No. 239 Strategic Forum April 2009 Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University http://www.ndu.edu/inss The United States and the Asia-Pacific Region: National Interests and Strategic Imperatives by James J. Przystup

In addition, the growing number of Asian- Key Points Benefiting from unhampered access, Americans has reinforced the long history of U.S. trade with East Asia rapidly expanded, cultural interaction across the Pacific, marked with China in particular defined as the “mar- Notwithstanding the 2008–2009 financial by art, architecture, literature, music, and ket of the future.” But in the last decade of crisis, East Asia today remains the home of the today, manga. the 19th century, China’s internal weakness, world’s most dynamic economies. In 1990, the The totality of these commercial, cultural, combined with the activities of the imperial- region’s share of global gross domestic prod- and security ties reflects the enduring nature of ist powers, threatened to segment the China uct (GDP) amounted to 26.5 percent; in 2006, U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific and argues for that figure stood at 37.5 percent. In 2006, the an active American role in shaping the future market into exclusive spheres of influence. GDP growth rate for Asia’s economies aver- of this region. Key to this engagement is a clear The U.S. response, in the form of Secretary aged 5.1 percent, compared to a world average understanding of U.S. interests in Asia and the of State John Hay’s Open Door Notes, defined of 3.9 percent. strategic imperatives that will confront the U.S. interests in China as unimpeded access Driven in large part by China’s economic Obama administration’s policymakers. to its markets and, later, support for China’s resurgence and benefiting from an open inter- territorial integrity as the means of assuring national trading system, Asia has become an U.S. Interests that access. Hay’s definition reflected historic engine of global economic growth. American interests in the larger East Asia Meanwhile, U.S. trade with the region From its earliest days, the United States region dating to the Empress of China and grew from $300 billion in 1991 to $900 billion in has been engaged in trade with East Asia. the opening of Japan. 2006, much of it in higher value-added manu- In February 1784, the Empress of China Taking into consideration the nearly 225- factured goods and services.1 In all likelihood, left New York harbor, sailing east to China, year history of U.S. engagement with East Asia, restructured and revived economies in Asia and arriving at Macau on the China coast in this essay defines U.S. interests as the following: the United States will lead the world out of the August of that year. The ship returned to the current global recession. United States the following May with a con- ■ Defense of the homeland and U.S. ter- In addition to its longstanding com- signment of Chinese goods, which generated ritories and protection of U.S. citizens. Today, mercial links to the region, the United States a profit of $30,000. In 1844, China granted U.S. forces are engaged across the Asia-Pacific maintains treaty alliance relationships with the United States trading rights in the Treaty region dealing with terrorist threats to the Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, the of Wanghia. United States and its citizens. Philippines, and Thailand. For over a half The U.S. interest in trade with Asia and ■ Access to regional markets. The century, this bilateral alliance structure the protection of American merchantmen United States has supported efforts in the has formed the region’s informal security architecture. The alliances remain of critical took Commodore Matthew C. Perry to Japan. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) importance in addressing the hard security The Treaty of Kanagawa of 1854 granted forum to open and secure market access and challenges of the East Asia region and provide access to the markets of Japan, opening the has promoted efforts to expand trade by cre- a firm foundation for multilateral efforts to ad- ports of Shimoda and Hakodate to trade with ating an Asia-Pacific Free Trade Area and by dress the nontraditional security issues there. the United States, and provided for the protec- signing free trade agreements with Australia, tion of shipwrecked American sailors. Singapore, and South Korea.

No. 239, April 2009 Strategic Forum 1 ■ Freedom of the seas to assure access. ensuring access to and equality of commer- region have come to see the United States as The U.S. Navy, operating from the West Coast, cial opportunity in the China market. preoccupied with the global war on terror and Hawaii, and bases in Japan and through ■ Theodore Roosevelt worked to balance having a regional tunnel vision focus on Iraq, access agreements with Singapore and other Imperial Russia’s efforts to develop an exclu- Afghanistan, Iran, and the greater Middle Southeast Asian countries, is positioned to sive sphere of influence in northern China by East. The failure of President George W. Bush assure freedom of the seas. aligning the United States with Japan during and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to ■ Maintenance of a balance of power the Russo-Japanese War. attend various regional meetings has been to prevent the rise of any hegemon or group ■ At the Washington Conference of viewed as a barometer of U.S. interest in the of powers that would impede U.S. political 1920, the United States supported multilat- region—and often contrasted with the atten- and economic access to the region. The sys- eral efforts to preserve the postwar status quo tion paid by China’s leadership. tem of bilateral U.S. alliances with Japan, in the Asia-Pacific region and to ensure the Not only will the Obama administra- the Republic of Korea (ROK), Australia, the territorial integrity of China through great tion have to reassert active leadership and Philippines, and Thailand maintains a stable power cooperation. engagement, but it also will have to reaffirm balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region. ■ Following World War II and through- U.S. commitment to the region and articu- ■ Preventing the proliferation of weapons out the Cold War, the United States relied on a late a vision toward which policies will be of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic mis- series of bilateral alliances with Japan, the ROK, ordered. In doing so, the new administra- sile delivery systems. The United States, along Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand to tion would do well to internalize the vision secure its interests in the Asia-Pacific region. set out by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates the ability of the United in his remarks to the Shangri-La Dialogue States to protect and Strategic Imperatives in Singapore on May 31, 2008. He defined the United States as “a Pacific nation with advance its interests Based on an understanding of U.S. inter- an enduring role in East Asia,” one standing will depend significantly ests in the region, the Obama administra- “for openness and against exclusivity” and on the reassertion of tion will have to address a number of strategic committed to “mutual prosperity.” Noting imperatives that should guide the evolution of that American territory in the Pacific Ocean active leadership and policy. These imperatives include developing a extended from the Aleutian Islands to Guam, engagement from statement of purpose and vision for the region Secretary Gates characterized the United the new administration that reaffirms U.S. commitment and lead- States as a “resident power” in the region. in Washington ership; strengthening alliances; supporting Since the time of the Open Door Notes, the peaceful resolution of disputes; integrat- the United States has championed an open ing rising powers in ways compatible with U.S. international trading order. This practice with China, the ROK, Japan, Russia, and interests; preventing WMD proliferation; and has advanced living standards in the United North Korea, is engaged in the Six-Party Talks participating in the region’s multilateral eco- States and across the globe. At a time when aimed at the denuclearization of North Korea. nomic, political, and security structures and answers to the current financial and eco- At the same time, the Proliferation Security addressing nontraditional security threats. nomic crisis are not fully understood and Initiative (PSI) enjoys broad support across Developing a Statement of remain open to debate, U.S. policy should the region. Purpose. Looking ahead to the com- aim to avoid what history has demonstrated ■ The promotion of democracy and ing decade, the ability of the United States to does not work. To retreat to the protectionism human rights. For successive U.S. admin- protect and advance its interests will depend and beggar-thy-neighbor policies of the 1930s istrations, this has been an enduring ele- significantly on the reassertion of active would be to repeat a mistake of historic pro- ment in policy, with notable successes in the leadership and engagement from the new portion, forfeit U.S. international leadership, Philippines, the ROK, and Taiwan. administration in Washington. Secretary of and put at risk recovery of the global econ- State Hillary Clinton’s February 2009 visit to omy, with unknown consequences for stabil- Over the course of its relations with Japan, Indonesia, the ROK, and China, fol- ity and security in the Asia-Pacific region. East Asia, the United States has adopted lowed by the visit of Japan’s Prime Minister Strengthening Alliances. multiple approaches to protecting and Taro Aso to Washington, DC, stands as an The United States bilateral alliance structure advancing its interests: early indicator of the Obama administration’s remains the foundation of regional stability intent to assert active leadership and engage- and prosperity and the starting point for U.S. ■ The Open Door policy represented a ment in the Asia-Pacific region. security engagement with the region. The alli- unilateral U.S. initiative that evolved into a Whether accurate or not, a number ances allow the United States to maintain a structure of multilateral cooperation aimed at of our closest allies and friends across the significant forward-deployed presence, and the basing structure in Japan and South Korea, Dr. James J. Przystup is a Senior Research Fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. Comments may be directed to [email protected].

No. 239, April 2009 Strategic Forum 2 reinforced by access agreements with nonallied Asia-Pacific region. Japan’s Maritime Self- security contributions but also security broadly Asian friends, makes credible the U.S. security Defense Force is engaged in refueling oper- defined, such as postconflict reconstruction commitment to the region. Operating from ations in the Indian Ocean in support of and the development of the instruments of bases in Asia, U.S. forces are able to extend Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan; good governance. At a time when U.S. alliance their operational reach to the Indian Ocean its Air Self-Defense Force participated in trans- partners and friends will also be facing budget- and Persian Gulf. It is noteworthy to recall that port operations in Iraq; and the Ground Self- ary constraints, the task of working out appro- the first U.S. forces to reach the Persian Gulf in Defense Force contributed to postwar recon- priate roles and missions will challenge alli- 1991 and in Operation Enduring Freedom in struction in Iraq. The ROK has deployed forces ance managers in the years ahead. 2001 were based in Japan. to Iraq and Afghanistan. And Australia, under Supporting the Peaceful During the Cold War, the alliance struc- former Prime Minster John Howard, deployed Resolution of Disputes. The ture stood as a vital link in the U.S. global forces to Iraq and Afghanistan. administration will also have to manage containment strategy. Success in the Cold The process of alliance transformation two Cold War legacy issues: the future of the War did not put an end to interstate tensions focused on the two key Northeast Asia coun- Korean Peninsula and the resolution of cross- and rivalries in East Asia. In the decade that tries, the ROK and Japan, where the U.S. mil- Strait issues between China and Taiwan. Both followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, itary presence is concentrated. In both the are issues in which diplomacy, backed by a the area experienced a series of challenges ROK and Japan, relocation and concentra- treaty alliance commitment to the security of to regional stability and security—the 1994 tion, leading to a more readily deployable the ROK and legal structure governing U.S. nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula, the force structure, defined the transformation relations with Taiwan, offers the best hope of a 1996 Taiwan Strait missile crisis, and North process. In the ROK, U.S. forces are redeploy- peaceful resolution of outstanding differences. Korea’s Taepo Dong missile launch over Japan ing from bases along the demilitarized zone in 1998—that affected the security interests and concentrating in two major hubs south of the United States, its allies, and friends. of the Han River. Meanwhile, wartime opera- today, Cold War legacy Today, Cold War legacy issues in East tional control is being transferred to the ROK, issues in East Asia Asia—China-Taiwan relations and a divided moving the United States from a leading to Korean Peninsula, with North Korea now pos- a supporting role in the country’s defense. In continue to pose sessing a demonstrated nuclear capability— Japan, a similar process is under way, with challenges to U.S. continue to pose challenges to U.S. security collocation of bilateral army and air force security interests interests and commitments. In dealing with headquarters, the establishment of a bilat- and commitments the hard security challenges facing the region, eral joint operations center, and a reduction the alliance structure is irreplaceable. This will in U.S. Marine bases on Okinawa, featuring remain true for the foreseeable future. a significant redeployment of 8,000 Marines The consistent policy of successive U.S. However, as instruments of national pol- from Okinawa to Guam. administrations has been to support unifica- icy, alliances are dynamic elements that are The Obama administration must con- tion of the Korean Peninsula under the ROK in a constant process of evolution, adjusting tinue the process of alliance transformation. government. Toward this end, the U.S.–ROK roles, missions, and capabilities to adapt to While there is a clear understanding of the alliance has successfully deterred the out- a fluid international environment. At times, strategic importance of the alliances among break of a second Korean war. Meanwhile, changes in the international environment, our partners, there is a gap between strategic diplomacy, through the ongoing Six-Party such as the terrorist attacks of September 11, consensus and on-the-ground performance, Talks aimed at the denuclearization of North 2001, are transforming events, requiring a notably on the relocation of the Marine Corps Korea, has also committed “the directly restructuring of alliance relationships. Air Station at Futenma, Okinawa, and the related parties” to “negotiate [a] permanent The war on terror accelerated the trans- redeployment of Marines from Okinawa to peace regime on the Korean Peninsula at an formation of the Asian alliances. In addition Guam. While realignment issues are opera- appropriate separate forum.”2 to the existing alliance commitments to the tional in nature, they are strategic in con- Creating a permanent peace regime defense of Japan and the ROK, and a non- sequence and will be central to the political requires the realization of a number of dip- treaty commitment to the security of Taiwan, health of the alliances over the next decade. lomatic objectives that will result in a regime U.S. forces now would also be tasked with Challenges to international security are that ratifies and supports a preexisting, de operations relating to the war on terror. At the likely to increase over the coming decade, facto state of peace. same time, transformation is requiring the while U.S. capabilities to meet a diversity of The first step down this path is the allies to do more in their own defense and in threats will be constrained as it recovers from denuclearization of North Korea, without support of international order. the financial meltdown of 2008–2009. The which peace on the peninsula is unattain- In this regard, the war on terror has Obama administration will be asking more of able. Other steps include agreement to replace extended alliance cooperation beyond the its allies and friends, in terms of not only hard the 1953 armistice, to which the United

No. 239, April 2009 Strategic Forum 3 States, North Korea, and China are parties, with the defensive arms necessary to assure subscribed to the Declaration of Conduct of with either a political agreement or a peace its ability to resist coercion or attack. Parties in the South China Sea, which com- treaty that would add the ROK to the signato- Integrating Rising Powers. mits signatories to a peaceful resolution of ries; and implementation of the 1991 South- Over the past three decades, since Deng disputed maritime boundaries, and is the first North Agreement on Reconciliation, Non- Xiaoping initiated China’s market-opening non-ASEAN government to sign the associa- Aggression, and Cooperation and Exchange, reforms, successive American administra- tion’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. China a document that stands as a prototype peace tions, Democratic and Republican alike, have has also played a catalytic role in assembling regime. Meanwhile, North Korea’s denuclear- pursued a broad and deep engagement strat- and sustaining the Six-Party Talks on the ization would open the door to the normal- egy aimed at integrating a rising China into denuclearization of North Korea. ization of U.S.–North Korea relations. The the existing international order. President At the same time, China’s military power realization of such a peace structure would Bill Clinton, with the support of a Republican has increased significantly over the past foster reconciliation and ultimately create Congress, worked to advance China’s entry decade, with double-digit increases in defense conditions for a peaceful unification of the into the World Trade Organization. The spending for over 20 years. This has allowed Korean Peninsula. administration of President George W. Bush the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to accel- With respect to Taiwan, the Taiwan worked to further China’s integration and erate its modernization program and acquire Relations Act of April 10, 1979, states that it is to have China act as a “responsible stake- advanced weaponry. Much of this arsenal the policy of the United States: holder” in support of the international eco- appears focused on deterring possible U.S. nomic order. intervention in a Taiwan contingency, but ele- to declare that peace and stability in the Today, China’s booming economy and ments also appear to enhance PLA capabili- area are in the political, security, and eco- increasingly sophisticated diplomacy are ties to project beyond Taiwan into the broader nomic interests of the United States; to transforming economic and political rela- Asia-Pacific region. make clear that the United States deci- tionships across the Asia-Pacific region. The challenge China represents is sion to establish diplomatic relations with In 2006, China stood as a top three thus multifaceted. In his “Responsible the People’s Republic of China rests on the trading partner with Japan, the ROK, Taiwan, Stakeholder” speech, Deputy Secretary of expectation that the future of Taiwan will the Association of Southeast Asian Nations State Robert Zoellick stated that the United be determined by peaceful means; to con- (ASEAN), and India, the leading source States “respects China’s interests in the sider any effort to undermine the future of Japanese imports, and the second-place region.” While tacitly recognizing the reality of Taiwan by other than peaceful means export market for Japan. For the ROK and of China’s growing influence and cautioning . . . a threat to the peace and security of Taiwan, China is the leading export market against efforts to “maneuver toward a pre- the Western [P]acific and of grave concern and ranks second as a source of imports. At ponderance of power,” Zoellick did not take to the United States; to provide Taiwan a position on China’s long-term intentions in with arms of a defensive character; and to Asia and avoided specifying which of its inter- maintain the capacity of the United States the Obama administration ests the United States considered legitimate to resist any resort to force or other forms should define and specify and would respect. of coercion that would jeopardize the secu- what it considers China’s The starting point for the Obama rity or the social or economic system of the legitimate interests in the administration’s approach to China should be people of Taiwan. an internal effort to define and specify what Asia-Pacific region it considers China’s legitimate interests in the This statement of policy has served U.S. Asia-Pacific region. In this regard, it will also interests well over the past 30 years by pre- have to consider whether the United States can serving stability in the Taiwan Strait and the same time, China has become the focus accept China’s imminent status as the domi- providing a secure environment in which of production networks that span the region. nant power in East Asia (if it is not already), Taiwan’s economy and democracy could This is particularly true with regard to high provided that China respects historic U.S. develop. The United States should continue technology. In 2005, China was not only the interests, based on access to the region. In to support Taiwan’s democracy as well as third largest exporter of electronics products this regard, China’s efforts to develop access- uncoerced peaceful resolution of the issues and components, but also the second largest denial capabilities with regard to a Taiwan between Taiwan and China, including unifi- importer of high-tech components. contingency and toward areas of broader East cation if it is achieved on terms acceptable to China’s diplomatic activism is reflected Asia would strategically challenge U.S. inter- the people of both Taiwan and China. In this in its pursuit of bilateral free trade agree- ests in assuring access. regard, given China’s accelerating buildup of ments, in its proposal for a China-ASEAN Preventing WMD military capabilities across the Taiwan Strait, free trade agreement, and in its active par- Proliferation. Averting WMD prolifer- it is critical that the United States remains ticipation in the region’s various multilateral ation is a global strategic imperative of U.S. steadfast in its commitment to supply Taiwan structures and security dialogues. China has policy. Its focus in the Asia-Pacific region

No. 239, April 2009 Strategic Forum 4 is North Korea. The challenge presented by change, from nonproliferation to containing Inclusion should continue to guide but not North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile the spread of infectious diseases. The habits predetermine U.S. policy toward multilateralism. programs is twofold: the first is the threat of cooperation and coordination developed The United States need not participate in every of a nuclear attack on U.S. territory or on over the years within the alliances can pro- multilateral initiative advanced in the region, the territory of U.S. allies in Northeast Asia, vide a firm foundation for initiatives aimed but it should take advantage of opportunities Japan, and the Republic of Korea; the second at dealing with contemporary issues of com- to demonstrate U.S. commitment and engage- is the threat of WMD proliferation from the mon concern on an ad hoc basis. ment. Consistent high-level participation in the Korean Peninsula. Across the region, efforts to forge mul- region’s multilateral dialogues along with sign- The Obama administration will be the tilateral structures for economic and polit- ing ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation fifth to try its hand at denuclearizing North ical cooperation and coordination have and participating in the East Asia Summit would Korea. The efforts, dating back to the 1989– accelerated since the end of the Cold War— signal U.S. interest in and commitment to the 1993 George H.W. Bush administration’s suc- ASEAN, the ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN region’s efforts in building multilateral struc- cessful efforts to persuade North Korea to tures for cooperation. Properly managed partic- allow International Atomic Energy Agency the immediate challenges ipation would in no way compromise the alli- inspectors to inspect the operating records ance structure but would only reinforce it at the facing the Obama of the Yongbyon facility, have been bilateral diplomatic level. as well as multilateral in nature. The cur- administration should not rent Six-Party Talks, involving the United deflect attention from The immediate challenges facing the States, China, the ROK, Japan, Russia, and addressing the strategic Obama administration—Iraq, Afghanistan, North Korea, have produced the diplomatic and stability in the greater Middle East— agreements of September 2005 and February imperatives that will should not deflect attention from address- 2007, which present a three-stage roadmap to shape the contours of the ing the strategic imperatives that will shape denuclearization. Implementation, however, Asia-Pacific region the contours of the Asia-Pacific region in the had not moved beyond the second stage as of decades ahead. As the administration moves December 2008. to engage the region, the pursuit of historic To address the issue of WMD prolifer- Plus 3, APEC, the Changmai Initiative, the interests, openness, inclusion, and mutual ation, the Bush administration launched East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC), the prosperity should guide its policy choices. the PSI in 2003. The initiative represented Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the This will both promote U.S. leadership and a multilateral effort to interdict and defeat East Asia Summit are representative of the advance regional stability and security. WMD-related trade. PSI exercises in the Asia- region’s interest in shaping its future. Some, Pacific region have been hosted by Japan such as the EAEC and initially the East Asia Notes and Singapore and have involved the United Summit, aimed to exclude the United States; States, United Kingdom, Australia, and New U.S. opposition to such efforts was based on 1 Deputy U.S. Trade Representative Karan K. Bhatia, “U.S. Trade Relations with Asia,” remarks before the Zealand as participants. its historic interest in being included in the Washington International Trade Association, July 24, 2007. Multilateral Engagement region. Conceptually and in terms of policy, 2 Article 4 of the Joint Statement issued in Beijing and Addressing Non- the United States has favored trans-Pacific at the conclusion of Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks, traditional Threats. The bilateral forums, such as APEC, as opposed to pan- September 19, 2005. nature of the alliances should not be viewed Asian ones (the EAEC). as a constraint on U.S. multilateral engage- ment with the region. This should start with the trilateral security dialogues now taking root among the United States, Japan, and the The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is a policy The Strategic Forum series presents original research by members ROK, and the United States, Australia, and research and strategic gaming organization within the National of NDU as well as other scholars and specialists in national security Japan, which are focused on expanding the Defense University (NDU) serving the Department of Defense, affairs from this country and abroad. The opinions, conclusions, its components, and interagency partners. The institute provides and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of areas for alliance-based cooperation. A quad- senior decisionmakers with timely, objective analysis and gaming the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of ripartite strategic dialogue among the United events and supports NDU educational programs in the areas of the Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal international security affairs and defense studies. Through an Government. For information on NDU Press, visit the Web site at States, Japan, Australia, and India has been active outreach program, including conferences and publications, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/nduhp. INSS also produces Joint Force INSS seeks to promote understanding of emerging strategic Quarterly for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the journal under consideration and may yet materialize. challenges and policy options. can be accessed at www.ndupress.edu. The alliances also should be seen as the building blocks for multilateral coordina- INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES tion with nonallies to deal with myriad non- Patrick M. Cronin James A. Schear Director David H. Gurney traditional security issues confronting the Director of Research Director, NDU Press region, ranging from disaster relief to climate

No. 239, April 2009 Strategic Forum 5 Other titles from For on-line access to NDU Press publications, NDU Press go to: ndupress.ndu.edu

Hybrid Threats: Reconceptualizing the Lessons of Abu Ghraib: Understanding Evolving Character of Modern Conflict and Preventing Prisoner Abuse in Frank G. Hoffman Military Operations (Strategic Forum No. 240, forthcoming) Paul T. Bartone (Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Defense Horizons 64, Saddam’s War: An Iraqi Military November 2008) Perspective of the Iran-Iraq War Kevin M. Woods et al. NATO’s Uncertain Future: (McNair Paper 70, March 2009) Is Demography Destiny? Jeffrey Simon A 21st-century Concept of Air and (Strategic Forum No. 236, October 2008) Military Operations Robbin F. Laird The Absence of Europe: Implications for (Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Defense Horizons 66, International Security? March 2009) Steven Philip Kramer (Strategic Forum No. 235, October 2008) Ukraine Against Herself: To Be Euro-Atlantic, Eurasian, or Neutral? Irregular Warfare: New Challenges for Jeffrey Simon Civil-Military Relations (Strategic Forum No. 238, February 2009) Patrick M. Cronin (Strategic Forum No. 234, October 2008) From Sputnik to Minerva: Education and American National Security Defense Transformation à la française Sean Kay and U.S. Interests (Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Defense Horizons 65, Leo G. Michel January 2009) (Strategic Forum No. 233, October 2008)

Challenges to Persian Gulf Security: Energy Security in South Asia: Can How Should the United States Respond? Interdependence Breed Stability? Judith S. Yaphe Joseph McMillan (Strategic Forum No. 237, November 2008) (Strategic Forum No. 232, September 2008)

No. 239, April 2009 Strategic Forum 6