Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 Chinese Foreign Relations with Weak Peripheral States

This book examines China’s relations with its weak peripheral states through the theoretical lens of structural power and structural violence. China’s foreign policy concepts toward its weak neighbouring states, such as the ‘One Belt, One Road’ strategy, are premised on the assumption that economic exchange and a commitment to common development are the most effective means of ensuring stability on its borders. This book, however, argues that China’s over-reliance on economic exchange as the basis for its bilateral relations contains inherently self-defeating qualities that have contributed and can further contribute to instability and insecurity within China’s periphery. Unequal economic exchange between China and its weak neighbours results in Chinese influence over the state’s domestic institutions, what this book refers to as ‘structural power’. Chinese structural power, in turn, can undermine the state’s development, contribute to social unrest, and exacerbate existing state/society tensions – what this book refers to as ‘structural violence’. For China, such outcomes lead to instability within its peripheral environment and raise its vulnerability to security threats stemming from nationalism, separatism, terrorism, transnational organised crime, and drug trafficking, among others. This book explores the causality between China’s economically-reliant foreign policy and insecurity in its weak peripheral states and considers the implications for China’s security environment and foreign policy. This book will be of much interest to students of Chinese politics, Asian security studies, international political economy, and IR in general.

Jeffrey Reeves is Associate Professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Secu- Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 rity Studies, Honolulu, Hawaii, USA, and has a PhD in International Relations from the London School of Economics and Political Science. He is co-author of Non-traditional Security in East Asia: A Regime Approach (2015, with Ramon Pacheco-Pardo). Asian Security Studies Series Editors: Sumit Ganguly, Indiana University, Bloomington, Andrew Scobell, Research and Development (RAND) Corporation, Santa Monica, and Joseph Chinyong Liow, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

Few regions of the world are fraught with as many security questions as Asia. Within this region it is possible to study great power rivalries, irredentist conflicts, nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation, secessionist movements, ethnoreligious conflicts, and interstate wars. This book series publishes the best possible scholarship on the security issues affecting the region and includes detailed empirical studies, theoretically oriented case studies, and policy-relevant analyses as well as more general works.

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Chinese Civil-Military Relations The transformation of the People’s Liberation Army Edited by Nan Li

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 The Chinese Army Today Tradition and transformation for the 21st century Dennis J. Blasko

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China’s War on Terrorism Counter-insurgency, politics and internal security Martin I. Wayne

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Multilateral Asian Security Architecture Non-ASEAN stakeholders See Seng Tan Chinese Foreign Relations with Weak Peripheral States Asymmetrical economic power and insecurity Jeffrey Reeves

Democratic Transition and Security in Pakistan Edited by Shaun Gregory Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 Chinese Foreign Relations with Weak Peripheral States Asymmetrical economic power and insecurity

Jeffrey Reeves Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 First published 2016 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa business © 2016 Jeffrey Reeves The right of Jeffrey Reeves to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Reeves, Jeffrey (Writer on Asian security issues), author. Chinese foreign relations with weak peripheral states : asymmetrical economic power and insecurity / Jeffrey Reeves. pages cm. — (Asian security studies) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. China—Foreign economic relations—21st century. 2. China— Economic policy—21st century. 3. Asia, Central—Foreign economic relations—China. 4. China—Foreign economic relations—Asia, Central. 5. South Asia—Foreign economic relations—China. 6. China—Foreign economic relations—South Asia. 7. Southeast Asia—Foreign economic relations—China. 8. China—Foreign economic relations—Southeast Asia. I. Title. HF1604.R44 2016 327.5105—dc23 2015019472 ISBN: 978-1-138-89150-0 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-315-70962-8 (ebk) Typeset in Times by Apex CoVantage, LLC Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 To my wife, Oyun, and children, Patrick and Julia. Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 This page intentionally left blank Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 Contents

Acknowledgements xiii Abbreviations xv

Introduction 1

1 Asymmetrical economic exchange: negative outcomes of structural power and structural violence 22

2 China’s reliance on economic exchange with its peripheral states 39

3 Sino-Kyrgyzstan relations 59

4 Sino-Tajikistan relations 74

5 Sino-Afghanistan relations 91

6 Sino-Pakistan relations 110

7 Sino-Nepal relations 133

8 Sino-Myanmar relations 149 Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016

9 Sino-Lao PDR relations 167

10 Sino-Mongolia relations 188 xii Contents 11 Weak states, China’s security, and policy prescriptions 205

12 Weak states, structural power, and structural violence 223

Index 229 Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) in Honolulu, Hawaii, for supporting this research. In particular, I would like to thank the center director, Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Dan “Fig” Leaf, and the dean of the College of Security Studies, Capt. (Ret.) Carleton R. Cramer, for giving me the time, space, and resources to research and write. I would like to thank my APCSS colleagues Jeffrey Hornung, Justin and Kerry Nankivell, and Lora Saalman for their advice and support. Lastly, I would like to thank my family for their continual support and acceptance of the long travel and late nights that went into this book. Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 This page intentionally left blank Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 Abbreviations

ADB Asian Development Bank AIIB Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank ANSF Afghan National Security Forces ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations CNPC China National Petroleum Corporation DP Democratic Party of Mongolia EIA Environmental impact assessment EITI Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative ETIM East Turkestan Islamic Movement ETLO East Turkestan Liberation Organization FATA Federally Administered Tribal Areas FDI Foreign direct investment FTA Free trade agreement GDP Gross domestic product GNI Gross national income ICBC Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Ltd IMAR Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region ISAF International Security Assistance Forces JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency KIA Kachin Independence Army KIO Kachin Independence Organization Lao PDR Lao People’s Democratic Republic LeJ Lashkar-e-Jhangvi LPRP Lao People’s Revolutionary Party Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 MCC Metallurgical Corporation of China MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China MOFCOM Ministry of Commerce, People’s Republic of China NLD National League for Democracy NUG National Unity Government ODA Overseas development aid PLA People’s Liberation Army PRC People’s Republic of China RATS Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure xvi Abbreviations SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organisation SOE State-owned enterprises SPDC State Peace and Development Council TAR Tibet Autonomous Region TTP Tehrik-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan UCPN(M) Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) UML Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist–Leninist) UNHCR United Nations’ High Commission for Refugees USDP Union Solidarity and Development Party UTO United Tajik Opposition UWSA United Wa State Army WTO World Trade Organisation XUAR Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 Introduction

State weakness is a critical, structural component of China’s peripheral security environment. Of the fourteen states directly on China’s borders at least eight are weak, with varying degrees of instability and insecurity. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nepal, Myanmar, Lao PDR, and Mongolia all struggle with issues of ineffective domestic institutions, governance illegitimacy, and poor state/society relations that result in different levels of internal unrest and transnational threats. For China, engagement with these weak states so as to ensure stability on its borders is a top foreign policy priority.1 Since the early 1980s, China has relied on a foreign policy approach based on economic exchange to ensure good relations with its neighbouring weak states and stability on its borders. China first advanced this economic-centric approach with the Periphery Policy (zhoubian zhengce) and Good Neighbour Policy (mulin zhengce) concepts, both of which drew heavily on economic exchange as a basis for security. Later foreign policy iterations that stressed economic development as a means of providing security included the South-South Cooperation (nan-nan hezuo), Go Out Strategy (zou chuqu zhanlue), and New Security Concept (xin anquan guan) strategies. While these concepts have evolved over time, they continue to advance economic exchange and development as their core principles for engagement. They also remain essential policies in shaping China’s relations with its weak neighbouring states and in guiding its search for security on its borders. There is clear continuity between China’s past foreign policies and those of its current leadership under President Xi Jinping. In 2013, President Xi articulated a new foreign policy approach to peripheral security at the October Symposium for Working Periphery Diplomacy in Beijing based on the existing concept of Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 ‘Friendly, Secure, and Prosperous Neighbourhood’ (mulin, anlin, fulin).2 In 2014, President Xi introduced the ‘One Belt, One Road’ strategic concept, which is entirely premised on economic exchange between China and the countries in its near abroad.3 While Chinese media lauded both initiatives as breakthroughs in foreign policy thinking on periphery relations, there is little within either concept that is different from past policies. Both the Friendly, Secure, and Prosperous Neighbourhood approach and the One Belt, One Road concept continue to assume economic exchange and a commitment to common development are the most effective conduits for security relations with the weak states on China’s borders. 2 Introduction The approaches also retain the assumed logic that all economic ties between China and its weak neighbours result in positive outcomes for both parties involved. It is this book’s position that China’s policy dependence on economic exchange to ensure security vis-à-vis the weak states on its periphery has actually contributed to insecurity on China’s borders and has the potential to do so further. In particular, China’s over-reliance on economic exchange as a basis of security relations is problematic in that not all economic exchange between China and its weak neighbouring states results in positive outcomes. For weak states in particular, economic exchange with China can, and often does, result in China developing a negative influence over their domestic structures, what this book refers to as ‘structural power’, and domestic insecurity, or ‘structural violence’. This paradox of economic exchange’s negative outcomes becomes clearer when one considers the differing nature of China’s economic exchange with developed Asian states and its weak peripheral neighbours. For developed Asian states, or those with more developed economies and more robust political institutions, China’s role as a regional economic core has been largely beneficial. Economic cooperation with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has been a driving force for developed Asian states’ growth over the past two decades. Chinese demand for natural resources such as wood, coal, iron, and copper, for example, has contributed to the development of resource sectors in Thailand, Indonesia, and Australia.4 Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in roads, rail lines, and other infrastructure projects in developed Asian states has enabled more effective transfers of goods and services that have, in turn, spurred developed Asian states’ growth. China’s central role in Asia’s ‘supply chain’ has led to greater intraregional trade in intermediate products, more robust regional export growth, and enabled some developed Asian states to strengthen their manufacturing sectors. Across many circumstances, economic cooperation with China has been a positive phenomenon for developed Asian states, contributing both to their domestic employment and economic expansion and providing a base for their bilateral relations with the PRC.5 Weak states on China’s periphery also benefit from economic exchange with China in ways similar to developed states, yet such exchange also comes with a price. While developed Asian states are able to mitigate negative outcomes so that economic exchange with China remains, for the most part, a net positive activity, the same is not true for the weak states on China’s borders. Inefficient governance and internal instability together with growing economic dependence on China Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 limits these weak states’ ability to reduce the negative aspects of economic cooperation so that the overall benefits outweigh the costs. The direct and indirect costs of economic cooperation with China for these weak states include, but are not limited to, disruption or distortion of their economic development, economically driven environmental degradation, social and/or political insecurity, localised violence, and schisms within state/society relations.6 While neither the cause nor the sole driver of weakness within these states, the negative effects stemming from economic ties with China can contribute to these states’ further weakness as defined in this volume. The inability or unwillingness of Introduction 3 a weak state’s government to regulate harmful Chinese-originating economic activity (whether state-sponsored or private) can, for example, undermine its legitimacy and/or further weaken the country’s domestic institutions. The perception among a weak state’s society that its government draws on economic ties with China to advance its own interests at the cost of the state’s overall development can harm state/ society relations. Unrest, violence, and environmental degradation stemming from economic activity also erode the state’s institutions and lead to greater weakness. Viewed in line with weak states and the negative aspects of economic development, one can argue that the Friendly, Secure, and Prosperous Neighbourhood approach and the One Belt, One Road concept can, ironically, contribute to insecurity for China. China’s over-reliance on economic exchange for its relations with its bordering weak states has created a counter-cycle where unmanaged economic exchange contributes to greater instability. More specifically, China’s economic-centric approach to cooperation with weak states leads to their further weakness and opens China to threats stemming from nationalism, separatism, terrorism, transnational organised crime, and drug trafficking, among others. This book examines China’s relations with its peripheral weak states through the theoretical lenses of structural power and structural violence. Both concepts have their roots in Marxist theories of international political economics and peace and security studies. The book argues that China’s reliance on economic exchange to advance its political and security goals among its weak peripheral states contains an internal contradiction that results in a self-defeating policy and a less secure regional environment for China. The book asks three main questions. First, what are weak states and why do they matter for China? Second, how does China’s use of economic exchange with weak states result in negative outcomes? Third, what are the implications for China’s security environment and foreign policy? This chapter provides a framework for understanding the first question. Chapter 1 provides a theoretical basis for examining how China’s economic exchange approach to weak states can undermine their and China’s own security. Chapter 2 surveys Chinese language documents, speeches, and scholarship on its bilateral relations with the eight weak states on its periphery (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nepal, Myanmar, Lao PDR, and Mongolia) to demonstrate China’s continual reliance on economic means to ensure its strategic ends within the respective countries. Chapters 3 through 10 examine China’s bilateral relations with these eight weak peripheral states to demonstrate how Chinese economic exchange translates into Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 Chinese structural power and contributes to structural violence within the weak state. Chapter 11 considers the case studies’ findings in relation to China’s security environment and foreign policy. Finally, the book concludes with a summary of its major theoretical and empirical findings.

What are weak states and why do they matter? In employing the concept of state weakness to analysis of China’s periphery security, the volume knowingly wades into a contentious debate within international 4 Introduction relations (IR) and comparative politics on the nature of state weakness. While scholars working within the IR and comparative politics’ traditions have employed the term and concept for decades, there is currently no consensus of what constitutes state weakness. Scholars such as Burton Benedict and David Vital, for example, argue state weakness is based on material factors, whether in terms of small territories or small populations.7 Through application of material variables in determining state weakness, both Benedict and Vital suggest that weakness is relational. Others, such as Teygve Mathisen, Raimo Väyrynen, R. P. Barston, and Michael Handel, argue that weakness comes from a state’s external power relations.8 States without global influence, within this model, are weak. States with global influence, conversely, are strong. Material conditions play secondary roles within this strand of reasoning. Still others see state weakness as a psychological rather than material or power issue. Robert Rothstein and Robert Keohane are examples of scholars who view state weakness as stemming, at least in part, from psychological deficiencies.9 While this volume concedes the potentiality for all the aforementioned variables to contribute to state weakness in certain instances over certain periods of time, it employs an alternative, structural approach to state weakness for analysis. Juxtaposing Weber’s definition of the modern state as consisting of effective institutions, legitimate governments, and state control over society, this book takes the position that state weakness stems from weak institutions, deficiencies in state legitimacy, and poor state/society relations.10 While a less common approach to state weakness than those highlighted above, this approach to state weakness is entirely in line with existing IR and comparative politics accounts of weak states. Barry Buzan, for example, argues that state weakness exists when incongruence occurs between the idea of the state, the institutional expression of the state, and the physical base of the state.11 T. V. Paul defines state weakness as the inability ‘of a state to develop and implement policies in order to provide collective goods such as security, order, and welfare to its citizens in a legitimate and effective manner.’12 Michael Desch notes that weak states typically have weak governments, ineffective institutions, and a lack of cohesion between the state and society.13 Stewart Patrick, in developing his Index of State Weakness, identifies four components – legitimate political institutions, the effective management of security, the effective management of the economy, and the state’s provision of social welfare – for measuring state weakness.14 Joel Migdal similarly identifies inadequate capabilities, both in terms Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 of institutions and social control, and political legitimacy as the drivers behind state weakness.15 This book employs a three-part rubric to determine state weakness and consider how state weakness contributes to insecurity. First, it examines state institutions, such as those that contribute to security, political effectiveness, and economic management, to determine whether a state is capable of delivering public goods. A state’s ineffective institutions of control can translate into a security gap, or ungoverned space, within its sovereign territory that can become the centre of separatist, terrorist, or criminal activity.16 Organised crime groups take advantage Introduction 5 of states with ineffective institutions to engage in drug and human trafficking, and terrorist and insurgent groups are more likely to operate in weak states where governments cannot establish institutional control.17 States that have ineffective security institutions cannot deal with internal security challenges, which then have the potential to metastasise to become interstate threats.18 Neither are the security threats stemming from institutional ineffectiveness confined to the harder security concerns within nontraditional security such as transnational crime or terrorism. States that cannot effectively control outgoing migration for lack of an effective customs and borders mechanism are more likely to experience transnational pandemics and illicit good smuggling, for example, than those with effective control.19 Second, it considers whether the state is legitimate. To determine legitimacy, this book employs Alagappa’s criteria of normative elements (whether the state has effectively established a relationship with society based on shared goals and values) and performance.20 Weak states with political illegitimacy contribute to transnational threats in a number of ways. First, illegitimate governments are more likely to use force to maintain their hold on power. In instances where the illegitimate government also lacks institutional control (as is the case in most of China’s bordering weak states), this heavy-handed approach can create public resistance that manifests in its violent form in separatist/terrorist groups.21 Sec- ond, these groups can target outside actors seen as supporting the illegitimate state either directly, through terrorist activity, or indirectly, through support of existing separatist groups within the foreign country. Third, illegitimate states lack the political capital to deal with their domestic security issues, which translates into an inability to control transnational threats. Third, the volume draws on Migdal’s work to look at state/society relations, which entails consideration of a state’s ability to effectively manage its society through instrumental means and its relevance as a central governance body in societies traditionally organised along web-like social groupings.22 The state’s inability to control its society is closely related to both ineffective institutions and illegitimate governance. Poor state/society relations contribute to nontraditional security as disenfranchised groups within the state engage in separatist activity aimed at the state or, alternatively, at outside actors that support the state.23 States with weak state/society relations are also more likely to see alternative structures of control based on clan, ethnic, or religious ties that directly challenge the government’s ability to manage its domestic security environ- Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 ment. Such insecurity can have spillover effects on states with close geographic proximity.

Weak states on China’s periphery Applying these criteria to the fourteen states on China’s periphery, the volume argues that eight are weak. These include Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nepal, Myanmar, Lao PDR, and Mongolia. The following section identifies weakness across each state, respectively. 6 Introduction Kyrgyzstan The Kyrgyz government lacks the institutional capability and the financial resources to deal effectively with the country’s domestic security situation. Indeed, since 2000, Bishkek’s capacity to effectively deal with organised crime and terrorist groups such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) has actually decreased.24 Both the Kyrgyz police and military lack the ability to handle the country’s security threats, particularly the growth of drug traffic passing through the country from Afghanistan to the United States and Europe. As a result of its institutional shortcomings, the Kyrgyz government has become dependent on outside actors – particularly Russia, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and the United States (US) – for its security needs. While there was hope for political reform following the ‘Tulip Revolution’ in Kyrgyzstan that saw the ousting of President Askar Akaev in 2005, the continuation of the essential mechanisms of Kyrgyz politics in the post-Akaev years has led many in the state to see the ‘revolution’ as nothing more than a coup d’état.25 Indeed, Akaev’s successor, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, provided more continuity with past government institution than reform and was subsequently forced from office in 2010. Charges of vote irregularities and fraud in the 2011 election that brought Kyrgyzstan’s new president, Almazbek Atambayev, into office suggest the state continues to suffer from illegitimacy.26 The strong influence of traditional tribes and tribal loyalties in Kyrgyzstan contributes to a general weakening of the country’s political system.27 This is particularly the case as the Kyrgyz government has become more and more centralised and its institutions less capable of dealing effectively with parts of the population at some distance from Bishkek. Neither does the Kyrgyz government enjoy widespread public support. Indeed, most Kyrgyz see the country’s current political trajectory as ‘backsliding’ away from a more representational government.28

Tajikistan Tajikistan’s institutional capabilities in security, rule of law, border security, and economic stability are also incredibly weak. The country’s police force and army are endemically corrupt and maintain ties to organised crime groups that operate in Tajikistan and Central Asia.29 Since its independence from the former Soviet Union, both Russia and Uzbekistan have militarily intervened in Tajikistan on Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 numerous occasions to secure their own borders against transnational security threats originating in the country.30 Neither does Dushanbe have the ability to staunch the flow of terrorist activity both into Tajikistan from Afghanistan or from Tajikistan to its neighbouring states. Indeed, Dushanbe is almost entirely dependent on external actors (China and Russia) for its security and stability.31 Tajikistan’s political system is stable, but only as the result of oppressive government policies supported by Moscow.32 The state’s authoritarian president, Emomali Rahmon, relies on the government-controlled media, political intimida- tion, and the continued threat of Islamic radicalism as the base for his political Introduction 7 legitimacy.33 This authoritarian control, however, does not translate into legitimacy among younger generations of Tajiks, who are increasingly drawn to opposition parties such as the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) and see Rahmon’s People’s Democratic Party of Tajikistan as fundamentally at odds with their national Mus- lim identity.34 Tajik society is largely organised around the extended family (avlods), several of which constitute a kishlak, or agricultural community.35 These communities engage in subsistence farming and exist outside the formal state structures, maintain their own internal mechanisms for social order, and provide their own security.36 They operate outside the government’s control as ‘states within a state’.37 While analysts often cite the Tajik society’s indifference to Dushanbe as a source of political stability, any such stability rests on the state’s complete irrelevancy to society and is, therefore, an indication of structural weakness.

Afghanistan Afghanistan is in many ways the prototypical weak state, as the state’s institutions are almost nonexistent outside Kabul. The lack of institutional control results almost entirely from the government’s inability to provide even basic security to the various ethnic groups and tribes that live within the state’s territory; an inability that has become more pronounced following the International Security Assistance Forces’ (ISAF) late 2014 troop drawdown and mission reconceptualisation.38 As a result of this institutional weakness, a myriad of security threats exist within Afghanistan that the current government has no means of addressing. Whether terrorism, drug cultivation and trafficking, or organised crime, Afghanistan’s weak institutions translate into state paralysis and Kabul’s inability to affect even nominal domestic sovereignty.39 This institutional weakness directly translates into security threats for all the countries on Afghanistan’s borders.40 Years of misrule under the Karzai regime and a US-brokered power sharing agreement between Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah following a divisive 2014 have led to a crisis of political legitimacy in Afghanistan.41 The current Afghan government’s institutional weakness (measured by its inability to provide social goods such as healthcare, education, economic opportunity, or security) further compounds Kabul’s illegitimacy in the Afghans’ and foreign observers’ eyes.42 Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 Afghanistan has never been a homogenous nation but rather a geographic area where different ethnic groups, tribes, and family clans lived in proximity to one another and engaged in constant competition or outright conflict. By conservative accounts, there are at least twenty-five distinct groups in Afghanistan that live far outside the state’s nominal control.43 Post-conflict Afghanistan is extremely divided, as the Kabul-based government remains an abstraction for the majority of the people residing within the country’s delineated borders. In many ways, it is a gross misconception to speak about state/society relations in Afghanistan.44 8 Introduction Pakistan Pakistan is another archetypal weak state in terms of institutions. The country’s formal institutions, far from providing public goods such as health, education, or economic opportunity, are designed to meet its political and business elites’ needs and to perpetuate a system in the country to ensure their continued power and wealth.45 As a result, Islamabad’s institutions do not contribute to political stability or security for the vast majority of Pakistanis.46 In addition to these current deficiencies, Pakistan’s institutions are on a path to weaken further by 2030 due to insufficient investment, human capital, and leadership.47 Internal conflict and nontraditional security threats related to climate change also present significant obstacles for institutional development. Poor governance, a lack of input in government decision making, perceived corruption, and weak institutions all contribute to a sense among Pakistanis that Islamabad lacks political legitimacy.48 So has the struggle between liberal and orthodox Islam in Pakistan led to a domestic environment in which orthodox Islamic groups have come to form alternative governance structures, particularly in the country’s far-flung and ill-administered tribal regions.49 This uncertainty over the role of Islam in Pakistan has also created a domestic security environment in the country where a large number of insurgent groups believe it is in their right to engage in violence against the state.50 Islamabad lacks both the institutional capability and the political legitimacy to staunch ongoing tribal and sectarian violence in the state.51 Huge swaths of the state’s territory lay outside the government’s control, raising questions about Islamabad’s domestic sovereignty over parts the population that reside in the country’s territory. Islamabad’s inability to control its society directly translates into insecurity for its neighbouring states, including China, as it is unable to manage the flow of people across its borders.52

Nepal Nepal’s institutions are critically weak.53 The state is unable to provide basic security for its residents both in Kathmandu and those in more isolated, mountainous areas.54 According to the World Bank, more than one hundred violent criminal groups operate in Nepal’s Tarai Region alone.55 Political instability in the country compounds insecurity, as it hinders the development of public goods such as Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 health and education. Kathmandu’s political illegitimacy is derived from two sources. The first source is the lack of federalism and the resulting political system where more than 70 per cent of the country’s population is effectively marginalised from the political process.56 Adding to the marginalisation is the continued presence of a caste system which results in a mono-ethnic polity.57 The second source is external powers’ (China and India) manipulation of Nepal’s domestic political situation, which many Nepalese see as undermining the government’s effectiveness and impartiality.58 Introduction 9 The lack of state presence in large areas within Nepal’s boundaries translates into Kathmandu’s effective loss of control over the country’s domestic sovereignty. Large areas remain outside the state’s control and have become effective breeding grounds for insurgent groups and transnational criminal gangs.59 The state is also ineffective in dealing with sectarian conflict in the country such as that between Hindus and Muslims.60 Both instances of the state’s inability to control Nepalese society translate into insecurity for neighbouring states.

Myanmar The ‘security gaps’ resulting from Myanmar’s institutional weakness have allowed insurgent groups, ethnic violence, and drug manufacturing to flourish in the state.61 This development not only contributes to domestic insecurity, undermining the state’s institutional ability to provide even the most basic social goods to its citizens, but also poses nontraditional security threats to the states with which it shares a border. While the government has effectively mobilised coercive force to ensure its survival, its ineffectiveness in providing even basic public goods to the Burmese people translates into state weakness by this book’s applied definition.62 While the former military junta instituted elections in 2010, thereby usher- ing multiparty democracy to the country, it is far from certain that this political reform translates into political legitimacy for Naypyidaw. Many analysts who study Myanmar argue the most appropriate lens for viewing the state’s political legitimacy is not the political system per se, but the degree to which the system reflects the ethnic and cultural situation in Myanmar, particularly in relation to the country’s disenfranchised minority groups.63 If one uses this measurement of state legitimacy, a 2013 Human Rights Watch report on state-allowed crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing of Muslims in the county’s Arakan State would suggest gross state illegitimacy.64 By any measure, Naypyidaw lacks control over the country’s society. Large swaths of the country’s territory remain outside the state’s control, existing as governance and security ‘gaps’. Ethnic and sectarian violence remain rampant throughout the country, suggesting the government is either incapable of protecting all the individuals within its sovereign territory (some of whom, such as the Rohingya Muslims, the state denies citizenship) or willing to allow certain groups in Myanmar, such as the anti-Muslim Buddhist 969 Movement, to engage in ethnic cleansing activities.65 Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 Lao PDR For Lao PDR, institutional weakness is apparent in the state’s security, political, and economic sectors. This institutional weakness is most pronounced in the state’s security sector and results in a flourishing of transnational crime groups operating in the country’s ungoverned areas.66 Corruption among the political and business elite is also rampant and contributes to such nontraditional security concerns as illegal logging and trafficking in illegal animal products.67 Neither are the country’s economic institutions sufficient to deal with its endemic poverty.68 10 Introduction There is perhaps no greater indication of the Laotian government’s illegitimacy than the fact that since the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP) came to power in 1975, one out of six Laotians have immigrated abroad.69 Understanding the tenuous nature of its hold on power, the LPRP has been assiduous in oppress- ing opposition political movements and, until 2008, any semblance of civil society in the country. While the LPRP has moved to implement economic reform to improve its standing among the population, Lao PDR continues to experience social instability related to party illegitimacy.70 More than thirty-five years after its founding, the LPRP has not been able to establish a unifying national identity in Lao PDR.71 Indeed, Vientiane’s increasing inability to provide social advancement for the majority of the Laotian society has led to the formation of alternative forms of governance at the village level that challenge the government’s role as the provider of public goods. The gap between the state and society in Lao PDR is widening as many Laotians engage in self-marginalisation: a moving away from the central government’s sovereignty to exist in grey zones only nominally a part of the Laotian state.72

Mongolia Mongolia’s weak institutionalism is primarily the result of its small population, the mass migration of people to the country’s capital, Ulaanbaatar, its expansive territory, and its lack of resources.73 Indeed, outside of Ulaanbaatar, the country is sparsely populated, with large areas completely outside the government’s control. The country’s porous borders together with an understaffed border patrol allow for the flow of illicit goods such as narcotics, illegal timber, and illicit animal goods, as well as human trafficking.74 The state’s weak political institutionalism results in centrally directed policies that are often ignored at the local levels. Although often heralded by scholars as an oasis of political stability in Asia, few Mongolians would accord the country’s polity with such legitimacy. Corrup- tion, deteriorating public services, factionalism, and conflicts of interest between the state and business elite all undermine public support for the Mongolian government.75 Other sources of political illegitimacy include cash handouts for votes, the constant postelection turnover in government employees based on party affiliation, lack of effective long-term planning, and the politically motivated charges government officials raise against opposition members, including the arrest and imprisonment of former Mongolian president Nambaryn Enkhbayar. Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 Outside Ulaanbaatar’s more developed central district, the state has little control over Mongolia’s population. Mongolians still engaged in traditional nomadic practices, for instance, subside far outside the state’s authority in areas with little or no connection to the central government.76 Neither does the state’s control extend to Mongolians who have migrated to Ulaanbaatar to live in the city’s ger districts, or shantytowns. Ulaanbaatar does not provide these migrant workers with even basic public goods such as running water, sanitation, education, or healthcare, nor does the state ensure even a modicum of security to these impoverished areas.77 The results of this lack of government control are higher incidence of infectious disease and greater exposure to violence.78 Introduction 11

Why does it matter for China? While one weak state on China’s periphery may present a narrow security challenge, similar pressure from all the weak states on China’s borders at once would constitute a significant threat. This is particularly the case as China’s most sensitive domestic regions – the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region (IMAR), and southern and southwestern Yunnan Province – share borders with these weak states. Stability in the weak states is essential not only for China’s continued economic development but also to its ability to deal with domestic unrest. Far from a hypothetical scenario, China already faces such security pressures from all the weak states on its borders, as the following section demonstrates. Kyrgyzstan’s weak institutions, political illegitimacy, and poor state/society relations present specific nontraditional security challenges for China that include the ‘three forces’ of terrorism, radicalisation, and separatism, and energy insecurity.79 Regarding the ‘three forces’, the country is home to radical Islamic groups outside of Bishkek’s control that provide training and support for the East Turke- stan Liberation Organization (ETLO), the terrorist/separatist organisation active in China’s XUAR. Weak border control by the Kyrgyz government allows for the flow of illicit peoples and goods into China that undermine its domestic security and control.80 In regard to energy security, China relies on Kyrgyzstan as a transit point for its oil and gas from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Internal instability in the country resulting from weakness, therefore, threatens China’s ability to implement a ‘diversification’ strategy to ensure it avoids dependence on any one state (mainly Kazakhstan) for its Central Asian and Middle Eastern energy imports.81 Tajikistan’s shared border with the XUAR, its weak border protection, and its status as a transit and source country for drug trafficking all translate into direct threats to China’s security environment.82 The presence of potential subversive actors within the country coupled with Dushanbe’s inability to deal effectively with these groups also contributes to a sense of insecurity for China.83 China is also concerned with the growth of radical Islam within the country both as a potential trigger to unrest within the XUAR and as a challenge to Tajikistan’s existing political system. Such concern is well founded, as 85 per cent of Tajiks in 2010 identified Islam, not their national identity, as their most influential source of self-identify.84 The security issues stemming from Afghanistan’s weakness for China are mul- Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 tifaceted and complex. First, the state’s poor institutional control over huge swaths of territory within Afghanistan allows for security gaps to form where separatist groups such as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) can train and launch attacks into China. Similarly, poor border security between Afghanistan and China on the Afghan side allows for the spread of radical elements into the XUAR that undermine the region’s already fragile security.85 Second, alternative structures of governance based on clan and ethnic ties that depend on drug cultivation and manufacturing for sustenance have developed within the state due to its weak institutions, political illegitimacy, and poor state/society relations. These narcotic-based societies present a direct threat to China’s security through drug 12 Introduction trafficking and localised violence. Afghanistan is now one of the largest sources of drugs and weapons into China, with little indication Kabul will be able to bring these domestic security issues under control in the short to medium term.86 Third, Afghanistan’s instability undermines China’s economic security and energy security, as Kabul is unable to secure the safety and continuity of its investments in Afghanistan’s mineral sector.87 The Pakistan government’s inability to secure its territories and borders presents a direct threat to China’s security environment. The country’s ungoverned spaces allow for the development and transfer of separatist groups such as the ETIM. The country’s weak state/society relations and the resulting alternative sources of governance and legitimacy also contribute to radicalisation that has spillover effects in China’s XUAR.88 The country’s porous borders also allow for the continual flow of narcotics and weapons into China’s western regions. Understanding the larger security implications should Islamabad lose more of its tenuous hold on power, China has adopted a policy of supporting the state, despite its illegitimacy and inability to effectively govern.89 Such support also has security implications for China. China’s state support for Islamabad puts Chinese workers in Pakistan at risk as domestic terrorist groups attack them as proxies of China’s foreign policy.90 This both affects China’s economic security and fosters anti-Chinese sentiment at a social level. China depends heavily on Nepal’s government to ensure its security interests vis-à-vis the TAR and is, therefore, directly affected by the state’s institutional weakness. Kathmandu’s inability, for example, to stem the flow of Tibetans returning from Dharamsala to the TAR through Nepal exposes China to radical and separatist ideology, as many Tibetans travel to India to see the Dalai Lama.91 China also relies heavily on Nepal’s internal security forces to keep control of the country’s sizable Tibetan minority and refugee community. While Nepalese police do effectively deal with Tibetans within Kathmandu, their ability to do so diminishes greatly outside the country’s capital. Indeed, as highlighted earlier, huge areas within Nepal are effectively ungoverned spaces, contributing to drugs and goods smuggling between the two states. Myanmar’s huge ungoverned spaces allow for the growth and proliferation of drug trafficking into China’s Yunnan Province. The steady flow of opiates and methamphetamines from Myanmar into China contributes to human and societal security issues such as localised crime and an increasing rate of addicts in China.92 Naypyidaw’s political illegitimacy and poor state/society relations perpetuate Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 civil conflict in the country, particularly between the government and the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) in Kachin State, and also has spillover effects in China’s Yunnan Province both in terms of localised violence and refugees, as seen clearly in early 2015.93 While the changing nature of Myanmar’s political and economic system offers some hope that the state might achieve a greater degree of legitimacy, for the time being it remains a weak country with serious influence on the security situation in China. China relies heavily on Vientiane to help stem the flow of nontraditional security threats into China, as linkages between the two states are extensive.94 In this Introduction 13 respect, Vientiane’s current inability to ensure security within its borders has severe security implications for China. First, the Lao PDR government’s institutional weakness and resulting gaps in governance over large areas within the country’s borders contribute to drug trafficking and addiction within China. As with Myanmar, large portions of the country lay beyond Vientiane’s control, and organised crime groups act with impunity within those areas. The government has little control over the criminally run casinos on the Laotian side of the two countries’ shared border, which encourages illegal crossings between China and Lao PDR. Despite pressure from Beijing to close these enclaves, the Laotian government has been unable to do so.95 Poor state/society relations in Lao PDR also contribute to ethnic movement that negatively affects China’s own cross-border ethnic populations in what amounts to spillover instability.96 Lao PDR’s nontraditional security implications for China, therefore, directly stem from state weakness. Mongolia affects China’s security in several important ways. First, Mongolia’s institutional weakness and the country’s vast ungoverned spaces translate into insecurity for China, as Ulaanbaatar has very little capability to ensure organised crime groups, terrorists, or separatists from the XUAR or IMAR do not use its vast territory as a base for activity aimed at China.97 While Mongolia is not home to the same types of criminal or terrorist activity as states in Central, South, or Southeast Asia, it does present significant security vulnerability for China, particularly as it shares a long border with China’s XUAR and IMAR.98 Second, the state’s weak institutional control over its mining and agricultural sectors has resulted in severe desertification in Mongolia. Desertification in Mongolia causes sandstorms in China on an annual basis that affect the country’s environmental situation, cause massive public health issues, and undermine economic activities in key cities such as Beijing and Tianjin.99 While different in nature than the other weak states on China’s borders, Mongolia’s influence on China’s nontraditional security is no less significant.

China’s approach to peripheral security Rather than engage directly to mitigate the security threats on its borders, the PRC relies on economic exchange to advance its security objectives. While the state’s rationale for privileging economic over other forms of engagement has evolved over time, one can trace the logic behind China’s use of economic means to achieve its security ends to the commonly held belief among China’s early Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 communist leadership that poverty and class struggle inherently resulted in violence. Mao Zedong’s 1927 ‘Report on the Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan’ is an important example of early Chinese communist thinking on the nexus between economic development, poverty, and violence in this respect.100 In the essay, Mao argues that poor peasants are left with little recourse other than violence to deal with exploitative capitalist landlords and gentry. Violence, for Mao, is a means toward more egalitarian ends, idealised as peasant-administered co-operatives. Mao assumes that violence would cease once poor peasants achieve their economic goals, suggesting that economic development is the inherent 14 Introduction answer to violence resulting from poverty and exploitation. While one of countless writings on the relationship between economic development, poverty, and violence, the ‘Report on the Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan’ is a salient example of early Chinese thinking on the topic, as it influenced domestic and foreign policy in the PRC for decades after its publication. Indeed, the report’s logic that egalitarian economic development could address the sources of violence within a society influenced China’s foreign policy during Mao’s tenure from the 1950s to the 1970s, despite what were otherwise broad policy swings in China’s approach to foreign affairs. China’s propagation of an international order consisting of a Third World coalition, for example, included a call for common economic development between postcolonial states so as to address issues related to poverty and violence.101 Chinese support for revolutionary groups within Third World states employed similar logic that strengthening weak states against imperialist powers such as the Soviet Union and the United States through economic aid was the only way to overcome violence inherent in the international system.102 China’s reliance on economic exchange to secure its interests abroad continued throughout the 1970s and 1980s under Deng Xiaoping. Deng advocated increased trade between China and Asian states, Chinese financial support for Third World partners, and mutually beneficial economic development to ensure security in Asia through development.103 While Deng’s foreign policy approach included a desire to expand China’s access to foreign markets for the sake of its own development and stability, his continued reliance on win-win exchange to secure China’s periphery is clear. More recently, Chinese leadership reaffirmed their belief in a causal relationship between poverty and insecurity in the 1996 New Security Concept, which identifies poverty, underdevelopment, and injustice as the main contributors to insecurity in Asia.104 Similarly, China’s 2002 ‘Position Paper on Enhanced Cooperation in the Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues’ recognises poverty, a development gap, social injustice, and unfairness as key drivers of regional insecurity. Both concepts specifically distinguish the further development of economic ties between China and Asian states as critical to ensuring stability and security in the Asian region. China’s contemporary foreign policy concepts are also heavily premised on the idea that economic exchange between states is the most effective means of ensuring good relations and a secure regional and international environment. The Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 South-South Cooperation, for example, argues that China can improve security relations with developing states by “unifying, leading, and coordinating” economic relations through targeted investment and aid.105 Similarly, the Periph- ery Policy and the Good Neighbour Policy highlight the centrality of economic exchange to security. Specifically, the concepts stress “win-win” (or mutually beneficial) economic exchange, economic partnership, mutual development, and expanding trade as means of ensuring China’s security within periphery states.106 The Go Out Strategy is China’s way of pursuing security (and access to foreign markets and technology) by encouraging its enterprises to invest overseas.107 Introduction 15 President Xi Jinping’s articulation of the Friendly, Secure, and Prosperous Neighbourhood policy in 2013 stressed the importance of economics as a driver of security relations. President Xi’s One Belt, One Road strategy is equally reliant on economic exchange as a means of increasing stability. In its wider application, the One Belt, One Road concept includes China’s provision of finance through the 2015 establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and China’s trade and investment schemes toward Central and South Asia through the Silk Road Economic Belt and Maritime Silk Road, respectively.108 One Belt, One Road also includes China’s development of economic corridors with Mongolia and Russia, with Pakistan, and with India, Myanmar, and Bangladesh.109 The concept also calls for the establishment of a free trade agreement between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).110 As such, the strategic concept is a concerted effort to expand China’s economic relations within a ‘one bank, two belts, three corridors, one FTA’ framework to strengthen state cooperation with China’s peripheral states on matters related to security and stability.111 To be sure, China’s foreign policy concepts and approaches are not entirely focused on economic exchange but also contain regular, rote commitments to advance cooperation on issues such as education, health, and cultural exchange. Within all the above-mentioned foreign policy directives, China identifies the importance of these more developmentally focused areas to its overall bilateral relations. Such commitments are, nevertheless, always secondary in order of presentation and importance to China’s stated goal of relying on economic exchange to secure state-to-state ties. Indeed, all the above concepts premise education, health, and cultural exchanges on China and its respective partner first establishing win-win economic relations. For China, economic exchange provides the basis upon which to build other aspects of state relations. This book demonstrates that China’s use of economic linkages to advance its security interest in its weak periphery states is both inadequate and counterpro- ductive. Rather than ensuring security vis-à-vis these weak states, China has and continues to undermine its periphery security through structural power and structural violence. The book will demonstrate this process through eight case studies. Having demonstrated the prevalence of weak states on China’s borders and the implications these weak states have on China’s nontraditional security, the following chapter provides a theoretical outline for understanding how China’s economic cooperation with these same weak states translates into instability within the state, between the state and China, and for China itself. Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016

Notes 1 ‘Fei chuantong anquan tiaozhan dui zhongguo weilai zhoubian huanjing de yingxiang’ (Non-Traditional Security Challenges and Their Influence on China’s Future Periphery Environment), Central Committee of the CPC (2013), http://www.idcpc.org. cn/globalview/sjzh/120905.htm; Yu Yingli, ‘Dongya anquan de kunjing yu jiangou zhongguo zhoubian anquan xin silu’ (East Asia’s Security Challenges and Develop- ing a New Thinking on China’s Periphery Security), Journal of Eastern Liaoning 16 Introduction University Vol. 14, No. 6 (2012), pp. 14–21; Feng Shaolei and Feng Shuai ‘Zhongguo zhoubian anquan de xin renzhi: tedian, gongneng, yu qushi’ (Reconsidering China’s Periphery Security: Characteristics, Function, and Trends), Global Security Research (2013), pp. 49–50. 2 ‘Xi Jinping zai zhoubian waijiao gongzuo zuotanhui shang fabiao zhongyao jianghua’ (Xi Jinping gives an important speech at the Symposium for Working Periphery Diplo- macy), Renmin Ribao, October 25, 2013, http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2013/1025/ c1024-23331526.html. 3 ‘Xi Jinping ti zhanlue gouxiang: “yi dai yi lu” dakai “zhumeng kongjian” ’ (Xi Jin- ping advances a strategic concept: the ‘one belt, one road’ gives us space to build dreams), People’s Daily, August 11, 2014, http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2014/0811/ c1001–25439028.html. 4 Masuma Farooki and Raphael Kaplinsky, The Impact of China on Global Commodity Prices: The Global Reshaping of the Resource Sector (London: Routledge, 2013), 182. 5 Lok Sang Ho and John Wong, APEC and the Rise of China (Singapore: World Scien- tific, 2011), 87. 6 Li Kunwang and Song Ligang, ‘China’s trade expansion and the Asia-Pacific Econo- mies’, in eds. Ross Garnaut and Ligang Song, The China Boom and Its Discontents (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2005), 241. 7 David Vital, The Inequality of States (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967); Burton Benedict, Problems of Smaller Territories (London: Athlone Press, 1967). 8 Teygve Mathisen, The Functions of Small States in the Strategies of the Great Pow- ers (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1971), 21; Raimo Väyrynen, ‘On the Definition and Measurement of Small Power Status’, Cooperation and Conflict: Nordic Journal of International Politics Vol. 6, No. 2 (1971), 92–93; R. P. Barston, ‘Introduction’, in The Other Powers: Studies in the Foreign Policies of Small States, ed. R. P. Barston (London: George Allen & Unwind, 1973), 15–16; Michael Handel, Weak States in the International System, 2nd ed. (London: Frank Cass, 1990), 30. 9 Robert Keohane, ‘Lilliputians’ Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics’, International Organisation Vol. 23, No. 2 (1969), 291–310; Robert Rothstein Alliance and Small Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968). 10 Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2009), 156. 11 Barry Buzan, People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983), 40–41. 12 T. V. Paul, South Asia’s Weak States: Understanding the Regional Insecurity Predica- ment (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010), 5. 13 Michael Desch, ‘War and Strong States, Peace and Weak States?’, International Organization Vol. 50, No. 2 (1996), 242. Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 14 Stewart Patrick, Weak Links: Fragile States, Global Threats, and International Secu- rity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 19. 15 Joel Migdal, Strong Societies, Weak States (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), 5. 16 Stuart E. Eizenstat, John Edward Porter, and Jeremy M. Weinstein, ‘Rebuilding Weak States’, Foreign Affairs Vol. 84, No. 1 (2005), 134. 17 Edward Newman, ‘Weak States, State Failure, and Terrorism’, Terrorism and Political Violence Vol. 19, No. 4 (2007), 466. 18 Paul, South Asia’s Weak States, 7. 19 Patrick, Weak Links, 17. Introduction 17 20 Muthiah Alagappa, Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), 32–33. 21 Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 146. 22 Migdal, Strong Societies, 37–39. 23 Desch, War and Strong States, 243–44. 24 Mariya Y. Omelicheva, Counterterrorism Policies in Central Asia (London: Taylor & Francis, 2010), 30. 25 Donnacha Ó Beacháin and Abel Polese, The Colour Revolutions in the Former Soviet Republics: Successes and Failures (London: Taylor & Francis, 2010), 45. 26 Martin Albrow, Hakan Seckinelgin, and Helmut K. Anheier, Global Civil Society 2011: Globality and the Absence of Justice (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 137. 27 P. Nar Ak Al, Pinar Akçali, and Cennet Engin-demir, Politics, Identity and Education in Central Asia: Post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan (London: Routledge, 2013), 44. 28 Ibid., 44. 29 Lawrence P. Markowitz, ‘The Limits of International Agency: Post-Soviet State Build- ing in Tajikistan’, in Stable Outside Fragile Inside?: Post Soviet Statehood in Central Asia, ed. Emilian Kavalski (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013), 157. 30 Marlene Laruelle and Sebastien Peyrouse, Globalizing Central Asia: Geopolitics and the Challenges of Economic Development (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2012), 15. 31 Robert I. Rotberg, ‘The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States: Breakdown, Prevention, and Repair’, in When States Fail: Causes and Consequences, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 17. 32 Abel Polese and Donnacha Ó Beacháin, ‘From Roses to Bullets – The Rise and Decline of Post-Soviet Colour Revolutions’, in Totalitarismus und Transformation, eds. Uwe Backes, Tytus Jaskułowski, and Abel Polese (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2009), 87. 33 Hooman Peimani, Conflict and Security in Central Asia and the Caucasus (Santa Bar- bara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2009) 167–68. 34 Karina Korostelina, ‘Religion, War, and Peace in Tajikistan’, in Between Terror and Tolerance, ed. Timothy D. Sisk (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011), 178–79. 35 John Heathershaw, Post-Conflict Tajikistan: The Politics of Peacebuilding and the Emergence of Legitimate Order (London: Routledge, 2009), 74. 36 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Conflict and Fragility: The State’s Legitimacy in Fragile Situations: Unpacking Complexity (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2010) 26. 37 Ibid., 26. 38 Barnett R. Rubin, Afghanistan in the Post-Cold War Era (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 256. Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 39 Claire Metelits, Inside Insurgency: Violence, Civilians, and Revolutionary Group Behavior (New York: NYU Press, 2010), 168–69. 40 Raul Bakhsh Rais, ‘Afghanistan: A Weak State in the Path of Power Rivalries’, in South Asia’s Weak States: Understanding the Regional Insecurity Predicament, ed. T. V. Paul (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010), 213. 41 Rubin, Afghanistan in the Post-Cold War Era, 259–260. 42 Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History (Princeton, NJ: Prince- ton University Press, 2010), 8. 43 Larry P. Goodson, Afghanistan’s Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2012), 15. 18 Introduction 44 Ibid., 16–17. 45 Masooda Bano, Breakdown in Pakistan: How Aid Is Eroding Institutions for Collective Action (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012), 33–34. 46 Stephen P. Cohen, The Future of Pakistan (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press, 2011), 104. 47 Daniel Moran, Climate Change and National Security: A Country-level Analysis (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011), 89. 48 Anas Malik, Political Survival in Pakistan: Beyond Ideology (London: Taylor & Fran- cis, 2010), 170. 49 Shahram Akbarzadeh and Abdullah Saeed, Islam and Political Legitimacy (London: Routledge, 2013), 70. 50 Steven R. David, Catastrophic Consequences: Civil Wars and American Interests (Bal- timore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 75. 51 Rebecca L. Schiff, The Military and Domestic Politics: A Concordance Theory of Civil-Military Relations (London: Taylor & Francis, 2008), 89. 52 Ibid. 53 Susan E. Rice, ‘Poverty and State Weakness’, in Confronting Poverty: Weak States and U.S. National Security, eds. Susan E. Rice, Corinne Graff, and Carlos Pascual (Wash- ington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 34. 54 Rotberg, ‘The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States’, 17. 55 World Bank Publication, World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development (Washington, DC: World Bank Publication, 2011), 91. 56 Ibid., 90. 57 Mahendra Lawoti, ‘Ethnic Politics and the Building of an Inclusive State’, in Nepal in Transition: From People’s War to Fragile Peace, eds. Sebastian von Einsiedel, David M. Malone, and Suman Pradhan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 148. 58 Sebastian von Einsiedel, David M. Malone, and Suman Pradhan, ‘Introduction’, in Nepal in Transition: From People’s War to Fragile Peace, eds. Sebastian von Einsie- del, David M. Malone, and Suman Pradhan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 23. 59 Raul Caruso, Ethnic Conflicts, Civil War and Cost of Conflict (Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing, 2011), 118. 60 Megan Adamson Sijapati, ‘The National Muslim Forum Nepal: Experiences of conflict, formations or identity’, inNational and Ethnic Conflict, eds. Mahendra Lawoti and Susan I. Hangen (London: Routledge, 2012), 109. 61 Patrick, Weak Links, 246. 62 David I. Steinberg, Burma/Myanmar: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 183.

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 63 Ang Cheng Guan, ‘Political Legitimacy in Myanmar: The Ethnic Minority Dimen- sion’, Asian Security Vol. 3. No. 2 (2007), 134; David Camroux, ‘Burma’s Schizo- phrenic Transition’, SciencesPo (2013), http://www.sciencespo.fr/ceri/fr/content/ burma-s-schizophrenic-transition. 64 Human Rights Watch, All You Can Do Is Pray: Crimes against Humanity and Eth- nic Cleansing of Rohingya Muslims in Burma’s Arakan State (Zurich: Human Rights Watch, 2013), 109. 65 Ibid. 66 Christopher B. Roberts, ‘Laos: A More Mature and Robust State?’, in Southeast Asian Affairs 2012, eds. Daljit Singh and Pushpa Thampibillai (Singapore: Institute of South- east Asian Studies, 2012), 153. Introduction 19 67 Carol J. Pierce, ‘Minefields in Collaborative Governance’, in Collaborative Govern- ance of Tropical Landscapes, eds. Carol J. Pierce Colfer and Jean-Laurent Pfund (Lon- don: Routledge, 2011), 242. 68 Ian C. Porter and Jayasankar Shivakumar, Doing a Dam Better: The Lao People’s Democratic Republic and the Story of Lao Nam Theun 2 (Washington, DC: World Bank Publications, 2011), 33. 69 Robert Dayley and Clark D. Neher, Southeast Asia in the New International Era (Boul- der, CO: Westview Press, 2011), 532. 70 Helen E. S. Nesadurai, ‘The Indo-Chinese Enlargement of ASEAN’, in Regional Inte- gration in East Asia and Europe: Convergence or Divergence?, eds. Bertrand Fort and Douglas Webber (London: Routledge, 2013), 203. 71 Vatthana Pholsena, Post-war Laos: The Politics of Culture, History, and Identity (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), 215. 72 Ibid. 73 Raffael Himmelsbach, ‘Collaborative Pasture Management: A Solution for Grassland Degradation in Mongolia’, in Change in Democratic Mongolia: Social Relations, Health, Mobile Pastoralism, and Mining, ed. Julian Dierkes (Leiden, Netherlands: Drill, 2012), 180. 74 Ulziilkham Enkhbaatar, ‘Cases of Securitization: Human Trafficking in Mongolia and Kazakhstan’, in Mongolian Transborder Migration: Historical and Contemporary Accounts, ed. Ulziilkham Enkhbaatar (Ulan-Ude, Russia: IMBT, 2010), 79. 75 Sant Maral Politbarometer Vol. 12, No. 45 (Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia: Sant Maral, 2013), 3–5. 76 B. Batkhishig, ‘A Case Study of Community-based Rangeland Management in Jinst Soum, Mongolia’, in Restoring Community Connections to the Land: Building Resil- ience Through Community-based Rangeland Management in China and Mongolia, ed. María Edith Fernández-Giménez, Baival Batkhishig, and Wang Xiaoyi (Wallingford, UK: CABI, 2012), 126. 77 Takuya Kamata, Managing Urban Expansion in Mongolia: Best Practices in Scenario-based Urban Planning (Washington, DC: World Bank Publications, 2010), xvi. 78 Ulziilkham Enkhbaatar, ‘Outbound Migration and Human Security: Case of Mongo- lia’, in Mongolian Transborder Migration: Historical and Contemporary Accounts, ed. Ulziilkham Enkhbaatar (Ulan-Ude, Russia: IMBT, 2010), 187. 79 Jia Lihong, ‘Jierjisisitan dui zhongguo de zhongyaoxing jiqi dongjin jushi dui zhongguo de yinxiang’ (On the Significance Kyrgyzstan Has on China and the Influence of the Cur- rent Situations on China), Journal of Xinjiang University Vol. 38, No. 6 (2010), 94–95. 80 Lei Ling and Luo Xizheng, ‘Quanqiuhua jincheng zhong de Jierjisisitan bianju yu kunjing’ (Kyrgyzstan’s Changes and Problems in Globalisation), Journal of Xinjiang

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 University Vol. 39, No. 6 (2011), 84. 81 Jia, ‘Jierjisisitan dui zhongguo’, 95. 82 Xiao Bin, ‘Zong-Ta guanxi ershi nian de yingxiang yinsu ji lishi qishi’ (Factors of Influence and Historical Elimination in China-Tajikistan’s Ten-Year Relations), Xinji- ang Social Science No. 1 (2012), 80. 83 Xu Haiyan, ‘Wei yu ji: 2012 nian Tajikistan guojia fazhan pingshu’ (Threats and Opportunities: 2012 Discussion of Tajikistan’s Development), Journal of Xinjiang Normal University Vol. 34, No. 4 (2013), 52. 84 Wen Feng, ‘Shizilukou shang de Tajikesitan: shisuhua haishi Yisilanhua’ (Tajikistan on the Silk Road: Secularization or Islamization), Journal of Xinjiang Normal Univer- sity Vol. 32, No. 6 (2011), 30. 20 Introduction 85 Hu Juan, ‘Meiguo xin zhanlue xia Afuhan anquan xingshi jiqi dui zhongguo xibu bianjing anquan de yingxiang’ (The US’ New Security Strategy in Afghanistan and Its Effects on China’s Western Border’s Security), Southeast Asia South Asia Research No. 3 (2009), 30. 86 Zhao Huasheng, China and Afghanistan: China’s Interests, Stances, and Perspectives (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2012), 3. 87 Li Zongmin, ‘Afuhan chongjian, zhongguo banyan shenme jiaose’ (What role can China play in the rebuilding of Afghanistan), World Affairs No. 12 (2013), 51. 88 Rosheen Kabraji, The China-Pakistan Alliance: Rhetoric and Limitations (London: Chatham House, 2012), 7. 89 Zhou Yushu, ‘Zhong-Ba guanxi xuyao xin de lunshu’ (The Need for Discussion of the Chinese-Pakistan Relationship), Journal of Inner Mongolia Normal University Vol. 41, No. 2 (2012), 52. 90 Wen Lulu, ‘Lun shi shiqi zhong-ba guanxi mianlin de tiaozhan’ (The Challenges Fac- ing the New Phase of Sino-Pakistan Relations), Wide Angle Lens No. 3 (2013), 255. 91 Wu Guofu and Yang Jingxin, ‘Fazhan hexie zhong-ne guanxi de guojia liyi jiaodu kaoliang’ (National Interests and the Development of Peaceful Sino-Nepal Rela- tions), Journal of Yichun College Vol. 32, No. 9 (2010), 34. 92 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Transnational Organised Crime in East Asia and the Pacific (Bangkok: UNODC, 2013), 53. 93 Li Zonglin, ‘Xin shiqi zhongguo zai miandian de zhanlue liyi ji tiaozhan’ (The Strate- gic Benefits and Challenges in the New Phase on Sino-Myanmar Relations), Journal of Jiangnan Social University (2012), 30. 94 Zhang Ruikun, ‘Zhengchanghua yilai de zhong-lao guanxi’ (Sino-Laos Relations after Normalization), Southeast and South Asia Research No. 4 (2010), 12. 95 Juan Pablo Cardenal and Heriberto Araujo, China’s Silent Army: The Pioneers, Trad- ers, Fixers, and Workers Who Are Remaking the World in Beijing’s Image (New York: Crown Publishing Group, 2013), 160. 96 Li Chenyang and He Shengda, ‘China’s Participation in the GMS Cooperation: Pro- gress and Challenges’, in China-Asian Sub-Regional Cooperation: Progress, Prob- lems, and Prospect, eds. Li Mingjiang and Chong Guan Kwa (Singapore: World Scientific, 2011), 30. 97 Phil Williams, ‘Here Be Dragons: Dangerous Spaces and International Security’, in Ungoverned Spaces: Alternatives to State Authority in an Era of Softened Sover- eignty, eds. Anne Clunan and Harold A. Trinkunas (Stanford, CA: Stanford Univer- sity Press, 2010), 36. 98 Bazarsad Indra, ‘Sino-Mongolian Security Cooperation’, China Institutes of Contem- porary International Relations No. 1 (2010), 139. 99 Qian Zhengan, et al., ‘Zhongmeng diqu shachenbao yanjiu de ruogan jinzhan’ (Some

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 Advances in Dust Storm Research over China-Mongolia Areas), Chinese Journal of Geophysics Vol. 49, No. 1 (2006), 86–87. 100 Mao Zedong, Hunan nongmin yundong kaocha baogao (Report on the Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan) (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1951). 101 Charles Neuhauser, Third World Politics: China and the Afro-Asian People’s [sic] Solidarity Organization, 1957–1967 (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 1968), 5. 102 Lowell Dittmer and Samuel S. Kim, China’s Quest for National Identity (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 194. Introduction 21 103 Zou Jin, ‘Deng Xiaoping nannan hezuo sixiang yanjiu (On Deng Xiaoping’s Thought of South-South Cooperation)’, Journal of Jiangxi Radio & TV University Vol. 2 (2006): 13–15. 104 ‘Zhongguo guanyu xin anquan guan de lichang wenjian’ (China’s Position Paper on the New Security Concept), Ministry of Foreign Affairs Website (2002), http://www. mfa.gov.cn/chn//pds/ziliao/tytj/t4549.htm. 105 ‘Dui zhongguo nan-nan hezuo fazhan zhanlue de sikao’ (Consideration of China’s South-South Cooperation Development Strategy), The National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, August 20, 2009, http://www. cppcc.gov.cn/2011/09/24/ARTI1316828751015203.shtml. 106 ‘Kaichuang mulin youhao hezuo xin jumian’ (Initiation of a New Phase of the Good Neighbour Policy) Xinhua, December 10, 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/ comments/2012-12/10/c_113964759.htm. 107 ‘Shiwu qijian zhongguo “zou chuqu” zhanlue youli tuidong duiwai jingji hezuo’ (Fol- lowing the 15th Communist Party Congress, China’s Go Out Strategy Has Pushed Forward Foreign Economic Cooperation), The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, February 13, 2006, http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2006-02/13/ content_187120.htm. 108 ‘Xi Jinping ti zhanlue gouxiang: “yi dai yi lu” dakai “zhumeng kongjian” ’ (Xi Jin- ping Advances a Strategic Concept: The ‘One Belt, One Road’ Gives Us Space to Build Dreams’, People’s Daily, August 11, 2014, http://politics.people.com. cn/n/2014/0811/c1001-25439028.html. 109 Wang Weihua, ‘Hangshi jingji zoulang jianshe, zhu tui “yi dai, yi lu” zhanlue’ (Build- ing Economic Corridors Will Help Push ‘One Belt, One Road’ Forward’, Shanghai Institute for International Studies, April 17, 2015, http://www.siis.org.cn/index.php? m=content&c=index&a=show&catid=22&id=631. 110 ‘Zhongguo-Dongmeng qiaoding “Yidai, Yilu” da dan’ (China and ASEAN Have Agreed on the General Outline of ‘One Belt, One Road’), China FTA Network, December 3, 2014, http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/article/shidianyj/201412/19256_1.html. 111 Sun Zhuangzhi, ‘Chengzai lishi kaituo weilai de quanxin hezuo gongying zhilu (The New Win-Win Cooperation Path to Overcome the Past and Open the Future)’, Peo- ple’s Daily, July 3, 2014. Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 1 Asymmetrical economic exchange Negative outcomes of structural power and structural violence

Analysis of the effect China’s economic and political rise has had on weak states in Asia tends to highlight the positive outcomes. Scholars regularly point to how the country’s average annual 8.9 per cent economic growth over the past three decades has contributed to regional economic development and poverty reduction.1 Analysts argue that Beijing’s commitment to a grand strategy based on Peace- ful Development (heping fazhan) and foreign policies premised on the concept of win-win relations have helped create a stable regional environment in which states can pursue economic growth instead of having to focus on security issues. Others note that while recent disagreements over territorial and maritime issues in the East and South China Seas have somewhat diminished China’s image among Asian states and the Asian public, the majority still see it as a desirable actor in the region.2 Such analysis holds a great deal of truth. China’s investment and its intra-regional trade have helped foster gross domestic product (GDP) growth in states throughout Asia. Inexpensive consumer goods produced in China such as electronics and textiles have also contributed to a general rise in living standards throughout the region. Financing from China in the form of aid and loans has allowed many Asian countries to construct infrastructure and transportation linkages that contribute to domestic development. China’s foreign policy approach has also benefited Asia. For the past several decades, China’s commitment to Peaceful Development has resonated in the region, particularly when viewed in line with China’s concessions on territorial disputes, its embrace of regional multilateral institutions, and its launch of a regional ‘charm offensive’.3 China’s South-South Cooperation Policy, its Go Out Strategy, Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 its Good Neighbour Policy, its New Security Concept, its Friendly, Secure, and Prosperous Neighbourhood approach, and the One Belt, One Road strategic concept – Beijing’s key foreign policy guidance for its relations with weak states in Asia – have also been effective platforms for state-to-state cooperation. From a more critical perspective, however, China’s rise also has a dark side. For some weak states in Asia, China’s economic cooperation comes with a high price in terms of their political, economic, environmental, and societal security. This is not due to any malevolence on China’s part. Indeed, the negative outcomes resulting from economic relations with China happen despite China’s Asymmetrical economic exchange 23 best efforts to limit them. Rather, the inherent asymmetric nature of relations between China and the weak states in Asia coupled with Beijing’s over-reliance on economic exchange as a driver for foreign relations inadvertently contribute to insecurity.4 This book draws on the Marxist-based concepts of structural power and structural violence as a theoretical map to examine how China’s use of economic statecraft with the weak states on its periphery results in negative outcomes and to consider the security implications for both the weak states and for China. Structural power provides a means to understand how China’s dominant economic position over its periphery weak states can unconsciously translate into negative influence over their political and economic institutions and their domestic security, production, finance, and knowledge structures. Structural violence provides the means to view the negative outcome of structural power at both the state and society levels. As such, both concepts are invaluable in guiding a course of research that looks at the unintended negative socio-economic effects interaction with China has on its neighbouring weak states. There is, of course, no small amount of irony in examining China’s relations with weak states through the lens of Marxism. China has long been part of the global periphery, mired as it was (and in some ways continues to be) in poverty and underdevelopment. China’s century of humiliation (roughly 1839 to 1949) is perhaps one of the most salient examples of imperialism and colonialism in modern history. Yet there is no denying that China’s contemporary situation is much different than its past. While it is possible to point to compelling data suggesting that China is a still a developing nation, it is also the world’s second largest economy, Asia’s largest economy, and the world’s largest trading nation. For those that view China from its periphery and see their states and society fundamentally transformed by its actions, the country clearly has the power and influence of an economic core state.5 It is this book’s intention to tell the ‘other’ story of China’s economic relations with its periphery weak states, particularly as it relates to their stability and security. This entails looking beyond the myriad volumes that paint China’s development in Asia in an entirely positive light and instead focusing on the negative outcomes of economic exchange. The book’s purpose, however, is not to engage in ‘China bashing’ or to somehow denigrate the very real ways China’s growth has contributed to regional development and to rising living standards for some of its neighbouring weak states. Rather, it is to engage in critical analysis – to look Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 below the surface to discern the forces that contribute to insecurity – to give voice to those victimised through unequal economic exchange with China and to suggest a way forward for both China and the weak states. To reiterate, this book does not argue that all economic relations between China and weak states on its periphery result in negative outcomes. To make such a claim would be both disingenuous and factually wrong. That these economic relations are partially beneficial, though, is not to say they are without negative consequence. To ignore these unfortunate outcomes is also to mislead about the nature of economic exchange between China and its periphery weak states. 24 Asymmetrical economic exchange While this volume focuses specifically on structural power within international relations and international political economy and structural violence as part of critical security studies, these concepts gain in explanatory value when placed within the larger body of Marxist scholarship. As such, this chapter starts with a discussion of the Marxist ideas that inform the concepts of structural power and structural violence, continues with a survey of Marxist-inspired approaches within IR, international political economy, and security studies, and concludes with a discussion of structural power and structural violence as applicable for analysis of China’s contemporary security relations with its periphery weak states.

Historical materialism and Marx’s critique of capitalism A prolific author, Marx wrote on topics as diverse as religion and economics, philosophy and language. Two of his main theoretical contributions – historical materialism and his critique of capitalism – are particularly relevant to this book’s theoretical approach. Both concepts offer a starting point for thinking about the negative outcomes of structural power and structural violence in China’s relations with its weak neighbours. Marx conceptualised historical materialism as a research agenda for viewing historical development and social change. Marx’s historical materialism argued that the relations of production (classes) and the material forces of production (goods and capital) established the economic structure of society, or the foundation. The relations of production also formed the legal and political superstructure and resulting social consciousness, mostly in ways that reinforced the dominant party’s continued control.6 Change within the system came from changes in the mode of production, driven by such variables as new technology. Revolu- tion occurred when changes in the mode of production came into conflict with existing relations of production.7 Historical materialism, therefore, was a research programme for viewing history in terms of socio-economic forces, exploitation, oppression, and class struggle.8 While drawing exclusively on national-level phenomenon, historical materialism’s core observations provide the theoretical base for structural power. The approach highlights the relationship between economic relations and power, the causality between economic development and social change, and the process through which economics determine class relations. In addition, it considers the dominant class’s influence over the overarching system of laws, rules, and norms Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 (superstructure). Historical materialism also provides a theoretical starting point for determining how economic relations shape and perpetuate social development and knowledge formation. The historical materialist research agenda informed Marx’s critique of capitalism, which included criticism of bourgeoisie-perpetuated concepts of political economy that viewed the individual worker as a ‘cost’ or capital expenditure and a mode of production that is based on division between the working class (proletariat) and the capitalist class (bourgeoisie). Within this critique, capitalism contributed to conflict between classes and, therefore, inherently led to alienation Asymmetrical economic exchange 25 and oppression.9 Such conflict was wide-ranging as, for Marx, capitalism was not simply a system of economic production but ‘a form of organizing society that tends to embrace all phenomena in life – it is a totality’.10 It had both a surface (forms of appearance) and inner core (essence) that, together, were all pervasive, affecting every aspect of social interaction and social order. A capitalist system, therefore, was a system rife with inequality, oppression, and instability. Marx’s critique of capitalism provides the theoretical basis of structural violence. It highlights the potential negative outcomes associated with profit-seeking economic activity and unequal economic exchange. It describes capitalism’s effect over both tangible and intangible security issues at both the state and society levels. Within this system of economic exchange, environment, society, and culture are valued only in so far as they add value to production.

Marxist approaches to international relations, international political economy, and security studies Marx did not extend his analysis of economic and political systems to the international level. His work, rather, looked at social relations within states and between classes (the ‘national’) in ways that fit more naturally with fields of study such as sociology, political science, or anthropology. Scholars have, however, employed Marxism in a number of ways to theorise about international relations, international political economy, and security studies. Vladimir Ilyich Lenin’s theory of imperialism is arguably the best-known attempt to apply Marxist concepts to the study of the international system. Embracing both historical materialism and Marx’s critique of capitalism, Lenin applied the concept of class struggle to international relations by theorising an international system defined by a two-tiered structure of core and periphery states. For Lenin, core states not only engaged in aggressive economic expansion but purposefully stymied the formation of a concept of harmony (the assumption that workers across the world would unite in opposition to their shared oppression) between the international proletariat. Core states accomplished this by exploiting the periphery to improve the living conditions of their own proletariat.11 Thus core states, through imperialism, created a perennial system of oppression within the weak world and among the core state’s working classes. Dependencia theorists such as Cardoso, Faletto, and Gunder Frank drew on Marxist-Leninist critiques of capitalism to explain dependence between core and Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 periphery states.12 Dependency theorists argued that trade between the core and periphery in which the price of manufactured goods from the core rose steadily against the price of natural resources from the periphery contributed to underdevelopment within the periphery state. As the periphery state was primarily a provider of commodities – lacking in productive power – it found itself falling further and further behind the core as its resources bought less and less. Dependencia theorists argued that economic exchange between unequally developed states was, therefore, inherently oppressive and that international capitalism and the world market were tools of dominant powers to exploit weaker, more vulnerable states. 26 Asymmetrical economic exchange Similarly, Immanuel Wallerstein drew on Marxism-Leninism to inform his World-Systems Analysis theory. Wallerstein defined the world-structure not as ‘systems, economies, empires of the (whole) world, but systems, economies, empires that are a world’. Within the world-structure is a world economy, where states interact within an anarchical structure around the ultimate goal of accu- mulating capital. States are organised hierarchically, with the strong states dominating the flows of capital, dominating trade, and setting the rules of economic production. Weak states are essentially dependent on the core state’s good will for investment, market access, and subsequent growth. Antonio Gramsci took a somewhat different approach to Marxism and international relations in developing his cultural hegemony theory.13 Cultural hegemony theory is based on the hypothesis that the dominant state (the ‘hegemon’) uses coercion and consent to shape the international system to best serve its economic needs. Gramsci was especially interested in how the socio-economic relations (foundation) within the international system interacted with political and cultural practices (superstructure) to underpin a given order. Robert Cox drew from both Marx and Gramsci when developing his critical approach to international relations theory that highlighted the role of the dominant power, or hegemon, in shaping theory and knowledge in the international system. Cox argued that theory could not be impartial if it served the purpose of perpetuating the dominant power’s control, a point Marx made in his own critique of capitalism. Cox also viewed the world order (established by dominant powers) as a tool for continued oppression.14 Critical of the structural theories of Lenin and Cox for being limited in scope, Fred Halliday built on Marx’s historical materialism theory to construct a research agenda in international relations. Rather than focusing only on North-South relations, Hal- liday sought to shape a theory for IR based on socio-economic forces, history, class struggle, and conflict that could explain relations between states writ large.15 As Marxism is primarily concerned with issues related to social stability and conflict, it is somewhat difficult to identify a distinct school of security studies drawing on the theory. Scholars such as Lenin, Gramsci, Cox, Halliday, Cardoso, Faletto, and Gunder Frank all wrote to highlight tensions within the international system and between states that could, and did, lead to conflict on occasion. Indeed, Cardoso, Faletto, and Gunder Frank are all considered central academics operating in the Marxist Peace Research Tradition, which sought to draw linkages between development, underdevelopment, and violence.16 Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 Scholars within the Frankfurt School also drew on Marxist ideals in their critical approach to security studies. Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, and, most notably, Jürgen Habermas, while in no way uniform in their approach to the study of society, all drew inspiration from Marxism (if only to reject elements of it) in their approach to security studies.17 Marxist critiques of capitalism, class conflict, and underdevelopment have also been central to scholars such as Terry Terriff who work in the field of peace studies. Most relevant to this book’s theoretical approach, however, is Johan Galtung’s work on structural violence within peace and security studies (to be discussed later). Asymmetrical economic exchange 27 Galtung argued that the economic structures resulting from exploitative economic relations could result in violence for societies. For Galtung, violence occurred when dominant economic actors, whether in the form of a foreign state or domestic elite, caused a gap to form between the periphery’s potential and actual circumstances.18 While all valuable theoretical approaches, none alone provides a workable framework for analysis of the unintended negative outcomes resulting from China’s relations with weak states on its periphery. Their inapplicability to provide a comprehensive theoretical account stems from three considerations. First, none of the authors surveyed above offer a useful theoretical framework for operationalising their theories. Their shortcomings in this respect do not stem from any weakness in their theoretical approach to the study of international relations (IR), international political economy (IPE), or security studies but rather, as Andrew Linklater noted, in the inherent difficulty of adapting critical Marxism to a workable theory of state relations.19 This is particularly the case when analysis requires a multiple levels of analysis approach, as with China’s relations with its neighbouring weak states. Second, none of the approaches outlined above provides a theoretical basis for treating a single aspect of state-to-state relations through the lens of Marxism without having to accept Marxism as the defining feature for the international system. All the above theoretical approaches are premised on blanket critiques of capitalism and globalisation that are not applicable to China’s relations with weak states. As stated earlier, this book proceeds with the acknowledgement that many aspects of China’s economic exchange with weak states in Asia result in beneficial outcomes. Rather than dismiss these benefits outright – which would be factually incorrect – it is this book’s intention to focus on one strand of these states’ relations through a critical lens. The above theoretical approaches, therefore, are inadequate as they are far too broad in their scope. Third, all the above approaches assume some sort of intentionality on behalf of the dominant state. From Lenin to Halliday, the core/periphery relationship is defined by intentionality. The assumption is that a core state will engage in exploitative activity when it has the means to do so. Such is the nature of capitalism that those in positions of power will act to ensure the maintenance and expansion of their power. The assumption of states acting with intention cannot, however, account for the negative aspects of China’s relations with weak states. As this chapter has attempted to make clear from the start, many of the negative outcomes resulting from China’s economic exchanges with weak states are unintended or unconscious. Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016

Structural power The concept of structural power as developed in Susan Strange’s work and further expanded on by Stefano Guzzini, Michael Barnett, and Raymond Duvall provides the theoretical way forward for analysis of the negative outcomes of China’s relations with its weak neighbours. As a Marxist-influenced concept, it maintains all the critiques of capitalism central to other Marxist approaches, yet differs in two important ways. 28 Asymmetrical economic exchange First, the concept provides both a conceptual basis and an operational framework for viewing China’s economic relations with its periphery weak states at both the system and state levels. Conceptually at the system level, structural power is a dominant state’s power to ‘shape and determine the structures of the global political economy within which other states, their political institutions, their economic enterprises and (not least) their scientists and other professionals have to operate’.20 Operationally, structural power identifies such independent variables as trade, foreign direct investment, the presence of the dominant state’s firms in the weak states, aid, and loans to determine the constitutive relationship between the dominant and dependent state.21 Conceptually at the domestic level, structural power occurs when a dominant state gains power over a dependent state’s structure of security, structure of production, structure of finance, and structure of knowledge through asymmetric economic exchange.22 Operationally, one can measure a state’s structural power over a dependent state through examination of its ability to shape security priorities, to define production priorities and divisions of labour, to provide financing, and to influence knowledge. Second, by focusing on power’s effect and not its intended outcome, structural power does away with the need to assign the dominant power with intentionality.23 Indeed, structural power is inherently nonintentional power that results from gaps in capabilities between two different states. It is not power that stems from a core state’s purposeful policy of exploitation as theorised by Lenin, the Dependencia theorists, or Cox’s work and, in this way, breaks with other Marxist approaches to international relations and international political economy. Rather, structural power is relational power, depending on the ties between power A and power B for its manifestation, intensity, and perpetuation.24 This is not to deny that structural power is real power of one state over another. In many ways, it is more enveloping, as it is power over a state’s structures.25 The remaining section details China’s economic position within Asia and with weak Asian states to demonstrate the utility of employing a structural power approach to analysis of China’s bilateral economic relation in the region. The section demonstrates China’s position as an economic core state in Asia, shows the inherent asymmetrical nature of its bilateral economic relations with developing Asian states, and considers its influence over weak Asian states’ domestic structures and institutions. Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 Structural power at the system level Since 2000, intraregional trade in Asia has tripled, with a total of 54 per cent of all Asian exports staying in Asia in 2013.26 Intraregional foreign direct investment is also rising, particularly between China, Japan, and the ASEAN states.27 Having weathered the 2008/09 global financial crisis better than other regions in the world, Asia as a whole had a 5.75 per cent growth rate for 2013.28 Rising wages, increased employment, and improved productivity are contributing to a regional growth in consumption that suggests further economic regionalism is likely. Asymmetrical economic exchange 29 China is the core of economic regionalism in Asia, serving as a major source of intraregional investment and the pivotal component of the regional supply chain.29 China is increasingly becoming a source of final demand for Asian exports, accounting for 23 per cent of all Asian states’ exports in 2011, up from just under 5 per cent in 1997.30 China receives more than 50 per cent of all interregional trade flows in intermediary goods, making China the single most important destination of intermediate goods exports for all its trade partners.31 Chinese retail sales are currently experiencing double-digit growth, which suggests China will have increased capacity to absorb more Asian exports in the near future. Indeed, the IMF noted that as of 2013 Chinese demand fundamentally shifted intraregional economic relations and created a new paradigm for regional growth.32 China’s search for access to regional sources of energy and commodities such as iron ore and coal to fuel its continued growth also contributes to economic regionalisation.33 China’s rapid industrialisation and urbanisation has led to a regional commodities boom in both developing and developed economies, such as Mongolia and Australia. Chinese investment in regional commodities-related infrastructure is a major source of economic growth for states like Cambodia, Myanmar, Mongolia, and North Korea, among others. Commodities-dependent countries in Asia are now so economically dependent on China that shocks from the country have overtaken shocks from the United States as the most important external factor influencing their respective business cycles.34 Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) to the rest of Asia is also increasing both in absolute number and in overall percentage of China’s total FDI. In 2005, 54 per cent of China’s $5.5 billion in FDI went to Asian states, while 69 per cent of its $121 billion in FDI went to Asia in 2012.35 The amount of actually utilised Chi- nese FDI in small and medium Asian countries between 2006 and 2012 increased substantially (table 1.1). China’s Investment Corporation (CIC), now the world’s largest sovereign wealth fund with over $1 trillion in assets and $400 billion in

Table 1.1 China’s foreign investment actually utilised by country, 2006–2012 (USD 10,000)

Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Indonesia 10,068 13,441 16,725 11,172 7,684 4,607 6,378 Kazakhstan N/A N/A N/A 2,240 155 1,127 555 North Korea 85 92 193 151 1,122 84 155

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 Laos N/A 300 670 243 945 588 200 Malaysia 39,348 39,725 24,696 42,874 29,433 35,828 31,751 Mongolia 9 94 141 231 325 N/A 25 Myanmar 736 326 330 339 352 1,021 384 Nepal 9 23 N/A N/A 25 N/A 3 Philippines 13,434 19,532 12,687 11,101 13,806 11,185 13,221 Sri Lanka 225 7 40 147 143 68 20 Thailand 14,482 8,948 12,921 4,866 5,134 10,120 7,772 Vietnam 1,366 73 207 592 203 129 316

(Data taken from National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook 2007–2013, ‘For- eign Investment Actually Utilized by Countries or Regions’.) 30 Asymmetrical economic exchange Table 1.2 Bilateral trade between China and select Asian states, 2012: percentage of total trade for small states and percentage of total Asian trade for China (USD 100 million)

Country Total value of Total value Per cent of total As per cent of trade with China of trade trade with China, China’s total Asia 2012 2012 2012 trade, 2012 (20,451)

Myanmar 63 207.9 30% 0.3% Cambodia 30 231 13% 0.1% North Korea 56 68 85% 0.2% Laos 16 57 29% 0.03% Mongolia 61 107 57% 3.2% Malaysia 593 4,250 14% 4.6% Philippines 259 1,461 18% 1.7% Vietnam 427 2,130 20% 2.4% Sri Lanka 26.5 280 9% 0.1% Nepal 20 56 36% 0.01% Kyrgyzstan 21 81 26% 0.2% Pakistan 102 678 15% 0.6%

(Data on Asian states’ trade with China taken from the United Nations Statistical Division COMTRADE database; Data on China’s trade with Asian states comes from the National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook 2013, ‘Value of Imports and Exports by Country [Region] of Origin/Destination’.)

capital, is in the process of expanding its investment profile into Asia. While the majority of Chinese investment through the CIC to date has been in the United States, Gao Xiqing, the former executive director of CIC, has stressed the need to further the corporation’s holdings and investments in Asia and to move from investment in developed to developing countries.36 China not only sits at the centre of economic activity in Asia, but its economy is far larger than all Asian states, with the notable exception of Japan. China’s disproportionate economic presence in the region means that the majority of its economic relations are asymmetrical in nature; a situation represented in the jux- taposition of the percentage of overall trade China represents for developing Asian states and the percentage of China’s trade in Asia these developing states repre- sent (table 1.2).37 This asymmetry results in unequal exchange between China and many of the states in Asia, including all this volume’s weak state case studies. China’s place as the regional economic core in Asia, coupled with the asym-

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 metrical nature of its economic relations with these weak states, provides the basis for Chinese structural power at the system level. The weak states on its periphery are increasingly dependent on China both as a source of investment and as a trade partner, a pattern of bilateral asymmetric exchange this volume demonstrates within its eight case studies.

Structural power at the state level The potential for Chinese structural power is equally pronounced at the domestic level, particularly over states with weak institutions, illegitimate governments, Asymmetrical economic exchange 31 and poor state/society relations which are, according to Stephen Krasner, fundamentally more vulnerable to structural power.38 For this reason, structural power provides an important analytical framework for understanding China’s position in relation to weak states’ structures of security, production, finance, and knowledge at the domestic level. In regard to states’ security, China has the potential to develop structural power in two ways. First, China’s centrality within weak states’ economies provides it with political influence to shape the weak states’ security priorities and/or responses. China’s economic position gives it both direct influence over security priorities through military exchange and training (as in the case of Kyrgyzstan) and indirect influence through conditional aid and loans premised on the state’s willingness to adopt China’s security priorities as its own (as in the case of Nepal). Second, China influences weak states’ structures of security through the perception that it, itself, is a threat. This structural power occurs through the process of securitisation when actors concerned with China’s activities within their state identify China as a source of insecurity. This second-type influence is a prime example of unconscious structural power, as China neither seeks it nor benefits from it.39 In regard to weak states’ domestic production, China has the potential to develop structural power in three ways. First, China occupies the central role in the region’s deeply fragmented production networks, a position that gives it centrality in regional economic integration. Through this core position, China can influence weak states’ domestic production strategies as they seek either to develop complementary production networks with China or work to develop productive industry that can compete with China.40 Within this formulation, China’s domestic production can come to define the weak states’ production. Second, China can gain structural power over domestic production within the weak Asian state through its large and cheap labour pool. Contrary to claims that China’s production benefits Asian states equally, evidence suggests that production in China has had adverse effects on production growth among many weak states in Asia.41 Where China has contributed to regional growth through production is in relation to the capital goods exports channel, which largely favours developed, indus- trialised states, not the intermediate goods export channel that defines China’s production relations with weak states on its periphery. Third, China’s increasing demand for raw materials for its own domestic production also provides it with influence that can translate into structural power. Chinese industries create large Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 regional demand for goods ranging from minerals to coal and copper to wood, most of which weak states supply.42 Economic ties based on resource exports can result in Chinese structural power as weak states prioritise the development of their natural resource sectors over other sectors within their domestic production to meet Chinese demand. China’s role in financing also provides it with the opportunity to develop structural power over its weak neighbouring states. China is now a far more important lender to states like Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, Myanmar, Laos, and Mongolia than the World Bank or Asian Development Bank, particularly in relation to lending for 32 Asymmetrical economic exchange infrastructure development related to trade.43 Chinese banks such as the China Development Bank and China Export-Import (Exim) Bank – the country’s primary overseas lending institutions – are symbolic of China’s growing regional standing as a provider of credit and aid. China’s development of the Asia Infra- structure Investment Bank (AIIB), Silk Road Development Fund, and BRIC’s Development Bank (in which it has a controlling share) is fundamentally transforming developing financing in the Asia-Pacific. China’s CIC is also an increasingly important source of FDI in its neighbouring weak states. As with security and production, China’s core position in finance is shaping these weak states’ domestic political and economic structures and driving domestic development priorities. Lastly, China’s expansion of communications networks and its moves to establish Confucius Institutes and universities in the weak states on its borders provides it with a base for structural power over knowledge. China has invested tens of billions of renminbi into its state-controlled media to enhance their presence and prestige in Asia.44 China’s ‘Big Four’ media outlets – Xinhua News Agency, Central China Television, China Radio, and the China Daily – are now ubiquitous throughout Asia, broadcasting in both English and Mandarin Chi- nese. China has also aggressively moved to establish Confucius Institutes in its neighbouring weak states. There is at least one Confucius Institute in each of the states this volume examines, mostly attached to the state’s most prestigious university. Lastly, while in a nascent phase, Chinese universities are also looking to establish foreign campuses in states like Laos, where students can study in Mandarin and receive scholarships from the Chinese government. While difficult to quantify the degree to which China’s massive expansion of communications has influenced knowledge or identity in the weak states on its periphery, it is certain that the expansion has led to an increase in Chinese opinion being broadcast abroad.

Structural power’s applicability to the study of China’s bilateral relations with weak states This brief overview demonstrates the value in employing structural power for analysis of China’s bilateral relations, particularly with weak states in Asia, at both the system and state levels. China’s position as an economic core in Asia provides it with the centrality necessary to develop structural power either Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 through directed policies or through unconscious means. The inherent asymmetry of China’s relations with the vast majority of Asian states also provides it with leverage that could influence the shape and development of Asian states’ structures. More, even, China’s potential to influence weak states’ structures of security, production, finance, and knowledge through its economic dominance points to structural powers’ utility in explaining China’s role in relation to these states. The remainder of this chapter will expand on the idea of structural power to consider the concept of structural violence, which this volume employs to examine the negative outcomes within the state and society resulting from Chinese structural power. Asymmetrical economic exchange 33

Structural violence Structural violence as a concept within peace and security studies provides an extension of the structural power approach from the system/state levels to the social level. More specifically, structural violence is concerned with structural inhibitors to individuals’ and societies’ potential. Structural violence, in its sim- plest form, is about lost opportunity and resulting injustice. While less visible than direct violence, it is more pervasive as it affects every aspect of its victims’ lives. Johan Galtung provided the most developed account of structural violence in the late 1960s, defining it as violence resulting from an uneven distribution of resources, exploitation, social injustice, and abuses of state power.45 Contrary to direct violence, structural violence does not require a specific actor nor is it necessarily intentional violence. Rather, it results from the inherent inequality within the international system and translates into a gap between the potential/actual for societies within weak and dependent states. It includes both manifest and latent violence, or violence that is observable and/or violence that is unobservable. Structural violence is, in this respect, violence in the form of structural constraint. Scholars such as Tord Höivik, Gernot Köhler, Norman Alcock, and Paul Farmer further developed the concept in parallel to work on security studies, human development, anthropology, and public health. Höivik defined structural violence as violence stemming from unequal social conditions that result in harm or death within a social group. For Höivik, one could only observe structural violence at a collective level through observation of measurable outputs such as infant mortality, birth rates, and life expectancy.46 Köhler and Alcock, conversely, considered structural violence through its inputs, which included lack of food, shelter, medical care, employment opportunities, and education, among other indicators.47 Farmer defined structural violence in terms of inherently unequal socio-economic systems within a state that enable the spread and continuation of poverty, disease, crime, and accidents at a local level.48 While differing in their theoretical understanding of what measurements one should use to define structural violence, the above scholars shared the common belief that unjust and exploitative structural conditions cause structural violence. Inherently a Marxist critique of capitalism and core/periphery relations, this conceptualisation of structural violence is also pertinent to discussions of structural power. If a dominant state can develop power over a dependent state’s structures, for example, it follows that the dominant state’s actions can result in structural vio- Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 lence within the dependent state’s society if the outcome of its structural power is negative. While not to suggest that the dominant power is responsible for all structural violence within the dependent state, structural violence’s focus on structure over agency does suggest a dominant state can influence social outcomes within a dependent state at the local level regardless of whether such is its intention. In addition to its explanatory value in helping one understand China’s influence over its periphery states’ domestic security conditions, structural violence also provides a means of viewing China’s foreign policy toward its periphery states as self-defeating with its treatment of harmonised/disharmonised interests. Harmo- nised interests take place when the periphery’s elite adopt the core’s priorities as 34 Asymmetrical economic exchange their own, whether or not these priorities are in fact beneficial to the larger periphery state and society. Within the structural violence model, linkages in interests between the core and periphery elite contribute to lost opportunity within the periphery state and society, causing a gap to open between the periphery state’s actual and potential state of affairs.49 The gap between the actual and potential undermines social justice, contributes to inequality, and causes missed development opportunities for the dependent state and society. Lost potential leads to structural violence such as unemployment, economic underdevelopment and vulnerability, environmental degradation, poor public health outcomes, and resource exploitation. More even than these direct effects, harmonised interests between the core and periphery elites can lead to alienation within and between states and societies, or disharmonised interests. A periphery society, for example, may turn against its government if it views its political elite as more beholden to the core state’s priorities than its own. Opposition groups with the periphery state may also turn against its ruling elite if they view the elite’s relationship within the core state as corrosive to the periphery state’s sovereignty. Importantly, disharmonised interests are not limited to relations within the periphery state itself but can also extend to the periphery society and core society and/or between the periphery society and core state.50 Disharmonised interests can contribute to structural violence in the form of poor state/society relations, social conflict between states, localised violence, and antiforeign nationalism, among other outcomes. While China’s use of economic ties to advance its foreign policy leads to the development of harmonised interests between Beijing and its periphery states’ elite, its failure to regulate the negative outcomes of its structural power or its resulting structural violence leads to disharmonised interests within the state. These disharmonised interests can undermine the weak states’ state/society relations and lead to greater instability on China’s borders. Such instability within already weak states can contribute to insecurity for China in ways outlined in this volume’s introductory chapter. Disharmonised interests can also extend to state-to-state relations between the weak states’ government and China when it responds to growing social pressure to mitigate China’s influence. Government attempting to placate social criticism of the state’s dependency on China, for example, can enact foreign policy to distance itself from China (as in the case of Myanmar) or implement domestic legislation to manage China’s influence over its domestic structures (as in the case Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 of Mongolia).

Structural power and structural violence: an analytic approach The concepts of structural power and structural violence provide a powerful model for viewing the negative aspects of China’s economic relations with weak neighbours and for considering how these outcomes contribute to insecurity. First, structural power offers an alternative Marxist-based theoretical approach Asymmetrical economic exchange 35 to China’s economic relations with weak states at the system and domestic levels that can account for its influence without assigning it intentionality. This is an important theoretical contribution to the study of China’s relations with its periphery weak states (and developing states in general), as it provides an understanding of the economic forces contributing to China’s growing influence but avoids the pitfalls of other approaches that seek to assign China with mercantilist or imperialist aims. The concept of structural violence provides the theoretical bridge for structural power into security studies. Specifically, it expands on the component of structural power that affects the security of both the state and society. Structural violence is the negative end state of structural power and, in this respect, provides the explanatory stepping-stone for understanding how structural power leads to insecurity. This book draws on the structural power/structural violence model as outlined in figure 1.1 (above). To determine whether and to what degree China has developed structural power over a state at the system level, the volume examines the extent of economic ties between China and the weak state through consideration of such independent variables as trade, FDI, loans/aid, the presence of Chinese firms within the weak state, and ties between elites within China and the weak state. The volume draws on Strange’s sources of structural power to determine the extent of China’s structural power over the state’s domestic institutions of security, production, finance, and knowledge. The book focuses on the negative outcomes of China’s structural power to demonstrate how economic engagement with China can lead to further weakness within the already weak case study states.

Structural Power at the Structural Power at the Structural Violence System Level State Level

Extent of Sources of Structural power economic linkages structural power leads to structural (trade, FDI, aid) (threat, financing, violence production, knowledge) Presence of Structural violence

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 Chinese firms, state-owned and leads to instability private within the state/society

Ties between Structural violence dominant and undermines state dependent cores -to-state relations

Figure 1.1 Structural power/structural violence model 36 Asymmetrical economic exchange The book then considers whether and how China’s structural power translates into structural violence within the weak state. Specifically, the volume looks at whether China’s structural power contributes to underdevelopment, environmental degradation, forced seizures of land and relocation, localised violence, and/or tension between ethnic and religious groups within the weak state. Having identified how China’s structural power manifests into structural violence, the book examines whether the violence translates into political and/or social instability within the weak state, whether the weak state is acting to lessen Chinese structural power, and whether and how such developments affect China’s own security. The structural power/structural violence model aids in discussion of China’s periphery security in two important ways. First, it provides a means of examining one element of China’s relations with its weak neighbouring states that the more holistic approaches drawing on Marxism in IR and IPE theory and security studies cannot. Rather than depending on an entire system built on exploitative economic relations such as those inherent in Lenin, Gramsci, Cox, and Halliday’s work, the structural power/structural violence model is more specific. It provides the means to examine the corrosive effects of unequal economic exchange within a larger framework of economic relations that are often positive. The model, while a critical approach, is neither predicated nor dependent on an ideologically based systemic theory. Second, the structural power/structural violence model provides a critical multiple-levels-of-analysis approach to China’s relations with the weak states on its periphery based on the unintended negative outcome of unequal socio-economic exchange that is entirely absent from the existing literature on Chinese foreign policy relations. The model challenges commonly espoused liberalist perceptions that China’s growth and economic cooperation with its periphery states is contributing to better state-to-state relations and regional stability. The paradigm provides the theoretical framework for viewing the negative aspect for weak states of interaction with China which are often ignored in work on China’s rise and its regional impact. In particular, the approach highlights the security challenges for the weak state, for societies within that state, and, ultimately, for China itself.

Notes 1 John Knight and Sai Ding, China’s Remarkable Economic Growth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 59; Danny Quah, ‘Post-1990s East Asian Economic Growth’,

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 in The Rise of China and Structural Changes in Korea and Asia, eds. Takatoshi Itoz and Chin-hui Han (Camberley: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010), 20. 2 Travis Nelson and Matthew Carlson, ‘Charmed by China? Popular Perceptions of Chi- nese Influence’, Japanese Journal of Political Science Vol. 13, No. 4 (2013), 480. 3 For detailed discussion of China’s compromising positions on agreements with its neighbouring states over outstanding border disputes, see M. Taylor Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China’s Territorial Disputes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008). For discussion on China’s attempt to develop soft power through public diplomacy, see Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offen- sive: How China’s Soft Power Is Transforming the World (New Haven, CT: Yale Uni- versity Press, 2007). Asymmetrical economic exchange 37 4 Zhu Feng, ‘China’s Trouble with the Neighbors,’ Project Syndicate, October 31, 2011, accessed July 8, 2013, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/ china-s-trouble-with-the-neighbors. 5 Mel Gurtov, ‘Changing Perceptions and Policies’, in China, the Weak World, and the New Global Dynamic, eds. Lowell Dittmer and George T. Yu (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2010), 26. 6 Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr, 1911), 16–17. 7 Jonathan Hughes, Ecology and Historical Materialism (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni- versity Press, 2000), 92. 8 Stanley Aronowitz, The Crisis in Historical Materialism: Class, Politics, and Culture in Marxist Theory (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), 104. 9 Anthony Giddens, Capitalism and Modern Social Theory: An Analysis of the Writings of Marx, Durkheim and Max Weber (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 11–12. 10 Johan Fornas, Capitalism: A Companion to Marx’s Economy Critique (London: Tay- lor & Francis, 2013), 15. 11 Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, Imperialism: The Highest State of Capitalism (Broadway: Resistance Books, 1999). 12 Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, Dependency and Development in Latin America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), 17; Andre Gunder Frank, Dependent Accumulation and Underdevelopment (London: Macmillan, 1978), 18. 13 Deb J. Hill, Hegemony and Education: Gramsci, Post-Marxism, and Radical Democ- racy Revisited (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2008), 229. 14 Robert W. Cox, ‘Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International Rela- tions Theory’, in Neorealism and Its Critics, ed. Robert Owen Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 205. 15 Fred Halliday, Rethinking International Relations (London: McMillan Press, 1994), 53, 59. 16 Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, The Evolution of International Security Studies (Cam- bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 124–25. 17 Ken Booth, Theory of World Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 43–44. 18 Johan Galtung, ‘Violence, Peace, and Peace Research’, Journal of Peace Research 6, No. 3 (1969), 168. 19 Andrew Linklater, Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1990). 20 Susan Strange, States and Markets (London: Continuum, 1994), 24. 21 Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, ‘Power in International Politics’, International Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 Organization 59 (2005), 53. 22 Strange, States and Markets, 24. 23 Stefano Guzzini, ‘Structural Power: The Limits of Neorealist Power Analysis’, Inter- national Organization 47, No. 3 (1993), 457. 24 Barnett and Duvall, ‘Power in International Politics’, 53. 25 Stefano Guzzini, Power, Realism, and Constructivism (London: Routledge, 2013), 56. 26 Asian Development Bank, Asian Economic Integration Monitor: April 2014 (Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2014), 1. 27 United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific,Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Report 2012 (Bangkok: United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, 2012), 40 38 Asymmetrical economic exchange 28 International Monetary Fund, ‘Asia Faces Shifting Risks, New Foundations for Growth’, IMF Survey Online, April 29, 2013, accessed July 5, 2014, http://www.imf. org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2013/CAR042913A.htm. 29 International Monetary Fund, Regional Economic Outlook: Asia and the Pacific: Shift- ing Risks, New Foundations for Growth (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund Publication Services, 2013), 8. 30 International Monetary Fund, Asia and the Pacific: Managing the Next Phase of Growth (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2011), 2. 31 International Monetary Fund, Shifting Risks, 8. 32 International Monetary Fund, Shifting Risks, ix. 33 Chen Chunlai, Foreign Direct Investment in China: Location Determinants, Investor Dif- ferences and Economic Impacts (Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011), 130. 34 International Monetary Fund, Asia and the Pacific, 6. 35 Asian Development Bank, Asian Economic Integration Monitor, 27. 36 Patrick Jenkins, ‘China Investment Corp Defends Business Model’, Finan- cial Times, January 27, 2012, accessed July 1, 2013, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ bd85cd0e-2a2f-11e0-997c-00144feab49a.html. 37 Brantly Womack, China Among Unequals: Asymmetric Foreign Relationships in Asia (Singapore: World Scientific, 2010), 6. 38 Stephen Krasner, Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 40. 39 Matthew Linley, James Reilly, and Benjamin Goldsmith, ‘Who’s Afraid of the Dragon? Asian Mass Publics’ Perceptions of China’s Influence’, Japanese Journal of Political Science 13, No. 4 (2013), 501. 40 Deng Ziliang and Zheng Yongnian, ‘China Reshapes the World Economy’, in China and the New International Order, eds. Wang Gungwu and Zheng Yongnian (London: Routledge, 2008), 128. 41 Chin Hee Hahn and Yong-Seok Choi, ‘China’s Rise and Production and Investment Growth in Korean Manufacturing Industries: Channels and the Effects’, in The Rise of China and Structural Changes in Korea and Asia, eds. Takatoshi Itoz and Chin-hui Han (London: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010), 184. 42 Betina Dimaranan, Elena Ianchovichina, and Will Martin, ‘Competing with Giants: Who Wins, Who Loses?’, in Dancing with Giants: China, India, and the Global Econ- omy, eds. L. Alan Winters and Shahid Yusuf (Washington, DC: World Bank Publica- tions, 2007), 92. 43 Geoff Dyer and Jamil Anderlini, ‘China’s Lending Hits New Heights’, Finan- cial Times, January 17, 2011, accessed July 1, 2013, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/ s/0/488c60f4-2281-11e0-b6a2-00144feab49a.html#axzz2Xvq6rHLe. 44 David Shambaugh, China Goes Global: The Partial Power (Oxford: Oxford Univer-

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 sity Press, 2013), 83. 45 Galtung, ‘Violence, Peace, and Peace Research’, 171. 46 Tord Höivik, ‘The Demography of Structural Violence’, Journal of Peace Research Vol. 14, No. 1 (1977), 60. 47 Gernot Köhler and Norman Alcock, ‘An Empirical Table of Structural Violence’, Jour- nal of Peace Research Vol. 13, No. 4 (1976), 333. 48 Paul Farmer, ‘An Anthropology of Structural Violence’, Current Anthropology Vol. 45, No. 3 (2004), 305. 49 Galtung, ‘Violence, Peace, and Peace Research’, 168. 50 Ibid, 84. 2 China’s reliance on economic exchange with its peripheral states

Before examining China’s bilateral relations with this volume’s case study countries, it is first necessary to provide further evidence that China does in fact privilege economic exchange over other forms of political and diplomatic outreach with each state. In addition to its strategic-level concepts that detail a foreign policy approach based on economic exchange such as the One Belt, One Road, China’s partiality for an ‘economics-first’ approach to bilateral relations is evident in Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) documents, particularly statements that outline the contours of ‘good neighbour relations’ (mulin youhao hezuo) or ‘strategic partnerships’ (zhanlue huoban) between China and its respective partner states. One also gains insight into China’s reliance on economic ties as the basis for bilateral relations through examination of embassy documents, Ministry of Com- merce writings, state-controlled media commentary, and leadership statements, particularly from the countries’ respective ambassadors and President Xi Jinping. Examination of these primary documents provides the necessary starting point for consideration of Chinese structural power and resulting structural violence in this volume’s later case studies. In addition to China’s official policy pronouncements, Chinese-language scholarship on China’s bilateral relations with weak states on its periphery provides insight into the strategic rationale behind China’s engagement. As such, careful reading of Chinese scholarly articles detailing China’s foreign policy approach with its weak neighbours provides a second-degree understanding of how and why China relies on economic exchange to drive its foreign relations with each state. The remainder of this chapter examines contemporary Chinese policy state- Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 ments (post 2000) and Chinese-language scholarly articles on Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nepal, Myanmar, Lao PDR, and Mongolia to provide a basis for examination of each state’s bilateral relationship with China. In doing so, the chapter provides a necessary primer for understanding how China develops structural power within its modern bilateral relationships with its periphery states and how its structural power, in turn, leads to structural violence within each state. 40 China’s reliance on economic exchange

China’s bilateral relations: statements, scholarship, and economic exchange

Kyrgyzstan China’s penchant for economic exchange as the basis for its state-to-state relations with Bishkek is clearest in the 2002 Chinese MFA-drafted ‘Sino-Kyrgyz Good Neighbour Cooperation Treaty’. The treaty, which established the basis for the two states’ contemporary bilateral relations, first and foremost identified common economic development as the means through which the two sides can pursue their common interests and advance their bilateral ties (Article 6).1 The treaty then referenced cooperation in communications, transport, cultural and education exchange, technical training, legal research, and counter-terrorism (Articles 7–16) as extensions of common economic cooperation and development. As such, the treaty largely defined Sino-Kyrgyz relations as predicated on economic linkages. China’s primary focus on economic exchange with Kyrgyzstan is also evident in the 2013 ‘Joint Declaration of the Establishment of Sino-Kyrgyz Strategic Part- nership’, which is, in many ways, a more comprehensive declaration of intent with regard to the two states’ developing relations than the 2002 treaty. The declaration, for example, called for closer cooperation in building strategic or ‘political’ trust (zhengzhi huxin), achieving comprehensive development (quanfangwei fazhan), and working toward peace and stability. The declaration’s stated means in achieving these outcomes, however, remained economically focused, with specific references to the role that preexisting Chinese investment in Kyrgyzstan’s power sector, telecommunications, and public roads has in maintaining and advancing Sino-Kyrgyz bilateral relations.2 As such, the 2013 declaration continued to show China’s preference for the use of economic exchange to achieve its strategic aims, although these strategic aims have expanded. The centrality of economic exchange as a driver of state relations is also apparent in Chinese announcements on Kyrgyzstan’s involvement in Beijing’s proposed Silk Road Economic Belt. In 2013, for example, China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) called on Bishkek to join Chinese efforts to establish a Silk Road Economic Belt through Central Asia. The MOFCOM statement argued that Kyr- gyzstan’s participation in the Silk Road Economic Belt would facilitate wider economic cooperation between the two states, including Chinese involvement in rail construction in the country that could turn Kyrgyzstan into an entrepôt for Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 Chinese goods bound for Eurasian markets.3 In 2014, China’s ambassador to Kyr- gyzstan, Qi Dayu, similarly argued that Kyrgyzstan’s involvement in China’s Silk Road Economic Belt would help facilitate greater cooperation between the two countries, including Chinese construction of schools, hospitals, and infrastructure in the state.4 Most indicative of China’s use of economic exchange to secure Kyrgyzstan’s cooperation, however, is Xi Jinping’s 2014 speech on Sino-Kyrgyz relations. In the speech, Xi elevated the economic dimensions of Sino-Kyrgyz ties over other types of non-economic cooperation and promised further Chinese investment in China’s reliance on economic exchange 41 the country’s power, hydropower, minerals, and oil sectors to support the two countries’ newly established strategic partnership. Xi then defined the Sino-Kyrgyz’s strategic partnership in largely non-economic terms, firmly establishing past and future economic relations as the foundation of the two states’ bilateral relations. One gets a more comprehensive picture of China’s reliance on economic exchange with Kyrgyzstan through examination of Chinese scholarship on the two states’ bilateral relations. Huang Fojun of Xibei University and Zhang Yong- ming of the Xinjiang Economic Research Institute write, for example, that China invests in Kyrgyzstan’s energy and mining sector to ensure Beijing’s continued influence in the country and to advance China’s security objectives.5 Huang and Zhang also note that China employs direct economic exchange through trade – on which Kyrgyzstan is increasingly dependent – and indirect economic exchange, such as Chinese-originating aid delivered through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), to affect greater relations between China and Kyrgyzstan’s ruling elite. Sun Shiwei of Xinjiang Normal University writes that China uses investment in Kyrgyzstan’s natural resource sector, its banking and finance sectors, its agricultural sector, and its telecommunication sector as a means of deepening political partnership between the two states. Sun notes that China adopted this approach following Kyrgyzstan’s privatisation of its economy, when the state’s influence over economic activity in the country was weak.6 Zhou Lihua of Xinjiang Economics University argues that China uses economic incentives – including aid – to shape Kyrgyzstan’s domestic institutions and ensure its security, particularly in relation to the XUAR. Zhou writes that China also uses economic incentives (and could use sanctions) to ensure that Chi- nese goods can transit through Kyrgyzstan to Eurasian markets.7 For Zhou, economic exchange is a means of managing Kyrgyzstan’s internal dynamics while advancing China’s own development needs.

Tajikistan China’s MFA’s 1997 ‘Sino-Tajik Good Neighbour Cooperation Treaty’ also identified economic exchange – both actualised and potential – as the primary means to achieve China’s security objectives in relation to Tajikistan. Articles 1–8 of the treaty identified China’s interests vis-à-vis Tajikistan as securing Dushanbe’s acknowledgement of the One China policy, its support for China’s policy of non- Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 intervention, its neutrality in cooperation with third parties against China, and its cooperation in addressing terrorism. Article 9 then outlined the expansion and deepening of the two states’ economic relation to include greater cooperation on communication, science and technology, hydropower, mining, agriculture, and infrastructure development as the basis to achieve greater cooperation across the early stated range of priorities.8 The 2013 ‘Joint Declaration on the Establishment of the Sino-Tajik Strategic Partnership’ similarly prioritised economic exchange as a basis of cooperation, identifying economic ties between the two states as the ‘material base’ (wuzhi jichu) for their respective bilateral relations in Article 2.9 42 China’s reliance on economic exchange The 2013 declaration further called on both governments to support economic coordination, advance economic innovation, and expand the scope and level of cooperation to strengthen state ties. China’s 2014 ‘Joint Statement about Continual Development and Deepening the Strategic Partnership between China and Tajikistan’ is also constructed around an ‘economics-first’ logic, despite its more expansive treatment of the two states’ bilateral relations. The 2014 statement, for instance, called on both sides to contribute to the deepening of their good neighbour relations, mutual respect, and win-win relations. The statement also highlighted the need for greater political cooperation and consultation, particularly between the countries’ respective leadership. Article 3, however, once again raised economic cooperation as the primary means to achieve these goals, specifically citing trade, investment, cooperation in mining, and finance as important components of exchange.10 On review of the 2014 statement, one gets the clear impression that economic exchange dominates the two states’ bilateral relations. This view becomes even clearer when examining Xi Jinping’s statements during his September 2014 trip to Tajikistan, where he specially referenced trade, investment, and cooperation in agricultural development as a ‘road map’ (luxiantu) for the two states’ future relations.11 Statements by MOFCOM and the Chinese ambassador to Tajikistan further stressed China’s reliance on economic exchange with Tajikistan. Dispatches from MOFCOM, for example, regularly point to China’s role in trade and provision of investment as evidence of China’s overall commitment to Tajikistan.12 While one might expect MOFCOM to focus primarily on the economic dimensions of bilateral relations, the uniformity of its overall messaging with the MFA’s goals reinforces the singularly of China’s economic exchange approach. Equally, Chi- na’s ambassador to Tajikistan, Fan Xianrong, has highlighted the economic linkages between the two states as the primary contributor to state cooperation in statements regarding the two countries’ potential engagement through the Silk Road Economic Belt. In a 2015 press conference commemorating the start of the Chinese Spring Festival and the Lunar New Year, Fan Xianrong listed China’s involvement in Tajikistan’s power, communications, agriculture, and mining sectors as key points of cooperation between the two states in recent years. Fan then called for greater economic integration between the two countries through the Silk Road Economic Belt, which he labelled as key to the countries’ strategic partnership.13 Examination of Chinese-language scholarship on Sino-Tajik relations reveals Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 a common acceptance among scholars that Chinese investment, trade, and aid are China’s most important tools for achieving its strategic ends in the country. Zhou Lihua from Xinjiang Finance University, for example, writes that China should expand its already substantial economic linkages with Tajikistan to further cement its position as one of the country’s most important foreign partners.14 Zhou and Ye Zhixin (also of Xinjiang Finance University) further write that China’s approach to Tajikistan should adhere to the country’s Go Out Strategy, where China employs investment and trade as vehicles to expand China’s commercial interests overseas and ensure favourable strategic outcomes.15 For Zhou and Ye, China’s reliance on economic exchange 43 economic ties between the two states ensure China’s interests in the country and, therefore, have inherent strategic value. Xu Haiyan from the Chinese Academy of Social Science agrees with Zhou and Ye, writing that China should leverage its economic ties with Tajikistan to ensure the state cooperates with Beijing on security matters. Xu references Tajikistan’s proximity to the XUAR as a source of insecurity and argues that China should use economic means to stabilise the country.16 Similarly, Shi Jing and Chen Keshu of Xinjiang Normal University write that China should leverage its aid to Tajikistan to advance its interests in the country vis-à-vis Russia and the United States.17 Shi and Chen also call on Beijing to use its aid to advance China’s further commercial interests in the country, specifically noting China’s potential to expand its presence in Tajikistan’s agricultural sector.

Afghanistan The 2006 ‘Sino-Afghan Good Neighbour Cooperation Treaty’ is an anomaly with regard to the other bilateral treaties this volume examines, as economic exchange is mentioned toward the end of the document and then only in passing.18 Com- pared to other bilateral treaties China has with its other periphery states, the 2006 Sino-Afghan Treaty is quite vacuous and empty of concrete proposals for state relations. It is, however, supplemented by a 2006 ‘Agreement between China and Afghanistan on Trade and Economics’, which established the basis for economic cooperation in modern Sino-Afghan relations and is based on Chinese investment in Afghanistan’s mining sector, Chinese construction of Afghan infrastructure, and China’s development of Afghanistan’s energy sector.19 The 2006 agreement called for greater trade between the two states and announced the removal of tariffs on 278 Afghan goods. Held against the 2006 treaty, which calls for vague government relations based on Afghanistan’s adherence to a One China policy, the 2006 agreement is clear and specific. It is also a useful starting point for discussion of China’s use of economic exchange to ensure its state relations with Afghanistan, a practice that continues today. Building on the 2006 treaty and statement, China and Afghanistan published a ‘Joint Statement on the Establishment of a Sino-Afghan Strategic Partnership’ in 2012. The 2012 statement called for comprehensive partnership between the two states built around the five main pillars (wu da zhizhu) of economic, political, social, security, and international cooperation. Like the 2006 agreement, how- Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 ever, the 2012 statement provided a primary economic rationale for cooperation between the two states. The 2012 statement did call for greater state-to-state cooperation in Article 3 (in which Beijing also called for Afghanistan’s commitment to a One China policy), but then it identified economic cooperation in Afghanistan’s energy, mining, manufacturing, and agricultural sectors, together with China’s construction of infrastructure in the state, as the basis to achieve state relations in Article 4.20 Notably, the MFA published additional ‘Joint Statements on the Deep- ening of a Sino-Afghan Strategic Partnership’ in 2013 and 2014, respectively, with truncated references to state-to-state cooperation in Article 3. Adherence to 44 China’s reliance on economic exchange economic cooperation as a driver of state relations remained, however, in both the 2013 and 2014 statements. Indeed, both statements elevated discussion of economic cooperation from Article 4 to Article 3.21 China’s current leadership also reference economic exchange as the primary vehicle through which China can achieve its strategic and security aims with Afghanistan. In a 2013 speech to commemorate a state visit to Beijing by Afghan president Karzai, Xi Jinping identified China’s contribution to Afghani- stan’s security and development in largely economic terms, with only passing mention of non-economic aspects of the two states’ relations.22 Similarly, China’s premier Li Keqiang equated Afghan’s security with its economic development in a 2014 speech and argued that China is best suited to influence Afghanistan’s security environment through its investment, trade, and aid.23 Li also referenced economic relations as the prime example of the two states’ relations in 2015 when he declared the Year of Sino-Afghan Friendship and Cooperation in Beijing.24 China’s ambassador to Afghanistan, Deng Xijun, similarly identified China’s use of economic exchange, including investment, trade, and aid, to achieve strategic trust with Afghanistan and to ensure security between the two states in a 2014 speech entitled ‘The Future Development of Sino-Afghan Relations’.25 Chinese-language scholarship on Sino-Afghan relations provides both evidence and a rationale for Beijing’s increasing reliance on economic exchange to secure ties with Kabul and to pursue its strategic ends with regard to the state. Liu Zhongming of Shanghai International Studies University and Fan Peng of Gansu University of Social Science write, for example, that China since 2014 has sought to establish itself as a ‘benefactor’ (gongxian zhe) to Afghanistan by supporting development in the country. As such, Liu and Fan argue that economic exchange – whether aid, loans, or investment – are central (and increasingly important) components of China’s overall diplomatic approach to Afghanistan.26 He Ming of East China Normal University similarly identifies China’s ability to provide aid and investment to Afghanistan as a strategic asset for China, particularly in the post-2014 environment after ISAF troops complete their partial drawdown and China can move into a more central role in Afghanistan’s reconstruction. He also notes that China’s economic involvement in Afghanistan is the primary means through which China can develop good relations with Kabul and ensure its security interests in relation to the state.27 Zhang Jiafei and Hou Yawen of Xinjiang University argue that China should work to integrate the XUAR’s and Afghani- stan’s economies, to increase Chinese aid to Afghanistan, and to expand China’s Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 involvement in Afghanistan’s energy, communications, and infrastructure development as a means of ensuring good strategic ties between the two countries.28

Pakistan Chinese-language statements from China’s MFA, MOFCOM, and Chinese leadership tend to focus on the ‘all-weather friendship’, ‘strategic partnership’, or ‘brotherly relations’ (xiongdi guanxi) between China and Pakistan. One can, however, still observe China’s penchant for economic exchange with Islamabad China’s reliance on economic exchange 45 through examination of the two countries’ existing treaties, documents, joint statements, and leaders’ speeches. The 2005 MFA ‘Sino-Pakistan Good Neigh- bour Cooperation Treaty’, for example, identified economic exchange as a means of achieving greater coordination between the two states to meet their larger strategic aims in its Article 8.29 Speaking in relation to the 2005 treaty, Premier Wen Jiabao specifically referenced economic exchange between the two states – in the form of Chinese investment, aid, technology, and expertise in infrastructure development – as the primary driving force behind Sino-Pakistan ties.30 Beijing further expanded on its use of economic ties as its principal means of engagement with Islamabad in 2007 when the two countries signed the ‘China-Pakistan Five-Year Economic Development Plan’. In the 2007 plan, China pledged support for Paki- stan’s development through greater investment, through the expansion of Chinese industry, and through Chinese financing and construction of numerous projects in Pakistan.31 The document provided an important framework for further joint declarations, including the MFA 2010 ‘Joint Declaration between China and Paki- stan’, which further identified China’s role in promoting economic development with Pakistan as evidence of the two countries’ larger strategic partnership and as a means for furthering state-to-state collaboration.32 The economic rationale for state cooperation outlined in the 2007 plan also informed the 2014 ‘Joint State- ment on Deepening Sino-Pakistan Strategic and Economic Cooperation’, which, more than any other preceding document, established a cause/effect relationship between economic development (supported by Beijing) and security between the two states.33 Chinese contemporary leaders’ statements and speeches also confirm China’s economic exchange approach. In 2013, for example, Premier Li Keqiang identified trade and economic cooperation as the first of three methods (followed by cultural and people exchanges) through which China and Pakistan can ensure their political base (jichu).34 Li also committed the Chinese government and Chi- nese people to help Pakistan with its economic development as a sign of enduring state-to-state relations. In 2014, President Xi called on China and Pakistan to deepen their strategic partnership during a visit by Pakistan prime minister Nawaz Sharif to Beijing by expanding economic exchange, among other secondary means such as greater cultural and people-to-people exchanges.35 Xi pledged greater Chinese support to Pakistan through the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and called on Islamabad to cooperate with China in expanding the Silk Road Economic Belt. Predictably, China’s ambassador to Pakistan, Sun Wei- Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 dong, has adopted similar language to Li and Xi in his speeches on Sino-Pakistan relations. In 2014, for example, Sun pointed to Chinese investment and Chinese firms’ role in the development of the Sino-Pakistan economic corridor as evidence of China’s ongoing commitment to good relations with Islamabad. Chinese academics regularly reference China’s economic interaction with Paki- stan as Beijing’s means of deepening strategic relations with the state. Shen Dingli of Fudan University, for example, argues that common economic development is one of three pillars that constitute Sino-Pakistan relations, with the other two being common security concerns and national integrity. Of these three pillars, 46 China’s reliance on economic exchange Shen notes that economic exchange – primarily in the form of China supporting Pakistan’s development – provides the basis for engagement on the other two.36 As such, Shen writes that economic exchange is the fulcrum of Sino-Pakistan engagement. Zhong Guihong – also from Fudan University – similarly writes that trade and economic cooperation between China and Pakistan are together one of four areas of future cooperation (in addition to government relations, security cooperation, and cultural interaction) and the area that can contribute the most to the two states’ future relations. Zhong argues that economic relations between the two states are underdeveloped in comparison to state-to-state and military-to-military cooperation and that China should pursue closer ties through greater investment in Pakistan’s mining, energy, and hydropower sectors.37 Cheng Xiaohe of Renmin University points to Chinese funding and construction of large stretches of Paki- stan’s Karakoram Highway as a paradigm of Sino-Pakistan strategic relations, noting how Beijing uses economic engagement to strengthen state relations and to increase goodwill between the Chinese and Pakistani people.38

Nepal One can also observe Beijing’s predilection for economic exchange over other forms of engagement with Nepal in formal agreements and statements between the two countries. Article 4 of the 2012 ‘Sino-Nepalese Joint Statement’, for example, identified economic cooperation between the two states as the basis of the two states’ bilateral relations and bilateral agreements.39 The 2012 statement called on both China and Nepal to increase common economic development, trade, tourism, and cooperation in hydropower and infrastructure development – all types of exchange that require Chinese financial aid, investment, and technical expertise to achieve – as a means to increase cooperation between China’s Tibet Autono- mous Region (TAR) and Nepal and to ensure security cooperation between the two areas. The 2012 ‘Sino-Nepal Economic and Technology Agreement’ further built on the concept of economic exchange as the primary source of cooperation between the two states by arguing that China and Nepal should leverage existing economic linkages to expand cooperation across their respective security sectors and to increase exchanges between high-level leaders.40 In a 2013 speech, China’s former ambassador to Nepal, Wu Chuntai, similarly highlighted economic exchange between the two states as the primary motive and rationale behind Sino-Nepalese relations. Wu pointed to China’s role as a provider Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 of imports to Nepal, China’s continued investment in Nepal’s agriculture and hydropower sectors, China’s financing and construction of Nepal’s infrastructure, and Chinese tourists to Nepal as both the outcome of good state relations and the foundations upon which the two states can build closer relations.41 China’s current ambassador to Nepal, Ma Siji, reaffirmed China’s use of economic exchange with Nepal as a basis for diplomacy at the National People’s Congress in 2015 when he announced Nepal’s involvement in China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ (yi dai, yi lu) initiative and declared a new stage of Sino-Nepal relations.42 Shorthand for China’s Silk Road Economic Belt program, the One Belt, One Road concept is China’s reliance on economic exchange 47 first and foremost premised on economic exchange and a commitment to common economic development. Huang Zhengduo of Sichuan University and Li Yan of Chengdu University of Science and Engineering argue that China can best ensure security in the TAR through the economic buildup of Nepal, which, the two scholars argue, is vulnerable to instability resulting from poverty and underdevelopment.43 Huang and Li encourage China to take a more active role in developing Nepal through investment, trade, and aid so as to establish more robust state-to-state relations. Lan Jianxue of the China Institute of International Studies conversely argues that economic exchange between the two states serves the purpose of developing the TAR, which, in turn, contributes to internal security for China. As such, Lan encourages Beijing to push forward with economic exchange with Nepal so as to provide the TAR an overseas market for exports and a source for natural resources for its own development.44 Li Tao and Dai Yonghong of Sichuan University point to China’s economic exchange with Nepal as the primary means through which Beijing can compete with India’s and the United States’ influence in the country. For Li and Dai, economic cooperation is at the core of all China’s strategic options with regard to engagement with Nepal and should be further developed.45

Myanmar The 2011 MFA released the ‘Joint Statement on the Establishment of Comprehen- sive and Strategic Partnership Relations’, which provides a useful starting point for examination of the logic informing contemporary Sino-Myanmar relations. The joint statement, released by the MFA immediately after Chinese president Hu Jintao met with Myanmar’s President Thein Sein in Beijing, identified cooperation between the two countries’ respective parties, states, and industries as the foundation of the two state’s strategic relations in Article 1. In Article 3, the statement further expanded on the idea of cooperation through industrial entities by identifying investment, trade, and infrastructure development as the drivers of ‘healthy, balanced relations’ (jiankang, wending hezuo guanxi) between the two states. Article 3 also called on China and Myanmar to push for further economic and trade cooperation in support of their future relationship.46 The statement did reference cooperation between states as the ultimate end of cooperation but, as with other documents examined here, relies on economic cooperation as the principle means to achieve these ends. Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 China’s use of economic exchange is further visible in the 2014 MFA-issued ‘Joint Statement on Deepening the Strategic Partnership of Sino-Myanmar Rela- tions’. The 2014 Statement’s Article 6 proposed Myanmar’s participation in Chi- na’s Silk Road Economic Belt and Maritime Silk Road Initiative as a catalyst for future relations between the states.47 Articles 6 through 13 subsequently expanded the concept of economic relations within the Silk Road frameworks to include greater cooperation in investment, trade, finance, infrastructure development, and agricultural production. Such calls for expansion of the two states’ economic relations – led primarily by Chinese initiatives to contribute to Myanmar’s internal 48 China’s reliance on economic exchange economic development – dominate the 2014 statement to the point where all other types of cooperation are relegated to secondary positions of importance. Yang Houlan, China’s ambassador to Myanmar, further clarified China’s role as a provider of aid, investment, and expertise to Myanmar in support of the two states’ relations in a 2014 speech entitled ‘Push Forward East Asia’s Common Development by Raising Sino-Myanmar’s Strategic Cooperation’. In the speech, Yang called on the two states to collaborate within the One Belt, One Road strategic concept, including greater cooperation on large-scale energy and agricultural projects, infrastructure development, and finance.48 Premier Li Keqiang echoed Yang’s presentation of Sino-Myanmar relations in late 2014 by noting the two states’ relations rested largely on strategic trust and win-win economic relations. Li pledged Chinese government support to the expansion of Chinese industry in Myanmar to push forward greater economic integration between the two states, including collaboration between the two states’ banking and financial institutions.49 Chinese scholars focused on China’s relations with Myanmar similarly highlight China’s use of economic exchange as a principal tool of diplomacy. Xu Benqin of the University of International Relations notes that China uses economic linkages and incentives to secure its strategic interests in Myanmar. More specifically, Xu writes that Myanmar is a ‘fulcrum’ (shuniu) of China’s strategic posturing to South and Southeast Asia and demonstrates how China employs economic means to secure Naypyidaw’s willingness to cooperate.50 Liu Wu of Zunyi Normal University also identifies an economic rationale behind China’s foreign policy approach toward Myanmar. For Liu, China’s ability to contribute to Myan- mar’s development is the primary reason why Beijing can expect to maintain good relations with the country’s leadership regardless of their introduction of political reform.51 Li Zhonglin of Yunnan University agrees with Liu, writing that China’s economic approach to Myanmar (informed by its larger Go Out Strategy) is the most effective way for Beijing to manage the challenges that come from strategic engagement with the country.52 Cheng Xiafeng of China Radio International also writes that economic exchange is the most appropriate means for China of ensuring Naypyidaw’s continued cooperation during the country’s ongoing political transition and foreign policy realignment.53

Lao PDR Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 The 2000 MFA ‘Joint Statement Concerning Bilateral Cooperation between China and Lao PDR’ outlines China’s intent to ‘resume and develop’ (huifu he fazhan) ties with Lao PDR. Article 4 of the joint statement detailed the economic component of the two states’ agreed-upon bilateral framework and was, in contrast to the statement’s vague calls for government-to-government cooperation, by far its most developed component. Containing four subpoints, Article 4 announced the two states’ intentions to build an economic relationship based on Chinese investment in the country’s mining and agricultural sectors, expansion of trade between the two states, cooperation on labour issues, and expanded tourism between the China’s reliance on economic exchange 49 two countries.54 The statement’s Article 9 also outlined plans for economic cooperation between the two states as part of a ‘Four Corners’ (sijiao) economic cooperation scheme including China, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Thailand and as part of a wider Mekong regional economic cooperation plan including China, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam. One can also observe the prominence of economic exchange between the two states in the 2006 ‘Sino-Lao PDR Joint Declaration’, which outlines economic cooperation between the two states in a similar fashion to the 2000 statement. Like the 2000 statement, the 2006 statement devoted a disproportionate amount of text to economic cooperation between the two states, particularly in relation to statements concerning cooperation between the two governments on non-economic matters. The 2006 statement reiterated the type and fashion of economic cooperation between the two states, almost all of which is dependent on China’s largess and willingness to continue investment in and development of Lao PDR’s domestic economy.55 So did the 2014 ‘Sino-Lao PDR Joint New Communiqué’ preference Chinese investment and involvement in Lao PDR’s infrastructure development, agriculture, and natural resource sector as an overall contributor to Sino-Lao PDR cooperation in non-economic fields including education, culture, and public health.56 China’s top leadership also raise China’s contribution to Lao PDR’s economic growth and economic cooperation between the two states as a centre of gravity for greater cooperation between the two states. In 2013, Xi Jinping met with Lao president Choummaly Sayasone in Beijing and spoke about the need to ‘enrich’ (fengfu) relations between the two states through party-to-party and state-to-state relations enabled by deeper cooperation within the two countries’ economic spheres. Xi in particular noted bilateral cooperation in infrastructure and agricultural development.57 Premier Li Keqiang similarly talked of China’s need to expand its presence in Lao PDR’s trade portfolio and its investment in and construction of infrastructure in Lao PDR to expand state relations.58 In late 2014 and early 2015, China’s ambassador to Lao PDR, Guan Huabing, and MOFCOM assistant minister Gao Yan adopted similar language to describe the economic dimension of Sino-Lao PDR relations and its centrality in ensuring continued ties between the states.59 Fang Yi of the Yunnan Academy of Social Science argues that economic cooperation between the two states – primarily driven by Chinese investment, Chinese-origination trade, and Chinese involvement in infrastructure development in Lao PDR – is Beijing’s principal means of maintaining good relations Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 with Vientiane.60 Fang writes that China’s continued use of economic exchange to drive state-to-state relations is a great success for China’s diplomatic approach to the country and a cornerstone for future, deeper bilateral relations. Guo Jiguang of the Chinese Academy of Social Science also concludes that China’s economic presence in Lao PDR – established primarily through the presence and activities of its firms in the country – has contributed (and continues to contribute) to close relations between the two countries’ respective governments.61 For Guo, Chinese involvement in Lao PDR’s economy through trade, investment, and commercial activity provides the basis for the two states’ overall bilateral relations. 50 China’s reliance on economic exchange

Mongolia China’s use of economic means to secure its strategic and diplomatic ends is nowhere clearer than in relation to Mongolia. First outlined in the 2003 ‘Sino-Mongolian Joint Statement’, China has consistently pointed to its use of investment in Mongolia’s mineral sector, its provision of aid/loans for construction of infrastructure in the country, its involvement in Mongolia’s financial industries, and its market for Mongolian exports as the primary drivers of the two states’ bilateral relations. The 2003 statement, for example, focused exclusively on economic cooperation between the two states as the foundation for further cooperation on issues such as culture and education.62 This prioritisation of economic linkages continued in the 2005 ‘Sino-Mongolian Joint Statement’, where both sides specifically noted that economic cooperation was the most important component (zhongyao zucheng bufen) of the two states’ strategic partnership.63 As with the 2003 statement, the 2005 statement defined economic cooperation in terms of China’s investment in Mongolia’s mineral sector, China’s contribution to infrastructure development, and trade between the two states. The 2011 ‘Joint Statement on the Establishment of a Strategic Partnership between China and Mongolia’ continued prioritising economic exchange over government, cultural, or education exchange despite its more developed treatment of state relations. The 2011 statement, for example, does reference the importance of government and leadership cooperation and exchange but treats such cooperation cursorily compared to its description of economic relations.64 As with the 2005 statement, the 2011 statement identified economic cooperation between the two states providing an ‘enduring force’ (chijiu dongli) for the Sino-Mongolian bilateral relationship. One can equally observe Beijing’s clear preference for economic exchange with Mongolia in senior Chinese leaders’ statements regarding the bilateral relationship. Sun Weiren, commercial attaché to Mongolia, noted in 2014 that China’s investment in Mongolia has been central to China’s good neighbour approach to Mongolia. Sun stated that Chinese investment to Mongolia has been responsible for many developments within Mongolia and, as such, is a basis for greater relations between the two states.65 The Chinese ambassador to Mongolia, Wang Xiaolong, has also highlighted China’s contribution to economic development in Mongolia as a cornerstone of China’s overall diplomatic approach. In 2014, Wang wrote that the economic dimension of the two states’ relations provides a platform for wider engagement on non-economic issues.66 More importantly, President Xi Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 Jinping noted in 2014 that China’s approach to Mongolia was based on a ‘holy trinity’ (sange yiti) of economic policies including continued Chinese investment in Mongolia’s mining, Chinese involvement in infrastructure development in Mongolia, and Chinese-Mongolian cooperation in finance.67 Xi further called on Mongolia to participate in China’s proposed Silk Road Economic Belt so as to further expand the two countries’ ties. Scholarship on China’s diplomacy toward Mongolia and Sino-Mongolian relations also identifies China’s ability to influence Mongolia’s economic development as the primary means through which Beijing is able to advance its relations China’s reliance on economic exchange 51 with Ulaanbaatar and ensure its strategic interests vis-à-vis the country. Li Dajun and Zhang Jianping of China’s National Defence University and Wang Xin of Qingdao University, for example, write that China uses economic ties with Mon- golia as a way of drawing the country close to China so as to mitigate the effects of its ‘multidirectional’ (duo zhidian) foreign policy approach.68 Li, Zhang, and Wang argue that Mongolia’s outreach to states like the United States and Japan lessens China’s influence and that China should use further economic exchange to ensure its continued influence within the state. Ma Liguo from the Inner Mon- golia University of Technology – one of China’s most prominent writers on Sino-Mongolian relations – argues that China should deepen its economic ties with Mongolia to ensure Ulaanbaatar’s willingness to protect China’s security interests in the country and in Northeast Asia in general.69

Economic exchange and asymmetry: contributing to structural power and structural violence One can observe two commonalities in the official and non-official statements and/or literature examined above that reinforce this volume’s central contention that China relies on economic exchange with its periphery states that is inherently asymmetric. First, Chinese official pronouncements, whether issued by the MFA, MOFCOM, or Chinese senior leadership, uniformly privilege economic over other types of exchange. Statements calling on China and its partner states to engage in government or leadership exchange, for example, are exceedingly vague in form compared to the far more detailed references to cooperation across the economic sphere. Moreover, while the specificity of government exchanges does vary from statement to statement and from country to country, the large majority of such texts are standardised to the extent they simply repeat China’s conditions that its partner state accept a One China policy (which includes Taiwan, the XUAR, and TAR), not allow any third party to engage in activities within its territories directed against China, and pledge to respect China’s sovereignty, independence, and system of governance (together with China’s reciprocal promise). Statements on economic cooperation, in contrast, are more specific, considering the state of affairs (whether in early documents that establish relations or later texts that establish strategic partnerships) and the nature of economic cooperation between the two states. Similarly, discussion of economic cooperation between China and its partner Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 state always precedes discussion of non-economic cooperation on issues such as culture, education, and people-to-people relations. Indeed, cooperation within these non-economic spheres is largely predicated on established, sustained, and deepened economic cooperation between the two states. This privileging of economic cooperation and exchange is so routinely observable within China’s official documents and Chinese leaders’ speeches that one begins to feel mention of cooperation in culture, education, and through people is largely an afterthought within China’s bilateral relations; an aspect of state-to-state exchange that, while desirable, is also secondary. 52 China’s reliance on economic exchange Second, the type of economic interaction referenced in Chinese statements and scholarship is inherently asymmetric in nature. China’s call for ‘common’ or ‘joint’ development, in this respect, is largely a mischaracterisation of the type of economic exchange that takes place between China and its partner states, as demonstrated in detail in this volume’s subsequent case studies. Much economic cooperation as described in China’s policy statements depends, for instance, on Chinese investment to the state, Chinese financing and development of latent resources within the state, Chinese exports to the state, and China’s imports of the state’s goods, specifically natural resources. As such, the ties that Chinese documents and speeches refer to, while often ‘win-win’ from both states’ perspectives, are inherently unequal in that China supplies capital, technical expertise, and labour while its partner state supplies only natural resources. The asymmetric nature of economic exchange – observable in all the documents outlined above – is, in turn, the source of China’s power over the state’s domestic structures and a contributing factor in structural violence with the states. Chapters 3–10 detail the cause and effect between asymmetric economic exchange, structural power, and structural violence in China’s relations with Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nepal, Myanmar, Lao PDR, and Mongolia.

Notes 1 ‘Zhonghua renmin gongheguo he Ji’erjisi gongheguo mulin youhao hezuo tiaoyue’ (Treaty of Good Neighbour Cooperation between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of Kyrgyzstan), The National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China (2002), http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2003-06/12/content_5315452.htm. 2 ‘Zhonghua renmin gongheguo he Ji’erjisi gongheguo guanyu jianli zhanlue huoban guanxi de lianhe xuanyan’ (Joint Statement on the Establishment of Strategic Part- nership Relations between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of Kyr- gyzstan), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (2013), http:// www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/zyxw_602251/t1075614.shtml. 3 ‘Ji’erjisi jiji zhichi Zhongguo jianshe sichou zhilu jingji dai de changyi’ (Kyr- gyzstan Energetically Supports China’s Plan to Develop the Silk Road Economic Belt), Economic and Commercial Counsellor’s Office of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of Kyrgyzstan (2014), http://kg.mofcom.gov.cn/article/zxhz/ sbfw/201407/20140700668818.shtml; ‘Ji’erjisi xi dali tuidong ji-zhong jingji hezuo de fazhang’ (Kyrgyzstan Wishes to Energetically Push Forward with Mutual Economic Development with China), Economic and Commercial Counsellor’s Office of the Peo- Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 ple’s Republic of China in the Republic of Kyrgyzstan (2014), http://kg.mofcom.gov. cn/article/zxhz/sbfw/201407/20140700668820.shtml. 4 ‘Zhu Ji’erjisisitan dashi Qi Dayu zai Renmin Ribao “dashi suibi zhuanlan fabiao shuming wenzhang “Zhong-Ji youhao hezuo zhi fan xie mao” ’ (Chinese Ambas- sador to Kyrgyzstan Qi Dayu publishes an ‘Ambassador’s essay’ on the benefice of Sino-Kyrgyz Friendship Cooperation in the People’s Daily), The Embassy of the Peo- ple’s Republic of China in the Kyrgyz Republic (2014), http://kg.chineseembassy.org/ chn/zjgx/t1157389.htm. 5 Huang Fojun and Zhang Yongming, ‘Ji’erjisisitan boyi jiegou yu woguo jingji weidu celue xuanze’ (Deconstructing the Contest for Kyrgyzstan and China’s Option of an Economic Strategy), Xinjiang daxue xuebao 40, No. 1 (2012), 107. China’s reliance on economic exchange 53 6 Sun Shiwei, ‘Ji’erjisisitan jingji zhuanxing zhong touzi huanjing ji Zhongguo dui ta touzi qianjing fenxi’ (Kyrgyzstan’s Investment Environment during Its Economic Transformation and an Analysis of China’s Future Investment Prospects), Xi’an Cai- jing Xueyuan Xuebao 27, No. 1 (2014), 14. 7 Zhou Lihua, ‘Zhongguo (xinjiang) yu Ji’erjisisitan ziben liudong de fazhan yu tezheng yanjiu’ (A Study of the Characteristics of the Development of China [Xinjiang] Capital Flows with Kyrgyzstan), Xinjiang caijing daxue 3 (2014), 122–23. 8 ‘Zhongguo he Tajikesitan qianshu mulin youhao hezuo tiaoyue’ (China and Tajikistan Sign a Friendly Neighbour Cooperation Treaty), Xinhua (2007), http://news.xinhuanet. com/politics/2007-01/15/content_5610191.htm. 9 ‘Zhongguo he Tajikesitan guanyu jianli zhanlue huoban guanxi de lianhe xuanyan’ (Joint Statement on the Establishment of a Strategic Partnership between China and Tajikistan), The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China (2013), http://www.gov.cn/ldhd/2013-05/20/content_2406817.htm. 10 ‘Zhongguo remin gongheguo he Tajikesitan gongheguo guanyu jinyibu fazhan he shenhua zhanlue huoban guanxi de lianhe xuanyan’ (Joint Statement on the Contin- ual Development and Deepening of Strategic Partner Relations between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of Tajikistan), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (2014), http://www.mfa.gov.cn/mfa_chn/zyxw_602251/ t1190872.shtml. 11 ‘Xi Jinping chufang Tajikesitan jiang qianshu jingmao deng hezuo wenjian’ (Xi Jin- ping Will Travel to Tajikistan and Sign an Economic and Trade Cooperative Agree- ment), Sina (2014), http://finance.sina.com.cn/china/20140909/200820246464.shtml. 12 ‘Tajike jingmao buzhang biaoshi zhongguo touzi you liyu ta jingji fazhang’ (Tajik- istan Minister of Trade Says Chinese Investment Is Beneficial for Tajikistan’s Eco- nomic Development), Economic and Commercial Counsellor’s Office of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of Tajikistan (2015), http://tj.mofcom.gov.cn/arti cle/jmxw/201501/20150100882824.shtml; ‘Zhongguo shi Tajikesitan di er da maoyi huoban’ (China Is Tajikistan’s Second Largest Trading Partner), Economic and Com- mercial Counsellor’s Office of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of Tajikistan (2015), http://tj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/jmxw/201501/20150100883860. shtml; ‘Zhongguo yu Tajike shuangbian maoyi e jixu baochi kuaisu zengzhang shitou, Zhongguo dui Ta maoyi shuncha zhubu la da’ (China and Tajikistan’s Bilateral Trade Continues to Rapidly Grow, China’s Trade Surplus Continues to Grow), Economic and Commercial Counsellor’s Office of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of Tajikistan (2015), http://tj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/sqfb/201412/20141200820800. shtml. 13 ‘Zhu Tajikesitan dashi Fan Xianrong zai 2015 nian xinchun zhaodaihui shang de zhici’ (Chinese Ambassador to Tajikistan Fan Xianrong Makes a Speech at the 2015

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 New Year’s Reception), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (2015), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/dszlsjt_602260/t1233124.shtml. 14 Zhou Lihua, ‘Zhongguo he Tajikesitan shuangbian maoyi fazhan qushi yanjiu’ (Research on the Growing Trend of Bilateral Economic and Trade between China and Tajikistan), Cooperative Economy and Science No. 420 (2014), 47. 15 Ye Zhixin and Zhou Lihua, ‘Zhongguo dui Tajikesitan zhijie touzi de maoyi xiaoying shizheng fenxi’ (An Empirical Analysis of Trade Effect of China’s Direct Investment on Tajikistan), Finance and Economics of Xinjiang No. 6 (2010), 77. 16 Xu Haiyan, ‘Wei Yuji: 2012 nian Tajikesitan guojia fazhan pingshu’ (Crisis and Chance: Comment on National Development of Tajikistan in 2012), Journal of Xinji- ang Normal University Vol. 34, No. 4 (2013), 55–56. 54 China’s reliance on economic exchange 17 Shi Jing and Chen Kexu, ‘Zhongguo yuanzhu Tajikesitan yanjiu’ (A Research on Chi- na’s Foreign Aid to Tajikistan), Journal of Xinjiang University No. 4 (2012), 97. 18 ‘Zhongguo renmin gongheguo he Afuhan yisilan gongheguo mulin youhao hezuo tiaoyu’ (Treaty of Friendly Neighbour Cooperation between the People’s Republic of China and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan), The National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China (2006), http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2006-12/06/ content_5354924.htm. 19 ‘Zhongguo yu Afuhan fabiao lianhe shengming’ (China and Afghanistan Publish a Joint Statement), Xinhua, June 20, 2006, http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2006-06/ 20/content_4723358.htm. 20 ‘Zhongguo renmin gongheguo yu Afuhan yisilan gongheguo guanyu jianli zhanlue hezuo huoban guanxi de lianhe xuanyan’ (Joint Statement on the Establishment of Strategic Cooperative Partnership between the People’s Republic of China and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan), Xinhua, 8 June 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/ politics/2012-06/08/c_112158605.htm. 21 ‘Zhongguo renmin gongheguo yu Afuhan yisilan gongheguo guanyu shenhua zhanlue hezuo huoban guanxi de lianhe shengming’ (Joint Statement on the Deepening of Stra- tegic Cooperative Partnership between the People’s Republic of China and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan), Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (2013), http://af.china-embassy.org/chn/zagx/wxzl/t1088793. htm; ‘Zhongguo renmin gongheguo yu Afuhan yisilan gongheguo guanyu shenhua zhanlue hezuo huoban guanxi de lianhe shengming’ (Joint Statement on the Deepening of Strategic Cooperative Partnership between the People’s Republic of China and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Repub- lic of China (2014), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/ziliao_611306/1179_611310/ t1205144.shtml. 22 ‘Xi Jinping: Shenhua Zhongguo he Afuhan liangguo zhanlue hezuo huoban guanxi’ (Xi Jinping: Deepen China and Afghanistan’s Strategic Partnership), The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China (2013), http://www.gov.cn/ ldhd/2013-09/27/content_2496819.htm. 23 Zhang Qiaosu, ‘Li Keqiang: zai Afuhan wenti Yisitanbu’er Jincheng di sici waizhang hui kaimushi shang de jianghua’ (Li Keqiang: Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the Fourth Foreign Minister’s Meeting on the Afghanistan Problem in Istanbul), Xinhua, October 31, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2014-10/31/c_1113065585.htm. 24 ‘Li Keqiang tong Afuhan shouxi zhixingguan Abudula hu hedian qingzhu liangguo jianjiao 60 zhounian ji “Zhong-A youhao hezuo nian” ’ (Li Keqiang and Chief Executive Officer Abdulla Exchange Congratulatory Telegrams to Celebrate the 60th Anniversary of the Establishment of the Two Countries’ Diplomatic Relations and Announce the ‘Year of Sino-Afghan Friendly Cooperation’), Ministry of Foreign

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (2015), http://www.mfa.gov.cn/mfa_chn/ zyxw_602251/t1229843.shtml. 25 ‘Zhu Afuhan dashi Deng Xijun zai “Zhong-A guanxi weilai fazhan” yantaohui shang de jiangghua’ (Chinese Ambassador to Afghanistan Deng Xijun Speaks at a ‘Future of Sino-Afghan Relations’ Seminar), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (2014), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/dszlsjt_602260/t1210593.shtml. 26 Liu Zhongmin and Fan Peng, ‘Zhongguo dui Afuhan chongjian de waijiao canyu’ (China’s Diplomatic Involvement in the Reconstruction of Afghanistan), Asia and Africa Review No. 1 (2015), 12–17. China’s reliance on economic exchange 55 27 He Ming, ‘Afuhan zhongjian yu Zhongguo de zhanlue anquan’ (Rebuilding of Afghan- istan and Strategic Security of China), Indian Ocean Economics and Political Review No. 1 (2014), 60. 28 Zhang Jiafei and Hou Yawen, ‘Zhongguo yuanzhu Afuhan heping chongjian tanxi’ (China’s Aiding Measures to Afghanistan Peaceful Reconstruction), Journal of Xinji- ang University No. 4 (2014), 97. 29 ‘Zhongguo Bajisitan qianshu Zhong-Ba mulin youhao hezuo tiaoyue’ (China and Pakistan Sign a Sino-Pakistan Treaty on Sino-Pakistan Friendly Neighbour Coopera- tion), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (2006), http://www. fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/ziliao_611306/tytj_611312/tyfg_611314/t229431.shtml. 30 ‘Zhongguo zhongshi yu Ba jingji hezuo jiang jiji shangtao jian liangguo zimaoqu’ (China Attaches Importance to Economic Cooperation with Pakistan and Will Estab- lish a Free Trade Area between the Two Countries), China News, April 5, 2005, http:// news.china.com/zh_cn/domestic/945/20050405/12217301.html. 31 ‘Zhongguo-Bajisitan jingmao hezuo wu nian fazhan guihua: xiangmu shishi guicheng’ (Sino-Pakistan Economic Cooperation Five Year Plan: Plans for Project Implementa- tion), Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China (2007), http://www. mofcom.gov.cn/article/h/redht/200704/20070404613907.shtml. 32 ‘Zhongguo renmin gongheguo he Bajisitan yisilan gongheguo lianhe shengming’ (Joint Statement from the People’s Republic of China and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (2010), http:// www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/ziliao_611306/1179_611310/t779373.shtml. 33 ‘Zhongguo renmin gongheguo he Bajisitan yisilan gongheguo guanyu shenhua Zhong-Ba zhanlue yu jingji hezuo de lianhe shengming’ (Joint Statement by the Peo- ple’s Republic of China and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the Deepening of the Two Countries’ Strategic Relations), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Repub- lic of China (2014), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/ziliao_611306/1179_611310/ t1130162.shtml. 34 Di Lei, ‘Li Keqiang yanjiang: ruguo ni ai Zhongguo ye qing ni ai Bajisitan’ (Li Keqiang Lectures: If You Love China, I Ask That You Also Love Pakistan), Sohu (2013), http:// news.sohu.com/20130523/n376889297.shtml. 35 ‘Xi Jinping huijian Bajisitan zongli: zhong-Ba shi quantianhou zhanlue hezuo huoban’ (Xi Jinping Will Meet with Pakistan’s Prime Minister: China and Pakistan Are All-Weather Strategic Cooperative Partners), People’s Daily, November 8, 2014, http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2014/1108/c70731-25995976.html. 36 Shen Dingli, ‘Fazhan xin hijie Zhongguo yu Bajisitan de zhanlue guanxi’ (Developing Sino-Pakistan Strategic Relationship in the New Century), South Asian Studies Quar- terly No. 2 (2011), 5. 37 Zhang Guihong, ‘Bajisitan de zhanlue diwei yu Zhong-Ba guanxi de weilai’ (Paki-

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 stan’s Strategic Position and the Future of Sino-Pakistan Relations) South Asian Stud- ies Quarterly No. 2 (2011), 16. 38 ‘Zhong-Ba zhanlue hezuo de dianfan: Kalakunlun gonglu’ (A Symbol of the Sino-Pakistani Strategic Cooperation: The Karakoram Highway), South Asian Studies No. 2 (2011), 30. 39 ‘Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo he Nibo’er fabiao lianhe shenming’ (The Peo- ple’s Republic of China and Nepal Issue a Joint Declaration), Embassy of the Peo- ple’s Republic of China in the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal (2012), http:// np.chineseembassy.org/chn/zt/wenjiabaovisitnepal20120114/t895814.htm. 56 China’s reliance on economic exchange 40 ‘2012 nian Zhong-Ni jingji jishu hezuo xieding’ (2012 Sino-Nepal Agreement on Eco- nomic and Technology Cooperation), Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal (2012), http://np.mofcom.gov.cn/article/zxhz/ sbmy/201203/20120308020050.shtml. 41 ‘Wu chuntai dashi zai Ni-Zhong xiehui juban de Zhong-Ni jianjiao 58 zhounian jinian huodong shang de jianghua’ (Ambassador Wu Chuntai Speaks at an Event Marking the 58th Anniversary of the Establishment of Sino-Nepal Diplomatic Relations at the Nepal-China Association), Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal (2013), http://np.chineseembassy.org/chn/zngxs/zyyj/t1076506.htm. 42 ‘Nibo’er zhuhua dashi guanzhu zhengfu gongzuo baogao JI Naru “yi dai, yi lu” guihua’ (Nepalese Ambassador to China Publishes Work Report Expressing Desire to Join the ‘One Belt, One Road’ Project), Huanqiu, March 6, 2015, http://world.huanqiu. com/hot/2015-03/5831781.html. 43 Huang Zhengduo and Li Yan, ‘Zhongguo-Nibo’er jingmao hezuo: xianzhuang, wenti yu duice’ (China-Nepal Economic and Trade Cooperation: Present Situation, Prob- lems, and Countermeasures), South Asian Studies Quarterly No. 4 (2010), 70. 44 Lan Jianxue, ‘21 shiji de Zhongguo-Nibo-er guanxi: guojia liyi de shijiao’ (21st Cen- tury Sino-Nepal Relations: National Interest and Perspectives), South Asia Research (2009), 26. 45 Li Tao and Dai Yonghong, ‘Nibo’er zhengju yu Zhongguo de celue xuanze’ (Political Situation in Nepal and China’s Policy Options), South Asian Studies Quarterly No. 3 (2010), 32. 46 ‘Zhongguo yu Miandian guanyu jianli quanmian zhanlue hezuo huoban guanxi de lianhe shengming’ (China-Myanmar Joint Statement on the Establishment of a Com- prehensive Strategic Partnership Relationship), Xinhua, May 28, 2011, http://news. xinhuanet.com/world/2011-05/28/c_121467764.htm. 47 ‘Zhonghua renmin gongheguo yu Miandian Lianbang gonogheguo guanyu shenhua liangguo quanmian zhanlue hezuo de lianhe shengming’ (Joint Statement on the Deep- ening of Bilateral Comprehensive Strategic Cooperation between the People’s Repub- lic of China and the Republic of Myanmar), People’s Daily, November 14, 2014, http:// politics.people.com.cn/n/2014/1114/c1001-26026898.html. 48 ‘Cujin Dongya gongtong fazhan tisheng Zhong-Mian zhanlue hezuo’ (Promote East Asian Common Development, Increase Sino-Myanmar Strategic Cooperation), Minis- try of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (2014), http://www.fmprc.gov. cn/mfa_chn/dszlsjt_602260/t1214691.shtml. 49 ‘Li Keqiang quanmian tisheng Zhong-Mian zhanlue hezuo shuiping’ (Li Keqiang: Comprehensively Raise the Level of Sino-Myanmar Strategic Cooperation), Caijing (2014), http://www.caixin.com/2014-11-14/100751398.html. 50 ‘Zhong-Mian zhengzhi jingji guanxi: zhanlue yu jingji de cengmian’ (Sino-Burmese

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 Political and Economic Relations: Strategic and Economic Dimensions), Southeast Asian Affairs No. 1 (2005), 39. 51 Liu Wu, ‘Miandian weilai waijiao zhengce zouxiang yiji Zhong-Mian guanxi’ (Bur- ma’s Future Foreign Policy and Sino-Burma Relations), Journal of Zunyi Normal Col- lege No. 1 (2008), 14. 52 Li Zhonglin, ‘Xin shiqi Zhongguo zai Miandian de zhanlue liyi yj tiaozhan’ (China’s Strategic Interests and Challenge in Burma in New Era), Journal of Jiangnan Social University No. 2 (2011), 29. 53 Chen Xiafeng, ‘Miandian gaige dui Zhong-Mian guanxi de yingxiang ji Zhongguo de duice’ (Impacts on Sino-Myanmar Relations in Light of Myanmar’s Reforms and China’s Countermeasures), Southeast Asian Studies No. 1 (2013), 45–46. China’s reliance on economic exchange 57 54 ‘Zhonghua remin gongheguo he Laowu renmin minshu gongheguo guanyu shuangbian hezuo de lianhe shengming’ (Joint Statement by the People’s Republic of China and the Lao Democratic People’s Republic Regarding Bilateral Cooperation), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (2000), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ mfa_chn/ziliao_611306/1179_611310/t11289.shtml. 55 ‘Zhong-Lao lianhe shengming’ (Sino-Lao Joint Statement), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (2006), http://www.mfa.gov.cn/chn//pds/ziliao/1179/ t280885.htm. 56 ‘Zhonghua renmin gongheguo he Laowo renmin minshu gongheguo lianhe xinwen gongbao’ (Joint News Announcement by the People’s Republic of China and Lao Peo- ple’s Democratic Republic), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (2014), http://www.mfa.gov.cn/chn//gxh/zlb/smgg/t1146234.htm. 57 ‘Xi Jinping: fengfu he fazhanzhong Lao quanmian zhanlue hezuo huoban guanxi’ (Xi Jinping: Enrich and Develop a Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership Relationship with Lao), The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China (2013), http://www.gov.cn/ldhd/2013-09/26/content_2495893.htm. 58 ‘Li Keqiang: Shenhua Zhong-Lao guanxi yu wushi hezuo cujin Zhongguo-Dongmeng guanxi fazhan’ (Li Keqiang: Deepen Sino-Lao Relations and Pragmatically Work Together to Advance Sino-ASEAN Relations), Xinhua, September 26, 2013, http:// news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013-09/26/c_117526264.htm. 59 ‘Zhu Laowo shiguan juxing 2015 nian xinchun zhaodaihui’ (China’s Console General to Lao PDR Attends a 2015 New Year’s Reception), Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Lao People’s Republic (2015), http://la.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/ t1236981.htm; ‘Zhong-Lao jingmao hezuo weiyuanhui di liu ci huiyi zai Beijing zha- okai’ (Sino-Lao Trade Cooperation Committee’s 6th Meeting Is Held in Beijing), Eco- nomic and Commercial Counsellor’s Office of the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the People’s Democratic Republic of Laos (2014), http://la.mofcom.gov.cn/ article/jmxw/201407/20140700677995.shtml. 60 Fang Yun, ‘Laowo quanfangwei waijiao zhengce yu Lao-Zhong guanxi’ (Comprehen- sive Foreign Policy of Laos and the Relationship between China and Laos), Southeast Asian and South Asian Studies No. 2 (2011), 18. 61 Guo Jiguang, ‘Zhongguo qiye dui Laowo de zhijie touzi jiqi yingxiang’ (The Direct Investment of Chinese Enterprises in Lao PDR and Its Impact), Southeast Asian Stud- ies No. 5 (2013), 39. 62 ‘Zhong-Meng fabiao lianhe shengming’ (China and Mongolia Issue a Joint State- ment), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (2003), http:// www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/ziliao_611306/1179_611310/t23680.shtml. 63 ‘Zhonghua remin gongheguo yu Mengguguo lianhe shengming’ (Joint Statement from the People’s Republic of China and Mongolia), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 the People’s Republic of China (2005), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/ziliao_ 611306/1179_611310/t223799.shtml. 64 ‘Zhonghua renming gongheguo he Mengguguo jianli zhanlue huoban guanxxi de lianhe shengming’ (Joint Statement on the Establishment of a Strategic Partnership between the People’s Republic of China and Mongolia), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (2011), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/ziliao_ 611306/1179_611310/t831612.shtml. 65 ‘Sun Weiren: Zhongguo qiye touzi Mengguguo de jidian sikao’ (Sun Weiren: Reflec- tions on Chinese Investment in Mongolia), Economic and Commercial Counsellor’s Office of the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Mongolia (2014), http:// mn.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztdy/201411/20141100790312.shtml. 58 China’s reliance on economic exchange 66 ‘Zhu Menggu dashi Wang Xiaolong zai Zhong-Meng jianjiao 65 zhounian zhaodaihui shang de zhici’ (Chinese Ambassador to Mongolia, Wang Xiaolong, Makes a Speech at an Event Marking the 65th Anniversary of Sino-Mongolian Diplomatic Ties), Minis- try of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (2014), http://www.fmprc.gov. cn/mfa_chn/dszlsjt_602260/t1201681.shtml. 67 ‘Xi jinping fang Meng qianzhan: jingmao hezuo “santi yiti” shusong fazhan hongli’ (Xi Jinping’s Thoughts Prior to Visiting Mongolia: The ‘Holy Trinity’ of Economic Cooperation Will Lead to Development Benefits), People’s Daily, August 18, 2014, http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2014/0818/c1001-25489403.html. 68 Li Dajun, Zhang Jianping, and Wang Xin, ‘Mengguguo “duo zhidian” waijiao zhengce jiqi dui wo zhoubian anquan huanjing de yingxiang’ (Impact of Mongolia’s Multi-orientation Foreign Policy on the Security Situation of Chinese Northern Area), Northeast Asia Forum No. 2 (2005), 40. 69 Ma Liguo, ‘Mengguguo zai Zhongguo diyuan anquan zhanlue zhong de diwei’ (The Status of Mongolia in China’s Geopolitical Security Strategy), Journal of Radio and TV University No. 4 (2012), 60. Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 3 Sino-Kyrgyzstan relations

A progression of strongman leaders have undermined the political gains Kyr- gyzstan made in the early years of its independence from the former Soviet Union. Since the mid-1990s, Presidents Askar Akaev, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, and Almaz- bek Atambayev have worked to consolidate power in the office of the president by weakening the state’s other political institutions, particularly the parliament and the office of the prime minister. The three men have also repressed political opposition in the country by arguing that ‘Western’ democracy is unsuitable to Kyr- gyzstan’s particular social-cultural background and delegitimised the country’s civil society through target accusations that domestic organisations are colluding with and/or are controlled by Western intelligence agencies.1 Cronyism and corruption have replaced the country’s democratic institutions, and authoritarianism has overshadowed the country’s once robust parliamentary system.2 The modern Kyrgyz state is, as a result, deeply illegitimate and equally ineffective in providing social goods such as economic growth and security. Political pluralism in the country is nonexistent outside the scattering of small parties that either support the state or that the state keeps weak so as to avoid opposition.3 While President Almazbek Atambayev has pledged to leave power in 2016, he has surrounded himself with a coterie of political supporters who will in all likelihood continue the state down its authoritarian path. Kyrgyzstan is also one of the world’s poorest states, with a per capita gross national income (GNI) of $920 and an average poverty rate at the oblast (provincial) level of 33.1 per cent as of 2013.4 The country’s economy is largely dependent on natural resource exports, particularly gold, which results in unsteady growth tied to international demand and commodities prices. In 2014, for example, a drop Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 in external demand for gold led to decreased domestic production and a reduction of GDP growth from 10 per cent in 2013 to 3 per cent for the year. Industrial output consequently contracted 1.6 per cent and retail trade slowed from 8.8 per cent to 6.2 per cent. Kyrgyzstan is also dependent on remittances for 32 per cent of its GDP growth; a source of domestic wealth that declined sharply in response to Russia’s recession of 2014–15.5 Persistent high inflation in the state is a source of instability and has averaged 8.47 per cent per annum between 2003 and 2015.6 Taken together, these indicators suggest a fundamental weakness in Kyrgyzstan’s economy that adds to the country’s overall vulnerability. 60 Sino-Kyrgyzstan relations Indeed, both the country’s weak political and economic institutions directly contribute to social instability in Kyrgyzstan. Analysts largely agree, for example, that public concern over political illegitimacy, political ineffectiveness, corruption within the state, and economic stagnation were the primary drivers behind the 2005 Tulip Revolution that led to the ouster of Askar Akaev from power.7 Similarly, socially perceived corruption in the Bakiyev government and a hugely unpopular utility price hike provided the catalyst for the second Kyrgyz revolution in 2010.8 Public concern over cronyism and economic mismanagement continues with regard to the Almazbek Atambayev administration. The country’s disparate ethnic groups have responded by establishing alternative sources of political power at the sub-oblast level, many of which directly challenge the state’s sovereignty at the local levels.9 China’s presence in Kyrgyzstan has significantly expanded over the past two decades and is on track to grow in the near to medium terms. Beijing and Bishkek regularly sign cooperation agreements aimed at deepening ties and economic and security cooperation between the two states, which has increased year-on-year. China has seen a corresponding increase in its structural power over Kyrgyzstan’s political and economic institutions, and Kyrgyz elites have aligned their domestic priorities to suit China’s foreign policy pursuits. While beneficial in that China is a key foreign actor in helping Kyrgyzstan develop its economy, Chinese activities in the state, particularly around the mining and construction sectors, have also resulted in structural violence both within Kyrgyz society and between the Kyrgyz people and Bishkek.

Structural power at the systems level

Economic linkages While China is not Kyrgyzstan’s most important trade partner, China does occupy an increasingly prominent role in Kyrgyzstan’s overall trade profile, particularly in relation to the country’s imports. From 1995 to 2011, for example, China’s partner share of exports to Kyrgyzstan grew from 14.7 per cent to 38.7 per cent while Kazakhstan’s – Kyrgyzstan’s largest trading partner in 1995 – fell from 18.2 per cent to 8.5 per cent over the same period.10 In 2012 alone, Chinese exports to Kyrgyzstan grew 31.7 per cent, amounting to $1.2 billion. Conversely, China is not a major recipient of Kyrgyz exports, over 48 per cent Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 of which are gold. While China does receive the majority of Kyrgyzstan’s other natural resource exports such as copper, wool, and cotton, it receives only 2.4 per cent of Kyrgyzstan’s total exports, with 42.2 per cent going to Switzerland in 2012.11 China has, however, invested heavily in Kyrgyzstan’s mining sector with the intent of increasing imports of copper, coal, rare earths, and antimony from the country in the near term. Trade relations between the two states translate into Chinese structural power over Kyrgyzstan’s domestic economy in a number of ways. First, Kyrgyzstan’s textile and apparel sectors – the fastest-growing components of Kyrgyzstan’s Sino-Kyrgyzstan relations 61 economy over the past decade – have become dependent on cloth and fabric exports from China for continued growth. Much of the growth in Kyrgyzstan’s textile and apparel sectors comes from value-added manufacturing to imports from China.12 Second, trade with China has created a relationship of dependency in which Kyrgyzstan relies on Chinese goods for growth in the country’s commercial services sector. Kyrgyz traders have developed the commercial service sector around Chinese imports, which they then re-export to other Central Asian states and Russia. Without Chinese goods, Kyrgyzstan’s commercial services sector would collapse and the country would lose one of its most important sources of economic growth.13 Third, Kyrgyzstan’s reliance on exports from China has complicated the country’s ability to join the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Tripartite Customs Union (TCU), as Bishkek cannot afford to raise tariffs on Chinese goods in line with the Customs Union’s requirements. Kyrgyzstan’s failure to join the TCU will result in less trade between the state, Central Asia, and Russia and will lead to greater dependency on China.14 While China’s position in Kyrgyzstan’s overall trade is secondary, it is the country’s primary and most consistent provider of foreign direct investment. From 2001 to 2014, China provided anywhere from 23 to 40 per cent of all FDI into Kyrgyzstan.15 Between 1992 and 2012, China provided 12 per cent of all public investment in Kyrgyzstan, or about $1.7 billion, ranking it third after the World Bank and Asian Development Bank in terms of capital provided for public works development.16 To date, most of Chinese FDI has gone toward Kyrgyzstan’s mining and oil sectors, with notable projects such as the Taldy-Bulak Levoberezhnyy and Solton-Sary gold mines and the Kara-Balta oil refinery. In 2013, however, China announced it would provide $2.2 billion in FDI over four years for public infrastructure development, including $1.4 billion in FDI for a Kyrgyzstan-China oil pipeline.17 Chinese FDI provides the state with structural power over Kyrgyzstan in three ways. First, it allows for the expansion of Chinese firms and Chi- nese labour throughout the country, on which more is written later. Second, it establishes Chinese dominance over the country’s mining sector. Not only has Chinese-originating FDI allowed for Chinese control over some of the country’s most important mining sites, but FDI into infrastructure around the mining sector has also positioned Beijing to assume control over latent sites such as the Sandyk and Jetyn Suu deposits. As Chinese firms currently hold 60 per cent of all Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 licenses for exploration and development of Kyrgyz mineral deposits, Beijing’s structural power over this key economic sector is likely to grow in the near to medium terms.18 Third, Chinese FDI has allowed Beijing to establish a stran- glehold on Kyrgyzstan’s oil sector, both in terms of extraction and refinement. While providing Kyrgyzstan an alternative to Russian imports – thereby breaking an existing dependency – Chinese control over the country’s hydrocarbons provides Beijing with increased leverage and influence and prevents Bishkek from achieving the self-sufficiency it would achieve if it had domestic control over its hydrocarbon market.19 62 Sino-Kyrgyzstan relations State-owned enterprises/private enterprises in Kyrgyzstan Chinese enterprises – whether joint ventures, SOEs, or private firms – have established a dominant position across a range of Kyrgyzstan’s economic sectors. As of 2010, for example, there were more than three hundred Sino-Kyrgyz joint enterprises operating in the country within sectors including construction, manufacturing, and hydropower. As of 2014, more than one hundred Chinese firms operated within the country’s mining sector alone, the largest of which is the SOE-affiliated Zijin Mining group which operates the Taldy-Bulak Levobrejnyy mine.20 So are Chinese firms prominent in all four of Kyrgyzstan’s free economic zones, where Chinese FDI accounts for as much as 60 per cent of total foreign investment.21 Other notable semiprivate and private Chinese firms operating in Kyrgyzstan are the Chinese Full Gold Mining Company at the Ishtamberdy gold deposit, the ZTE Company and China Telecom in telecommunications, Czhunnen in the oil sector, and the China Road and Bridge Corporation in construction. Chinese merchants have also established a predominant position in Kyrgyzstan through their extensive trading networks. As a result, markets such as the Dordoi bazaar in Bishkek have become flooded with Chinese goods and Chinese hawk- ers, many of whom conduct their business in fluent Kyrgyz. Ethnic Hui Chinese now dominate truck transport between China and Kyrgyzstan – a situation that has led to riots in Kyrgyzstan as locals accuse the Chinese trucks of ruining roads and Chinese truckers of stealing jobs.22 China has developed structural power over Kyrgyzstan’s domestic development and domestic labour market through the presence of its firms and merchants. Chi- nese firms’ centrality in Kyrgyzstan’s mining and oil sectors, for instance, allows Beijing to dictate how and when certain sectors within the country’s domestic economy develop. Similarly, Chinese merchants’ monopoly over trade between the two states translates into an asymmetrical economic exchange in which the Chinese side shapes Kyrgyzstan’s domestic market and influences the country’s economic development. Relatedly, Chinese firms’ proclivity to use Chinese instead of Kyrgyz workers has led to Chinese structural power over the country’s labour market. At present, Chinese workers account for 72 per cent of all foreign workers in Kyrgyzstan. While there is no firm data on the total number of Chinese workers in the country, ministry officials believe the number to be around 100,000. Chinese workers’ presence has a particularly unsettling influence over the country’s labour situation, as

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 they are typically employed in work such as mining and construction and as Kyr- gyzstan’s unemployment rate was 8.4 per cent in 2013.23 The confluence of Chi- nese labour and unemployment in Kyrgyzstan contributes to the underdevelopment of Kyrgyzstan’s own labour forces through lost work and training opportunities.24

Ties between cores While the Kyrgyz elite maintained closer ties to the Russian Federation throughout the 1990s than with China, Bishkek’s new generation of leaders have realigned Sino-Kyrgyzstan relations 63 their preference based on China’s growing economic clout in Central Asia. For- mer prime minister Jantoro Satybaldiyev publicly called China Kyrgyzstan’s ‘only partner’ in 2013, arguing that Kyrgyzstan must accept whatever conditions China places on its investment in the country, as it was the only state willing to invest.25 More recently, Kyrgyz president Atambayev has energetically courted China as both an economic and political partner as Moscow’s economic influence in the country has waned.26 Atambayev has also gone out of his way to assure Chinese politicians and investors that Bishkek will act to secure Chinese investment in Kyrgyzstan in the face of mounting social concern over Chinese structural power.27 Bishkek has also pushed forward with projects China favours, such as a rail line connecting China to Uzbekistan through Kyrgyzstan and a natural gas pipeline between China and Kyrgyzstan, despite social unease over the projects and, in some cases, political opposition. China has developed its ties to the Kyrgyz elite for the sake of advancing its interests in the country. In this respect, China has purposefully sought the structural power it enjoys from elite-to-elite relations and is even suspected of having provided funding to Atambayev in support of his presidential bid.28 As with all China’s elite relation-based structural power, Beijing has managed to align its interests in Kyrgyzstan, which are access to minerals, energy, and markets, with the country’s leadership to the point where Bishkek supports China’s activity in the country despite public opposition.

Structural power at the state level

Security Chinese security concerns stemming from instability in the XUAR drive Sino-Kyrgyz security relations. For Beijing, Kyrgyzstan is an indispensable partner both in terms of its ability to secure the XUAR’s borders and to deal with ethnic Uyghur groups operating within Kyrgyzstan that promote separatism, radicalism, or terrorism in China. Kyrgyzstan has benefited from China’s need to secure Bishkek’s cooperation on security matters in terms of material support and intelligence sharing. Yet, as with other aspects of Sino-Kyrgyz relations, security cooperation between the two states – whether bilateral or under the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’s (SCO) auspices – is unequal. Indeed, examination of the two states’ relations clearly shows that Chinese priorities dominate and that Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 Beijing has developed structural power over Kyrgyzstan’s structures of security in that it drives Bishkek’s security priorities. Chinese structural power over Bishkek’s structures of security is most visible in Beijing’s push for the state to securitise potential sources of terrorism over its other, more salient domestic security concerns.29 While Kyrgyzstan does face a growing possibility of terrorist activity within the state, particularly in its south, political instability and inter-ethnic conflict both pose a far more immediate threat to Bishkek’s authority. Yet Chinese bilateral aid and military support in terms of bilateral joint exercises are aimed at raising terrorism to Bishkek’s top security 64 Sino-Kyrgyzstan relations priority.30 Where Bishkek has struggled with political instability or domestic instability in the past, Beijing has remained unwilling to intervene or provide the state with support.31 Beijing also focuses exclusively on counter-terrorism when dealing with Kyr- gyzstan within the SCO’s framework. SCO support of Bishkek during Kyrgyzstan’s 2010 spate of political instability, for example, was limited to the establishment of a Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS) in the country’s south with the intent of dealing with terrorism stemming from the state – hardly Bishkek’s greatest security concern at the time, but one of clear priority for China.32 Military and law enforcement exercises within the SCO involving China and Kyrgyzstan (whether bilaterally or multilaterally) also focus exclusively on counter-terror and border security. China’s one-sided focus on terrorism in Kyrgyzstan has led to the elevation of terrorism as Bishkek’s single most important security threat despite the presence of other real security concerns within the country and scant evidence of terrorism as an overwhelming threat in the state. That Bishkek has aligned its structures of security to China’s structural power is not surprising as, in doing so, it receives more support in the form of grants and material assistance. Chinese structural power also influences structures of security at the social level, albeit in entirely different ways. Among large portions of Kyrgyz society, the image of China as an expansionist, exploitative power is growing. In a 2012 poll of Kyrgyzstan’s foreign relations, more than 30 per cent of respondents identified China as a threat as opposed to 0 per cent who saw Russia as a threat, 3 per cent who saw Kazakhstan as a threat, and 4 per cent who viewed the European Union as a threat.33 Many Kyrgyz are concerned that China will leverage the structural power it has developed through its economic position to affect political change in the country in order to advance its own Central Asian agenda.34 Others equate the presence of Chinese workers in the country with economic colonisation. Main- stream newspapers in Kyrgyzstan such as Kyrgyztoday have called on young Kyr- gyz men to become ‘skinheads’ to drive the Chinese out of the country.35 One prominent Kyrgyz newspaper, the Jany Ordo, publicly accused the Chi- nese of coming to Kyrgyzstan to kidnap Kyrgyz children in order to eat them.36 The paper drew a line between missing Kyrgyz and perceived Chinese tastes for the exotic and rare, noting that foetuses or embryos have been central to Chinese medicine for thousands of years. Another common trope within Kyrgyz newspapers is that Chinese men are kidnapping, raping, and impregnating Kyrgyz Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 women. That major Kyrgyz newspapers, some with ties to prominent politicians, would publish such speculation speaks to the depth of fear within Kyrgyz society over the effect China’s structural power could have over the country’s security.

Finance China is the largest provider of concessional loans to Kyrgyzstan, accounting for more than 60 per cent of the country’s planned funding between 2013 and 2016.37 The majority of Chinese loans are designated for public infrastructure Sino-Kyrgyzstan relations 65 development, including a proposed north/south highway and a rail line that would connect China to Uzbekistan through Kyrgyzstan. While Chinese aid and loans to Kyrgyzstan have provided Bishkek opportunity to develop its internal infrastructure and industry, they have also led to the development of substantial Chinese structural power over the state’s domestic development priorities. The Chinese-proposed rail line connecting China and Uzbekistan through Kyrgyzstan is arguably the most salient example of this type of structural power. While Kyrgyz academics, pundits, civil society leaders, and opposition politicians have criticised the project as lacking overall beneficence for the country and have argued that China’s insistence the rail line use narrow gauges in line with its own domestic standard as opposed to the wider gauges used throughout Central Asia is a clear indication that Beijing has only its own interests in mind, Bishkek has embraced the controversial project.38 Beijing’s proposed ‘Resources for Investment’ scheme, which would require Bishkek to grant Chinese companies control over the Sandyk and Dzhetyn Suu deposits, valued at $15 billion and $100 billion respectively, in return for the $3 billion loan compounds the sense among many Kyrgyz that China will benefit disproportionately from the rail line’s construction. Closely related are the growing concerns around China’s structural power derived from loans made to the state’s mining sector. China has used loans to try to secure access to mining sites such as gold ore deposits in southern Jalalabad province and aluminium and iron deposits in central Naryn province in lieu of repayment.39 This trend raises concerns within Kyrgyzstan over the development of Chinese structural power related to loans and the country’s control over its mining sector.

Production Chinese structural power has developed over Kyrgyzstan’s production in three ways. First, Kyrgyz reliance on intermediary good imports from China for production of textiles and apparel provides China with influence over the state’s domestic industry and factors of production. Kyrgyz producers are now focused more on adding value to Chinese imports, which, while not detrimental to the country’s economic growth in and of itself, has contributed to a decline in the country’s manufacturing sector across certain sectors. More importantly for the sake of structural power, Kyrgyz producers are now dependent on Chinese goods for pro- Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 duction, many of which are of lesser quality than those produced previously by Kyrgyz vendors.40 Second, Chinese workers in Kyrgyzstan have a major influence over the state’s labour as a factor of production. According to official numbers from the Kyrgyz Ministry of Labour, Migration and Youth Affairs, Chinese nationals working in Kyrgyzstan account for 72 per cent of total foreign workers as of 2014.41 This percentage is likely far higher, however, as it does not account for the large number of illegal Chinese labour migrants who live and work in Kyrgyzstan. As Chinese companies prefer to hire Chinese workers for reasons ranging from work ethic 66 Sino-Kyrgyzstan relations to cultural affinity, Chinese labour in Kyrgyzstan has the effect of marginalising Kyrgyz labour and remitting wages from labour from Kyrgyzstan to China.42 Both outcomes have a negative structural power influence on the country’s production and have contributed to structural violence in the country. Third, Chinese investment in Kyrgyzstan’s oil and hydroelectric sectors, while driving development within those industries, has provided Chinese firms with control over the country’s energy production in a way that creates potential vulnerability for the state and society. Chinese SOEs such as Zhongda and China Petrochemical Corporation now control Kyrgyzstan’s major oil fields and the country’s oil refineries (built with Chinese FDI).43 Chinese companies like TBEA have provided 100 per cent financing through China’s Exim Bank for development of energy stations and power transition lines between China and Kyrgyzstan. China, through the SOE Sinohydro, has also committed $2 billion for the development of a series of hydropower plants that would increase the country’s current hydropower output by 25 per cent. While beneficial for the country in terms of access to much needed energy, China’s strategic hold over these assets creates structural power and leverage that it could use in future negotiations or for coercive measures.

Knowledge Chinese structural power over knowledge in Kyrgyzstan is expanding through concerted efforts on the Chinese government’s part and through indirect means of self-regulation on the Kyrgyz side. In terms of Chinese initiatives, the Chi- nese Ministry of Education has established two Confucius Institutes in Bishkek at Bishkek Humanities University and the Kyrgyz National University and has provided funding and teachers for a number of Chinese-language schools in the state’s capital. China also funds two travel placement programmes through the SCO and the Kyrgyzstan president’s office for Kyrgyz students to study Mandarin in China for one year. The costs China covers include travel, food, and tuition.44 China’s State Central Television has also established a Russian-language channel in Kyrgyzstan to provide a divergent perspective on regional news to those put forward by Russian-based media stations. To support the effort, the Chinese government provided 15,000 free digital TV receivers to various Kyrgyz residents.45 While some have welcomed these developments, other Kyrgyz politicians and scholars have warned against the threat such activity has to the state’s national Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 ideology and identity, arguing that the fact that Beijing funds and sponsors such developments points to a hidden agenda in line with cultural expansionism.46 In terms of Chinese structural power developed through indirect means, there are clear linkages between Chinese security priorities in Kyrgyzstan and the state’s approach to its ethnic Uyghur population. Most pronounced during the run-up to the 2008 Olympic Games, when Bishkek undertook internal security measures in support of China’s own domestic security approach to the XUAR, the state has time and time again discriminated against its Uyghur population in order to appease Chinese interests.47 While ethnic Uyghurs make up a small percentage of Sino-Kyrgyzstan relations 67 the country’s overall ethnic groups, government-sponsored targeting of the group for China’s sake undermines Kyrgyz national identity, which is an elemental part of the state’s knowledge base.

Structural violence Kyrgyzstan’s political instability and pervasive poverty have facilitated the mor- phing of Chinese structural power into structural violence across a number of domains. While this manifestation of Chinese influence over Kyrgyz economics, environment, society, and state/society relations does not preclude benefits the country receives from Chinese economic involvement, structural violence stemming from Chinese structural power is noteworthy as it plays an important role in Sino-Kyrgyz relations. Moreover, the linkage between Chinese structural power and structural violence in Kyrgyzstan closely fits with the model of bilateral relations in the other case studies this volume examines.

Economy China’s structural power contributes to structural violence within Kyrgyzstan’s domestic economy in terms of underdeveloped manufacturing and production and stagnant wages and unemployment. This is particularly true when examining Kyrgyzstan’s economic situation exclusive of the country’s gold sector, which is the driving force behind the country’s economic growth as of 2014 and is far less dependent on Chinese involvement than other industries.48 While Kyrgyzstan’s economy has made impressive gains since its 0.1 per cent contraction in 2012 – registering 10.5 per cent real GDP growth in 2013, for example – the country’s non-gold-related manufacturing has declined. Growth in the manufacturing of textiles, utilities, and the production of minerals other than gold fell from 6.1 per cent in 2012 to 3.5 per cent in 2013.49 This decline in non-gold-related manufacturing is in line with Kyrgyzstan’s overall post-1990 manufacturing sector development, which has yet to recover to its pre-1990 level of production. While it is neither possible nor fair to attribute Chinese imports of textiles and utilities with the country’s overall decline in manufacturing, these inexpensive imports’ market predominance – in some instances accounting for more than 85 per cent of goods available in key markets – is a contributing factor.50 A more direct relationship between Chinese structural power and structural Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 violence over Kyrgyzstan’s economic sector is the relationship between Chinese migrant workers and stagnant wages and unemployment in Kyrgyzstan. While estimates vary greatly, most experts believe the number of Chinese workers – both legal and illegal – in the country is around 100,000, which is significant for a country with a population of just under 5.6 million. As many of these Chi- nese migrant workers are unskilled, their presence in Kyrgyzstan has a downward effect on wages and displaces Kyrgyz from the local labour market.51 Such structural violence is all the more pronounced as the official unemployment rate among Kyrgyz is 8 per cent (with 37 per cent of respondents identifying themselves as 68 Sino-Kyrgyzstan relations unemployed in a 2012 public opinion survey) and as many as 500,000 Kyrgyz are forced to look for work outside the country each year in neighbouring states like Russia or Kazakhstan.52 Remittances from Chinese workers to China also remove value from Kyrgyzstan’s economy that would otherwise contribute to a growth in GDP through consumption.

Environment Unchecked, environmentally harmful industrial activity around the country’s mining sector has placed severe strain on Kyrgyzstan’s environmental sector. So has the country’s lack of an enforcement mechanism, political corruption, and the lowly political status of the country’s national environmental authority allowed for the expansion of other sorts of environmentally damaging activity. While an entirely domestic matter in terms of political and institutional weakness, Chinese firms – both state-affiliated and private – have contributed to structural violence in the country’s environmental sector through exploitative and polluting activity.53 More specifically, Chinese companies have taken advantage of Bishkek’s lack of an enforcement mechanism to engage in mining activities that result in exces- sive waste, such as mining gold with excavators and washing the ore by putting it through large metal sieves. Chinese firms have also used highly destructive methods for mining exploration, including the bulldozing and ploughing of pasture- lands and felling of trees. Chinese mining companies such as Tenlin have also dammed or diverted rivers in Kyrgyzstan for use in mining, leading, in at least one recorded instance at the Dzhetim Too mine in Naryn District, to crop failure and food shortages.54 While China is not alone in terms of foreign companies engaged in environmentally damaging activity in Kyrgyzstan, its centrality in the county’s mining sector means its activities result in a disproportionate amount of structural violence.

Society There are clear linkages between Chinese-resulting structural violence within Kyrgyzstan’s economic and environmental sectors and structural violence as it manifests itself in Kyrgyzstan’s society. Unemployment, low wages, and environmental degradation all have direct effects on individuals’ and groups’ quality of Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 life and contribute to a gap between their potential and actual circumstances. So as to avoid repetition, it is enough to acknowledge these spillover effects into social structural violence without further elaboration. China’s structural power is not, however, limited to these types of structural violence within Kyrgyzstan society. In addition to the economic and environmental factors, Chinese structural power also has severe negative effects on social stability and inter-ethnic relations. This structural violence is closely related to structural power China has developed through both its influence over sources of security and knowledge in Kyrgyzstan. Sino-Kyrgyzstan relations 69 First, fear of Chinese expansion, of Chinese illicit activities, and of Chinese targeting of children and women (however misinformed) has created instability in relations between Kyrgyz and Chinese migrants that has resulted in brawls and/ or riots at the local level. The clearest example of this took place in 2013 in the Uzgen District of the Osh Region when a mass fight broke out between Chinese and Kyrgyz workers over rumours a Chinese national attacked a Kyrgyz woman.55 Riot police responded to the incident, where a reported eighteen Chinese nationals were hospitalised, and clashed with the Kyrgyz workers. Similar events take place on a somewhat regular basis over issues ranging from labour disputes to traffic accidents involving Chinese migrants. Similarly, tensions between Kyrgyz and Chinese lorry drivers in Kyrgyzstan have resulted in fights, protests, and antiforeign sentiment. The effect of such conflict is greater instability within Kyrgyzstan, a country that is still attempting to recover from political and social violence in 2010. Tensions between Chinese and Kyrgyz in Kyrgyzstan serve as a destabilising trigger in this sense that could undermine already fragile internal social dynamics. Closely related is the issue of Chinese influence over Bishkek’s policies toward the country’s Uyghur population, earlier referenced in relation to China’s structural power over knowledge. As China has securitised activity within Kyrgyzstan it sees as posing a potential threat to stability in the XUAR, it has placed pressure on Bishkek to police Kyrgyzstan’s ethnic Uyghur population in a manner that dis- enfranchises them. While of limited issue with the Kyrgyz population writ large, this form of structural violence is pronounced for the country’s Uyghurs. On a different note is the issue of Chinese food imports of substandard quality – a reoccurring development in trade between the two states that contributes to structural violence as food insecurity. High-profile instances of Chinese imports of contaminated food to Kyrgyzstan include dairy products and baby formula laced with the industrial chemical melamine, flour containing the khapra beetle, and poultry infected with the H7T9 flu virus.56 Trade in food from China is widespread within the country’s informal economic sector, with concurring implications for the spread of structural violence.

State/society relations Disharmonised interests between Kyrgyz state/society toward China and the perception among Kyrgyz society that the state is corrupt and beholden to Chinese Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 interests are key to understanding the development of structural violence within state/society relations resulting from Chinese structural power. While Bishkek regularly intones China as the country’s most important partner on the international stage or highlights its positive role in the country’s economic development, Kyrgyz academics, pundits, and society regularly highlight China’s destructive qualities and openly worry about the effect China’s influence is having on the country’s economic, political, and cultural stability. Whereas Kyrgyz political elite see cooperation with China as an opportunity to diversify the state’s foreign relations, Kyrgyz society views the state’s ties with Beijing with suspicion and 70 Sino-Kyrgyzstan relations angst. This schism in perspectives between the state and society over Chinese influence is most evident in instances where the state supports Chinese involvement in controversial projects despite social opposition.57 Such projects include, but are not limited to, the rail line connecting China and Uzbekistan through Kyr- gyzstan, Chinese development of pollution-producing oil refineries, and Chinese control over the development of some of the country’s most strategic and economically significant mineral sites. Perceptions among the Kyrgyz public that the country’s government is ineffective and corrupt compounds China’s negative influence over state/society relations. A 2012 Gallup-sponsored opinion poll on Kyrgyz national opinion cap- tured this sense of social dissatisfaction when respondents identified corruption and political instability as the country’s second and fourth most pressing issues, respectively.58 More than 75 per cent of respondents to the same poll identified corruption as a ‘very big issue’ for the state, while 42 per cent called the country’s presidential elections ‘unfair’.59 While China’s role in domestic politics is limited to the degree that it is an external actor, its structural power and the burgeoning sense among the Kyrgyz public that it has a growing, negative influence on the country’s political and economic institutions does translate into structural violence in that it widens the gulf between the state and society.

Notes 1 Rachel Vanderhill and Michael E. Aleprete Jr, International Dimensions of Authoritar- ian Persistence: Lessons from Post-Soviet States (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2013), 87–89. 2 Erica Marat, The State-Crime Nexus in Central Asia: State Weakness, Organised Crime, and Corruption in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (Washington, DC: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Programme, 2006), 83. 3 T. Umaraliev and Ruby Russell, ‘Kyrgyz Government Collapses, Increasing Political Instability’, The Washington Times, August 22, 2012. 4 Meera Mahadevan, Nobuo Yoshida, and Larisa Praslova, Poverty Mapping in the Kyr- gyz Republic: Methodology and Key Finding (Washington, DC: World Bank 2013), 14. 5 ‘Kyrgyz Republic: Country Outlook’, EIU ViewsWire, February 20, 2015. 6 Asian Development Bank, ‘Kyrgyz Republic: Economy’, last modified May 14, 2014, http://www.adb.org/countries/kyrgyz-republic/economy. 7 S. Juraev, ‘Domestic and International Perspectives on Kyrgyzstan’s “Tulip Revolu- tion” ’, in Domestic and International Perspectives on Kyrgyzstan’s ‘Tulip Revolu-

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 tion’: Motives, Mobilization and Meanings, ed. Sally Cummings (London: Routledge, 2013), 32. 8 Eric McGlinchey, ‘Exploring Regime Instability and Ethnic Violence in Kyrgyzstan’, Asia Policy 12 (2011), 81. 9 Johan Engvall, ‘The Political Sources of Kyrgyzstan’s Recent Unrest’, CACI Analyst (2013). 10 Observatory of Economic Complexity, ‘Import Origins of Kyrgyzstan’, last modified May 14, 2014, http://atlas.media.mit.edu/explore/tree_map/hs/import/kgz/show/ all/2011/. Sino-Kyrgyzstan relations 71 11 Observatory of Economic Complexity, ‘Export Origins of Kyrgyzstan’, last modified 14 May 14, 2014, http://atlas.media.mit.edu/explore/tree_map/hs/export/kgz/show/all/ 2011/. 12 Laura Birkman et al., Textile and Apparel Cluster in Kyrgyzstan (Boston: Harvard Business School, 2012), 11. 13 Roman Mogilevsky and Anara Omorova, Assessing Development Strategies to Achieve the MDGs in the Kyrgyz Republic (Bishkek: United Nations Department for Social and Economic Affairs, 2011), 5 14 Gavin Bowring, ‘Kyrgyzstan’s Dilemma over Joining Russian-Led Customs Union’, Financial Times, November 21, 2014, http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2014/11/21/ guest-post-kyrgyzstans-dilemma-over-joining-russian-led-customs-union/. 15 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, ‘Kyrgyzstan: FDI Flows’, last modified 2013, http://unctad.org/Sections/dite_fdistat/docs/webdiaeia2014d3_KGZ. pdf. 16 Ministry of Finance of the Kyrgyz Republic, ‘Foreign Direct Investment and Pub- lic Investment in the Kyrgyz Republic’, last modified 2012, http://adbi.adb.org/ files/2012.05.07.cpp.sess2.8.kerimalieva.fdi.kyrgyz.republic.pdf. 17 International Monetary Fund, The Kyrgyz Republic: Fifth Review Under the Three-Year Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility, and Request for Modification of Per- formance Criteria (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, Middle East and Central Asia Dept., 2013), 11. 18 ‘Kyrgyz Ex-Official Says China Taking over Country’s Natural Deposits’, Moskovs- kiy Komsomolets v Kyrgyzstane, September 20, 2011, translated by the Open Source Center (hereafter OSC), CEP20110926950206. 19 Chris Rickleton, ‘Kyrgyzstan: China Muscles into Energy Market, Fueling Suspicion’, Eurasianet.org, March 20, 2013, accessed May 14, 2014, http://www.eurasianet.org/ node/66716. 20 ‘Chinese Companies Have 79 Licenses for Gold Deposits in Kyrgyzstan’, Kabar, June 23, 2013, accessed May 14, 2014, http://kabar.kg/eng/economics/full/2095. 21 Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Kyrgyz Republic, Cost of Doing Business in Kyrgyzstan (Bishkek: Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Kyrgyz Republic, 2013), 41. 22 Alexandros Petersen, ‘How Chinese Merchants Are Transforming Central Asia’, The Atlantic, December 2, 2013. 23 ‘Chinese Migrant Workers’ Number on Rise in Kyrgyzstan’, Tushtuk, January 28, 2014, translated by the OSC, CEL2014012848420287. 24 ‘Foreign Workers, Mostly Chinese, Said Forcing Kyrgyz out of Labour Market’, Kabar Online, May 21, 2013, translated by the OSC, CEL2013052247570853. 25 ‘Premier Says China Only Investor in Kyrgyzstan’, Vecherniy Bishkek, December 9,

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 2013, translated by the OSC, CEL2013120943246966. 26 Dmitry Shlapentokh, ‘Kyrgyzstan Between China and Russia’, CACI Analyst (2013). 27 ‘Premier Atambayev Vows to Protect Chinese Investors, Foreign Firms in Kyrgyzstan’, Interfax, September 15, 2011. 28 ‘Kyrgyz Expert Says China May Fund Candidates in Presidential Polls’, Vesti.kg, July 25, 2011, translated by the OSC, CEP20110726950062. 29 Alexei Malashenko, ‘Islam in Central Asia’, in Central Asian Security: The New Inter- national Context, eds. Roy Allison and Lena Jonson (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), 65. 72 Sino-Kyrgyzstan relations 30 ‘China to Allocate Grant to Kyrgyzstan to Fight Separatism, Terrorism’, Knews, May 11, 2012, translated by the OSC, CEP20120511950169. 31 ‘AFP: PRC FM Spokesman Says China ‘Deeply Concerned’ by Kyrgyz Unrest’, Hong Kong AFP, April 8, 2010. 32 ‘SCO to Help Kyrgyzstan Ensure Security in Southern Regions – RATS’, ITAR-TASS, September 23, 2010. 33 International Republican Institute, Kyrgyzstan National Opinion Poll: Febru- ary 4–February 27, 2012 (Bishkek: The Gallup Organisation, 2012), 41. 34 ‘Pundit: Kyrgyzstanis See Russia as ‘Elder Brother’ Fear China ‘Domination’, Kom- mersant Online, November 18, 2011, translated by the OSC, CEP20111118008014. 35 ‘Creation of Kyrgyz Skinhead Gangs Mooted to Fight Foreign Migrants’, Kyrgyzto- day, August 16, 2013, translated by the OSC, CEL2013082357328208. 36 ‘Paper Urges Kyrgyzstani Leader to End ‘Chinese Expansion’ or Resign’, Jany Ordo, November 23, 2012, translated by the OSC, CEP20130111950090. 37 International Monetary Fund, The Kyrgyz Republic: Fifth Review Under the Three-Year Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility, and Request for Modification of Per- formance Criteria (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, Middle East and Central Asia Dept., 2013), 11. 38 ‘Kyrgyz Observers, MPs Slam Railway Deal with China’, Moskovskiy Komsomolets v Kyrgyzstane, September 20, 2011, translated by the OSC, CEP20110928950027. 39 John C. K. Daly, ‘China and Kyrgyzstan Discuss Rail Projects’, Jamestown Founda- tion, February 13, 2014. 40 Chris Rickleton, ‘Kyrgyzstan: China’s Economic Influence Fostering Resentment’, Eur- asianet.org, April 28, 2011, accessed May 14, 2014, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/ 63383. 41 ‘Chinese Migrant Workers’ Number on Rise in Kyrgyzstan’. 42 ‘Foreign Workers, Mostly Chinese, Said Forcing Kyrgyz out of Labour Market’. 43 ‘China Petrol Company Zhongda Plans to Launch Kyrgyz Refinery on August 31’, Interfax, July 30, 2013. 44 Chris Rickleton, ‘Kyrgyzstan: China Expanding Influence, One Student at a Time’, Inter Press Service News Agency, January 6, 2012. 45 Mirgul Akimova, ‘Kyrgyzstan Commentators Wary of China TV Largesse Buying Influence’, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, October 24, 2008. 46 ‘Kyrgyz Opposition MP Says Chinese School Threat to National Ideology’, AKIp- ress Online, February 3, 2010, translated by the OSC, CEP20100203950132; ‘BBCM: Kyrgyzstani Politicians, Analysts Divided over Chinese Russian-Language TV’, BBC Monitoring, October 28, 2009. 47 ‘Kyrgyz Police Detain Uighur Leaders for Holding Unsanctioned Rally’, Interfax-Kazakhstan Online, August 10, 2009, translated by the OSC, CEP200908109 Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 50139. 48 ‘Kyrgyz Republic: Country Outlook’, EIU ViewsWire, February 12, 2014. 49 Asian Development Bank, ‘Kyrgyz Republic: Economy’, last modified May 14, 2014, http://www.adb.org/countries/kyrgyz-republic/economy. 50 Rickleton, ‘Kyrgyzstan: China’s Economic Influence Fostering Resentment’. 51 Arno Tausch and Almas Heshmati, Globalization, the Human Condition, and Sustain- able Development in the Twenty-first Century: Cross-national Perspectives and Euro- pean Implications (London: Anthem Press, 2013), 36. 52 Bakyt Asanov and Farangis Najibullah, ‘Kyrgyz Ask Why Jobs at Home Are Going to Chinese’, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, November 16, 2013. Sino-Kyrgyzstan relations 73 53 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Environmental Performance Reviews: Kyrgyzstan 2nd EPR Synopsis (Bishkek: United Nations, 2008), 3. 54 ‘Kyrgyz Authorities Suspend Chinese Mining Company’s Licence’, Kyrgyz Television 1, June 4, 2008, translated by the OSC, CEP20080605950295. 55 ‘Mass Brawl Reported between Chinese Nationals, Locals in Kyrgyz South’, Kyrgyz Television 1, January 9, 2013, CEP20130109950009. 56 ‘Kyrgyzstan Bans Import of Poultry from China’, KirTAG, April 13, 2013, translated by the OSC, CEL2013042646513874; ‘Kyrgyz Government Says Chinese Flour Con- tains Allowable Amount of Melamine’, Moya Stolitsa Novosti, December 2, 2008, translated by the OSC, CEP20081205950172. 57 ‘Kyrgyz President Says China ‘Reliable, Faithful’ Neighbour’, Kyrgyz Television 1, September 11, 2013, translated by the OSC, CEL2013091121692684; ‘Kyrgyz NGO Urges Government to Stop “Chinese Expansion” ’, Kyrgyz Sayasat.kg, May 15, 2012, translated by the OSC, CEP20120516950051. 58 International Republican Institute, Kyrgyzstan National Opinion Poll, 19. 59 Ibid., 27. Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 4 Sino-Tajikistan relations

Cronyism, corruption, and abuses of power contribute to ongoing weakness within Tajikistan’s political system. Tajik president Emomalii Rahmon, who first came to power in 1994 during the height of the country’s civil war with Russia’s support, has amassed power in Dushanbe through election fraud, through the persecution of opposition political parties, and through the provision of economic largess to the country’s political elite.1 Rahmon has leveraged this power to consolidate and prolong his position as president through constitutional amendments that make him the head of all three branches of government, invest him with the rights to appoint key judges, provide him the power to appoint all fifty-six of the country’s districts’ governors, and give him the sole right to initiate draft laws.2 This consolidation and abuse of power has raised concerns among those who follow Tajikistan’s political developments that Rahmon is intent on establishing a cult of leadership in line with Turkmenistan’s Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow. Rahmon’s concentration of influence, however, has not translated into Dushanbe’s political control across the country. Alternative structures of political authority based on clan affiliation continue to exist in the country’s eastern and southern regions, such as Gorno-Badakhshan, largely the outcome of a ceasefire agreement between Rahmon’s government and opposition groups such as the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) in 1997.3 A number of indicators also suggest weakness across the country’s economy. Tajikistan is not only one of the poorest states in Central Asia, but its economy is largely dependent on remittances which, as of 2013, constituted 50 per cent of the country’s total GDP. Dependency on remittances creates vulnerability from external shocks in states like Russia and China (the source of the overwhelming Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 majority of remittances to Tajikistan) and undermines prospects in the country for growth related to consumption and construction.4 Tajikistan’s industrial sector, which accounted for 21.6 per cent of the country’s GDP in 2013, has also shown weakness in recent years. Production of aluminium – the country’s key industrial output – experienced a 30 per cent contraction in 2013, the result of a drop in international commodities’ prices.5 Inflation in the country, which reached 6.3 per cent in 2014 and is on track to rise to 7.3 per cent in 2015, has largely negated household gains from growth. For the vast majority of the country’s population, the state’s much vaunted (and potentially overvalued) 7.4 per cent growth in 2013 simply did not translate into an improvement in living standards. Sino-Tajikistan relations 75 Weak political control, fractious political authority, and economic weakness continue to feed social tensions in the country that have never been fully resolved since the end of Tajikistan’s five-year civil war. While Dushanbe has made some progress in employing patronage to co-opt local elite into its centralised political apparatus, the country remains largely internally divided between the central government and local strongmen.6 Cronyism and corruption also contribute to a society that is increasingly divided between the extremely rich and the extremely poor. Poverty in Tajikistan continues to grow despite the country’s high annual growth rates.7 China’s ties to the country have significantly expanded in recent years. Eco- nomic ties between the two countries – driven primarily by Chinese loans to the state for infrastructure development – are the fastest growing out of all of China’s bilateral relations in Central Asia.8 By volume, China is now Tajikistan’s largest trade partner and is also the country’s largest source of foreign direct investment.9 China also engages in substantial military cooperation with Tajikistan both directly and through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Through these two channels of exchange, China has developed considerable influence over Tajikistan’s political and business elite that translates into power across the state’s domestic structures. In part beneficial for its contribution to the country’s growth and stability, Chinese structural power also contributes to structural violence within the state as it perpetuates a system of political oppression and economic exploitation that results in insecurity within Tajiki society.

Structural power at the systems level

Economic linkages Trade between China and Tajikistan has grown exponentially from a low base and a relatively recent start. Bilateral trade between the two states largely began in 1996, at which time total trade amounted to just $11.6 million, of which $4.1 million were Tajikistan’s exports to China and $7.5 million were Chinese exports to Tajikistan.10 As of 2014, bilateral trade between the two states reached $2 billion, according to China’s Ministry of Commerce.11 In 2013, China was the largest provider of imports to Tajikistan at 45.3 per cent, far outpacing second-place Kazakhstan, which provided just 13.9 per cent.12 Chinese exports to Tajikistan mostly consist of apparel, light machinery, cars Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 and trucks, and agricultural goods. China is the second largest recipient of Tajik exports after Turkey, having received 11.4 per cent of the country’s total exports in 2013.13 China receives both raw aluminium and raw cotton from Tajikistan, the country’s two primary commodities for export. Through its position as Tajikistan’s dominant trade partner, China has developed significant structural power over the country’s domestic production and its overall economic stability. Chinese exports to Tajikistan, which consist entirely of manufactured goods, complicate the country’s ability to develop its own textile and light industries, as local producers cannot compete in price, quality, or output with Chinese goods.14 The effect Chinese exports have on Tajikistan’s domestic 76 Sino-Tajikistan relations industry is particularly acute as Beijing provides the country with export credits designed to further Chinese penetration of its domestic market. Lax export credits also contribute to a persistent trade imbalance between the two states. Of $682 million in bilateral trade between the two states in 2013, China’s exports to Tajikistan accounted for $595.7 million while Tajikistan’s exports to China accounted for just $86.3 million, according to Tajikistan’s Statistics Agency.15 China has also developed structural power through trade with its propensity to unilaterally close its borders with Tajikistan, whether for security reasons or in response to Chinese holidays. In 2009, for example, China responded to riots in Xinjiang by closing its borders with Tajikistan, curtailing trade between the two states and severely affecting Tajikistan’s economic stability.16 China has also emerged as Tajikistan’s most important foreign direct investment partner, overtaking Russia in the first nine months of 2013 as the country’s largest source of FDI with a total of $92.9 million versus Moscow’s $26 million.17 Chinese president Xi Jinping pledged a further $5 billion over three years in FDI to the country during his 2014 state visit which, if delivered, would raise China’s status further.18 Chinese FDI is now so important to Tajikistan that Dushanbe revised its overall macroeconomic growth projections upward in line with Chinese-committed FDI through 2016.19 China’s current position is all the more remarkable considering its marginal role as a provider of FDI to Tajikistan as recently as 2007, when it ranked fifth overall. Equally notable are Russia and Kazakhstan’s diminishing roles as FDI providers to the country. The majority of Chinese FDI goes toward development of Tajikistan’s power sector, modernisation of its processing plants (particularly aluminium plants), construction of its internal transportation infrastructure, and construction of a gas pipeline.20 This focus of FDI is a clear indication of China’s structural power over Tajikistan’s domestic development, as the projects accord closely with Chinese interests in the country, not the interests of the Tajik people. China invests in the country’s power sector, for example, to increase energy imports from Tajik- istan for its own consumption, not to increase access to much needed energy for Tajikistan itself.21 China invests in Tajikistan’s roads and rail to expand Chinese trade with Tajikistan.22 Beijing has proposed Chinese funding and construction of a pipeline through Tajikistan that will effectively turn it into a transit country for China’s energy imports from Central Asia and Eurasia.23 Chinese FDI does increase Tajikistan’s overall GDP growth. It does not, however, contribute to growth in the state that leads to greater domestic employment opportunities or Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 overall poverty reduction.24

State-owned enterprises/private enterprises in Tajikistan Chinese firms, both private and state-owned, have moved aggressively into Tajik- istan in support of the country’s own development priorities and those of the Chi- nese state. Chinese companies are now the dominant, if not only, major actor in Tajikistan’s construction and mining sectors.25 Chinese firms have been instrumental, in particular, in the development of Tajikistan’s domestic infrastructure, Sino-Tajikistan relations 77 much of which has facilitated greater connectivity between Tajikistan and China whether directly or through secondary states such as Uzbekistan and/or Kyr- gyzstan. Examples of such development included the Chinese-financed and built Dushanbe-Khujand highway, the north-south tunnel at the Shahristan Pass, the road linking Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and the highway linking Tajikistan with Uzbekistan. The Chinese firm China Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC) is now is the process of constructing the Dushanbe-Kulma Pass road, which will directly connect China with Tajikistan.26 Other Chinese firms in Tajikistan include TBEA, which is engaged in Tajik- istan’s power sector, Zijin Mining, which is developing the gold mine Zarafshon, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), which is engaged in oil exploration, extraction, and construction of the pipeline, China Gold, which is manufacturing explosives and engaged in mining, and Yantai Yuancheng Gold, which is mining gold.27 These firms are primarily state-owned with direct access to China’s Exim Bank, which provides the majority of China’s financing to Tajikistan (on which more is written later). Chinese workers support Chinese firms’ efforts in Tajikistan, particularly in the construction and power sectors where Tajik workers largely lack the technical skills necessary to do the work.28 As of 2014, 82,000 Chinese worked in Tajikistan officially, up from just 30,000 in 2007.29 Expert assessments, however, believe the actual number of Chinese workers in Tajikistan to be significantly higher. Tajik media reports that Chinese firms that do employ Tajik workers mistreat them, underpay them, or often do not pay them at all.30 Chinese firms and workers have established an unassailable presence within Tajikistan’s domestic economy, resulting in Chinese power over the country’s commercial development and labour market, a concerned raised by Tajik opposition politicians such as former deputy prime minister Davlat Usmon.31 Rather than develop a local capacity for construction and/or engineering, Tajik leaders have become reliant on Chinese firms and Chinese workers for expertise.32 The result is a continued underdevelopment of the country’s domestic industry in terms of technological capacity and continued underdevelopment within the country’s labour force, as more high-skilled Chinese workers displace less-skilled Tajik workers.33

Ties between cores Ties between China and Tajikistan’s political elite have developed in correspond- Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 ence with the two states’ deepening economic ties. While Dushanbe has traditionally looked to Moscow on matters such as economic and political support, the country’s current leadership is more orientated toward Beijing. President Rahmon, for instance, has called China Tajikistan’s ‘most important’ foreign partner and noted that policy alignment with Beijing is an essential component of Tajikistan’s foreign policy.34 Tajik prime minister Suhrob Sharifov and foreign minister Hamrokhon Zarifi have also highlighted Tajikistan’s relations with China as preferable to those with Russia in what amounts to a shift in ideational focus. 78 Sino-Tajikistan relations One gets a fuller picture of elite relations between the two states through consideration of China’s effect on Dushanbe’s economic and security priorities. In regard to economic matters, China has successfully aligned the Tajik elites’ economic interests with its own through a China ‘lobby’ in Dushanbe that has established direct ties to the president’s office. The China lobby has facilitated linkages between Chinese firms and Rahmon’s son-in-law, for instance, which have increased Chinese imports to Tajikistan and fundamentally altered trade relations between the two states.35 Chinese businessmen also work closely with Rahmon’s brother-in-law, Khassan Sadulloev, and have gained greater access to the country’s natural resources as a result.36 While a narrow sample of China’s influence over the country’s elite, these two examples do provide clarity into how Chinese structural power develops into elite relations that, in turn, further expand the power on which they are based. In regard to security, China has successfully aligned Dushanbe’s priorities with its own. One can view this alignment in the Tajik government’s allocation of security resources to address threats stemming from terrorism, extremism, and radicalism – what China refers to as the ‘three evil forces’ (san ge gu shili). Tajikistan does face insecurity owing to radical Islamic terrorist groups within its borders and in its neighbouring states, but such threats to the country’s domestic stability are secondary to insecurity stemming from ethnic and social unrest (further examined below). That Tajikistan’s leaders now regularly identify terrorism and radicalism as the country’s greatest threats belies the country’s actual security environment and demonstrates Beijing’s success in shaping Dushanbe’s security priorities. One can see clearly in President Rahmon’s speeches on the Tajik-China ties that he increasingly sees the two states’ futures as intricately, inextricably tied.37 As such, Tajik leadership regularly dismiss calls from Tajik society to regulate Chinese activity in the state so as to avoid dependency. Rather, Tajikistan’s elite seemingly view such dependency as both inevitable and desirable. Beijing has clearly succeeded in aligning the Tajik leaderships’ interest with China’s to the point where the country’s elite naturally secure China’s interests over their own.

Structural power at the state level

Security China is an important security partner for Tajikistan, growing in influence to Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 challenge Russia as the country’s primary security provider. Beijing, for example, supplies the country’s military and law enforcement agencies with financial, material, and personnel support through bilateral channels and through the Shang- hai Cooperation Organization.38 Security cooperation between China and Tajik- istan has increased exponentially since 2013, when the two states entered into a strategic partnership with the aim of leveraging their existing economic ties to expand their security linkages. Both Beijing and Dushanbe have pledged even greater security contact post-2014 in response to ISAF’s planned troop drawdown in Afghanistan.39 Sino-Tajikistan relations 79 While beneficialfor Dushanbe in that Chinese support allows for better-trained and equipped security personnel, security ties between the two states are inherently asymmetrical. Tajikistan depends on Chinese military support, for example, to secure its borders, to undertake counter-terrorism operations, and to deal with its own internal social instability and unrest.40 Tajik military and law enforcement agencies rely on Chinese military aid for their technology, weapons, intelligence, and training.41 China’s reliance on security relations with Tajikistan is, conversely, limited to largely symbolic cooperation on counter-terrorism. China has developed substantial power over Tajikistan’s structures of security through the two states’ asymmetric security exchange. As noted above, China has successfully aligned Dushanbe’s security agenda with its own in regard to terrorism, separatism, and radicalism.42 While Tajikistan does face some pressure from terrorism and radicalism stemming from Afghanistan, the country itself does not face insecurity from terrorism and has not experienced terrorism-related activity since 2001.43 Rather, Tajikistan’s main source of domestic instability is social unrest which culminated in a civil war in the 1990s and remains a much more salient threat. Tajikistan’s mobilisation of security forces against largely non-existent terrorist boogeymen – whether in its bilateral relations with China or through the SCO – is, therefore, an effort to appease Beijing at the cost of the country’s overall security readiness. As such, it is a clear example of China’s ability to set the country’s security agenda. Beijing’s financial support for and elite relations with the Rahmon administration also contribute to social instability in the country, as many Tajiks view their country’s government as illegitimate.44 Beijing provides financial and security support to the state so as to ensure stability on its borders, marginalising alternative power centres in the process.45 The outcome is stability in the country at the cost of empowering an unpopular, illegitimate regime. This chapter examines this dynamic of Sino-Tajik relations in more detail in relation to structural violence in the country. More directly, Beijing has leveraged its power over the country’s economic and security structures to gain control over 1,000 square kilometres of land in the Pamir mountain range formerly under Tajik control (further examined below).46 The Rahmon administration ceded the land to China in 2011 in ‘repayment’ for Chinese economic and political support, going so far as to mobilise the country’s military against local Tajiks who opposed the policy.47 This book’s central contention that China’s economic statecraft leads to power over its weak neighbours’ Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 institutions of security is perhaps nowhere clearer than in this example.

Finance More than any other aspect of the two states’ relations, China has developed power over Tajikistan’s structure of finance. Chinese commercial and concessional loans to Dushanbe, in particular, contribute to a relationship of dependency between the two states through which China gains influence over the country’s domestic political, economic, and social structures. As of 2014, Chinese loans to 80 Sino-Tajikistan relations Tajikistan account for 41 per cent of the country’s total foreign debt ($862 million of $2.4 billion).48 This amount represents a quadrupling of China’s total loans to Tajikistan since 2008. China’s Exim Bank is now the country’s largest holder of foreign debt, ahead of both the World Bank and Asian Development Bank. Loans from the Exim Bank account for 80 per cent of funding for all Chinese commercial investments in the country.49 Chinese loans have become an increasingly important source of short-term economic growth for Tajikistan.50 Reliance on external loans for growth, however, has created an unstable, unsustainable growth model for Tajikistan that leads to vulnerability in the medium to long term. Tajikistan is now largely dependent on China to continue its provision of loans and, as a result, increasingly vulnerable to external shocks coming from China.51 The preponderance of Chinese loans to the state also raised the potential for loan default should Tajikistan not be able to service its existing or future debt. Signs that debt service of existing debt is growing increasingly costly for Tajikistan already exist. Debt service costs for the Tajik government, for example, have doubled since 2011 and are expected to be over 10 per cent of total GDP in the medium term.52 Such high levels of debt repayment have significant implications for economic growth and economic opportunity for future generations.53 Chinese structural power is also evident in Beijing’s use of capital to advance its agenda over the two states’ territorial dispute. While the exact conditions around Chinese-Tajik territorial negotiations were not made public, many Tajik and foreign observers agree that China’s debt forgiveness was an important condition in securing Dushanbe’s agreement to terms largely favourable to Beijing.54 China’s ability to use its loans to exact political and/or territorial concessions from Dushanbe will increase should the Tajik government find itself unable to finance its loan repayment and/or default on its existing Chinese loans.

Production In 2014, the Asian Development Bank wrote that Tajikistan must move from an export-oriented growth strategy toward one more reliant on internal consumption financed through remittances if it hopes to avoid a slump in overall economic growth in the near to medium term.55 The bank’s analysis rests on two consecutive years of large contractions within the country’s aluminium and cotton industries – Tajikistan’s two primary commodities which, together, account for more than 70 Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 per cent of the country’s total exports. Aluminium production, for example, contracted by 31 per cent in 2013, and cotton production fell to 52,600 tonnes, down from 112,200 tonnes in 2012.56 These declines in production are the result of record-low global prices for both aluminium and cotton; a trend many economists believe will persist in the short to medium term. The country’s future growth, therefore, largely depends on consumption of consumer goods such as textiles, household goods, light machinery, and food/ agricultural products. Under ideal circumstances, this type of shift in economic Sino-Tajikistan relations 81 growth paradigm could contribute to the development of domestic production and related services, such as those around internal transportation. Chinese structural power over the country’s domestic consumer market – detailed in this chapter’s earlier discussion of Sino-Tajik trade ties – will, however, prevent the country from benefiting in the medium to long term from a growth in consumption, as inexpensive Chinese finished-goods imports make it near impossible for Tajik- istan to develop its own internal capacity. Moreover, a shift from industry toward consumption will result in greater Chinese structural power over Tajikistan’s domestic economy, as the majority of the country’s production-related imports come from China.57 Any increase in domestic spending toward consumption will ultimately translate into a greater penetration by Chinese goods of the country’s domestic market.

Knowledge China’s power over the country’s structure of knowledge is largely underdeveloped, particularly in relation to Russia, which remains Tajikistan’s primary foreign partner for cooperation on non-economic issues such as education, culture, and language.58 Neither does China seem intent on developing ties with Tajikistan that could eventually result in greater Chinese power over the country’s knowledge structure. In the 2014 ‘Joint Statement about Continual Development and Deepening the Strategic Partnership between China and Tajikistan’, for example, President Xi largely downplayed the desirability of cooperation centred on cultural, historical, and educational matters. Rather, China seems content at the moment to rely on economic and security cooperation as a basis for its bilateral relations with Tajikistan.59 This is not to suggest, though, that China has not made some efforts to influence younger generations of Tajiks in ways beneficial to the two states’ long-term relations. As with all this volume’s other case studies, China’s Hanban has established a Confucius Institute at Tajikistan’s premier university, Tajikistan Nationality University. The institute has built twelve Chinese-language centres in Tajikistan and enrolled more than 2,000 Tajik students since its 2009 inception. The Chi- nese Embassy has also announced plans to fund Tajik students through Tajikistan National University for short- to long-term study in China. Still in an early stage, the programme would increase China’s influence over younger Tajiks, many of whom will become the country’s future political and business elite. Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 Nor does China’s secondary role in relation to Russia imply that China has not influenced knowledge formation within the country across certain niche areas. Beijing has been largely successful, for example, in persuading the Tajik government to securitise the country’s ethnic Uyghur minority that China views as a security threat toward the XUAR.60 In response to Chinese pressure, Dushanbe has passed legislation tightly regulating Uyghur activity and Uyghur gatherings. The Tajik police have also targeted ethnic Uyghur Chinese nationals in the country and arrested them, in some instances, on questionable charges.61 82 Sino-Tajikistan relations Structural violence China’s power over Tajikistan’s various structures, as described above, has directly and indirectly caused structural violence within the country that has the potential to lead to greater weakness and instability within the state. Chinese power over Tajikistan’s structures of production and finance, for example, directly causes structural violence in the form of underemployment and indirectly contributes to structural violence related to economic vulnerability and underdevelopment. Chi- nese commercial activity in the country also contributes to environmental insecurity with spillover consequences for localised communities.

Economy China’s economic ties with Tajikistan do not all, of course, result in negative outcomes. Tajikistan does benefit, for example, from Chinese investment in and construction of domestic infrastructure such as roads and power stations. The inherent asymmetric nature of the two states’ economic exchange, however, has resulted in Chinese structural power over aspects of the state’s economy that do result in structural violence. Structural violence resulting from Chinese structural power is evident in three particular outcomes. First, as this chapter has shown, Chinese exports to Tajikistan have contributed to the underdevelopment of production in the country. Chinese exports to Tajik- istan consist almost exclusively (over 80 per cent) of finished products brought in by Chinese trucks, sold by Chinese merchants, and sold in markets increasingly dominated by Chinese sellers. This domination of Tajikistan’s domestic market by Chinese goods makes development of industrial production including textiles, light machinery, and automobiles all but impossible for Tajik businessmen. Underdeveloped production leads to increased reliance on remittances from Tajik labourers in Russia and China, on export of the country’s natural resources, and on loans from China for the country’s growth. This reliance, in turn, creates vulnerability within the country’s economy to external shocks such slowdowns in Rus- sia’s and/or China’s economy or a drop in international prices for commodities such as aluminium and/or cotton. This vulnerability is clear in Tajikistan’s current economic environment, which is experiencing slower growth for both reasons.62 Second, Chinese loans to the country, as described above, contribute to both dependency and vulnerability within the Tajik economy and perpetuate a model Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 of economic exchange between the two states that is damaging to Tajikistan’s long-term economic health and viability. Tajik leaders have become increasingly dependent on Chinese financing in the form of loans for both economic growth and internal development. Should China reduce the amount of funding it makes available through loans, Tajikistan would experience a budget shortfall that would result in the state’s inability to meet its financial and contractual obligations. Less of a hypothetical scenario is Dushanbe’s actual and persistent need to repay the loans, many of which are commercial, not concessional. As earlier noted, debt repayment for the state is increasingly expensive, with all indicators pointing to Sino-Tajikistan relations 83 even greater expense in the medium to long term. Failure by Dushanbe to pay could lead to default, which would have significant implications for the state’s future ability to raise external funding from any source other than China. China may also demand payment in kind of the country’s natural resources or of large swaths of the Tajikistan’s territory in the event of default, as it has in the past. Third, the preponderance of Chinese workers in the country, most of whom work in construction on Chinese-financed projects, contributes to further underemployment in what is already a desperate domestic labour market. At present, more than one million Tajiks (out of a country with a population of just over eight million) live and work outside Tajikistan because they cannot find work in their own country.63 Unofficial estimates suggest the number of Chinese workers in the country at around 82,000. While removing Chinese workers from Tajikistan’s labour market would not, of course, solve the country’s labour problems, Chinese workers do take jobs that could otherwise go to Tajiks. Even more important, Chi- nese companies’ use of Chinese labour prevents technology and skills transfers to the Tajik people that they desperately need.64

Environment China also has a sizable presence in Tajikistan’s agricultural sector through which it has developed substantial structural power over the country’s environment. Under a widely criticised agreement between Dushanbe and Beijing, Tajik authorities granted Chinese agricultural firms, such as China’s Chuntai-New Silk Road Company, the right to lease at least 6,600 hectares of land in the Kumsangir and Bokhtar districts of southern Khatlon Province, which many agriculturalists believe is the country’s most fertile region.65 China has also directly bought land in Tajikistan for commercial agricultural use.66 Since 2011, in particular, Chinese farmers have been actively cultivating rice and cotton in the country for export back to China. Aside from the implications Chinese agricultural activity in the country has on social stability and state/society relations (discussed in more detail below), Chinese farmers directly contribute to soil erosion, soil degradation, and ground water pollution through their use of chemical fertilisers and pesticides, through their reliance on poor irrigation, and through their use of substandard farming technologies.67 Chinese firms also contribute to industrial pollution in the country, indirectly through investment in pollution-producing activities and directly through their Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 own commercial activity in polluting industries. Chinese firms have invested heavily, for example, in the building materials industry, which, collectively, is the third largest economic sector in Tajikistan in terms of the production of industrial waste.68 China’s Huaxin Cement Co. Ltd’s investment in the Ghayur-Sughdcement plant in Bobojon Gafurov District and China’s Dong Ying Heli Investment and Development Co. Ltd’s investment in an oil refinery in the Danghara free economic zone are important examples of this type economic activity.69 Chinese firms are also increasingly dominant in the Tajikistan’s non-ferrous metallurgy sector, which is the largest economic sector in terms of industrial waste.70 China 84 Sino-Tajikistan relations Global New Technology’s $250 million investment in the Zarnisor zinc deposit in northern Tajikistan’s Sughd region, China’s Yantai Yuancheng’s work in gold extraction also in the Sughd region, and Zijin Mining Group’s development of a copper deposit in the Sogdiisk region are all examples of Chinese involvement in this heavily polluting, under-regulated economic sector.71 While Chinese firms are not the only actors involved in industrial polluting activities in the country, their centrality within Tajikistan’s economy both in terms of investment and commercial activity does translate into structural power with an outcome of structural violence.

Society China’s structural power over Tajikistan’s economic and environmental structures together with Chinese influence over the Tajik elite translates into structural violence across a range of social institutions. One can best view Chinese-resulting structural violence over Tajikistan’s society in line with the approach’s concept of violence resulting from a gap between a group’s actual and potential circumstances. This gap is perhaps clearest in the relationship between Chinese and Tajik labour, which this chapter has addressed in writing on Sino-Tajik economic ties and China’s influence over the country’s structure of production. Structural violence related to labour relations, however, is most evident at the social level in the form of unemployment and lost opportunity. Chinese labourers’ contribution to unemployment in the country, while a secondary cause, does perpetuate structural violence in the form of continued poverty and social instability resulting from lack of economic opportunity and resentment against Chinese nationals living and working in the country. In 2014, for example, the World Bank identified labour earnings exclusive of remittances as the key driver to poverty reduction in Tajik- istan; a logic that implies, in turn, that lost labour earnings contribute to ongoing poverty.72 The World Bank report also points to the importance of employment for the country’s bottom 40 per cent in raising living standards. The 80,000-plus Chi- nese workers in Tajikistan – many of whom are illegally in the country – directly prevent an equal number of Tajik men and women from working and earning through labour in their own country, according to Tajikistan’s Center for Migra- tion and Development.73 Tajik society is keenly aware of this condition and, at times, reacts in ways that contribute to structural violence within an already fragile society. Unemployed Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 Tajiks have clashed with Chinese workers around construction sites, for example, where the Chinese often live separated from Tajik society at large. Resentment between Tajiks and Chinese within the country remains high. Both outcomes have destabilising effects on Tajik society that would not persist in the absence of Chi- nese workers.74 A lesser examined albeit potentially more important source of structural violence within Tajik society is environmental degradation resulting from Chinese activity in the country, as described above. More than 70 per cent of Tajiks live in rural areas and are dependent on local agricultural production for food and Sino-Tajikistan relations 85 local sources of water for drink.75 Environmental issues such as soil erosion, water pollution, and food insecurity have complicated Tajiks’ ability to remain self-sufficient in their rural settings and placed pressure on rural inhabitants to migrate to the country’s larger cities, such as Dushanbe, or to foreign countries such as Russia, Uzbekistan, or, to a much lesser degree, China.76 As of 2012, social perceptions that environmental conditions have worsened were most acute in Khatlon and Sughd provinces: the two areas where Chinese agricultural and industrial activities are most present.77 These viewpoints were based on perceptions of increased soil and water pollution and greater pollution resulting from industrial waste. Also in regard to structural violence within Tajikistan society is the growing fear among many Tajiks that China is intent on leveraging its economic power and its increasing hold on Tajik territory (both legitimate and illegitimate) to ‘colo- nise’ the country. Tajik media, scholars, and opposition politicians point to Chi- na’s activities in Tajikistan as part of a scheme through which Beijing is intent on incorporating the country into China’s XUAR.78 Whether such concerns are valid or not, the perception among Tajik society that China’s intentions in regard to the country are less than honourable feeds a degree of anxiety within Tajik society that translates into structural violence.

State/society relations China’s influence also contributes to structural violence in the form of strained state/society relations. China’s ties with the country’s political elite and its influence over the country’s structure of security, in particular, perpetuate already existing tensions within the country between a government with questionable legitimacy and a society with competing clan and religious-based authority structures. Regarding elite relations, China has been instrumental in providing the Rah- mon administration with foreign support for its continued hold on power. Chinese investment, loans, and aid have enabled Rahmon to secure political loyalty from those closest to him and to ensure continued support from his political base in Danghara, or from his ‘Danghara clique’.79 Chinese political support, which has expanded under the Xi administration, has provided Rahmon with international legitimacy despite his use of fraud and oppression to secure his continued presi- dency.80 Chinese security support – whether through Chinese-financed joint train- Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 ing or China’s provision of military equipment to Tajikistan – has also helped Dushanbe address domestic instability resulting from social opposition against the state.81 The opacity with which Beijing conducts its affairs with the Tajik elite also fuels public perception of corruption within the Rahmon administration. China’s investment, loans, and aid, in particular, are a source of concern in relation to the state’s corruption. Chinese economic support is largely unconditional in terms of transparency and allocation, which means the Rahmon government has little accountability for how it uses Chinese financing.82 As of 2012, Transparency 86 Sino-Tajikistan relations International ranked Tajikistan 157th out of 176 countries in terms of corruption – placing the country firmly on the higher end of its corruption index – with a score of 9 out of 10 for its inability to control corruption.83 More than 80 per cent of Tajiks identified corruption as one of the country’s most pressing social problems in 2010 in a United Nations Development Programme–sponsored public opinion poll. Corruption, to be certain, is largely a domestic issue in Tajikistan. China’s economic support to the state and country’s elite, however, directly supports the corrupt regime. Both China’s support for Tajikistan’s elite and its contribution to their ongoing corruption play an enabling role in Dushanbe’s continued hold on power, despite perceptions among Tajik society that the state is both illegitimate and ineffective.84 China’s structural power serves to strengthen the Tajik state against the country’s society in ways that maintain the status quo against any domestic-driven change.85 In this respect, China contributes to structural violence in the form of political authoritarianism, political illegitimacy, government corruption, and social oppression. Chinese power over the country’s structure of security also contributes to structural violence between the state and society. China’s push for Dushanbe to securitise terrorism, radicalism, and separatism, for example, exacerbates internal tensions, if not leading to outright hostility, between the Tajik state and local Islamic leaders.86 Tensions between the secular state and Islamic groups have existed, to be sure, outside of China’s influence over Dushanbe. Chinese ideological and material support to move against Islamic groups in the state – nearly all of which do not engage in terrorist activity – does, however, constitute external involvement in the country’s domestic affairs that contributes to structural violence at the local level in two important ways. First, it furthers conflict between the state and society, most evident in the 2012 state-led military action against local Islamic leaders in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Province.87 Sec- ond, it undermines local identity and authority within Tajikistan which, in many instances, is derived from Islam.88 In both instances, Chinese power over the country’s structure of security results in structural violence within Tajik society and between the Tajik state and society.

Notes 1 Martha Brill Olcott, Tajikistan’s Difficult Development Plan (Washington, DC: Carn- Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 egie Endowment for International Peace, 2012), 12–13. 2 Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2010: Democratization from Central Europe to Eurasia (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010), 516. 3 Madeleine Reeves, Movement, Power and Place in Central Asia and Beyond: Con- tested Trajectories (London: Routledge, 2013), 49. 4 World Bank, ‘Migration and Remittance Flows in Europe and Central Asia: Recent Trends and Outlook, 2013–2016’, World Bank, October 2, 2013, http://www.world bank.org/en/news/feature/2013/10/02/migration-and-remittance-flows-in-europe- and-central-asia-recent-trends-and-outlook-2013-2016. 5 ‘Tajikistan: Country Outlook’, EIU ViewsWire, September 17, 2014. Sino-Tajikistan relations 87 6 Emilian Kavalski, Stable Outside, Fragile Inside? Post-Soviet Statehood in Central Asia (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd), 80. 7 Hooman Peimani, Conflict and Security in Central Asia and the Caucasus (Santa Bar- bara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2009), 35. 8 Yu Lintao, ‘Getting Tight with Tajikistan’, Beijing Review, September 25, 2014, http:// www.bjreview.com.cn/world/txt/2014-09/22/content_640966.htm. 9 Dezan Shira, China’s Neighbors: Who Is Influencing China and Who China Is Influ- encing in the New Emerging Asia (London: Spring Science and Business, 2012), 75. 10 Felix B. Chang and Sunnie T. Rucker-Chang, Chinese Migrants in Russia, Central Asia and Eastern Europe (London: Routledge, 2013), 93. 11 ‘China, Tajikistan Pitch for Closer Energy Cooperation, Stronger SCO’, Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, September 9, 2015, http://www.fdi.gov. cn/1800000121_37_45090_0_7.html. 12 Observatory of Economic Complexity, ‘Import Origins of Tajikistan’, last modified May 19, 2014, https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/explore/tree_map/hs/import/tjk/show/ all/2012/. 13 Observatory of Economic Complexity, ‘Export Destinations of Tajikistan’, last modified May 19, 2014, https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/explore/tree_map/hs/export/tjk/ show/all/2012/. 14 Oleg Salimov, ‘China Expands Influence in Tajikistan’, The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, October 1, 2014, http://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/field-reports/ item/13061-china-expands-influence-in-tajikistan.html. 15 Agency on Statistics Under President of the Republic of Tajikistan, Tajikistan in Figures 2013 (Dushanbe: Agency on Statistics Under President of the Republic of Tajikistan), 131. 16 M. Taylor Travel, ‘Economic Growth, Regime Insecurity, and Military Strategy’, in The Nexus of Economics, Security, and International Relations in East Asia, eds. Avery Goldstein and Edward Mansfield (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013), 198. 17 ‘Investment Climate in Tajikistan’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Tajik- istan, accessed April 2015, http://mfa.tj/en/investment-climate/investment-climate-in- tajikistan.html. 18 Yu Lintao, ‘Getting Tight with Tajikistan’. 19 ‘Chinese Investments Prompt Changes in Tajikistan’s 2014–2016 Economic Indica- tors’, Avesta, October 3, 2014, translated by the OSC, CEL2014100450518787. 20 ‘Tajik Premier, Chinese Official Discuss Joint Projects’, Avesta.tj, July 4, 2014, translated by the OSC, CEL2014070445997300. 21 Maria Jesus Herrerias Talamantes, Energy Security and Sustainable Economic Growth in China (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 59. Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 22 Mu Xuequan, ‘Chinese, Tajik Presidents Inaugurate Construction of Gas Pipeline, Ther- mal Power Plant’, Xinhua, September 14, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/ china/2014-09/14/c_126983079.htm. 23 Joanna Lillis, ‘Tajikistan, China Break Ground for Landmark Gas Pipeline’, Eurasi- anet, September 14, 2014, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/69976. 24 Roger Kanet and Rémi Piet, Shifting Priorities in Russia’s Foreign and Security Policy (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing, 2014), 192. 25 Alexandros Petersen, ‘Implications of Tajikistan’s New Chinese-Built Tunnel’, China in Central Asia, November 2, 2012, http://chinaincentralasia.com/2012/11/02/ implications-of-tajikistans-new-chinese-built-tunnel/. 88 Sino-Tajikistan relations 26 Mark Vinson, ‘Road Projects in Tajikistan Impact Its Strategic Geography’, Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume No. 9 (2012), 5. 27 ‘Visiting Tajik President Meets CEOs of Major Chinese Companies’, Khovar, May 19, 2014, translated by the OSC, CEL2014051950968112. 28 ‘Article Says Tajikistan Suffering from Lack of Skilled Workforce’, Asia-Plus Online, August 7, 2013, translated by the OSC, CEL2013081424927187. 29 Alexander Cooley, Great Games, Local Rules: The New Great Power Contest in Cen- tral Asia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 87. 30 ‘Workers of Tajik-Chinese Venture Stage Protest over Low Wages – Agency’, Tojnews Online, September 12, 2011, translated by the OSC, CEP20110912950167. 31 ‘Ex-Tajik Official Calls for Central Asian Integration to Stop Chinese Expansion’, Asia-Plus, December 19, 2013, translated by the OSC, CEL2014010315427233. 32 ‘Tajik Official, Envoy Discuss ‘Improving’ Chinese Labour Migrants’ Status’, Asia-Plus Online, March 9, 2012, translated by the OSC, CEP20120309950058. 33 Paul Goble, ‘Chinese Workers Coming to Tajikistan as Tajik Ones Go to Russia’, Win- dow on Eurasia, October 9, 2012. 34 ‘Rahmon Calls China Tajikistan’s Main Asian Partner, Pledges to Develop Relations with West’, Interfax, April 23, 2014, http://www.interfax.com/newsinf.asp?id=499663; ‘Tajik Leader Says Cooperation with China Key in Foreign Policy’, Tajikistan Televi- sion First Channel, April 23, 2014, translated by the OSC, CEL2014042334760399. 35 Sébastien Peyrouse, ‘Tajikistan’s New Trade: Cross-Border Commerce and the China-Afghanistan Link’, PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 169 (2011), 4. 36 Ibid. 37 ‘Tajik President Upbeat on Cooperation with China’, President of Tajikistan, Septem- ber 13, 2014, CEL2014091343019384. 38 ‘China Vows to Help Tajikistan Combat Terrorism’, Interfax, May 20, 2014; ‘China Gives Tajikistan Cadillacs for SCO Summit’, Interfax, August 20, 2014. 39 ‘Xi Jinping, Tajik President Hold Talks on Deepening Strategic Partnership’, Xinhua Domestic Service, September 13, 2014, translated by the OSC, CHR2014091333 579751. 40 ‘Tajik Police Set to Boost Cooperation with Chinese Counterparts’, Asia-Plus Online, November 26, 2012, translated by the OSC, CEP20121126950009. 41 ‘Tajik Army to Be Equipped with Modern Technologies “Phase by Phase” ’, Imru- zNews, March 14, 2013, translated by the OSC, CEL2013032147911789. 42 ‘ Tajik, Chinese Senior Officials Discuss Combating errorism,T Extremism’, Avesta.tj, September 22, 2014, translated by the OSC, CEL2014092236658986. 43 Kamoludin Abdullaev and Shahram Akbarzaheh, Historical Dictionary of Tajikistan (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2010), 351. 44 ‘Zhonghua renmin gongheguo he Tajikesitan gongheguo guanyu jinyibu fazhan he Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 shenhua zhanlue huoban guanxi de lianhe xuanyan’ (Joint Statement by the People’s Republic of China and Republic of Tajikistan Regarding the Continual Development and Deepening of Strategic Partnership Relations), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, September 13, 2014, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/ zyxw_602251/t1190872.shtml. 45 ‘China Firmly Backs Tajikistan’s Efforts to Safeguard Stability: Premier’, Xinhua, Sep- tember 2, 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-09/02/c_131822988. htm. 46 Alexander Sodiqov, ‘Tajikistan Cedes Disputed Land to China’, Eurasia Daily Moni- tor Vol. 8, No. 16 (2011), 1. Sino-Tajikistan relations 89 47 ‘Opposition Leader Says China Seizes Part of Tajik Land in Eastern Region’, Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, April 15, 2013, translated by the OSC, IML2013041643159769; ‘Tajik Ministry Denies Opposition Claim That China Given More Land Than Agreed’, Asia-Plus Online, April 16, 2013, CEL2013041640310963. 48 World Bank, Tajikistan Partnership Program Snapshot (Washington, DC: World Bank Group, 2015), 2. 49 David Owen et al., Republic of Tajikistan: Debt Sustainability Analysis Under the Debt Sustainability Framework for Low Income Countries (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2011), 7. 50 ‘Chinese Investments Prompt Changes in Tajikistan’s 2014–2016 Economic Indica- tors’, Avesta, October 3, 2014, translated by the OSC, CEL2014100450518787. 51 ‘China’s Economic Expansion Makes Tajikistan Dependent’, Pressa.ti, March 28, 2013, translated by the OSC, CEL2013033053509031. 52 ‘World Bank: Debt Service Costs on the Rise in Tajikistan’, Asia-Plus, May 27, 2013, http://www.news.tj/en/news/world-bank-debt-service-costs-rise-tajikistan. 53 ‘Economist Says Growing Foreign Debts “Threat” to Tajikistan’, Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, August 22, 2012, translated by the OSC, IAP20120823950089. 54 ‘China Advances into Tajikistan Territories: National Social-Democratic Party’, Press TV, April 17, 2013, http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/04/17/298742/china-advances- further-into-tajikistan/. 55 Asian Development Bank, Asian Development Outlook 2014: Fiscal Policy for Inclu- sive Growth (Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2014), 119–20. 56 ‘Tajikistan: Country Outlook’, EIU ViewsWire, September 17, 2014. 57 Marlène Laruelle and Sébastien Peyrouse, Globalizing Central Asia: Geopolitics and the Challenges of Economic Development (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2013), 37. 58 ‘Russia: No Change in Tajikistan’s Principal External Partner Seen’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta Online, November 8, 2013, translated by the OSC, CEL2013110844722764. 59 ‘Zhonghua renmin gongheguo he Tajikesitan gongheguo guanyu jinyibu fazhan he shenhua zhanlue huoban guanxi de lianhe xuanyan’ (Joint Statement by the People’s Republic of China and Republic of Tajikistan Regarding the Continual Development and Deepening of Strategic Partnership Relations). 60 Andrew James Nathan and Andrew Scobell, China’s Search for Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 207. 61 ‘Chinese Man’s Market “Seized” in Tajikistan after He Is Jailed for Rape’, Ozodagon Online, September 4, 2014, translated by the OSC, CEL2014090444114910. 62 ‘Tajikistan: Country Outlook’, EIU ViewsWire, September 17, 2014. 63 Marlène Laruelle, Migration and Social Upheaval as the Face of Globalization in Cen- tral Asia (New York: Brill, 2013), 69. 64 Cooley, Great Games, Local Rules, 87.

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 65 ‘Chinese Farmers Rent More Land in Southern Tajikistan’, Ozodagon, January 18, 2012, translated by the OSC, CEP20120118950136. 66 Luc Nijs, The Handbook of Global Agricultural Markets: The Business and Finance of Land, Water, and Soft Commodities (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 67. 67 Camille Bann, Rakhmon Shukurov, Lutfullo Boziev, and Dilorom Rakhmatova, The Economics of Land Degradation for the Agricultural Sector in Tajikistan (Dushanbe: UNDP-UNEP Poverty Environment Initiative, 2012), 9–10. 68 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Tajikistan: Environmental Perfor- mance Reviews, Second Review (Geneva: UN ECE Information Unit, 2012), http:// www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/epr/epr_studies/TajikistanII.pdf, 130. 90 Sino-Tajikistan relations 69 ‘China to Build Cement Plant, Oil Refinery in Tajikistan’,Tojnews , April 3, 2014, translated by the OSC, CEL2014040449275697. 70 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Tajikistan: Environmental Perfor- mance Reviews, 130. 71 ‘Zijin Mining May Develop Copper Deposit in Tajikistan’, Interfax, June 5, 2012; ‘Tajik Mining Firm Reaches Deal with Chinese Gold Company’, Asia-Plus Online, June 17, 2014, translated by the OSC, CEL2014061813517337. 72 Joao Pedro Azevedo, Aziz Atamanov, and Alisher Rajabov, Poverty Reduction and Shared Prospects in Tajikistan: A Diagnostic (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2014), 14. 73 ‘Status of Chinese Labor Migrants in Tajikistan Discussed in Dushanbe’, Asia-Plus, March 10, 2012. 74 Chris Rickleton, ‘Tajikistan: Under China’s Economic Thumb’, Eurasianet, August 26, 2014. 75 Idil Tunçer-Kılavuz, Power, Networks and Violent Conflict in Central Asia: A Com- parison of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (London: Routledge, 2014), 26. 76 Alexander Sodiqov, ‘From Resettlement to Conflict: Development-Induced Involun- tary Displacement and Violence in Tajikistan’, in The Transformation of Tajikistan: The Sources of Statehood, eds. John Heathershaw and Edmund Herzig (London: Rout- ledge, 2013), 55. 77 Saodat Olimova and Muzaffar Olimov, Environmental Degradation, Migration, Inter- nal Displacement, and Rural Vulnerabilities in Tajikistan (Dushanbe: IOM Interna- tional Organization for Migration, 2012), 21. 78 ‘Report Says China Wants to Dominate Tajikistan through Economic Projects’, Nigoh, January 18, 2012, translated by the OSC, CEP20120204950036. 79 John Heathershaw, Post-Conflict Tajikistan: The Politics of Peacebuilding and the Emergence of Legitimate Order (London: Routledge, 2009), 38. 80 Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2013: Democratization from Central Europe to Eurasia (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), 555; ‘Xi Jinping, ajikT President Hold Talks on Deepening Strategic Partnership’, Xinhua Domestic Service, September 13, 2014, translated by the OSC, CHR2014091333579751. 81 ‘China, Tajikistan to Enhance Cooperation in Security, Law Enforcement’, Xinhua, September 13, 2014; ‘Tajik, Chinese Senior Officials Discuss Combating Terrorism, Extremism’. 82 Jack Farchy, ‘Tajikistan Looks to China as Russian Remittances Dry Up’, Financial Times, October 22, 2014; ‘China Promises Multimillion Military-Technological Aid Package to Tajikistan’, Interfax, March 31, 2014. 83 Transparency International, Overview of Corruption and Anti-Corruption in Tajikistan (Berlin: Transparency International, 2012), 2.

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 84 ‘Tajik Leader Says Cooperation with China Key in Foreign Policy’, Tajikistan Televi- sion First Channel, April 23, 2014, translated by the OSC, CEL2014042334760399. 85 ‘China Firmly Backs Tajikistan’s Efforts to Safeguard Stability: Premier’, Xinhua, September 2, 2012. 86 ‘Tajikistan: Islamic Extremists Control Drug Trafficking Routes – Chinese Minister’, Asia-Plus Online, April 17, 2014, translated by the OSC, CEL2014041760700725. 87 ‘Paper Slams Military Operation by Government Forces in Eastern Tajikistan’, Nigoh, September 29, 2012, translated by the OSC, CEP20121003950164. 88 Hafiz Boboyorov, Collective Identities and Patronage Networks in Southern Tajikistan (Zurich: LIT Verlag Münster, 2013), 21. 5 Sino-Afghanistan relations

Decades of war, civil conflict, and enduring tribalism have left Afghanistan a fundamentally weak and fragmented state. Corruption, cronyism, and involvement by government officials in narco-trafficking further undermined Afghanistan’s political development during the Karzai administration.1 While the establishment of a National Unity Government (NUG) has given some analysts hope that Afghani- stan is now entering a period of relative stability, the power-sharing government does not meaningfully address any of the country’s systemic political deficiencies. Moreover, the NUG has as much potential to lead to breakdowns in power and authority across ethnic lines as it has opportunity to contribute to national unity. That President Ashraf Ghani and “chief executive officer” Abdullah Abdul- lah differ in their interpretations of the structure and form of the power-sharing government does not bode well for the country’s future political stability.2 The opaque process through which the United States, Ghani, and Abdullah reached the power-sharing agreement also undermines the country’s fledgling democratic institutions.3 The country’s economy is also weak, partially the result of political instability (which deters foreign investment) and inefficient political institutions (which prevent the state from collecting revenue) and partially the result of an underperform- ing agricultural sector, which has slowed by nearly two-thirds since 2012 (with the exception of poppy production).4 Corruption and fraud largely undermined the country’s financial institutions; a development best exemplified by the 2010 Kabul Bank fraud scandal. The Afghan government also faces the possibility of censure by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) for its lack of commitment to fights against money laundering and terrorist finance. If such censure occurs, Afghani- Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 stan will experience a drastic reduction in foreign direct investment and Afghan firms will lose their ability to maintain ties with international banks.5 Capital flight from the country, particularly to Dubai, is also a major impediment for growth, as the wealthy shift their resources abroad for fear of the country’s deteriorating security environment and/or to avoid implication in anticorruption investigations.6 According to the Afghan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, insecurity in the country as of 2014 negatively affected the country’s business environment and resulted in widespread closure of firms, contraction in orders, and widespread layoffs.7 92 Sino-Afghanistan relations Even more notable than structural weakness in the country’s economy is its dependency on foreign aid, which many experts anticipate will dramatically decrease in parallel with the overall decrease in International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) in the country post-2014. By way of example, Afghanistan’s nominal GDP in 2012 was $27.8 billion, of which $15 billion was aid expenditure.8 The World Bank has predicted Afghanistan’s annual GDP growth will drop from the 9.4 per cent average it maintained from 2003–12 to 5 percent from 2015–16 because of an overall decrease in foreign aid.9 More than the country’s political and economic systems, Afghanistan’s greatest internal weakness is its security environment which, despite periodic decreases in violence, remains chaotic. In spite of progress made by the US military, NATO, and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) since 2009, the ISAF have not fully defeated the Taliban, which remains a serious security threat to both Kabul and within various provinces. Insurgents based in Pakistan – the Haqqani network in particular – are also a continuing source of insecurity as they continue to move people and weapons into Afghanistan from Pakistan.10 Alliance between the Tali- ban and Haqqani network, which has repeatedly pledged allegiance to the Quetta Shura (Taliban leadership) in recent years, is also far greater than before, with corresponding security implications for the country. The substantial withdrawal of ISAF troops, together with inefficiencies and divided loyalties in the ANSF and Afghan police, will exacerbate these existing security challenges further. The US Department of Defense predicts that Afghanistan’s security forces will lack sufficient air support, intelligence, special operations, and a security ministry capacity to deal with growing threats post-2014.11 China’s presence in Afghanistan has been limited since the beginning of US-led Operation Freedom in 2001. A near collapse of Afghanistan’s political and economic institutions, together with widespread insecurity throughout the country, precluded Chinese involvement in the country’s domestic affairs for the immediate years following the US invasion.12 China’s activities within and toward Afghanistan have, however, increased exponentially in parallel with the country’s improved security environment. Such involvement has, to date, been limited to economic cooperation with Kabul, primarily Chinese investment in the country’s underdeveloped mining sector. China’s recent overtures toward Afghanistan – whether bilateral or through the SCO – however, suggest Beijing is increasingly interested in leveraging its economic linkages with the state to develop political ties, security relations, and cultural exchange. Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 Sino-Afghan relations are, in this respect, somewhat of an outlier to the other case studies this volume examines. Relations between the two states have been limited by fiat until very recently; a disruption in ties that presents a skewed picture of the two countries’ bilateral relations which, historically, have been far more developed that at present. Moreover, much of the structural violence within Afghanistan is the result of oppression by the Taliban, threats by insurgents, and/ or the outcome of more than ten years of ISAF occupation of the country. China has, to date, held limited structural power over the state. Sino-Afghanistan relations 93 Nevertheless, Sino-Afghan ties are worth examining in more detail, as they demonstrate the development of China’s foreign policy approach as it leads to structural power. As with the other states in this volume, China relies first and foremost on economic statecraft to secure ties with Afghanistan. Beijing then leverages its economic importance to secure its other foreign policy aims, which contribute to structural violence when they result in negative outcomes for Afghanistan. In this respect, the Chinese/Afghan case study is a particularly salient example of how structural power and structural violence develop in China’s foreign relations and, as such, is a critical case study in supporting the volume’s overall approach.

Structural power at the systems level

Economic linkages Instability under the Taliban, ISAF control over Afghanistan’s development priorities in the early years of Operation Enduring Freedom, and a lack of physical connectivity stymied economic linkages between China and Afghanistan for much of the last twenty years.13 Since 2004, however, economic ties between the two states have expanded, the direct result of concerted Chinese policy in line with its Go Out Strategy.14 Central to the two states’ economic relations is bilateral trade, both actual and potential. In terms of actual trade, China’s share of Afghanistan’s total trade increased substantially between 2004 – when the two states re-established economic ties following the start of the ISAF campaign – and 2013. The value of Chinese exports to Afghanistan grew from $56 million in 2004 to $3.2 billion in 2013.15 Imports from Afghanistan to China grew from $942 thousand to $100 million over the same time period.16 China’s exports to Afghani- stan consisted of light machinery, construction materials, textiles, and agricultural products, while Afghanistan’s exports to China were mostly leather. The growing importance of trade between the two states is clearest with regard to potential trade relations, particularly as China has taken steps to increase trade with Afghanistan in a number of ways. First, in 2006, China and Afghanistan signed the ‘Agreement between China and Afghanistan on Trade and Economics’, which pledged an increase in Chinese machinery, building materials, electronic equipment, and light industrial goods exported to Afghanistan; eliminated import tariffs on 278 goods from Afghanistan; and identified strategic areas for trade between the two states, such as Afghanistan’s natural resource sector.17 Second, Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 the two states established a strategic partnership in 2012 with a specific focus on expanding trade relations as defined in the 2006 agreement.18 As part of the 2012 ‘Joint Statement on the Establishment of a Sino-Afghan Strategic Partnership’, China eliminated import duties on 95 per cent of Afghan goods to encourage trade.19 Third, China has increased investment to Afghanistan in areas such as mining and infrastructure in support of expanded trade between the two states. Chinese investment to Afghanistan is important to examine further, as it provides insight into how economic exchange between the two states could translate, 94 Sino-Afghanistan relations indeed is translating, into Chinese structural power over the country’s domestic economy. China invests exclusively in Afghanistan’s mineral and energy sectors and in infrastructure around its projects to facilitate both site development and trade. The most prominent example of Chinese investment in mining is the Chinese firms’ Metallurgical Corporation of China (MCC) and Jiangxi Cooper Cooperation (JCCL) 2007 acquisition of Afghanistan’s Aynak copper mine. The two state-owned firms also pledged $6 billion in rail investment to secure the contract in what is China’s largest infrastructure development plan in the country to date.20 A lesser-known example of Chinese investment in the country’s energy sector is the China National Petroleum Corporation’s (CNPC) 2011 investment in the Amu Darya oil fields in the Sari-i-Pul and Faryab Provinces in the country’s northwest.21 Both China and Afghanistan have agreed to work toward conditions that allow for more Chinese investment in Afghanistan’s natural resource sector after 2014.22 Chinese investment is likely in Mazar-e-Sharif, for example, where Kabul is planning to offer tenders for three copper mines, two gold deposits, and a massive oil basin in the near future. China’s firms and, indeed, the Chinese Ministry of Defence have also been involved in infrastructure development in Afghanistan, much of which can facilitate greater trade between the two countries.23 CNPC, for example, has proposed a pipeline extension through Afghanistan as part of its TATC project (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Tajikistan-China) from the Amu Darya gas fields directly to Xinjiang.24 Chinese firms have financed and are building a road through Afghanistan’s Wakhan Corridor that will connect the two countries for the first time. The road will provide traders a land route for direct trade between the XUAR and Badkhshan’s Wakhan District, thereby bypassing the Khyber Pass route through Pakistan on which Afghanistan has long been dependent for trade with China.25 The Wakhan Corridor road also provides China with direct access to more of Afghanistan’s natural resource wealth, particularly timber and gems in the region adjacent to the XUAR’s border. By all accounts – including Beijing and Kabul’s own – China’s position within Afghanistan’s economy will expand exponentially in the coming years, especially after ISAF completes its troop drawdown post-2014. President Ghani has specifically and frequently referenced China as the most important economic actor in Afghanistan’s near- and medium-term economic development approach.26 China’s focus on trade, its investment in Afghanistan’s natural resource sector, and its development of infrastructure provide Beijing with the normative and physical base for Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 power over Afghanistan’s emerging structures. Indeed, without some change in direction from either the Chinese or Afghan governments, the natural progression of the two states’ economic trajectory will likely be Afghan dependency on China as an import/export market and on Chinese aid for domestic development.

State-owned enterprises/private enterprises in Afghanistan China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have steadily gained ground in relation to all other foreign firms in Afghanistan, as they receive direct state support in Sino-Afghanistan relations 95 the form of lower-cost capital and inputs than private firms and are willing to engage in Afghanistan’s deeply corrupt domestic business environment.27 Their dominant position in Afghanistan is almost certain to solidify, as both Chinese and Afghan leadership committed to ‘unprecedented’ economic cooperation in 2014.28 As stated earlier, China and Afghanistan view Chinese economic involvement in the country as a necessary component of Afghanistan’s post-2014 development, particularly as the international assistance Kabul has become dependent on decreases.29 Chinese SOEs’ access to capital, their technical expertise, and their willingness to work in Afghanistan’s difficult domestic environment results in significant structural power for Beijing; a point President Ghani’s repetitive speeches on Afghanistan’s need for Chinese investment and expertise make clear.30 In line with China’s investment priorities, Chinese SOEs in Afghanistan work in the country’s energy or mining sectors. The largest Chinese firms operating in the country are the China National Petroleum Company (CNPC), which is developing the Amu Darya oil fields, and the MCC and Jiangxi Copper Cooperation (JCCL), which are jointly developing the Aynak copper mine. The three companies together have facilitated more than $5 billion in investment to Afghanistan through China’s Exim Bank and the China Development Bank, making China the largest provider of non-military-related FDI into the country. Chinese firms’ penetration of Afghanistan’s domestic market is likely to continue as China becomes more involved in infrastructure development, particularly rail construction, and security. China Railway Construction Corporation, for example, is already involved in projects in Afghanistan and is likely to expand its commercial activities as Chinese involvement in rail development in the country (around the Aynak mine or the Wakhan Corridor, for example) deepens.31 Chi- na’s Huawei – a private firm that receives Chinese government support – is also expanding into telecommunications and fibre optics infrastructure.32 Shandong Huawei Security Group, a private state-backed security agency that is active in Iraq, will also likely become an important Chinese firm in post-2014 Afghanistan as the ISAF discontinues its security provisions for Chinese firms operating in the country.33 These firms’ low-cost operations, particularly in relation to Western firms, their willingness to work in a corrupt environment, and their support from the Chinese government will facilitate their entry into the Afghan market and expand China’s structural power.

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 Ties between cores China’s relations with the Afghan elite have grown substantially over the past several years, the result of former President Karzai’s troubled relations with ISAF leading officials and the outcome of Chinese initiatives to expand relations.34 From the Afghanistan side, elite relations with China were valuable as they provided Karzai with leverage in his negotiations with the United States. This leverage was particularly useful in negotiations over the Bilateral Security Agreement, as Karzai was able to argue that China could replace the ISAF as the country’s primary security provider post-2014.35 As such, Karzai used the ‘China card’ as a 96 Sino-Afghanistan relations balancing force against US dominance, coercion, and/or abandonment.36 Contact between senior Chinese and Afghan officials took place bilaterally and within multilateral venues, especially the SCO and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building in Asia (CICA). Afghan businessmen have also assertively developed ties with China, not the United States or Pakistan, as they increasingly view China as key to Afghanistan’s future economic development.37 China responded to Afghanistan’s overtures by establishing a special envoy to Afghanistan, Sun Yuxi, in 2014. A former ambassador to Afghanistan, Sun’s expressed role was to facilitate greater cooperation and communication between Chinese officials and their Afghan counterparts so as to better advance China’s economic position in the country in ways that supported Afghanistan’s overall development and stability.38 Elite relations between the two states developed further in October 2014, when President Ghani met with China’s top leadership, including Xi Jinping, in his first official trip abroad as acting Afghan president. On his return, Ghani stressed the centrality China plays, and will play, in Afghani- stan’s post-2014 development, both economically and politically. While China has developed, and is developing, ties with Kabul, Beijing is also developing ties with the Afghan Taliban. Meetings between Chinese officials and Taliban leadership have taken place in China and Pakistan over the past several years with the stated intention of addressing China’s security concerns in the XUAR.39 This approach underscores China’s pragmatic dealings with Afghani- stan, which do not necessarily depend on what elite group is in power, only that China meets its economic and security interests.40 China’s elite relations with Afghanistan, derived from its importance as an economic partner to the state, provide Beijing with power over the country’s political and security structures as Kabul increasingly views Chinese support as essential to its stability. As such, China’s influence over the country’s domestic development will likely grow, to the benefit of China’s strategic aims in the country.

Structural power at the state level

Security Without question, the ISAF has defined Afghanistan’s security environment for the past decade. The US military’s strategic and operational aims in the country, in particular, drove Kabul’s security priorities and the development of its police and Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 armed forces. The ISAF’s scheduled drawdown of troops in 2014/15 will, however, fundamentally alter the country’s security dynamics. Uncertainty remains regarding Afghanistan’s future security environment, although most analysts agree the ISAF’s withdrawal will lead to a security vacuum and greater instability in the country.41 Beijing has clearly stated it will not replace the ISAF or United States as Afghanistan’s primary security provider. This does not mean, however, that China does not have security interests in the country and that it will not act to deal with these interests. Since 2014, for example, China has regularly declared its intent Sino-Afghanistan relations 97 to develop closer security ties with Kabul based on the two states’ existent economic linkages.42 Beijing has noted, however, that its security cooperation will be narrower and more focused than the ISAF’s mandate. Specifically, China has outlined its security priorities in Afghanistan as ensuring ETIM does not use the country as a base for attacks and/or influence in the XUAR and protecting its economic interests in the country, particularly around its vulnerable mining sites. As such, China will gain significant power over Afghanistan’s structure of security through the two states’ future cooperation. Beijing will, for example, raise the ETIM as a primary security concern in Afghanistan, perhaps over more salient threats, and pressure Kabul to expend its security resources (both personnel and equipment) to protect China’s commercial activities. The Afghan government has already shown itself willing to prioritise Chinese security concerns in exchange for Chinese economic and security support.43 China is less willing, however, to support Afghan security aims such as dealing with a resurgent Taliban threat or, far more importantly, managing Pakistan’s role in the country’s insecurity.44 The result is an asymmetric security partnership where China sets aspects of Afghanistan’s security agenda in line with its own while ignoring the country’s more pressing security concerns when they do not affect China.

Finance China has not been a significant source of financial support to Afghanistan for much of the past decade. The United States and other ISAF-contributing states have provided the vast majority of economic and military assistance since Opera- tion Enduring Freedom began. According to the US special inspector general for Afghanistan, John F. Sopko, the US alone has provided $104 billion in aid to Afghanistan since 2002, the majority of which went toward infrastructure development and reconstruction and development of Afghanistan’s internal security forces.45 Aid to Afghanistan from the international community over the same period of time totalled $57 billion delivered, $90 billion pledged.46 China’s aid contribution to Afghanistan’s reconstruction between 2002 and 2014 was $250 million.47 China’s role as an important source of aid and loans will, however, fundamentally change post-2014 for two reasons. First, aid from the United States and the rest of the international community will decline in the years following the Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 ISAF’s withdrawal, despite international pledges for continued aid. The US special inspector general for Afghanistan’s quarterly report notes, for example, that aid ‘fatigue’ from the US and the international community will likely force cuts in committed aid in the near term, much as has occurred in other post-conflict scenarios such as Iraq, Bosnia, and Kosovo.48 Second, while China alone with not fill the gap of declining aid, it has pledged increased aid, particularly in support of economic development and security. President Xi announced in 2014 that China would provide $327 million (¥2 billion) to Afghanistan between 2014 and 2017.49 While negligible in relation to aid and grants from the West, the pledge more than 98 Sino-Afghanistan relations doubles the amount of aid China has provided Afghanistan over the past ten years and indicates that China is intent on playing a more central role in the country’s future financial sector. Even more than development aid, Chinese loans have the potential to fundamentally transform its position within Afghanistan’s structure of finance. This volume has repeatedly shown how China uses commercial and concessional loans to secure access to states’ natural resources, particularly mining, and how it develops influence over the respective state’s development direction as a result. China’s use of loans to this effect is perhaps clearest in the Tajikistan case study, where China has used billions of dollars of loans to secure access to the country’s mineral wealth.50 Chinese financial institutions have not yet made offers of loans to Afghanistan, although it is likely only a matter of time.

Production China’s approach to economic relations with Afghanistan, as outlined above, is largely confined to facilitating greater trade between the two states through infrastructure development aimed at greater state-to-state connectivity and through investment in the country’s mining sector. These economic priorities contribute to growth in Afghanistan’s mineral extraction and construction industries while resulting in negative Chinese power over the country’s structure of production. Chinese investment in construction and mining, for example, has led the Afghan government to prioritise development of these components of the economy over others; a prioritisation that will deepen as Kabul becomes more and more reliant on China as the source for the country’s future economic growth post-2014.51 While a state’s overconcentration on development within the construction and mining sectors does contribute to overall GDP growth, it also stymies growth in the manufacturing, agriculture, and/or services sectors, which tend to generate more ‘pro-poor’ growth. As such, economic exchange between Afghanistan and China – both present and future – goes directly against Afghanistan’s stated medium-term structural development priority, which is the equitable and sustainable development of the country’s entire economy. Neither will a model of economic growth driven by Chinese priorities contribute to Afghanistan’s other goals of inclusive job creation, increasing human capital, and strengthening institutions and governance.52 China’s involvement in Afghanistan’s mining sector also contributes to under- Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 development within the industry as Chinese SOEs delay construction of certain mines and/or attempt to renegotiate mining contracts. China’s MCC’s activities at the Aynak mine are a case in point of this behaviour among Chinese firms in Afghanistan. Having won a thirty-year contract to develop Aynak through a competitive bidding process in 2007, MCC has not yet begun to develop the mining site despite its contractual obligation to do so by 2012. Neither has MCC paid its promised $808 million in contractual bonuses to the Afghan government, started construction of a promised rail line to the site, or begun the building of a 400-megawatt power plant for the site.53 As of 2013, MCC ceased all activity Sino-Afghanistan relations 99 around the mine and called for a total renegotiation of its original contract with the Afghan government. The company seeks exemption from its promised infrastructure development and a cut in its royalty payment to 19.5 per cent.54 MCC cited the Afghan government’s attempts to preserve cultural relics around Aynak as the primary factor behind its delays, not, as one might suspect, the country’s security environment. The Afghan Ministry of Mines and Petroleum, however, has refuted this claim through internal studies that show both preservation and mining development are simultaneously possible without negative effect for the country’s artefacts.55 Afghanistan’s dependence on Chinese investment in its mining sector and its vulnerability to Chinese SOEs’ delaying tactics are products of Chinese power over the country’s structure of production. Chinese involvement in the state has both the potential to set Kabul’s development priorities and to undermine production development where doing so provides Chinese firms more leverage to negotiate better commercial terms. As with the structures of security and finance, China’s structural power over Afghanistan’s production will increase in parallel with its commercial activities in the country.

Knowledge China’s power over Afghanistan’s structure of knowledge was severely curtailed for much of the early 2000s as the US-led ISAF undertook military operations in the country to the overall detriment of Kabul’s foreign relations with outside actors. For the majority of the duration of Operation Freedom, Beijing downplayed its bilateral relations with Afghanistan to all but economic and security issues, forgoing cooperation on non-economic matters such as education, culture, and person-to-person exchange.56 Since 2013, however, the Xi administration has sought to expand bilateral relations between the two states to include education exchange, people-to-people exchange, and training for Afghan businessmen and diplomats.57 While still a minor component of Sino-Afghan relations, non-economic ties between the two states are expanding, particularly in the wake of a general drawdown in Western-originating development and training aid. This expansion is a direct result of Chinese state-sponsored initiatives aimed at spread- ing Chinese language and culture in Afghanistan and at increasing institutional ties between Chinese and Afghan businessmen and politicians.58 As with this volume’s other case studies, Beijing has funded and constructed a Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 Confucius Centre at Afghanistan’s most prestigious institute of higher education, Kabul University. Beijing’s embassy in Kabul coordinates activities at the Con- fucius Centre promoting Chinese language and culture, such as a 2013 language competition for Afghan students who spoke on their interpretation of the ‘Chi- nese Dream’ concept.59 The Chinese embassy has also facilitated an institutional partnership between Shaanxi Normal University of China and Kabul University and committed itself to providing funding and opportunity for up to five hundred Afghan students to study in China over the next five years.60 The Chinese government has also announced it will provide training for Afghan entrepreneurs and 100 Sino-Afghanistan relations diplomats both in Afghanistan (through outreach programmes) and in China at designated government-training institutions.61 The Chinese government has also announced its intention to provide training for Afghan military and police officials on matters of shared security concerns.62 This type of elite training, together with a focus on Afghanistan’s academic elite, is central to China’s renewed approach to Afghanistan under Xi Jinping and has the potential to greatly expand Chinese power over the country’s structure of knowledge in the medium to long term.

Structural violence China’s contribution in insecurity in Afghanistan – whether with regard to direct violence or structural violence – is nominal compared with that of the United States and/or other ISAF contributing countries. The decade-plus US-led campaign against the Taliban and other insurgent groups has left a wide swath of human misery in its wake, despite the progress the US military, international aid organisations, and government-affiliated development organisations have made toward human development. Until quite recently, China has been largely a bystander to insecurity in the country. As such, one would be remiss to assign China with disproportionate blame over Afghanistan’s past security situation. This realisation does not, however, absolve China of its negative influence over Afghanistan’s current security environment, particularly as its position within and influence over the country is growing. As shown above, China’s narrow focus on economic relations and security has contributed to undesirable outcomes for the Afghan state and people that one can consider structural violence.

Economy China’s contribution to structural violence in Afghanistan is clearest in relation to the state’s economy. China’s prioritisation of investment and development within Afghanistan’s mining sector – as evident in numerous Chinese government communiqués regarding Sino-Afghan relations – is driving the Afghan state to prioritise the industry to the detriment of the country’s overall economic development.63 This prioritisation is problematic for the Afghan people for a number of economic reasons, as well as non-economic reasons addressed in more detail below. First, reliance on the mining sector for growth does not necessarily translate into increased economic opportunity for the Afghan people. States Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 with resource-dependent economies traditionally are ineffective at creating jobs (unemployment in Afghanistan is officially at 40 per cent, likely much higher) and in reducing poverty.64 Growth from mining tends to conglomerate in urban areas and disproportionately benefit a country’s elite. As such, it is far from certain whether Afghanistan’s mineral wealth can provide a sustainable source of growth for the state with far-reaching, antipoverty effects. Second, an overfocus on mining leads to underdevelopment in the country’s other key industries such as agriculture and manufacturing, both of which contribute far more to human development indicators such as education, employment, Sino-Afghanistan relations 101 and poverty reduction.65 Underdevelopment of a sector occurs when a state does not prioritise infrastructure development around the industries (as is occurring in Afghanistan, where foreign investment – especially Chinese financing – goes almost exclusively to infrastructure development around the mining sector) and when resource revenues cause currency appreciation that makes domestic industries uncompetitive. Chinese involvement in mining has resulting in both outcomes for Afghanistan, to the detriment of social development at the local level.66 Chinese firms’ use of Chinese labour in Afghanistan also contributes to structural violence within Afghan society, as it results in continued unemployment and prevents technology transfers to human capital that the Afghan people desperately need.67 Remittances from Chinese labour out of Afghanistan also affect the country’s development, as much needed capital is removed from the country that could otherwise be reinvested in human capital.68 China and Chinese firms are certainly not the only source of structural violence within Afghanistan’s economic structure, but they do occupy an increasingly central role in the country’s economic development and, as such, have a growing influence over human development in the country related to unemployment and poverty.

Environment One can view China’s influence over structural violence within Afghanistan’s environment on a graduating scale from actual to potential effect. The actual effects China has on structural violence within the country’s environment are clearest at Chinese SOE sites where commercial activity is developed and/or ongoing. The Chinese SOE CNPC’s work at the Amu Darya oil fields is, in this respect, a case in point of China’s actual contribution to structural violence. CNPC’s use of Soviet-era mining technology for oil exploration and extraction has caused river water pollution in the Amu Darya Basin and has contributed to soil degradation and biodiversity disturbance in Sari-i-Pul and Faryab Provinces.69 CNPC’s extraction of petroleum in the region has also led to arsenic seepage into ground drinking water.70 As CNPC’s work at in the Amu Darya is China’s first and largest active project in Afghanistan, the SOE’s contribution to environmentally damaging activity is a concerning precedent. More even than China’s actual contribution to structural violence within the country’s environmental sector is China’s potential to influence environmental Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 structural violence within the state. Such potential is visible at Chinese SOE sites where commercial activity is suspended, developing, or where Chinese firms have expressed intent to develop. Here, the Chinese SOE MCC’s work at the Aynak copper deposit is an important case study, as Afghanistan’s National Environment Protection Agency (ANEPA) specifically identified MCC’s production plans as a potential source of pollution and environmental degradation for the country in 2014. The ANEPA cited MCC’s unwillingness to develop a transparent environmental protection plan and the SOE’s intent to use environmentally damaging extraction methods as the source of its concern.71 MCC plans to use coal to extract 102 Sino-Afghanistan relations copper, a method that commonly contributes to air and soil pollution. ANEPA also criticised MCC for failing to clarify how it intends to mitigate the sulphide and acid sulphuric gases copper extraction produces and how it plans to dispose of industrial waste. Chinese firms’ activities in Badakhshan Province’s Wakhan District – home to the tugai forests and Afghanistan’s largest gem reserves – also have potential to cause structural violence within Afghanistan’s environmental sector.72 The abun- dance of timber in the Wakhan District, its proximity to China, Afghanistan’s inability to regulate commercial activity in the area, and Chinese firms’ regular engagement in illegal logging within China’s periphery states all increase the possibility of deforestation in the region.73 Chinese firms’ regular use of cheap, noxious chemicals for gemstone mining also raises the possibility that Chinese mining in Afghanistan’s Wakhan District will result in water and soil pollution.74 Far from hypothetical outcomes, Chinese state-controlled firms have already expressed their intent to exploit the Wakhan District’s natural resources and have engaged in such environmentally damaging activities in logging and gem extraction in the past.75 China is not, of course, the only state involved in Afghanistan that contributes to structural violence within the state’s environment. It is, however, the state with the most significant economic presence in the country and, consequentially, the most influential foreign actor in Afghanistan’s domestic environmental development, for better or worse.

Society China requires stability in Afghanistan to advance its economic-centric policies toward the state. China’s strategy to ensure stability in Afghanistan is not, however, predicated on singular support of Afghanistan’s current government. While Beijing has vigorously pursued closer relations with Kabul in recent years, for example, it has concurrently engaged with the Taliban as part of a more general hedging strategy.76 Chinese government officials have met with Taliban leadership, including the Quetta Shura based out of Pakistan, both in China and Pakistan on multiple occasions since the mid-2000s.77 Beijing has justified its engagement with the Taliban through claims that its talks support peace process efforts in Afghanistan. Chinese state media and government-affiliated analysts, however, suggest China’s dealings with the Taliban serve the more immediate purpose of Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 securing China’s commercial activities in Afghanistan and in dealing with potential terrorist threats originating in Pakistan and Afghanistan toward the XUAR.78 Neither has China’s interaction with the Taliban been without cost for Kabul, as Beijing’s support has emboldened it against the Afghan state. In direct contrast to the Afghan government’s requests, for example, Beijing has pressured the Pakistani government not to target Taliban groups in the Federally Admin- istered Tribal Areas (FATA).79 China has done this in exchange for guarantees from Taliban leadership that the group would not target China in the XUAR or Chinese interests in Pakistan and/or Afghanistan.80 China’s hedging approach has Sino-Afghanistan relations 103 been successful in that it ensures Chinese commercial and security interests in the region. China’s outreach to the Taliban, conversely, undermines Afghanistan’s already weak government and contributes to greater political and social instability within the state. Chinese economic activities in Afghanistan also contribute to socially oriented structural violence in the form of land reclamation, forced relocation, and loss of livelihood. MCC’s work to date at the Aynak copper concession is emblematic of this type structural violence, as it has resulted (and will result) in forced displacement of families from nine villages and the reclamation of local agricultural land.81 Per its contract with the Afghan government, MCC is responsible for development and implementation of land resettlement plans in conjunction with the Afghan Ministry of Mines. Since 2013, however, the SOE has attempted to renegotiate its contract with the Afghan government so it bears less financial responsibility for environmental and social impact.82 As China is almost exclusively interested in Afghanistan’s extractive industries, this model of corporate behaviour and its contribution to violence within the country’s social structure is deeply concerning. The Chinese government has also made clear that it will not intervene in Afghanistan militarily in order to provide the state with security. China has repeatedly stated that its interests in the country are limited to economic exchange – which it argues will contribute to stability – and that it views military support as interference in Afghanistan’s domestic affairs. It is not, of course, China’s responsibility to provide for Afghanistan’s security. China does, however, intend to engage in commercial activity in the country, much of which will generate local opposition and require security. The Afghan government must use its limited security resources to protect China’s commercial interests, which, as this chapter argues, are largely exploitative in nature. As such, one can view China’s refusal to engage in security stabilising operations in Afghanistan as a contributor to structural violence in the form of exploitation and social instability. Closely related is China’s influence over employment, labour relations, and poverty reductions through its place as a central actor in Afghanistan’s domestic economy. As this chapter has already addressed this aspect of structural violence in relation to China’s influence over the state’s economy, it is enough here to highlight its linkages to insecurity within the country’s social sector.

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 State/society relations The Afghan government remains deeply troubled in terms of its relations with large parts of the Afghan population, to no fault of China’s. Kabul, despite more than a decade of support and help from US political advisors and the ISAF, has not successfully consolidated its legitimacy and/or its sovereign control outside the country’s capital. China is not, however, blameless in its actions and does contribute to structural violence within state/society relations. Chinese commercial activity in the mining sector, for instance, contributes to corruption in Afghanistan’s government, which, according to Transparency 104 Sino-Afghanistan relations International, ranked 172 out of 175 countries in terms of corruption in 2014.83 Chinese SOEs such as MCC have used direct bribes in the form of ‘bonuses’ to secure contracts in Afghanistan’s mining sector. MCC promised the Afghan state $808 million in bonuses to secure the Aynak contract, at least $30 million of which was later shown to be a direct bribe to a Ministry of Mining official.84 China’s willingness to engage in corrupt practices with Kabul is likely also a factor in Afghanistan’s flawed mining regulations, published in 2013. The regulations do not require the Afghan government to make public the source of funding for mining contracts, do not put in place safeguards to avoid bribery during the tender process, and fail to establish local community monitoring mechanisms at mine sites.85 They are, as such, not in line with Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) standards. That China is the country’s largest provider of investment in the mining industry, has engaged in corrupt activities in the past, and benefits from the inherent weakness in the country’s regulations suggests Chinese structural power over the state’s regulation development process. A 2014 Integrity Watch Afghanistan survey on Afghan public opinion identified corruption in the government as the country’s second most serious problem after insecurity.86 These findings closely mirrored a 2013 Asian Foundation public opinion poll that noted 95 per cent of Afghan respondents identified corruption in the government as a ‘major problem’ – the highest percentage of respondents to do so since the Asia Foundation’s first survey in 2006.87 This increase in concern over corruption corresponds with a decrease in reported confidence in government.88 One can view China’s contribution to corruption in the Afghanistan government, therefore, as an indirect impediment to state/society relations in the country. China’s involvement in corrupting activities, as such, contributes to structural violence in the form of tension between the Afghan people and government. China’s focus on mining in the country, Kabul’s prioritisation of partnership with China to develop its mining sector, and Chinese firms’ insistence on nego- tiating (or renegotiating) mining contracts in their favour at the cost of mining revenue for the state also opens China to charges of exploitation and Kabul to charges of insufficient oversight and protection of the state’s most important natural resources.89 Kyrgyzstan stands as an important example of how perceptions among society that the state is pursuing its own commercial interests with China at the cost of social development and the country’s natural resources can contribute to tension within state/society relations. While this outcome of Chinese struc- Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 tural power remains more of a potential than actual development, international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) such as Global Witness and Afghan NGOs such as Integrity Watch Afghanistan have already raised concerns about China’s presence in the mining industry and Kabul’s seeming inability to ensure that the Afghan people benefit as much as the Afghan elite.90

Notes 1 Richard W. Mansbach and Kirsten L. Taylor, Introduction to Global Politics (London: Routledge, 2013), 238. Sino-Afghanistan relations 105 2 Srinjoy Bose and Niamat Ibrahimi, ‘Why Afghanistan’s National Unity Govern- ment Is Risky’, Foreign Policy, July 22, 2014, http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/07/22/ why-afghanistans-national-unity-government-is-risky/. 3 ‘Democracy, Afghan-Style’, The Economist, September 27, 2014. 4 World Bank, Afghanistan Economic Update (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2014), 3. 5 ‘Afghanistan Economy: Quick View – Afghanistan Avoids FATF Blacklisting’, EIU ViewsWire, July 1, 2014. 6 The Soufan Group, ‘TSG IntelBrief: Afghanistan’s Capital Flight and Post-2014 Future’, The Soufan Group, January 8, 2014, http://soufangroup.com/tsg-intelbrief- afghanistans-capital-flight-and-post-2014-future/. 7 Afghanistan Chamber of Commerce, ACCI Business Tendency Survey Report (Kabul: Afghanistan Chamber of Commerce, 2014), 5. 8 ‘Afghanistan: Country Outlook’, EIU ViewsWire, June 10, 2014. 9 World Bank, Afghanistan Economic Update (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2014), 18. 10 Jonathan Schroden et al., Independent Assessment of the Afghan National Security Forces (Washington, DC: CNA Analysis and Solutions, 2014), 307–8. 11 United States Department of Defense, Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2014), 24. 12 Robert D. Crews and Amin Tarzi, The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan (Cam- bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 332. 13 M. J. Gohari, The Taliban: Ascent to Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 88; Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy, Opium: Uncovering the Politics of the Poppy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 55. 14 ‘Zhong-A jingmao’ (Sino-Afghan Trade), Economic and Commercial Counsellor’s Office of the People’s Republic of China in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2009, http://af.mofcom.gov.cn/article/zxhz/hzjj/200902/20090206056087.shtml; ‘Afuhan’ (Afghanistan), Economic and Commercial Counsellor’s Office of the People’s Repub- lic of China in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (2014), http://fec.mofcom.gov.cn/ gbzn/upload/afuhan.pdf. 15 Observatory of Economic Complexity, ‘Import Origins of Afghanistan’, last modified May 19, 2014, http://atlas.media.mit.edu/explore/tree_map/hs/import/afg/show/ all/2004/. 16 Observatory of Economic Complexity, ‘Export Destinations of Afghanistan’, last modified May 19, 2014, https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/explore/tree_map/hs/export/ afg/show/all/2004/. 17 ‘Zhongguo yu Afuhan fabiao lianhe shengming’ (China and Afghanistan Issue a Joint Declaration), Xinhua, June 20, 2006. 18 ‘Zhonghua renmin gongheguo yu Afuhan Yisilan gongheguo guanyu jianli zhanlue hezuo huoban guanxi de lianhe xuanyan’ (Joint Statement from the People’s Republic

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 of China and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on the Establishment of Strategic Cooperative Partnership Relations), Xinhua, June 8, 2012. 19 ‘Zhongguo dui Afuhan 95% shu hua chanpin jiyu ling guanshui daiyu’ (China Grants Afghanistan Goods 95% Tariff Free Status), Economic and Commercial Counsellor’s Office of the People’s Republic of China in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2012, http://af.mofcom.gov.cn/article/zxhz/sbmy/201210/20121008382592.shtml. 20 Erica Downs, ‘China Buys into Afghanistan’, SAIS Review Vol. 32, No. 2 (2012), 65. 21 ‘Provincial Governor Says China Company to Resume Oil Extraction in Afghan North’, Afghan Islamic Press, August 9, 2013, translated by the OSC, SAL2013080941111024. 22 ‘Shenhua Zhong-A zhanlue hezuo huoban guanxi’ (Deepen China and Afghanistan’s Strategic Cooperative Partnership Relations), Xinhua, October 29, 2014. 106 Sino-Afghanistan relations 23 Russell Hsiao and Glen E. Howard, ‘China Builds Closer Ties to Afghanistan through Wakhan Corridor’, The Jamestown Foundation Vol. 10, No. 1 (2010), 1. 24 Alexandros Petersen, ‘Afghanistan Has What China Wants’, Foreign Policy, April 18, 2013, http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/04/18/afghanistan-has-what-china-wants/. 25 ‘Afghanistan: Afghanistan Ready to Construct Wakhan-China Road: MoPW’, TOLO- news Online, October 29, 2014. 26 ‘Afghan Paper Says China Can Be Good Economic Partner’, Hasht-e-Sobh, Octo- ber 28, 2014, translated by the OSC, SAL2014103035437283; ‘Afghan MP Backs Good Relations with China’, 1TV, October 29, 2014, translated by the OSC, SAL20141 02951607595. 27 Erica Downs, ‘China Buys into Afghanistan’, SAIS Review Vol. 32, No. 2 (2012), 70–71. 28 ‘Afghanistan: Ghani Visit to China May Expand Regional Cooperation’, OSC Media Note, November 18, 2014. 29 Zalmay Khalilzad, ‘Why Afghanistan Courts China’, New York Times, November 3, 2014. 30 ‘Afghan President Hopes China Would Contribute to Economic Reconstruction of His Country’, QNA, October 27, 2014. 31 Dmitri Titoff, ‘China Aims to Compete Globally with Railroads’, Silk Road Reporters, January 6, 2015, http://www.silkroadreporters.com/2015/01/09/china-aims-compete- globally-railroads/. 32 Nathaniel Ahrens, China’s Competitiveness: Myth, Reality, and Lessons for the United States and Japan: Case Study: Huawei (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2013), 22. 33 Andrew Erickson and Gabe Collins, ‘Enter China’s Security Firms’, The Diplomat, February 21, 2012, http://thediplomat.com/2012/02/enter-chinas-security-firms/. 34 ‘Afghanistan-China’s Developing Relations’, The Afghanistan Express, July 21, 2014. 35 ‘Pakistan: Editorial Hails Pact with China, Russia to Enhance Post-2014 Coop- eration on Afghanistan’, Nawa-e Waqt, November 22, 2013, translated by the OSC, SAL2013112227421960; ‘China to Support Afghanistan Regardless of US Security Deal’s Fate’ Cheragh, February 24, 2014, translated by the OSC, SAL2014022638 499534. 36 ‘Karzai Sees China’s Greater Role in Establishing Peace in Afghanistan’, Afghan Islamic Press, July 24, 2014, translated by the OSC, SAL2014072424549870. 37 ‘Afghan Business Chief Stresses Importance of China Visit’, Tolo News, May 19, 2014, translated by the OSC, SAL2014051946386459. 38 ‘Zhongguo waijiaobu Afuhan shiwu teshi Sun Yuxi baihui Afuhan zongtong Ka’erzayi’ (China’s Minister of Afghan Affairs Sun Yuxi Pays a Visit to Afghan President Kar- zai), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2014, http://www. fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/wjbxw_602253/t1177419.shtml.

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 39 Andrew Small, ‘Why Is China Talking to the Taliban? Inside Beijing’s Plan to Set Up Shop in Post-Karzai Kabul’, Foreign Policy, June 21, 2013, http://foreignpolicy. com/2013/06/21/why-is-china-talking-to-the-taliban/. 40 Zhao Huasheng, China and Afghanistan: China’s Interests, Stances, and Perspectives (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2012), 9. 41 Brooks Tigner, ‘Central Asia Braces for Fall-Out from ISAF Withdrawal’, IHS Jane’s 360, October 23, 2014. 42 ‘Afghans Pin Hope on China to Play Proactive Role in Stabilizing Afghanistan’, Xin- hua, October 30, 2014; ‘Afghanistan: Analysts Want Ghani to Seek Out China’s Help on Pakistan, Taliban’, TOLOnews Online, October 23, 2014. Sino-Afghanistan relations 107 43 Matthew Rosenberg, ‘China’s Uighur Unrest Is Opportunity for Afghans’, New York Times, November 5, 2014. 44 ‘Afghanistan: Analysts Want Ghani to Seek Out China’s Help on Pakistan, Taliban’, TOLOnews Online, October 23, 2014. 45 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress (Washington, DC: Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, 2014), 1. 46 International Crisis Group, ‘Aid and Conflict in Afghanistan’, International Cri- sis Group, August 4, 2011, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/ afghanistan/210-aid-and-conflict-in-afghanistan.aspx. 47 Shannon Tiezzi, ‘Can China Save Afghanistan? The 2014 Istanbul Process, Hosted by China, Is a Litmus Test of Regional Support for Kabul in the Post-NATO Era’, The Dip- lomat, October 31, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/10/can-china-save-afghanistan/. 48 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress (Washington, DC: Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, 2014), 7. 49 ‘Zhonghua renmin gongheguo yu Afuhan Yisilan gongheguo guanyu shenghua zhanlue hezuo huoban guanxi de lianhe shengming’ (Joint Statement by the People’s Republic of China and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on the Deepening of Their Stra- tegic Cooperative Partnership Relations), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, October 29, 2014, http://www.mfa.gov.cn/mfa_chn/zyxw_602251/ t1205144.shtml. 50 Marlène Laruelle and Sébastien Peyrouse, Globalizing Central Asia: Geopolitics and the Challenges of Economic Development (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2013), 37. 51 Lynne O’Donnell, ‘Afghanistan’s Plan to Jumpstart Economy with Chinese Min- ing Investment under Threat’, South China Morning Post, September 20, 2013, http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1313161/afghanistans-plan-jumpstart- economy-chinese-mining-investment-under-threat. 52 World Bank, Afghanistan Economic Update (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2014), 21. 53 O’Donnell, ‘Afghanistan’s Plan to Jumpstart Economy with Chinese Mining Invest- ment under Threat’. 54 Lynne O’Donnell, ‘China’s MCC Turns Back on US$3B Mes Aynak Afghanistan Mine Deal’, South China Morning Post, March 20, 2014. 55 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Mines and Petroleum, Sustainable Devel- opment of National Resources Program: Anyak Copper Mine: Compliance Monitoring Project (Kabul: Ministry of Mines and Petroleum, 2013), 8. 56 Zhao Huasheng, China and Afghanistan: China’s Interests, Stances, and Perspectives (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2012), 2. 57 ‘Zhu Afuhan dashi Deng Xijun chuxi di er jie “Afuhan-Zhongyao duihua hui” bing

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 jianghua’ (Chinese Ambassador to Afghanistan Deng Xijun Attends the Second ‘Afghanistan-China Dialogue’ to Deliver a Speech), December 12, 2014, http:// af.china-embassy.org/chn/sgxw/t1219039.htm. 58 ‘Wang Yi Holds Talks with Foreign Minister of Afghanistan Zarar Ahmed Moqbel Osmani’, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of Germany, February 23, 2014, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cgham/det/gnxw/t1131891.htm. 59 ‘Remarks by H. E. Deng Xijun, Chinese Ambassador to Afghanistan at “My Chi- nese Dream” Speech Competition’, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, October 21, 2013, http://af.china-embassy.org/eng/ sgxw/t1091235.htm. 108 Sino-Afghanistan relations 60 ‘Zhu Afuhan dashi Deng Xijin zai “Zhong-A guanxi weilai fazhan” yantaohui shang de jianghua’ (Chinese Ambassador to Afghanistan Gives a Speech at a Seminar on ‘The Future Development of Sino-Afghan Relations’), Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, November 13, 2014, http:// af.china-embassy.org/chn/sgxw/t1210592.htm. 61 ‘Wu Xi gongshi chixi Zhong-Mei hezuo peixun Afuhan waijiaoguan kaiban yishi’ (Minister Wu Xi Attends the Opening Ceremony of Sino-US Diplomatic Training Center for Afghanistan), Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States, October 22, 2014, http://www.china-embassy.org/chn/sgxx/sgld/wxgs/wxgszy hd/t1203143.htm. 62 Chen Shan, ‘Zhongguo jiang jiyu Afuhan gengduo zhichi’ (China Will Give Afghani- stan More Support), People’s Daily, July 28, 2014, http://military.people.com. cn/n/2014/0727/c172467-25348087.html. 63 ‘Expectations from China Visit’, Hasht-e-Sobh, October 28, 2014, translated by the OSC, SAL2014103035437283. 64 Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey Sachs, and Joseph E. Stiglitz, Escaping the Resource Curse (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 177. 65 S.B.D. de Silva, The Political Economy of Underdevelopment (London: Routledge, 2012), 31–32. 66 J. Edward Conway, ‘How Afghanistan Can Escape the Resource Curse’, Foreign Affairs, February 29, 2012. 67 Hamid Wahed Alikuzai, A Concise History of Afghanistan in 25 Volumes, Vol. 14 (Vic- toria: Trafford Publishing, 2013), 819. 68 Samuel Munzele Maimbo and Dilip Ratha, Remittances: Development Impact and Future Prospects (Washington, DC: World Bank Publications, 2005), 356. 69 ‘Amu River Basin Contract Seen Detrimental for Afghanistan’, Pajhwok Afghan News, November 30, 2014, http://mines.pajhwok.com/news/amu-river-basin-contract- seen-detrimental-afghanistan. 70 Susan Murcott, Arsenic Contamination in the World: An International Sourcebook 2012 (Portland: IWA Publishing, 2012), 3. 71 ‘Ainak Copper Mine Extraction Can Cause Environmental Pollution’, Pajhwok Afghan News, August 31, 2014, http://mines.pajhwok.com/news/ainak-copper-mine-extraction- can-cause-environmental-pollution. 72 Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Provincial Profile: Badakhshan (Kabul: United Nations Development Programme, 2008), 1. 73 Environmental Investigation Agency, Appetite for Destruction: China’s Trade in Ille- gal Timber (London: Environmental Investigation Agency, 2012), 5; Global Witness, A Disharmonious Trade: China and the Continued Destruction of Burma’s Northern

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 Frontier Forests (London: Global Witness, 2009), 45. 74 Joel Jay Kassiola, China’s Environmental Crisis: Domestic and Global Political Impacts and Responses (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 97. 75 Wang Xinxue, ‘Jianlun zhongguo shifou yinggai kaifang Wahan zoulang’ (Consider- ing Whether China Should Open the Wakhan Corridor), Beijing Language and Cul- tural University Humanities Institute Research Publication No. 6 (2010), 179; Zhu Yongbbiao and Cao Wei, ‘Afuhan wenti yu Zhongguo guanlian’ (The Afghan Prob- lem as Related to China), South Asian Studies Quarterly No. 1 (2012), 2; Luiz Drude de Lacerda, Environmental Geochemistry in Tropical and Subtropical Environments (Berlin: Springer Science & Business Media, 2004), 137; Luiz Drude de Lacerda, Sino-Afghanistan relations 109 Environmental Geochemistry in Tropical and Subtropical Environments (Berlin: Springer Science & Business Media, 2004), 137. 76 ‘Waijiaobu huiying “ni yaoqing Taliban daibiao canjia Afuhan he tan’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Responds to Doubts over Inviting the Taliban to Send Representation to Negotiations with Afghanistan), People’s Daily, November 14, 2014, http://politics. people.com.cn/n/2014/1114/c70731-26020175.html. 77 Small, ‘Why Is China Talking to the Taliban?’. 78 ‘Dong Manyuan: Taliban weixie Afuhan zhengfu tongyang weixie Zhongguo’ (Dong Manyuan: Taliban Threatens the Afghan Government the Same as It Threatens China), Phoenix Television, November 1, 2014, http://phtv.ifeng.com/a/20141101/40854067_0. shtml; ‘Zhongguo zai Afuhuan de touzi refou anquan’ (Is China’s Investment in Afghanistan Safe?), Observer, October 29, 2014, http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2014-10- 29/1259808154_2.html. 79 ‘China Can Play Fundamental Role in Ensuring Peace in Afghanistan’, Arman-e Melli, October 28, 2014, translated by the OSC, SAL2014102941537013. 80 Andrew Small, The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 136. 81 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Mines and Petroleum, ‘Note on Resettlement Process of Project Affected Persons at Aynak’, Ministry of Mines and Petroleum (2010), 3, http://mom.gov.af/Content/files/Resettlement_of_People_Affected_by_Mining_in_% 20Aynak.pdf. 82 O’Donnell, ‘China’s MCC Turns Back on US$3B Mes Aynak Afghanistan Mine Deal’. 83 Transparency International, ‘Corruption Perceptions Index 2014: Results’, Transpar- ency International, accessed April 20, 2015, http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/ results. 84 Elizabeth Economy and Michael Levi, By All Means Necessary: How China’s Resource Quest Is Changing the World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 77. 85 Stephen Carter, ‘Gaps in New Afghan Mining Law Pose a Threat to Stability’, Global Witness, August 19, 2014, http://www.globalwitness.org/library/gaps-new-afghan- mining-law-pose-threat-stability. 86 Integrity Watch Afghanistan, ‘Corruption Has Become Afghanistan’s Second Biggest Problem’, Integrity Watch Afghanistan, May 28, 2014, http://www.iwaweb.org/ncs/. 87 Asia Foundation, Afghanistan in 2013: A Survey of the Afghan People (Washington, DC: Asia Foundation, 2013), 79. 88 Ibid., 70. 89 Sai Felicia Krishna-Hensel, New Security Frontiers: Critical Energy and the Resource Challenge (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd, 2012), 122. 90 Global Witness, Copper Bottomed? Bolstering the Aynak Contract: Afghanistan’s First Major Mining Deal (London: Global Witness, 2012). Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 6 Sino-Pakistan relations

Pakistan differs from this volume’s other case studies as it possesses significant advantages in terms of its strategic assets and geostrategic placement. The country is the world’s sixth largest state by population, fourth largest possessor of nuclear weapons, and second largest Muslim state.1 Its geographic position at the juncture of China, India, Central Asia, and South Asia makes it the ‘fulcrum of Asia’ with the potential to act as a hub for regional interaction such as trade.2 More than any other state this volume examines, Pakistan’s natural endowments provide it the potential to develop into a significant regional power. As of 2015, however, Paki- stan’s potential is unrealised and the country is fundamentally weak. The primary source of Pakistan’s weakness is the country’s political system, which is ineffective, illegitimate, and corrupt. The central government (hereafter, Islamabad) does not have control over large portions of Pakistan’s territory, particularly in Balochistan and Sindh provinces, where there are ongoing separatist movements, and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), where powerful warlords and extremist groups such as the Taliban exert control. Neither is the state capable of providing security in key cities like Karachi, Peshawar, and Quetta, where conflict between sectarian and ethnic groups has undermined security for the cities’ respective residents.3 Violence by opposition groups led by former cricketer Imran Khan and Sufi cleric Tahir ul-Qadri have undermined the democratic gains the country made in 2013 with the successful transition of a civilian-led government for the first time in its history.4 Transparency International ranks the Pakistani state as 126 out of 176 countries on measures of corruption.5 The state is rife with nepotism, maladministration, and political vendettas – all of which serve to delegitimise its mandate to govern.6 Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 More fundamentally, competition for political influence, legitimacy, and authority among the state, the military, and Islamism leads to a diffusion of political power across the state that contributes to state weakness.7 The Pakistani state is just one of three rival political forms of government, all of which enjoy similar percentages of public support among the general population. Pakistan’s youth, however, are increasingly disillusioned with democracy in the country and view Islamic law, or shariah, as a preferable model of governance.8 Pakistan’s domestic economy is also weak, having registered an average of 3 per cent GDP growth over the past several years, which is insufficient to raise Sino-Pakistan relations 111 Pakistani living standards and to provide enough opportunity for the growing labour force.9 Productivity growth has fallen considerably over the past two decades and private investment in the country – which accounted for around 8.7 per cent of GDP in 2014 – has fallen by half over the past five years.10 Inflation in 2014 averaged 8 per cent over 80 per cent of the country’s goods, but reached 38 per cent on energy and housing-related inflation.11 Close to 60 per cent of all Paki- stanis continue to live below the international poverty line of $2 a day.12 While as of 2015, Islamabad was pursuing economic reform on macroeconomic stability and fiscal consolidation, widespread doubt persists among economists and analysts as to whether the state can succeed in invigorating the economy in the face of chronic energy shortages and continued – in some ways deepening – violence and insecurity throughout the country.13 Pakistan’s poor track record of economic management over its entire history adds to concerns over the country’s current economic development trajectory.14 Pakistan’s incredibly diverse and divided society is also a major source of weakness for the state, as well as a source of insecurity. Ethnic conflict over nationalist identity persists between the Baloch, Sindhi, and Mohajir ethnic groups and the Pakistani state.15 These ethnic conflicts are an existential threat to the modern Pakistani state, as they contain separatist movements that seek to break the country apart. The 1971 breakaway of ‘East Pakistan’ to become Bangladesh provides important precedent in this regard and a continuing motivation for the country’s separatist movements that autonomy and/or independence is possible to achieve through violence and struggle. The devolution of state powers away from the central government toward tribal leaders in the FATA also contributes to instability in the state. Islamabad’s use of local tribal structures of authority to indirectly govern the FATA, for example, has allowed for the development of alternative sources of political power in the shape of warlords – many of whom are adverse to the central government’s control and openly hostile to the idea of inclusion in a Pakistani ‘state.’16 The government’s continued reliance on the colonial-era Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) contributes to the underdevelopment of a modern legal architecture in the FATA that leads to disenfranchisement of large portions of the country’s population from the modern state and ongoing conflict in the region, often aimed against the state itself.17 The FATA is now essentially outside Islamabad’s control and has become a safe haven for separatist and terrorist organisations such as Al-Qaeda in Pakistan, the Tehrik-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan (TTP, Pakistan Taliban), and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 (LeJ), all of which launch periodic attacks against targets inside Pakistan.18 The TTP in the FATA organised an attack on a school in Peshawar in December 2014 where seven men killed 132 children. Pakistan also faces insecurity stemming from sectarian violence as opposing sects of Islam target one another.19 Attacks between Sunni and Shia groups in particular are a regular feature of Pakistan’s domestic security environment and have become more violent throughout the country. Both Sunni and Shia militant groups have employed tactics such as suicide bombings at religious sites during prayer time.20 Sectarian violence overlaps closely with insecurity related to government 112 Sino-Pakistan relations ineffectiveness and tribalism in the FATA. The TTP and LeJ, for example, are Salafi-jihadist Sunni groups that target Shia as well as the Pakistani military and civilians. China has acted as one of few constants in Pakistan’s chaotic history; a position that has earned it the sobriquet of ‘all-weather friend’. China’s political and economic support for the country have been bulwarks for Pakistan against external pressures from regional actors, such as India, and global powers, such as the United States.21 While Beijing’s initial motivation for relations with Islamabad were initially dominated by security concerns, the two states’ relations have expanded to include political, economic, and social as well as security ties.22 Aside from the United States – with which Islamabad maintains a troubled relationship – China is Pakistan’s foremost foreign partner, with a corresponding level of influence over the state’s domestic affairs. In this respect, one can view China’s structural power over Pakistan and its influence over structural violence in the state as the product of China’s unconditional support for Islamabad and its willingness to supplement the state’s economy through massive investment. While stabilising on the one hand, Chinese influence over the state has also allowed for the continuation of a deeply illegitimate central polity and the underdevelopment of domestic institutions to address the sources of the country’s fundamental economic malaise. So is China’s insistence that Paki- stan address its security concerns in relation to the ETIM driving developments in the state that threatens instability along ethnic lines in the FATA.23 China is not, of course, the sole actor responsible for Pakistan’s deeply troubled domestic security environment. Its dominant position within the state and its resulting sizable influence do, however, translate into structural power and structural violence as defined by this volume.

Structural power at the systems level

Economic linkages Since the two countries implemented a free trade agreement (FTA) in 2007, China has become Pakistan’s most important trade partner.24 Bilateral trade between the two states grew from $6.8 billion in 2008 to $14.3 billion in 2013; a 14.5 per cent increase in overall trade from 2012.25 The Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FPCCI) predict trade between the two states will top Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 $15 billion in 2015 and grow exponentially following the establishment of the newly proposed economic corridor between the two states.26 To put these numbers into perspective, Pakistan’s trade with the United States – its second most important trade partner as of 2014 – amounted to just $5.3 billion in 2013.27 In 2013, China was the second largest recipient of Pakistan’s exports at 11 per cent ($3.2 billion).28 Over the same period, China was the second largest supplier of imports to Pakistan, accounting for 16 per cent of the country’s total imports, valued at $11.1 billion.29 Pakistan’s trade deficit with China as of 2013 stood at $7.8 billion.30 Industry analysts believe that overall trade between the two states, Sino-Pakistan relations 113 particularly in terms of China’s exports to Pakistan, is far larger, as illegal trade between the two states is rampant. The overall composition of bilateral trade between the two states has enabled China to gain structural power over aspects of Pakistan’s domestic economy. Unbal- anced trade in China’s favour, for example, results in disruption and/or underdevelopment in Pakistan’s economy as cheaper, higher-quality Chinese goods such as electronics, machinery, and clothing crowd out the country’s domestic industry, which is already low level.31 Pakistan’s increasing negative terms of trade (53.17 index points in 2014) exacerbate China’s structural power, as its imports become increasingly cheap in Pakistan and Pakistani exports increasingly expensive in China’s market.32 Poor terms of trade also expose Pakistan to volatility stemming from China, as lack of demand for Pakistan’s exports and increasingly expensive imports result in low or negative GDP growth.33 Such vulnerability in Pakistan’s domestic economy has grown substantially, with the value imports contribute to GDP having grown from 12.8 per cent in 1972 to 20.3 per cent in 2012.34 Chinese FDI to Pakistan has also become a defining feature of the two states’ bilateral economic ties. Negligible for much of Pakistan’s recent past – in some instances constituting less than 0.5 per cent of the state’s total FDI—Chinese commitments for future FDI, in particular, have catapulted Beijing to a distant first among Pakistan’s FDI providers.35 In 2014, China pledged $45.6 billion in FDI to Pakistan over the course of six years (2015–2021) for development of twenty projects along an ‘economic corridor’ ( jingji zoulang) between the two states.36 If realised, this pledge would constitute an average of $7 billion a year: an amount that dwarfs average annual FDI into the state since 2000 from all sources.37 While details regarding the exact conditions and timeline for dispersal were not available at the time of writing, Pakistani sources indicate that China plans to invest $33.8 billion in various energy projects in Pakistan and $11.8 billion in infrastructure-related projects.38 A portion of China’s promised FDI will go toward linking western China to Pakistan’s Gwadar Port, which holds both commercial and military strategic value for China. Through its FDI, China has developed structural power over Pakistan’s domestic economy to the point where Islamabad has linked the future of its economic development to Chinese investment. Over the course of 2014, for example, both President Mamnoon Hussain and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif repeatedly identified Chinese investment as the key to Pakistan’s future growth and development and pledged to shape Pakistan’s development around Chinese FDI priorities.39 Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 Pakistani politicians and analysts also predicted FDI from China would transform Pakistan into a regional economic centre.40 Relatedly, Pakistan’s political and business elite viewed President Xi Jinping’s 2014 cancellation of planned travel to Pakistan out of concern for his safety as a serious blow to the country’s domestic economic development and regional standing.41 President Xi’s cancellation led to a political ‘crisis’ in the country as opposition politicians accused one another of jeopardising Pakistan’s future economic growth by failing to ensure Xi’s visit.42 Islamabad’s linkage of Pakistan’s economic security to Chinese investment is troublesome. First, reliance on Chinese FDI for growth has created a relationship 114 Sino-Pakistan relations of dependency between the two states where Pakistan is incredibly vulnerable to external shocks. Islamabad is now reliant on the actualisation of promised Chinese FDI – which has yet to materialise – for its future growth. Instability in the country, a slowdown in the Chinese economy, or a decrease in initially promised funding all serve as potential stumbling blocks for the realisation of Chinese investment related to Pakistan’s growth.43 This potential and Pakistan’s vulnerability were evident in November 2014 when Chinese banks declined to finance Shandong Ruyi Science & Technology Group Co.’s acquisition of Pakistan’s Masood Textile Mills Ltd, citing large domestic loan defaults as the reason.44 Second, reliance on FDI has led Pakistan to prioritise the development of the energy sector over the country’s primary and secondary sectors, despite Pakistani economists’ claims that FDI in the primary and secondary sectors is more conducive to sustained, real domestic development.45 While Pakistan will ultimately benefit from investment in energy and infrastructure, the overall returns to the country are more long term and unlikely to address the country’s pressing economic issues. Third, Chinese FDI creates an enormous amount of contingent liability for Pakistan, as it must guarantee repayment for Chinese investment regardless of a project’s actual value. Pakistan has struggled with the privatisation of its energy industry in the past – for example, as it committed to purchasing terms that exceeded the value of energy it actually received.46 Fourth, Pakistan’s agreement to China’s planned route for the economic corridor also raises concerns over unequal development and regional exclusion. China has insisted that the corridor bypass Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa – two of the country’s poorest regions – a point to which Islama- bad agrees. Pakistani opposition politicians and analysts believe the agreed-upon route will create imbalances and a sense of abandonment in areas already rife with poverty and separatism.47

State-owned enterprises/private enterprises in Pakistan In 2005, Chinese companies – both state-affiliated and private – accounted for 12 per cent of all foreign firms operating in Pakistan.48 As of 2013, more than 120 Chinese companies operated in the country.49 Spread throughout Pakistan, these firms focus on the public utilities sector, mining, telecommunications, energy, and – most controversially – nuclear power. Major companies included Harbin Electric Machinery Company Limited, which imported power equipment from China to Pakistan; Haier, which established a special economic zone for Chinese Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 companies in Lahore; the China Harbour Engineering Company, which worked on the development of Gwadar Port; and China National Nuclear Corporation, which helped Pakistan development a domestic nuclear capacity.50 Chinese firms have expanded since 2005, the result of the 2007 FTA between Beijing and Islamabad and the agreed-upon economic corridor. Following the 2007 FTA, Chinese SOEs such as the Great United Petroleum Holding Company, China Mobile, and China Great Wall Industry Corporation gained key market share in the country’s oil and telecommunications sectors.51 The firms China Machinery Engineering Corporation (CMEC) and the Private Power and Infrastructure Board Sino-Pakistan relations 115 (PPIB) moved into leadership positions in Pakistan’s coal industry in 2014 with a $3 billion investment in the Gadani II coal power plants.52 In support of the 2013 agreement on establishment of an economic corridor, China’s Three Gorges Cor- poration and China Power International Development Ltd emerged as key actors in Pakistan’s energy and infrastructure development sector. Chinese banks including the China Development Bank and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Ltd (ICBC) have pledged financial backing for the expansion of Chinese firms into the country over the next five years. The result is a significant expansion of China’s SOE giants and a relative increase in China’s structural power over the country’s economic development. The presence of Chinese firms in Pakistan results in structural power as they crowd out domestic Pakistan firms that are either forbidden to bid for projects due to conditions on Chinese loans (explained in more detail below) or that lack the technological capacity to compete with Chinese firms. Chinese firms also regularly employ Chinese workers – both skilled and unskilled – to work in Pakistan, which undermines local labour markets and contributes to underdevelopment of the country’s domestic labour force (also addressed in more detail below).

Ties between cores As early as 1955 at the Bandung Conference, Chinese premier Zhou Enlai expressed China’s desire to maintain relations with Pakistan’s leadership, despite the deeply contradictory nature of the two states’ political leanings.53 The two states maintained close contact at the leadership level for the subsequent half century, driven in part by their mutual distrust of the Soviet Union and India’s regional intentions.54 Elite relations between the two states deepened under Chinese president Jiang Zemin as the Chinese military supported Islamabad’s efforts to develop a domestic nuclear capacity to balance against India’s capacity. High-level leadership exchanges continued during President Hu Jintao’s tenure, culminating in a three-day visit by Hu to Pakistan in 2010.55 Elite relations between the two states have expanded substantially in recent years, the result of China’s growing economic ties with Islamabad and increased tension between the United States and Pakistan over security issues in Afghanistan and within Pakistan. China’s PLA maintains close operational relations and training ties with the Pakistani military and engages in joint annual military exercises such as the Shaheen air exercises with the Pakistan Armed Forces. President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Nawaz Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 Sharif have publicly reaffirmed their mutual friendship and their intention to build closer relations as a means to expand the two countries’ bilateral relationship.56 In 2013, Premier Li Keqiang spoke at length of the two states’ friendship, stating, ‘if you love China, you must also love Pakistan.’57 The amity between Chinese and Pakistani leaders has enabled Beijing to expand its strategic interests in the state vis-à-vis the United States and India. Pakistan’s treatment of China as an ‘all-weather friend’ – based largely on more than fifty-plus years of elite relations – enables Islamabad to turn to Beijing when outside powers pressure it to accommodate their own strategic aims. The result, 116 Sino-Pakistan relations for both states, is a deepening relationship where Pakistan is dependent on China to serve as an external balancer. China’s elite relations have, in this respect, contributed to structural power over Pakistan as it directly affects the country’s foreign relations and their domestic outcomes.

Structural power at the state level

Security Beijing has purposefully linked its economic-resulting structural power and the structural power it has gained through elite relations to its security interests in Pakistan. In recent years, in particular, the Xi administration has explicitly warned the Pakistani government that China’s economic engagement with the state is premised on the degree to which Islamabad addresses Chinese concerns over Uyghur activity in the country’s North Waziristan District.58 While the Pakistani government has been hesitant to engage in prolonged military campaigns in the FATA for a number of reasons, Pakistani military activity and public government statements indicate that Islamabad is moving to address the ‘Uyghur issue’ to placate China.59 Beijing also leveraged its structural power to force Islamabad to privilege the protection of Chinese workers in Pakistan above those from other states.60 First raised as a Chinese priority following the 2006/07 killing of Chinese workers by separatist and terrorist groups in Balochistan and Peshawar, Beijing and Islama- bad signed a 2007 agreement where Pakistan pledged to prioritise the protection of Chinese workers in the state.61 Pakistan’s promise to ensure Chinese workers’ safety, as such, goes beyond a state’s overall responsibility to protect foreign workers in that it accords them privileged status.62 China’s extended use of its economic-derived structural power to influence Pakistan’s structure of security has three distinct negative outcomes for the state. First, China’s structural power implicitly links Pakistan’s economic stability and development to its ability to deal with internal instability, much of which is linked to ethnic, separatist, and sectarian currents within the state. This linkage between economic stability and security puts increased pressure on Pakistan’s already weak domestic institutions and could lead to further internal tensions as dominant groups come to view minority groups as an obstacle to economic growth and prosperity.63 Second, China’s push for Pakistan to act against Uyghurs in the Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 country provides fodder for Pakistan’s radical Islamic groups to engage in acts of terrorism against the Pakistani people and state. Prominent scholars in Paki- stan have already raised concerns that China’s approach to security in Xinjiang is inherently anti-Islamic, for example.64 Islamabad risks inheriting this charge as it moves forward to deal with China’s security concerns over its own. Third, Islamabad is in danger of interpreting China’s security concerns in Pakistan as an indication of wider-ranging security cooperation between the two states. As of 2014, for example, Pakistani media hailed partnership with China as the ‘cornerstone’ of the country military strategy and Pakistan’s senior leadership publicly Sino-Pakistan relations 117 identified China as a security provider.65 The reality of the two states’ relations, from China’s perspective, is quite different. While Beijing does realise Pakistan’s strategic importance in terms of security in the XUAR, it is not prepared to support Pakistan’s larger security aims in the region, particularly in relation to India. Beijing has made this policy clear over the past five decades – a stance seemingly lost on Pakistan’s increasingly dependent leadership.

Finance China’s centrality in Pakistan’s domestic economy also translates into power over the country’s structure of finance, as the majority of Chinese investment into the country is in the form of loans, aid, and grants.66 As such, Chinese power has increased exponentially in recent years as it has emerged as Pakistan’s most important source of external financing. Chinese loans, in particular, have become important sources of structural power for Beijing, as they both shape and drive Islamabad’s own domestic development agenda. In 2013, for example, China pledged $6.5 billion in loans to finance the uildingb of two nuclear power stations in Karachi.67 In 2014, China pledged another $22 billion in loans to finance the construction of the Bhasha Dam, the Gaddani and Lakhra coal plants, and the Tarbela Extension project; $3 billion for construction of a liquefied natural asg pipeline from Gwadar Port to western China; and $1.6 billion for construction of a metro system in Lahore.68 In late 2014, China pledged indirect loans through the Chinese-controlled Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and Chinese Silk Road Investment Fund for at least part of the $45.6 billion construction cost of the China-Pakistan economic corridor.69 The indirect delivery of funds through these two institutions has allowed Pakistan’s president to claim the country would not receive any new loans from China; a claim that, while technically true, is patently false. Of somewhat lesser significance for China’s power over Pakistan’s structure of finance is the role of Chinese aid. Having started from a relatively minor position as an aid provider in the early 2000s, China’s role as a source of aid financing has expanded significantly to where it is, by many measures, Pakistan’s most important partner. Chinese non-military financial aid, for example, grew from $9 million between 2004 and 2009 to $500 million in 2011.70 Chinese loans and, to a much lesser extent, aid both result in negative structural power in several important ways. First, China has used the power it has gained Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 through its loans to force the Pakistani government to agree to use Chinese firms and labour for construction and to purchase all materials and components from Chinese suppliers.71 While optimal for the Pakistani elite, who benefit from the contracts through kickbacks and corruption, the conditions China attaches to its financing prevent the Pakistani people from benefiting through the development of their domestic economy, as they lose employment opportunities and do not learn from a transfer of skills. Second, China has leveraged its role as financier to ensure that its firms receive all contracts for Pakistan’s major projects without their having to pass through a competitive process.72 China’s insistence on 118 Sino-Pakistan relations no-competition awarding decreases the overall benefit for the state, as it leads to increased costs, potentially lower quality, and zero oversight.73 Third, China has used its structural power to insist that all loan repayment be made in Chinese renminbi (RMB); a condition that increases the likelihood of contingent liability for Pakistan, as its currency is far more volatile and subject to devaluation.74 Should the Pakistan rupee fall further, Pakistan could see its foreign debt with China expand beyond its ability to repay.

Production China has developed power over Pakistan’s structure of production through its role as an alternative provider of goods to Pakistan’s primary trade partners, its supply of inexpensive imports to the country, and through its demand (or lack thereof) for Pakistan’s principal exports. As a negative outcome, Chinese structural power results in underdevelopment within Pakistan’s productive industries, particularly in manufacturing and agriculture, with spillover effects for structural violence in the country (on which more is written later). The negative outcome of Chinese structural power over Pakistan’s production is clearest in relation to the effect China’s exports to third-party states have on Pakistan’s manufacturing sector. As Pakistan relies on manufacturing for upward of 80 per cent of its merchandise exports, it is particularly vulnerable to competition from Chinese manufacturers who have more access to state-provided capital, high-tech manufacturing machinery, and who operate on far greater scales.75 Chinese manufacturing exports to third-party states crowd out Pakistani goods, leading to a corresponding decline in Pakistani exports.76 Pakistani manufacturing exports would be at least 4 per cent larger in the absence of direct competition from China.77 Decreased manufacturing exports also contribute to a general underdevelopment in Pakistan’s domestic production, which is already fundamentally weak. Chinese exports to Pakistan compound this underdevelopment, as their low cost and relatively high quality makes it infeasible for domestic Pakistani companies to compete.78 This effect has increased since implementation of the two countries’ FTA in 2007, with only a small number of large Pakistani firms benefiting from increased Chinese imports.79 Lastly, Chinese demand for Pakistan’s exports – particularly cotton textiles, which constitute 50 per cent of Pakistan’s total exports – has a direct effect on Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 the country’s agricultural sector and overall economic growth.80 While Chinese demand for Pakistan’s cotton has contributed to growth in the country over the past several years, a dramatic drop in Chinese demand for cotton in 2014 has led to the collapse of the commodity as an export.81 China now has a surplus of cotton (which it built through a stock building policy) and will likely meet its near-term demand through destocking: a strategic move with profound implications for Pakistan’s cotton-dependent agricultural sector.82 The Pakistani government’s move to increase the price of cotton so as to regain revenue lost through diminished exports will, in turn, undermine the country’s domestic textile industry.83 Sino-Pakistan relations 119

Knowledge Chinese power extends over Pakistan’s structures of knowledge, particularly across its political, foreign policy, and economic sectors. China’s structural power is clearest in this regard in its successful use of its economic and military support to Pakistan to cast itself as Pakistan’s ‘all-weather’ friend despite its clear propensity to pursue its strategic interests in Central and South Asia exclusive of what one might consider Pakistan’s best interests. China regularly points to its economic interests, military aid, and its political support, for example, as evidence that it is a selfless actor interested only in Pakistan’s domestic security and regional stability vis-à-vis other great powers, such as the United States and India.84 China’s current ambassador, Sun Weidong, has gone so far as to suggest that neither China nor Pakistan would survive without the other as their mutual dependency has tied them irrevocably together.85 As Islamabad is largely reliant on external assistance for its economic growth and domestic security, it is exceedingly willing to accept and perpetuate the idea that China is the country’s partner (or benefactor) and that the two states share strategic aims in the region.86 Indeed, Pakistan’s current leadership has repeatedly tied Pakistan’s economic growth and security to China’s largess in public statements.87 While China’s support for Pakistan is without question, the conceptualisation of it being a benevolent, altruistic partner for Islamabad is a state-level narrative driven by Chinese structural power. Pakistani scholars, analysts, and media pundits regularly criticise Islamabad for its framing of Chinese commercial activity and security interests in the state as ‘brotherly’ support and accuse Pakistani elite of portraying China in a false, entirely benign light in support of their own, often corrupt, interests.88 Many of these same critics openly worry that the concept of ‘all-weather friends’ provides a veneer for China’s more exploitative activities in the country.89 As touched on earlier in the chapter, Chinese investment in the country has also had a role in forming knowledge around Pakistan’s domestic economic development, particularly in relation to Islamabad’s development priorities. The China-Pakistan economic corridor is the most salient example of China’s priorities shaping Islamabad’s domestic planning, as Beijing has largely driven the project’s scope, focus, and range.90 Islamabad, for example, has largely agreed to Chinese terms in moving the project forward despite a number of domestic concerns about the nature of the corridor’s numerous projects and major ques- Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 tions about their sustainability and their overall benefit to non-elite Pakistanis.91 These terms include a focus on mega-projects, the use of Chinese financing, firms, labour, and technology for all construction, and a redirection of the corridor’s route to address China’s security concerns. In each instance, Pakistani scholars and opposition politicians have raised concern over whether Pakistan’s willingness to adopt China’s strategic priorities as its own is in line with what is best for the country. Rather than focusing on mega-projects, for example, Pakistani academics (as well as the majority of international development agencies operating in the country) suggest the country should first focus on micro-projects for rural 120 Sino-Pakistan relations development and poverty reduction.92 Pakistani economists have similarly raised concerns over Chinese firms’ and labourers’ dominance of the project, given Pakistan’s high unemployment and pervasive poverty.93 Pakistani politicians have voiced dissatisfaction over Islamabad’s acceptance of China’s planned route.94 That Pakistan has accepted these terms in order to appease Chinese concerns and ensure Chinese investment is indicative of Chinese structural power over economic development-related knowledge.

Structural violence Structural violence in Pakistan is extensive in terms of lost opportunity, oppression, and localised violence. Equally, the sources of structural violence in the country are vast, ranging from poor governance, ethnic conflict, sectarian conflict, and extreme poverty. The Pakistani government ultimately bears the majority of the responsibility for the country’s current condition. Yet, as this chapter has shown, China also contributes to domestic circumstances in the country that allow for the perpetuation of structural violence. China’s contribution is both direct – through, for example, investment in the state that leads to economic underdevelopment and unemployment – and indirect, such as the way its state-to-state relations with Islamabad lead to greater conflict within the state.

Economy One can get a sense of China’s influence over structural violence within Pakistan’s economic sector by examining the negative outcomes of its power over Pakistan’s structures of production and knowledge. Proceeding with the caveat that China is just one of many variables that contribute to structural violence in the country through its involvement with its economic processes, the remaining section will detail how China’s structural power does lead to lost opportunity, poverty, and instability within Pakistan’s economic sector. First, trade with China has a negative effect on production in Pakistan, particularly over the country’s manufacturing and agricultural sectors. As detailed above, Chinese exports to third-party countries decreases demand for Pakistan’s manufacturing goods abroad by an estimated 4 per cent. Pakistan is less able, subsequently, to find external markets for its manufactured goods, which account for upwards of 80 per cent of its merchandise exports. This lack of external demand Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 not only affects Pakistan’s trade volume and trade balance but also contributes to an underdevelopment of its domestic manufacturing sector, which is extremely vulnerable to external pressure. Chinese exports to the country, which are likely $3.38 billion more than officially reported because of illegal smuggling from China into Pakistan, result in downward pressure on Pakistan’s domestic industry as they undermine domestic firms’ profitability and competitiveness.95 Similarly, Pakistan’s dependence on China as an export market for its agricultural products – primarily cotton and cotton-derived textiles – makes the country extremely vulnerable to a drop in demand from China, something the country Sino-Pakistan relations 121 experienced in 2014. Even Pakistan’s policy response to less demand (i.e., raising prices) has had a negative effect on agricultural growth and production, as detailed above. China’s deleterious effect on manufacturing and agriculture in Pakistan is closely related to its second strand of influence over structural violence in the country: its structural power acting as an obstacle to Pakistan adopting a more pro-poor plan for economic growth. Pakistani researchers and policy makers, Pakistani NGOs, international economists, and development specialists have all identified growth in manufacturing and agriculture as key to inclusive growth (citing, ironically, poverty reduction in China as a model), which suggests that trade from China is undermining those components of Pakistan’s domestic economy that could contribute to sustainable, pro-poor growth.96 More even, China’s structural power undermines poverty reduction in the country as it has pressured Islamabad to adopt development priorities not in line with a pro-poor poverty strategy but with China’s own economic goals so as to ensure the continual flow of Chinese investment into the country. Pakistan’s adherence to (indeed, embrace of) China’s investment priorities in mega-projects along the two countries’ economic corridor, as well as China’s insistence the corridor be rerouted to avoid some of the country’s most impoverished regions, such as Balochistan, is a prime example of how Chinese structural power is preventing economic inclusion and a reduction of regional disparities. Third, China’s insistence that the Pakistan government use Chinese firms, expertise, labour, and funding to construct the mega-projects along the economic corridor effectively removes value added from its commercial activity in the country that would benefit the Pakistani people through job opportunities, technology transfers, skill development, and increased income.97 The loss of value for Paki- stan is even clearer when one considers that China has publicly stated that all its commercial activities along the economic corridor will be for-profit ventures.98 While Pakistan may benefit from the increased supply of energy from power projects along the corridor once they are constructed, it is less likely that the Paki- stani people will benefit from construction of the economic corridor. Indeed, poor governance in Pakistan – which increases the potential for corruption around the economic corridor – makes it even less likely that the ordinary Pakistani will benefit from the massive commercial undertaking.99

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 Environment China’s commercial priorities and activities also result in structural violence across Pakistan’s environment. Chinese-originating structural violence is clearest in relation to China’s involvement in Pakistan’s coal industry.100 As of 2015, China was the primary external driver of coal-related development in Pakistan, having pledged $14 billion in private investment to Pakistan to develop coal-fired power plants at Port Qasim, Sahiwal, Engro Thar, Muzafargarh, Gwadar, Rahim- yar Khan, and SSRL Thar.101 Industry analysts believe Chinese investment will increase Pakistan’s use of coal as a source of power and decrease its dependency 122 Sino-Pakistan relations on cleaner sources of energy such as oil.102 China is also spending $2.2 billion to develop two coal mining projects at the Thar coalfields in Sindh, replacing the World Bank as the projects’ primary funder after the organisation withdrew support due to concerns over the projects’ environmental implications.103 The link between China commercial interest in coal and pollution in Pakistan is evident. More coal-fired power plants in Pakistan will contribute to greater air pollution in the country, which already experiences some of the worst air pollution of any state in the world.104 While coal currently constitutes around 1 per cent of Pakistan’s total energy production, it is one of the most significant contributors of poor air quality in the country.105 China’s drive to develop coal production and coal power in Pakistan – which is unparalleled by any other foreign actor – directly contributes to structural violence within the country’s environmental sector.106 This structural violence, in turn, extends to the country’s economic growth and social instability, as air pollution in the country, according to the World Bank, also contributes to lower GDP per capita growth in the country.107 China’s involvement in dam building in Pakistan also contributes to structural violence in the form of water pollution and environmental degradation. The Azad Jammu and Kashmir Environmental Protection Agency, for example, censured China’s Gezhouba Group and the China National Machinery Import-Export Com- pany for disposing of solid waste material directly into the Neelum and Jhelum rivers during their $1.5 billion construction of the Neelum Jhelum Dam.108 The practice contributed to widespread water pollution in surrounding areas. Paki- stani scholars have also raised concern over the dam’s impact on native fish, macro-invertebrate species, and on local wildlife.109 Similarly, Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority has cited widespread environmental degradation around China’s involvement in the Diamer Bhasha Dam, noting construction at the site has led to serious harm of the local ecosystem, particularly affecting plant and animal habitats.110 Environmental groups such as International Rivers have raised further concern over Chinese firms’ environmentally harmful dam-building projects in relation to China’s future involvement in the Sukki Kanari and Karot dam projects.111 China’s provision of financing, construction, technology, and labour for dam building in Pakistan has the secondary effect of contributing to water pollution, water waste (through seepage), and poor sanitation in the country, as it supports the Pakistani government’s controversial ‘fetish’ for the construction of dams over the construction and/or repair of the country’s badly depleted canal system.112 Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 Chinese financing of dam building through commercial loans also affects Paki- stan’s long-term economic health, as researchers have shown mega-dam projects do not deliver a positive return and, as such, may contribute to sovereign default in the medium term.113

Society China contributes to structural violence in Pakistan’s society through unemployment, continued poverty, poor public health conditions, and localised conflict. Sino-Pakistan relations 123 China’s trade with Pakistan – both in terms of its exports to the country and its imports from the country – has led to underdevelopment in the country’s manufacturing and agricultural sectors, for instance, as detailed earlier in this chapter. Both manufacturing and agriculture are key industries capable of contributing to employment in the country or, as the International Labour Organisation noted in 2014, major sources of unemployment when they experience slow or negative growth.114 China’s practice of providing Chinese labour for its construction projects – both skilled and unskilled labour – also contributes to lost employment opportunities in the country as Chinese workers displace their Pakistani counterparts.115 As Chinese banks and firms make the use of Chinese labour a condition for financing and construction, and as there are now an estimated 20,000 Chinese working in Pakistan, there is a clear link between China’s economic structural power in the country and structural violence in the form of unemployment in the country. While it is remiss to suggest China alone contributes to unemployment in Pakistan – just as many states have suffered increased unemployment since 2008 due to the Global Financial Crisis – its priorities with regard to the state and activities within the state are undeniably contributing factors. As a consequence of its effect on unemployment in Pakistan, China also contributes to structural violence in the form of poverty in the country. Pakistani and international development economists have long identified employment in the country’s manufacturing and agricultural sectors as key drivers of poverty reduction in the state, as both industries tend to employ high numbers of people and provide liveable (if low) wages.116 That China indirectly contributes to unemployment through trade and directly contributes to unemployment through the use of Chinese instead of Pakistani workers indicates that China has at least a casual effect on the continuation of poverty in the country. China’s centrality in Pakistan’s coal industry also has severely negative outcomes for structural violence in Pakistan in the form of poor public health. Pollu- tion from coal is the second largest contributor to air pollution in Pakistan, which is directly linked to public health effects such as cardiovascular, pulmonary, and respiratory disease, birth defects, and 9,000 premature deaths a year.117 China’s investment in and construction of coal-fired plants and coal mining sites is, therefore, a direct contributor to coal-related public health outcomes in the state and a source of structural violence in Pakistan’s society.118 China’s structural power over security in Pakistan also contributes to structural violence across Pakistani society. According to Pakistani analysts and government Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 officials, for example, the Pakistan military undertook Operation Zarb-e-Azb in June 2014 in North Waziristan largely to placate Chinese demands that Islamabad act against the ETIM.119 The military undertook this campaign against its own strategic interests (Islamabad has important ties with the Haqqani Network and Hafiz Gul Bahadar, or the ‘good’ Taliban, in the region that it does not want to undermine) and despite the Uyghurs relatively minor role in Pakistan’s domestic security environment.120 Yet the Pakistani government’s decision to placate Chi- nese demand in this respect is entirely understandable, as Beijing threatened a break in economic ties if Pakistani forces did not act against ETIM in the FATA 124 Sino-Pakistan relations and promised expanded ties if the Pakistani forces did act in China’s best interest.121 Operation Zarb-e-Azab has led to the displacement of as many as one million residents – many of whom are now homeless – and the deaths of thousands of ‘militants’.122 China’s concern for security in Balochistan also contributes to poverty and instability in the region. China’s insistence that the Sino-Pakistani economic corridor bypass Balochistan for security reasons, for example, means that any development related to the project the Pakistani people do receive will not reach the province, which is one of Pakistan’s poorest. Pakistani ministers and scholars have raised concerns over China’s influence in the region, only to have their concerns overridden by Islamabad, which, instead, focuses on growth largely at the state level.123

State/society For all China’s contribution to structural violence in Pakistan, Beijing enjoys enormous popularity and goodwill among Pakistan’s society. A 2014 Pew Sur- vey Report on Global Attitudes notes that most Pakistanis (57 per cent of total respondents) view China as the state’s greatest ally and the United States as the country’s greatest enemy (38 per cent of total respondents).124 According to the report, 78 per cent of Pakistanis interviewed had a favourable opinion of China: the highest percentage of any state polled. Far different than this volume’s other case studies, China enjoys widespread support among the majority of the people in the country. As such, one might expect its influence on structural violence with state/society relation – measured in terms of worsening relations – to be far more muted or even, perhaps, non-existent. Closer examination of China’s effect on state/society relations, however, suggests that China’s indirect influence over the quality of state/society relations is somewhat corrosive. First, the nature of Sino-Pakistani economic relations, which are largely forged at the elite level and premised on massive Chinese investment into Pakistani industries known for corruption and inefficiency, has led to instability within Pakistan’s contemporary political system. Opposition politicians such as Imran Khan and Tahir ul Qadri (both of whom enjoy widespread public backing) have referenced Sino-Pakistani economic relations, for example, in their charges of corruption against the Nawaz Sharif government.125 Such charges were central to the opposition political movement ‘Freedom March’, which drew an Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 estimated 250,000 people at its peak, caused widespread disruptions in Karachi, Lahore, and other cities, and resulted in the Pakistani military’s deployment from Islamabad in August 2014.126 Disbanded in December 2014 in response to the massacre of 132 schoolchildren in Peshawar, the Freedom March seriously chal- lenged Pakistan’s existing government to the degree that observers feared a collapse of the country’s political system. Second, China’s influence over Pakistan’s economic development priorities has opened the state to charges of political dependency, economic naivety, and apathy toward the country’s poor, particularly among Pakistani scholars and analysts. Sino-Pakistan relations 125 Pakistani media, for example, regularly run editorials and commentaries belittling the country’s leadership for their toadying relationship with Beijing and raising concerns over Islamabad’s ability to act in Pakistan’s best interest when doing so conflicts with China’s agenda in the state.127 Less of an immediate threat to state/ society relations, the sense that Pakistani leaders fail to ensure the country’s independence from Chinese involvement does feed a growing narrative among some in Pakistan that China is positioning itself to become a colonial power over the country.128 As such, the Pakistani government’s acquiescence to Chinese interests above its own has serious potential to undermine social confidence in the government. Third, Islamabad’s unconditional support for China opens the state to charges of compliance with China’s security measures in the XUAR, measures which an increasing number of Pakistani and international Muslim leaders consider anti-Islamic.129 Pakistani leadership has long co-opted Islam as its source of legitimacy, particularly for legitimacy with the country’s more orthodox Islamic groups that would otherwise view the state as an illegitimate source of political authority.130 Any erosion of the linkage between Islam and the Pakistani state would, therefore, greatly undermine social support for the state; an occurrence with precedent in modern Pakistani history when Islamic groups turned against General Pervez Musharraf’s government for being ‘un-Islamic’ following the Pakistani military’s shift away from orthodox Islam to a more liberal Islam.131 A similar danger exists for the current state if society comes to view its ties with China as indirectly supporting anti-Islamic policies.

Notes 1 Stephen P. Cohen, The Future of Pakistan (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2011), 7. 2 T. V. Paul, South Asia’s Weak States: Understanding the Regional Insecurity Predica- ment (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010), 187. 3 T. V. Paul, The Warrior State: Pakistan in the Contemporary World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 13–14. 4 C. Christine Fair, ‘Still Standing in Pakistan: The Protests, the Military, and What Comes Next’, Foreign Affairs, September 3, 2014. 5 Transparency International, ‘Pakistan Overview, Corruption’, Transparency Interna- tional, accessed April 20, 2015, http://www.transparency.org/country#PAK. Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 6 Naveeda Khan, Beyond Crisis: Re-evaluating Pakistan (London: Routledge, 2012), 134. 7 Ashutosh Misra and Michael E. Clarke, Pakistan’s Stability Paradox: Domestic, Regional and International Dimensions (London: Routledge, 2013), 3. 8 Daniel S. Markey, No Exit from Pakistan: America’s Tortured Relationship with Islam- abad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 33. 9 International Monetary Fund, Pakistan Country Report No. 13/287 (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2013), 5. 10 The World Bank, Pakistan Development Update April 2014 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2014), 7. 126 Sino-Pakistan relations 11 Ibid., 10. 12 OECD, Society at a Glance: Asia/Pacific 2014 (Paris, OECD Publishing, 2014), 96. 13 World Bank, South Asia Economic Focus Spring 2014: Time to Refocus (Washington, DC: World Bank Publishing, 2014), 27. 14 Robert Walker and Grace Bantebya-Kyomuhendo, The Shame of Poverty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 174. 15 Farhan Hanif Siddiqi, The Politics of Ethnicity in Pakistan: The Baloch, Sindhi and Mohajir Ethnic Movements (London: Routledge, 2012), 3. 16 Kimberly Marten, Warlords: Strong-arm Brokers in Weak States (Ithaca: Cornell Uni- versity Press, 2012), 33. 17 C. Christine Fair, Pakistan: Can the United States Secure an Insecure State? (Washing- ton, DC: Rand Corporation, 2010), 14. 18 Edward Aspinall, Robin Jeffrey, and Anthony J. Regan, Diminishing Conflicts in Asia and the Pacific: Why Some Subside and Others Don’t (London: Routledge, 2013), 212; C. Christine Fair, ‘Lashkar-e-Tayiba and the Pakistani State’, Survival Vol. 53, No. 4 (2011), 7. 19 William J. Miller, Stephen Ceccoli, and Ron Gelleny, The Sources of Pakistani Atti- tudes toward Religiously Motivated Terrorism Vol. 33, No. 9 (2010), 816. 20 C. Christine Fair and Peter Chalk, Fortifying Pakistan: The Role of U.S. Internal Secu- rity Assistance (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 2006), 27. 21 Ghulam Ali, ‘Sino-Pakistan Relations Since 9/11’, in Multidimensional Diplomacy of Contemporary China, eds. Simon Shen and Jean-Marc F. Blanchard (Lanham: Lexing- ton Books, 2012), 155. 22 S. D. Muni and Tan Tai Yong, A Resurgent China: South Asian Perspectives (London: Routledge, 2012), 17. 23 Andrew Small, ‘The Xinjiangistan Connection’, Foreign Policy, July 30, 2014, http:// foreignpolicy.com/2014/07/30/the-xinjiangistan-connection/. 24 ‘Top Ten Trading Partners’, Dawn, January 15, 2015, http://www.dawn.com/ news/688389/top-ten-trading-partners. 25 ‘2013 nian Zhong-Ba shuangbian jingmao hezuo jian kuang’ (Sino-Pakistan 2013 Bilat- eral Trade Cooperation Situation), Economic and Commercial Counsellor’s Office of the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, June 10, 2014, http://pk.mofcom.gov.cn/article/zxhz/hzjj/201406/20140600618801.shtml. 26 ‘Enhanced Business: “Pak-China Trade Can Reach $15B” ’, The Express Tribune, January 14, 2014, http://tribune.com.pk/story/658780/enhanced-business-pak-china- trade-can-reach-15b/. 27 Office of the United States Trade Representative, ‘U.S.-Pakistan Trade Facts’, Office of the United States Trade Representative, accessed April 20, 2015, http://www.ustr.gov/ countries-regions/south-central-asia/pakistan.

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 28 ‘2013 nian Zhong-Ba shuangbian jingmao hezuo jian kuang’ (Sino-Pakistan 2013 Bilateral Trade Cooperation Situation). 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid. 31 Rajshree Jetly, Pakistan in Regional and Global Politics (London: Taylor & Francis, 2012), 87. 32 Nishat Fatima, Analysing the Terms of Trade Effect for Pakistan (Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, 2010), 10. 33 Matthew McCartney, ‘Pakistan, Growth, Dependency, and Crisis’, The Lahore Journal of Economics No. 16 (2011), 82. Sino-Pakistan relations 127 34 Nasir Iqbal, Ejaz Ghani, and Musleh ud Din, Pakistan’s Imports, Dependency, and Regional Integration (New Delhi: Global Development Network, 2014), 2. 35 Shahid Yusuf, Can Chinese FDI Accelerate Pakistan’s Growth? (Washington, DC: International Growth Center, 2013), 2. 36 ‘Rimei: Zhong-Ba jingji zoulang shi tongxiang zhongdong de menhu’ (Japanese Media: The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor Will Become a Window to the Middle East), Ministry of Commerce on the People’s Republic of China, December 11, 2014, http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/i/jyjl/j/201412/20141200828635.shtml. 37 Yusuf, Can Chinese FDI Accelerate Pakistan’s Growth?, 2. 38 Ismail Dilawar, ‘Plan to Link Gwadar Port to Western China Finalised’, Pakistan Today Online, November 26, 2014. 39 ‘Pakistan-China Economic Corridor Game Changer for Region – President’, Associ- ated Press of Pakistan, December 19, 2014; ‘China’s Cooperation Will Provide Jobs in Pakistan: PM’, The Nation Online, November 7, 2014. 40 ‘China’s Special Economic Zone Will Boost Regional Trade’, Dawn, November 2, 2014. 41 ‘Pakistan Media Say Postponement of China President’s Visit “Economic Setback” ’, BBC Monitoring, September 8, 2014. 42 F. S. Aijazuddin, ‘Pakistan Article Criticizes Ongoing Political Conflict Causing Chi- na’s President to Cancel Visit’, Dawn, September 11, 2014. 43 Muhammad Suhaib Manzoor, M. Mohan Fonseka, and Usman Bashir, ‘Determinants and Factor Dependency of FDI: A Study of Pakistan and China’, International Review of Management and Business Research Vol. 3, No. 1 (2014), 243. 44 Dinny McMahon, ‘Lack of Local Lending Sinks Chinese Company’s Pakistan Deal’, Wall Street Journal, November 5, 2014. 45 Muhammad Arshad Khan and Shujaat Ali Khan, Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Growth in Pakistan: A Sectoral Analysis (Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, 2011), 19. 46 Peter Vanham, ‘Pakistan’s Real Power Problem: A Failed Privatisation’, Financial Times, June 22, 2012. 47 ‘Senators Angry over Change in Route of Pak-China Corridor’, Dawn, October 11, 2014. 48 Craig Cohen, A Perilous Course: U.S. Strategy and Assistance to Pakistan (Washing- ton, DC: CSIS, 2007), 39. 49 Kokab Farshori, ‘Chinese Economic Footprint in Pakistan Increasing’, Voice of Amer- ica, August 7, 2013. 50 Peter Nolan, Chinese Firms, Global Firms: Industrial Policy in the Age of Globali- zation (London: Routledge, 2014), 124; Thomas Farole and Gokhan Akinci, Special Economic Zones: Progress, Emerging Challenges, and Future Directions (Washing- ton, DC: World Bank Publishing, 2011), 2; Arabinda Acharya, Rohan Gunaratna, and Wang Pengxin, Ethnic Identity and National Conflict in China (London: Palgrave, Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 2010), 128; Shirley A. Kan, China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruc- tion and Missiles: Policy Issues (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2009), 3. 51 Carolyn Bartholomew, Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (Washington, DC: DIANE Publishing, 2010), 218. 52 ‘Agreement Signed with China for Coal Power Plants’, Dawn, April 10, 2014. 53 C. Christine Fair, Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 184. 54 Robert G. Sutter, Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy since the Cold War (London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012), 238. 128 Sino-Pakistan relations 55 Ibid., 241. 56 ‘Zhong-Ba liangguo lingdao ren huzhi hedian’ (Chinese and Pakistan Leadership Exchange Congratulatory Dispatches), Chinese Communist Party News, December 8, 2014, http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2014/1208/c87228-26164388.html. 57 ‘Li Keqiang: ning she jinzi bushe zhong-Ba youyi’ (Li Keqiang: Would Rather Give Up Gold Than Sino-Pakistan Friendship’, Sina, May 23, 2013, http://news.sina.com. cn/c/2013-05-23/174727206945.shtml. 58 ‘2013 nian 6 yue 28 ri waijiapbu fayanren Hua Chunying zhuchi lixing jizhehui’ (Min- istry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Hua Chunying holds a press conference), Min- istry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, June 28, 2013, http://www. mfa.gov.cn/mfa_chn/fyrbt_602243/jzhsl_602247/t1054255.shtml. 59 ‘Prime Minister’s China Visit’, Business Recorder Online, November 13, 2014; ‘Paki- stani Lawmaker Considers China’s Growing Regional Security Role’, Gandhara, Feb- ruary 7, 2014, http://gandhara.rferl.org/content/article/25443331.html. 60 ‘Wanming zhongguo gongchengshi gongzuo jinzhu Bajisitan Ba zhun quantianhou baohu’ (Chinese Engineers Work with the Pakistan Army to Advance the Two Coun- tries’ All-Weather Partnership), Sina, December 9, 2013, http://mil.news.sina.com. cn/2013-12-09/0741753639.html. 61 ‘Paved With High Hopes’, Dawn, April 12, 2014; C. Christine Fair and Sumit Gan- guly, Treading on Hallowed Ground: Counterinsurgency Operations in Sacred Spaces (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 100–101. 62 Cohen, The Future of Pakistan, 128. 63 Alessandro Rippa, ‘Pakistan and China: A Precarious Friendship?’, The Diplomat, July 17, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/pakistan-and-china-a-precarious-friendship/. 64 Khawar Chaudhry, ‘Oppression Against Muslims in China’, Daily Islam Online, July 14, 2014, translated by the OSC, SAL2014071428478692; Rafia Zakaria, ‘Break- ing up with China?’, Dawn, July 4, 2014. 65 Nazir Naji, ‘Pakistan-China Friendship’, Dunya, May 22, 2014, translated by the OSC, SAR2014052226646986. 66 ‘Dui wai touzi hezuo guobie: Bajisitan’ (Country-Specific oreignF Investment Coop- eration: Pakistan), Ministry of Commerce, People’s Republic of China (2014), http:// fec.mofcom.gov.cn/gbzn/upload/bajisitan.pdf, 53. 67 ‘China Commits $6.5bn Loan for N-Power Plants in Karachi’, Dawn, December 25, 2013. 68 Khalid Mustafa, ‘China Reveals Its Cards for Investing $20 Billion in Pakistan’, The International News, January 20, 2014, http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-New s-13-28050-China-reveals-its-cards-for-investing-$20-billion-in-Pakistan; ‘China to Help Build $3Billion LNG Pipeline and Terminal: Report’, Pakistan Today Online, November 25, 2014; ‘$1.6bn Lahore Metro Train Deal Signed with China’, Dawn,

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 May 23, 2014. 69 ‘Ya tou hang kaizhang zaiji’ (Asian Investment Bank’s Opening in Sight), Xinhua, November 24, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2014-11/24/c_127245680. htm. 70 Joachim Krause and Charles King Mallory, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Strategic Change: Adjusting Western Regional Policy (London: Routledge, 2014), 253; Cohen, The Future of Pakistan, 130. 71 Ali Syed, ‘China Links $3–4B Loan with Major Components Purchase’, Pakistan Observer Online, December 13, 2011. 72 Mustafa, ‘China Reveals Its Cards for Investing $20 Billion in Pakistan’. Sino-Pakistan relations 129 73 Munir Ahmad Baloch, ‘Government Signing Coal Power Projects with China at Inflated Rates’, Dunya, September 12, 2014, translated by the OSC, SAL2014091226524837; ‘Editorial Criticizes Pakistan’s Move to Sign Pact with China for Power Projects of “Dubious Merit” ’, The News, February 23, 2014. 74 Syed, ‘China Links $3–4B Loan with Major Components Purchase’. 75 Robert C. Feenstra and Shang-Jin Wei, China’s Growing Role in World Trade (Chi- cago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 140. 76 Barry Eichengreen, Yeongseop Rhee, and Hui Tong, ‘The Impact of China on the Exports of Other Asian Countries’, The National Bureau of Economic Research No. 10768 (2004), 20. 77 Gordon H. Hanson and Raymond Robertson, ‘China and the Manufacturing Exports of Other Developing Countries’, The National Bureau of Economic Research No. 14497 (2008), 16. 78 Robert G. Sutter, Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy since the Cold War (London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012), 106. 79 Ernesto Sánchez-Triana, Revitalizing Industrial Growth in Pakistan: Trade, Infrastruc- ture, and Environmental Performance (Washington, DC: World Bank Publications, 2014), 4. 80 Observatory of Economic Complexity, ‘Products Exported by Pakistan’, last modified May 19, 2014, https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/explore/tree_map/hs/export/pak/ all/show/2010/; Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, ‘Agriculture Statistics: Introduction’, Government of Pakistan, accessed April 25, 2015, http://www.pbs.gov.pk/content/ agriculture-statistics. 81 Shahid Iqbal, ‘Chinese Policy Hits Yarn Production, Exports’, Dawn, July 13, 2014. 82 ‘World: Commodities EIU’s Monthly Cotton Outlook’, EIU ViewsWire, January 1, 2015. 83 Ibid. 84 ‘Zhu Bajisitan dashi Sun Weidong zai 65 zhounian guoqing zhaodaihui shang de zhici’ (Chinese Ambassador to Pakistan Sun Weidong Makes a Speech at an Event Mark- ing the 65th Anniversary of Sino-Pakistan Diplomatic Relations), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, October 1, 2014, http://www.mfa.gov.cn/ mfa_chn/dszlsjt_602260/t1197158.shtml. 85 ‘Sun Weidong dashi chuxi Kong yuan chuangban 10 zhounian qingzhu huodong’ (Ambassador Sun Weidong Attends an Event Marking the Tenth Anniversary of the Confucius Institute), Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Islamic Repub- lic of Pakistan, September 29, 2014, http://pk.chineseembassy.org/chn/zbgx/t1196420. htm. 86 ‘Pakistan and China Have Convergence of Geo-Strategic Interests: CJCSC’, The Nation, November 7, 2014; ‘Confucius Institute: ‘Friendship between Pakistan and

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 China Vital for Survival’, The Express Tribute, September 27, 2014; ‘Pak-China Friendship Is Sweeter Than the Sweetest Honey: Nawaz’, The Express Tribune, April 12, 2014. 87 ‘Special Assistant to the Prime Minister on Foreign Affairs, Syed Tariq Fatemi, Con- cludes Seminar on Building China-Pakistan Community of Shared Destiny in the New Era’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan, August 6, 2014, http:// www.mofa.gov.pk/pr-details.php?prID=2136; ‘Pak-China Friendship Is a Beneficial Partnership: Shahbaz’, The Nation, July 6, 2014; ‘ Pakistan-China Friendship: Higher than Himalayas, Deeper than the Oceans’, Jang Online, September 9, 2014, translated by the OSC, SAL2014090930964926. 130 Sino-Pakistan relations 88 Javed Chudhary, ‘Reality and Perception’, Daily Express, October 3, 2014, translated by the OSC, SAL2014100322934253; Imtiaz Gul, ‘How Far Will China Go?’, The Friday Times, October 3, 2014; Salman Tarik Kureshi, ‘Diplomatic Ties’, The Friday Times, September 19, 2014. 89 Chudhary, ‘Reality and Perception’; Munir Ahmad Baloch, ‘Chinese President’s Visit’, Dunya, September 12, 2014, translated by the OSC, SAL2014091226524837. 90 Gordon G. 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Cleaning Pakistan’s Air: Policy Options to Address the Cost of Outdoor Air Pollution (Washington, DC: World Bank Publications, 2014), 66. 108 ‘Checking Pollution: Ban on Dumping Waste in Rivers’, The Express Tribune, July 11, 2013; Shabir Choudhry, ‘Neelum Jhelum Hydroelectric Project – An Environment Sino-Pakistan relations 131 Disaster’, Counter Currents, June 26, 2010, http://www.countercurrents.org/choudhry 260610.htm. 109 Abdul Qadir, Potential Effects of Human and Climate Change on Freshwater Resources in Pakistan (Gothenburg: The International Association of Hydrological Sciences, 2013), 332. 110 Marcus Nüsser, Large Dams in Asia: Contested Environments between Technological Hydroscapes and Social Resistance (New York: Springer Science & Business Media, 2013), 2; Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority, Daimer Bhasha Dam and Its Environmental Impacts (Islamabad: WAPDA, 2014), 5. 111 International Rivers, ‘Diamer-Bhasha Dam’, International Rivers, accessed April 20, 2015, http://www.internationalrivers.org/campaigns/diamer-bhasha-dam. 112 Michael Kugelman and Robert M. Hathaway, Running on Empty (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2009), 44. 113 Atif Ansar, ‘Should We Build More Large Dams? The Actual Costs of Hydropower Megaproject Development’, Energy Policy (2014), 12. 114 International Labour Organization, ‘Where Is the Unemployment Rate the Highest in 2014?’, International Labour Organization, May 27, 2014, http://www.ilo.org/global/ research/global-reports/global-employment-trends/2014/WCMS_233936/lang--en/ index.htm; Ali Sidiki, ‘Unemployment in Pakistan Set to Increase in 2014: ILO Report’, The Express Tribune, January 22, 2014. 115 Shahzad, ‘Footprints’. 116 Christopher Candland, Labor, Democratization and Development in India and Paki- stan (London: Routledge, 2007), 129–30. 117 Sánchez-Triana et al., Cleaning Pakistan’s Air, 66. 118 Hussain and Siddiqui, ‘Coal-based power generation and environmental degradation’. 119 ‘Based in Tribal Areas, Uighur Leader Vows Revenge on China’, Dawn, March 15, 2014; ‘Pakistan Says Will Help China Fight Xinjiang Militants’, Pakistan Today, November 8, 2014. 120 ‘Pakistani Lawmaker Considers China’s Growing Regional Security Role’, Gand- hara, February 7, 2014; Daud Khattak, ‘What We Still Need to Know About the North Waziristan Operation’, Foreign Policy, August 7, 2014, http://foreignpolicy. com/2014/08/07/what-we-still-need-to-know-about-the-north-waziristan-operation/. 121 ‘Chinese Reassurances’, Dawn, February 22, 2014; ‘China’s Pledge to Invest in Pakistan, Islamabad’s Resolve to Fight Terror’, Business Recorder, November 13, 2014. 122 Office forthe Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, ‘Pakistan: Humanitarian Snap- shot – Internal Displacement NWA and the rest of KP and FATA’, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, August 15, 2014, http://reliefweb.int/sites/ reliefweb.int/files/resources/PakistanSnapshot.pdf. Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 123 ‘Senators Angry over Change in Route of Pak-China Corridor’, Dawn, October 11, 2014. 124 Pew Global, ‘How Asians View Each Other’, Pew Research Center, July 14, 2014, http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/07/14/chapter-4-how-asians-view-each-other/. 125 Malik Muhammad Ashraf, ‘Imran’s Unforgivable Indiscretion’, Pakistan Today, December 6, 2014; ‘Imran Questions Shahbaz’s Visit to China’, The News National, November 9, 2014. 126 Mateen Haider, ‘Army Deployed in Islamabad from Today’, Dawn, August 1, 2014. 127 ‘Pakistan’s Move to Sign Pact with China for Power Projects of “Dubious Merit” ’, The News, February 23, 2014; ‘Beijing Calling’, The Express Tribune, September 9, 2014; Imtiaz Gul, ‘How Far Will China Go?’, The Friday Times, October 3, 2014. 128 ‘China’s Increased Investment Upsets Some Pakistanis’. 132 Sino-Pakistan relations 129 ‘Pak-China Friendship Is Sweeter Than the Sweetest Honey’; ‘Muslim Countries Should Raise Voice Against Ban on Fasting in Xinjiang Province in China’, Ummat, July 7, 2014, translated by the OSC, SAR2014070717297910. 130 Jonathan Fox and Shmeul Sandler, Religion in World Conflict (London: Routledge, 2014), 4. 131 Shahram Akbarzadeh and Abdullah Saeed, Islam and Political Legitimacy (London: Routledge, 2003), 87. Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 7 Sino-Nepal relations

Nepal has struggled with political instability since the country’s transition from a constitutional monarchy to a republic in 2007. Internecine conflict between the country’s largest political parties – the Nepali Congress (NC), the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist–Leninist) (UML), and the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), (UCPN(M)) – has undermined the state’s ability to implement policy, to agree on a budget, and, most importantly, to establish a new constitution. While elections in November 2013 were promising in that the ruling coalition gained a two-thirds majority in the parliament – enough to ratify a new constitution – concerns remain over the coalition’s durability, and doubts persist about the possibility for the Second Constituent Assembly to reach an agreement on a new constitution. Similar concerns exist over the ruling coalition’s ability to implement needed policy reform in the near to medium term, particularly reform in the country’s financial sector.1 The threat of political instability within the country – in many ways the system’s defining trait since 2007 – remains, particularly in relation to the sensitive political issues of federalism and the nature of the parliament and executive. The country’s economy remains weak, with GDP growth slowing to 3.6 per cent in 2013 from 4.5 per cent in 2012. This slowdown is attributable to an overall decline in production within Nepal’s agriculture sector over 2013 to 1.3 per cent, on which the country depends for one-third of its nominal GDP. Remittances also dropped over the same period, further undermining an important source of current account surplus and a driver behind consumption-led growth. High inflation is also a concern, reaching 10 per cent in 2014 and projected to remain high at 9.5 per cent for 2015.2 Lack of reliable access to energy, continued labour disputes Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 and protests, and political instability continue to depress the country’s industrial sector, which grew at just 1.6 per cent in 2013. Bottlenecks in transportation and energy – together with political uncertainty – remain persistent impediments to foreign direct investment in the country. The confluence of political uncertainty and economic weakness contributes to social instability throughout the country. In 2013, for example, the UCPN(M) organised protests, strikes, and transportation shutdowns in an attempt to stop the country’s November Constituent Assembly elections, several of which turned violent.3 Instability stemming from the UCPN(M)’s actions forced the Nepalese 134 Sino-Nepal relations government to dispatch the country’s army for the first time since the 2007 peace agreement.4 Exclusive of instability related to political machinations, Nepal regularly experiences labour protests and/or protests over the government’s inability to provide security evenly throughout the state and equitably between different ethnic groups. Social discontent extends to the state’s military, law enforcement, and legal institutions, all of which suffer from corruption, inefficiency, and bias.5 Large geographic areas within Nepal remain outside Kathmandu’s sovereignty and are home to organised criminal networks that challenge the state’s legitimacy and its ability to effectively exercise control. For the moment, China remains of secondary importance to Kathmandu, overshadowed by India’s central role in Nepal. Chinese influence, however, is disproportionate to its position in Nepal, as Beijing focuses on niche issues that are often outside India’s area of concern. Specifically, Beijing interacts with the Nepalese government on matters related to Tibetans in Nepal, hydropower, and infrastructure development – areas where New Delhi has either never developed influence or where it has lost influence in proportion to China. More important for the examination of Chinese structural power, though, is that China’s influence is growing through a concerted effort on Beijing’s part to expand ties between the two states. Beneficial in many ways, Chinese influence has also resulted in, or has the potential to result in, structural violence in Nepal. While not as pronounced as in other case studies this volume examines, such structural violence is consistent with other manifestations in that it contains the seeds of contention that could complicate or undermine China’s relations with Nepal either at the state-to-state or state-to-society levels, or both.

Structural power at the systems level

Economic linkages China’s position in Nepal’s overall trade portfolio is secondary compared with India’s. China received 5 per cent of Nepal’s exports in 2012, the majority of which were textiles, while India received 51 per cent during the same year.6 Simi- larly, India was the source of 51 per cent of Nepal’s total imports over the same period in comparison to China’s 39 per cent.7 While trends in trade do show an increased Chinese share in both the country’s import and export markets, they do not necessarily show a corresponding decrease in India’s overall share. Rather, Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 China has gained stature as a trade partner with Nepal at the cost of states in the European Union such as Germany, Italy, and France. This is not to suggest that Beijing is complacent in terms of expanding trade with Nepal, which grew a notable 61 per cent between 2011 and 2012 and continues to grow exponentially year-on-year. Indeed, Chinese efforts to expand trade between the two states are a source of structural power in that they provide Nepal with an alternative trade partner to India, a country with which the Nepalese have a complicated cooperative/competitive-type relationship. Central to China’s attempt to facilitate trade with Nepal are targeted investment in infrastructure, Sino-Nepal relations 135 its plans to reduce or eliminate tariffs on 7,000 Nepalese products, its intent to expand the number of active dry ports between the two states such as in Tatopani, and the establishment of ‘cross-border free trade zones’ in locations such as Gyi- rong Port.8 Once these initiatives go into effect, trade between the two states will increase. The growth in trade between the two states, while negligible in relation to India-Nepal trade relations (at least for now), is a source of positive Chinese structural power in three ways. First, China is becoming an increasingly important alternative partner for Nepal. Rather than rely exclusively on trade with India, as Nepal has been forced to do for decades, Kathmandu now has options and opportunities to develop areas and industries long outside its domestic economic development sphere. The Nepalese government sees this development in an entirely positive light, and Chinese influence has grown accordingly. Second, Chinese investment in support of trade has led to an increase in living standards among a number of impoverished districts along the Sino-Nepalese border such as Darchula, Humla, Bajhang, Mustang, Manang, Rasuwa, Dhading, Sindhupal- chok, Dolakha, and Sankhuwasabha.9 Whether such improvements come through Chinese-originating food aid or through growth in local economies due to the construction of cross-border trade links, locals largely see Chinese structural power as beneficial. Third, imports from China translate into greater options for the Nepalese consumer, many of whom can now afford to buy goods long considered luxuries due to their low cost and widespread availability in markets throughout the country. Some Nepalese are concerned, however, about the future of trade relations between the two states, as trends suggest China’s role in the country’s trade portfolio will grow. For many, the benefits of trade with China are directly tied to its now secondary role and will disappear in conjunction with China’s rise in overall trade. Such concerns were central to a 2013 Nepalese Ministry of Com- merce and Supplies conference in Kathmandu on Sino-Nepalese trade relations, where participants pointed to the two countries’ growing trade imbalance (in Chi- na’s favour), the unwillingness of China to eliminate tariffs on Nepalese goods (despite promises to do so), cumbersome security checks, and unreasonable quar- antine requirements for goods such as rice as evidence that trade relations with China are highly problematic.10 Representatives from Nepal’s Federation of Nepa- lese Chambers of Commerce and Industry have raised similar concerns over the nature of Sino-Nepalese trade relations, suggesting that China is intent on making Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 it as difficult as possible for Nepalese traders to export their goods while taking advantage of Nepal’s domestic market to unload inexpensive Chinese goods. If Sino-Nepalese trade relations continue to develop along this path, Beijing will quickly see diminishing returns on the positive aspects of its structural power as local traders and merchants highlight the negative components. In contrast to its position within Nepal’s trade portfolio, China has been the country’s primary source of FDI since 2012, according to the Government of Nepal’s Department of Industry. Even more notable than its role as Nepal’s main provider of FDI is Chinese FDI’s exponential growth over recent years, particularly 136 Sino-Nepal relations in relation to India, which has seen its overall share of FDI to Nepal decline in relation. In 2014, for instance, FDI from China accounted for more than 60 per cent ($174 million) of all FDI into the country ($269 million), representing a two-thirds increase on the amount of FDI it provided in 2012/13.11 Over the same period, China received permission from the Nepalese government to invest in ninety-seven projects, as opposed to India’s second-place forty-one.12 More than 90 per cent of all Chinese FDI goes toward Nepal’s hydroelectric sector – an underdeveloped sector the Nepalese government has prioritised for investment and growth – with FDI toward infrastructure development coming in a distant second. While beneficial in that FDI from China is helping drive economic development in Nepal, the nature of Chinese FDI in the country’s hydroelectric sector has resulted in negative structural power, as it impairs Nepal’s domestic hydroelectric sector development strategy. This subversion is most evident in Chinese companies’ and Chinese banks’ proclivity to invest in large hydropower projects such as the West Seti Hydropower Project, the Upper Marsyandi Hydropower Project, and the Upper Modi Hydropower Project when most industry analysts believe that large-scale projects are detrimental to the sustainability of Nepal’s hydropower sector.13 Large-scale projects are environmentally damaging, socially disruptive, and financially infeasible as they require too much time to develop to impact Nepal’s present energy shortage, to say nothing of projected future energy demand. Nepalese and foreign advisors largely believe that micro-dams provide a more fiscally responsible and environmentally sustainable path for development of Nepal’s hydropower sector and identify China’s lack of interests in funding and building such dams as a major impediment to their construction.14

State-owned enterprises/private enterprises in Nepal Chinese firms have developed a substantial presence in Nepal in two important ways. First, the number of Chinese firms in Nepal has expanded to where China is now the largest source of foreign firms operating in the country. As of 2014, 4,129 Chinese firms accounted for 30 per cent of all foreign investors in Nepal and operated across a range of sectors including hydropower, construction, tourism, and hospitality-related services.15 The breadth of Chinese firms in Nepal is now unparalleled, with second-place India accounting for just 17 per cent of foreign firms in the country. Second, while the majority of Chinese firms operating in Nepal are either small or medium-sized, some of China’s largest SOEs now operate in Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 the country, particularly in the hydropower and construction industries. While far from an exhaustive list, some of these companies include CWE Investment Company, the foreign component of the massive China Three Gorges Corpora- tion; South China Mining Energy Company; Chenhui Minerals Limited; China International Water and Electric Corporation; Sinohydro; China Overseas Engi- neering Group; and the China CAMC Company, which will build Nepal’s new international airport in Pokhara. These companies’ stature, together with their ability to provide funding through China’s Exim Bank and China Development Bank, translates into substantial Chinese structural power. Sino-Nepal relations 137 Chinese enterprises’ presence in Nepal results in negative structural power by undermining competition and, in some instances, by producing substandard results; a case in point highlighted by the multibillion-dollar Melamchi Water Supply Project fiasco. In 2002, the firm China Railway 15 Bureau Group underbid a local Nepalese construction company by 1 per cent to receive the government contract to construct the Melamchi water tunnel, despite budget projections that showed its bid was clearly under cost. On receiving the contract, the China Rail- way 15 Bureau Group experienced cost overruns and engaged in delay tactics, including closing the project for a month after a Chinese driver hit and killed a cow (during which period the Nepalese government was contractually required to continue payment). Funding agencies including the World Bank, the Swed- ish International Development Agency (SIDA), and the Norwegian Agency for Development (NORAD) withdrew funding from the project in 2011/12 due to inefficient oversight, continual extensions, and poor quality control.16 The Mel- amchi Water Supply Development Board cancelled its contract with the China Railway 15 Bureau Group in 2012, citing the firm’s completion of only 6.5 kilometres out of the contractually agreed-upon 27.5 kilometres during three years as evidence of project neglect.17 China Railway 15 Bureau Group’s work forced a delay of three years to the project, from 2013 to 2016. Such practices, according to a senior researcher at the Nepal-based South Asia Watch on Trade, Economics, and Environment, are distinct and common among Chinese firms in Nepal, which are more concerned with making money during the construction phase than com- pleting projects.18

Ties between cores Elite ties exist between the Chinese government and Nepalese political parties, particularly the country’s Maoist parties; between the Chinese Embassy and Nepal’s political institutions, primarily the Nepalese police and Ministry of Home Affairs; and between Chinese firms and Nepalese legal and political professionals.19 Ties take the shape of both direct contact, as between senior Chinese leadership and the chairmen of Nepal’s UML and the UCPN(M), and indirect contact, such as between representatives of the Chinese Embassy in Kathmandu and Nepa- lese police and Chinese agents and Nepalese individuals. China has carefully cultivated these ties by dispatching more senior officials such as Wu Chuntai, former deputy director general of the Department of External Security Affairs of the Min- Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 istry of Foreign Affairs, as China’s ambassador to the country and by providing training for Nepalese officials and politicians.20 China has developed substantial structural power as a result of these elite relations. More pointedly, China’s elite relations have resulted in Chinese structural power over policy developments in Nepal related to minority issues. Nepalese analysts identify China’s opposition to federalism in Nepal, for example, as an obstacle for domestic political reform aimed at mitigating ethnic marginalisation.21 Nepal’s political leaders are wary to pursue federalism out of concern doing so might alienate Beijing. Similarly, the Chinese Embassy draws on elite relations with the 138 Sino-Nepal relations Nepalese police and Ministry of Home Affairs to influence Nepal’s approach to matters related to Nepal’s ethnic Tibetans.22 The Chinese Embassy, for instance, was implicated in a scandal involving the bribing of Nepalese parliamentarians in 2010 so as to receive their support on Tibetan-related issues. Nepalese media have also recorded instances of Chinese firms leveraging elite relations to interfere in Nepal’s legal affairs. In a high-profile example of this practice, an unspecified Chinese firm bribed a local defence attorney to sabotage a case against ethnic Tibetans in Nepal’s Supreme Court.23 Chinese structural power stemming from elite relations is not, however, limited to the above examples. Elite relations are central to the structural power that China has developed across many of Nepal’s other structures of power, including, as detailed below, the structure of security.

Structural power at the state level

Security Beijing is concerned that the 20,000-plus Tibetans in Nepal could undermine China’s domestic security in the TAR and pressures Kathmandu to deal severely with any ‘anti-Chinese’ tendencies within the country’s Tibetan community.24 To achieve its domestic security ends, China leverages its economic links, aid, and loans with Nepal to pressure the Nepalese government to regulate and control Tibetan activities in the country.25 The Chinese Embassy in Kathmandu provides training, equipment, directives, and advice to Nepal’s security forces for dealing with any unrest related to Tibetans in Nepal. Beijing also supports its security aims in Nepal through state-to-state exchange and through the deployment (often without Kathmandu’s knowledge) of security personnel from the TAR to Nepal. China’s approach to security relations with Nepal results in Chinese structural power over the country’s structure of security. The Nepalese government and Nepalese police have securitised the state’s Tibetan population’s activities to the highest level, spending a huge number of resources regulating their activity and engaging in both reactive and proactive measures to prevent their engagement in ‘anti-Chinese’ activities. Nepal also employs its internal intelligence apparatus, specifically the National Investigation Department, to monitor activities at Tibetan refugee camps, Tibetan monasteries, and among its Tibetan population writ large.26 More pertinent to discussion of structural power is the linkage between Chinese pressure for Kathmandu to secure its Tibetan population and Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 the growing severity of the Nepalese state’s internal security measures toward the marginalised community.27 Equally notable is how Chinese structural power has reshaped Nepal’s ‘Gentleman’s Agreement’ with the United Nations’ High Com- mission for Refugees (UNHCR) under which Kathmandu previously allowed Tibetans safe passage from Tibet to India. Nepal no longer extends this ‘courtesy’ to Tibetans coming from China but rather detains or repatriates them to China. Ironically, China’s attempt to ensure its security in Nepal also results in unconscious structural power over Nepal’s structure of security at the social level, with potential destabilising effects for China’s position in the country. Nepalese Sino-Nepal relations 139 increasingly view China’s structural power over the state’s structure of security as detrimental to social stability and social cohesion. In 2013, Himalmedia, a Kathmandu-based media organisation that conducts annual public polls in Nepal, reported that Nepalese do not support the Nepalese government’s politicisation of ethnicity and do not assign stability over ethnic Tibetans in Nepal with high priority.28 Nepalese increasingly view the country’s Tibetan ‘problem’ as a dis- traction from the more pressing concerns of political and economic instability and organised crime. China’s myopic focus on Tibetan issues in Nepal not only runs counter to social sentiments but frames China as a foreign actor willing to meddle in Nepal’s internal affairs even when doing so contributes to domestic instability. This strand of Chinese structural power has implications for structural violence in Nepal as it contributes to disharmonised interests between Nepalese state and society, an issue addressed in more detail below.

Finance China is a key provider of development aid to Nepal, although it ranks third behind first-place Japan and second-place India. At present, China has committed $295 million in aid to Nepal and dispersed $105 million in contrast to Japan’s $369 million committed, $122 dispersed and India’s $301 committed, $148 dispersed.29 Chinese aid-driven projects include the Tatopani Frontier Inspection Sta- tion Project, the Syaprubesi Rasuwagadhi Road Project, and the Upper Trishuli 3A Hydroelectric Project. The nature of Chinese aid, however, is far different than other donors. Beijing allots its aid for infrastructure and economic development rather than social development, which is the focus of Japanese and Indian aid. China also provides aid and grants for training and non-lethal materials for Nepal’s military and police forces.30 Beijing has also provided $8 million in aid to build and run two mobile military hospitals. Such aid is exclusive of its development aid and largely predicated on Nepal’s continued cooperation on matters of security stemming from the TAR. China is also a central provider of loans for Nepal, having committed $37.2 million in early 2014 alone.31 As with aid, Chinese loans are exclusively allotted for projects related to economic development, such as the Chinese Exim Bank loan to the Nepal Airlines Corporation for the purchase of Chinese aircraft in 2014.32 China’s Exim Bank will also provide $180 million in loans for the development Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 of an international airport in Pokhara.33 As with other aspects of Sino-Nepalese economic relations, China gains structural power through its influence over Nepal’s structure of finance. More specifically, China’s funnelling of both aid and loans toward sectors where its firms excel and its insistence that the Nepalese side employ Chinese firms and labour for construction provides Chinese firms with opportunity to expand their presence across Nepal’s domestic economy. The Pokhara airport tender is a prime example of Chinese structural power over finance, as only Chinese firms – CAMC Com- pany Limited, China Water and Electric Company, and Sinohydro – were eligible 140 Sino-Nepal relations to compete.34 Similarly, Chinese loans for the West Seti project (of which Nepal has requested an additional $400 million from China) went directly to the CWE Investment Company, which primarily employed Chinese workers. Both examples show how Chinese aid/loans help Chinese firms establish a dominant position in Nepal’s most important development projects at Nepal’s own domestic firms’ clear expense.

Production Nepal remains a primarily agrarian economy, with the agricultural sector accounting for one-third of the country’s overall GDP and providing two-thirds of employment. The country’s industrial sector remains underdeveloped due to lack of investment, human capital, and, according to the Nepalese Ministry of Finance, continued political instability in the country. Manufacturing in Nepal has also performed poorly and has seen negative growth rates since 2007. Growth in the country’s construction sector has been flat since 2009.35 Production in the country is, therefore, limited, despite government attempts to increase outputs. While China plays a positive role in Nepal’s water and mining industries through its FDI, aid, and loans, its structural power over other aspects of Nepal’s production is largely negative. Chinese exports to Nepal, for example, contribute to underdevelopment in the country’s manufacturing sector. While Nepal used to manufacture clothing and textiles, Chinese imports of higher-quality, lower-priced goods disrupted the domestic industry and displaced countless workers, most of whom were women.36 Neither has Nepal been able to develop manufacturing for light machinery, as its domestic companies cannot compete with Chinese machinery imports.37 Notable is that Nepal does not face equal pressure from India – its other main trade partner – as India’s primary exports to Nepal are oil and coal: both commodities that contribute to domestic production. So does India invest in Nepal’s domestic manufacturing sector, thereby providing employment and a source of poverty reduction to the Nepalese.38 China’s structural power also has negative effects over Nepal’s agricultural sector. Chinese restrictions on Nepal’s agricultural exports and Chinese exports to Nepal of basic agricultural goods such as meat products and vegetables contribute to an underdevelopment of agriculture for export in Nepal.39 As noted earlier, Nepalese merchants regularly accuse China of imposing unreasonable standards on Nepal’s agricultural goods so as to slow imports into the TAR.

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 China’s focused investment in mining and hydropower in Nepal also contributes to lopsided development across Nepal’s structure of production. Chinese-financed infrastructure, for example, does not facilitate manufacturing as a whole, but rather results in an enclave economy where all development is focused around Nepal’s natural resource sector. While beneficial for these sectors, such focused investment leads Kathmandu to prioritise one component of production over all others to the detriment of the country’s sustainable development.40 While China does not bear the blame for Kathmandu’s narrow development policies, Chinese structural power does influence how the state develops its priorities. Sino-Nepal relations 141 Knowledge Much as in the other case studies this volume examines, China has a developed programme for expanding the study of Chinese language, culture, and history in Nepal. Kathmandu University – Nepal’s flagship institution of higher education – boasts a Confucius Institute, and the Chinese Embassy in Nepal regularly organ- ises Chinese cultural activities in the state’s capital. China also operates education and cultural fairs through the Nepal-China Commerce Friendship Association, the Nepal-China Friendship Youth Association, and the Nepal-China Cultural and Educational Council: three groups with ties both to the Chinese Embassy and their respective Nepalese ministries.41 While an important source of structural power over knowledge, China’s formal educational and cultural ties with Nepal pale in comparison to the structural power China has gained through its efforts to shape perceptions and rhetoric around Bud- dhism, the Dalai Lama, and Tibet in Nepal. An essential component of China’s overall security strategy in Nepal, Beijing, both through the Chinese Embassy and local leaders from the TAR (many of Tibetan ethnic origin), has used economic leverage to advance a ‘pro-China’ approach to these three issues in the country. In 2011, for example, the Asia-Pacific Exchange and Cooperation Foundation (a Chinese-government controlled investment firm based in Hong Kong) unilaterally announced plans to spend $3 billion to develop the southern Nepalese village of Lumbini – the birthplace of the Buddha – into a ‘Mecca for Buddhists’. Plans included building rail links from the region to Tibet, constructing an international airport and hotels, and establishing a Buddhist university. According to the foundation’s chairman, Xiao Wunan, who also holds a position with China’s National Development and Reform Commission, Lumbini would bring together three schools of Buddhism (Mahayana, Hinayana, and Sakya) but would exclude Gelug, or ‘Yellow hat’ Buddhism, of which the Dalai Lama is the religious leader.42 Recent reports indicate that the China Buddhist Association, headed by the Beijing-selected 11th Panchen Lama, will take over the project from the foundation, placing it firmly under Beijing’s control.43 This attempt to establish an organised structure around Buddhism (which is inherently unorganised) is hugely significant, as it would allow China to shape the religion’s narrative in ways that support its political agenda in the TAR. While perhaps the most dramatic example of Chinese structural power over knowledge in Nepal, Lumbini is far from the only instance that China has used its influence to shape discourse around Bud-

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 dhism in Nepal. In 2005, for instance, the Chinese government used aid and loans to pressure Kathmandu to close the Dalai Lama’s office and Tibetan Refugee Wel- fare Office in Nepal, which it promptly did.44 Since the closing of these offices, the Dalai Lama has been a persona non grata for Nepal’s leadership. China has also developed structural power through its continued campaign against activities by ethnic Tibetans in Nepal. China has spent a considerable amount of time and resources convincing the Nepalese government to act against this portion of their population and has been successful to the point of influencing knowledge about Tibetan activity in Nepal. The concept of ‘anti-Chinese’ activity 142 Sino-Nepal relations among the Tibetan Nepalese is a case in point of China’s structural power over knowledge in Nepal. While the concept has no legal basis in Nepalese law, it has become the central rationale for continued, even escalating, hard-handed tactics by the Nepalese police against the country’s Tibetans.45 The need to ‘pacify’ the Tibetans for China’s sake, in this respect, has supplemented Kathmandu’s sovereign responsibility toward a large portion of its own population.

Structural violence Political instability and illegitimacy in Nepal together with Chinese structural power as described above result in structural violence across the state’s economic, environmental, and social sectors and contribute to structural violence between the state and Nepalese society. While less pronounced than in this volume’s other case studies, structural violence stemming from China’s structural power is at least proportionate to its presence in Nepal’s internal affairs.

Economy While China occupies a secondary place in Nepal’s economy compared to India, its structural power is pronounced enough that Nepal is dependent on Chinese trade, FDI, aid, and loans for its economic development.46 While beneficial to Nepal in that economic linkages with China contribute to growth, aspects of the two states’ economic ties result in structural violence. Chinese exports to Nepal and Chinese investment in hydropower, in particular, result in structural violence within Nepal’s economy. While there is, of course, no guarantee that Nepal’s economy would develop in a more sustainable, balanced way in the absence of Chinese structural power, that its presence has put obstacles in the way of such sustained growth is certain. As earlier mentioned, Chinese imports, consisting mainly of apparel, textiles, electronic equipment, and light machinery, undermine Nepal’s manufacturing sector, as Nepalese companies cannot compete with the price and quality of Chi- nese goods. As manufacturing has been, and continues to be, an important source of work for women in Nepal and, as such, a key component of sustainable development linked to poverty reduction, Nepal’s failure to develop this key economic sector has widespread, negative implications for the country’s overall social development. While other variables such as the lack of energy and insufficient Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 infrastructure also play a role in the underdevelopment of Nepal’s manufacturing sector, China’s exports to Nepal play an important, disruptive role.47 China’s investment in Nepal’s hydropower sector also results in structural violence in Nepal. Chinese firms’ dominance of the sector translates into Nepa- lese dependence on foreign capital, technology, and, in some instances, labour for development of a key component of its national economy. Such dependence undermines Nepal’s domestic firms’ development and drives Nepal’s energy strategy in ways more suited to Chinese firms’ potential than the country’s energy needs.48 China’s preference to construct large dams despite general agreement Sino-Nepal relations 143 among industry analysts that Nepal needs micro-dams is a clear example of such structural violence. Chinese dam development in Nepal has also resulted in, and has the enormous potential to lead to, contingent liability for Nepal. Contingent liability comes from a state’s commitment to fixed financial terms before completion of a project and regardless of the project’s eventual outcome. Contingent liability means that the Nepalese government is responsible to purchase a fixed amount of energy at a fixed price from a Chinese-financed and constructed dam project regardless of whether the dam is eventually used or even connected to a power grid. As such agreements are central to Chinese financing, whether aid or loans, and as corruption and ineffectiveness are endemic in both the Nepalese government and Chi- nese firms, the potential that contingent liability will become a crippling source of debt for Nepal is significant.49 Indeed, the Nepalese government’s contractual requirement to pay China Railway 15 Bureau Group for the Melamchi Water Sup- ply Project and the China Gezhouba Group Co. for the Upper Trishuli 3A Hydro- electricity Project despite both companies’ continued delays and clear negligence is evidence that contingent liability for Nepal is already a component of its economic exchange with China.50

Environment Chinese structural power has also developed into structural violence over Nepal’s environment, more specifically over Nepal’s rivers. Chinese construction of dams on Nepal’s rivers threatens these same rivers’ health and vitality, damages the local environment, and endangers local flora and fauna. China’s damming of Nepal’s rivers’ headwaters in Tibet also threatens the country’s environment, water supply, and food security. The remaining section addresses each issue in turn. Chinese firms undertake dam building in Nepal, as in other countries, without first conducting environmental impact assessments (EIAs) to determine the extent certain projects will affect local environmental conditions.51 More even, Chinese firms have moved forward on projects despite concerns among international organisations such as the World Bank and IMF and international bodies such as the World Commission on Dams that construction in the area would vio- late international norms related to dam building and lead to extensive environmental damage.52 The Chinese government’s decision to provide funding through the Exim Bank and construction through the CWE Investment Company for the West Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 Seti Dam is only the most visible example of such behaviour. China agreed to go ahead with the project in 2012 despite the Asian Development Bank’s withdrawal from the project over concerns that construction would negatively impact large expanses of cultivated land, forest, grassland, shrub land, and the flora and fauna that depend on them. China also chose to ignore concerns over the dam’s potential to result in increased seismic activity, flooding, and inundation of local areas, many considered holy. The West Seti Dam is just one example of Chinese practices that have become widespread throughout Nepal at other major sites including the Upper Trishuli 3A and 3B Dams.53 144 Sino-Nepal relations Chinese dam building in the Tibetan Plateau also results in structural violence over Nepal’s environment.54 Not only is China engaged in dam building on the headwaters of Nepal’s major rivers for the sake of hydropower, but it is channel- ling these rivers’ waters for irrigation and other purposes. Even more worrying for Nepal is the Chinese scheme for inter-basin and inter-river water transfers that would see a massive internal reallocation of water within China and subsequent decrease in water for Nepal.55 A reduction in water coming from the TAR to Nepal has the potential to fundamentally and negatively affect the country’s water supply, food security, environmental health, and social stability.

Society Structural violence within Nepalese society resulting from Chinese structural power is visible within the country’s economic and environmental sectors. Extrap- olation of China’s influence over the country’s manufacturing sector, for example, suggests Chinese influence over unemployment and poverty in the country. Simi- larly, Chinese firms’ careless development of dams along Nepal’s rivers has implications for rural Nepalese communities in terms of forced relocation, community disintegration, water and food security, and loss of livelihood.56 While certainly important points to raise in terms of Chinese-originating structural violence, these aspects of social structural violence are, however, arguably secondary in terms of the structural violence that occurs within Nepalese society due to Chinese manipulation of ethnic relations in the country. Chinese interference in Nepal’s society through its campaign against the state’s Tibetan population results both in human rights violations and in social tensions between ethnic groups. Both Nepalese and international non-governmental organisations such as Human Rights Organization of Nepal, Human Rights Watch, UN Human Rights Committee, and the International Campaign for Tibet clearly identify Chinese structural power as the driving force behind Nepal’s aggressive and abusive policies toward the country’s ethnic Tibetans.57 More specifically, Chinese demands that Kathmandu secure the activities of ethnic Tibetans in Nepal have led to indiscriminate targeting, arrests, refoulement, and torture. More even, China’s insistence that the Nepalese state closely regulate Tibetan activity in the country has contributed to marginalisation and discrimination of Tibetans in Nepal – an outcome with clear consequences for political and social stability in the state. The state’s securitisation of Tibetan activity in Nepal, for Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 instance, contributes to sentiment among Nepal’s other ethnic groups that Tibet- ans are inherently aggressive and/or intent on causing disorder. Such perceptions undermine Nepal’s social integration and present significant challenges for the country’s weak political institutions.58

State/society relations More than 60 per cent of respondents in a 2013 public opinion poll in Nepal registered a complete lack of confidence in the country’s political leaders and Sino-Nepal relations 145 processes. An equal number claimed Nepal’s democracy was under threat from political weakness and corruption. More important for state/society relations is that respondents claimed conditions in Nepal were getting worse under the current government and unlikely to improve under any government.59 These perceptions indicate a structural violence within Nepalese state/society relations resulting from disharmonised interests that has the potential to further weaken the already weak state. China’s contribution to this structural violence is threefold. First, Beijing’s interference with Nepal’s political process – whether through Chinese Commu- nist Party (CCP) ties to the state’s Maoist parties, its attempts to bribe members of Nepal’s parliament, or its involvement in the state’s legal processes – contributes to perceptions that the state is corrupt and beholden to foreign interests.60 While the majority of Nepalese continue to see Indian influence over the state’s domestic affairs as the most pronounced, a growing number, according to the 2013 Himal- media poll, also see China as an outside actor capable of negatively influencing the state’s democratic process and sovereignty.61 Second, Chinese involvement in Nepal over security issues related to the country’s Tibetans also undermines the Nepalese state’s claim to political legitimacy and sovereignty. Chinese pressure for the state to act against ‘anti-Chinese’ activity in the country, for example, undermines Nepal’s rule of law, as Nepalese law does not outlaw such activity yet Nepalese police are forced to arbitrarily enforce its violation.62 Chinese insistence that Nepal repatriate Tibetan refugees to China, where they are reportedly held in long-term confinement and often tortured, also results in Kathmandu’s violating the non-refoulement principle of international law. Third, Chinese clandestine activity in Nepal in support of its security objectives undermines the state’s sovereignty. The Chinese Embassy in Nepal operates an extensive range of Chinese intelligence agents throughout Nepal, often without Kathmandu’s knowledge, and Chinese security officials regularly travel to the Nepalese side of the Chinese-Nepal border to conduct security reviews without the state’s permission.63 China also conducts surveillance of Nepal’s non-government organisations – in violation of Nepalese law – with the intent of gaining intelligence on Tibetan activity in the state. While China, alone, is not responsible for the current deficiencies in Nepal’s state/society relations, its structural power does result in influence that translates into structural violence. Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016

Notes 1 ‘Nepal: Country Outlook’, EIU ViewsWire, February 20, 2014. 2 The World Bank, Nepal Economic Update: With a Special Focus on Dealing with Excess Liquidity (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2014), 7–8. 3 ‘Nepal: Maoist-Led Alliance Announces Fresh Protest Programme to Obstruct 19 Nov CA Polls’, The Kathmandu Post Online, August 29, 2013. 4 G. S. ‘Mountains to Climb’, The Economist, November 21, 2013. 146 Sino-Nepal relations 5 Rameshwar Bohara, ‘Selfish Leadership’, Himal Khabarpatrika, June 30, 2013; ‘Nepal’s Legal Community Protests Against Supreme Court’, Xinhua, September 7, 2013. 6 Observatory of Economic Complexity, ‘Export Destinations of Nepal’, last modified May 14, 2014, http://atlas.media.mit.edu/explore/tree_map/hs/export/npl/show/ all/2012/. 7 Observatory of Economic Complexity, ‘Import Origins of Nepal’, last modified May 14, 2014, http://atlas.media.mit.edu/explore/tree_map/hs/import/npl/show/all/2012/. 8 ‘Nepal-China Trade Talks in August: Five Priority Agenda’, Nagarik, July 21, 2013. 9 Girija Adhikari, ‘Tibet to Assist VDCs Along Its Border’, Naya Patrika, November 5, 2011. 10 Drub Dangal, ‘Problems of Export to China Discussed’, Nagarik, June 23, 2013. 11 ‘China Becomes Largest FDI Contributor in Nepal’, Xinhua, January 22, 2014. 12 Department of Industry, Industrial Statistics: Fiscal Year 2012/2013 (Kathmandu: Ministry of Industry, 2014), 58. 13 Deepak Adhikari, ‘Hydropower Development in Nepal’, NRB Economic Review Vol. 18 (2006), 70–94. 14 Madeline Bergner, Developing Nepal’s Hydroelectric Resources: Policy Alternatives (Washington, DC: Stimson Center, 2013), 34. 15 ‘China Tops Foreign Investors in Nepal’, Global Times, April 11, 2014. 16 Mukul Hugmagain and Anil Giri, ‘Multiple Issues Hit Multibillion Project Melamchi’, Ekantipur.com, August 26, 2010, http://www.ekantipur.com/2010/08/26/business/ multiple-issues-hit-multibillion-project-melamchi/321170.html. 17 ‘Melamchi Water Treatment Plant to Begin Construction Next Week’, WN.com, January 31, 2014, http://article.wn.com/view/2014/01/31/Melamchi_water_treatment_plant_to_ begin_construction_next_we/. 18 Personal Interview, 2013, Nepal. 19 Jeffrey Reeves, ‘China’s Self-Defeating Tactics in Nepal’, Contemporary South Asia Vol. 20, No. 4 (2012), 527–28. 20 Chandra Shekhar Adhikari, ‘Wu Chuntai Proposed as New Chinese Ambassador’, Annapurna Post, January 26, 2013. 21 Prashant Jha, ‘The Message From the North’, The Hindu Online, October 5, 2012. 22 Chudamani Bhattarai, ‘Chinese Pressure to Get Tibetan Commanders Arrested’, Annapurna Post, March 9, 2014. 23 Reeves, ‘China’s Self-Defeating Tactics in Nepal’, 528. 24 Human Rights Watch, Under China’s Shadow: Mistreatment of Tibetans in Nepal (Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch, 2014), 5–7. 25 Andrew James Nathan and Andrew Scobell, China’s Search for Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 160. 26 Shambhu Kattel, ‘After Security Tightened Free Tibet Day Suspended: Capital on Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 High Security Alert’, Annapurna Post, March 10, 2014. 27 Human Rights Watch, Under China’s Shadow, 5–7. 28 ‘A Wide Open Field’, Nepali Times, March 21, 2013. 29 Ministry of Finance, ‘Foreign Aid in Nepal: China’, Ministry of Finance, Nepal, accessed May 22, 2014, http://portal.mof.gov.np/projects-search?organisations_dn=20. 30 ‘China to Give Nepalese Army $5 Million’, Nagarik, February 22, 2013. 31 ‘Chinese Govt Provides 19.2 Million US Dollars Aid to Nepal’, Global Times, March 5, 2013. 32 Sushil Bhattarai, ‘Nepal Buys $1.25 Billion More Expensive Chinese Aircraft’, Nagarik, March 12, 2014. Sino-Nepal relations 147 33 Sushil Bhattarai, ‘China Ready to Provide NR18 Billion [$180 Million]’, Nagarik, August 7, 2013. 34 Ibid. 35 Ministry of Finance, Fiscal Year 2011/2012 (Kathmandu: Ministry of Finance, 2012), 7–8. 36 Ted Fishman, China, Inc.: How the Rise of the Next Superpower Challenges America and the World (New York: Scribner, 2006), 92. 37 United Nations Publications, Promoting Complementarities and Investment in Selected Manufacturing Sectors: Resource-Based Industries and Poverty Alleviation (New York: United Nations Publications, 2005), 6. 38 John Whalley, China’s Integration into the World Economy (Singapore: World Scien- tific, 2011), 256. 39 Centre for Trade and Development New Delhi, South Asian Yearbook of Trade and Development: Harnessing Gains from Trade: Domestic Challenges and Beyond (Kath- mandu: Academic Foundation, 2009), 126. 40 Gabi G. Afram and Angelica Salvi Del Pero, Nepal’s Investment Climate: Leveraging the Private Sector for Job Creation and Growth (Washington, DC: World Bank Publi- cations, 2012), 43. 41 ‘Friendship Organizations Celebrates H.E. Ambassador Mr. Yang Houlan’s Successful One Year Tenure in Nepal’, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal, accessed May 22, 2014, http://np.china-embassy.org/ eng/News/t956703.htm. 42 Melissa Chan, ‘The Lumbini Project: China’s $3bn for Buddhism’, Aljazeera, July 16, 2011. 43 Jayadeva Ranade, ‘China’s Tightening Embrace of Nepal’, Centre for China Analysis, April 2014, accessed May 22, 2014, http://ccasindia.org/article_ details.php?aid=10. 44 ‘Dalai Lamas Office Says China Pressed Nepal to Close Them Down’, Radio Free Asia, January 28, 2005, accessed May 22, 2014, http://www.rfa.org/english/news/poli tics/tibetan_nepal-20050128.html. 45 Human Rights Watch, Under China’s Shadow, 9. 46 Afram and Del Pero, Nepal’s Investment Climate, 202. 47 Ted C. Fishman, China Inc.: The Relentless Rise of the Next Great Superpower (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2012), 92. 48 P. Godde, Tourism and Development in Mountain Regions (Wallingford, UK: CABI, 2000), 174. 49 International Monetary Fund, Nepal: Staff Report for the 2012 Article IV Consultation (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2013), 6. 50 Nepal Energy Forum, ‘Deadline Extended for Upper Trishuli Hydro’, Nepal Energy

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 Forum, May 3, 2014, accessed May 27, 2014, http://www.nepalenergyforum.com/ deadline-extended-for-upper-trishuli-hydro/. 51 Jianqiang Liu, Chinese Research Perspectives on the Environment, Vol. 3: Public Action and Government Accountability (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 253. 52 International Rivers, ‘West Seti Dam, Nepal’, International Rivers, accessed May 28, 2014, http://www.internationalrivers.org/campaigns/west-seti-dam-nepal-0. 53 International Rivers, ‘Upper Trishuli 3A and 3B’, International Rivers, accessed May 27, 2014, http://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/upper-trishuli-3a-and-3b-3589. 54 Judith Shapiro, China’s Environmental Challenges (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2013), 122. 148 Sino-Nepal relations 55 William G. Moseley, et al., An Introduction to Human-Environment Geography: Local Dynamics and Global Processes (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2013), 309. 56 Yuki Tanabe, Report on the West Seti Hydroelectric Project and ADB Policy Violations (Tokyo: Japan Center for a Sustainable Environment and Society, 2007), 1–3. 57 International Campaign for Tibet, ‘UN Human Rights Committee Urges Nepal to Reg- ister Tibetan Refugees’, International Campaign for Tibet, April 10, 2014, accessed May 27, 2014, https://www.savetibet.org/un-human-rights-committee-urges-nepal-to- register-tibetan-refugees/. 58 Mahendra Lawoti and Susan Hangen, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nepal: Iden- tities and Mobilization After 1990 (London: Routledge, 2013), 39. 59 ‘A Wide Open Field’, Nepali Times, March 21, 2013. 60 ‘Nepal Parties Call for Probe into Maoist Bribe Tape’, Hindustan Times, Septem- ber 5, 2010, accessed May 27, 2014, http://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/ nepal-parties-call-for-probe-into-maoist-bribe-tape/article1-596282.aspx; Mei Jin- gya, ‘Chinese Company Bribed Nepal Leaders for Airport Deal: Indian Media’, Sina English, October 9, 2010, accessed May 27, 2014, http://english.sina.com/ china/2012/1008/514238.html. 61 ‘A Wide Open Field’. 62 Human Rights Watch, Under China’s Shadow, 5. 63 Santosh Ghimire and Nava Raj Mainali, ‘Tibetan Senior Security Officials Urge to Control Demonstrations by Refugees’, Naya Patrika, February 27, 2012; Reeves, ‘Chi- na’s Self-Defeating Tactics in Nepal’, 527–28. Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 8 Sino-Myanmar relations

Myanmar’s political transition from a military junta-led government to a democratic state has not addressed the underlying weakness within its political system. Political illegitimacy and ineffectiveness are still prominent issues as the military, or Tatmadaw, remains the country’s most powerful political actor despite reforms and elections. The military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), for example, now holds 80 per cent of the country’s parliamentary seats and has a constitutional right to hold at least 25 per cent of all seats in future governments. The military itself has a constitutional mandate to ensure domestic security and stability as well as a legal right to undo reforms as it sees fit. The Tatmadaw’s continued centrality in Myanmar’s security and politics undermines the democratically elected state’s legitimacy and calls its ability to independently govern into question. Adding to the sense of uncertainty around the military/state split in governance is concern over internal division within the military itself, which many observers believe will become more acute once eighty-year-old Sen- ior General Than Shwe no longer holds power.1 Neither are the military nor state able to execute firm sovereignty over the country’s divergent areas and ethnic groups; a deficit in political control that has severe and negative implications for social stability and interethnic relations in Myanmar.2 Myanmar’s weakness extends to the country’s economy, despite recent high-level growth driven by FDI in the energy sector and garment industry. The country is one of the poorest states in Asia, with more than 25 per cent of its population subsisting below the country’s poverty line. Gross domestic product per capita in 2012/13 was $868, with underemployment a persistent and widespread problem.3 Inflation is rampant mainly due to inadequate rice supplies (the Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 country’s main staple food), accelerating private-sector credit growth, and an increasingly dollarised economy. The price of rice, for example, rose 15 per cent year-on-year from 2013 to 2014 while both food and non-food prices have skyrocketed as the kyat has depreciated against the US dollar.4 While international financial organisations such as the World Bank and Asian Development Bank predict Myanmar’s economy will grow in the near to medium term at between 7 and 8 per cent per annum, such growth is predicated on continued political and economic reform that is far from guaranteed. In 2014, for example, the World Bank ranked Myanmar 182 out of 189 countries in terms of the ease of doing 150 Sino-Myanmar relations business – hardly an indication that the country has undergone the sea change needed for economic stability.5 Even more than weakness stemming from its political and economic systems, Myanmar’s state/society relations are a source of instability and, increasingly, political illegitimacy at both the domestic and international levels. Conflict between the ethnic Burmese-dominated military and government and armed ethnic groups in the Kachin and Shan States result in internal displacement and violence. Communal violence between Buddhist Burmese and Muslim communities throughout the country (specifically violence against the Muslim Rohingya in Arakan State) has led international organisations including the United Nations and Human Rights Watch to accuse the government of crimes against humanity and of complicity in ethnic cleansing.6 These interethnic tensions, combined with the state’s poor institutional control over large geographic areas within Myanmar proper, translate into state weakness that could undermine the political and economic gains the country has made over the past several years. China’s influence in Myanmar remains unparalleled, despite growing concern within Myanmar over its economic activity, its influence over the state’s political process, and its role in the country’s internal ethnic conflicts. Beijing is both Myanmar’s primary trading partner and its main source of foreign direct investment. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) maintains close relations with the Tatmadaw (as well as the United Wa State Army in Kachin State) while the Chi- nese Communist Party has developed ties with the state and opposition parties. Cross-border ethnic ties also enhance China’s presence and influence in the country, with both stabilising and destabilising effects. Of the eight case studies this volume examines, Chinese structural power and its manifestation as structural violence is nowhere clearer than in its relations with Myanmar.

Structural power at the systems level

Economic linkages China is Myanmar’s most important source of foreign goods, providing 40 per cent of its total imports for 2012.7 The 2012 figure represents a 4 per cent increase from 2009, drawing into question the common assumption that China’s economic position in Myanmar is waning in the face of the country’s political and economic reforms. Indeed, there is every indication that Chinese imports to Myanmar will Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 grow, as they primarily consist of machinery, metals, and vehicles – all necessary goods for Myanmar’s economic growth and industrialisation.8 China ranks third in terms of receiving Myanmar’s exports, lagging behind both Thailand and India. In 2012, China received 15 per cent of Myanmar’s export goods compared to 44 per cent for Thailand and 16.8 per cent for India.9 Notable, however, is the growth in the overall percentage of Myanmar’s exports China receives. In 2009, China accounted for just 10 per cent of the country’s overall exports in comparison to Thailand’s 47 per cent and India’s 21 per cent. This increase suggests closer trade relations, something China has committed to Sino-Myanmar relations 151 through targeted investment in infrastructure aimed at expanding physical connectivity between the two states. Myanmar’s trade relations with China, while beneficial in terms of overall growth, contain negative outcomes that complicate the country’s economic development. The nature of trade between the two states, for example, leads to dependency within Myanmar on cross-border as opposed to foreign trade. This dependency increases Myanmar’s reliance on China as a source/destination state for trade, lessens the state’s ability to engage with foreign actors, and undermines Naypyidaw’s policy priority of diversifying its trade portfolio to 80 per cent foreign/20 per cent cross-border trade by 2015.10 Legal cross-border trade between China and Myanmar increased threefold between 2011 and 2012, while its trade with foreign actors such as Japan and the United states remained nominal over the same period. Reliance on cross-border trade also leads to greater illicit trade between China and Myanmar, as much of the trade is under-regulated and informal.11 Cross-border trade over land is increasingly vulnerable to illicit activity as organised crime groups employ established trade routes to move goods such as narcotics, weapons, and people. The United Wa State Army (UWSA) and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) have both used legitimate cross-border land routes to move illegal goods across the Chinese/Myanmar border.12 Cross-border and illicit trade with China also contributes to a depletion of Myanmar’s natural resources as local merchants trade in illegal timber, an outcome of trade relations that this volume examines in more detail in later sections on Chinese-originating structural violence in the country.13 Trade with China also puts pressure on Myan- mar’s domestic industries, as local entrepreneurs cannot compete with Chinese imports in terms of price or quality.14 All these trade-related outcomes result in Chinese negative structural power within Myanmar. China is also Myanmar’s most important source of foreign investment, accounting for 61 per cent of all FDI into the country in 2013/14.15 This amount is nearly triple that of second-place Thailand, which provided 22 per cent over the same period, and exponentially more than Japan and the United States, which provided just 0.7 per cent and 0.5 per cent, respectively. Chinese firms account for 57 per cent of all foreign firms operating in Myanmar and are primarily involved in the oil and gas, power, and mineral sectors.16 As with trade, China’s overall percentage of FDI to Myanmar has increased since the country’s adoption of political and economic reform in 2011. In 2009, for example, China ranked fourth overall of FDI providers to Myanmar, far behind first-place Thailand. That Chinese FDI to Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 the country has grown as much as it has between 2009 and 2014 is clear evidence of its expanding structural power as tied to investment. While rightly credited as driving certain aspects of Myanmar’s domestic development, Chinese FDI also results in negative structural power in three ways. First, Chinese FDI provides Beijing with an economic tool for coercion to achieve its economic and political aims in Myanmar, even when such aims go against Naypyidaw’s interests. The precipitous drop-off in Chinese FDI in 2011/12 in response to Naypyidaw’s suspension of Chinese construction of the Myitsone Dam is a case in point of such behaviour.17 Chinese FDI only increased again 152 Sino-Myanmar relations when President Thein Sein guaranteed continuation of Chinese projects in Myan- mar in late 2012.18 Second, Chinese FDI in Myanmar, much as in this volume’s other case studies, drives Naypyidaw’s domestic economic development priorities in ways that are not always beneficial for Myanmar’s long-term economic growth or its foreign relations with other states. Chinese investment in dam building, mining, and oil and gas pipelines, for example, all indicate that Beijing is intent on exploiting Myanmar’s natural resources through targeted investment. Third, Chinese FDI in mega-projects such as the Shwe Gas Pipeline, the Letpadaung copper mine project, the Myitsone Dam, the Tarpein hydropower project, and the Tagaung Taung Nickel Mine contribute to social, environmental, and political instability throughout Myanmar that this volume further examines in relation to structural violence.19

State-owned enterprises/private enterprises in Myanmar There are two types of Chinese enterprises operating in Myanmar: Chinese SOEs involved in the development and construction of major projects – usually within the power, oil and gas, and mineral sectors – and Chinese private firms that engage in licit/illicit trade between the two states. Together, these Chinese firms have a firm hold on foreign involvement in Myanmar’s domestic economy and are the source of a considerable amount of structural power for China. Major Chinese firms include, but are not limited to, the Chinese arms manufac- turer, Wanbao, which has a controlling share of the controversial Letpadaung copper mine project; the state-owned China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), which is involved in construction of the Shwe Gas Pipeline; the state-owned China Nonferrous Metal Mining (Group) Co., Ltd, which is developing the Tagaung Taung Nickel Mine; the state-owned China Power Investment Corporation, which was (is) developing the Myitsone Dam; and the state-owned China Datang Cor- poration, which is overseeing development of the Tarpein hydropower project. Beijing directly controls these firms, which suggests their activities in Myanmar support China’s strategic purpose in the country. Chinese private firms, most of which are small to medium-sized companies that rely on established trade networks between China and Myanmar’s ethnic Chi- nese, tend to operate along the old Burma Road between Mandalay and Kunming. These small private firms are the driving force behind the two states’ cross-border trade, facilitating 87 per cent of total legal cross-border imports and exports at Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 the Ruili/Muse border trade zone. While many are legitimate firms engaged in legitimate business, others are involved in the illegal trade of timber, jade, gems, minerals, and narcotics, run casinos, and engage in human trafficking.20 The structural power coming from these firms’ involvement in Myanmar’s domestic economy differs between the SOEs and private firms. SOEs, for example, engage directly with Naypyidaw on matters of Myanmar’s domestic policy as it relates to Chinese interests.21 They employ lobbyists to advance their economic and strategic interests both with the state and society and leverage their ties to Beijing and China’s Exim Bank and Development Bank to secure access to major Sino-Myanmar relations 153 projects.22 The Chinese Embassy in Myanmar serves as the coordinating platform for Chinese SOEs’ interests in the country, with the ambassador pressing Presi- dent Thein Sein directly to assure their preferential treatment.23 Chinese private firms, conversely, have structural power at the tactical level in their monopoly control over certain aspects of trade between China and Myanmar, particularly from Mandalay through the Kachin and Shan States. Chinese firms operating in these areas dominate local trade and commerce through their use of ethnic ties, kin-based networks, and established trade routes.24 Structural power coming from these private firms’ operations is so extensive that major areas and towns in Myan- mar now have a clear Chinese rather than Burmese atmosphere.25

Ties between cores Ties between Beijing, specifically the PLA, and the Myanmar Armed orces,F or Tatmadaw, remain the most developed and formal between the two states. Since 1988, the PLA has provided the Tatmadaw with an estimated $4 billion in arms, including combat aircraft, battle tanks, armoured personnel carriers, surface-to-air missiles, and antiaircraft guns. The PLA has also cultivated person-to-person ties by funding and bringing Myanmar officers to the PLA’s Staff College and Defence College.26 The two states engage in regular bilateral military exchanges and have cooperation agreements related to control of their shared border regions.27 As no other state can boast ties with the Tatmadaw as extensive as China’s, Beijing remains the predominant actor in elite relations with Myanmar’s de facto power centre. China’s ties with the Tatmadaw spill over into its relations with the state’s elite, particularly with military appointees and the Union Solidarity and Develop- ment Party (USDP), Myanmar’s ruling party and heir to the military junta’s, or State Peace and Development Council’s (SPDC), mass organisation, the Union Solidarity and Development Association. The CCP has also worked to form ties with the opposition political party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), to maintain its level of influence in Myanmar following the country’s transition toward democracy.28 Chinese firms and the Chinese Embassy are central actors in developing and deepening the network of linkages between China’s state and party officials and their Myanmar counterparts through the provision of loans and training.29 More controversially, China maintains close ties with the United Wa State Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 Army (UWSA), an armed ethnic group based in Shan State that remains in conflict with Naypyidaw over its status and sovereign rights. Drawing on relations between the CPC and Communist Party of Burma (CPB) first established in the 1960s, Beijing continues to support the UWSA by supplying it with military hard- ware including helicopter gunships with air-to-air missiles, surface-to-air missiles, wheeled tank destroyers, and small arms.30 China also provides training and intelligence for UWSA soldiers.31 The UWSA use the Chinese RMB in the areas they control, speak Chinese, and rely on Chinese networks for their telecommunication needs.32 Similarly, Beijing also reportedly maintains ties with the Kachin 154 Sino-Myanmar relations Independence Army (KIA) in order to play a double game of impartial mediator and arms supplier.33 Beijing’s multipronged approach to elite relations in Myanmar results in destabilising structural power. First, China’s ties with the SPDC allowed the military junta to stay in power despite foreign sanctions and pressure against its human rights violations, its inability to deliver social goods to the Myanmar population, and its opposition against social progress.34 Beijing’s pro-junta image is now a serious liability in the country’s post-reform public opinion environment. Sec- ond, China’s value-free diplomacy and its willingness to engage with both the USDP and the NLD have angered the Tatmadaw, thereby creating internal tensions between the country’s military and political systems. While Beijing claims its willingness to work with any party in power is a result of its non-interference doctrine in foreign affairs, for the Tatmadaw, the USDP, and even the NLD, its outreach smacks of opportunism.35 Third, its use of the UWSA to balance power against the Tatmadaw prevents Myanmar from dealing with an internal contradiction of sovereignty and domestic control. The UWSA’s ability to remain a separate political entity with a military capable of repelling (and possibly defeating) Myanmar’s armed forces means that Myanmar remains divided for Beijing’s benefits.

Structural power at the state level

Security Chinese activity in Myanmar contributes to Chinese structural power over the state’s and society’s structure of security in three ways. First, China’s continual support for armed ethnic groups in Myanmar, mainly the UWSA, allows for a balance of power between the state and a non-state actor that undermines internal stability, stymies political and social reconciliation, and prevents Naypyidaw from exercising total sovereignty. China’s rationale behind support for the UWSA is to use the group as a source of leverage to prevent Naypyidaw from becoming too close to Western states such as the United States and to ensure that the government looks after Chinese investments in the country.36 Beijing’s support for the UWSA is a direct example of how Chinese structural power shapes the security environment in Myanmar across the military and government and within the armed ethnic groups themselves. Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 Second, Chinese commercial and strategic interests have a direct effect on Myanmar’s internal security environment and on Naypyidaw’s attempt to negotiate peaceful ceasefires with domestic groups. Beijing has used its leverage as a neutral broker within the peace talks between Naypyidaw and the KIO, for example, to cancel talks rather than let outside actors such as the United Nations, United States, or European Union have a role in mediation.37 China has also dis- couraged the Myanmar military from taking armed action against the KIA out of concern such operations would have a negative effect on security around the Shwe Gas Pipeline.38 Sino-Myanmar relations 155 Third, Chinese support for the UWSA and KIA undermines Naypyidaw’s ability to effectively regulate drug cultivation and production in Shan State: the source of 94 per cent of the country’s heroin and methamphetamine production.39 While drug trafficking from Myanmar to China is also a major concern for China, particularly due to the high levels of drug consumption and addiction in Yunnan Province, its backing of the UWSA and KIA – both of which rely on drug trafficking for their financing – prevents Naypyidaw from bringing the area under effective control.40

Finance China has been Myanmar’s primary source of aid, loans, and technical assistance for the past two-plus decades. While other states suspended aid to the country following the 1988 unrest, China continued its development support. Throughout the 2000s, Myanmar was one of the largest recipients of Chinese aid in the Asian region. By 2005, China had provided Myanmar with over $400 million in aid and $1 billion in loans through the China Exim Bank.41 In 2003, China agreed to write off an unspecified amount of Myanmar’s debts to the country. Chinese financial assistance continues to outstrip that coming from Myanmar’s other providers, including Japan and India, which have increased aid in recent years to regain influence in the country. In 2013, for example, of $900 million in collective aid that Myanmar received from the three countries, $527 million came from China, $211 million came from India, while just $161 million came from Japan.42 In addition to this aid, China’s Exim Bank offered Naypyidaw a $600 million loan at 4.5 per cent interest in 2013 and a $3 billion loan for the construction of a highway linking the planned Kyaukphyu industrial zone on Myanmar’s west coast with Ruili in southwest China.43 Chinese aid and loans are central to the country’s structural power over Myan- mar. Chinese monetary assistance, for example, provided Beijing with direct political access to the SPDC throughout the 1990s and 2000s.44 This access, in turn, translated into Chinese influence over the country’s domestic political and economic development and helped advance China’s commercial interests in the state at a time when other actors had withdrawn from Myanmar.45 China also drew on access to Myanmar’s military and political leaders to establish elite relations that it used, and continues to use, to advance it strategic interests in Myanmar. Chinese structural power over Myanmar’s structure of finance also provides Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 China with a dominant position within the country’s natural resource sector. This influence comes from conditionality attached to Chinese aid and loans that requires Myanmar develop infrastructure around China’s commercial sites, such as mines and hydropower developments, and that Chinese firms undertake construction – with Chinese labour – of any aid/loan financed project.46 China has secured the dominant position in Myanmar’s latent oil, gas, and uranium sectors through this targeted use of aid and loans.47 China has also used its aid and loans to Myanmar in an attempt to limit the activity and influence of other foreign actors in the country, particularly since the 156 Sino-Myanmar relations country’s 2011 reforms. China has made it clear to Myanmar that Chinese aid is conditional on the two states maintaining good bilateral relations, which China increasingly views in zero-sum terms.48 Such pronouncements implicitly carry a threat of aid/loan reduction should Naypyidaw move too close to any other foreign state.49

Production Production in Myanmar remains underdeveloped due to the state’s lack of a private sector, its bureaucratic weakness, its centrally planned economy, and its legacy of Western economic sanctions.50 Manufacturing, agriculture, and construction all contribute nominally to the country’s GDP growth, while the mining/extractive sector remains under-realised due to mismanagement and fragmentation. While Naypyidaw bears ultimate responsibility for this state of production as of 2014, China, as the country’s most important economic partner, also plays a role through its structural power. China’s position as both the primary investor in and consumer of Myanmar’s natural resources is a case in point. Chinese investment in the country’s mining and extractive industries, which account for the majority of Chinese investment, drives Naypyidaw’s economic priorities away from other sectors, thereby contributing to unequal development within the country’s domestic production.51 Over-reliance on mining and extraction results in fewer resources going toward sources of production such as manufacturing, agriculture, and construction. Industry analysts have identified the lack of investment in manufacturing, agriculture, and construction as a source of underdevelopment of production in general in Myanmar.52 The nature of Chinese investment in Myanmar’s natural resource sector also discourages other sources of foreign investment into the sector. Lack of transparency around Chinese investment contributes to corruption and mismanagement within Myanmar’s mining/extractive industries, while Chinese-subsidised SOEs outbid other foreign firms for projects related to mining development.53 China also occupies a central role in the underdevelopment of Myanmar’s agricultural sector. Chinese demand for rice has led Naypyidaw to prioritise rice growing over the development of a commercial agricultural sector. Naypyidaw continues to allocate land (on which it has a monopoly control) for this singular use, preventing the growth of a more robust, diverse agricultural sector.54 The state’s focus on rice cultivation also discourages non-Chinese foreign investment Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 into the country’s agricultural sector and undermines the potential for agriculture policy reform. As with this volume’s other case studies, Chinese exports to Myanmar also play a detrimental role in the country’s attempt to develop a manufacturing sector. Myanmar’s local manufacturers cannot compete with inexpensive Chinese goods such as textiles, machinery, and electronics either in terms of quality or price. The result is a continued underdevelopment of Myanmar’s domestic manufacturing sector, which, among other outcomes, reinforces the country’s reliance on its natural resource sector.55 Sino-Myanmar relations 157 Knowledge China has gained structural power over knowledge in Myanmar through Chinese language and culture and through Chinese training of Myanmar’s political and military elite. In terms of language and culture, China has developed structural power through such efforts as the establishment of a Confucius Classroom at the Yangon Foreign Language University, the launching of a Burmese-language China Today magazine, and the establishment of Burmese-language Chinese news out of Yunnan Province.56 These Chinese Embassy-directed initiatives are purposefully designed to expound China’s culture and views throughout the country. The Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Yangon also advocates Chinese language and culture, ostensibly to encourage bilateral trade but with the added effect of expanding China’s influence throughout Myanmar’s business community.57 While these efforts do influence knowledge formation in Myanmar, the unconscious structural power that China has gained through the presence of ethnic Chinese in the country is arguably even more pronounced and influential. Many ethnic Chinese in Myanmar maintain close language, cultural, and kinship relations with China (often for the purpose of trade) that contribute to the spread of Chinese influence over knowledge across vast areas within the country.58 Areas with heavy concentrations of ethnic Chinese in Myanmar, for example, often have their own Chinese-language schools, temples, newspapers, clubs, and associations. China has also developed structural power through exchanges and training with Myanmar’s elites. On the political side, Beijing regularly hosts high-level delegations from Myanmar’s government to establish organisational ties and to more clearly communicate Chinese interests in Myanmar to the country’s leadership.59 China also regularly hosts youth members from the USDP, the NLD, and Myan- mar non-governmental and governmental organisations in China for extensive, prolonged political and technical training.60 On the military side, the PLA provides extensive training to the Tatmadaw to the extent that the Myanmar military has become profoundly influenced by Chinese military culture.61 In addition to this official military-to-military engagement, the PLA also actively engages with the UWSA on a variety of training exercises, such as pilot training.62 On the civilian side, China regularly sends young Chinese volunteers to Myanmar to conduct training on technical and vocational matters at the local level.63 Such training provides China with an opportunity to establish knowledge linkages within the Burmese state and society that serve its immediate and long-term strategic aims in the country. 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Structural violence Observers often point to China’s domineering commercial activity in Myanmar and its negative effects on social stability and environmental health as a driving force behind the SPDC’s 2011 reforms. Similarly, both Chinese and Western scholars have identified the negative aspects of Sino-Myanmar exchange – what the following section will present as structural violence – as substantial, continuous obstacles for Myanmar’s domestic stability and for China’s position in post-reform Myanmar. 158 Sino-Myanmar relations Economy Economic exchange between China and Myanmar has contributed to structural violence in Myanmar in three ways. First, trade with China as well as Chinese investment, aid, and loans allowed the SPDC to weather sanctions throughout the 1990s and 2000s aimed at curbing its human rights violations. Without this economic support from China, it is likely the SPDC would have lost power and/or been forced to implement reform aimed at liberalisation far sooner than it eventually did as it lacked sufficient tax revenue to otherwise run the state. China’s economic relations with Myanmar, therefore, were an essential contributing factor to nearly two decades of horrific human rights abuse in Myanmar as well as the underdevelopment of its economy during the same period.64 Chinese firms’ willingness to engage in corrupt, non-transparent practices with the SPDC also undermined the country’s economic institutions and rule of law. Second, the nature of Chinese economic involvement with Myanmar has created an asymmetrical exchange in which China pursues its own strategic and commercial interests (best understood in terms of China’s energy security) to the detriment of Myanmar’s overall economic growth. Chinese FDI, for instance, is almost entirely geared toward the country’s natural resource sector, primarily oil, gas, and timber. This focus of FDI has created an economic enclave that prevents the restructuring of Myanmar’s economy, as it does not contribute to growth or employment across other economic sectors.65 Rather, China engages Myanmar as a source of natural resources for exploitation with little regard for the long-term sustainability of this economic exchange. As with all resource-dependent states, Myanmar benefits in the short term from Chinese FDI in that it contributes to growth, but it also becomes increasingly vulnerable to external shocks from China. The two states’ trade relations further this unequal economic exchange as they follow a classic asymmetrical model where Myanmar exports its natural resources and agricultural products to China and imports manufactured goods from China. Third, Chinese demand for illicit goods and services is the driver behind Myanmar’s black market economy and, subsequently, a contributing factor to state-sponsored crime in the country.66 Demand for narcotics in Yunnan, for example, provides incentives for opium and methamphetamine production in Myan- mar’s Shan State in which both the state and armed ethnic groups have engaged. Chinese desire for timber, particularly tarmalan, is the driving force behind Myan- mar’s illegal logging industry and the cause of widespread environmental degra-

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 dation. China is also the destination of choice for human trafficking of women for labour or sexual exploitation from Myanmar.67 This relationship of causality between supply and demand leads to structural violence in Myanmar in terms of underdevelopment of the formal economy and in terms of localised violence associated with transnational organised crime.

Environment Chinese investment in the country’s mineral, oil and gas, and power sectors has led to widespread environmental degradation across Myanmar. China’s Wan Bao Sino-Myanmar relations 159 Company’s work at the Letpadaung copper mine, for example, has contributed to sulphate pollution across more than 8,000 acres (3,000 hectares) of farmland in the Sagaing division, forcing local residents to relocate. The company’s commercial activity has also poisoned local sources of ground water with sulphuric acid and caused air pollution that contributes to respiratory disease among the local population.68 The CNPC’s work on the Shwe Gas Pipeline also resulted in structural violence within Myanmar’s domestic environment. Dredge waste and debris from the project have polluted rivers in Kyuakpyu and resulted in widespread fish die-offs, undermining both local agriculture and fishing industries. Oil leaks from the pipeline, discarded cement from the project, and slash-and-burn clear-cutting have caused mass crop destruction in Rakhine and Shan States.69 China Power Investment Corpo- ration’s work on the Myitsone Dam is yet another example of Chinese commercial activity resulting in structural violence within Myanmar’s environmental sector. An independent assessment by the international NGO International Rivers showed that construction at the Myitsone Dam led to extensive destruction of flora and fauna along the Irrawaddy River, contributed to a deteriorated flow stream, or still water and lacustrine conditions, for 580 kilometres along the river, and resulted in massive build-up of river sediments.70 Local NGOs also raised concern about the dam’s proximity to a major fault line and its potential vulnerability to earthquake damage. While just three examples, one must keep in mind that all three companies are Chinese SOEs and, as such, are far more regulated than Chinese private firms acting in Myanmar. In this respect, while the three companies are not emblematic of all Chinese commercial activity in the country, they are in many ways examples of China’s best-behaved companies. Beijing has far less control over the actions of Chinese private firms, many of which engage in more destructive behaviour than that detailed above. Indeed, Chinese small and medium-sized private firms are at the centre of what is arguably the most environmentally damaging industry in Myanmar: illegal logging. According to the United Kingdom-based Environmental Investigation Agency, more than $8 billion in illegal timber passed from Myanmar to China between 2000 and 2013, much of it originating in areas with intense civil unrest such as the Kachin and Shan States.71 Chinese demand for hardwood and char- coal drives this trade which, in turn, contributes to deforestation in the country of around 1 per cent per year.72 Conservative estimates now suggest Myanmar has lost 25 per cent of its forest cover.73 The Food and Agricultural Organisation clas- sifies primary forest cover in Myanmar as scarce. Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 Chinese-driven deforestation has multiple implications for Myanmar’s environment. First, deforestation allows for the release of greenhouse gases, which in turn affects climate change and agriculture. Between 2005 and 2009, deforestation in Myanmar contributed to 158 million tonnes of emissions in the country, placing it first of all Southeast Asian states in greenhouse gas emissions resulting from logging.74 Deforestation along hills and mountains – common in Myanmar – affects crop production, allows for flooding, and contributes to landslides. Logging along rivers undermines hydrologic and ecological processes as well as floodplain ecosystems in the country. Forest fragmentation contributes to social disintegration and loss of wildlife and increases the risk of forest fires. 160 Sino-Myanmar relations Naypyidaw has directly appealed to Beijing to stop the trade in illegal timber between the two states.75 Both the SPDC and current government have also largely criminalised logging in the country in an attempt to preserve the country’s forests and dependent landscapes. The blame for the continued trade in illicit timber, therefore, largely rests with China.76

Society Structural violence resulting from China’s structural power over the country’s economic and environmental sectors further develops into structural violence over Myanmar’s society. In regard to China’s commercial activities, Chinese investment contributes to an enclave economy in which growth does not translate into social opportunity and Chinese trade undermines local industries such as manufacturing. Both outcomes have a direct effect on local labour, particularly as Chi- nese firms tend to employ Chinese workers at projects funded and financed by China. Chinese demand for natural resources also results in land appropriation and the displacement of entire communities.77 Chinese control over Myanmar’s primary assets in the oil and gas and power industries results in an exploitative relationship in which Myanmar society does not benefit from its country’s own natural resource wealth but rather exports it for the benefit of its larger, wealthy patron state.78 Naypyidaw’s decision to export four-fifths of the country’s natural gas to China from the Shwe Offshore gas site when only 25 per cent of residents in Rakhine State have access to power is a case in point of Naypyidaw’s prioritisation of China’s needs over those of Myanmar society.79 Naypyidaw must now re-import energy from China to provide electricity in Rangoon.80 Demand in China for illicit goods also contributes to organised crime in Myanmar such as drug cultivation and production and human trafficking. Structural violence stemming from organised crime includes localised violence, exploitation, and social disruption. Structural violence within Myanmar’s environment also extends to the country’s society in a number of ways. Pollution in rivers and of drinking water, such as that associated with the Myitsone Dam, leads to diminished fishing and crop failure, with direct implications for local communities’ economic and food security. Air pollution from Chinese commercial activity (such as that at the Letpadaung copper mine) and Chinese firms’ use of slash-and-burn clear-cutting affect local peoples’ health by increasing the severity and presentation of respiratory diseases. Failure to com- Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 ply with environmental impact assessments and/or environmental best practices in commercial activity, such as the CNPC’s construction of the Myitsone Dam near a well-known, active fault line, also results in structural violence at a community level. If the Myitsone Dam, when completed, were to break due to an earthquake, hundreds of thousands of residents would be killed or made homeless. Similarly, residents in towns along the Shwe Gas Pipeline such as Nawnghkio, Kyaukme, Hsipaw, Namtu, and Namhkam, all face potential threats if the pipeline should explode.81 Chinese structural power also results in social structural violence through its continual support of armed ethnic groups such as the UWSA and KIA.82 While the Sino-Myanmar relations 161 domestic drivers behind these groups are multifaceted and complex, Chinese support for both groups is crucial for their survival, particular in terms of finance and military equipment. Chinese support for both groups prevents Myanmar’s social unity and contributes to structural violence within the state’s society.

State/society relations Anti-Chinese sentiments in Myanmar date back to at least the late 1960s, when riots broke out in the country over Beijing’s support for the Communist Party of Burma, the precursor organisation for the UWSA. At the time, such sentiments were prevalent both within society and the state, as the population as a whole viewed China’s actions as intrusive and manipulative.83 In this respect, Chinese structural power at an early stage helped contribute to good state/society relations, particularly when the Burmese viewed the Tatmadaw as opposing China for the sake of the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. As Beijing’s ties with the military junta deepened, however, the nature of Chi- nese structural power changed and began to contribute to structural violence over state/society relations in four ways. First, the military junta’s dependency on China for military, economic, and political aid led many Burmese to question the state’s ability to effectively govern without foreign involvement. While the SPDC, on a number of occasions, sought to demonstrate its independence from Chinese control, the regime’s international isolation and its continued need for Chinese support meant that such efforts were short-lived and unable to demonstrate a sustainable political capacity for independent survival.84 As such, the SPDC’s ties with Beijing helped undermined its political legitimacy through an implicit sense of dependence. Second, China’s policy of non-interference and its reliance on state-to-state relations to advance its strategic agenda empowered the regime over society in ways that contributed to ineffective governance and a complete disregard for any semblance of a social contract.85 Chinese support for the SPDC, for example, allowed the regime to stay in power despite its record of failed economic policies and of horrific human rights abuses. Such structural power translated into structural violence as it perpetuated a situation in which the state was able to engage in despotism over its population. Third, commercial ties between China and Naypyidaw have contributed, and continue to contribute to, corruption within the state and military. Beijing’s will- Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 ingness to engage in (indeed, preference for) non-transparent business dealings has created a cycle in which Myanmar’s military and political leadership enrich themselves by selling the state’s natural resources to China, even when doing so results in hardship among local populations such as forced eviction, destruction of local flora and fauna, and/or other human rights abuses. Corruption among officials, furthered by Chinese involvement, undermines social support for the state and thereby contributes to structural violence.86 Fourth, China continues to de facto support the Tatmadaw in relation to Nay- pyidaw, despite its rhetoric of neutrality. As Beijing and the PLA have invested 162 Sino-Myanmar relations heavily in developing military-to-military relations, and as China is at a disadvantage in advancing its interests vis-à-vis a more democratically aligned government, particularly as society views it as pro-junta, it would prefer to see the military junta’s return to power.87 Such support has the potential to weaken Myan- mar’s fragile political structures to the detriment of state/society relations.

Notes 1 Joshua Kurlantzick, ‘Myanmar: Sources of Instability and Potential for U.S.-China Cooperation’, in Managing Instability on China’s Periphery, ed. Paul Stares et al. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 2011), 28. 2 ‘Myanmar Politics: Ethnic Conflicts Intensify’, EIU ViewsWire, May 16, 2014. 3 ‘Myanmar Overview’, World Bank, February 2014, http://www.worldbank.org/en/ country/myanmar/overview. 4 ‘Myanmar Economy: Quick View – Inflation Rate Picks Up’,EIU ViewsWire, May 8, 2014. 5 Kyaw Hsu Mon, ‘A Waiting Game for Burma’s Business Community in 2014’, The Irrawaddy, January 29, 2014; Asian Development Outlook 2014: Fiscal Policy for Inclusive Growth (Washington, DC: Asian Development Bank, 2014), 214. 6 “All You Can do Is Pray”: Crimes Against Humanity and Ethnic Cleansing of Roh- ingya Muslims in Burma’s Arakan State (Geneva: Human Rights Watch, 2013), 11. 7 Observatory of Economic Complexity, ‘Export Destinations of Burma 2012’, last modified June 9, 2014, http://atlas.media.mit.edu/explore/tree_map/hs/export/mmr/show/ all/2012/; Observatory of Economic Complexity, ‘Import Origins of Burma 2012’, last modified June 9, 2014, http://atlas.media.mit.edu/explore/tree_map/hs/import/mmr/ show/all/2012/. 8 Observatory of Economic Complexity, ‘Products That Burma Imports from China’, last modified June 9, 2014, http://atlas.media.mit.edu/explore/tree_map/hs/import/ mmr/chn/show/2012/. 9 Observatory of Economic Complexity, ‘Export Destination of Burma’, last modified June 9, 2014, http://atlas.media.mit.edu/explore/tree_map/hs/export/mmr/show/all/2012/. 10 ‘Burma: Border Trade with China Increases Three-Fold’, Eleven Media Group, December 22, 2013. 11 Guo Xiaolin, ‘Boom on the Way from Ruilin to Mandalay’, in ed. Alexis Rieffel Myan- mar/Burma: Inside Challenges, Outside Interests (Washington, DC: Brookings Uni- versity Press, 2010), 91. 12 Federico Varese, Mafias on the Move: How Organized Crime Conquers New Territo- ries (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 173. 13 ‘Burma: Myanmar Urges China to Improve on Bilateral Trade’, Eleven Media Group,

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 December 13, 2013. 14 UESCAP, Unveiling Protectionism: Regional Responses to Remaining Barriers in the Textiles and Clothing Trade (New York: United Nations Publications, 2008), 229. 15 Ministry of National Planning and Economic Development, ‘Foreign Investment of Permitted Enterprises as of (30/6/2015) (By Country)’, Directorate of Investment and Company, http://dica.gov.mm.x-aas.net/admin/Pages/DisplayPdf?path=By%20 Country%28June%2015%29.pdf. 16 Ministry of National Planning and Economic Development, ‘Foreign Investment of Existing Enterprises as of (30/6/2015) (By Country)’, Directorate of Investment Sino-Myanmar relations 163 and Company, http://dica.gov.mm.x-aas.net/admin/Pages/DisplayPdf?path=By%20 Country%28June%2015%29.pdf; ‘Burma: China Investment Reaches $14 Billion with Latest in Electricity’, MRTC-3 Programme, June 19, 2012. 17 Paul Vrieze, ‘Drop in Chinese Investment Could Hurt Burma Economy, Reform: US Report’, The Irrawaddy, September 17, 2013. 18 ‘Thein Sein “Guarantees Continuation” of China-Backed Projects in Burma’, Mizzima News, December 28, 2012. 19 Nay Tun Naing, ‘Burma: Commentary Views China’s Interests, Business Dealings, Influence’, Eleven Media Group, March 17, 2014. 20 Helen Le Bail and Abel Tournier, From Kunming to Mandalay: The New ‘Burma Road’ (Paris: Institut Français des Relations Internationals, 2010), 26–32. 21 Kyaw Myat Zan, ‘Burma: China Dreams of Reviving Myitsone Hydropower Project With Next Government’, The Yangon Times Daily Online, September 5, 2013. 22 ‘China Lobbying Locals for Resumption of Myitsone Hydropower Project in Burma’, Eleven Media Group, June 1, 2013. 23 Saw Yan Naing, ‘Burma: China Seeks Burmese Support to Restart Myitsone Dam’, The Irrawaddy, August 13, 2013. 24 Nick Cheesman, Monique Skidmore, and Trevor Wilson, Myanmar’s Transition: Openings, Obstacles and Opportunities (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Stud- ies, 2012), 105. 25 Ian Holliday, Burma Redux: Global Justice and the Quest for Political Reform in Myanmar (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 109. 26 Aung Myoe, In the Name of Pauk-Phaw: Myanmar’s China Policy Since 1948 (Singa- pore: Institute of Southeast Asian, 2011), 144. 27 Nay Pyi Taw, ‘Burma, China Sign Agreement on Cooperation Between Two Armed Forces’, MRTV-3 Programme, September 6, 2012. 28 ‘China Approaching Opposition Forces, Uses Facebook in Attempts to Maintain Influ- ence in Burma’, Kyodo Clue IV, July 29, 2013, translated by the Open Source Center (hereafter OSC), JPO2013073010928785. 29 ‘Senior CPC Official Meets Myanmar’s USDP Leader’, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Union of Myanmar, July 2, 2013, http://www.google.com/url ?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&ved=0CDQQFjAC&url=http%3A%2 F%2Fmm.china-embassy.org%2Feng%2Fsgxw%2Ft1055471.htm&ei=UluWU7iGG 4rioAT584G4AQ&usg=AFQjCNEF42JZCfVCLUMc1_yVCJVmpK-2EA&sig2=1JI wM919WnFJ7TxU7GVHtA&bvm=bv.68693194,d.cGU. 30 Saw Yan Naing, ‘China Sells Helicopter Gunships to UWSA: Report’, The Irrawaddy, May 3, 2013. 31 Saw Yan Naing, ‘Wa Rebels to Send Fighters to China for Pilot Training’, The Irrawaddy, February 10, 2014. Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 32 Bertil Lintner, ‘Who Are the Wa?’, The Irrawaddy, June 2, 2014. 33 William Boot, ‘Kachin Conflict Shows China’s Business Dilemma in Burma’, The Irrawaddy, January 23, 2013. 34 Zhu Zhiqun, China’s New Diplomacy: Rationale, Strategies and Significance (London: Ashgate Publishing, 2010), 189. 35 China’s Myanmar Dilemma (Washington, DC: International Crisis Group, 2009), 10; ‘China Should Discuss Myitsone Issue Only with President: Suu Kyi’, Eleven Media Group, May 22, 2013. 36 Lintner, ‘Who Are the Wa?’. 164 Sino-Myanmar relations 37 ‘Government Admits KIO Peace Talks Put Off Due to China’s Objection’, Eleven Media Group, April 22, 2013. 38 William Boot, ‘Kachin Conflict Shows China’s Business Dilemma in Burma’, The Irrawaddy, January 23, 2013. 39 Ko-lin Chin, The Chinese Connection: Cross-Border Drug Trafficking between Myan- mar and China (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2007), 7. 40 Aung Myoe, In the Name of Pauk-Phaw, 137. 41 Hong Zhao, ‘China’s Myanmar Policy: Challenges and Adjustments’, in China’s Poli- cies on Its Borderlands and the International Implications, eds. Yufan Hao and Bill K. P. Chou (Singapore: World Scientific, 2011), 258–59. 42 ‘Government Counts on Big Loans from China, India and Japan’, Eleven Media Group, January 14, 2013. 43 ‘Despite Criticisms, Myanmar Signs US$100M ‘High Interest-Rate Loan’ with China’, Eleven Media Group, October 20, 2013; Simon Roughneen, ‘After Snubbing Loan, Burma Awaits China’s Response on Road Link’, The Irrawaddy, March 18, 2014. 44 Christopher Roberts, ASEAN’s Myanmar Crisis: Challenges to the Pursuit of a Secu- rity Community (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010), 94. 45 Gabriel Collins et al., China’s Energy Strategy: The Impact on Beijing’s Maritime Poli- cies (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2012), 426. 46 Ian Storey, ASEAN and the Rise of China (London: Routledge, 2013), 161. 47 Masako Ikegami, ‘China’s Grand Strategy of “Peaceful Rise” ’, in Rise of China: Bei- jing’s Strategies and Implications for the Asia-Pacific, eds. Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao and Cheng-Yi Lin (London: Routledge, 2009), 26. 48 Yun Sun, Myanmar in US-China Relations (Washington, DC: Stimson Center, 2014), 8. 49 William Boot, ‘West “Cannot Afford” Major Economic Aid to Burma, Says China Commentary’, The Irrawaddy, December 17, 2013. 50 OECD, Economic Outlook for Southeast Asia, China and India 2014: Beyond the Middle-Income Trap (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2014), 172. 51 Storey, ASEAN and the Rise of China, 145. 52 OECD, OECD Development Pathways Multi-dimensional Review of Myanmar, Vol. 1: Initial Assessment (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2013), 115. 53 Elizabeth Economy and Michael Levi, By All Means Necessary: How China’s Resource Quest Is Changing the World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 67. 54 OECD, OECD Investment Policy Reviews: Myanmar 2014 (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2014), 292. 55 Monique Skidmore and Trevor Wilson, Dictatorship, Disorder and Decline in Myan- mar (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2008), 94. 56 ‘China, Burma Sign MoU on Media Cooperation’, People’s Daily Online, March 27, 2012, http://english.people.com.cn/90883/7770123.html; ‘CHINA TODAY Magazine Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 in Myanmar Language Relaunched’, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Union of Myanmar, August 5, 2012, http://mm.chineseembassy.org/eng/sgxw/ t1064229.htm. 57 Mya Than, ‘The Ethnic Chinese in Myanmar and Their Identities’, in Ethnic Chi- nese as Southeast Asians, ed. Leo Suryadinata (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1997), 141. 58 Chee Kiong Tong, Identity and Ethnic Relations in Southeast Asia: Racializing Chi- neseness (New York: Springer, 2010), 154. 59 ‘Senior CPC Official Meets Myanmar’s USDP Leader’. Sino-Myanmar relations 165 60 ‘Young Members of Burmese Political Parties Attending Young Leaders Training Pro- gramme in China’, Shan Herald Agency for News, June 5, 2013, translated by the OSC, SER2013060569954683. 61 Lynn Kuok, Promoting Peace in Myanmar: U.S. Interests and Role (Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), 24. 62 Saw Yan Naing, ‘Wa Rebels to Send Fighters to China for Pilot Training’. 63 Joseph Y. S. Cheng, ‘China’s Foreign Policy After the Seventeenth Party Congress’, in Dancing with the Dragon: China’s Emergence in the Developing World, eds. Dennis Hickey and Baogang Guo (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010), 43. 64 Kyaw Yin Hlaing, ‘Daw Aung San Suu Kyi: A Burmese Dissident Democrat’, in Burma Or Myanmar?: The Struggle for National Identity, ed. Lowell Dittmer (Singa- pore: World Scientific, 2010): 147. 65 Ian Brown, Burma’s Economy in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni- versity Press, 2013), 197. 66 Jeffrey E. Curry, A Short Course in International Economics: Understanding the Dynamics of the International Marketplace (Petaluma, CA: World Trade Press, 2009), 124. 67 Ibid., 137. 68 Nyein Nyein, ‘Near Letpadaung, Factory Pollution Raises Health Fears’, The Irrawaddy, December 12, 2013. 69 Shwe Gas Movement, Drawing the Line: The Case Against China’s Shwe Gas Pro- ject, For Better Extractive Industries in Burma (London: Burma Campaign UK, 2013), 23–24; ‘Farmers Blame Shwe Gas Pipeline for Destroying Their Crops’, Democratic Voice of Burma Online, October 10, 2013, http://www.dvb.no/news/ farmers-blame-shwe-gas-pipeline-for-destroying-their-crops/33342. 70 Independent Expert Review of the Myitsone Dam EIA (Berkeley, CA: International Rivers, 2012). 71 Paul Vrieze and Htet Naing Zaw, ‘$5.7Bln in Timber Smuggled Out of Burma, Illegal Logging Rampant: Report’, The Irrawaddy, March 26, 2014. 72 ‘Even Tarmalan Hardwood Posts and Fences Are Being Bought as Demand Rises for Shan State’s Tarmalan Hardwood’, Shan Herald Agency for News, February 1, 2014, translated by the OSC, SEL2014020155602470. 73 Ecosystems in the Greater Mekong: Past Trends, Current Status, Possible Futures (Washington, DC: World Wildlife Fund, 2013), 7. 74 Ibid., 17. 75 Win Ko Ko Latt, ‘Myanmar Protested to China over Illegal Timber, Minerals Exports: Minister’, Mizzima, February 27, 2014; ‘Myanmar Calls to End Illegal Timber Trade with China’, Eleven Media Group, December 9, 2013. 76 A Choice for China: Ending the Destruction of Burma’s Northern Frontier Forests (London: Global Witness, 2005), 20–24.

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 77 ‘Locals Living near Myanmar-China Pipeline Await Compensation’, Eleven Media Group, October 23, 2013; Edward Chung Ho, ‘Shan Farmers Demand Halt to Shwe Pipeline’, Democratic Voice of Burma Online, April 5, 2013, https://www.opensource.gov/portal/ server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_217_0_43/content/Display/SEP20130405095003. 78 ‘Myanmar-China Gas Pipeline Cheats Myanmar Society: Activists’, Eleven Media Group, December 15, 2013. 79 ‘20 Million Cubic Feet of Shwe Gas Opted for Arakan Consumption’, Narinjara, August 2, 2013; ‘Rakhine Residents Plan Signature Campaign for Share of Gas to Be Exported to China’, Eleven Media Group, March 28, 2013. 166 Sino-Myanmar relations 80 Min Thet, ‘Burma to Buy Back Electricity Power from China to Supply Rangoon Con- sumption’, Mizzima News, April 25, 2012. 81 Sai Lon, ‘Tremors Resulting from Oil and Gas Flow to China Frighten People of Northern Shan State’, Shan Herald Agency for News, January 7, 2014. 82 ‘China’s Encirclement of India Getting Tight’, Panchjanya Weekly, November 11, 2012. 83 Maung Aung Myoe, Building the Tatmadaw: Myanmar Armed Forces Since 1948 (Sin- gapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), 27. 84 Lowell Dittmer, Burma or Myanmar? The Struggle for National Identity (Singapore: World Scientific, 2010), 17. 85 Denny Roy, Return of the Dragon: Rising China and Regional Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 136. 86 Ibid. 87 Aung Tun, ‘Myanmar’s China Problem’, World Policy Blog, October 30, 2013, http:// www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2013/10/30/myanmars-china-problem. Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 9 Sino-Lao PDR Relations

Ineffective political control, corruption, and internal discord in the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP) all contribute to weakness within the Lao People’s Democratic Republic’s (Lao PDR) political system. The LPRP-led government (hereafter, Vientiane) is, for instance, unable to control taxation, spending, or project development outside the capital despite its attempts to centralise these local-level activities.1 Neither has Vientiane been effective in establishing total sovereign control over Lao PDR’s internal territories; a failure that has allowed organised crime and drug cultivation to flourish in the state’s ungoverned spaces.2 Corruption pervades the state’s political apparatus and is responsible, by some accounts, for annual losses in state revenue of $150 million.3 Corrupt ties between the state and Laotian business elite contribute to political illegitimacy for the LPRP, particularly when corrupt dealings result in land reclamation and/or environmental degradation.4 Recent developments also suggest internal discord within the LPRP, particularly in regard to the issue of succession. The most salient example of such discord was Vientiane’s inability to replace the country’s defence minister, public security minister, propaganda chief, and mayor of Vientiane in a timely manner after the four men were killed in a plane crash in 2014.5 Internal conflict over succession will become more pronounced in the run-up to the country’s 2016 leadership transition, and potentially a greater source of weakness. Lao PDR’s economy maintains a number of fundamental weaknesses despite its average 7 per cent annual GDP growth for much of the 2000s. The country’s economy is highly resource-dependent and exceedingly vulnerable to external shocks such as decreased demand from its immediate export partners (mainly China) and drops in international commodities’ prices.6 Low demand for gold, copper, Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 and silver and a corresponding decline in prices for these commodities in 2014, for example, led to lower than average growth for the country, with projections showing even lower growth for the coming decade.7 Lao PDR’s resource dependency also contributes to fiscal problems in the country as Vientiane experiences constant budget shortfalls. In 2014, for instance, Vientiane delayed payments for wages and utilities, suspended and cancelled new projects, and indefinitely postponed a cost of living increase for its government workers in response to a decrease in commodities’ rents.8 168 Sino-Lao PDR relations Lao PDR is also disproportionately dependent on economic linkages with its three neighbouring states – China, Vietnam, and Thailand – as its economy is less integrated into the regional and global economic system than other South- east Asian states.9 Lao PDR relies almost exclusively on these three countries for foreign direct investment (FDI), loans, and aid, for instance. Vientiane has taken steps to improve its regional integration into trade and finance networks in the region, including the important milestone of becoming a member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2013. The state’s domestic economic institutions remain, however, fundamentally at odds with regional economic regimes: economic openness absent significant domestic economic reform could have a negative impact on Lao PDR’s domestic economic development.10 Lao PDR also lacks sufficient human capital, as the country has exceedingly high levels of adult illiteracy (73 per cent in 2013) and a deficit of skilled and semi-skilled labourers. Rather than addressing this deficiency through the development of an adequate education system, Vientiane instead imports labour from states like China.11 This substitution of foreign workers does address the country’s short-term needs but ultimately further compounds Lao PDR’s unskilled labour problem. State/society relations in Lao PDR are equally troubled and further contributed to weakness within the state. Protests against state-backed land reclamation and environmentally harmful commercial activity have grown in recent years despite the LPRP’s stringent regulations against unauthorised assembly that include the threat of imprisonment for up to five years.12 Greater access to social media and the Internet has given rise to social discontent over perceived corruption and inefficiency within the LPRP, as Lao society is more aware of issues related to poor governance and generally more informed.13 The LPRP is now undertaking reform to tighten state control over Internet and social media use in ways that could further fuel antigovernment sentiment at the social level. While it is unlikely that poor state/society relations in Lao PDR will lead to a widespread antigovernment movement in the short term, there is precedent for such opposition in Lao PDR’s recent history. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, for instance, the LPRP faced opposition from ethnic Hmong guerrillas in the country’s north and a series of unrelated bomb attacks in Vientiane perpetrated by groups with an apparent antigovernment agenda.14 China’s influence over Lao PDR’s domestic institutions and structures has increased markedly since the mid-1980s.15 China is now the country’s primary Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 economic partner in terms of trade volume, foreign direct investment, and direct aid. As such, China maintains a great degree of structural power over the pace and direction of Lao PDR’s economic development, some of which contributes to structural violence within the country in the form of under- and uneven development. China’s economic relations with Vientiane also result in power over the country’s political structure, both in terms of domestic politics and foreign relations. China holds significant influence over the LPRP’s younger generation politicians, for example, as they are, in general, more ideologically (and commer- cially) aligned with China than the LPRP’s older, pro-Vietnam cadres.16 China Sino-Lao PDR relations 169 has leverage over Lao PDR’s foreign policy primarily with regard to its relations to ASEAN and ASEAN member states. China’s influence increases Lao PDR’s dependency on Beijing as a foreign partner and challenges its more traditional relations with states such as Vietnam and Thailand.

Structural power at the systems level

Economic linkages China has emerged as Lao PDR’s most important economic partner in regard to trade, foreign investment, and loans. Over the past decade, in particular, China’s position within Lao PDR’s economic portfolio has grown in contrast to the country’s more traditional partners – Thailand and Vietnam – which have seen a corresponding decrease in their economic ties with Lao PDR. Trade between the two states, for example, has fundamentally changed Lao PDR’s external orientation away from Hanoi and Bangkok toward Beijing. In 2012 – the most recent data available from the Lao Statistics Bureau – China received 35 per cent of Lao PDR’s total exports, making it the country’s largest export market.17 As recently as 2005, China received just 3 per cent of Lao PDR’s exports while Thailand received 35 per cent, France 12 per cent, and Vietnam 6 per cent.18 Lao PDR’s exports to China are all raw materials, including copper, rubber, zinc, and lead. China was the source of 25 per cent of Lao PDR’s imports in 2012; an amount that placed it second after Thailand in terms of import origins.19 While Thailand still dominates the import market to Lao PDR at 48 per cent of total imports, China’s current position is a significant increase from 2005 when it provided just 9 percent to Thailand’s 70 per cent. More important for this chapter’s analysis are the types of imports China provides the state. These include light machinery, automobiles, furniture, surveying equipment, and textiles: all products of China’s domestic manufacturing industry. Thailand, by contrasts, provides Lao PDR with petroleum, iron, and animal products. Trade between the two states results in direct Chinese power over the country’s structure of economy and provides the base for Chinese power over the country’s other various structures. With regard to Lao PDR’s economy, China’s demand for Lao PDR’s exports – almost all of which are primary goods – has been, and continues to be, one of the most important sources of Lao PDR’s contemporary growth.20 Chinese demand for copper and rubber from Lao PDR, for instance, Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 contributed to the country’s high GDP growth for much of the early 2000s, while a drop in Chinese demand (for copper in particular) has resulted in slower overall growth in the country since 2014.21 Lao PDR, as a result, is increasingly dependent on Chinese demand for economic growth; a dependency that has implications for a range of domestic issues in the country, as outlined further below. Equally, Chinese manufactured goods exports to Lao PDR have resulted in Chi- nese structural power over Lao PDR’s economy, particularly its factors of production. Cheap supplies of Chinese electronics, machinery, and cars, for instance, now flood Lao PDR’s domestic market, complicating the country’s attempts 170 Sino-Lao PDR relations to develop a domestic manufacturing industry that could increase employment opportunities in the country and raise the quality of its human capital.22 As such, Chinese structural power resulting from exports to Lao PDR also contributes to structural violence in the country. More even than trade ties between the two states, Chinese foreign direct investment to Lao PDR has grown in recent years, although Chinese-originating FDI to the country has played a significant part in Lao PDR’s economic development since the early 2000s. In 2014, China became the largest provider of FDI to Lao PDR (surpassing Vietnam), with a cumulative total of $5.1 billion of FDI.23 The majority of Chinese FDI to the country goes toward its mining sector (specifically bauxite, copper, gold, iron, zinc, and salt), where it is the largest foreign investor. As of 2012, China was in direct control of sixty-nine mining projects in the country in comparison to thirty-two for Vietnam and three for Thailand.24 China also invests in dam building in Lao PDR and is responsible for financing and constructing at least four of the nine dams Vientiane has plans to build.25 Smaller amounts of Chinese FDI go into Lao PDR’s commercial agricultural security, primarily its rubber industry. One can view linkages between Chinese FDI and Chinese structural power in Lao PDR’s domestic development priorities, which are largely focused around the mining sector (mining activity, for example, covers more total area of land than cultivation of rice in the country).26 Primary goods from mining constitute 41 per cent of the country’s total exports and provide the bulk of government spending.27 While Lao PDR’s focus on mining has benefited the country through higher annual GDP growth, prioritisation of the industry over others, such as agriculture, has not translated into widespread social benefit for the Lao people. Moreover, Lao PDR’s mining sector development has enriched a very small number of individuals and contributed to corruption in the state.28 Lastly, China has become Lao PDR’s most important source of development aid and loans. Between 2013 and 2014, for instance, China granted Lao PDR $187 million in aid, according to the Chinese embassy in Lao PDR.29 This amount of aid dwarfed Japan’s commitment of overseas development aid (the second largest) of $98 million. Chinese aid to Lao PDR regularly goes to construction of prestige projects such as the National Culture House or monuments in Vientiane.30 Conversely, Chinese loans to Lao PDR are important sources of financing mainly directed toward infrastructure development. In 2012, for instance, China’s Exim Bank offered Lao PDR a $7.2 billion loan for the development of a high-speed Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 rail line (to be constructed by Chinese firms) from China’s Kunming Province to Vientiane.31 While the two states have not yet agreed on the specific terms or the loan’s exact amount, Vientiane has already leveraged the loan to begin construction of infrastructure around the proposed rail line.32 Chinese aid and loans to the country further Chinese structural power over Lao PDR’s internal development strategy, particularly in relation to infrastructure development. Vientiane’s interest in the high-speed rail line is, for example, a direct extension of China’s own ‘bridgehead’ development strategy toward South- east Asia, which relies on expanding Southwest China’s access to markets in the Sino-Lao PDR relations 171 region.33 The danger for Lao PDR, however, is that it will assume debt beyond its capacity for repayment and, as such, will default on Chinese loans.34 Lao PDR will use its mineral wealth as collateral for the loan, further raising the possibility of a negative outcome for the state and society.

State-owned enterprises/private enterprises in Lao PDR Chinese state-owned and government-affiliated firms have established an unparalleled presence across Lao PDR’s economy. Within the country’s hydropower sector, for example, the Chinese SOEs’ Sinohydro, the China Three Gorges Corporation, and the China International Water and Electric Corporation have control over four of the country’s most important projects: the Nam Lik 1–2 hydropower project, the Xepone 3 hydropower station, the Nam Kham 2 hydropower project, and the Nam Ngiep 1 hydropower project. Similarly, Chinese companies have established the central foreign position within Lao PDR’s mining sector. The China Nonfer- rous Metals International Mining Co., Ltd, China Minmetals Corp., Minmetals Resources, and Asian Potash Corp. Ltd control the bauxite project in Champasak Province, the Sepon mine, and the potash salt ore mine in Khammouane Prov- ince.35 China’s position in Lao PDR’s domestic mining industry is set to expand even more with China’s Guangdong Rising Assets Management’s $1.4 billion bid for PanAust, Ltd, which controls two copper, gold, and silver mines in Lao PDR that contribute a total of 8 per cent of Lao PDR’s annual GDP growth.36 China Railways Corporation is also the primary actor in Lao PDR’s railway industry with its contract for development and construction of the Vientiane-China high-speed rail link. China National Electric Engineering Co., Ltd, and Beijing Kedong Electric Power Control System Co., Ltd, are similarly dominant in the country’s energy sector, as they are responsible for construction of the Lao PDR Hongsa Coal Fired Power Plant Project, five electricity transmission lines, and four transformer substations.37 Sinomach-CAMC Engineering and the Shanghai-based Wanfeng Group have both undertaken (and will undertake) massive commercial property development worth more than $1.7 billion in the country.38 In addition to these SOEs and government-affiliated firms, smaller Chinese companies dominate cross-border trade between China and Lao PDR to the extent that towns in Oudomxay and Luang Namtha provinces – such as Muang Sing – use Chinese renminbi rather than the Lao kip for everyday transactions. These same towns exist largely outside Lao society as they are populated by ethnic Chi- Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 nese, have Chinese-language schools, hospitals, and cultural centres, and operate outside Lao PDR’s domestic law.39 China exercises structural power over Lao PDR’s domestic development through its SOEs’ and government-affiliated firms’ access to capital and labour. Chinese SOEs provide access to funding in the form of loans from the China Development Bank and/or the China Exim Bank. China Railways Corporation, for example, is able to provide over $7 billion in funding for high-speed rail construction between the two states. Such access to capital gives Chinese firms (and the Chinese government) substantial influence over Lao PDR’s development priorities. 172 Sino-Lao PDR relations China also gains structural power over Lao PDR through its firms’ use of Chi- nese labour. While the official number of Chinese workers in Lao PDR is around 30,000, conservative estimates suggest the actual number is at least ten times the official number.40 The presence of Chinese labourers in Lao PDR directly affects employment/unemployment in the country in ways that contribute to structural violence within Lao society.

Ties between cores For much of the twentieth century, Lao PDR’s elite maintained close political and social ties with their Vietnamese counterparts. Over the past decade, however, elite relations within Lao PDR have shifted away from Hanoi toward Beijing, particularly among the younger generation of Lao leaders.41 This paradigmatic change is the natural extension of China’s growing structural power and the product of a concerted effort by the Chinese government to cultivate ties between the two countries’ political, military, and business leaders. Increased commercial and financial ties between the two states, for instance, have led Lao elite to prioritise relations with China over relations with other states. In 2014, for example, Lao PDR’s president and party general secretary, Choummaly Sayasone, called China Lao PDR’s most important economic and political partner.42 Khemmani Pholsena, minister of industry and commerce, similarly noted in 2014 that Lao PDR’s economic growth was ‘inseparable’ from China, argued for closer Lao PDR-Chinese ties, and identified China as Lao PDR’s most important foreign partner.43 Minister of Planning and Investment Somdy Duangdy called Chinese businessmen and Chinese investment the drivers of the Lao economy.44 Statements of this kind from the country’s top political leadership show the natural progression from commercial to elite ties within Sino-Lao PDR relations. The Chinese government has also undertaken a comprehensive attempt to cultivate elite relations with Lao PDR elites since the late 1990s.45 Under the Xi administration, for example, China worked to expand cooperation with Lao PDR within China’s One Belt, One Road strategy.46 China sees Lao PDR’s participation in the One Belt, One Road strategy (which includes cooperation through the AIIB and Maritime Silk Road) as means to expand China’s state-to-state relations with Lao PDR elite.47 Beijing has also pushed for greater government-to- government exchanges with Lao PDR; a policy that Xi is intent on expanding Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 further to cultivate closer relations between the CCP and LPRP.48 In parallel, Xi has advocated greater military-to-military ties between the two states. Toward this end, the deputy chief of the General Staff of the PLA, Wang Guanzhong, met with the deputy chief of the General Staff of the Lao People’s Army, Chanthon, in November 2014.49 Xi has made similar pledges to advance cooperation between the two states’ respective police forces.50 Elite relations between the two states are both the product of China’s economically originating structural power and a means of furthering China’s power over the Lao PDR’s structures of security and knowledge, as expanded on below. Sino-Lao PDR relations 173 Structural power at the state level

Security China has both tactical and strategic-level security concerns with relation to Lao PDR. At the tactical level, China faces localised violence in Kunming province stemming from Lao PDR-originating drug and human trafficking and transnational crime.51 Relatedly, China must deal with unregulated and illegal border crossings between the two states where Chinese nationals travel to Lao PDR to engage in gambling, drug use, and prostitution, and Lao nationals travel to China for economic migration and for human trafficking. Lao PDR lacks the capacity to address these security issues on its side of the border, compounding the challenges to China’s security. Strategically, China views Lao PDR as an essential partner with regard to Chi- na’s relations with ASEAN and, ultimately, a central supporter of China’s bid for greater control over fixtures and (potentially) territorial waters in the South China Sea.52 China needs Lao PDR’s support, for example, to prevent ASEAN unity against China’s claims and activities in the South China Sea. Lao PDR’s role in this respect is largely in line with Cambodia’s, which many analysts see as obstructionist in nature. Lao PDR’s value for China will increase greatly in 2016 as Vientiane assumes the rotating ASEAN chairmanship. China’s power extends to Lao PDR’s structure of security, as China has leveraged its economic position in the country to assure Vientiane addresses its security concerns. China, for example, reportedly linked trade and investment cooperation to Lao PDR’s willingness to allow Chinese armed naval patrols along the Mekong River following the 2011 massacre of thirteen Chinese sailors on the river.53 Vientiane was initially hesitant about allowing Chinese patrols along the Mekong, as it understood the unprecedented expansion of China’s security presence in Southeast Asia would be difficult, if not impossible, to reverse.54 Lao PDR was also concerned over loss of sovereign rights, as initial patrols consisted solely of Chinese vessels with Chinese sailors. Vientiane eventually agreed to the patrols as a means of appeasing China and ensuring continued economic cooperation between the two states.55 China has also demonstrated structural power over Lao PDR’s security relations with ASEAN and, more importantly, with Vietnam. Since 2012, in particular, Beijing has pushed Lao PDR to side with it against Hanoi on matters related

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 to the South China Sea.56 This exercise in Chinese structural power is significant considering Lao PDR and Vietnam’s traditional patron/client state relationship and the LPRP’s older ‘pro-Vietnam’ faction. Indeed, China’s ability to shape Lao PDR’s security outside the paradigm of Lao-Vietnam relation is a clear indication that China’s structural power over the state’s elite relations has grown.

Finance Important sources of economic development and growth for Lao PDR, Chinese overseas development aid (ODA), its state-backed loans, and its bilateral trade with 174 Sino-Lao PDR relations Lao PDR also result in Chinese power over the country’s structure of finance. In regard to aid, for example, China is now the largest provider of ODA to Lao PDR, having eclipsed the country’s most traditional aid providers in terms of pledged aid since 2013. Chinese ODA for 2013 and 2014 amounted to $187 million compared with Japan’s $98 million, Australia’s $48 million, Thailand’s $39 million, and Vietnam’s $28 million.57 China’s dominant position as Lao PDR’s primary aid provider follows a longer-term trend of increased Chinese aid to the country since the early 2000s and is in line with the Xi administration’s pledge to increase aid to Southeast Asia as part of the country’s Maritime Silk Road economic plan. Chinese ODA has fundamentally altered Lao PDR’s approach to aid from one based on Western concepts of social inclusion toward a more state-centric model that prioritises large-scale economic projects (e.g., hydropower). Lao PDR is no longer content with accepting conditional aid from Western donors as China offers ‘unconditional’ aid (or, more accurately, aid with more ‘acceptable’ conditions). The result is an increase in Chinese influence and a corresponding decrease in Western influence within Lao PDR’s donor community.58 This shift in paradigm has implications for structural violence in Lao PDR, examined in more detail below. China is also the largest provider of concessional and commercial loans to Lao PDR, primarily through financing provided by the China Development Bank and China’s Exim Bank.59 The rise of Chinese-originating loans to the country has displaced Thailand and Vietnam – Lao PDR’s traditional loan providers – and increased Vientiane’s reliance on Chinese financing for the development of strategic industries, particularly the country’s hydropower sector. China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank will likely play an increasingly important role in expanding Chinese loans to the state, as Lao PDR is an original signatory member of the institution and the LPRP has expressed its interests in securing financial support from the AIIB. Chinese loans to Lao PDR are increasingly a part of Lao PDR’s public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) debt, which effectively means the state and/or a public body is responsible for repaying the debt. In 2014, for example, the percentage of Chinese loans that fell under PPG loans rose to 44.8 per cent in Lao PDR.60 Such loans expose the state to vulnerability to a foreign creditor and raise the potential that foreign financing could contribute to instability within state/society relations. While Lao PDR has come to rely on Chinese loans for its domestic development, such reliance exposes the state to potential default. China’s bilateral trade with Lao PDR (together with Chinese FDI to the coun- Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 try) also results in Chinese structural power, as Lao PDR runs its second largest trade deficit with China and as terms of trade between the two states have worsened for Lao PDR.61 Lao PDR’s trade imbalance with China as of 2014, which has been persistent since 2004, is the second largest it maintains with any external partner (Thailand is the largest).62 Drops in Chinese demand for copper, gold, and coal have also led to increasingly poor terms of trade between the two states. Chi- na’s trade surplus and poor terms of trade with Lao PDR complicate Vientiane’s ability to manage its foreign reserves and currency exchanges. As such, China has developed substantial influence over Lao PDR’s monetary policy. Sino-Lao PDR relations 175 Production China affects Lao PDR’s structure of production through its targeted FDI, its demand for natural resources, its inexpensive exports to the country, and its financing for infrastructure development in the country. Chinese FDI toward Lao PDR’s mining sector, for instance, has driven Vientiane to prioritise development of the sector over others for short-term, high-level GDP growth. Chinese investment in the country’s agricultural sector also leads to a concentration of Vienti- ane’s resources in commercial agricultural development, undermining the more pro-poor subsistence farming sector.63 Similarly, Chinese demand for Lao PDR’s natural resources – whether copper, wood products, or rubber – has shaped the country’s development strategy away from production toward natural resource exploitation.64 The result of Vientiane’s focus on the country’s primary sector is a lack of diversification into its secondary sector, with a particular loss for development of a manufacturing sector.65 China’s exports to Lao PDR, which consist almost exclusively of finished goods such as light machinery, automobiles, furniture, surveying equipment, and textiles, also undermine the country’s domestic manufacturing capacity. Inexpen- sive, high-quality Chinese goods have flooded Lao PDR’s central markets making it all but impossible for Laotian businessmen to compete in production and Lao- tian workers to acquire the human capital needed for manufacture sector development. Lao PDR’s demand for Chinese goods also contributes to a current account deficit for the country.66 China’s provision of loans for infrastructure development in Lao PDR also has a negative effect on the country’s structure of production. Chinese financing, for instance, has driven Vientiane to prioritise large-scale infrastructure development projects such as the Chinese-proposed high-speed rail line between Vientiane to south-western China over smaller-scale infrastructure development projects aimed at creating internal connectivity between domestic centres of production. This pattern of infrastructure development is more conducive to expanding trade between China and Lao PDR than effecting productive industry development in the country.67 Development economists have long identified domestic infrastructure linkages as key to a state’s ability to develop a manufacturing sector, an approach to pro-poor growth shared by the Lao PDR’s own Ministry of Planning and Investment.68 That Chinese financing has shaped Vientiane’s infrastructure development priorities in a way that undermines growth in the country’s produc-

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 tive industries is a clear example of Chinese power over the country’s structure of production.

Knowledge One can view China’s power over Lao PDR’s structure of knowledge as a cor- ollary of its power over the state’s economy and as means through which Bei- jing is expanding its bilateral ties with Lao PDR to facilitate greater economic exchange. China has power over knowledge formation in Lao PDR through its 176 Sino-Lao PDR relations trade networks, for example, as Chinese traders and merchants have overtaken Lao nationals in areas within Oudomxay and Luang Namtha provinces and brought with them Chinese language, Chinese culture, and Chinese customs.69 Cities such as Boten and Tonpheung have become Chinese enclaves (or ‘concessions’) within the larger Lao state, where Chinese norms and language are dominant to the degree that the Lao people have become second-class citizens in their own country.70 The difficulty for the Lao people to penetrate Chinese trade networks and to understand Chinese business practices, in particular, has effectively disenfranchised parts of the Lao population from economic activity in these areas. Those who stay and work with the Chinese must adopt Chinese customs and language and use Chinese currency.71 Chinese workers in Vientiane have had similar impact on Lao PDR’s culture, norms, and practices, raising concerns among the Lao people in the capital that China is engaged in cultural colonisation.72 Chinese workers tend to live together on large worksites and, subsequently, to create enclaves of Chinese influence within the city. Relatedly, Chinese workers also facilitate penetration of Chinese goods into Vientiane’s markets, many of which displace Lao cultural textiles and goods.73 More directly, China influences knowledge formation in Lao PDR through its formalised effort to expand Chinese language, culture, and news, which is a subsidiary component of state-to-state relations meant to support further economic cooperation.74 China has established a Confucius Institute at the National Uni- versity of Lao PDR – the country’s most prestigious higher education institute – which offers Chinese language instruction and scholarship opportunities to study in China for Lao PDR’s elite students.75 In 2014, China established a Chinese Culture Center in Vientiane it hopes will increase interest in China among the Lao people.76 China regularly sends academics from its top universities to Lao PDR to engage in ‘Track Two’ dialogues with the intention of influencing Lao PDR’s top officials and has worked closely with the LPRP to enhance media cooperation between the two states.77 As noted earlier, China has also developed a robust system to develop political and business ties with Lao PDR’s elite, including high-level political exchange and training for Lao officials in China. China’s approach has been particularly effective with Lao PDR’s younger political leaders, many who view China as a more desirable partner than states like Thailand and Vietnam. Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 Structural violence China’s power over Lao PDR’s disparate structures results in unparalleled influence for China over the country’s domestic development. In some instances, Chi- nese influence has an entirely positive effect on Lao PDR’s domestic situation, leading to faster GDP growth and contributing to infrastructure development, for instance. As with this volume’s other case studies, however, Chinese influence also has negative effects on the country’s economic and environmental sectors, social stability, and political legitimacy. At the most extreme end, the negative Sino-Lao PDR relations 177 outcomes of Chinese influence contribute to structural violence within Lao PDR, as detailed below.

Economy China’s contribution to structural violence within Lao PDR’s domestic economy is clearest in the effect Chinese-originating FDI has on the country’s agricultural and natural resource sectors, the pressure Chinese exports put on Lao PDR’s manufacturing sector, and the influence Chinese immigrant workers have on Lao PDR’s labour market. Chinese FDI into Lao PDR’s agriculture sector, for example, has led to a fundamental shift in the industry away from subsistence farming and toward commercial farming. Chinese investment and demand in Luang Namtha, Oudomxay, Bokeo, and Phongsaly Provinces, in particular, has forced Lao farmers to abandon their traditional practice of shifting cultivation of rice and soybeans for commercial production of cash crops such as sugar and rubber.78 While an important contributor to economic growth in the short term, the industrialisation of agriculture in the country and a reliance on cash crops has increased Lao PDR’s agricultural sector’s vulnerability to external shocks – such as precipitous drops in demand from outside buyers or commodities’ prices – and raised concern over sustainability.79 Chinese investment in Lao PDR’s resource sector and Chinese demand for the country’s natural resources also contribute to structural violence within the country’s economy as they move Vientiane to prioritise the sector’s development over others. This over-prioritisation has contributed to over-reliance on the country’s natural resource sector for growth. It has also undermined development of a manufacturing sector in the country, as the natural resource sector has an upward effect on the kip’s exchange rate, which makes manufacturing more expensive.80 As the natural resource sector has a high ratio of capital over labour (as opposed to manufacturing), Lao PDR’s recent Chinese-inspired growth has actually pre- vented the country from creating more jobs. The sector’s rapid development also raises the risk that Lao PDR will develop an economy dependent on resource extraction at the cost of a more balanced economy. Low-priced and high-quality Chinese exports to Lao PDR further complicate Vientiane’s ability to develop a manufacturing sector and further contribute to structural violence within the country’s economy in the form of lost employment, underdevelopment, and disproportionate growth.81 Lao PDR’s textile and gar- Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 ment industries, for example, have seen an estimated 20–25 per cent loss in profit due to increased Chinese goods imported to the country following Lao PDR’s 2013 accession to the WTO.82 Chinese markets in Vientiane – stocked entirely with labour-intensive goods made in China – have crowded out local vendors and undermined Lao PDR’s producers and manufacturing networks.83 Growth in Lao PDR’s manufacturing sector, as a result, has stalled since 2008 at 11 per cent of the country’s economic output.84 Neither has the manufacturing sector created new jobs in recent years, despite Vientiane’s stated intent to focus on manufacturing sector growth as a tool of poverty reduction and human capital development. 178 Sino-Lao PDR relations Chinese migrant workers in Lao PDR exacerbate China’s contribution to structural violence within the country’s economy as they displace lesser skilled, lesser educated Lao workers across a range of industries, including the natural resource, construction, manufacturing, and service sectors.85 Official statistics put the number of Chinese workers living in Lao PDR in the early 2000s at 30,000, although unofficial estimates believe the number is likely ten times higher.86 Added to this number are an estimated 80,000 Chinese workers in Lao PDR working with Chi- nese firms on Chinese-invested projects over the short to medium term.87 This massive influx of Chinese workers contributes to higher unemployment in the country, particularly among Lao youth, and hinders growth of skilled labour in Lao PDR as Chinese and Lao firms employ educated and experienced Chinese rather than train Lao workers.88 While employment of Chinese workers to undertake more technical work in Lao PDR addresses the lack of skilled employment in the country in the short term, the trend has long-term deleterious effects on labour in Lao PDR as Lao workers lack the opportunity and means to develop more appropriate skills.

Environment China’s involvement in the development and exploitation of Lao PDR’s natural resource sector also contributes to structural violence within the country in the form of deforestation, large-scale land clearing and inundation, large volumes of solid waste, water pollution, and destruction of local flora and fauna.89 China’s influence is clear in regard to deforestation in Lao PDR, which China contributes to through its demand for timber (both legal and illegal) and its investment in rubber plantations in Lao PDR’s northern provinces. China’s demand for rosewood, for example, has led to widespread clear-cutting in Lao PDR and facilitated a lucrative illicit regional trade network in timber originating in Lao PDR, passing through other Southeast Asian states such as Vietnam, and ending up in China.90 Chinese investment in rubber plantations in Lao PDR (covering more than 30,000 hectares) also requires massive land clearing and leads to deforestation, soil erosion, and loss of biodiversity.91 Chinese involvement in mining in Lao PDR also contributes to environmental degradation within the country. Chinese firms engaged in the exploration and/ or extraction of bauxite in Lao PDR’s Bolaven Plateau (including Sinoma Inter- national Engineering Co. Ltd, the Yuqida Mining Group Ltd, China Nonferrous Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 Metals International Mining Company, and China International Alumnia Co.), for instance, have contributed to solid waste, water pollution, and contamination of soil in the areas surrounding the mineral deposits and mines.92 Unregulated activity by Chinese state-owned firms such as Sinohydro Mining Ltd and Qin Huang Dao Xin He Steel and Mining Development along Lao PDR’s Nam Ngum River Basin has also led to fish kills, chemical pollution, river bank erosion, and waste water within the basin.93 Small-scale Chinese firms further contribute to deforestation, loss of biodiversity, water pollution, and soil contamination at local levels across the country through mining exploration and/or extraction.94 Sino-Lao PDR relations 179 More relevant to discussion of China’s contribution to structural violence within Lao PDR’s environmental sector is China’s involvement in the building of dams along Lao PDR’s rivers. As of 2014, Chinese SOEs including Sinohydro Corpora- tion, China National Electric Engineering, Dongfang, China Datang Corporation, China International Water and Electric Corporation, China Southern Power Grid, and Gezhouba Group were involved in thirty different dam-building projects in Lao PDR; a degree of involvement in the country’s hydro sector’s development unparalleled by any other foreign actor.95 As such, no other state (including, arguably, Lao PDR) has as much impact on Lao PDR’s water and riparian environment as China. Unfortunately, much of China’s influence results in largely negative environmental outcomes. China’s extensive involvement in the building of seven dams across Lao PDR’s Nam Ou River (undertaken by Sinohydro Corporation), for instance, contributes to extensive fish die-offs and to the depletion of the river’s otter, reptile, and bird populations.96 China Southern Power Grid’s development of the Nam Tha 1 Hydropower Project on the Nam Tha River also results in deforestation along the riverbed and flooding in Bokeo Reserve and the Nam Ha NPA forests.97 China’s Datang Corporation’s Pak Beng Dam and Sanakham Dam and Sinohydro’s Pak Lay Dam have all directly contributed to environmental disasters along Lao PDR’s portion of the Mekong River, including mass fish kills, blockage of sediment flows, flooding, and drought, among many other outcomes.98

Society China’s contribution to structural violence within Lao PDR’s environment extends to structural violence within Lao PDR’s society. Chinese financing, planning, and construction of dams along Lao PDR’s rivers, for instance, has led to the displacement of tens of thousands of Lao people from their traditional communities, the flooding of agricultural land, and an increase in food insecurity for riparian communities along the Mekong and its tributaries.99 China Southern Power Grid’s work on the Nam Tha 1 Dam alone has forced the relocation of thirty-four villages, or 8,000 ethnic minority peoples, due to land inundation, water pollution, and food insecurity.100 Chinese involvement in mining in Lao PDR also contributes to structural violence at the social level in the form of forced relocation, destruction of traditional livelihoods and cultures, and public health issues related to contaminated food and water and air pollution.101 China Nonferrous Metals Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 International Mining Company’s work in bauxite mining in the Bolaven Plateau, for instance, has led to the forced relocation of Thadikseua, Nong Phanouan, Houay Chot, and Nam Tuat villages and contributed to destruction of agricultural land and rural livelihoods in the area.102 Chinese involvement in agricultural production in the Lao PDR has also led to the loss of land among local farmers either directly, through government-backed land reclamation, or indirectly, through Lao farmers selling their land to China so they can participate in Chinese-dominated production and distribution networks.103 Estimates suggest that China is now in direct control over between 300,000 and 180 Sino-Lao PDR relations 429,000 hectares of land in Luang Namtha, Oudomxay, Bokeo, and Phongsaly Provinces, where it engages primarily in rubber cultivation.104 Rubber cultivation also forces the displacement of local lowland farming communities, as it results in deforestation, food insecurity, and loss of economic opportunity for local farmers.105 Farmers in Lao PDR who lose their land either become unemployed or engage in agricultural labour, gaining little or nothing for their loss.106 As between 75 and 80 per cent of the Lao people depend on agriculture for employment, and as Lao PDR has not developed diversified employment opportunities, this shift in production, land use, and labour results is widespread structural violence across the country’s society.107 China similarly contributes to structural violence in terms of lost employment opportunities and ongoing poverty in Lao PDR through its position in the country’s natural resource sector development and its indirect effect on underdevelopment in Lao PDR’s manufacturing sector. China’s role in the growth of Lao PDR’s mining sector, for example, has enabled Vientiane to focus on direct economic growth without consideration for job-generating, pro-poor growth.108 Min- ing in Lao PDR, while contributing substantially to GDP growth, does not result in numerous jobs for the Lao people. Vientiane’s prioritisation of the country’s natural resource sector for economic growth similarly leads to underdevelopment in the country’s manufacturing sector, which is further hampered by the inflow of inexpensive, high-quality Chinese imports. As manufacturing plays a central role in poverty reduction in developing countries, its underdevelopment in Lao PDR is akin to unrealised potential and, as such, is a source of structural violence within Lao society.109 Chinese firms’ use of Chinese labour, as described above in discussion on Chi- na’s structural power over Lao PDR’s economy, further undermines social security in Lao PDR as it creates a disincentive for Vientiane to invest in technical training and vocational education. Lao PDR’s labour force is grossly underdeveloped in terms of human capital and, as such, requires state support to develop skills appropriate to a developing economy.110 Vientiane has opted, instead, to rely on Chinese skilled labour for short-term gain rather than invest in the Lao people for long-term benefits as a means to ensure continued high-level, resource-dependent growth.111 This state policy accords closely with Chinese firms’ insistence to use Chinese rather than Lao workers; a condition Chinese firms regularly attach to their Chinese-originating funding.112 Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 State/society relations Despite the country’s draconian policies against public protest, Lao society has mobilised against the LPRP-led government on matters related to Chinese influence in the country. The Lao people, for instance, have engaged in demonstrations against Vientiane’s land concessions to China for use in agricultural production, for construction and operation of casinos, for mining exploration and extraction, for residential construction, and for dam building. In 2012, for instance, seven farmers protested against the Lao PDR government’s reclamation of their land in Sino-Lao PDR relations 181 Thateng District, Sekong Province, for use as a land concession for rubber, arguing that the state neither consulted nor compensated them for its seizure.113 While a single example, NGOs such as Freedom House and the Centre for Develop- ment and Environment (CDE) believe such protests related to land reclamation and Chinese-invested agriculture are relatively widespread but underreported and likely to increase in the short term.114 Similarly, in 2014, fifty farmers from six villages in Tonpheung District, Bokeo Province, protested against the Lao PDR’s police’s attempt to force them from their land so a Chinese firm could build an airport as part of an extensive casino development project.115 Police armed with Kalashnikovs confronted the protesters and ultimately forced them from their land. Lao social opposition has also taken place in recent years within the country’s mining sector, despite heavy-handed state responses including imprisonment. Lao residents have reportedly engaged in armed clashes against Lao PDR security personnel for their management of mining concessions with China, although specific examples of such behavior are not reported in Lao media.116 Over one hundred Lao have similarly protested against Vientiane’s plan to grant Chinese firms the right to develop a massive $1.6 billion residential complex in Vientiane’s That Luang marsh, as its development would lead to their displacement from ances- tral land and loss of livelihood.117 In 2003 local residents armed with sticks and guns clashed with police and Chinese workers at the site of China International Water and Electric Corporation’s Nam Mang 3 hydro project over land reclamation, environmental pollution related to construction and mining activity, and lost livelihoods.118 One gets a clearer picture of the importance these China-related events have on state/society dynamics in Lao PDR when one holds them in parallel to past and ongoing state/society tensions in the country. In 2003, for example, over 3,000 farmers, ethnic minorities, Lao PDR army defectors, and intellectuals undertook at extensive antigovernment campaign against the LPRP, which included targeted attacks against government officials and bombings of city buses that led to thirty fatalities.119 While the LPRP claimed the incidents were isolated criminal acts, participants coalesced under the name Lao Citizens Movement for Democracy (LCMD) and claimed a common political agenda driven by grievances over state corruption, inefficiency, ongoing poverty, and exploitation.120 The LPRP was ultimately able to defeat the movement using its extensive security services. The state was less successful, however, in addressing the underlying economic, political, and social conditions that provided both motivation and impetus for the conflict. Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 Lao PDR remains a state where stability is the result of a heavy-handed state apparatus (with questionable legitimacy) and where the potential for state/society conflict remains just below the façade of stability. As such, China’s contribution to instability in Lao PDR through its commercial activities and its resulting power over the state’s structures does contribute to structural violence within state/society relations. China’s influence leads to social grievances against the state that further challenge its political legitimacy and its overall effectiveness in protecting the Lao people’s interests and delivering public goods. While Vientiane’s weakness is ultimately a product of its own internal 182 Sino-Lao PDR relations economic and political machinations, China has exploited the weakness – both directly and indirectly – to achieve its own aims in the country even when these aims run contrary to the Lao people’s own interests. Chinese contribution to structural violence over and within the state is, therefore, clear.

Notes 1 ‘Laos Politics: Quick View – Parliament Is Told of Embezzlement of Funds’, EIU ViewsWire, December 16, 2014. 2 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Southeast Asia Opium Outlook 2014: Lao PDR, Myanmar (Thailand: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2014), 25. 3 ‘Almost 150 Million USD Lost to Corruption in Laos’, Shanghai Daily, July 22, 2014, http://www.shanghaidaily.com/article/article_xinhua.aspx?id=231097. 4 Josie Cohen, ‘Corruption Is Allowing Loggers and Land Grabbers to Run Amok in Laos’, Global Witness, July 31, 2014, https://www.globalwitness.org/blog/corruption- allowing-loggers-and-land-grabbers-run-amok-laos/. 5 ‘Laos: Country Outlook’, EIU ViewsWire, September 16, 2014. 6 Jonathan McGrain, ‘Laos: Investment Potential and Economic Challenges’, CSIS cogit ASIA, July 28, 2014, http://cogitasia.com/laos-investment-potential-and-economic- challenges/. 7 Asian Development Bank, Asian Development Bank Outlook 2015: Financing Asia’s Future Growth (Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2015), 221; ‘Economy and Region Specific Forecasts and Data: Lao PDR’, World Bank, accessed April 25, 2015, http:// www.worldbank.org/en/publication/global-economic-prospects/data?variable=NYGD PMKTPKDZ®ion=EAP. 8 Asian Development Bank, Asian Development Bank Outlook 2015, 221. 9 ‘Laos: 2015 Index of Economic Freedom’, Heritage Foundation, accessed April 25, 2015, http://www.heritage.org/index/country/laos. 10 ‘Laos: Integration Will Worsen Development Frictions’, Oxford Analytica Daily Brief Service, February 2, 2015. 11 Lars Sondergaard et al., Expanding Productive Employment for Broad-Based Growth (Washington, DC: The World Bank Group, 2014), 11. 12 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2014: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), 395. 13 ‘Laos: Country Outlook’, EIU ViewsWire, September 16, 2014. 14 Simon Ingram, ‘Five Dead in Laos Border Clash’, BBC News, July 3, 2000, http:// news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/817335.stm. 15 Donald E. Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 Autonomy (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), 168. 16 Ian Storey, ASEAN and the Rise of China (London: Routledge, 2013), 33. 17 Observatory of Economic Complexity, ‘Export Destinations for Laos (2012)’, last updated on May 24, 2014, https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/explore/tree_map/hs/export/ lao/show/all/2012/. 18 Observatory of Economic Complexity, ‘Export Destinations for Laos (2005)’, last updated on May 24, 2014, http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/explore/tree_map/hs/export/ lao/show/all/2005/. 19 Observatory of Economic Complexity, ‘Import Origins for Laos (2012)’, last updated on May 24, 2014, http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/explore/tree_map/hs/import/lao/show/ all/2012/. Sino-Lao PDR relations 183 20 National Economic Research Institute Ministry of Planning and Investment Lao PDR, Lao PDR’s Macroeconomic Model: The Technical Background Paper, 2nd ed. (Vienti- ane: Ministry of Planning and Investment, 2014), 3. 21 International Labour Organization, Country Report of the ASEAN Assessment of the Social Impact of the Global Financial Crisis: Lao PDR (Jakarta: ASEAN, 2010), 1; ‘Laos Economy: Quick View – Mining Difficulties to Hit Government Revenue’, EIU ViewsWire, December 4, 2014. 22 Magnus Andersson, Anders Engvall, and Ari Kokko, In the Shadow of China: Trade and Growth in Lao PDR (Stockholm: Stockholm School of Economics, 2009), 16. 23 ‘Zhongguo yueshang wei Laowo zui da touzi guo’ (China Jumps to Become Lao PDR’s Largest Investment Partner’, Xinhua, January 29, 2014. 24 ‘Laos Economy: Quick View – Mineral Exports Continue to Dominate’, EIU Views- Wire, May 6, 2014. 25 Energy and Mines, ‘Operational and Planned Projects’, Department of Energy Business, July 10, 2008, http://www.poweringprogress.org/index.php?option=com_content& view=article&id=272&Itemid=2. 26 Asian Development Bank, Asian Development Bank Outlook 2015: Financing Asia’s Future Growth (Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2015), 221; ‘Laos Looks to Mining to Boost Growth’, Economist Intelligence Unit, November 27, 2013, http://country.eiu. com/article.aspx?articleid=691275853&Country=Laos&topic=Economy&subtopic= Forec_7. 27 ‘Laos Economy: Quick View – Mineral Exports Continue to Dominate’. 28 Pascale Hatcher, Regimes of Risk: The World Bank and the Transformation of Mining in Asia (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 97. 29 ‘Zhongguo lianxu di 2 nian chengwei dui Laowo zui da yuanzhu guo’ (China Has Been Lao PDR’s Largest Source of Aid for the Past Two Years), Economic and Com- mercial Counsellor’s Office of the People’s Republic of China in the People’s Demo- cratic Republic of Lao PDR, December 31, 2014, http://la.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ jmxw/201501/20150100855926.shtml. 30 Hossein Jalilian, Assessing China’s Impact on Poverty in the Greater Mekong Subre- gion (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2013), 415. 31 Keith Barney, ‘High Speed Rail Could Bankrupt Laos, but It’ll Keep China Happy’, The Conversation, April 7, 2014, http://theconversation.com/high-speed-rail-could- bankrupt-laos-but-itll-keep-china-happy-22657. 32 ‘Laos Economy: Quick View – China Suspends Infrastructure Loans to Laos’, EIU ViewsWire, August 5, 2014. 33 Anthony P. D’Costa, Globalization and Economic Nationalism in Asia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 45. 34 Barney, ‘High Speed Rail Could Bankrupt Laos, but It’ll Keep China Happy’.

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 35 ‘Zhongguo lianxu di 2 nian chengwei dui Laowo zui da yuanzhu guo’ (China Has Been Lao PDR’s Largest Source of Aid for the Past Two Years). 36 ‘Chinese Company in a Major Property Project in Laos’, The National, December 24, 2012, http://www.thenational.ae/business/property/chinese-company-in-a-major-property- project-in-laos. 37 ‘Briefer on Chinese Investments in Laos’, IHLO, January 2014, http://www.ihlo.org/ CINTW/Laos.pdf, 2. 38 ‘Chinese Company in a Major Property Project in Laos’. 39 Nathalie Fau, Sirivanh Khonthapane, and Christian Taillard, Transnational Dynamics in Southeast Asia: The Greater Mekong Subregion and Malacca Straits Economic Cor- ridors (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2014), 441–43. 184 Sino-Lao PDR relations 40 Zhiqun Zhu, China’s New Diplomacy: Rationale, Strategies and Significance (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing, 2013), 175. 41 Ian Storey, ‘China and Vietnam’s Tug of War over Laos’, Jamestown Foundation, December 31, 2013, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=3867#. VTa6–5OvF2B. 42 ‘Laos, China to Strengthen Governance Ties’, Vientiane Times, November 3, 2014. 43 ‘World’s Stability, Prosperity Inseparable from China’s Development: Lao Official’, Xinhua, September 30, 2014. 44 Patithin Phetmeuangphuan, ‘Lao Govt, Chinese Business Leaders Discuss Invest- ment’, Vientiane Times, January 5, 2015. 45 David W. Lovell, Asia-Pacific Security: Policy Challenges (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003), 96. 46 ‘China’s Creation of AIIB to Facilitate Trade in ASEAN: Former Thai Deputy PM’, Xinhua, December 13, 2014. 47 Tamaki Kyozuka, ‘Beijing Pushes “Go South” Policy at Greater Mekong Summit’, Nikkei Asian Review, December 20, 2014. 48 ‘China Willing to Strengthen Exchanges of Governance Experience with Laos: Senior CPC Official’, Xinhua, November 1, 2014. 49 ‘China Vows to Boost Military Cooperation with Laos and Mongolia’, Jiefangjun Bao Online, November 24, 2014. 50 ‘China, Laos Pledge to Deepen Law Enforcement, Security Cooperation’, Xinhua, September 1, 2014. 51 Susan Kneebone and Julie Debeljak, Transnational Crime and Human Rights: Responses to Human Trafficking in the Greater Mekong Subregion (London: Rout- ledge, 2012), 131. 52 Michael Wesley, ‘What’s at Stake in the South China Sea’, Lowy Institute, July 25, 2012, http://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/whats-stake-south-china-sea. 53 Interview with Lao security practitioner Luang Prapang, 2013. 54 Brian Spegele and Eric Bellman, ‘China Considers Armed Mekong Patrols’, Wall Street Journal, November 10, 2011. 55 Ian Storey, ‘China’s Growing Security Role in Southeast Asia Raises Hopes and Fears’, World Politics Review, July 5, 2013, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/13070/ china-s-growing-security-role-in-southeast-asia-raises-hopes-and-fears. 56 Saw Swee-Hock, ASEAN-China Economic Relations (Singapore: Institute of South- east Asian Studies, 2007), 333. 57 ‘Zhongguo lianxu di 2 nian chengwei dui Laowo zui da yuanzhu guo’ (China Has Been Lao PDR’s Largest Source of Aid for the Past Two Years). 58 Simon Creak, ‘The Western Aid Sector in Laos – Days Numbered?’, New Mandala, June 3, 2010, http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2010/06/03/the-western-aid-sector-in-

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 laos-days-numbered/. 59 Danielle Tan, ‘China in Laos: Is There Cause for Worry?’, ISEAS Perspective, May 16, 2014, 6. 60 World Bank, East Asia and Pacific Economic Update April 2014: Preserving Stability and Promoting Growth (Washington, DC: World Bank Publications, 2014), 96. 61 International Monetary Fund, ‘Lao People’s Democratic Republic: 2013 Article IV Consultation’, IMF Country Report, No. 13/369 (2013), 23. 62 ‘Laowo jinchukou maoyi’e nicha zengjia’ (Lao PDR’s Trade Deficit Increased), Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, September 10, 2014, http://la.china-embassy.org/chn/lwdt/t1192449.htm. Sino-Lao PDR relations 185 63 OECD, Southeast Asian Economic Outlook 2013: With Perspectives on China and India (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2013), 312. 64 Montague Lord, Lao PDR Market Access Guide: Trading with ASEAN Dialogue Part- ners: People’s Republic of China (Jakarta: ASEAN Economic Cooperation Division, 2013), 3. 65 OECD, Economic Outlook for Southeast Asia, China and India 2015: Strengthening Institutional Capacity (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2015), 52. 66 World Bank, World Bank East Asia and Pacific Economic Update April 2015 (Wash- ington, DC: World Bank Publications, 2015), 116. 67 Jane Perlez, ‘China Looks to High-Speed Rail to Expand Reach’, New York Times, August 8, 2014, accessed July 22, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/09/world/ asia/china-looks-to-high-speed-rail-to-expand-reach.html?_r=0. 68 Sithanonxay Suvannaphakdy, ‘Promoting manufacturing investment in Lao PDR’, Asian International Economists Network, April 15, 2013, accessed July 22, 2015, http:// www.aienetwork.org/blog/32/promoting_manufacturing_investment_in_lao_pdr. 69 Fau, Khonthapane, and Taillard, Transnational Dynamics in Southeast Asia, 443. 70 Mike Dwyer, ‘The Internal Frontier: Chinese Extraterritoriality in Northern Laos?’, New Mandala, February 11, 2011, http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2011/02/11/ the-internal-frontier-chinese-extraterritoriality-in-northern-laos/#_ftn3. 71 Chris Lyttleton and Pál Nyíri, ‘Dams, Casinos and Concessions: Chinese Megaprojects in Laos and Cambodia’, Engineering Earth (2010), 1243. 72 Ken Quimbach, ‘Laos in Danger of Losing Jobs and Culture as Chinese Pour In’, Global Times, January 24, 2013. 73 ‘China Launches Culture Center in Laos’, Xinhua, November 3, 2014. 74 ‘Xi Jinping tong Laowo renmin geming dangzhongyang zongshuji, guojia zhuxi Zhu Mali huitan’ (Xi Jinping Meets Lao PDR’s Premier Zhu Mali for Talks), Xinhua, July 28, 2014. 75 ‘An Introduction on the Confucius Institute at National University of Laos’, Confucius Institutes, http://english.hanban.org/confuciousinstitutes/node_10656.htm. 76 ‘China Launches Culture Center in Laos’, Xinhua, November 3, 2014. 77 ‘Southeast Asia: China Uses “Track Two” Diplomacy to Promote Image in Region’, OCS In-Depth, August 2014; ‘Lao and Chinese Medias Urged to Strengthen Tradi- tional Cooperation’, KPL, August 14, 2014. 78 V. Manivong and R. A. Cramb, ‘Economics of Smallholder Rubber Production in Northern Laos’, Australian Agricultural & Resource Economics Society (2007), 2. 79 Peng Li et al., ‘A Review of Swidden Agriculture in Southeast Asia’, Remote Sensing No. 6 (2014), 1670. 80 Sondergaard et al., Expanding Productive Employment for Broad-Based Growth, 11. 81 Magnus Andersson, Anders Engvall, and Ari Kokko, In the Shadow of China: Trade

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 and Growth in Lao PDR (Stockholm: Stockholm School of Economics, 2009), 14. 82 Banesaty Thephavong, Khouanchay Iemsouthi, and Buavanh Vilavong, ‘Laos: The Textile and Garment Industry in the Post-ATC Era’, World Trade Organization, accessed April 25, 2015, https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/casestudies_e/ case22_e.htm. 83 Kenta Goto, ‘Implications for Laos’ Development of Its Increasing Regional Inte- gration and Chinese Influence’, Asian-Pacific Economic Literature Vol. 25, No. 3 (2011), 86. 84 Asian Development Bank, Asian Development Bank Outlook 2015: Financing Asia’s Future Growth (Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2015), 221. 186 Sino-Lao PDR relations 85 ‘Laos Moves to Regulate Undocumented Foreign Workers’, Radio Free Asia, Novem- ber 6, 2013, http://www.rfa.org/english/news/laos/foreign-workers-11062013152224. html. 86 Ian Storey, ASEAN and the Rise of China (London: Routledge, 2013), 171. 87 Daniel Ray Lewis, ‘Forecasting Migration Flows: The Relationships among Eco- nomic Development, Demographic Change and Migration in the Greater Mekong Subregion’, GMS Migration Briefing (2010), 1. 88 ‘Laos Moves to Regulate Undocumented Foreign Workers’. 89 Renae Stenhouse et al., An Environmental Perspective on Hydropower and Mining Development in the Lao PDR (Washington, DC: World Bank Publication, 2010), 7. 90 Environmental Investigation Agency, Appetite for Destruction: China Trade in Illegal Timber (London: Environmental Investigation Agency, 2010), 24. 91 ‘The Future of Laos: A Bleak Landscape’, The Economist, October 24, 2013. 92 Kate M. Lazarus and Heinrich Böll Stiftung, In Search of Aluminum: China’s Role in the Mekong Region 2009 (Phnom Pen: International Institute for Sustainable Devel- opment, 2009), 33; Alexander Smajgl and John Ward, The Water-Food-Energy Nexus in the Mekong Region: Assessing Development Strategies Considering Cross-Sectoral and Transboundary Impacts (Berlin: Springer Science & Business Media, 2013), 168. 93 Clive Lyle and Chanthanet Boulapha, ‘Scenario-Based Development Planning for the Nam Ngum Basin’, CRBOM Small Publications No. 24 (2011), 9. 94 Monemany Nhoybouakong, Lao Environmental Outlook 2012 (Vientiane: Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment, Lao PDR, 2012), 19. 95 International Rivers, ‘China Overseas Dams List’, International Rivers, accessed April 25, 2015, http://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/china-overseas-dams- list-3611. 96 International Rivers, ‘Nam Ou River’, International Rivers, accessed April 25, 2015, http://www.internationalrivers.org/campaigns/nam-ou-river. 97 International Rivers, ‘Nam Tha 1’, International Rivers, accessed April 25, 2015, http://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/nam-tha-1-3591. 98 Pilita Clark, ‘Troubled Waters: The Mekong River Crisis’, Financial Times, July 18, 2014. 99 Poverty-Environment Initiative of Lao PDR, Investments in Hydropower (Vientiane: United Nations Development Programme, 2010), 1. 100 International Rivers, ‘Other Destructive Pipeline and Legacy Projects’, International Rivers, accessed April 25, 2015. 101 Teresita Cruz-del Rosario, The State and the Advocate: Case Studies on Development Policy in Asia (London: Routledge, 2014), 125. 102 Claudio Delang, Matthew Toro, and Marieke Charlet-Phommachanh, ‘Coffee, Mines and Dams: Conflicts over Land in the Bolaven Plateau, Southern Lao PDR’, The Geo- Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 graphic Journal Vol. 179, No. 2 (2013), 158. 103 Goto, ‘Implications for Laos’ Development of Its Increasing Regional Integration and Chinese Influence’, 85. 104 Karen McAllister, ‘Rubber, Rights and Resistance: The Evolution of Local Struggles against a Chinese Rubber Concession in Northern Laos’, Land Deal Politics Initiative (2012), 3. 105 Oliver Schoenweger and Alfons Üllenberg, Foreign Direct Investment in Land in the Lao PDR (Eschborn: GTZ, 2009), 34. 106 The United Nations in the Lao PDR Vientiane, Country Analysis Report: Lao Peo- ple’s Democratic Republic (Vientiane: United Nations Development Programme, 2010), 5. Sino-Lao PDR relations 187 107 Sondergaard et al., Expanding Productive Employment for Broad-Based Growth, 10. 108 The United Nations in the Lao PDR Vientiane, Country Analysis Report: Lao Peo- ple’s Democratic Republic (Vientiane: United Nations Development Programme, 2010), 2. 109 Committee for Planning and Development, National Socio-Economic Development Plan (2006–2020) (Vientiane: Committee for Planning and Development, 2006), 25. 110 The United Nations in the Lao PDR Vientiane, Country Analysis Report: Lao Peo- ple’s Democratic Republic, 7. 111 ‘Laos to Allow Tens of Thousands More Foreign Workers’, Radio Free Asia, Septem- ber 9, 2013, http://www.rfa.org/english/news/laos/labor-09242013152345.html. 112 Quimbach, ‘Laos in Danger of Losing Jobs and Culture as Chinese Pour In’. 113 ‘Land Dispute Villagers Released’, Radio Free Asia, June 28, 2012, http://www.rfa. org/english/news/laos/land-concessions-06282012173323.html. 114 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2014: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), 397; Centre for Devel- opment and Environment, On the Right Path? Land Concessions in Laos (Bern: Center for Development and Environment, 2014), 3. 115 ‘Lao Rice Farmers Defy Police Orders to Give Up Land to Chinese Firm’, Radio Free Asia, January 22, 2014, http://www.rfa.org/english/news/laos/landgrab-012220142 15351.html. 116 ‘Can the Government Rein in Resource Investment?’, The Economist Intelligence Unit, August 24, 2012. 117 ‘Vientiane Authorities Say That Luang Area Belongs to Investors’, Radio Free Asia, August 1, 2013, http://www.rfa.org/english/news/laos/concessions-08012013161959. html. 118 International Rivers Network, ‘New Lao Dam Embroiled in Controversy: Report from a Fact-Finding Mission to the Nam Mang 3 Hydropower Project’, International Rivers, May 1, 2003, http://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/new-lao-dam-embroiled- in-controversy-report-from-a-fact-finding-mission-to-the-nam-mang-3. 119 Carlyle Thayer, ‘Laos in 2003: Counterrevolution Fails to Ignite’, Asian Survey Vol. 33, No. 1 (2004), 111. 120 Russell Hiang-Khng Heng and Denis Hew Wei-Yen, Regional Outlook: Southeast Asia 2004–2005 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2004), 19. Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 10 Sino-Mongolia relations

While Western scholarship often points to Mongolia as a model developing democratic state, the country remains fundamentally weak in line with this volume’s use of the concept. The state’s political institutions, including the executive, legislative, or judicial branches, are ineffectual at instituting social or economic reform and have become, in many ways, a greater hindrance than help to the country’s development. Cronyism and nepotism have infected the state’s various political parties, undermining their ability to implement policy.1 The Democratic Party of Mongolia (DP), for example, has been unable to capitalise on its parliamentary and presidential victories in 2012 and 2013, respectively, to push forward reform with any meaningful outcome for the country’s residents and, as such, is unlikely to continue in power following the 2016 parliamentary elections. Corruption among politicians remains a major issue for the state’s political effectiveness and legitimacy, despite claims by outside groups such as Transparency International that corruption in Mongolia has decreased in recent years. Mongolia’s economic system is also weak, despite the country’s much-trumpeted high annual GDP growth rates since 2012. Mongolia remains dependent on its natural resource sector for growth, which has seen a slowdown since 2013 due to decreased global demand and, more specifically, to decreased demand from China for its key commodity exports, including copper, gold, and iron ore. Foreign direct investment into the country – another important source of growth – has fallen dramatically since 2012 when the DP implemented a new Foreign Investment Law that required parliamentary approval for foreign companies desiring more than a 49 per cent stake in Mongolia’s strategic industries.2 The shortfall in FDI has Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 contributed to a deficit in the state’s budget as policy makers planned spending for 2014/15 in line with expectations of higher levels of FDI. Inflation, which reached 15 per cent in 2012 and 10 per cent 2013, has undermined the state’s spending on social welfare and has the potential to lead to social unrest as the cost of living in Ulaanbaatar continues to increase. Mongolia’s banks also face fundamental challenges as more than 90 per cent of their overall deposits are for one year or less, an indication the Mongolian public lacks confidence in the country’s financial institutions. Sino-Mongolia relations 189 Mongolia’s political and economic weakness complicates social stability and worsens state/society relations. While Mongolia has not experienced widespread protests since 2008, social discontent with the state’s political and economic conditions as measured in public opinion polls is increasing. Corruption, government inefficiency, and inflation, in particular, present serious short-term challenges to state/society relations. While Mongolia’s ties with China have been the driving force behind its development over the past two decades, they also contain negative outcomes that further stress Mongolia’s weak domestic institutions. Chinese commercial interests in the country, for example, have had a negative influence on the country’s political process in terms of creating special interest groups that complicate policy making.3 Economic dependency on China undermined Mongolia’s economy on at least one occasion (of which more is written later) and continues to be a source of vulnerability for the state.4

Structural power at the systems level

Economic linkages Economic linkage between China and Mongolia is driven primarily by trade relations and foreign direct investment from China into Mongolia. Regarding trade, the two states’ relations have been on an unceasing upswing both in terms of exports and imports since the late 1990s. The amount of Mongolia’s exports China receives has grown both in overall percentage (22 per cent in 1997; 94 per cent in 2012) and value ($101 million in 1997; $4.4 billion in 2012).5 Mongolian exports to China consist primarily of mineral products (89 per cent of total exports) such as zinc, copper, iron, and coal. Mongolia’s imports from China have also increased from 13 per cent in 1997 ($63 million) to 49.1 per cent in 2012 ($2.03 billion).6 As of 2012, China surpassed Russia to become the largest source of Mongolian imports, consisting of agricultural products such as chicken, flour, and rice as well as petrol and textiles. While trade between the two states has mutually beneficial components, such that it provides China with much needed access to resources in its near abroad and contributes to Mongolia’s economic growth while providing variety in consumables for the Mongolian public, it has also increased Mongolia’s dependency on Chinese demand for its economic growth. This dependency translates into Chi- nese structural power over Mongolia’s macroeconomic stability, as evidenced in Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 the correlation between the downturn in Chinese demand for Mongolian minerals in 2009 and 2012/13 and Mongolia’s overall economic growth. In 2009 in particular, decreased Chinese demand for coal and copper contributed to a 1.9 per cent contraction of the Mongolian economy and caused a ripple effect throughout the country’s domestic sector that resulted in what the World Bank called a ‘near collapse’ of Mongolia’s economy.7 Chinese foreign direct investment to Mongolia is also an important and growing source of economic linkage between the two states. While Beijing provided just 24 190 Sino-Mongolia relations per cent of the $11.12 million in FDI Mongolia received in 1991, by 2010 it provided 51 per cent of Mongolia’s $1.76 billion in FDI.8 In the same year, according to the Mongolian-Chinese Trade Cooperation Association, Chinese-based companies were invested in over 4,600 different projects within Mongolia.9 While the vast majority of Chinese FDI is toward mining sector-related infrastructure development or in infrastructure projects that create physical linkages between the two states to facilitate greater trade relations, Beijing has also invested in prestige projects such as a new national stadium, a new Chamber of Commerce building, and a development of luxury shops in central Ulaanbaatar.10 While Chinese-originating FDI to Mongolia has had the positive effect of contributing to domestic development, particularly within the country’s mining sector, it has also resulted in Chinese structural power over Mongolia’s domestic economy in two important ways. First, Chinese FDI has influenced and shaped Mongolia’s economic development priorities away from traditional industries such as animal husbandry and manufacturing toward mining and construction.11 This shift in priorities has significant implications for Mongolia’s economic growth, employment, and, ultimately, societal stability. Second, Chinese dominance of FDI has limited the role other foreign states play in Mongolia through their respective investment. As FDI plays a dual role of both supporting domestic economic growth and ingratiating the recipient country into the international financial and economic systems, that Chinese FDI in essence dilutes other countries’ influence is a type of structural power that directly affects Mongolia’s foreign relations.

State-owned enterprises/private enterprises in Mongolia Chinese firms – both state-owned and private – dominate Mongolia’s domestic sector, accounting for 50 per cent of all foreign companies operating in Mongo- lia.12 This percentage far outpaces second-ranked South Korea, which accounts for just 18 per cent. Officially, there were 397 Chinese companies active in Mongolia across a range of industries including construction, finance, import/ export, and the country’s mineral sector as of 2014.13 Some officials in Mon- golia’s Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, however, believe these official numbers are a dramatic underestimation of Chinese foreign firms operating in Mongolia, as many Chinese firms prefer to act through Mongo- lian intermediaries to avoid the stigma attached to Chinese firms in Mongolia.14 Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 Some of the larger Chinese firms operating in Mongolia include Shenhua, which is involved in the Tavan Tolgoi Coal Mine and railway development; the Chi- nalco Aluminum Corporation of China, which holds shares in the Oyu Tolgoi Copper-Gold Mine; Hopu Investment, which operates the Lung Ming Iron Ore Project; PetroChina, which is developing the Tamsag Oil Project; and Sinopec, which has significant oil investments at the Zuunbayan Project in southeast Mongolia. China’s sovereign wealth fund, the China Investment Corporation, is also active in Mongolia through its direct funding of Chinese commercial projects in the state.15 Sino-Mongolia relations 191 Chinese firms’ dominance of Mongolia’s domestic economy translates into structural power for Beijing in two ways. First, Chinese SOEs control, or have partial control of, many of Mongolia’s key strategic industries and sites. This control translates into Beijing’s ability to directly influence Mongolia’s domestic economic policies, particularly in relation to the state’s mining sector. Chinalco Aluminum Corporation of China’s systematic reduction of coal imports from Mongolia in response to the DP’s attempt to renegotiate a cash-for-coal contract with it in 2012/13 is a clear example of a Chinese SOE leveraging its commercial ties with Mongolia to affect domestic policy. While the Mongolian government enjoyed widespread public support for its attempts to strike a more balanced deal with Chinalco, it eventually capitulated to the firm’s demands as Mongolia experienced a 17 per cent reduction in coal exports to China during the negotiations.16 Such structural power allows China to coerce the Mongolian state into maintaining and/or implementing policies favouring Beijing over its own domestic priorities. Second, Chinese firms have gained structural power through the Chinese migrant labourers they employ. Between 2000 and 2012, the number of inbound Chinese passengers to Mongolia jumped from 5,000 to 25,000 annually. This number is now more than one and a half times larger than that of Russian inbound passengers – the second largest amount – despite having started at an equal point in 2000.17 In 2010, Mongolian customs put the number of legally registered Chi- nese workers in Mongolia at 16,675, although Mongolian government officials estimate the number of total workers, including illegal labourers, is two to three times higher than the official amount.18 Chinese workers’ presence in Mongo- lia results in Chinese structural power over the country’s labour forces, as they contribute to unemployment in the country and prevent Mongolian workers from gaining technical skills in important sectors such as construction and mining.

Ties between cores The predominance of wealthy businessman in Mongolia’s parliament has allowed China to develop ties with the country’s political elite through its commercial dealings in the state. These ties, in turn, contribute to policies in Mongolia that seek to maximise profit through dealings with China at the expense of the country’s democratic system and economic stability.19 While Ulaanbaatar has sought to deal with the negative impact of overlapping commercial and political interests in parliament through legislation aimed at curbing conflicts of interest, that the Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 incomes of the seventy-six members of parliament in Mongolia were equal to 7.6 per cent of the country’s entire GDP in 2013 is a clear indication that commercial and political interest in Mongolia remain deeply intersected.20 Indeed, one need look no further than former Mongolian prime minister Sükh- baataryn Batbold for an example of how Mongolia’s elite ties with China can affect the country’s policies. In addition to his former position as prime minister and general secretary of the Mongolian People’s Party, Batbold is the owner of Mongolia’s Altai Holding LLC and is one of Mongolia’s wealthiest businessmen. Batbold founded Altai Holdings in 1991 as an international trading company with 192 Sino-Mongolia relations a specialisation in exporting raw cashmere abroad; a market trend in the 1990s that sent more than 50 per cent of Mongolia’s raw cashmere to China and contributed to the overall deterioration of the country’s cashmere manufacturing sector.21 Altai Holdings has since expanded to include Sky Trade LLC, a subsidiary spe- cialising in importing goods from China.22 Altai Holdings also owns interests in a number of key mines, including the Boroo Gold Mine, which it owns outright, and Tavan Tolgoi, which the Mongolian government under Batbold awarded to the Chinese SOE Shenhua to develop. Both mines export (and will export) the majority of their mineral resources to China.23 While Batbold denies a conflict of interests between his political and business roles, the Mongolian media has questioned his impartiality on business issues related to Altai Holding’s activities and China.24 Other prominent Mongolian politicians with economic ties to China include Mongolian minister of foreign affairs, Luvsanvandan Bold, Mongolian minister for industry and agriculture, Kh. Battulga, former Mongolian minister of finance S. Bayartsogt, and MPs B. Bat-Erdene and MP Ch. Saikhanbileg.25 While it is difficult to determine the degree to which these or other individuals’ commercial ties to China influence their domestic and foreign policy decision making, that China has advanced its commercial interests in Mongolia during their tenures and to their clear economic advantage is certain.26 Ties between Mongolian and Chinese elite have also contributed to the two states’ asymmetrical relations and Chinese structural power over Mongolia’s domestic institutions.

Structural power at the state level

Security Chinese structural power influences Mongolia’s structure of security at both the state and society levels. At the state level, China’s structural power has driven a debate within the Mongolian military and government over how Mongolia can best mitigate China’s growing influence without alienating China as an economic partner. This ongoing debate is best viewed in line with Mongolia’s revised 2010 National Security Concept and its 2011 Foreign Policy Concept. The 2010 National Security Concept, for example, identifies economic overdependence on a single state as an inherent threat to Mongolia’s national security and establishes a ‘one-third’ clause which prohibits any single state for accounting for more than Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 one-third of overall FDI into the country.27 The concept also raises concerns over foreign migration’s effect on Mongolia’s genetic purity. As only China currently provides more than one-third of FDI to China and as Chinese migrants make up the majority of foreign nationals in Mongolia, the 2010 Concept clearly seeks to mitigate Chinese structural power. Ulaanbaatar’s revisions to the 2011 Foreign Policy Concept also implicitly identify Chinese structural power as the country’s principal security concern. The 2011 Concept demotes China from the central strategic position it occupied in the 1994 document by stressing the need for Mongolia to develop relations with Sino-Mongolia relations 193 states such as Japan, the United States, and Europe and international organizations such as the United Nations.28 The 2011 Concept no longer identifies good relations with China as the country’s primary foreign policy goal. Rather, it highlights the need to engage in complex balancing aimed against China.29 The overall tone toward China in the 2011 Concept is more assertive, as is the concept’s clear perception of the need to distance the state from Chinese influence. The perception of Chinese structural power as a threat at the social level is also growing, as evidenced in the prevalence of registered, quasi-political anti-Chinese groups in Mongolia. While formed on the fringes of Mongolian society, groups like Dayar Mongol and Xox Mongol now enjoy increasing popular support for their nationalist stances against Chinese ‘imperialism’.30 Xox and Dayar Mon- gol both hold that Chinese structural power is leading to a social and cultural ‘invasion’ of Mongolia that threatens the nation’s character and unity. Claiming Ulaanbaatar has failed to secure Mongolia from Chinese structural power, these ultra-nationalist groups have established armed militias that engage in routine training, have targeted Chinese nationals in Mongolia, and have persecuted Mon- golians, particularly Mongolian women, who they believe have colluded with China to advance Chinese interests in Mongolia.31 While some analysts dismiss organisations like Xox Mongol and Dayar Mon- gol as little more than hooligan groups, it is important to note they have grown in size and in legitimacy because they have tapped into a widely held concern over China’s structural power. While these groups’ tactics are radical, popular news sources such as Seruuleg Sonin in Mongolia publicly sympathise with their cause and regularly carry stories of Mongolia’s Chinese ‘challenge’ and accounts of related government corruption.32 That this widely read periodical uses much the same rhetoric as Xox Mongol and Dayar Mongol when describing China’s activities in Mongolia suggests the dismissal of their appeal to the wider Mongolian public is foolish.

Finance The Chinese government has steadily increased the amount of monetary assistance in the form of aid it provides to Mongolia. While direct aid from China is nominal compared to that which Mongolia receives from Japan, it is increasing and much more in line with current Mongolian governmental development objectives.33 Beijing and Ulaanbaatar have an ‘unwritten’ rule in relation to aid Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 that includes one or two high-level political visits each year where the Chinese government pledges somewhere between $7 million and $15 million for projects related to mining infrastructure or construction.34 China is now Mongolia’s primary lender. In 2007, China provided Mongolia a commercial loan of $300 million and in 2011 Beijing agreed to another $500 million loan.35 In 2009, the Mongolian government requested an emergency $3 billion loan from China, a request that suggests Ulaanbaatar increasingly views China as a lender of last resort in contrast to the World Bank or Asian Development Bank, its traditional loan providers.36 194 Sino-Mongolia relations China’s role as Mongolia’s principal lender increases China’s structural power over the country in a way that directly affects Mongolia’s economic and foreign relations. As China’s loans do not require the same oversight and accountability as loans from Western states and institutions, Mongolia is no longer as willing to accept the conditions attached to other financial sources. In response to Mongolia’s unwillingness to accept conditionality along with aid and loans, Mongolia’s traditional lenders have decreased the amount of aid they are willing to provide and, in some instances, cancelled allotted funding altogether.37 This loss of alternative sources of funding increases Mongolia’s overall dependency on China; a condition evidenced by Ulaanbaatar’s turning to Beijing, not the World Bank or the IMF, for $3 billion to shore up troubled banks in 2009. This dependency also provides Beijing with more direct leverage over Mongolia that it can use to influence domestic economic development in the country. Examples of this influence are Chinese insistence that Mongolia use aid and loan funds to develop its mining and energy sectors and that Mongolia employ Chinese companies and Chinese workers for the projects.38

Production While Ulaanbaatar is ultimately responsible for the nature and direction of Mon- golia’s domestic economic development, China’s structural power over the country’s sources of production is advanced. China’s dominance over Mongolia’s trade, both in terms of the country’s exports and imports, and its role as the primary provider of FDI, for example, contribute to foreign and domestic constraints on the Mongolian government’s ability to implement an economic development programme entirely in line with domestic priorities. So does Chinese demand for natural resources such as coal and copper provide incentive for Ulaanbaatar to prioritise certain aspects of the Mongolian economy over others. Mongolia’s overall economic dependency on China means that Beijing largely shapes the economic environment in which Mongolia operates, for better or worse. Chinese structural power over Mongolia’s production is most evident in how the country’s demand for resources and its targeted FDI into the country’s mining sector have shaped Mongolia’s overall economic growth for the past decade. While Mongolia was an agricultural and manufacturing sector dependent economy for much of the twentieth century, the country is now dependent on its mining sector for industrial production growth. In 2013, for example, a slowdown in the production of coal led to a drop of industrial production growth from 16 per Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 cent to 2 per cent, despite what the World Bank classified as a ‘strong’ performance in the country’s manufacturing sector.39 That Chinese demand has driven the shift from manufacturing and agriculture to mining is evident in that China receives more than 90 per cent of Mongolia’s exports, of which 89 per cent are mineral-related, and provides more than 50 per cent of its FDI, almost all of which is targeted toward Mongolia’s mining sector development. GDP growth in Mon- golia to date depends heavily on both exports and investment, thereby providing Beijing with indirect influence over how Ulaanbaatar shapes the country’s development priorities.40 Sino-Mongolia relations 195 Imports from China constitute the other half of China’s structural power over Mongolia’s production in that they provide disincentive for local manufacturers to produce goods such as electronics and textiles and for Mongolia’s farmers to develop a domestic capacity for basic food staples such as flour and rice. Mongo- lia’s manufacturing sector, as of 2014, contributes just 6.2 per cent to the country’s industrial production, as it is limited to such products as alcoholic beverages, camel wool blankets, leather, sausage, and some knitted goods.41 Mongolia’s agriculture sector has seen a steady decline in production of goods such as potatoes and cereals and low-level growth in vegetables throughout the 2000s.42 While China certainly is not responsible for Mongolia’s underdeveloped manufacturing and agriculture sectors, its imports clearly contribute to an economic environment where dependency on Chinese goods imports is more expedient and profitable than the laborious process of developing a domestic capacity. Chinese FDI in Mongolia’s construction industry, which is currently boom- ing, also provides Beijing with structural power. First, Chinese FDI is an important source of funding for many large infrastructure-related projects, particularly since Mongolia’s government approved a Foreign Investment Law in 2013 that removed restrictions on the type of foreign company that can invest in Mongolia, opening the doors for China’s SOEs.43 Chinese funding of Mongolia’s infrastructure provides the country with structural power whether or not the firm is Chi- nese or Mongolian. Second, China also gains structural power through its migrant workers in Mongolia’s construction sector, as they result in an expanding Chinese cultural presence in the country and as they displace Mongolian workers from the sector, thereby contributing to unemployment in the country.

Knowledge China has developed structural power over Mongolia’s structures of knowledge through its control over the IMAR and through concerted efforts to spread Chi- nese culture and Chinese language in Mongolia. China has worked through the IMAR to established cultural and educational ties between its ethnic Mongols and Mongolia through efforts such as the ‘2005 Mongolian Students to Study Chinese in China and Chinese Teachers to Go to Mongolia to Teach Agreement’. This agreement, formed between the IMAR government and Ulaanbaatar, sought to leverage Mongolian as a common language to advance ties between the two states at a provincial-to-state level.44 Similarly, in 2006, the IMAR government agreed to Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 provide annual tuition and living expenses for one hundred Mongolian students to study in the IMAR and in 2008 the Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of China agreed to provide funding for fifteen IMAR teachers to go to Mongolia and teach Chinese.45 Since the 1990s, Beijing has also developed structural power by expanding educational opportunities in Mongolia related to Chinese language learning. In 2008, the Chinese government and Shandong University established a Confucius Centre at Mongolia’s National University and pledged to provide funding for Chinese language teachers.46 In addition to the high-profile Confucius Centre, there are more than 196 Sino-Mongolia relations sixty Chinese-language schools in Ulaanbaatar alone and dozens of Chinese-funded Chinese language teachers in both the capital and Mongolian countryside. The Chinese and Mongolian governments have also signed a series of agreements aimed at fostering cooperation of the two countries’ closely connected histories and customs.47 These include the 1994 ‘Cultural Cooperation Agree- ment’, the 1998–2000 ‘Executive Plan for Sino-Mongolian Cultural Exchanges’, the 2001–03 ‘Executive Plan for Cultural Exchanges and Cooperation’ and, most recently, the 2008–10 ‘Executive Plan for Cultural Exchange’.48 While such exchange is ostensibly to advance state-to-state and society-to-society relations, educational, language, and cultural ties between China and Mongo- lia are asymmetrical. While China is willing to provide teachers and funding to Mongolia for cultural and/or educational training, it is does not host Mongolian teachers in the IMAR nor does Mongolia provide financial assistance to Chinese nationals to study in Mongolia. Neither is there equal interest between the two states’ societies to exchange language and culture, particularly as many Chinese view Mongolian culture as a component of greater Chinese identity.49

Structural violence While not all of China’s structural power over Mongolia is negative, examination of its influence over Mongolia’s economic, environmental, and societal sectors, as well as its effect on state-social relations, suggests Chinese structural power does contribute to structural violence within the country.

Economy China has developed structural power over Mongolia’s production and finance through its dominant position in Mongolia’s domestic economy. This structural power became evident when a steep drop in China’s industrial production growth and subsequent decrease in Chinese demand for resources in 2008/09 contributed to a financial crisis in Mongolia.50 As by 2009 more than 70 per cent of Mongo- lia’s commodities went to China, a steep drop in Chinese demand caused Mon- golia’s industry sector (mining) to experience –4.1 per cent growth and its overall economy to contract by 1.9 per cent. This downturn in Mongolia’s commodities market caused a ripple effect through the economy. Wages sharply declined, first in the formal sector and then the informal sector, which fell as much as 60 Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 per cent.51 Unemployment in the country rose from 10.5 to 12.8 per cent in one year. The country experienced a surge of non-performing loans (NPL) in the agriculture, construction, and manufacturing sectors, accounting for 17.9 per cent of all outstanding loans.52 Its fiscal and current account deficits widened. A lack of demand for local currency forced the government to absorb substantial reserve losses as they worked to support the struggling tugrik. A loss of confidence in the country’s banking system led to the fall of Anod, Mongolia’s fourth largest bank, and a decrease in overall deposits.53 The Mongolian government had insufficient financing to meet its spending needs.54 Sino-Mongolia relations 197 While Mongolia’s economic crisis in 2008/09 was as much about bad Mongo- lian economic policies as anything else, China’s structural power over Mongo- lia’s economic sector played a central role. Many of Mongolia’s poor economic decisions were the result of policies grounded in unsustainable and ineffective expenditure trends resulting from a decade of continual economic growth; growth fuelled by Chinese demand for commodities. When China indirectly removed that demand, Mongolia suffered a systemic shock that the International Monetary Fund called a near financial collapse.55 Mongolia remains dependent on Chinese demand for natural resources and Chinese investment for growth. While far less severe than Mongolia’s 2009 shock, the World Bank has identified lack of Chinese demand and a subsequent decrease in the global price of natural resources such as coal and copper as the contributing factors to Mongolia’s slower than expected growth in 2014.56 Such vulnerability is even more pronounced in the long term, as China’s leadership has expressed its intent to move the country away from using coal toward using natural gas as one means of dealing with China’s increasingly dire environmental situation.57 As Mongolia’s largest mines will not come into full production until well into the 2020s, it is possible that Chinese demand for Mongolian coal will decrease before Mongolia is able to fully benefit from its resources.

Environment China’s structural power in Mongolia contributes to structural violence within the country’s environmental sector in five ways. First, demand in China for animal products used in Chinese traditional medicine, such as fur, musk glands, and horns, has led to a growth in Mongolia’s illegal wildlife trade and a subsequent loss of biodiversity in Mongolia including the red deer, the saiga antelope, the argali, and the saker falcon.58 Demand in China for game meat has contributed to species near extinction among the Mongolian grey wolf, brown bear, Siberian ibex, Mongolian gazelle, wild boar, and Yakut moose. Second, demand for cashmere in China contributes to desertification in Mongolia as herders increase the percentage of goats in their overall herd composition to meet Chinese demand.59 Goats damage pastureland as they eat grass roots and cut the topsoil with their sharp hooves. For hundreds of years, Mongolian herders limited the percentage of their herds made up of goats to 10 per cent.60 Now, goats account for over half of all Mongolia’s livestock. Since 2005, Chinese demand for cashmere Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 from Mongolia has skyrocketed as the Chinese government restricted the number of goats allowed in the IMAR so as to arrest desertification.61 By some accounts, desertification now affects as much as 90 percent of Mongolia’s territory.62 Third, illegal wood trade between China and Mongolia is contributing to deforestation in Mongolia.63 Illegal logging in Mongolia, while by its nature difficult to measure, accounts for at least ten times the amount of the country’s annual legal harvest limits. Conservative estimates believe that at least 5.51 million cubic metres, about five times the sustainable annual harvest volume, are felled each year.64 The majority of wood ends up in the Chinese market.65 198 Sino-Mongolia relations Fourth, Chinese construction on Mongolia’s rivers is also contributing indirectly to an overall worsening of Mongolia’s environment through pollution and water shortages. At present, Chinese firms are engaged in supporting the Mon- golian Ministry of Fuel and Energy goals of expanding Mongolia’s hydroelectric capacity through work on the Chono-Kharaikh River in western Mongolia and the Orkhon River in the Gobi Desert.66 Chinese firms are financing and constructing both dams with the stated intention of providing Mongolian mining sites a source of reliable energy. Local residents and environmental groups such as the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) have raised concern over the dam’s environmental impact and the fact that the projects were undertaken without proper environmental assessment.67 Fifth, Chinese demand for commodities contributes to structural violence within Mongolia’s environmental sector. While many of the larger mining projects in Mongolia are untaken in line with international best practices, the majority of small and medium-sized mines (from which China gets the majority of its resource supply) are largely outside government regulation.68 These mines regularly damage the environment through illegal drainage of polluted water, illegal digging, and careless explosions. Mongolia’s artisan placer gold miners, or ‘ninja’ miners, poison water with mercury and sodium cyanide (used to winnow gold from small stones) and leave behind unprocessed waste and makeshift shanty villages. Nearly all ninja-collected gold and fluorspar go directly to China.69

Society Chinese structural power over Mongolia’s production and finance directly translates into structural violence within Mongolia’s societal development in terms of economic outcomes such as unemployment and poverty and non-economic outcomes such as public health. China contributes to unemployment, for example, in three important ways. First, Chinese workers in Mongolia displace Mongolian workers who would otherwise find employment in sectors such as construction and mining. While the Mongolian government has passed legislation designed to limit the number of foreign workers in Mongolia to 3 per cent of the country’s population, Mongolian media has reported that the actual number of Chi- nese migrant workers is 26,000, which exceeds the total allotment for all foreign workers in Mongolia.70 Both Mongolian and Chinese firms prefer to hire Chinese workers, as they work longer hours for less money and are thought to be more Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 reliable than Mongolian workers. Second, China’s focus on developing Mon- golia’s mining sector through trade and FDI has contributed to a skewed economy in Mongolia where the state invests disproportionately in natural resources extraction at the cost of investment in other sectors. As mining is a relatively low-labour-intensive industry when compared to agriculture or manufacturing, Chinese structural power over Mongolia’s economy contributes to structural violence as defined by loss of economic opportunity for those residents in the dependent country.71 Third, Chinese receipt of more than 90 per cent of Mongo- lia’s exports has created Mongolian dependency on China for employment in its Sino-Mongolia relations 199 mineral sector. During the 2009 financial crisis in Mongolia, for xample,e unemployment increased from 10.5 to 12.8 per cent as Chinese demand for Mongolia’s mineral exports decreased.72 Closely related to China’s influence over structural violence within Mongo- lia’s labour field is China’s influence over structural violence as related to poverty. While Mongolia has benefited at the state level from Chinese investment and trade, and while many Mongolians have seen a rise in their standard of living due to inexpensive consumables from China, the large majority of Mongolians have not experienced direct benefit from the country’s high-level, mining-driven growth. Poverty in Mongolia remains endemic, with more than 27 per cent of the population living below the poverty line in 2014 according to the World Bank.73 The country’s failure to develop its manufacturing and agricultural sectors – both key industries in providing employment and contributing to poverty reduction – is an important component of the country’s continued struggle with poverty.74 That China plays the central foreign role in Mongolia’s domestic economic development while directing its aid and loans toward infrastructure rather than social development means that Beijing is an indirect contributor to ongoing poverty in the country. Lastly, Chinese structural power contributes to structural violence over Mon- golia’s public health. When Mongolia experienced a financial crisis in 2009, for example, it also experienced a public health crisis in which infant mortality, maternal deaths, and under-five mortality all rose.75 As a drop in Chinese demand was the principal cause of the country’s economic crisis, it is an external source of insecurity within the country’s closely related public health sector. Chinese environmentally harmful commercial activity in Mongolia also contributes to pollution in Mongolia, with corresponding public health outcomes. Researchers attribute one in ten deaths in Mongolia to the country’s air pollution, particularly to harmful dust. While much of the pollution in Mongolia comes from ger districts where residents burn rubbish for heat, other sources include mining and construction sites and deforested lands.76 China’s contribution to both sources of pollution in Mongolia is well established. China has also contributed to the underdevelopment of Mongolia’s domestic healthcare industry through its development of Mongolian-speaking hospitals in the IMAR aimed at attracting Mon- golians from Mongolia. While beneficial for those Mongolians with the resources to travel to China in that the care they receive in the IMAR is far superior to what they would receive in Mongolia, for those without resources China’s medical mar- Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 ket is a drain in that Mongolian capital goes to China rather than going into the development of Mongolia’s domestic health industry.

State/society relations Chinese structural power also contributes to structural violence within state/society relations in Mongolia. Mongolian society has come to view Chinese structural power as an external source of the country’s internal weakness, particularly in relation to the state’s inefficiency and corruption. Mongolian society also 200 Sino-Mongolia relations increasingly believes that economic dependency has created an uneven political relationship between China and Mongolia where Beijing is able to dictate Ulaan- baatar’s domestic priorities and policies to the country’s overall detriment. Mongolian public opinion polls consistently register a general sense of distrust among Mongolians toward China. In 2013, only 2 per cent of respondents identified China as Mongolia’s ‘best partner’ in the Mongolian-based Sant Maral Foun- dation poll question on foreign cooperation.77 This ranking placed China last on the list of countries with which Mongolians would like to cultivate partnerships; a place it has occupied since Sant Maral Foundation began to track public opinion about foreign relations in 2009.78 Similarly, Mongolians surveyed in the 2009 Asian Barometer poll overwhelmingly identified Chinese influence over Mongo- lia as negative (49 per cent) as opposed to positive (25 per cent).79 This perception is in contrast to the 80 percent of respondents who identified Russian influence as ‘positive’. While elements of anti-Chinese sentiments in Mongolia are partially historically based, a recent survey of the Mongolian press between 2000 and 2010 suggests that Mongolian opinion toward China has worsened over the past decade. Reviewing every article written about China in twenty-nine Mongolian periodi- cals over the course of ten years, the Press Institute of Mongolia found that the number of articles published on China has dramatically increased (twenty-three articles in 2000, fifty-two articles in 2010) while the rhetoric depicting China has steadily worsened.80 Whereas ‘positive’ articles about China made up 80 per cent of coverage in 2000, coverage of Chinese activities was 70 per cent negative by 2010.81 While coverage of Chinese activities in 2000 tended to focus on political relations and business, coverage in 2010 focused more on crime committed by Chinese in Mongolia, human rights violations in China, and preferential treatment Chinese nationals received from Mongolia’s judiciary.82 Portrayal of Chinese in Mongolia has also steadily worsened, with articles in 2010 routinely using the derogatory term ‘hujaa’ to refer to Chinese nationals and depictions of the Chinese ‘character’ as dishonest, sneaky, and violent.83 This review of Mon- golian attitudes toward China in the Mongolian press suggests a corresponding relationship between growing Sino-Mongolian economic relations and deepening anti-Chinese sentiments in Mongolia. Anti-Chinese sentiment in Mongolia extends to the country’s political institutions, as Mongolian society increasingly views its politicians as profit-maximisers with close commercial ties to Chinese firms.84 As detailed in discussion of Chi- Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 nese structural power within elite ties, many of Mongolia’s most prominent politicians maintain links to the business world that depend on Chinese involvement for profitability. Mongolian society increasingly views Chinese involvement, whether direct or indirect, within the country’s political system as corrosive in terms of governance and contributory in terms of corruption and inefficiency.85 The sense that Mongolia’s political system is beholden to foreign commercial interests, particularly Chinese interest, is a key component of Mongolian perceptions that Ulaanbaatar is inherently ineffective and increasingly illegitimate.86 China’s contribution to structural violence between Mongolia’s state and society is clear. Sino-Mongolia relations 201

Notes 1 Mendee Jargalsaikhany, ‘Foreign Policy Implications of Mongolian Crony Democ- racy’, The Jamestown Foundation, March 12, 2014. 2 ‘Mongolia: Country Outlook’, EIU ViewsWire, May 12, 2014. 3 Mendee Jargalsaikhany, ‘Foreign Policy Implications of Mongolian Crony Democracy’. 4 ‘Mongolia Politics: Keeping Up with the Neighbours’, EIU ViewsWire, March 19, 2014. 5 National Statistical Office of Mongolia, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics (Ulaanbaatar: National Statistical Office of Mongolia, 2000), 34, 74. 6 Ibid., 38, 78. 7 World Bank, Mongolia Economic Retrospective: 2008–2010 (Washington, DC: World Bank Publishing, 2010). 8 Ministry of Economic Development, ‘Foreign Direct Investment in Mongolia’, For- eign Investment Regulations and Registration Department, accessed July 14, 2015, http://investmongolia.gov.mn/en/?page_id=757. 9 InfoMongolia, ‘Foreign-Listed Companies with Mongolian Assets’, InfoMongolia, accessed July 15, 2015, http://www.infomongolia.com/ct/ci/750. 10 Xinhua, ‘Zhongguo gongsi chengjian mengguguo gonglu xiangmu kaigong’ (Chinese Companies Begin Construction of a Highway Project), Xinhua, April 30, 2013. 11 Truman G. Packard and Trang Van Nguyen, East Asia Pacific at Work: Employment, Enterprise, and Well-Being (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2014), 48–49. 12 Ministry of Economic Development, ‘Registered Foreign Investment Companies in Mongolia by Country’, Foreign Investment Regulations and Registration Department, accessed September 30, 2013, http://investmongolia.gov.mn/en/?page_id=757. 13 Economic and Commercial Counsellor’s Office of the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Mongolia, ‘Zai meng zhongzi qiye minglu’ (A List of Chinese Firms’ Investment in Mongolia), Economic and Commercial Counsellor’s Office of the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Mongolia, accessed September 30, 2013, http://mn.mofcom.gov.cn/article/catalog/zgqy/200611/20061103881217.shtml. 14 Personal Interview, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, 2012. 15 Clement Huaweilang Dai and David Tyler Gibson, Minegolia Part I: China and Mon- golia’s Mining Boom (Washington, DC: The Wilson Center, 2012). 16 ‘Mongolia Politics: Keeping Up with the Neighbours’. 17 National Statistical Office of Mongolia, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics (Ulaanbaatar: National Statistical Office of Mongolia, 2013), 41. 18 Sh. Baatar, ‘Hyatad hilee haaval Mongol hogjin’ (Close the Border with China So Mongolia Can Develop), Orloo, March 5, 2011. 19 Mendee Jargalsaikhany, ‘Foreign Policy Implications of Mongolian Crony Democracy’. 20 Brian White, ‘The Wealth of Parliament Redux: What’s It Worth?’, The Mongolist, Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 November 11, 2013, http://www.themongolist.com/blog/parliament/79-the-wealth-of- parliament-redux.html. 21 Altai Cashmere, ‘About Us’, Altai Cashmere, accessed July 15, 2015, http://www.altai cashmere.mn/en/4/m/26/company.html; Vernon Roningen, The Impact of a Ban on Mon- golian Raw Cashmere Exports (Ulaanbaatar: Gobi Regional Economic Growth, 1999), 1. 22 Sky Trading, Inc., ‘About Us’, Sky Trading, Inc., accessed July 15, 2015, http://www. skytradinginc.com/indexE.html. 23 AME Group, ‘Boroo, Mongolia (Gold Mines)’, AME Group, accessed July 15, 2015, http://usa.amegroup.com/Website/Content/GuestInformation/SiteDetail/Gold Mines/108/Boroo; Pui-Kwan Tse, The Mineral Industry of Mongolia (Ulaanbaatar: US 202 Sino-Mongolia relations Geographical Survey, 2007), 15.2; World Bank, Mongolia: Quarterly Economic Update (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2011), 5. 24 ‘PM of Mongolia S.Batbold: Let’s Not Criticise the Past, We Should Focus on Creation and Implementation’, Business-Mongolia, April 5, 2011. 25 L. Baatarshuu, ‘Erhem Tusheediin Tansag Haus Yamar Unetei Ve?’ (How Much Are Our ‘Dear Officials’ Homes Worth?), Uls Toriin Toim, January 13, 2012. 26 E. Dari, ‘Prime Minister Concludes Productive Visit to China’, UB Post, October 30, 2013; ‘N. Altankhuyag Meets China’s Top Legislator’, UB Post, October 28, 2013. 27 National Security Council, ‘2011 Concept of National Security’, National Security Council, accessed July 15, 2015, http://www.nsc.gov.mn/sites/default/files/images/ National%20Security%20Concept%20of%20Mongolia%20EN.pdf. 28 National Security Council, ‘2011 Concept of National Security’, National Security Council, accessed July 15, 2015, http://www.nsc.gov.mn/sites/default/files/images/ National%20Security%20Concept%20of%20Mongolia%20EN.pdf. 29 Mongolian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Mongolia’s Foreign Policy’, Mongolian Min- istry of Foreign Affairs, accessed July 15, 2015, http://www.mfa.gov.mn/en/index. php?option=com_content&view=category&id=36&Itemid=55&lang=en. 30 Alicia Campi, ‘Mongolia’s Uneasy Relationship with China’, Transitions Online, accessed October 7, 2013, http://www.tol.org/client/article/21485-mongolias-uneasy- relationship-with-china.html. 31 Kitty Hamilton, ‘Anti-Chinese Sentiment Sparks Alarm in Mongolia’, Mysinew, August 31, 2010. 32 Press Institute, ‘Mongoliin zarim togtmol hevleld 2000, 2010 ond niitlegdsen OHU, BNHAU-iin tuhai niitleliin harcuulsan sudalgaa’ (2000–2010 Survey of Mongolian Media Attitudes Toward China and Russia), (Ulaanbaatar: Press Institute, 2012), 25. 33 Personal Interview, Beijing, China, 2013. 34 Personal Interview, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, 2012. 35 Daniel Allen, ‘China Breathes New Life into Mongolia’, Asian Times, September 1, 2007; David Stanway, ‘China Agrees $500 Million Loan to Mongolia,’ Reuters, June 16, 2011. 36 The China Post, ‘Mongolia Asks China for US$3 Billion Crisis Loan’, The China Post, accessed October 7, 2013, http://www.chinapost.com.tw/business/asia/other/2009/ 01/16/192331/Mongolia-asks.htm. 37 L. Nyamtseren, Challenges of New Era: Mongolian Development Opportunities (Ulaanbaatar: Admon, 2007). 38 Ian Jeffries, Mongolia: A Guide to Economic and Political Developments (London: Taylor & Francis, 2007). 39 Altantsetseg Shiilegmaa, Mongolia Economic Update (Ulaanbaatar: The World Bank, 2013), 7. Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 40 ‘Mongolia: Country Outlook’, EIU ViewsWire, May 12, 2014. 41 Social and Economic Situation of Mongolia (As of January 2014) (Ulaanbaatar: National Statistical Office of Mongolia, 2014), 4. 42 Social and Economic Situation of Mongolia (As of the Preliminary Result of 2013) (Ulaanbaatar: National Statistical Office of Mongolia, 2013), 1. 43 Toh Han Shih, ‘Mongolia’s New Law Expected to Attract Chinese Billions’, South China Morning Post, November 20, 2013. 44 Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of Inner Mongolia, ‘Nei menggu zai zhong-meng hezuo zhong jiji fahui giaoliang zuoyong’ (Inner Mongolia Is an Active Bridge Sino-Mongolia relations 203 between Mongolia and China), Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of Inner Mongolia, accessed on October 7, 2013, http://www.nmgfao.gov.cn/web/default.asp. 45 Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of China, ‘Nei menggu zizhiqu jiaoyu’ (Education in Inner Mongolia), Education in Inner Mongolia, accessed October 7, 2013, http://www.nmgov.edu.cn/. 46 Confucius Institute, ‘Confucius Institute at National University of Mongolia’, Hanban, accessed July 15, 2015, http://english.hanban.org/confuciousinstitutes/node_10787. htm. 47 Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Mongolia, ‘Zhong-Meng shuangbian guanxi’ (Sino-Mongolian Partnership), Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Mongolia, accessed October 7, 2013, http://mn.china-embassy.org/chn/zmgx/t174828. htm. 48 Xinhua News Agency, ‘Mongolian Students to Study in Inner Mongolia’, Xinhua News Agency, June 6, 2005. 49 Enze Han, Contestation and Adaptation: The Politics of National Identity in China (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 99. 50 World Bank, Mongolia Economic Retrospective: 2008–2010 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2010), 1. 51 Ibid. 52 National Statistics Office of Mongolia,Mongolian Statistical Bulletin 2009 (Ulaan- baatar: National Statistics Office of Mongolia, 2010), 13. 53 World Bank, Mongolia Economic Retrospective, 5. 54 Steven Barnett and Julia Bersch, ‘Mongolia Stages Dramatic Turnaround’, Interna- tional Monetary Fund, accessed October 7, 2013, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/ survey/so/2010/car091410a.htm. 55 Barnett and Bersch, ‘Mongolia Stages Dramatic Turnaround’. 56 ‘Mongolia: Country Outlook’, EIU ViewsWire, May 12, 2014. 57 ‘Xi Stresses Efforts to Revolutionize Energy Sector’, Xinhua, June 13, 2014. 58 James Wingard and Peter Zahler, Silent Steppe: The Illegal Wildlife Trade Crisis. (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2006), 1. 59 Vera Songwe, From Goats to Coats: Institutional Reform in Mongolia’s Cashmere Sector (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2003), 41. 60 Arshad Sayed, ‘Dzud: A Slow Natural Disaster Kills Livestock and Livelihoods in Mongo- lia’, World Bank, accessed October 7, 2013, http://blogs.worldbank.org/eastasiapacific/ dzud-a-slow-natural-disaster-kills-livestock-and-livelihoods-in-mongolia. 61 Karl Zimmerer, Globalization and New Geographies of Conservation (Chicago: Uni- versity of Chicago Press, 2006), 298. 62 Personal Interview, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, 2012. 63 T. Erdenechuluun, Wood Supply in Mongolia: The Legal and Illegal Economies (Wash- Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 ington, DC: World Bank, 2006), 7. 64 Erdenechuluun, Wood Supply in Mongolia, 15. 65 Personal Interview, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, 2009. 66 World Wildlife Fund, WWF-Mongolia Position on Proposed Durgon Hydropower Plant (Ulaanbaatar: World Wildlife Fund, 2003), 3; China Shanghai Corporation for Foreign Economic and Technological Cooperation (SFECO), ‘Duragun Hydroelectric Power Station in Mongolia,’ SFECO, accessed October 7, 2013, http://www.sfeco.net. cn/English/SegMent-Industry-ProjectDetail.aspx?ID=15; Ts. Tsevenkherlen, ‘Ogii Nuur Olsoj Ehellee’ (Ogii Lake Gets Hungry), Onooder, January 25, 2007. 204 Sino-Mongolia relations 67 Wildlife Fund, WWF-Mongolia Position on Proposed Durgon Hydropower Plant, 2. 68 Giovanna Dore et al., A Review of the Environmental and Social Impacts of the Mining Sector (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2006), 16. 69 Ibid., 22. 70 ‘Total of 17 Thousand Chinese Workers in Mongolia’, InfoMongolia, May 12, 2012, http://www.infomongolia.com/ct/ci/4064. 71 Hi. Batbayar, Employment and Poverty in Mongolia (Ulaanbaatar: United Nations Development Programme, 2007), 64. 72 National Statistics Office of Mongolia, Mongolian Statistical Bulletin (Ulaanbaatar: National Statistics Office of Mongolia, 2010), 10. 73 ‘Mongolia: Data’, World Bank, June 16, 2014, http://data.worldbank.org/country/ mongolia. 74 Batbayar, Employment and Poverty in Mongolia, 65. 75 National Statistics Office of Mongolia, Mongolian Statistical Bulletin 2009, 10; Bilal Habib, et al., ‘The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Poverty and Income Distribution in Mongolia,’ World Bank, accessed October 7, 2013, http://www-wds.worldbank.org/ external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2011/11/02/000333037_2011110201 0143/Rendered/PDF/651610WP0P1223019000Decision0final.pdf. 76 B.Khash-Erdene, ‘Poison Air Pollutes the City’, The UB Post, October 8, 2014. 77 Sant Maral, Politbarameter, May 2013 (Ulaanbaatar: Sant Maral, 2013), 13. 78 Sant Maral, Politbarameter 2009–2011 (Ulaanbaatar: Sant Maral, 2009–2011). 79 Mendee Jargalsaikhan, ‘Anti-Chinese Attitudes in Post-Communist Mongolia: The Lingering Negative Schemas of the Past’ (master’s thesis, University of British Colum- bia, 2011). 80 Press Institute, ‘2000–2010 Survey of Mongolian Media’, 19. 81 Ibid., 12. 82 Ibid., 11. 83 Ibid., 20. 84 Morris Rossabi, ‘Mongolia: Transmogrification of a Communist arty’,P Pacific Affairs 82, No. 2 (2010), 245; Press Institute, ‘2000–2010 Survey of Mongolian Media’, 20. 85 Asia Foundation, USAID, and Sant Maral, Mongolia: Trends in Corruption Attitudes (Ulaanbaatar: USAID, 2009), 5. 86 Sant Maral, Politbarameter, May 2011 (Ulaanbaatar: Sant Maral, 2013), 5. Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 11 Weak states, China’s security, and policy prescriptions

Examination of the eight case studies raises questions about the utility of China’s overall foreign policy approach to its weak peripheral states. As shown, China relies extensively on economic exchange with Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghani- stan, Pakistan, Nepal, Myanmar, Lao PDR, and Mongolia to serve as a basis of overall state-to-state relations. While beneficial for the states in that economic cooperation with China does, at times, contribute to their overall growth, the unintended consequences of such exchange, whether negative structural power or structural violence, severely challenge China’s approach as it contributes to greater state weakness.

Implications for China’s weak peripheral states As this volume has shown, China’s use of economic exchange to ensure its relations with its weak peripheral states can lead to Chinese structural power and structural violence. In Kyrgyzstan, for example, China has developed structural power over the country’s weak economy through its growing position in the country’s trade portfolio, its proprietary role as the country’s largest provider of FDI, and the presence of its SOEs in the country’s mining and construction sectors. Weak political institutions and political illegitimacy within the country has allowed for the expansion of China’s structural power through elite relations that advance Chinese interests over those of the Kyrgyz people. Poor state/society relations and its weak economy contribute to Chinese power over Kyrgyzstan’s structure of security, particularly in relation to the country’s approach to terrorism, as well as its structures of finance, production, and knowledge. Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 Chinese structural power results in structural violence in Kyrgyzstan’s economy in terms of underdevelopment and underemployment, both common and reoccurring presentations of structural violence in all this volume’s eight case study states. Chinese structural power also causes structural violence within the country’s environmental sector through Chinese firms’ unregulated activity in mining and mineral exploration and the country’s societal sector in terms of localised violence and social unrest related to its commercial activities. Lastly, Chinese negative structural power results in structural violence within Kyrgyz state/society 206 Weak states, China’s security, and policy relations as Kyrgyz society views Bishkek as politically dependent on Beijing to the detriment of the country’s governance. China has developed power over Tajikistan’s various structures through its growing dominance of trade, investment, and finance in the country. Dushanbe is now dependent on Chinese investment, aid, and loans for its annual GDP growth. Chinese firms and Chinese labour have become dominant in construction and mining within the country to a degree that marginalises Tajik domestic firms. China’s structural power extends to the two states’ elite ties, as more and more of Dushanbe’s top leadership orient their policies and relations toward Beijing as opposed to Moscow. China’s influence extends to the country’s structure of security, as Beijing has successfully used its economic leverage to align Tajik- istan’s security priorities with its own. Most significantly, China’s power over the country’s economic structure and the Rahmon government’s weakness resulted in China’s acquisition of Tajik territory to Tajikistan’s overall disadvantage. China affects violence in Tajikistan’s economic structure through its provision of commercial loans, its contribution to Tajikistan’s growing debt, and its resulting culpability in Dushanbe’s growing vulnerability to default. Chinese exports to Tajikistan undermine development of the country’s manufacturing sector and, as such, contribute to structural violence in the form of unemployment and underemployment. Chinese firms engage in environmentally demanding activity in the country, undermining food and water security for the Tajik people. Chinese security demands inflame state/society tensions as Dushanbe marginalises the state’s minorities through targeted policing aimed at appeasing Beijing. Chinese structural power over Afghanistan is expanding at a rapid rate, particularly in the wake of the ISAF’s withdrawal. Chinese SOEs control the country’s most coveted mineral tenders, for example, and Chinese investment drives infrastructure development throughout the state. Trade, FDI, and loans result in significant Chinese power over the direction of Afghanistan’s domestic economic development as they push Kabul to prioritise growth in the mining industry and put downward pressure on the manufacturing industry. China’s concentration on Afghanistan’s natural resources also raises the potential that the two states will develop an economic relationship based on exploitation and unequal exchange. China’s effect over structural violence in Afghanistan is limited to the degree that it was a secondary actor in the country for much of the early 2000s. China’s influence over social outcomes in Afghanistan such as unemployment, environmental pollution and/or degradation, and forced relocation has grown (and Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 is growing), however, in proportion to its expanding commercial activity in the country. China’s ability to shape Afghanistan’s economic development priorities toward mining and away from manufacturing, for instance, has a negative effect on employment in the country and is, consequentially, an obstacle to pro-poor growth in the state. China’s ongoing talks with the Taliban are also a particular source of structural violence, as they challenge Kabul’s political legitimacy and raise the potential for localised violence in the country. Through its role as Pakistan’s primary economic partner, China has developed power over Pakistan’s structures of economy, security, production, and knowledge. Weak states, China’s security, and policy 207 Pakistan is now so dependent on trade and investment from China for its growth that it has shaped its domestic development strategies around China’s economic priorities. To ensure continued economic relations with China, Islamabad has enacted military action against groups in the state which pose minimal threats to Pakistan but which China views as threats against its interests in the XUAR. For fear of alienating China, Pakistan has remained silent on China’s anti-Islamic legislation in the XUAR; a silence that undermines the state’s political legitimacy and increases the potential for greater violence within Pakistan aimed at the state. China’s influence over economic development in Pakistan contributes to structural violence in the shape of uneven development and unemployment. China’s desire to bypass Balochistan when developing the Sino-Pakistan economic corridor, for example, means that the province – one of Pakistan’s poorest – has become marginalised from the investment and development at the centre of Paki- stan’s overall development approach. Chinese firms’ reliance on Chinese labourers in Pakistan contributes to unemployment in the state and prevents the transfer of technological skills to Pakistani workers. China’s investment in coal-fired power projects as part of the Sino-Pakistan economic corridor will also contribute to widespread pollution in air, water, and soil throughout the country.1 In Nepal, China has developed structural power within the state’s weak economic system through its investment, aid, and loans in the country’s energy and construction sectors and through its emerging role as an alternative economic partner to India. The presence of China’s SOEs in Nepal’s underdeveloped domestic economy also results in Chinese structural power both through their ability to bring new technologies to the construction of major infrastructure projects and their ability to access Chinese financing through China’s Exim and Development Banks. China has developed structural power with Nepal’s political and economic elite through training and through exchange organised by the Chinese Embassy in Kathmandu. China’s power has shaped Nepal’s structure of security, as it has successfully aligned the Nepalese government’s security interests with its own on Tibetan issues. China contributes to structural violence over Nepal’s environment, its society, and within its state/society relations. Chinese investment in Nepal, particularly in its hydropower industry, contributes to environmental degradation and results in social instability caused by forced relocation and loss of livelihoods. China’s myopic focus on Tibetans in Nepal contributes to intra-social tensions, and Kath- mandu’s acceptance of China’s security interests as its own undermines public Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 trust in the state’s autonomy. China’s involvement in the state’s political and judicial affairs also contributes to structural violence in the form of state illegitimacy and weak domestic institutions. China’s power over Myanmar’s domestic structures comes from its investment in the state’s infrastructure, mining, and power sectors, its ties to the country’s military and political elite, and its demand for illicit materials, such as timber and narcotics. Such influence provides China with an unparalleled ability to shape the country’s development priorities and influence its security objectives, even when doing so runs against Myanmar’s best interests. Chinese financing in the form of 208 Weak states, China’s security, and policy aid and loans was also instrumental in supporting the SPDC and Burmese military during the military junta’s reign and remains an important source of income for the state. This financing provides China with significant influence over the country’s political developments and is, as such, an additional source of structural power. China contributes to structural violence in Myanmar in the form of economic underdevelopment, environmental degradation, and social instability. Inexpen- sive Chinese goods and the presence of Chinese firms, for example, prevent the development of a domestic manufacturing sector and contribute to un/underemployment in the country. China’s activity in and around the country’s mining and energy sectors causes pollution and harms the country’s native plants and animals, often resulting in forced relocation and food and water insecurity for the Burmese people. China adds to structural violence in the form of strained state/society relations, as many Burmese view its involvement in the state’s political affairs as detrimental to Naypyidaw’s sovereignty. China’s structural power is clearest over Lao PDR’s agricultural, mining, and hydropower sector development. China’s preference for rubber imports from the state, for example, has fundamentally altered production and employment in the agricultural sector away from the state’s traditional structures. China’s investment in Lao PDR’s mining sector has driven the state to prioritise growth within the industry even when doing so does not result in pro-poor economic growth within the state. Chinese investment and commercial interests have been the driving force behind the state’s dam building, to the detriment of the country’s water security and domestic environment. Chinese-Lao PDR elite relations also provide China with influence over political development in the state, with corresponding effect on Lao PDR’s foreign relations. China’s contribution to structural violence in the country closely mirrors its structural power. China’s involvement in rubber production, for example, has driven many farmers out of work and off their land. Chinese firms’ mining exploration and extraction relies on state-backed land reclamation and forced relocation. China’s commercial dam building similarly affects riparian communities through flooding, pollution, and fish and animal die-offs. Beijing’s support for the Lao PDR government also contributes to structural violence in the form of poor state/society relations as it removes pressure from Vientiane to compromise with the Lao people on political or economic issues. The Sino-Mongolian case study also shows how China’s economic dominance Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 results in structural power over the state’s myriad weak institutions. China’s trade relations with Mongolia, for example, have developed into Chinese power over the country’s structure of production while Chinese FDI, aid, and loans have resulted in Chinese influence over the state’s economic development. China’s commercial interests in the state have facilitated ties between China and Mongolia’s political elite that result in Chinese power over the state’s politics and finance. China’s power drives the state’s structure of security, albeit in a way entirely different from the volume’s other case studies in that Ulaanbaatar is seeking – unsuccessfully to date – to limit China’s influence. Weak states, China’s security, and policy 209 Chinese influence over structural violence in Mongolia is pronounced. It is clearest in the effect China’s structural power has over Mongolia’s economy in the form of economic vulnerability and unemployment, across its structures of production in the shape of industrial underdevelopment, and even within its public health sector in regard to health outcomes. Chinese commercial activity results in structural violence within Mongolia’s environmental sector while its ties with the state’s political and economic elite result in structural violence between Mongo- lia’s state and society.

Implications for China’s security In addition to impairing its peripheral weak states’ already enfeebled institutions, Chinese structural power and Chinese-influenced structural violence also influence China’s own internal and external security. Examination of the eight case studies demonstrates areas where Chinese-influenced structural violence has undermined China’s position within the state to the overall detriment of its strategic position and/or security. Consideration of structural violence’s potential development within each case study provides further insight into potential areas of insecurity for China vis-à-vis the weak states examined.

Kyrgyzstan Instability in Kyrgyzstan resulting from Chinese structural power and structural violence has significant security implications for China. Kyrgyz society, for example, has begun to use violence in an attempt to regulate Chinese economic and commercial activity in the country. Kyrgyz workers have protested against and fought with Chinese nationals in the country over issues related to perceived exploitation.2 Relatedly, crime against Chinese nationals in Kyrgyzstan has increased and local ‘skinhead’ groups have formed with the expressed purpose of expelling Chinese workers and traders from the country.3 These outcomes limit China’s ability to engage in Kyrgyzstan’s economy and for Chinese workers to live in the country. They also show a diminished desire for cooperation with China among the population that has long-term implications for the two states’ relations. Kyrgyz activists and intellectuals have also started to equate China’s presence in the country with the state’s political corruption and inefficiency. Kyrgyz media, for example, regularly runs articles by prominent academics accusing Bishkek of Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 advancing Chinese interests over those of the state.4 Opposition politicians have started speaking out against China as a foreign partner, playing on public fears of China and public perception that China is contributing to internal weakness and instability in the state.5 The perception that China and Bishkek’s relations have a corrupting effect on governance in Kyrgyzstan has also inspired activists to target visiting Chinese delegations as proxies of state corruption and inefficiency.6 This decrease in elite support suggests a desire among some to engage in more assertive policy toward China aimed at limiting its influence. Should the state adopt such policies as means of assuaging social criticism against its shortcomings, China 210 Weak states, China’s security, and policy ability to influence yrgyzstan’sK domestic security environment and to ensure Bishkek’s cooperation on security matters would be lessened. Kyrgyz media has also begun highlighting the negative outcomes (structural violence) that accompany Chinese commercial activity in the country, particularly in the mining sector.7 Charges of ‘imperialism’ or ‘expansionism’ are now common within popular media; a trend suggesting Kyrgyz society has started to securitise Chinese commercial activity in the state. Such perceptions undermine China’s desired image as a country interested in ‘win-win’ economic relations. They also complicate China’s firms’ ability to engage in commercial activity, such as in Kyrgyzstan’s mineral sector, that serve Beijing’s strategic ends.

Tajikistan China’s structural power contributes to a loss of support among Tajik opposition politicians and public intellectuals who view Chinese activity in the country as corrosive to the state’s autonomy and the state’s territorial integrity. Many Tajik opposition officials and academics, for instance, spoke out against China’s corrupting effects on the state’s governance following Dushanbe’s decision to cede Tajik territory to China in exchange for unspecified financial incentives.8 Tajik media and civil society leaders similarly raise concern about the effect China’s dominance over the state’s economy has on the state’s ability to act against Chinese interest when such interests interfere with the state’s domestic stability and/or economic growth.9 These concerns extend to the social level in Tajikistan as groups have come to view China’s presence in the country as undesirable and disruptive. Many Tajik workers, for example, view Chinese workers in the country as a by-product of Chinese expansionism with the effect of marginalising Tajik labour.10 Some Tajiks are similarly concerned about Beijing’s influence over the Rahmon administration, both in relation to China’s support for what some view as an illegitimate regime and China’s ability to shape Dushanbe’s priorities and politics.11 These developments have direct implications for China’s domestic security. First, greater instability in Tajikistan complicates China’s security approach to the XUAR. Any decrease in Dushanbe’s ability to control domestic security, for example, could lead to greater cross-border migration that could fuel criminal, insurgent, and terrorist activity in the XUAR. Second, loss of support among the Tajik elite reduces China’s ability to work with the state to fight against terrorism, separatism, and radical Islam. Third, increased animosity toward China’s pres- Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 ence in the state among the Tajik people will make it far harder for Chinese firms and Chinese labourers to work in the state. This difficultly will, in turn, reduce China’s ability to use economic exchange as its primary diplomatic tool toward Tajikistan.

Afghanistan Instability in Afghanistan has the potential to fundamentally challenge China’s domestic security. The country is home to numerous radical Islamic groups that Weak states, China’s security, and policy 211 provide direct material support to the ETIM in China, serve as sources of radicalisation for China’s Uyghur population, and provide external bases for operations in the XUAR. Drug cultivation in Afghanistan poses a severe risk for China through drug smuggling, localised crime, and drug addiction among Chinese residents in China. Lack of government control over areas within Afghanistan raises the potential that Chinese commercial ventures in the country will become unsustainable due to insecurity and increases the possibility that groups antipathetic to Chinese interests will establish a presence on China’s borders. Chinese structural power in Afghanistan has developed, and is developing, in ways that feed these threats and increase China’s vulnerability. China’s involvement in the country’s natural resource sector, for example, influences Afghani- stan’s economic development strategy toward mining and away from pro-poor industries like manufacturing and services. This model of growth is more likely to contribute to instability as it creates fewer employment opportunities and raises the potential that unemployed men will look to illicit activities, whether drug cultivation or insurgency, for economic opportunity.12 The Afghan people are also more likely to view China’s presence in the country as exploitative and, in more extreme cases, as a type of imperialism that must be struggled against. These perceptions could feed into discontent aimed at Chinese firms in the country and could provide an ideological base for terrorist activity aimed at China itself. China’s commercial activity in the country’s mining sector also contributes to state corruption, which is a major source of political discontent toward Kabul and a potential driver of social instability. China’s role, in this respect, both undermines its image as a responsible actor and contributes to tension within state/ society relations that could lead to instability within the country. China’s ongoing interaction with the Taliban also has the potential to contribute to instability for the state, as the group remains an existential threat to Afghanistan’s leadership.13 Instability in Afghanistan increases the potential for transborder insurgency in the XUAR and raises the vulnerability of China’s commercial assets in the state.

Pakistan Chinese structural power also contributes to instability and vulnerability in Paki- stan with direct inference for China’s own security. Pakistani opposition leaders, for example, have begun to point to elite ties between Islamabad and Beijing Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 as evidence of government corruption and inefficiency.14 Popular antigovernment politicians now raise the potential that the state’s leadership is beholden to China as a means of criticising their policies and questioning their loyalty.15 These perceptions of interference in the state’s political process are detrimental to China, as they undermine its image as the state’s ‘all-weather’ partner. They are also harmful as they link Beijing together with Pakistan’s current leadership, which many Pakistanis view as illegitimate and overly secular. China’s tendency to work directly with the state further strengthens this critique and increases China’s vulnerability to political and public censure. 212 Weak states, China’s security, and policy Similarly, Pakistani academics and intellectuals have become more critical of China’s economic activities in the state by raising questions about China’s overall intentions.16 Pakistani observers have become concerned over the state’s dependency on Chinese investment, aid, and loans for economic growth and China’s tendency to take advantage of Pakistan’s need to secure unfair contracts and prices for goods.17 Some Pakistani intellectuals have gone further and suggested that China is engaged in exploitative economic exchange through its targeted investment in the country’s natural resource sector and its supply of cheap exports to the state.18 This presentation of China’s intentions and its commercial activities in the state feeds social-level concern about China’s activities, particularly in the country’s poorer areas such as Balochistan Province. Opposition to Chinese commercial activity in Balochistan turned violent in the past; the most salient examples being the 2004 and 2006 targeted assassination of Chinese engineers working to develop the Gwadar Port.19 Chinese power over Pakistan’s structure of security, together with its domestic policies over religious expression in the XUAR, has also exposed Beijing to charges of anti-Islam bias among certain Pakistani religious leaders.20 These accusations result in greater animosity toward China in Pakistan and raise the potential for Pakistan-based support for Uyghur insurgents in the XUAR. In 2014, for example, Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan Jamaat-ul-Ahrar threatened to launch attacks in the XUAR in response to China’s support to the Pakistan military in car- rying out attacks in North Waziristan and the FATA and for China’s anti-Islamic policies in Xinjiang.21 Perception of China’s anti-Islamic policies also weakens public support for the Pakistani state as local religious leaders accuse Islamabad of compliance through inaction.22

Nepal Nepalese trade associations, entrepreneurs, merchants, and workers have begun to push back against Chinese involvement in the country’s domestic economy and trade, arguing that Chinese investment and export goods are undermining the country’s development and that economic ties between the two states are inherently unequal.23 The growing sense among the Nepalese business community that China is not a beneficial economic partner undermines China’s principal tool for engagement with Nepal and complicates its ability to leverage its economic position to advance its security interests in the country. Nepalese public opinion Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 polls and media are also growing critical of China’s role in Nepal’s internal political and security affairs.24 Accounts of Chinese involvement in domestic politics, for example, are increasing, with a number of commentators now questioning whether China really follows a policy of ‘non-intervention’.25 Nepalese media – still extremely measured in its treatment of China – now carries reports of Chinese attempts to bribe members of parliament and to influence the country’s judicial process. Media and public opinion about China’s role in Nepal’s internal security (particularly toward the country’s ethnic Tibetans) has also become less sup- portive than in the past. Some commentators have started to question whether Weak states, China’s security, and policy 213 strict adherence to China’s security interests in Nepal is entirely beneficial for the state’s political legitimacy, sovereignty, or international reputation.26 As a result, China cannot assume Kathmandu will continue to advance Beijing’s interests over its own for the indefinite future, particularly if structural violence surrounding China’s influence in Nepal’s domestic affairs continues to expand. Public concern over China’s environmentally damaging commercial activities has also increased pressure on Kathmandu to regulate Chinese commercial activity in the state, particularly over Chinese SOEs’ activities in the hydropower sector and in dam building. The implications for China are a loss of both economic opportunity and strategic influence through its SOEs and Exim and Development Banks. Should the Nepalese government regulate China’s commercial activities in the country as a result of growing social pressure, China’s ability to continue with its status quo foreign policy toward the state – one premised on economic exchange – would be severely curtailed.

Myanmar State and public opposition to China’s commercial and political activities has grown steadily in Myanmar. Burmese have started pushing back against Chinese economic involvement in the country, particularly in areas related to trade, mining, and infrastructure development. Protests against Chinese traders and Chi- nese firms’ exploitative actions are now common, as are demonstrations against Chinese-initiated (and government-supported) land reclamation.27 Social unrest challenges China’s position within the state by complicating the domestic context in which its firms operate. The strategic implications of this development became clear for China when Naypyidaw suspended China’s work on the Myitsone Dam and called for renegotiations of China’s contract to develop the Letpadaung copper mine in response to social protest.28 The state has also taken action aimed at limiting China’s influence over the country’s domestic development in response to public concern over Myanmar’s dependency on Beijing. The Tatmadaw and Naypyidaw have both taken concrete steps to expand the number of foreign actors involved in the state’s economic and political affairs: a development most evident in the military junta’s decision to allow political and economic reform to take place in 2011. Internal opposition to China’s activities within the state has grown since the transition, with media commentary by politicians who question the benefits of Sino-Myanmar relations Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 increasingly commonplace.29 This diminishment of state support complicates China’s ability to advance its strategic agenda in Myanmar and results in a less secure periphery for Beijing. Local media and Myanmar civil society now also identify Chinese involvement in the country’s domestic affairs as a source of structural violence across a range of domestic issues. These include China’s support for domestic insurgent groups, China’s involvement in human trafficking, China’s contribution to environmental degradation and pollution, and Chinese exploitation of Myanmar’s natural resources.30 This public association between perceived Chinese interference in 214 Weak states, China’s security, and policy Myanmar’s internal affairs and structural violence runs counter to China’s political narrative of non-interference and win-win relations. It also challenges the premise on which the two countries’ foreign relations are based. If the Burmese public continues to securitise China’s activities in the country along these lines, Beijing will not be able to operate in the country without intense, critical scrutiny. Neither will the public accept China’s security priorities in the state without question as it has done for so many years.

Lao PDR China faces a number of security issues with regard to Lao PDR, many of which have their roots in economic exchange between the two states and Chinese structural power. Social opposition to China’s commercial activities in the country’s agricultural sector has grown in recent years, for example, particularly in relation to China’s use of reclaimed land for cultivation and its mechanisation of agricultural processes that contributes to unemployment or underemployment in the field.31 Lao construction workers and small-scale merchants are more mobilised against Chinese firms’ use of Chinese labour and Chinese dominance over trade in the country. Local Lao residents have rioted in response to Chinese firms’ development of mining sites in the country where such activity causes environmental pollution.32 Reports of protests and riots against Chinese-run and financed casinos on the Lao PDR-China border are more frequent, especially when involving forced eviction from land and lost economic opportunity for local residents.33 The rise of anti-Chinese sentiment among the Lao people affects China’s ability to operate in the country and increases the potential for violence against Chinese workers in Lao PDR. Opposition to China’s structural power has also increased among Lao scholars, intellectuals, and politicians. At least nine legislators in the LPRP spoke out against China’s offer of $7.2 billion in loans to the state in 2012, arguing that the loan would result in too much debt for Lao PDR and would expose the state to Chinese influence.34 Other senior officials have criticised China’s involvement in corruption in Lao PDR, particularly in relation to cooperation between Lao PDR and Chinese SOEs.35 Individuals from Lao PDR’s civil society have spoken out against unfair terms of trade with China, China’s involvement in land reclamation in the country, and Chinese work on large-scale dam-building projects.36 Vocal opposition among the country’s political and intellectual elite undermines China’s Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 image and its ability to advance its economic and security agendas in the country. Unrelated, China’s expanding trade networks with Lao PDR have the secondary effect of increasing drug and weapons trafficking between the two states.37 More extensive road links, increased volume on cross-border trade, and Chinese-dominated trade channels all contribute to larger volumes of narcotics and weapons moving from Lao PDR’s northern regions into Yunnan Province. Drug smuggling from Lao PDR to China results in localised crime and violence and high levels of addiction in Yunnan Province. Financing from drug cultivation and trafficking also supports organised criminal groups on both sides of the border Weak states, China’s security, and policy 215 which engage in other illicit activities such as human trafficking and illegal gambling, both of which contribute to instability in Lao PDR and China.38

Mongolia As with the other case studies, structural violence resulting from China’s presence in Mongolia constitutes a strategic loss for Beijing. Ulaanbaatar has responded to China’s dominance within the country’s mineral sector through legislation aimed at limiting Chinese SOEs’ involvement in the state. Mongolia’s 2012 Strategic Entities Foreign Investment Law, for example, sought to ban foreign state-owned firms from owning the country’s key mineral assets. While the Mongolian parliament ostensibly drafted this legislation to regulate all foreign firms operating in Mongolia, it is clear the state formulated the policy in response to the Alumin- ium Corporation of China’s (Chalco) bid to purchase SouthGobi Resources Ltd (SGQ), the Canadian-Mongolian firm that holds license to develop the Ovoot Tol- goi mine.39 Ulaanbaatar has similarly redrafted its National Security and Foreign Policy Concepts in an attempt to limit Chinese FDI and to provide a legal rationale for limiting the number of Chinese workers in Mongolia. While Mongolia has since revised its legislation to attract Chinese FDI (on which it is dependent), China remains the focal point of formalised resource nationalism, to its strategic disadvantage. Beijing can no longer assume good working relations with Ulaan- baatar based on economic exchange. The rationale behind China’s foreign policy approach to Mongolia has weakened, despite the extensive economic ties that remain between the two states. The outcome for China is a less secure periphery in terms of cooperation and strategic trust. Social backlash against Chinese activity in the country – whether economic, social, or cultural – is also growing, placing direct pressure on Chinese firms, individuals, and interests in Mongolia. Anti-Chinese sentiment among large portions of the population is high and, indeed, seems to grow together with Chi- na’s expanded presence. Fear over a Chinese ‘invasion’ has led some groups to securitise China’s presence in Mongolia. These groups operate outside the state’s formal institutions and engage in violence to preserve what they view as a threatened Mongolian culture, Mongolian state, and Mongolian ethnic composition.40 The merging of nationalism and anti-Chinese sentiment in Mongolia also complicates China’s peripheral environment as it results in an inherently antago- nistic population in a state adjacent to the IMAR. Past examples of Mongolian Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 ethno-nationalism spilling from Mongolia into the IMAR clearly show the negative strategic implications such a development has for China.41

Structural power, structural violence, and Chinese foreign policy Structural power and structural violence’s corrosive effects extend to China’s peripheral foreign policy, as they subvert many of the positive aspects of exchange and contribute to poorer state-to-state and state-to-society relations. As China 216 Weak states, China’s security, and policy devised its foreign policy to foster more amicable ties that contribute to regional security, that its implementation leads to fundamental contradictions in purpose and intent should be cause for concern. Both structural power and structural violence present serious challenges for China’s over-reliance on economic exchange as a driver for foreign relations with the weak states on its periphery. They negate the assumption that all economic exchange between China and its weak neighbours is net-positive. As this assumption premises all the various foreign policy concepts China employs when inter- acting with its neighbouring states, it is not an exaggeration to note that structural violence, in particular, presents an existential threat to the very rationale behind China’s peripheral foreign policy. The presence of structural power and structural violence within economic exchange between China and its weak neighbours also results in the impression among both the weak states and societies that China is engaged in exploitative economic exchange. The perception that economic exchange with China results in a ‘win-lose’ outcome where China’s interests are met at the expense of the weak state’s domestic stability and/or security perpetuates this sense to China’s overall foreign policy disadvantage. Structural power and structural violence also open China to charges of economic imperialism where the weak states see it advancing its strategic interest within the state through economic means. While this volume does not claim China is engaged in such activity, it is clear that China’s economic and commercial activities within the weak states do result in negative structural power and that structural violence weakens China’s self-cultivated image of a peaceful developing state. Structural power and structural violence further cloud China’s economic altruism, as they raise doubt over the nature of Chinese aid, loans, and grants. As financial assistance is an important and selfless component of China’s foreign policy approach to weak states, having its motives questioned as a result of negative structural power and/or structural violence is a substantial loss of prestige and influence for Beijing. Structural power and structural violence also complicate China’s preference for state-to-state ties as a basis for foreign relations. Structural power and structural violence gained through state-to-state relations undermine the weak states’ governments’ legitimacy and control in a way that is self-defeating for Chi- nese foreign policy. As Beijing’s intent through its foreign policy is to achieve security on its periphery, anything that undermines regional stability – a weakened state, for instance – is both unintended and undesirable. Structural power Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 and structural violence resulting from China’s interaction with the state also interfere with state/society relations through the perception that the state allows China to engage in damaging activities out of dependence. As this outcome, too, contributes to instability, it is clearly against China’s overriding policy aims. Chinese structural power gained through elite ties and over the country’s political process further opens Beijing to charges within the weak state’s society of interference in domestic affairs. Charges of ‘interference’ are anathema to Bei- jing, as the policy of non-interference is a keystone of its foreign policy and grand strategy. Weak states, China’s security, and policy 217 Structural power and structural violence also overshadow the supporting aspects of China’s foreign policy approaches to its peripheral states that focus on state-to-society ties such as education, cultural, and/or social exchange. Structural power and structural violence contribute to asymmetrical relationships between China and the weak states on its periphery that expand beyond economic ties and extend into the social components of exchange. This expansion complicates social exchange as it becomes inherently unequal, with China exerting varying degrees of control and influence through its place in the dependent states’ social institutions. More clearly, what starts as ‘exchange’ ends up as expanded Chi- nese structural power over structures of knowledge, of security, and over elite relations. Structural power and structural violence also sour social desire within the weak states for state-to-society relations, particularly once the weak state’s society securitises China’s presence and mobilises to counterbalance it through opposition, protest, or violence. There is little appetite for greater social exchange with China, for instance, in most of this volume’s case studies where anti-Chinese sentiment has merged with nationalism in parts of their respective populations.

China’s foreign policy: policy mitigation While this volume takes a critical approach to the analysis of China’s peripheral foreign policy, it is important to note that the policy is not entirely ineffective. Neither is China’s use of economic exchange as the key driver of its foreign relations inherently unmanageable. Beijing has made good use of economic exchange to secure solid bilateral relations with many Asian states and continues to rely on economic cooperation as its primary means of engagement within the region. China’s ongoing preference for foreign policy premised on economic exchange is clear in Xi Jinping’s signature One Belt, One Road grand strategy, which encom- passes the ‘one bank, two belts, three corridors, and one FTA’ approach outlined in this volume’s introduction. What examination of China’s bilateral relations, security environment, and foreign policy through the lens of structural power and structural violence does suggest is that Beijing’s current approach contains seeds of discontent that if left unchecked will grow in scope and destructive force. To address these issues, Beijing should adjust its foreign policy strategy toward its weak neighbours. Such adjustment should address three key considerations. First, China should rethink its foreign policy approach to account for the negative outcomes that occur from China’s engagement with weak states. China could Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 accomplish this through three key developments. First, China could re-examine its approach to public diplomacy, expanding its aims to include state-sponsored support to address the negative outcomes associated with economic exchange between China and its partner states. At present, China’s public diplomacy – much as its foreign policy – relies on the assumption that common development leads to prosperity and that China’s economic rise brings sufficient benefits to its partner states to advance China’s ‘soft power’.42 As this volume demonstrates, this understanding of economic exchange is insufficient and in need of reconstruction to address structural violence stemming from China’s commercial activity. 218 Weak states, China’s security, and policy Second, China could extend the concepts of ‘putting people first’ (yiren wei- ben) and ‘diplomacy for the people’ (waijiao weiren) to its dealings with foreign societies. The two concepts are premised around the belief that domestic policy should serve the people’s rather than the state’s interests and that Chinese leaders must consider the socio-economic implications of any new policy as part of their policy-making process.43 China’s extension of these criteria to its dealings with other states would help mitigate charges of Chinese exploitation and strengthen support for cooperation with China within the foreign society. Third, China could restructure its foreign policy to avoid contributing to weakness within already weak states. Where China sees its trade with a weak state as undermining local manufacturing, for instance, it could work through its embassy to provide aid and/ or technical support for the country’s domestic economic development. Similarly, China could make greater effort to control the outflow of Chinese migration to its neighbouring weak states with unemployment problems of their own. To date, China has done the opposite by encouraging unskilled Chinese workers to go abroad to find opportunity not available to them in China.44 While such efforts would lessen Chinese firms’ short-term financial gains, they would strengthen the weak state and improve China’s image to Beijing’s long-term benefit. Second, China should ensure that its economic exchange with its weak neighbouring states does not result in structural violence. China could accomplish this in a number of ways. First, China could monitor and regulate the commercial activities of its overseas firms to ensure they are in compliance with local regulations and are not engaged in harmful behaviour. This would admittedly be a massive undertaking and require significant resources. China could, however, start by regulating its SOEs’ activities in states where their activity undermines China’s larger foreign policy objectives, such as this volume’s case study states.45 Such monitoring could take place in conjunction with the foreign state’s civil society – an approach that would raise China’s overall image within the state. Second, China could require its firms to develop a more institutionalised culture of corporate social responsibility and insist all Chinese firms undertake a robust, internally rigorous environmental impact assessment before undertaking major development projects abroad. To enforce these measures, China could link Chi- nese firms’ funding opportunities to their behaviour abroad, thereby providing the firms with financial incentive to engage in responsible commercial activity. These approaches are all in line with China’s own professed desire to engage in overseas activity in line with a ‘more responsibility, less profit’ (yiliguan) model. Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 Third, the Chinese government could increase transparency and accountability around its aid and loans to countries. It could also depoliticise aid and include local civil society where possible in aid distribution so as to decrease the potential that Chinese-originating funding will contribute to structural violence in the form of political corruption, human rights violations, or environmental degradation.46 All three policies would require greater involvement by Beijing in Chinese commercial activities abroad – something it has been hesitant to do in the past – but would go a long way toward demonstrating China’s commitment to ensuring that all economic exchange it engages in through its foreign policy is, in fact, ‘win-win’ and not ‘win-lose’. Weak states, China’s security, and policy 219 Third, China should develop mechanisms to deal with structural violence stemming from its presence within a given foreign state once it has occurred. While there are a number of ways that Beijing could accomplish this, two initiatives, in particular, would go a long way toward mitigating the negative outcomes of Chinese structural power. First, China could establish a state-sponsored foreign development organisation with a socio-economic development agenda along the lines of USAID or the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). Such an agency could regulate and monitor Chinese aid and loans and focus a portion of Chinese financial assistance on social development rather than infrastructure development and/or prestige projects. China’s Ministry of Commerce plays this role to some extent in developing countries but is limited to the effect that its efforts are aimed at expanding China’s commercial activities.47 A development-oriented government agency outside the Ministry of Commerce specifically focused on socio-economic development would increase China’s overall image in developing states where it contributes to structural violence. Second, China could allow or even encourage the development of a domestic civil society with a foreign mandate. The UK-based Oxfam Interna- tional or US-based Mercy Corps are examples of non-government organisations involved in socio-economic development that enjoy close relations to their host states without relying on their funding or permission for operations. While such a development would be a far step for Beijing, particularly as the state maintains close control over China’s domestic civil society, it would provide China with a mechanism for addressing structural violence in its partner states that it currently lacks.48 For China, the adoption of any of the abovementioned proposals would require a fundamental realignment of one of its central foreign policy maxims: that of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states. Non-interference as a guiding doctrine of Chinese foreign policy has its roots in China’s acceptance of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in the 1950s and remains a cornerstone of Chinese foreign policy today.49 The concept has served China well in terms of its adherence to peaceful development and resonates in line with regional norms (such as the ASEAN Way). Yet the concept of non-interference is also at the heart of Chinese structural power and structural violence in the weak states this volume has examined as case studies. The norm drives China’s state-to-state approach to foreign policy and facilitates its custom of allowing unregulated Chinese activity with the weak state. While non-interference is an important, admirable compo- Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 nent of Chinese foreign policy – particularly in relation to the United States’ more assertive foreign policy in weak states such as Iraq and Afghanistan – it has also become a convenient excuse for behaviour bordering on neglect and, in some instances, exploitation. China should, therefore, address the inherent contradiction within its policy of non-interference so as to deal with the negative aspects of its structural power and structural violence within its weak state partners. While this volume does not argue for a more assertive rebranding of non-intervention such as conditional intervention, it does suggest that China should be more willing to engage with weak states both at the state and society level to ensure that its interaction with the state is overall beneficial. 220 Weak states, China’s security, and policy

Notes 1 ‘Chinese Group Plans to Invest in $2.1bn Pakistan Coal-Fired Power Project’, Dawn, April 9, 2015. 2 ‘Mass Brawl Reported between Chinese Nationals, Locals in Kyrgyz South’, Kyrgyz Television 1, January 9, 2013, CEP20130109950009; ‘Border Guards Break Up Fight between Chinese Workers and Local People in Kyrgyzstan’, Interfax, August 1, 2013. 3 ‘Creation of Kyrgyz Skinhead Gangs Mooted to Fight Foreign Migrants’, Kyrgyztoday, August 16, 2013, translated by the OSC, CEL2013082357328208. ‘Chinese Embassy Concerned over Attacks on Nationals in Kyrgyzstan’, AKIpress, November 29, 2013, translated by OSC, CEL2013112955306363. 4 ‘Atambayev Who Does Not Care About the Kyrgyz Should Go’, Jany Ordo, Novem- ber 23, 2012, translated by the OCS, CEP20130111950090. 5 ‘Kyrgyz Public Figure Calls for End to “Chinese Civilian Expansion” ’, 24.kg, Febru- ary 21, 2013, translated by the OCS, CEP20130221950119. 6 ‘Chinese Delegation’s Motorcade Narrowly Escapes Accident in Kyrgyzstan’, KirTAG, September 12, 2013, translated by the OCS, CEL2013091240579436. 7 ‘Protest in Kyrgyz North Demands Closure of Chinese Oil Refinery’, Belyy Parus Online, February 17, 2014, CEL2014021738412596. 8 ‘Opposition Leader Says China Seizes Part of Tajik Land in Eastern Region’, Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, April 15, 2013, translated by the OSC, IML2013041643159769; ‘Tajikistan: China’s Advance Causing Increasing Unease among Tajiks’, Eurasianet, February 14, 2011, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/62894. 9 ‘Ex-Tajik Official Calls for Central Asian Integration to Stop Chinese Expansion’, Asia-Plus, December 19, 2013, translated by the OSC, CEL2014010315427233; ‘Tajik Journalist Raises Concern over Impact of Chinese Expansion’, Ozodagon Online, December 18, 2013, translated by the OSC, CEL2013121846195963. 10 Bahodur Zairov, ‘Tajik Researcher Concerned over China’s Labor Expansion’, Asia-Plus, May 23, 2008. 11 International Crisis Group, China’s Central Asia Problem (Brussels: International Cri- sis Group, 2013), 15. 12 David Isby, Afghanistan: Graveyard of Empires: A New History of the Borderland (New York: Open Road Media, 2011), 156. 13 Andrew Small, ‘Why Is China Talking to the Taliban?’, Foreign Policy, June 21, 2013, http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/06/21/why-is-china-talking-to-the-taliban/. 14 Malik Muhammad Ashraf, ‘Imran’s Unforgivable Indiscretion’, Pakistan Today, December 6, 2014. 15 ‘Imran Questions Shahbaz’s Visit to China’, The News National, November 9, 2014. 16 Salman Tarik Kuresh, ‘Diplomatic Ties’, The Friday Times Online, September 19, 2014. Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 17 Munir Ahmad Baloch, ‘Chinese President’s Visit’, Dunya Online, September 12, 2014, translated by the OSC, SAL2014091226524837. 18 ‘China’s Increased Investment Upsets Some Pakistanis’, NPR, August 21, 2012, http://www.npr.org/2012/08/21/159531740/chinas-increased-investment-upsets- some-pakistanis. 19 Kanti Bajpai, ‘Pakistan’s Relations with the United States and China since 2001’, in Pakistan in Regional and Global Politics, ed. Rajshree Jetly (London: Taylor & Fran- cis, 2012), 85. 20 Khawar Chaudhry, ‘Oppression Against Muslims in China’, Daily Islam Online, July 14, 2014, translated by the OSC, SAL2014071428478692. Weak states, China’s security, and policy 221 21 Tahir Ali, ‘Taliban Group Threatens to Attack Chinese Interests’, The Nation, Novem- ber 17, 2014. 22 Faraz Talat, ‘Islamophobia in China and Pakistan’s Vow of Silence’, Dawn, March 31, 2015. 23 ‘Protesting Traders Stop Imports through Khasa’, The Kathmandu Post, January 13, 2014. 24 ‘A Wide Open Field’, Nepali Times, March 21, 2013. 25 ‘Thickening Visit, Changing China’, Kantipur, December 28, 2013. 26 Bishnu Raj Upreti, Human Security in Nepal: Concepts, Issues and Challenges (Kath- mandu: Nepal Institute for Policy Studies, 2013), 176. 27 ‘Locals Living near Myanmar-China Pipeline Await Compensation’, Eleven Media Group, October 23, 2013; Lin Thant, ‘China Urged to Revisit Its Burma-Related Investment Contracts’, The Irrawaddy, May 19, 2013. 28 ‘Burma, China Amend Latpadaung Mine Contract’, MRTV-3 Programme, July 25, 2013. 29 ‘Fear of China Keeps Copper Mine Open: Aung Min’, The Irrawaddy, November 26, 2012; Win Ko Ko Latt, ‘Myanmar Protested to China over Illegal Timber, Minerals Exports: Minister’, Mizzima, February 27, 2014. 30 ‘China Said Opposed Agreement on Ceasefire Monitoring, Aid at Kachin Talks’, Shan Herald Agency for News, February 7, 2013; Patrick Boehler, ‘China Arrests Five for Trafficking 200 Burmese’, The Irrawaddy, March 1, 2013; ‘Government Admits KIO Peace Talks Put Off Due to China’s Objection’, Eleven Media Group, April 22, 2013; ‘Myanmar-China Gas Pipeline Cheats Myanmar Society: Activists’, Eleven Media Group, December 15, 2013. 31 ‘Land Dispute Villagers Released’, Radio Free Asia, June 28, 2012, http://www.rfa. org/english/news/laos/land-concessions-06282012173323.html. 32 ‘Vientiane Authorities Say That Luang Area Belongs to Investors’, Radio Free Asia, August 1, 2013, http://www.rfa.org/english/news/laos/concessions-08012013161959. html. 33 ‘Lao Rice Farmers Defy Police Orders to Give Up Land to Chinese Firm’, Radio Free Asia, January 22, 2014, http://www.rfa.org/english/news/laos/landgrab-0122201 4215351.html. 34 Viengsay Luangkhot, ‘Ambitious Rail Plan Opposed’, Radio Free Asia, October 26, 2012, http://www.rfa.org/english/news/laos/train-10262012140516.html. 35 Max Avary, ‘Lao Officials Slam Corruption’, Radio Free Asia, February 11, 2009, http://www.rfa.org/english/news/laos/laocorruption-02112009175322.html. 36 Gretchen Kunze, ‘Nascent Civil Society in Lao PDR in the Shadow of China’s Eco- nomic Presence’, in Global Civil Society: Shifting Powers in a Shifting World, eds. Heidi Moksnes and Mia Melin (Uppsala: Uppsala University, 2012), 157. Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 37 ‘Silk Road Smuggling’, Economist, November 28, 2014. 38 Mark Harris, Transnational Organized Crime in East Asia and the Pacific: A Threat Assessment (Bangkok: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2013), 53. 39 Oxford Business Group, The Report: Mongolia 2013 (Oxford: Oxford Business Group, 2014), 115. 40 ‘Mongolian Neo-Nazis: Anti-Chinese Sentiment Fuels Rise of Ultra-Nationalism’, Baabar.mn, March 8, 2010, http://www.baabar.mn/content/2260.shtml. 41 Uradyn E. Bulag, Collaborative Nationalism: The Politics of Friendship on China’s Mongolian Frontier (London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010), 101. 42 Yang Jiechi, ‘China’s Public Diplomacy’, Qiushi Vol. 3, No. 3 (2011). 222 Weak states, China’s security, and policy 43 ‘Message from the Minister’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, accessed June 25, 2014, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/. 44 OECD, International Migration Outlook 2012 (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2012), 183. 45 Min Ye, ‘China Invests Overseas’, in Democratization in China, Korea and Southeast Asia: Local and National Perspectives, eds. Kate Xiao Zhou et al. (London: Routledge, 2014), 190. 46 Juichi Inada, ‘Evaluating China’s “Quaternity” Aid: The Case of Angola’, in A Study of China’s Foreign Aid: An Asian Perspective, eds. Yasutami Shimomura and Hideo Ohashi (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 104. 47 Dennis D. Trinidad, ‘The Foreign Aid Philosophy of a Rising Asian Power’, in A Study of China’s Foreign Aid: An Asian Perspective, eds. Yasutami Shimomura and Hideo Ohashi (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 36–37. 48 Jessica C. Teets, Civil Society under Authoritarianism: The China Model (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 2. 49 Gerald Chan, ‘Chinese Foreign Policy: Sixty Years On’, in China at 60: Global-local Interactions, eds. Lai-Ha Chan, Gerald Chan, and Fung Kwan (Singapore: World Sci- entific, 2011), 21. Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 12 Weak states, structural power, and structural violence

In employing structural power as an analytical approach to China’s bilateral relations with its peripheral states, this volume has constructed a critical view of China’s foreign policy that highlights the corrupting influence unequal economic exchange can have on states that lack political legitimacy, robust institutions, and sound state/society relations. Use of structural violence as a lens to view the negative effects of China’s activity within its neighbouring weak states furthers the critique through examination of structural powers’ social-level outcomes with an eye toward critical security studies. Structural violence also provides insight into how China’s foreign policy, predicated on economic exchange, contains internal contradictions that undermine its own security. With state weakness as an analytical framework, the volume’s approach illuminates a little-understood aspect of China’s foreign and security relations.

Weak states as a framework for understanding China’s periphery security and foreign policy This volume’s use of state weakness as an organising concept provides insight into China’s foreign relations and security studies in a number of ways. The concept draws on shared features within the states on China’s borders – weak institutions, deficiencies in state legitimacy, and poor state/society relations – to argue that state weakness is a key component of China’s peripheral security environment. By providing this archetype for analysis, the volume is subsequently able to identify insecurity ‘types’ that China either faces or could face in relation to the state. Poor state/society relations, for example, are a common feature in all the weak states on Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 China’s periphery and present similar security challenges for Beijing, including internal instability within the weak state resulting from disharmonised interests. The use of weak states as an organising concept also allows for the identification of domestic determinants within the structural system that contribute to the spread of both structural power and structural violence. State weakness is instrumental within each of the eight case studies in the spread of Chinese structural power and the manifestation of structural power into structural violence. This vulnerability is specific to weak states, as states with more robust institutions, legitimate governments, and good state/society relations such as the Philippines, 224 Structural power and structural violence Singapore, Taiwan, and Vietnam are more able, at first glance, to absorb unequal economic exchange with China without suffering widespread negative outcomes. Through identification of the domestic sources of structural outcomes, the volume provides a more robust explanation of China’s foreign policy relations than has been developed to date. State weakness also allows for identification of areas of vulnerability within the states on China’s borders where external pressures, such as those resulting from Chinese structural power, can undermine domestic institutions. This framework allows for greater focus as it drives analysis in relation to China’s influence over the state. If one proceeds, for example, with the understanding that political illegitimacy is a component of state weakness, one can then consider whether Chinese structural power is a contributing factor. Similarly, viewing state weakness in line with Chinese structural power is the starting point for determination of whether structural violence exists within the state and, if so, to what degree China contributes. The employment of state weakness as a variable in China’s security calcu- lus also helps identify the deficiencies in China’s foreign policy in relation to its neighbouring states. Examination of the eight case studies, for example, suggests that China’s lack of regulation over its SOEs and Chinese private firms leads to structural violence in the weak states, while its reliance on state-to-state ties undermines state/society relations within the weak state. Relatedly, weak states as a paradigm underscore ways in which China might improve its foreign policy, as outlined in this volume’s previous chapter. Addressing state weakness in its peripheral states through mechanisms aimed at supporting socio-economic development could, for instance, help China mitigate the structural violence it causes through its asymmetrical relations. The value of approaching China’s peripheral relations in line with a weak state paradigm is, therefore, clear. The concept provides both a framework for analysis and a categorical method for understanding vulnerability within states, pressure points related to structural power and structural violence, and areas where existing foreign policy exacerbates weakness or where new policy might ameliorate weakness. The value of employing state weakness in analysis of China’s periphery relations becomes even clearer, however, when examined in line with structural power.

Structural power: the negative outcomes of

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 unequal exchange Structural power provides an appropriate theoretical approach for better understanding the nature of economic exchange between China and weak states which, by definition, have limited capacity to manage the negative outcomes stemming from cooperation with a core, dominant economic power. The approach’s applicability is particularly pronounced in the volume’s eight case studies, as China’s relations with each state are inherently asymmetric. More specifically, structural power provides insight into China’s peripheral security relations with its weak states in the following ways. Structural power and structural violence 225 First, structural power provides a model to understand how China gains influence, whether purposefully or indirectly, through its dominant position in a dependent states’ economy at both the system and state levels. Structural power accounts for how influence spreads through economic linkages such as trade and investment into areas such as finance, knowledge, and security. The approach allows for the rationalisation of asymmetry which, oddly enough, is conspicu- ously absent in much foreign policy analysis of China’s bilateral relations with Asian states despite its being an inherent condition of the majority of these very relations. Second, structural power allows for analysis of China’s relations with its weak neighbours stripped of intention or motivation. The approach is not interested in passing normative judgement of China’s activities but rather focuses on the structural causes of its exchange with the understanding that structure, in the instance of asymmetrical economic relations, is more important than agency. While China may have intentions to establish control over certain aspects of a certain state’s domestic institutions, such motivation does not play a central role in structural power as a theoretical approach. Far more important is determining the degree to which China’s role as the core has resulted in control, either direct or indirect, over the dependent state and whether such control has negative outcomes for the state. Structural power’s ability to forgo normative judgement is a powerful device in that it does away with the value judgement that so often enters Western scholarship on China. Third, structural power provides a means of thinking about how asymmetrical economic exchange results in weakness and/or dependency for the secondary state within the core-periphery paradigm. In this respect, it is the ideal theoretical companion to the weak state framework as it provides an intellectual guide for understanding how dependence translates into insecurity. Within this volume’s eight case studies, trade with China, for example, while beneficial in ways that analysts tend to highlight, also contributes to underdevelopment, unemployment, and exploitation. These negative outcomes become clearer within the structural power approach, which is inherently sceptical of the effects that inequality within state-to-state relations have on weaker, dependent states’ institutions of control. Structural power as a theoretical approach, therefore, provides a critical means of viewing China’s relations with weak states that is often overlooked in analysis of China’s relations for the positive benefits coming from cooperation. As such, its utility in better understanding China’s bilateral relations is certain. Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016

Structural violence within the weak state Structural violence provides a third arrow for inquiry, particularly in relation to how state weakness and structural power result in direct instability or lost opportunity for the state or society. If structural power, on the one hand, is a theory of how core states establish influence and control over dependent states, structural violence is in many ways a continuation of the theory into how such power harms. There are overlaps between the two, particularly in that both are structural 226 Structural power and structural violence theories and, as such, less concerned with actors than with outcomes. Yet the two concepts’ focuses are different enough – one on a structural-level control, the other on violence caused by and within a structure – that they complement one another when used together. In evaluating China’s foreign policy relations with the weak states on its periphery, structural violence is useful in the following ways. First, the theory allows for a logical continuation of structural power to account for violence within a state and society, whether in the form of traditional violence or lost opportunity (as in the case of unemployment, for example). While negative outcomes for the weak or dependent state are inherent in structural power – the idea being that one state’s power over another’s structures results in an exploitative relationship detrimental to the dependent state – it does not account for insecurity as such within a society or between a state and society. Structural violence as an approach does provide the critical account of security. Second, structural violence allows for consideration of the human element that is entirely absent from the structural power approach. While still a structural approach in that it relies on asymmetrical interaction as a catalyst for interaction between states, structural violence’s origins are in peace and conflict research, and its interests extend to the effect structures have on individuals, groups, societies, and states (as a formal social construction). Structural violence’s focus on the socio-economic aspects related to structural power’s negative outcomes fills a gap otherwise ignored within structural power. As such, it is an essential conceptual part of analysis of China’s asymmetric relations with weak states, as it allows for exploration of economic exchange’s ‘dark side’ in ways structural power alone cannot. Third, structural violence, much as structural power, provides insight into state weakness in ways that highlight both vulnerability and opportunity for development. Structural power in this volume’s case studies, for example, occurs both because of and within weak institutions, illegitimate governments, and poor state/ society relations. Structural violence exacerbates these weak structures where left unchecked but also provides clues for how a state – either the dependent state (if left to its own devices) or the core state – might go about offsetting such weakness. China’s contribution to structural violence in the form of poor state/society relations in all eight case study states, for example, not only shows how weakness manifests within the state’s structures but also provides a conceptual and potential policy way forward for dealing with the negative outcomes. As such, structural Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 violence has a practical as well as theoretical value – it highlights violence within the system and demonstrates its trigger points.

China and its peripheral states: implications for structural power and structural violence Just as this volume gains from the systemic employment of structural power and structural violence in looking at China’s peripheral security in line with its bilateral relations with its neighbouring weak states, the volume’s approach contributes to Structural power and structural violence 227 greater nuance and explanatory power within the concepts themselves. First and already cursorily touched upon, the use of both structural power and structural violence together allows for a conceptual fusion through which it is possible to explain the negative outcomes of China’s asymmetric relations from the system level to the social level. While both concepts are in and of themselves powerful explanatory tools, together they present a far more holistic picture of the harm at all levels that can come from unregulated asymmetrical exchange, particularly within a weak state. Second, the inclusion of weak states as an analytical paradigm into the structural power/structural violence approach provides greater clarity as to how a core state’s external power can result in insecurity within a peripheral state. While both Strange and Galtung identified parameters where structural power and structural violence occur, imposing the weak state model into both concepts further develops their theoretical underpinnings in that it provides additional metrics for determining vulnerability and examining influence. In many ways a natural inclusion, as both structural power and structural violence assume comparative weakness in core/periphery state relations, the weak state paradigm this volume employs formalises one strand of state weakness through its consideration of weak institutions, illegitimate governments, and poor state/society relations. Last, this volume’s use of the structural power/structural violence concepts to consider China’s insecurity extends their applicability to studies of insecurity from the peripheral state – where both concepts traditionally ended analysis – to the core state itself. The application of both concepts to the core state is significant for a number of reasons. First, the use of structural power/structural violence for explication of the core underlines the importance of structural determinants within state relations as opposed to agents. While it is, of course, quite possible for a state to engage purposely in self-harmful foreign policy, it is far more likely that the negative outcomes are related to structural conditions. This consideration further vindicates the volume’s use of structural power and structural violence as conceptual approaches for understanding China’s foreign policy relations and security affairs. Second, it furthers the argument that core states gain structural power and structural violence unconsciously, as such power is, in some instances, self-defeating. The advantage in such a realisation is the ability to engage in value-free analysis of outcomes as opposed to analysis of motivations and/or policy preferences. Rather than attempt to discover why China engages in the activities it does, for example, it is enough to observe the activities’ outcomes. Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016

Implications for the study of Chinese foreign policy and security studies The exercise in theory building involving weak states, structural power, and structural violence has several important implications for the study of China’s foreign policy and its security environment. The approach challenges current scholarship on China that focuses on the state’s foreign policy as an offshoot of domestic institutions such as bureaucracy and individual leaders. While such domestic 228 Structural power and structural violence determinants clearly play a role in the formulation of China’s foreign policy and, as such, will continue to be an important source of information in determining Chinese priorities and intentions, this volume’s approach allows for consideration of foreign policy’s outcomes within a structure and, as such, outside the constraints of domestic-oriented foreign policy analysis. The volume’s approach also transcends two bodies of current scholarship on Chinese foreign relations and security in that it does not attempt to assign China with intentionality. Much of the current body of literature on Chinese studies vacillates between writing accusing China of an expansionist, revisionist foreign policy and scholarship intent on arguing the validity of China’s own professed peaceful rise. It is this volume’s opinion that such parsing of Chinese behaviour accomplishes little other than exposing the author’s predilection of China as an international actor. Conversely, the volume’s structural approach examines the outcomes of China’s foreign relations and, therefore, avoids the need to assign value judgements to its actions. The volume’s critical view of Chinese foreign policy relations highlights the negative aspects of economic exchange China has with its neighbouring states; an overlooked topic in the Asia-Pacific. While recent years have seen a deluge of writing on China’s economic presence in Africa that focuses on Chinese involvement and influence in African states, far less has been written on China’s relations with developing and weak states in Asia, somewhat surprisingly. Scholars in general tend to assume that China’s economic ties with states in Asia are largely beneficial, perhaps because China has enjoyed a prolonged period of good relations with most Asian weak states. Yet such views are mistaken, as this volume has shown. What have long been considered China’s greatest strengths – its rapid growth and its extensive regional ties – are not without their weaknesses. Iden- tification of these weaknesses is the starting point for understanding the expanse of China’s reach, the sources of its insecurity, and its effect on weak Asian states’ stability. Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 Index

Note: Page numbers in italics followed by f indicate figures and by t indicate tables

Abdullah, Abdullah, Afghanistan 7, 91h (NGO) 104; International Security As- Adorno, Theodor 26 sistance Forces (ISAF) 7, 92 – 6, 99, 103; Afghanistan 91 – 109, 219; Abdullah, Ab- Joint Statement on the Establishment dullah 7, 91; Afghan National Security of a Sino-Afghan Strategic Partnership Forces (ANSF) 92; Agreement between (2006) 93; Kabul Bank fraud scandal China and Afghanistan on Trade and (2010) 91; Karzai administration 7, 91, Economics (2006) 93; agricultural sector 95; Khyber Pass 94; knowledge 99 – 100; 91; Aynak copper mine 94, 95, 98, 103; loans from Chinese 97 – 8; Mazar-e- background 1, 7, 11 – 12, 91 – 3; Bilateral Sharif 94; Metallurgical Corporation Security Agreement 95; China National of China (MCC) 94, 95, 98, 101 – 2, Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) 94, 103, 104; mining sector 92, 95, 98 – 9, 95, 101; Chinese banks 95; Chinese 100, 103, 104; narcotic-based societies firms 95; Chinese policy statements, 11 – 12, 91; National Unity Government scholarship, and economic exchange (NUG) 91; NATO 92; non-governmental 43 – 4; Conference on Interaction and organisations (NGOs) 104; oil and gas Confidence Building in Asia (CICA) fields 94, 95, 101; Operation Enduring 96; Confucius Centres 99; cronyism and Freedom (2001) 92, 93, 97, 99; pollution corruption 91, 104; democratic institu- 101 – 2; poverty 101; production 98 – 9; tions 91; Dubai and 91; East Turkestan Quetta Shura (Taliban leadership) 92, Islamic Movement (ETIM) 11, 97; 102; security 96 – 7; security implica- economic linkages 91, 93 – 4; economy tions for China 210 – 11; society and and structural violence 100 – 1; educa- structural violence 102 – 3; Sopko, John tion exchange 99 – 100; environment and F. 97; state institutions 7; state-owned structural violence 101 – 2; ethnic groups enterprises/private enterprises 94 – 5; and tribes 7, 91; Extractive Industries state/society relations and structural Transparency Initiative (EITI) standards violence 7, 103 – 4; statistics/demograph-

Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 104; Federally Administered Tribal Ar- ics 92, 93, 97, 104; structural power at eas (FATA) 102; finance 97 – 8; Financial the state level 96 – 100; structural power Action Task Force (FATF) 91; foreign at the systems level 93 – 6; structural direct investment (FDI) 95; gas pipelines violence 100 – 4; Sun Yuxi (special 94; Ghani, Ashraf, president 7, 91, 94, envoy) 96; Tajikistan and 79; Taliban 92, 95, 96; Go Out Strategy 93; gross do- 93, 96, 97, 100, 102; ties between cores mestic product (GDP) 92, 98; Haqqani 95 – 6; trade relations 93; Transparency network 92; human development 100, International 103 – 4; Turkmenistan- 101; implications of China’s foreign pol- Afghanistan-Tajikistan-China project icy for 206; infrastructure development (TATC) 94; unemployment 100, 101; 94, 95; Integrity Watch Afghanistan United States and 91, 92, 96, 97, 100, 230 Index 103; universities 99; Wakhan Corridor 22 – 3, 27, 35; operationalising theories 94, 95, 102; as weak peripheral state 27, 28; Peaceful Development (heping of China 1, 7, 11 – 12; Xi Jinping and fazhan) 22; positive outcomes 22, 232; 96, 100; Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous revolutions 24; social consciousness Region (XUAR) 94, 96, 97, 102 24; state-to-state relations 27; statistics/ AIIB see Asian Infrastructure Investment demographics of bilateral trade between Bank China and select Asian nations 30, 30t; Akaev, Askar, president, Kyrgyzstan 6, statistics/demographics of Chinese 59, 60 foreign direct investment (FDI) 29 – 30, Alagappa, Muthiah 5 29t, 35; statistics/demographics of in- Alcock, Norman 33 traregional trade in Asia 28 – 30; Strange, ASEAN see Association of Southeast Susan 27, 35; structural power 23, 24, Asian Nations 27 – 32; structural power and China’s Asian Development Bank, as lender to bilateral relations with weak states 32; states 31 structural power and structural vio- Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank lence as an analytic approach 24, 34 – 6; (AIIB) 15, 32 structural power and structural violence Association of Southeast Asian Nations model 34 – 5, 35f; structural power at (ASEAN):China 15; Lao People’s the state level 30 – 2; structural power Democratic Republic (PDR) 169 at the systems level 28 – 30; structural asymmetrical economic exchange 22 – 38, violence 23, 24, 33 – 6; Terriff, Terry 26; 51 – 2; Adorno, Theodor 26; Alcock, universities 32; Wallerstein, Immanuel Norman 33; background 22 – 4; Barnett, 26; working class (proletariat) 24, 25; Michael 27; capitalist class (bourgeoi- see also China; China’s economic- sie) 24; Cardoso, Fernando Henrique centric foreign policy approach to weak 23, 26; China’s Investment Corporation peripheral states (CIC) 29, 30; China’s role in financing Australia, China and 2, 29 31 – 2; communication networks 32; Confucius Institutes 32; core states 25, Bakiyev, Kurmanbek, president, Kyr- 28, 29, 32; Cox, Robert 26, 28; depend- gyzstan 6, 59, 60 encia theorists 25, 28; Duvall, Raymond Bangladesh, China and 15 27; exploitation, oppression, and class banks, in China 32 struggle 24 – 5; Faletto, Enzo 23, 26; Barnett, Michael 27 Farmer, Paul 33; Franfurt School 26; Barston, R. P. 4 Frank, Gunder 25, 26; Galtung, Johan Batbold, Sükhbaataryn, prime minister, 26 – 7, 33; Gao Xiqing 30; Gramsci, Ato- Mongolia 191 nio 26; gross domestic product (GDP) Bat-Erdene, B., Mongolia 192 22; Guzzini, Stefano 27; Habermas, Battulga, Kh., Mongolia 192 Jürgen 26; Halliday, Fred 26; harmo- Bayartsogt, S., Mongolia 192 nised/disharmonised interests 33 – 4; Benedict, Burton 4 historical materialism 24; Hoivik, Tord Berdimuhamedow, Gurbanguly (Turkmen- 33; Horkheimer, Max 26; intentionality istan), Tajikistan 74 of the dominant state 27, 28; Köhler, Big Four media outlets, China 32 Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 Gernot 33; Krasner, Stephen 31; Lenin, Bold, Luvsanvandan, Mongolia 192 Vladimir Ilyich 25, 26, 28; living stand- Buddhism, in Nepal 141 ards 22, 23; Marcuse, Herbert 26; Marx- Buddhist Burmese, Myanmar 150 ist approaches to international relations Buzan, Barry 4 (IR), international political economy (IPE), and security studies 24, 25 – 7; Cambodia: China and 29; Lao People’s Marxist-based concepts 23 – 24; Marxist Democratic Republic (PDR) and 173 Peace Research Tradition 26; Marx’s capitalist class (bourgeoisie) 24 critique of capitalism 24 – 5, 33; natural Cardoso, Fernando Henrique 23, 26 resources 25; negative outcomes of Centre for Development and Environment structural power and structural violence (NGO) 181 Index 231 China: Association of Southeast Asian hezuo) 1, 14; state/society relations 3; Nations (ASEAN) 15; Australia and 2, structural power 2, 3, 226 – 7; struc- 29; Bangladesh and 15; banks in 32; tural violence 2, 3, 226 – 7; summary of Big Four media outlets 32; Cambodia major theoretical and empirical findings and 29; century of humiliation 23; 223 – 8; theoretical outline of policy Deng Xiaoping 14; as an economic 15; Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) core state 23, 28; egalitarian economic 11; value judgement 225, 227, 228; development 13 – 14; foreign direct Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region investment (FDI) 2; India and 15; (XUAR) 11; Yunnan Province (southern Indonesia and 2; Mao Zedong, Report and southwestern) 11; see also China; on the Investigation of the Peasant China’s reliance on economic exchange Movement in Hunan (1927) 13 – 14; with its peripheral states; weak states Mongolia and 29; Myanmar and 29; defined; specific countries natural resource demands 2; New China’s Investment Corporation (CIC) Security Concept (1996) 14; North 29, 30 Korea and 29; peasant-administered China’s reliance on economic exchange co-operatives 13 – 14; peripheral with its peripheral states 39 – 58; back- security and 13 – 15; Position Paper on ground 39; Chinese-language scholarly Enhanced Cooperation in the Field of articles 39; economic exchange and Non-Traditional Security Issues (2002) asymmetry 51 – 2; good neighbour rela- 14; rapid industrialisation and urbani- tions (mulin youhao hezuo) 39; leader- sation 29; regional sources of energy ship statements 39; Ministry of Com- and commodities 29; security implica- merce writings 39; Ministry of Foreign tions for China 209 – 215; Thailand and Affairs (MFA) documents 39; official 2; Third World coalition and 14; three policy pronouncements 39; One Belt, evil forces (san ge gu shili) 11, 78, 79; One Road 39; One China Policy 51; Xi Jinping, president 1, 15, 76; see state-controlled media commentary 39; also asymmetrical economic exchange; statements and scholarship in specific China’s economic-centric foreign countries 40 – 51; strategic partnerships policy approach to weak peripheral (zhanlue huoban) 39; Xi Jinping’s states; weak states on China’s periph- statements 39; see also China; China’s ery; specific countries economic-centric foreign policy China Export-Import (Exim) Bank 32 approach to weak peripheral states; China’s economic-centric foreign policy specific countries approach to weak peripheral states China Today magazine, Myanmar 157 1 – 21; Asian Infrastructure Investment Chinese foreign policy 215 – 19, 227 – 8; di- Bank (AIIB) 15; benefits to weak states plomacy for the people (waijiao weiren) 2; Friendly, Secure, and Prosperous 218; environmental impact assessment Neighbourhood (mulin, anlin, fulin) 1, 218; establishing a state-sponsored 3, 15, 22; Good Neighbor Policy (mulin foreign development organisation 219; zhengce) 1, 14; Go Out Strategy (zou exploitation 218, 219; firms in compli- chuqu zhanlue) 1, 14; implications for ance with local regulations 218; Five China’s security environment and for- Principles of Peaceful Coexistence Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 eign policy 3, 11 – 13, 209 – 17, 227 – 8; (1950s) 219; nongovernment organisa- implications for these peripheral states tions (NGOs) 219; non-interference in 205 – 9; Inner Mongolian Autonomous the domestic affairs of other states 219; Region (IMAR) 11; Maritime Silk Road policy mitigation 217 – 19; public diplo- 15; negative effects of policy 2 – 3, 15; macy 217; putting people first (yiren New Security Concept (xin anquan wei ben) 218; structural power and guan) 1; October Symposium for structural violence 215 – 17; transpar- Working Periphery Diplomacy (2013) ency and accountability in aid and loans 1; One Belt, One Road (2014) 1, 3, 15; 218; see also China; China’s economic- Periphery Policy (zhoubian zhengce) centric foreign policy approach to weak 1, 14; Silk Road Economic Belt 15; peripheral states; specific states South-South Cooperation (nan-nan Chinese-language scholarly articles 39 232 Index Chinese policy statements, scholarship, Kyrgyzstan 59, 60 – 1; Lao People’s and economic exchange: Afghanistan Democratic Republic (PDR) 169 – 71; 43 – 4; Kyrgyzstan 40 – 1; Lao People’s Mongolia 189 – 90; Myanmar 150 – 2; Democratic Republic (PDR) 48 – 9; Nepal 134 – 6; Pakistan 112 – 14; Tajik- Mongolia 50 – 1; Myanmar 47 – 8; istan 75 – 6 Nepal 46 – 7; Pakistan 44 – 6; Tajikistan economy and structural violence: Af- 41 – 3 ghanistan 100 – 1; Kyrgyzstan 67 – 8; Lao CIC see China’s Investment Corporation People’s Democratic Republic (PDR) CICA see Conference on Interaction and 177 – 8; Mongolia 196 – 7; Myanmar Confidence Building in Asia 158; Nepal 142 – 3; Pakistan 120 – 1; CIS see Commonwealth of Independent Tajikistan 82 – 3 States egalitarian economic development, China class struggle 24 – 5 13 – 14 Commonwealth of Independent States EITI see Extractive Industries Transpar- (CIS) 6, 61 ency Initiative Conference on Interaction and Confidence empirical and theoretical findings, Building in Asia (CICA) 96 China’s economic-centric foreign Confucius Centres: Afghanistan 99; Mon- policy approach to weak peripheral golia 195 states 223 – 8 Confucius Classroom, Myanmar 157 Enkhbayar, Nambaryn, former president, Confucius Institutes 32; Kyrgyzstan 66; Mongolia 10 Lao People’s Democratic Republic environmental degradation 3 (PDR) 176; Nepal 141; Tajikistan 81 environmental impact assessment 218 core states 25, 28, 29, 32; China as an Environmental Investigation Agency, economic core state 23, 28 Myanmar 159 Cox, Robert 26, 28 environment and structural violence: Af- cultural hegemony theory (Gramsci) 25 ghanistan 101 – 2; Kyrgyzstan 68; Lao People’s Democratic Republic (PDR) Dakyar Mongol, Mongolia 193 178 – 9; Mongolia 197 – 8; Myanmar Dalai Lama 12, 141 158 – 60; Nepal 143 – 4; Danghara clique (Rahmon), Tajikistan 85 Pakistan 121 – 2; Tajikistan Deng Xiaoping, China 14 83 – 4, 85 dependencia theorists 25, 28 ETIM see East Turkestan Islamic Move- Desch, Michael 4 ment diplomacy for the people (waijiao weiren) ETLO see East Turkestan Liberation 218 Organisation drug trafficking 3, 5; Afghanistan’s narcot- Europe, Mongolia and 193 ic-based societies 11 – 12; Kyrgyzstan European Union, Nepal and 134 6; Lao People’s Democratic Republic Exim Bank see China Export-Import (PDR) 13, 167, 173; Myanmar 9, 155, (Exim) Bank 158, 160 exploitation 218, 219 Duangdy, Somdy, minister of planning and exploitation, oppression, and class strug- investment, Lao People’s Democratic gle 24 – 5 Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 Republic (PDR) 172 Extractive Industries Transparency Initia- Dubai, Afghanistan and 91 tive (EITI) standards, Duvall, Raymond 27 Afghanistan 104 extremism, one of ‘three evil forces’ (san East Turkestan Islamic Movement ge gu shili) 78 (ETIM):Afghanistan and 11, 97; Paki- stan and 12 Faletto, Enzo 23, 26 East Turkestan Liberation Organisation Farmer, Paul 33 (ETLO) 11; Kyrgyzstan and 11; Paki- FATA see Federally Administered Tribal stan and 112, 123 Area economic exchange and asymmetry 51 – 2 FDI see foreign direct investment economic linkages: Afghanistan 91, 93 – 4; Federally Administered Tribal Area Index 233 (FATA):Afghanistan 102; Pakistan 110, 10; Myanmar 158, 160 111, 112, 116, 123 – 4 Hussain, Mamnoon, president, Pakistan finance: Afghanistan 97 – 8; Kyrgyzstan 113 64 – 5; Lao People’s Democratic Re- public (PDR) 173 – 4; Mongolia 193 – 4; IMAR see Inner Mongolian Autonomous Myanmar 155 – 6; Nepal 139 – 40; Paki- Region stan 117 – 18; Tajikistan 79 – 80 IMU see Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence India: China and 15; Myanmar and 150, (1950s), Chinese foreign policy 219 155; Nepal and 134, 136, 140, 142; foreign direct investment (FDI), China 2 Pakistan and 112, 117 Foreign Policy Concept (2011), Mongolia Indonesia, China and 2 192 Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region Franfurt School 26 (IMAR) 11; Mongolia 13, 195, 197, Frank, Gunder 25, 26 199 Freedom House (NGO) 181 Integrity Watch Afghanistan (NGO), Friendly, Secure, and Prosperous Neigh- Afghanistan 104 bourhood (mulin, anlin, fulin) 1, 3, 15, intentionality of the dominant state 27, 28 22 international political economy 25 international relations (IR) 25 Galtung, Johan 26 – 7, 33, 227 International Security Assistance Forces Ghani, Ashraf, president, Afghanistan 7, (ISAF):Afghanistan 7, 92 – 6, 99, 103; 91, 94, 95, 96 Tajikistan 78 global financial crises (2008 – 09) 28, 123 Iraq 219 Global Witness (NGO) 104 IRP see Islamic Renaissance Path Good Neighbor Policy (mulin zhengce) ISAF see International Security Assistance 1, 22 Forces good neighbour relations (mulin youhao Islam: in Kyrgyzstan 11; in Pakistan 8, hezuo) 39 110, 111 – 12, 116, 125; in Tajikistan 11, Go Out Strategy (zou chuqu zhanlue) 1, 78, 86 14, 22, 93 Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) 6 Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Prov- Islamic Renaissance Path (IRP), Tajikistan ince, Tajikistan 86 7 Gramsci, Antonio, cultural hegemony theory, 26 Japan 30; Mongolia and 193 Guzzini, Stefano 27 Japan International Cooperation Agency Gwadar Port, Pakistan 113, 117 (JICA) 219 Gyirong Port, Nepal 135 Jiang Zemin (former Chinese president) 115 Habermas, Jürgen 26 Hafiz Gul Bahadar, Pakistan 123 Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), Halliday, Fred 26 Myanmar 12 Handel, Michael 4 Karzai administration, Afghanistan 7, Haqqani Network: Afghanistan 92; Paki- 91, 95 Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 stan 123 Keohane, Robert 4 harmonised/disharmonised interests 33 – 4 Khan, Imran, Pakistan 110, 124 historical materialism 24 KIO see Kachin Independence Organiza- Hmong guerillas, Lao People’s Demo- tion cratic Republic (PDR) 168 knowledge: Afghanistan 99 – 100; Kyr- Hoivik, Tord 33 gyzstan 66 – 7; Lao People’s Democratic Horkheimer, Max 26 Republic (PDR) 175 – 6; Mongolia Hu Jintao (former Chinese president) 115 195 – 6; Myanmar 157; Nepal 141 – 2; Human Rights Watch report (2013), My- Pakistan 119 – 20; Tajikistan 81 anmar 9, 150 Köhler, Gernot 33 human trafficking 5; Lao People’s Demo- Krasner, Stephen 31 cratic Republic (PDR) 173; Mongolia Kyrgyzstan 59 – 73; Akaev, Askar, 234 Index president 6, 59, 60; Atambayev, Almaz- textile and apparel sectors 61, 65; ties bek, president 6, 59, 63; background between cores 62 – 3; trading networks 6, 11, 50 – 60; Bakiyev, Kurmanbek, 62; traditional tribes and tribe loyalty president 6, 59, 60; Bishkek Humani- 6; Tulip Revolution (2005) 6, 60; un- ties University 66; Chinese firms 62; employment 62, 67 – 8; universities 66; Chinese food imports 69; Chinese as weak peripheral state of China 1, 6, language schools 66; Chinese policy 11, 31; Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous statements, scholarship, and economic Region (XUAR) and 63, 66, 69 exchange 40 – 1; Chinese workers 65 – 6, 67, 69; commercial services sector 16; Lao Citizens Movement for Democracy Commonwealth of Independent States (LCMD) 181 (CIS) Tripartite Customs Union (TCU) Lao People’s Democratic Republic (PDR) 61; concessional loans 64 – 5; Confucius 167 – 87; adult illiteracy 168; agriculture Institutes 66; corruption and political 170, 175, 177, 179, 180; Association of instability 70; cronyism and corrup- Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 169; tion 59; democracy and 59; domestic background 1, 9 – 10, 12 – 13, 167 – 9; labour market 62, 65; Dordoi bazaar in Cambodia and 173; Chinese armed na- Bishkek 62; East Turkestan Liberation val patrols 173; Chinese companies 171, Organisation (ETLO) 11; economic 178, 180, 181; Chinese Culture Center colonisation 64; economic linkages 59, 176; Chinese policy statements, scholar- 60 – 1; economy and structural violence ship, and economic exchange 48 – 9; 67 – 8; environment and structural Chinese workers 168, 172, 176, 177, violence 68; ethnic Uyghur population 178, 180; Confucius Institute 176; cor- 66 – 7, 69; exports from China 61; fear ruption 167; cultural colonisation 176; of Chinese expansion 69, 70; finance dam building 179, 180; deforestation 64 – 5; foreign direct investment (FDI) 178, 180; demonstrations and social 61; free economic zones 61; Gallup- opposition 180, 181; drug trafficking sponsored opinion poll (2012) 70; 13, 167, 173; Duangdy, Somdy, minister gold exports 59, 60; gold mines 61, of planning and investment 172; eco- 62; gross domestic product (GDP) 59; nomic linkages 169 – 71; economy and implications of China’s foreign policy structural violence 177 – 8; education for 205 – 6; knowledge 66 – 7; legitimacy system 168; environmental degradation of state 6, 59; mining sector 68, 70; 167, 178; environment and structural national identity 67; natural gas pipeline violence 178 – 9; finance 173 – 4; food 63; newspapers and Chinese workers insecurity 179, 180; forced relocation 64; non-gold related manufacturing 67; 179; foreign direct investment (FDI) oil and hydroelectric sectors 66, 70; oil 170, 174, 175; foreign policy 169; gross pipeline 61; poverty 59, 67; production domestic product (GDP) 167, 169, 65 – 6; quality of life 68; radical Islamic 170, 176; Hmong guerillas 168; human groups 11; rail lines 63, 65, 70; Re- capital 168, 170, 177, 180; human traf- gional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS) ficking 173; hydropower 171, 174, 179, 64; Satybaldiyev, Jantoro, former prime 181; implications of China’s foreign minister 63; second revolution (2010) policy for 208; infrastructure 175, 176; Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 60; security 63 – 4; security implica- institutional weakness 9; international tions for China 209 – 10; Shanghai commodities’ prices 167, 177; Internet Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and 168; knowledge 175 – 6; land reclama- 63, 64; society and structural violence tion 167, 168, 179; Lao Citizens Move- 68 – 9; state-owned enterprises/private ment for Democracy (LCMD) 181; Lao enterprises 62; state/society relations People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP) and structural violence 69 – 70; statis- 10, 167, 172, 181; loans and aid 168, tics/demographics 59, 60, 61, 64, 67; 169, 170 – 1, 173, 174, 175; manufactur- structural power at the state level 63 – 7; ing sector 175, 177, 178, 180; Maritime structural power at the systems level Silk Road 172; mining exploration and 60 – 3; structural violence 60, 67 – 70; extraction 180, 181; natural resources television 66; terrorist activity 63 – 4; 175, 177, 178, 180; nongovernmental Index 235 organisations (NGOs) 181; One Belt, Marxist theories of international political One Road strategy 172; organized economics 3, 23 – 7, 34 crime 167, 173; Pholsena, Khemmani, Marx, Karl 3, 23 – 7, 34 minister of industry and commerce 172; Marx’s critique of capitalism 24 – 5, 33 pollution 178, 179, 181; poverty 9, 177; Mathisen, Teygve 4 production 175; public health issues Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan 94 179; railway industry 171, 175; rubber media: Pakistan 125; state-controlled plantations 178, 180, 181; Sayasone, media commentary 39 Choummaly, president 172; security Melamchi Water Supply Project fiasco, 173; security implications for China Nepal 137 214 – 15; social media 168; society Mercy Corps 219 and structural violence 179 – 80; South Migdal, Joel 4, 5 China Sea 173; state-owned enterprises/ Ministry of Commerce writings 39 private enterprises 171 – 2; state/society Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) relations and structural violence 180 – 2; documents 39 statistics/demographics 169, 170, 174, Mongolia 188 – 204; agricultural sec- 178; structural power at the state level tor 194, 195, 198, 199; anti-Chinese 173 – 6; structural power at the sys- sentiments and groups 193, 200; Asian tems level 169 – 72; structural violence Barometer poll 200; background 1, 10, 176 – 82; Thailand and 168, 169; ties 13, 29, 188 – 9; banking system 196; between cores 172; trade relations 168, Batbold, Sükhbaataryn, prime minister 169, 173, 174, 175, 176; universities 191; Bat-Erdene, B. 192; Battulga, 32, 176; Vietnam and 168, 169; Wang Kh. 192; Bayartsogt, S. 192; Bold, Guanzhong 172; as weak peripheral Luvsanvandan 192; cashmere manufac- state of China 1, 9 – 10, 12 – 13; World turing sector 192, 197; Chinese firms Trade Organisation (WTO) member 190, 191, 194, 198; Chinese policy 168, 177; younger generation politi- statements, scholarship, and economic cians 168, 172, 176 exchange 50 – 1; Chinese traditional Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP) medicine and 197; Chinese work- 10, 167, 172, 181 ers 191, 194, 195, 198; commodities Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), Pakistan 111, 112 market 188, 196, 197, 198; Confucius LCMD see Lao Citizens Movement for Centre 195; construction sector 195, Democracy 199; corruption and cronyism 188, 199, leadership statements 39 200; cultural exchange 196; Dakyar legitimacy of state, weak states defined 5 Mongol 193; dam building 198; defor- Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich 25, 26, 28 ested lands 199; Democratic Party of Li Dajun 51 Mongolia (DP) 188; as democratic state Li Keqiuang 115 188, 191; desertification 13, 197; eco- living standards 22, 23 nomic linkages 189 – 90; economy and local regulation compliance 218 structural violence 196 – 7; Enkhbayar, LPRP see Lao People’s Revolutionary Nambaryn, former president 10; envi- Party ronment and structural violence 197 – 8; Europe and 193; finance 193 – 4; foreign Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 Ma Liguo 51 direct investment (FDI) 188, 189 – 90, Mao Zedong, Report on the Investigation 192, 194, 195, 198; foreign nation- of the Peasant Movement in Hunan als and migration 192; foreign policy (1927) 13 – 14 192 – 3; Foreign Policy Concept (2011) Marcuse, Herbert 26 192; gross domestic product (GDP) Maritime Silk Road 15, 172 188, 191, 194; human trafficking 10; Marxist approaches to international hydroelectric capacity 198; illegal wild- relations (IR), international political life trade 197; illegal wood trade 197; economy (IPE), and security studies 24, implications of China’s foreign policy 25 – 7 for 208 – 9; inflation 188; Inner Mon- Marxist-based concepts 23 – 4 golian Autonomous Region (IMAR) Marxist Peace Research Tradition 26 195, 197, 199; institutional weakness 236 Index 10; Japan and 193; knowledge 195 – 6; 158 – 9; ethnic cleansing of Muslims 9, Li Dajun 51; loans and aid 193 – 4; Ma 150; ethnic groups 149, 150, 160; fi- Liguo 51; manufacturing sector 194, nance 155 – 6; foreign direct investment 195, 198, 199; mass migration to the (FDI) 149, 150, 151, 158; greenhouse capital 10; mining sector 191, 194, 197, gases 159; gross domestic product 198, 199; National Security Concept (GDP) 156; human rights violations (2010) 192; natural resources 188, 9, 150, 154, 158, 161; Human Rights 194, 197, 198; ninja-collected gold and Watch report (2013) 9, 150; human fluorspar 198; nomadic practices 10; trafficking 158, 160; hydropower 155; pollution 198, 199; poverty 198, 199; illegal timber 160, 161; implications of production 194 – 5; public health 198, China’s foreign policy for 207 – 8; India 199; public opinion polls 200; Saikhan- and 150, 155; inflation 149; institu- bileg, Ch. 192; Sant Maral Foundation tional weakness 9; insurgent groups poll 300; security 192 – 3; security 9; Kachin Independence Organization implications for China 215; Seruuleg (KIO) 12; knowledge 157; loans and Sonin (periodical) 193; social welfare aid 155, 158; manufacturing sector spending 188; society and structural 160; mega-projects 152; mining and violence 198 – 9; South Korea and 190; extractive industries 156; multiparty special interest groups 189; state-owned democracy 9; Muslim Rohingya 9, enterprises/private enterprises 190 – 1; 150; National League for Democracy state/society relations and structural (NLD) 153; natural resources 155, 156, violence 189, 199 – 200; statistics/de- 158, 160, 161; organised crime 158; mographics 188, 189, 190, 191, 193, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 153; 196, 198, 200; structural power at the pipelines 159, 160; political parties state level 192 – 6; structural power at 153; pollution 159, 160; poverty 149; the systems level 189 – 92; structural production 156; rule of law 158; securi- violence 196 – 200; ties between cores ty 154 – 5; security implications for Chi- 191 – 2; trade relations 189, 194 – 5, 198; na 213 – 14; Sein, Thein, president 152; Transparency International 188; unem- Shwe, General Than 149; society and ployment 191, 196, 198, 199; United structural violence 160 – 1; state-owned States and 193; universities 51; as weak enterprises/private enterprises 152 – 3; peripheral state of China 1, 10, 13; State Peace Development Council World Wildlife Fund (WWF) 198; Xox (SPDC) 154, 155, 158, 160; state/socie- Mongol 193; Zhang Jianping 51 ty relations and structural violence 150, Musharraf, General Pervez, Pakistan 125 161 – 2; statistics/demographics 149, Muslim Rohingya, Myanmar 9, 150 150, 152, 155, 159; structural power at Myanmar 149 – 166; agricultural sec- the state level 154 – 7; structural power tor 156; anti-Chinese sentiments 161; at the systems level 150 – 4; structural background 1, 9, 12, 29, 149 – 50; black violence 157 – 62; Tatmadaw 153, 154, market 158; Buddhist Burmese 150; 161; Thailand and 150; ties between China Today magazine 157; Chinese cores 153 – 4; trade relations 150 – 1, Embassy 153, 157; Chinese firms 152, 160; underdevelopment of domestic 159; Chinese policy statements, schol- manufacturing sector 156; underem- Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 arship, and economic exchange 47 – 8; ployment 149; Union Solidarity and Chinese workers 160; climate change Development Party (USDP) 149, 153; 159; Communist Party of Burma 161; United States and 155; United Wa State Confucius Classroom 157; corruption Army (UWSA) 153, 154, 155, 160, 161; cross-border and illicit trade 151; 161; as weak peripheral state of China deforestation 159; drug trafficking 9, 1, 9, 12; Yunnan Province and 12 155, 158, 160; economic and food security 160; economic linkages 150 – 2; nationalism 3 economy and structural violence 158; National League for Democracy (NLD), Environmental Investigation Agency Myanmar 153 159; environment and structural vio- National Security Concept (2010), lence 158 – 60; environment degradation Mongolia 192 Index 237 natural resources 2, 25 violence 142 – 5; Wu Chuntai (ambassa- negative outcomes of structural power dor) 137; Tibetan minority and refugee and structural violence 2 – 3, 15, 22 – 3, community 12, 145; Tibetans in 134, 27, 35 138, 139, 141 – 2, 144; Tibet Autono- Nepal 133 – 48; agricultural sector 140; mous Region (TAR) 138, 141, 144; ties background 1, 8 – 9, 12, 31, 133 – 4; Bud- between cores 137 – 8; unemployment dhism in 141; caste system 8; Chinese 144; Unified Communist artyP of Nepal banks 136; Chinese clandestine activity (Maoist), (UCPN(M)) 133 – 4, 137; 145; Chinese companies 136; Chinese United Nations’ High Commission for Embassy 137 – 8, 141, 145; Chinese Refugees (UNHCR) 138; universities policy statements, scholarship, and eco- 141; as weak peripheral state of China nomic exchange 46 – 7; Communist Par- 1, 8 – 9, 12, 31; World Bank and 137, ty of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) 143; World Commission on Dams 143; (UML) 133, 137; Confucius Institute Xiao Wunan 141 141; contingent liability 143; criminal New Security Concept (xin anquan guan) groups in 8, 134; Dalai Lama 141; dams 1, 14, 22 and micro-dams 136, 142 – 4; democ- NGOs see nongovernment organisations racy in 145; economic linkages 134 – 6; NLD see National League for Democracy economy and structural violence 142 – 3; nongovernment organisations (NGOs) energy shortage 133, 136; environmen- 219; Afghanistan 104; Lao People’s tal impact assessments (EIAs) 143; Democratic Republic (PDR) 181 environment and structural violence North Korea, China and 29 143 – 4; ethnic marginalisation 137, 144; European Union and 134; Federation of October Symposium for Working Periph- Nepalese Chambers of Commerce and ery Diplomacy (2013), China 1 Industry 135; finance 139 – 40; foreign official policy pronouncements 39 direct investment (FDI) 133, 135, 140, One Belt, One Road (2014) 1, 3, 15, 22, 142; free trade zones 135; funding 39, 172 agencies 127; gross domestic product One China Policy 51 (GDP) 133, 140; Gyirong Port 135; operationalising theories 27, 28 Himalmedia (2013 public poll) 139; Operation Enduring Freedom (2001), human rights violations 144; hydro- Afghanistan 92, 93, 97, 99 power 134, 136, 140, 142; implications Operation Zarb-e-Azb, Pakistan 123, 124 of China’s foreign policy for 207; India oppression 24 – 5 and 134, 136, 140, 142; infrastructure organised crime: transnational 3, 4; weak development 134, 140; insurgent groups states defined 4 – 5 9; knowledge 141 – 2; living standards Oxfam International 219 135; loans and aid 139, 140; manufacturing sector underdevelopment 140, Pakistan 110 – 32; advantages in strategic 142; marginalisation of population 8; assets and geostrategic placement 110; Melamchi Water Supply Project fiasco agricultural sector 118, 120; ‘all- 137; Nepali Congress (NC) 133; politi- weather friend’ sobriquet 112, 115, 119; cal parties 133, 137, 145; poverty 142, background 1, 8, 12, 110 – 12; Bangla- Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 144; production 140; rivers 143; rule of desh and 111; Chinese banks 115, 123; law 145; Second Constituent Assem- Chinese loans 115, 117; Chinese policy bly 133; sectarian conflicts 9; security statements, scholarship, and economic 138 – 9; security implications for China exchange 44 – 6; Chinese workers 115, 212 – 13; society and structural violence 116; climate change 8; coal industry 17, 144; state institutions 8; state-owned 115, 121 – 2, 123; corruption 110, 121, enterprises/private enterprises 136 – 7; 124; cotton 118, 120; dam building 117, state/society relations and structural 122; democracy 110; East Turkestan violence 144 – 5; statistics/demographics Liberation Organisation (ETLO) 112, 133, 134, 136, 139; structural power at 123; economic corridor (jingji zou- the state level 138 – 42; structural power lang) 113, 114, 115, 117, 121; eco- at the systems level 134 – 8; structural nomic linkages 112 – 14; economy and 238 Index structural violence 120 – 1; environment Patrick, Stewart 4 and structural violence 121 – 2; ethnic Paul, T. V. 4 conflict 111; Federally Administered Peaceful Development (heping fazhan) 22 Tribal Area (FATA) 110, 111, 112, 116, peasant-administered co-operatives, China 123 – 4; finance 117 – 18; foreign direct 13 – 14 investment (FDI) by China 113, 114; People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Myan- Freedom March 124; free trade agree- mar and 153 ment (FTA) 112, 118; gas pipelines 117; see (PRC) see China gross domestic product (GDP) 110 – 11, peripheral security, China and 13 – 15 113, 122; Gwadar Port 113, 117; Hafiz Periphery Policy (zhoubian zhengce) 1, 14 Gul Bahadar 123; Haqqani Network Philippines 223 – 4 123; Hu Jintao (former Chinese Pholsena, Khemmani, minister of industry president) 115; Hussain, Mamnoon, and commerce, Lao People’s Demo- president 113; implications of China’s cratic Republic (PDR) 172 foreign policy for 206 – 7; India and 112, PLA see People’s Liberation Army 117; insurgent groups 8; Islam in 8, 110, policy mitigation, Chinese foreign policy 111 – 12, 116, 125; Jiang Zemin (former 217 – 19 Chinese president) 115; Khan, Imran Position Paper on Enhanced Cooperation 110, 124; knowledge 119 – 20; Lashkar- in the Field of Non-Traditional Security e-Jhangyi (LeJ) 111, 112; Li Keqiuang Issues (2002), China 14 115; loan defaults 114; media 125; positive outcomes, asymmetrical econom- mega-projects 119, 121; Musharraf, ic exchange 22, 232 General Pervez 125; negative outcomes PRC see People’s Republic of China in security 116 – 17; nuclear power 110, production: Afghanistan 98 – 9; Kyr- 114, 117; Operation Zarb-e-Azb 123, gyzstan 65 – 6; Lao People’s Democratic 124; political system 110; pollution 122, Republic (PDR) 175; Mongolia 194 – 5; 123; population 110; poverty 120, 121, Myanmar 156; Nepal 140; Pakistan 122, 124; production 118; public health 118; Tajikistan 80 – 1 conditions 122, 123; security 116 – 17; public goods, weak states defined 4 security implications for China 211 – 12; putting people first (yiren wei ben), shariah (Islamic law) 110, 115; Sharif, Chinese foreign policy 218 Nawaz, prime minister 113, 124; society and structural violence 122 – 4; state Quetta Shura (Taliban leadership), institutions 8; state-owned enterprises/ Afghanistan 92, 102 private enterprises 114 – 15; state/society relations and structural violence 124 – 5; radicalism, one of ‘three evil forces’ (san statistics/demographics 111, 112, 113, ge gu shili) 11, 78 120, 123; structural power at the state Rahmon, Emomali, president, Tajikistan level 116 – 20; structural power at the 6 – 7, 74, 77, 78, 79, 85 systems level 112 – 16; structural vio- Rahmon’s People’s Democratic Party of lence 120 – 5; Sun Weidong 119; Taliban Tajikistan 7 110, 123; Tehrik-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan RATS see Regional Anti-Terrorism (TTP) 111, 112; terrorist and separatist Structure Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 groups 116; ties between cores 115 – 16; Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure trade with China 120, 123; Transpar- (RATS), Kyrgyzstan 64 ency International 110; tribal regions 8; Report on the Investigation of the Peasant ul-Qadri, Tahir 110, 124; underdevelop- Movement in Hunan (Mao Zedong) ment of domestic institutions 112, 118, 13 – 14 120; unemployment 120, 122, 123; revolutions 24 United States and 112, 115, 124; Uy- Rothstein, Robert 4 ghur issue 116, 123; as weak peripheral Russia: Kyrgyzstan and 6, 59; recession of state of China 1, 8, 12; Xi Jinping and 2014 – 2015 59; Tajikistan and 6 113, 115; Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) 117, 125; Zhou Enlai Sadulloev, Khassan, Tajikistan 78 (former Chinese premier) 115 Saikhanbileg, Ch., Mongolia 192 Index 239 Satybaldiyev, Jantoro, former prime SPDC see State Peace Development minister of Kyrgyzstan 63 Council Sayasone, Choummaly, president, Lao state-controlled media commentary 39 People’s Democratic Republic (PDR) state institutions, weak states defined 4 – 5 172 state-owned enterprises/private enter- SCO see Shanghai Cooperation Organisa- prises: Afghanistan 94 – 5; Kyrgyzstan tion 62; Lao People’s Democratic Republic security: Afghanistan 96 – 7; Kyrgyzstan (PDR) 171 – 2; Mongolia 190 – 1; My- 63 – 4; Lao People’s Democratic Repub- anmar 152 – 3; Nepal 136 – 7; Pakistan lic (PDR) 173; Mongolia 192 – 3; My- 114 – 15; Tajikistan 76 – 7 anmar 154 – 5; Nepal 138 – 9; Pakistan State Peace Development Council 116 – 17; Tajikistan 78 – 9 (SPDC), Myanmar 154, 155, 158, 160 security implications for China 209 – 15; state/society relations and structural Afghanistan 210 – 11; Kyrgyzstan violence 3; Afghanistan 103 – 4; China’s 209 – 10; Lao People’s Democratic economic-centric foreign policy Republic (PDR) 214 – 15; Mongolia approach to weak peripheral states 215; Myanmar 213 – 14; Nepal 212 – 13; 3; Kyrgyzstan 69 – 70; Lao People’s Pakistan 211 – 12; Tajikistan 210 Democratic Republic (PDR) 180 – 2; security studies 25, 227 – 8 Mongolia 189, 199 – 200; Myanmar 150, Sein, Thein, president, Myanmar 152 161 – 2; Nepal 144 – 5; Pakistan 124 – 5; separatism 3, 4, 11 Tajikistan 85 – 6; weak states defined 5 Seruuleg Sonin (periodical), Mongolia 193 state-sponsored foreign development Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) organisation 219 63, 64; Tajikistan 75, 78 state-to-state relations, asymmetrical shariah (Islamic law), Pakistan 110, 115 economic exchange 27 Sharif, Nawaz, prime minister, Pakistan statistics/demographics: Afghanistan 92, 113, 124 93, 97, 104; bilateral trade between Sharifov, Suhrob, prime minister, Tajik- China and select Asian nations 30, 30t; istan 77 Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) Shwe, General Than, Myanmar 149 29 – 30, 29t, 35; intraregional trade in Silk Road Development Fund 32 Asia 28 – 30; Kyrgyzstan 59, 60, 61, 64, Silk Road Economic Belt 15 67; Lao People’s Democratic Republic Singapore 224 (PDR) 169, 170, 174, 178; Mongolia Sino-Afghanistan relations see Afghani- 188, 189, 190, 191, 193, 196, 198, 200; stan Myanmar 149, 150, 152, 155, 159; Sino-Kyrgyzstan relations see Kyrgyzstan Nepal 133, 134, 136, 139; Pakistan 111, Sino-Lao PDR relations see Lao People’s 112, 113, 120, 123; Tajikistan 74, 75, Democratic Republic (PDR) 76, 77, 80 Sino-Mongolia relations see Mongolia Strange, Susan 27, 35, 227 Sino-Myanmar relations see Myanmar strategic partnerships (zhanlue huoban) 39 Sino-Nepal relations see Nepal structural power 2, 3, 226 – 7; an ana- Sino-Pakistan relations see Pakistan lytic approach 24, 34 – 6; asymmetrical Sino-Tajikistan relations see Tajikistan economic exchange 23, 24, 27 – 32; and Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 social consciousness, asymmetrical eco- China’s bilateral relations with weak nomic exchange 24 states 32; China’s economic-centric society and structural violence: Afghani- foreign policy approach to weak periph- stan 102 – 3; Kyrgyzstan 68 – 9; Lao eral states 2, 3; Chinese foreign policy People’s Democratic Republic (PDR) 215 – 17; negative outcomes of unequal 179 – 80; Mongolia 198 – 9; Myanmar exchange 224 – 5 160 – 1; Nepal 144; Pakistan 122 – 4; structural power at the state level 30 – 2; Tajikistan 84 – 5 Afghanistan 96 – 100; Kyrgyzstan 63 – 7; Sopko, John F. 97 Lao People’s Democratic Republic South Korea, Mongolia and 190 (PDR) 173 – 6; Mongolia 192 – 6; My- South-South Cooperation (nan-nan hezuo) anmar 154 – 7; Nepal 138 – 42; Pakistan 1, 22 116 – 20; Tajikistan 78 – 81 240 Index structural power at the systems level 75; power sector 76, 77; production 28 – 30, 60 – 3; Afghanistan 93 – 6; Kyr- 80 – 1; Rahmon, Emomali, president gyzstan 60 – 3; Lao People’s Democratic 6 – 7, 74, 77, 78, 79, 85; Rahmon’s Peo- Republic (PDR) 169 – 72; Mongolia ple’s Democratic Party of Tajikistan 7; 189 – 92; Myanmar 150 – 4; Nepal Sadulloev, Khassan 78; security 78 – 9; 134 – 8; Pakistan 112 – 16; Tajikistan security implications for China 210; 75 – 8 Shanghai Cooperation Organisation structural power/structural violence model (SCO) 75, 78; Sharifov, Suhrob, prime 34 – 5, 35f minister 77; society and structural structural violence 2, 3, 23, 24, 33 – 6, violence 84 – 5; state-owned enterprises/ 226 – 7; Afghanistan 100 – 4; an analytic private enterprises 76 – 7; state/society approach 24, 34 – 6; China’s economic- relations 85 – 6; statistics/demographics centric foreign policy approach to weak 74, 75, 76, 77, 80; structural power at peripheral states 2, 3; Chinese foreign the state level 78 – 81; structural power policy 215 – 17; Kyrgyzstan 60, 67 – 70; at the systems level 75 – 8; structural Lao People’s Democratic Republic violence 82 – 6; subsistence farming 7; (PDR) 176 – 82; Mongolia 196 – 200; terrorist activity 6; ties between cores Myanmar 157 – 62; Nepal 142 – 5; Paki- 77 – 8; Transparency International stan 120 – 5; Tajikistan 82 – 6 (2012) 85 – 6; underemployment 83; un- Su Chuntai (ambassador), Nepal 137 employment 84; United Tajik Opposi- Sun Weidong, Pakistan 119 tion (UTO) 74; universities 81; Usmon, Sun Yuxi (special envoy), Afghanistan 96 Davlat (former prime minister) 77; Uyghur minority 81; Uzbekistan and 6, Taiwan 51, 224 85; as weak peripheral state of China 1, Tajikistan 74 – 90; Afghanistan and 79; 6 – 7, 11; Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous agricultural community (kishlak) Region (XUAR) and 11, 81, 85; Zarifi, 7; aluminum and cotton 74, 80, 82; Hamrokhon, former prime minister 77 background 1, 6 – 7, 11, 74 – 5; Berdimu- Taliban: Afghanistan 92, 93, 96, 97, 100, hamedow, Gurbanguly (Turkmenistan) 102; Pakistan 110, 123 74; Chinese firms 77; Chinese loans TAR see Tibet Autonomous Region 79 – 80; Chinese policy statements, TATC see Turkmenistan-Afghanistan- scholarship, and economic exchange Tajikistan-China project 41 – 3; Chinese workers 77, 83; civil Tatmadaw, Myanmar 153, 154, 161 war with Russia 74, 75; clan affiliations TCU see Tripartite Customs Union 74; Confucius Institutes 81; cronyism, Tehrik-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan (TTP), Paki- corruption, and abuses of power 74, 75, stan 111, 112 85 – 6; Danghara clique (Rahmon) 85; Terriff, Terry 26 debt repayment 82; domestic consumer terrorism 3, 4, 5, 11; one of ‘three evil market 81; Dushanbe-Khujand highway forces’ (san ge gu shili) 78, 79 77; economic linkages 75 – 6; economy Thailand: China and 2; Lao People’s and structural violence 82 – 3; environ- Democratic Republic (PDR) and 168, ment and structural violence 83 – 4, 85; 169; Myanmar and 150, 169 extended family (avlods) 7; finance theoretical and empirical findings, China’s Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 79 – 80; foreign direct investment (FDI) economic-centric foreign policy ap- by China 75, 76; gas pipeline 76; Gor- proach to weak peripheral states 223 – 8 no-Badakhshan Autonomous Province Third World coalition, China 14 86; gross domestic product (GDP) 74, three evil forces (san ge gu shili) 11, 76, 80; implications of China’s foreign 78, 79 policy for 206; independence from Tibetans: minority and refugee community former Soviet Union 6; industrial sector in Nepal 12, 145; in Nepal 134, 138, 74; inflation 74; International Security 139, 141 – 2, 144 Assistance Forces (ISAF) 78; Islam and Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) 11, 51; 11, 86; Islamic Renaissance Path (IRP) Nepal and 12 7; Islamic terrorist groups 78; knowl- ties between cores: Afghanistan 95 – 6; edge 81; living standards 74; poverty Kyrgyzstan 62 – 3; Lao People’s Demo- Index 241 cratic Republic (PDR) 172; Mongolia legitimacy of state 5; organised crime 191 – 2; Myanmar 153 – 4; Nepal 137 – 8; 4 – 5; public goods 4; state institutions Pakistan 115 – 16; Tajikistan 77 – 8 4 – 5; state/society relations 5; struc- transnational organised crime 3, 4 tural power and negative outcomes of Transparency International: Afghanistan unequal exchange 224 – 5; structural 103 – 4; Mongolia 188; Pakistan 110; violence 225 – 6; see also China; China’s Tajikistan 85 – 6 economic-centric foreign policy ap- Tripartite Customs Union (TCU) 61 proach to weak peripheral states; Chi- TTP see Tehrik-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan nese foreign policy; specific countries Tulip Revolution (2005), Kyrgyzstan 6, 60 weak states on China’s periphery 5 – 10; Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Tajikistan- Afghanistan 7; Kyrgyzstan 6; Lao PDR China project (TATC), Afghanistan 94 9 – 10; Mongolia 10; Myanmar 9; Nepal 8 – 9; Pakistan 8; Tajikistan 6 – 7; see Ul-Qadri, Tahir, Pakistan 110, 124 also China; China’s economic-centric United Nations, High Commission for foreign policy approach to weak pe- Refugees (UNHCR) 138 ripheral states; Chinese foreign policy; United States: Afghanistan and 1 – 3, 91, specific countries 92, 96, 97, 100, 103; Kyrgyzstan and 6; Weber, Max 4 Mongolia and 193; Myanmar and 155; working class (proletariat) 24, 25 Pakistan and 112, 115, 124 World Bank: foreign direct investment United Tajik Opposition (UTO), Tajikistan (FDI) 61; as lender to states 31 74 World-Systems Analysis theory (Waller- United Wa State Army (UWSA), Myan- stein) 26 mar 153, 154, 155, 160, 161 World Trade Organisation (WTO) mem- universities, asymmetrical economic ber, Lao People’s Democratic Republic exchange 32 (PDR) 168, 177 Usmon, Davlat (former prime minister), Tajikistan 77 Xiao Wunan, Nepal 141 UTO see United Tajik Opposition Xi Jinping: Afghanistan and 96, 100; UWSA see United Wa State Army Pakistan and 113, 115; president of Uyghur population: Kyrgyzstan 66 – 7, 69; China 1, 15, 76; statements of 39 Pakistan 116, 123; Tajikistan 81 Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Uzbekistan: Islamic Movement of Uzbeki- (XUAR) 11, 51; Afghanistan and 11, stan (IMU) 6; Tajikistan and 6, 85 94, 96, 97, 102; China and 11; East Turkestan Liberation Organisation value judgement 225, 227, 228 (ETLO) 11; Kyrgyzstan and 63, 66, 69; Väyrynen, Raimo 4 Mongolia and 13; Pakistan and 12, 117, Vietnam 224; Lao People’s Democratic 125; Tajikistan and 11, 81 Republic (PDR) and 168, 169 Xox Mongol, Mongolia 193 Vital, David 4 XUAR see Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Wakhan Corridor, Afghanistan 94, 95, 102 Wallerstein, Immanuel 26 Yunnan Province, Myanmar and 12; Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:55 07 June 2016 Wang Guanzhong 172 southern and southwestern, 11 weak states defined 3– 5, 223 – 8; framework for understanding periphery Zhang Jianping 51 security and foreign policy 223 – 4; Zhou Enlai 115