Central Asia

CENTRAL ASIA: FAULT LINES IN THE NEW SECURITY MAP 4 July 2001 ICG Asia Report No 20 Osh/Brussels TABLE OF CONTENTS MAP OF CENTRAL ASIA...................................................................................................... i EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................ ii I. INTRODUCTION.........................................................................................................1 II. APPROACHES TO SECURITY: THREAT PERCEPTIONS...............................2 A. Uzbekistan: Seeking Order in a Dangerous Neighbourhood.............................3 B. Kyrgyzstan: Accidental Target of Islamist Militancy........................................4 C. Tajikistan: Containing the Chaos Left by the Civil War ...................................7 III. MILITARY CAPABILITIES...................................................................................10 A. Uzbekistan: Building a Regional Power..........................................................10 B. Kyrgyzstan: Mustering Limited Resources .....................................................10 C. Tajikistan: Under Russia’s Wing.....................................................................11 IV. PROBLEMS WITH REGIONAL COOPERATION.............................................13 A. Incompatible Threat Perceptions .....................................................................13 B. Incompatible Political Systems and Domestic Environments .........................15 V. OTHER REGIONAL ACTORS...............................................................................16 A. Kazakhstan: A Regional Power in Russia’s Underbelly..................................16 B. Turkmenistan: Going It Alone.........................................................................17 C. The Russian Federation: Ambivalent Sphere of Influence..............................17 D. China: Stability Above All...............................................................................18 E. Afghanistan: Source of Instability ...................................................................18 VI. REGIONAL COOPERATIVE INITIATIVES.......................................................19 A. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) ...........................................19 B. Shanghai Cooperation Organisation ................................................................20 C. External Support ..............................................................................................21 V. CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................23 APPENDICES A. The Central Asian Republics At a Glance .......................................................24 B. Glossary of Acronyms .....................................................................................25 C. About the International Crisis Group...............................................................26 D. ICG Reports and Briefing Papers ....................................................................27 E. ICG Board Members........................................................................................30 m Ob y 50° 60° ° ° ' ul 70 80 h 90° C V T Krasnoyarsk y Perm' u a r t a CENTRAL ASIA y k a Irty e sh s Tomsk i n e Vo Izhevsk Y ka lga Tom O Kazan' Tyumen' ' Yekaterinburg S Novosibirsk u r a RUSSIAN FEDERATION Novokuznetsk n Kurgan l o o D b Omsk Ufa o T Petropavl Penza Chelyabinsk Barnaul Voronezh Togliatti a b' f l O er a i p lg Samara U s ho o E K V Köshetau Magnitogorsk K B Qostanay a iya Saratov tu 50° Rudnyy- Pavlodar n Rubtsovsk 50° Orenburg U Oral r E al sil Orsk Astana Ertis MONGOLIA 40° Semey UKRAINE 90° Volgograd Öskemen N - u Temirtau Aqtöbe r Rostov na Donu a a Qaraghandy E y rtix y a h ay Z rg u T Zaysan su ry Ir Sa giz Atyrau- Astrakhan' Zhezqazghan Lake Balqash KAZAKHSTAN Ürümqi Taldyqorghan T ere Il k Aral i Sh - Aqtau- Sea Qyzylorda u GEORGIA S y Almaty r Tbilisi D a r CHINA y a Zhambyl Caspian Ysyk Köl Nukus Bishkek ARMENIA Sea rim 40° a AZERBAIJAN Kara Shymkent T 40° Yerevan Bogaz KYRGYZSTAN Gol Dashhowuz Urganch Chirchiq an Tashkent oxk UZBEKISTAN Angren Namangan T Baku A H Türkmenbashi m Qukon Osh o u t a D Farghona n a avshan t r er n Tabriz y Z a TURKMENISTAN a Samarqand k Kashi r a Bukhoro Y Chärjew TAJIKISTAN Qarshi Dushanbe Rasht Ashgabat ara At Mary K kumsk Canal ra ªªªªª k ªª ªªª ª ª ª ª ªª ª ª M ª ª ª ª ªªª u - r Tehran g Qonduz- a Mashhad b ISLAMIC REPUBLIC - 0 200 400 600 800 km The boundaries and names shown on this map Baghlan PAKISTAN OF do not imply official endorsement or acceptance AFGHANISTAN by the United Nations. IRAN 0 100 200 300 400 500 mi ° 50 60° Kabul 70° 80° Herat- INDIA Map No. 3763 Rev.4 UNITED NATIONS Department of Public Information October 1998 Cartographic Section ICG Asia Report No 20 4 July 2001 CENTRAL ASIA: FAULT LINES IN THE NEW SECURITY MAP EXECUTIVE SUMMARY After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Collective Security Treaty led by Russia, and independent states that emerged in Central Asia more recently the Shanghai Cooperation had to begin almost from scratch in building both Organisation led by China and Russia. Within military forces and security strategies. The these frameworks, concrete steps toward security unified position of the USSR was soon replaced cooperation and joint action on the ground have by sharply divergent security arrangements, amounted to very little. The will and the financial corresponding to the different strategic interests resources needed to implement cooperation have and paths of development of these new states. As not been forthcoming, and in some cases may a result, there has been more confrontation than simply not exist. The stark fact remains that the cooperation. This is particularly true of the three Central Asian states have not cooperated well states that are the focus of this report: with one another, either because they have not Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. made it a high priority or because they have perceived it to be in their interest not to do so. There are three ongoing military confrontations in the region. First, in Afghanistan the Taliban Indeed, rather than cooperating, the Central Asian movement controls more than 90 per cent of the states in the post-Soviet decade have engaged in a country and is fighting against the United Front series of serious violations of one another’s to control the remaining territory. Secondly, security interests. The list of points of contention Islamist rebels based in Afghanistan have been has only grown following the increase in Islamist fighting to overturn the government of militancy in 1999. Uzbekistan allowed or Uzbekistan and their incursions have spilled over supported armed incursions into Tajikistan and into Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Thirdly, in harboured dissidents whom Tajikistan accuses of Tajikistan although the peace process there has treason. Tajikistan likewise permitted the largely achieved an end to conflict, some armed presence of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan groups continue hostilities from within poorly (IMU) on its territory, from where it has controlled parts of the country, including even the conducted repeated incursions into Uzbekistan. outskirts of the capital Dushanbe, or from the While supposedly searching for IMU targets, territory of Uzbekistan. These security problems Uzbekistan bombed Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, suppress economic development and discourage causing numerous civilian casualties. Uzbekistan the countries from embarking on much-needed mined undemarcated borders between it and the political reforms. other two countries, resulting in dozens of fatalities. Uzbekistan also tried to force territorial The Central Asian states have made high-profile concessions from some of its neighbours and moves toward cooperative regional security unilaterally took control of territories to which it structures in which outside powers most often has a marginal claim. In response to Uzbekistan’s play the leadership role, notably the CIS actions on the borders, Kyrgyz officials Central Asia: Fault Lines in the New Security Map ICG Asia Report N° 20, 4 July 2001 Page iii threatened to reclaim territories that were ceded RECOMMENDATIONS to Uzbekistan in the early Soviet period. To the Central Asian Governments: No outside power is sufficiently interested in the region to make major investments in its security. Their interests are often very limited, focusing on 1. Governments should give the highest the potential of this region to propagate priority to boosting regional cooperation, instability in “more important” areas through the while avoiding unilateral measures aimed at drug trade or the spread of Islamist radicalism. pressuring or undermining the stability of Each also has certain special concerns. U.S. their neighbours such as border closures or involvement has been partially aimed at cross-border incursions. strengthening the capacity and independence of the Central Asian states, with the goal of 2. Governments should reinvigorate joint reducing Russia’s influence, but other U.S. border commissions and the multilateral policies have given priority to particular approaches to border disputes that have countries, which has undermined regional been successful in solving frontier disputes cooperation. Russia’s policy has been oriented with China. There should be no attempt to toward maintaining its influence in the region as change borders by unilateral demarcation. a means of protecting its security

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