abandoned youths are turning opposing objectives of these organizations. to crime for a living. Many are run by young unemployed gradu- ates, civil servants in search of additional in- 2- External actors come, public sector employees or dismissed Due to its enclaved location, the CAR shares political party leaders or members trying to long and porous boundaries with many oth- earn a living. Many see civil society merely er countries. This porosity is further com- as a stepping stone to social, economic or pounded by the close ethnic and cultural political advancement. relations between people on both sides of Other actors include the many religious such borders (Chad, Sudan, Congo-Kinsha- groups and occult circles in the CAR (Ros- sa and Cameroon) and the lack of State in- icrucian, Freemasons, Lion’s Club, etc.). stitutions in border regions. The conflict in These groups have greatly influenced the the CAR therefore has direct implications for thinking and actions of people in the CAR. insecurity in the Central and the West Afri- The leaders of these groups or sects and can sub regions. As a matter of fact, foreign their followers are always fighting those actors, both States and international organi- from other sects, during sub regional initia- zations, have always played an outsized role tives, to position themselves and their sects in the history of the Central African Repub- for promotion or appointment to high level lic. As indicated above, there are two main government posts. Even though it is difficult types of external actors: States (neighboring to determine the extent to which these sects or not) and intergovernmental organizations have influenced the thinking of the people, it (IGOs – continental or international) is obvious that they have played a significant role in the crisis in the CAR. In fact, their pro- a- State actors liferation can be seen as both the cause and Foreign States often intervene officially or effect of the crisis in the country. unofficially in the internal affairs of the CAR Finally the youth: government has not been for economic, geopolitical or geostrategic able to provide them with the type of train- reasons. These include Chad and France and ing and education that can turn them into to a lesser extent Cameroon, Congo, Sudan, veritable development actors. The youth to- South Africa and the US. day in the CAR are easily manipulated. Since 1990, politicians have taken advantage of - Chad the vulnerable youths by recruiting them Chad has intervened most frequently in the into militias and diverse armed groups. They various crises in the CAR. This can be at- easily fall prey to various gurus who recruit tributed to geographic, historic, cultural,

13 M. BENINGA Paul-Crescent, Dr. MANGA ESSAMA Déflorine Grâce, Dr. MOGBA Zéphirin Jean Raymond

political, economic and security factors. of Congo. This was on display when they The relationship between Chad and the disagreed over the road map to resolve the CAR is several centuries old. But the mili- crisis, notably when the Chadian president’s tary and political influence of Chad in the proposal was approved by the African Union country increased sharply when Idriss Déby to grant amnesty to former rebels. came to power in 1990 and started back- - France ing rebels in the CAR. Some observers even believe that Chad considers the CAR as its France has close ties with the CAR because 24th region. It was the political and military of colonization, the franc zone, defense backing from Idriss Déby ITNO that enabled agreements, military cooperation and the General François Bozize to overthrow the French energy group Areva in the CAR. It democratically elected Ange Félix Patassé in played a major political role when it backed 2003. Ten years later, the same Déby turned heads of state like David DACKO and Bar- against him and provided rebel groups with thelemy BOKASSA. It has also participated the means to overthrow him. A survey in in many bilateral and multilateral military in- 2003 by an American firm, Western Geo- terventions during the various crises in the physical, shows that Chad and the CAR share CAR. These include “” the same oil reserves in two blocks in Doba, of 1979 that brought down Bokassa and his to the north of the CAR near the Doseo and empire and installed Dacko as president; op- Salamat basins (Les dynamiques de la crise erations “Furet” and “Almandin I , 2, and 3” centrafricaine, Libération, 10 January 2014; alongside the Forces of the Central African also see “Aperçu sur le potentiel minier de Republic (FACA) to protect President Patasse la République centrafricaine” by the Central under threat from the 1996 revolt. Others in- African Republic’s ministry of mines, petro- clude the EUFOR-Chad/RCA 2007 and then, leum, energy and water resources). How- EUFOR-RCA 2014 (under the banner of the ever, many believe that Chad would like to European Union); the Sangaris force in 2013 keep the crisis alive in the CAR (but far from (as part of a UN mission) alongside the Inter- the north), so that it can continue to exploit national Support Mission to the Central Af- the common oil reserves unchallenged. rican Republic (MISCA). French involvement in efforts to end the crises in the CAR has to Chad also has geopolitical and geostrategic a certain extent been beneficial, especially as ambitions as it tries to emerge as a sub-re- other countries and the international com- gional power in central Africa. This can be munity which have no strategic interests to seen in the active participation of Chadian protect in the CAR, have generally ignored troops in support of continental and inter- this country. national forces in the CAR. This can also be explained by the struggle for leadership be- France has mostly abandoned its Françaf- tween Presidents Idriss DEBY of Chad and rique policy and now purportedly acts only Denis SASSOU NGUESSO of the Republic with “the legal backing of the UN and the

14 Persistence of the crisis in the Central African Republic: understanding in order to act

legitimacy conferred on it by the AU”. But ing interests which often generate a lot of the people of the CAR are doubtful about negative publicity, there are rumors of links the alleged humanitarian intentions of between French logging companies and France. It would be naïve to think that all local armed groups. This is reminiscent of the operations in the CAR or elsewhere are the Lafarge scandal in which Lafarge was for purely altruistic reasons. France’s inter- suspected of indirectly financing the Islamic est in the CAR is not based on some kind State in Syria in 2013. of altruism. It may not be underpinned by The geostrategic interests of France are the Françafrique policy, but, as we all know, mostly regional. Because of the central lo- relations between states are always based cation of the CAR, which is flanked on many on interests. Its interests in the Central Af- sides by countries in which France has inter- rican Republic are economic, geostrategic ests (Cameroon, Chad, Congo and Gabon and geopolitical. which is not far off), any chaos there would Concerning its economic interests, even provide a base for all armed groups from though the volume of trade between the Chad, Sudan and the RDC that could pose CAR and France is negligible, and the trans- a threat to the entire region, and especially national group Areva which had signed an to countries in which France has vast and agreement in 2008 with the CAR to mine direct interests. Uranium in the east has abandoned its plan Finally, France’s geopolitical interest is the to do so, France still has economic interests same as that which has always motivated all to protect. These include France Telecom major powers: to project power. It is a mem- that has been operating since 2007 in Ban- ber of the UN Security Council and wants to gui and the Bollore group managing the maintain its stature as an international pow- container terminal port in Bangui. By pro- er broker. For this reason, France has been tecting these economic interests in strategic actively involved in UN resolutions relating areas such as communication and commer- to the CAR, especially Resolution 2127, and cial shipping, France hopes to maintain links in European Union operations. By its actions with the CAR at a time when the African in the CAR one can see that France wants continent, especially sub-Saharan French to keep Central Africa within its sphere of speaking Africa is growing at a fast pace influence. French involvement is thus not as (3.7% in 2016 according to the World Bank) disinterested as it would want the world to and is being actively courted by countries like believe. Brazil, , Turkey, etc. Apart from min-

15 M. BENINGA Paul-Crescent, Dr. MANGA ESSAMA Déflorine Grâce, Dr. MOGBA Zéphirin Jean Raymond

PHOTO/Scource: humanite.fr, “CAR: Djotodia­ gone, crisis still to be resolved”, 2013

Sudan and South Sudan conflicts on the entire continent. Currently it The armed conflict in Sudan with the rebel- has a contingent of 400 soldiers in Bangui lion of John Garang has caused thousands as part of a 2007 bilateral agreement with of refugees to flee to the CAR, further wors- the CAR to train military personnel. Again, ening the security situation there. Indeed, it when President Deby withdrew the Chad- was the involvement of rebel fighters from ian armed forces that had been protecting Sudan and Chad that helped Michel Djoto- Bozize in September 2012, the latter turned dia to seize power. to South Africa for protection. The fall of Bozize caused political tension to the extent Uganda that President Jacob Zuma pulled diplomatic Uganda is facing a security threat of its own strings to get Djotodia removed. from the LRA that has its base in the south of the CAR. Ugandan armed forces have there- b - Intergovernmental organizations fore been deployed in the southeast of the involved in the crisis CAR alongside American Special Forces to Since 1997, the CAR has had thirteen peace- fight the LRA. keeping missions, earning the nickname “land of peacekeepers”. South Africa The IGOs involved in the crisis can be South Africa is not found in the central Africa grouped into two categories: extra-conti- sub-region. However, it wants to play a role nental and intra-continental. as a continental power by helping to resolve

16 Persistence of the crisis in the Central African Republic: understanding in order to act

• Extra-continental initiatives in the cri- ment of countries of the region in the crisis. sis in the CAR The Multilateral Forces in the Central African By extra-continental we mean peacekeeping Republic (FOMUC) failed to act as a buffer missions by the United Nations or by multi- between the army of President Patasse and national forces from outside Africa, such as Francois Bozize’s fighters. After Bozize seized the European Union. power, African countries transformed this UN missions include: the United Nations force into MICOPAX under ECCAS. This force Mission in the Central African Republic (MIN- sat passively as the Seleka took over power URCA, 1998-2000), the United Nations Sup- in 2013 and began to commit exactions on port Office in the Central African Republic the population. There was no coordination (BONUCA 2000-2010), the United Nations or even cooperation between CEMAC and Integrated Office in the Central African Re- ECCAS. public (BINUCA, 2009) and the United Na- Unlike FOMUC, MICOPAX had three com- tions Multidimensional Integrated Stabiliza- ponents: military, police and civilian com- tion Mission in the Central African Republic ponent. It had as mandate to consolidate (MINUSCA) that replaced MISCA in 2014. peace, coordinate humanitarian aid, ensure European Union missions include: Europe- human rights, assist in the peace process an Union Forces (EUFOR) TCHAD/ RCA from through promoting dialogue and national 2007 to 2009, EUFOR-RCA from 2014 to reconciliation, and help in the organization 2015, EUMAM-RCA (European Union Mil- of elections. When Seleka went on the of- itary Advisory Mission in the Central Afri- fensive in 2012, MICOPAX convened an ex- st can Republic) since 2015, EUTM (European traordinary summit in Ndjamena on the 21 Union Training Mission in the Central African of December 2012 which ordered MICOPAX Republic) since 2016. to act as a buffer force, along with an addi- tional Chadian military unit in Damara. This All these forces have been of immense help summit also approved ceasefire agreements and have provided much needed assistance that were never enforced for two reasons: • African initiatives in the CAR the presence of a powerful contingent of These include: The Inter-African Mission to Chadian soldiers whose conflicting objec- Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui tives have been explained above, and the Agreements (MISAB from 1997 to 1998), inability of ECCAS to enforce sub-regional CEN-SAD from 2001 to 2003, FOMUC (un- decisions and to even function normally. This der the CEMAC) from 2002 to 2008, MI- inability to operate normally can be seen in COPAX (under the auspices of ECCAS) from its budget woes. Indeed, the annual budget 2008 to 2013 and MISCA (international mis- of MICOPAX was estimated at about 30 mil- sion but led by Africa) from 2013 to 2014. lion Euros, with about 50% of this amount According to Roland Marchall there has expected from the EU (in equipment and been some ambivalence about the involve- logistics) and 20% from contributions by

17 M. BENINGA Paul-Crescent, Dr. MANGA ESSAMA Déflorine Grâce, Dr. MOGBA Zéphirin Jean Raymond

Member States. Member States of course that acting in a timely manner has always failed to meet their commitments and it be- been a strategic challenge for central Afri- came difficult to pay salaries and fund the ca. On deployment, the CAR was backed by civilian component. 2000 soldiers from the French “Sangaris” The African-led Mission to the Central Af- force and 600 soldiers from the EU’s EUFOR rican Republic (MISCA) was deployed in force. Although one of the most significant collaboration with the United Nations and achievements of MISCA was securing the ECCAS. This African initiative was intended corridor between Bangui and Cameroon, to help the transition government of the the lifeline of the Central African Republic’s Central African Republic in its effort to pro- economy, it failed to reconcile opposing fac- vide security in the country and to support a tions in the country and to stop the killings “brother country abandoned by the interna- and exactions against civilians. This failure tional community”. Initially scheduled for the can also be explained by the fact that this 1st of August 2013, the deployment finally force had only 7000 soldiers (all forces com- took place on the 19th of December 2013, bined), to cover a surface area of 623 000 confirming MathiasÉric OWONA‘s assertion km2 in conflict or post conflict.

PHOTO/Source: grotius, fr, history-lesson-understanding the Central African crisis.

18 Persistence of the crisis in the Central African Republic: understanding in order to act

CHAPTER II: DYNAMIICS OF ture that would make it a State in the true THE CONFLICT IN THE CENTRAL sense of the word: sovereignty. For it to be AFRICAN REPUBLIC: A STATE IN a sovereign State, it must have the requisite FRAGILITY! and legitimate physical force. Unfortunately, a closer look at the security situation of the We will start with an observation which, country shows that the government does though obvious, is still questionable: the not have monopoly over the use of legiti- Central African Republic is a State. From a mate violence. This is so because many other legal point of view, it is a State because it actors causing instability in the country also has its own territory, its own population, have the capacity to use such force. This is and its own government even though the the reason why we will examine the factors latter might not always be stable or legiti- perpetuating the crisis in the CAR and make mate. However, its status as a State is often useful suggestions that can help to resolve questioned because of the absence of a fea- it and consolidate lasting peace.

PHOTO/Source: FES expert, Bangui, 2013

19 M. BENINGA Paul-Crescent, Dr. MANGA ESSAMA Déflorine Grâce, Dr. MOGBA Zéphirin Jean Raymond

1- Factors perpetuating the crisis: is to buy arms. Unfortunately, weapons are the CAR a “failed” State or a “State in circulating freely among armed groups that Fragility”? by their very nature defy such resolutions. The reluctance of the international commu- The Republic of Central Africa could have nity to lift the embargo tied the hands of the been described as a “failed” State – an un- Samba-Panza’s transition government and flattering description by the way – if since its even today remains a challenge to Touadera. independence in 1960 it had been able to at Because of this state of fragility, it will not least function even a bit normally. In 2015, be easy for the people of the Central Afri- the OECD proposed a new multidimensional can Republic to rebuild the country on their fragility framework with a working model own, especially as the adult literacy rate is based on five dimensions: violence, justice, just 37% (UNICEF report, 2016). This has institutions, economic fundamentals and been compounded by social disharmony resilience. Depending on the crisis, political, and the chaos that exists in the education economic, military, ideological or religious sector with its numerous and greedy actors. factors, may be the main cause or may even As the saying goes, “a hungry belly has no merge to give specificity to a crisis. For the ears” and thus no memory! CAR, all these factors seem to be in play. b- Splintering of armed groups and a- The internal vulnerability of the country worsening of intercommunity tensions One of the major challenges faced by Djoto- Although there is relative stability in Ban- dia was providing security and restoring the gui, the security situation in the rest of the authority of the State throughout the coun- country is very poor. There is widespread try. Lack of the necessary human resources and growing criminal activity to the north, and absence of State institutions in some re- increased intercommunity tension to the gions made it impossible to provide even ba- south and a proliferation of armed groups sic social services. In fact, many of such ser- to the east of the country. About 14 armed vices were being provided by humanitarian groups are currently controlling nearly 80% and religious organizations. Humanitarian of the territory. organizations support State social structures The Seleka coalition which was formed in and provide assistance to the population in 2012 to overthrow the Bozize regime split about 50% of the country (UNOCHA report). into three factions just three months after Some years back, the president of the Re- the coup d’état when a dispute arose be- public was unable to travel to some parts of tween the Front Populaire pour la Renais- the country: the entire northern part of the sance de la Centrafrique (FPRC) and the country was in the hands of armed groups Union pour la Paix en Centrafrique (UPC), that considered themselves “sovereign”. Be- two of the more powerful factions of the ing under an embargo imposed by UN Reso- former Seleka, over control of the mining lution 2127, the government is not allowed and coffee growing areas.

20 Persistence of the crisis in the Central African Republic: understanding in order to act

Exactions and looting allegedly by the UPC c- Absence of a collective memory (mostly Peul) in some southern and eastern The absence of a collective memory is in fact parts of the country fueled an anti-Peul sen- the result of the failure to take advantage of timent. To retaliate, local self defense groups peacekeeping initiatives and of the recom- were organized, sometimes through unnat- mendations of the numerous forums, semi- ural alliances with other groups, to carry out nars and workshops organized to seek ways targeted attacks against Peul communities. to kick-start the never ending peace process. An example of such an attack is the one on One of such initiatives was the forum in Ban- Bangassou on the 13th of May 2017 that gui from May 4th to 11th 2015 which had as killed about a hundred people. Punitive ex- objective to create the dynamics necessary peditions against the Peul and Muslims were for a successful peace process and nation- considered by some warlords as an act of al reconciliation. In other words, the forum expiation, or an obligation to chase from the was intended to moderate the greed of the Central African Republic “foreign Muslims” actors of the conflict and to reconcile the who were seen as the incarnation of evil. population with the regime in power. Unfor- The escalation of attacks following the frag- tunately, the Samba-Panza transition regime mentation of armed groups has resulted in was mostly characterized by opportunistic a sharp increase in the number of killings behaviors at the Presidency with its hordes of civilians, peacekeepers and humanitarian of advisers, the National Transition Council workers. Today, very few NGOs will venture and in the Government. The main innova- into some provinces. Some humanitarian tion by her initiative was the possibility giv- organizations have even suspended opera- en to delegates from the provinces to make tions in the north of the country because of the voices of people in the hinterlands heard the increased violence there. The constant by national authorities. Delegates from the splintering of armed groups has rendered eastern provinces, for example, were able peace negotiations even more complex and to ask the government to take measures to made Disarmament, Demobilization, Rein- neutralize the Basse-Kotto Seleka rebels who tegration, and Rehabilitation (DDRR) more were sowing terror in their provinces. But, difficult. The failure to reunite some armed for armed groups in general, their demands groups by mediators like the Organization and intransigence, particularly their various for Islamic Cooperation (OIC) which tried demands for guarantees against legal action in 2016 to bring the factions of the former or social reintegration were based on their Seleka back together, shows the extent of strength on the ground. the rift between such armed groups. Howev- The recommendations of the forum had er, the recent attacks against Muslims have the merit of creating relatively conducive facilitated the rapprochement between the security and political conditions under Sam- UPC and the FPRC. ba-Panza for the elections that followed. The

21 M. BENINGA Paul-Crescent, Dr. MANGA ESSAMA Déflorine Grâce, Dr. MOGBA Zéphirin Jean Raymond

agreement between the transition govern- lower intercommunity tensions and to build ment and armed groups on Disarmament, a sustainable society both at individual and Demobilization, Reintegration and Rehabil- collective levels. itation (DDRR) and absorption into govern- • Median scenario: The Central African ment forces, was based on objective criteria: Republic will continue to be monitored and individual (not determined by membership kept on life support by the UN and foreign in a given group), progressive, after vetting development partners. (no criminal past) and professionalism. • Best case scenario: There will be a sud- - Possible future scenarios for the Cen- den and collective reawakening. The people tral African Republic will start promoting new political, econom- The manner in which the crises and conflicts ic and social ideals for their country (think in the CAR have been analyzed, understood ahead to reinvent the future), to enable it to and managed in the past cannot bring about emerge from the never-ending crises that lasting peace in the country. In most cases, has been bedeviling them for decades, and the need to strengthen the resilience of the to make their country a truly independent communities has been ignored by United and sovereign nation. Such a national re- Nations initiatives, humanitarian organi- awakening will require a change of mental- zations and international NGOs. Indeed, a ity, attitudes, governance approaches and large share of the funds received in the name strategies. It is only after such changes are of the crisis in the Central African Republic made, that the Central African Republic can is not spent on efforts to consolidate peace become a truly independent, sovereign and and build social harmony at grassroots lev- stable nation. el. The crisis in the Central African Republic has enriched many external actors. When 2- Recommendations programming, little or no provision is made Here are few recommendations that can for the use of local and national forces, en- guide some actors of the crisis in the Central ergies or intelligence. Most political, securi- African Republic. The various recommenda- ty and development objectives focus on the tions are directed at specific actors: priorities of the State and its development partners, and no thought is given to efficient a- To the government to enable it to integration. Because of these shortcomings, restore State authority throughout the there are three possible future scenarios for country the crisis in the CAR: • Reform of the FACA: a must for the • Worst case scenario: The conflict factors government in the CAR will persist and the State will con- International partners, the government, tinue to be weak and lack the coercive force armed groups and the population see the to respond to the proliferation of armed army as indispensable, and this is the only groups. It will also continue to be unable to

22 Persistence of the crisis in the Central African Republic: understanding in order to act

area where they all agree (Thierry Vircou- be made to enforce sentences against those lon). It is not for nothing that the army is found guilty of crimes. The country must also the crucible of national integration in other apply the provisions of the Oslo accord and countries. For the army to become a factor accelerate the setting up of the special crim- in national unity, a number of difficult de- inal court. cisions must be taken: incorporate some • improve the profile of those in charge of militias into the armed forces, provide the implementing the DDRR. army with good training and lift the embar- • Periodically evaluate the mandate of the go on arms. Who benefits from the embargo international missions. anyway? It is certainly not the government It will be necessary, in collaboration with and the FACA. How can a government suc- external partners, to evaluate the work of ceed in fighting against or even negotiate international missions (especially MINUSCA), with armed groups if it cannot buy and own so as to be in a position to take corrective arms? After these three conditions are met, measures where necessary, to avoid conflict the army of the Central African Republic will between the objectives of the government need to be rebuilt and made more profes- and those of the population with the priori- sional. Care should be taken to include men ties of international partners. and women from all parts of the country. • Set up a coordination and funding body After training, this professional army should that will pool financial resources that could immediately be deployed to all parts of the be managed collectively by development country to prevent rebel armed groups from partners. Such a body should be put in place occupying them. as soon as possible (National Recovery and • Reform the judicial system and en- Peacebuilding Plan PNCR 2017-2021). force court rulings • Set up State institutions in all regions of Reforming the judicial system will require the country. massive and sustained injection of funds. Redeploy administrative services in all parts The country will have to build the necessary of the country to gradually restore State physical infrastructure from scratch and train authority. Upgrade education facilities in judicial officials. Even though trials for crimes all remote areas to help train the many un- started in 2015 and have continued under der educated youths, and to prevent them President Touadera, their painfully slow from being recruited by armed groups. The pace is evidence of the numerous challeng- State should also endeavor to upgrade basic es facing the courts, especially in the area services that can provide alternatives to the of victim and witness protection (Amnesty population living in areas plagued by inter- International). These have led to cases being community violence. dismissed and also to the release of well- known and hardened criminals. Efforts must

23 M. BENINGA Paul-Crescent, Dr. MANGA ESSAMA Déflorine Grâce, Dr. MOGBA Zéphirin Jean Raymond

b- To political parties ingly facing attacks from rebel fighters and criticisms from the population (UNOCHA, They must work for the general interest and 2016). The size of MINUSCA and the funds educate the public on the importance of for its operation need to be increased to en- gaining power through elections. Political able the Mission to fight armed groups. parties must stop supporting local militias and should strongly condemn exactions by - Work more closely with the government such groups. to disarm groups and evaluate the work of international missions. Care should be taken c- To civil society to always put the interests of the population It must boost its technical and operational first. capacities through training. It should also - Coordinate mediation efforts and harmo- endeavor to mobilize its own resources so nize the positions of the various mediators that it can speak with authority when pro- (Angola, Chad, Congo, Gabon, the Catholic posing solutions, for a peaceful society in the community of Sant’Egidio), on the future of Central African Republic. warlords, rebel fighters and the return of for- mer heads of State. d- The international and African com- - Continue to finance structural reforms and munities should investment projects both at national and lo- - Properly vet, train and manage the staff in cal levels (while the State is being built). charge of peacekeeping operations to avoid - The AU, ECCAS and CEMAC should not tire abuses such as rape or drug trafficking by of mobilizing aid from members States and some army contingents. The good reputa- assisting the population. They should also tion of these forces is crucial for the smooth help to definitively “demobilize” armed fac- implementation of humanitarian projects, tions. particularly now that MINUSCA is increas-

24 Persistence of the crisis in the Central African Republic: understanding in order to act

BIBLIOGRAPHY 7. MARCHAL Roland, “Brève histoire d’une transition singulière. La République cen- 1. Amnesty International, “The Central trafricaine de janvier 2014 à mars 2016”, African Republic: the long wait for jus- ROSCA-G&D network of civil society orga- tice, Accountability in Central African nizations for governance and development Republic”, January 2017, https://www. in the central African Republic), September amnesty.org/download/ Documents/AFR- 2016, 73 pages ; 1954252017FRENCH.PDF (consulted on 13 8. NTUDA EBODE Joseph Vincent, “La Cen- May 2017) ; trafrique à la croisée des chemins”, in Diplo- 2. ANKOGUI-M’POKO Guy-Florent, “La crise matie, n° 68, Paris, 2014 Centrafricaine date de longues durées : qui 9. NTUDA EBODE Joseph Vincent, “Quel la finance ou la sponsorise?”, paper present- avenir pour la Centrafrique?” in Diplomatie ed during the post-conflict security and de- magazine, n°5, Paris, 2003. velopment workshop on the persistent crisis 10. NTUDA EBODE Joseph Vincent, “La Cen- in the CAR organized by the Friedrich Ebert trafrique de nouveau en ébullition: quelles Stiftung from 10 to 11 April 2017 in Douala, leçons pour la communauté international?”, Cameroon; in Diplomatie n° 68, Paris, 2015 3. BELLA MESSINA Fabrice, “L’appropriation 11. National recovery and Peace building locale de la réforme du secteur de la sécuri- Plan PNRC 2017 – 2021 (Republic of Central té en République Centrafricaine et en Sierra Africa), 6 November 2016; Leone: Contribution à l’étude sur la sécurité 12. VIRCOULON Thierry, “La reconstitution et le développement post-conflit”, MA The- de l’armée centrafricaine : un enjeu à hauts sis in political science, University of Yaoundé risqué”, in Note de recherche n° 36, IRSEM, II Soa, 2014-2015; 28 April 2017, https://defense.gouv. fr/ 4. Humanitarian Country Team, “Humanitar- conten/download/5011361/8515378/file/ ian Response Plan 2017-2019. Central Afri- NR_IRSEM_36.pdf (consulted on 13 May can Republic”, UNOCHA report, November 2017). 2016; 13. WEYNS Yannick, HOEX Lotte, HILGERT 5. HUGON Philippe, “Les défis de la stabilité Filip & SPITTAELS Steven, “Cartographie en Centrafrique”, in Les Notes de l’IRIS, Fe- des motivations derrière les conflits : la Ré- bruary 2014, 13 pages ; publique centrafricaine”, IPIS, Anvers, No- 6. KILEMBE Faouzi, “Assurer la sécurité en vember 2014 ; République Centrafricaine. Mission impos- sible?”, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Cameroon/ Central Africa, October 2014, 28 pages ;

25 Published online in february 2018 Yaounde - Cameroon FES Peace and Security Series No. 22

About the FES Africa Peace and Security Series social democracy, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) aims The lack of security is one of the key impediments at strengthening the interface between democracy to development and democracy in Africa. The and security policy. FES therefore facilitates political existence of protracted violent conflicts as well dialogue on security threats and their national, as a lack of accountability of the security sector in regional and continental responses.The FES Africa many countries are challenging cooperation in the Peace and Security Series aims to contribute to field of security policy. The emerging African Peace this dialogue by making relevant analysis widely and Security Architecture provides the institutional accessible. The series is being published by the FES framework to promote peace and security. Africa Security Policy Network. As a political foundation committed to the values of

About this publication In spite of its abundant wealth in natural two Congos and the two Sudans. It shares resources such as diamonds, gold, uranium, porous boundaries with countries that are coffee, forest products, etc. the Central African experiencing security problems of their own Republic has been gripped in the throes of which sometimes overflow into its territory. repeated security crises since its independence. To examine ways that can bring about lasting Instead of investing in the wellbeing of the peace, FES commissioned research on the country’s population, a large portion of its political economy of the crisis and organized a resources is spent on repeated coup d’états, series of security dialogues in April that led to armed rebellions, and intercommunity and this publication titled “Persistence of the Crisis interreligious violence. The consequences are in the Central African Republic, Understand multidimensional: in addition to the regrettable in order to act”. To properly understand the loss of lives, the economy has collapsed, there reasons for the recurrence of the crisis, the is constant misery, and social relations have analysis has focused on two aspects: the suffered, leading to a vicious cycle of mistrust, dynamics of the actors involved and the factors violence and the massive displacement of the that are causing the crisis to last for so long. The population both in and out of the country. first analysis examines the typology of actors The Central African Republic is located in a and clearly identifies their interests, which very unstable region. With a surface area of oscillate between interest and disinterest. At 623 000 km2 and a population of 6 616 000 the end of this study, one can say without any inhabitants, the country is hemmed in by six doubt that responsibility for the crisis is evenly different countries: Chad, Cameroon, the shared by all the actors. ISBN: 978-9956-532-06-1

9 789956 532061