MARJA VUORINEN Neo-nationalism in the 2010s Religious aspects of the Nordic and Northern European extra-parliamentary far right
DOI: https://doi.org/10.30664/ar.86792 Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)
he conflict between Christianity and Islam Over the blackened earth is a core issue for all varieties of European the old troops parade. neo-nationalist and nativist1 right-wing T W. B. Yeats (1865–1939) ideological organisation, from populist and far- right parties to extra-parliamentary groups and individuals. As a mundane political-social Introduction: nationalisms and religions, critique, this defensive and nationalistic form past and present of anti-Islamism focuses on the downsides of From the sixteenth century onwards, the mass immigration from Northern Africa and the Middle East, stressing the incompatibility of developing modern European states defined gross gender inequality, sexual intolerance and their politics in terms of, among other religiously motivated Islamist terrorism as well issues, religious preference and (in)toler- as the theocratic sharia system of laws with the ance. The emergence of Protestantism in secular European model of society (Vuorinen 2014: 188–94). Antisemitism makes an appear- Northern Europe was followed by the ance in the guise of the old Nazi concept which establishment of exclusively Protestant portrays ‘World Jewry’ as a community of inter- states – notably the then Swedish empire, national financial exploiters, allegedly inspired whose early wars on Catholicism wreaked in their misdeeds by their religion. However, this havoc mainly in the German lands. The notion is being countered by a stronger, pro semitic ideology, portraying the state of Israel hostilities between a declining Sweden and as an ally in the struggle against Islam(ism). a growing Russian empire lasted longer, up As ‘traditional’ European religions, Christianity until the early nineteenth century. Fought and the different historical and local varieties of across the fault line between Orthodox and paganism serve as important points of positive identification.2 mainly Lutheran (in the case of Poland,
1 Referring to an ideology that restricts the Traditional Catholicism, for obvious rea- right to citizenship of a particular country sons, appeals to the neo-nationalists of for to individuals who either have been born example Poland and France, while Angli- there, genetically belong to the native stock, canism is part and parcel of the Ulster or have long established roots in the coun- Unionist ideology. The former represent try. particular aspects of neo-nationalism, while 2 Militant neo-Protestant, neo-Lutheran, or the latter is a continuum of a longstanding neo-Calvinist affiliations in Europe I have nationalist ideology; their religious think- not yet come by, but would not dismiss ing, however, falls outside the category of offhand the possibility of their emergence. neo-religionism proper.
Approaching Religion • Vol. 9, No. 1–2 • October 2019 77 also Catholic) cultural spheres, they grad- Ever since the turn of the millennium, the ually led to annexations of several non- three ‘religions of the book’, Christianity, Orthodox areas into the Russian state; the Islam and Judaism, have gained renewed annexed areas were allowed to maintain visibility in an increasingly multicultur- their original faith within the multi-ethnic alist Europe, particularly in connection imperial context. The religious divergence, with a growing right-wing radicalism. however, would soon intertwine with lin- Social scientists have come to agree about guistic differences, capitalised upon – along the important political role of religions with other cultural-political differences – across the spectrum of neo-nationalist by the emerging domestic nationalist elites, ideologies – from garden-variety cultural seeking independence, and in most cases conservative movements to right-wing gaining it, in the aftermath of WWI. parliamentary parties and beyond, to the Imperialism and religion were thus extra-parliamentary far right inhabited by intertwined with modern European state nativist to neo-fascist organisations and nationalism right from the start. The inter- violent lone-wolf ideologues. war period brought its own distasteful fla- For obvious reasons, Islam – either vour to the soup with the rise and even- as the ‘alien’ religion of immigrants from tual fall of several ultranationalist, fascist, Northern Africa and the Middle East to more or less racist regimes. Particularly the Europe, or in the guise of radical Islamism, memory of the Holocaust, the Nazi project or as a perceived ‘foreign’ influence threat- of exterminating European Jewry – along ening the presumed cultural unity of the with other elements of society it deemed ‘to receiving countries – is recognised as be sub-human’– has tainted the reputation the main exemplar of the religion-based of nationalisms and intra-religious disputes enemy for all European neo-nationalists. since the end of WWII. With the establish- Accordingly, it receives the lion’s share ment of the binary Cold War system, the of publicity on religious hostilities, being religious divide for a while went dormant, mentioned by practically every author on but has gained renewed momentum after the subject.3 Particularly under the concept the collapse of the Cold War in the 1990s. of Islamophobia, anti-Islamist attitudes are Another prominent system of imperi dismissed as misinformed, alarmist, and/ alist oppression that reached its peak in or psychologically immature.4 The openly the nineteenth century was colonialism. A leftist critique readily equates anti-Islam perceived religious – Christian – superior- not only with Islamophobia, but with fas- ity, aided by a perceived racial superiority, cism and racism.5 provided the means for a ‘moral’ justifica- tion of several European overseas empires. 3 See, for example, Akkerman et al. 2016a: The dismantling of the colonialist system, 5, 2016b: 34–5; Banks and Gingrich 2006: in the post-WWII years, accompanied by 4–5, 10–11; Gullestad 2006: 76–9; Hervik an atonement for the racist thinking it con- 2006: 102–3; Larsson 2014; Minkenberg et al. 2014: 9, 12, 17; Mudde 2007: 6–7; Sunier tained, has repercussions on the relations and van Ginkel 2006: 110–21. between peoples/nations and religions to 4 Gardell 2010; Hannerz 2006: 281; Jokisalo this day. 2016: 189–221; Jupskås 2016: 186; Mudde 2007: 69–75, 82–6; Sander 2014. 5 Leplat 2015: iii–iv; Kellner 2015: 19, 24; * * * Löwy 2015: 29; Alm 2015: 99, 101–4; Com- mission antifasciste du NPA 2015: 113, 133,
Approaching Religion • Vol. 9, No. 1–2 • October 2019 78 The take on Judaism is more multifac- the pagan aspect of the different varieties of eted; it gets mentioned much more rarely neo-nationalism has been either ignored, than Islam, and is discussed more briefly dismissed as marginal, or even demonised when mentioned. On the one hand, neo- (e.g. Gardell 2003; Minkenberg et al. 2014: nationalists are routinely suspected of 16; Wiederer 2014: 35–6). antisemitism, either blatant or focussed What is missing in this rationalistic on Nazi-style conspiracy theories. On analysis is the recognition of the essentially the other hand, the pro-Israel attitudes of romantic nature of the neo-nationalist and many neo-nationalists, based on the idea nativist movements,7 reflecting heavily also of a common fight against Islam in both on their take on religions. On the reverse Middle-Eastern and diaspora contexts, are side of an exclusivist hate ideology there is also recognised by most authors, as well as an ardent wish to love and to belong – to a their appreciation of the Jewish state as a cherished ethnic-cultural group, to a chain paragon of a modern nativist state.6 It has of generations, to an ancestral place – and also been suggested that the neo-national- to be recognised as a valued member of a ists who position themselves as defenders local cultural community (Goodhart 2017). of the Jews, particularly against the ‘new’ Islamist antisemitism, are merely striking a Aim, focus, sources, approach pose, so as to evade being associated with My aim as such is not to refute the findings old-school Nazism (Akkerman 2016: 145; of the authors referenced above. Rather, I Heinisch and Hauser 2016: 76). wish to provide a more multifaceted and The points of positive religious identi- detailed picture, adding some shades of grey fication of neo-nationalists get even fewer, to the prevailing black. Quite understand- and more vague, mentions. Catholic con ably, neo-nationalist ideologues embrace servatives are often observed to be work- ‘native’ European religious traditions, from ing hand-in-glove with neo-nationalists in high church Catholic Christianity to local countries where Catholicism traditionally pagan cults and related folklore. Equally dominates the religious scene, such as Italy self-evidently, Islam(ism), particularly in (Stacul 2006: 167, 170), France (Gaillard- relation to recent mass immigration from Startzmann 2006: 184, 191; Commission North-Africa and the Middle East, appears antifasciste du NPA 2015: 155–8), Belgium as their main religious (or pseudo-reli- and Austria (Mudde 2007: 85; Seiser 2006: gious) antagonist, with a long history of 209). Interestingly, Protestant Lutheranism mutual ideological and geopolitical enmity, appears to serve as the ‘national’ religion in lately enhanced by the alleged struggle for Norway much in the same way as traditional demographic prominence. As we will see, Catholicism in the Central European coun- the apparent grand disagreement about tries (Gullestad 2006: 76–9). Meanwhile, Judaism and the state of Israel – either a powerful ally against Islamism or a par- 143–4; de Jong 2015: 269–75, 279–80, 289, ticipant in a joint global conspiracy against 301; Svensson 2015: 319–20. the Western Christian nations – eventually 6 See, for example, Akkerman et al. 2016a: 8, 2016b: 34–5; Minkenberg et al. 2014: 10, 17–18; Mudde 2007: 6, 22, 79–84; Wiederer 2014: 37; Commission antifasciste du NPA 7 This is not to say that they do not have also 2015: 132; de Jong 2015: 478; Svensson their own rationale based on anti-multicul- 2015: 324. turalist and nativist principles.
Approaching Religion • Vol. 9, No. 1–2 • October 2019 79 boils down to a trifle, at least when it comes programmatic texts, online and in print, to the ideologies of the extreme right. presented as foundational by their authors Mapping the historical influences and and therefore likely to convey the most parallels, political justifications and ideo- stable, serious and thought-through ide- logical consequences of each variety of reli- ological aspects of each movement and gious politics among the far right, I hope to individual writer. In the case of organised add also to the more general understand- movements, the jointly processed and col- ing of the ideological undercurrents of the lectively approved nature of such texts adds early twenty-first century neo-nationalist to their ideological weight. scene, presenting them as the newest addi- Both individual writers and collec- tion to a longer joint history of nationalism tives active on the neo-nationalist scene and religions. rely on online visibility for recruiting fol- To achieve what might be called a level- lowers and distributing ideological propa- headed analysis of one of the most debated ganda. Contrary to individual, self-radical- ideological phenomena of our time, I ised authors, who typically speak to private approach their programmatic texts as followers, collective movements openly normal ideological constructs – by nature recruit for new membership, with descrip- one-sided, selective, passionate, militant, tions of past activities and plans for future and persuasive. ones. As a caveat, one must keep in mind that some of these texts may have been * * * designed deliberately as a front, allow- ing their supporters to pose as relatively The practical aim of this article is to pro- harmless in order to veil a more sinister vide an up-to-date survey on the role of dif- intent. On the other hand, their contents ferent religions in the ideological thinking are aggressive enough as they are, so they of recent radical extra-parliamentary right- may well present the ideologies ‘as is’, with wing groups and individuals, who in the potential for further radicalisation as well 2010s have gained prominent media visibil- as for calming down. ity, due either to violent acts of terrorism or action directe operations. In want of a more * * * precise geographic term, I define my area of interest as Northern Europe with a Western My primary focus is on ideologies that twist – including the Nordics, Great Britain, have already inspired grave and/or recur- Germany, Austria and France, but exclud- ring aggressive action by relatively young ing, at least at this stage (on the basis of authors/perpetrators who publish in apparent differences of political tradition), English to reach an international audience. the other Mediterranean states, Russia and To trace such contents, I analyse the former ‘Eastern Europe’. To manage an academically sound view 1) the online manifesto 2083: A European that genuinely adds to our understanding Declaration of Independence, published about what is going on in the neo-nation- by Norwegian Anders Behring Breivik alistic scene, I will not focus on the volatile (b. 1979) immediately before embarking and transient, often grossly exaggerated, on his killing spree in 22 July 2011, with day-to-day expressions online. Instead, a death toll of 77; I analyse publicly available, permanent
Approaching Religion • Vol. 9, No. 1–2 • October 2019 80 2) the pamphlets and online materials by the original wannabe Knight Templar, published by the Génération Identitaire Breivik, are discussed in relation to his / Identitäre Bewegung / Generation Iden recent copycat/acolyte. tity youth movement, originating in France and active also in Austria and * * * Germany since early 2010s, engaging in direct action campaigns against Muslim To understand an ongoing neo-nationalist immigration and landmarks of Islam; ideological process, I utilise the approach and known as methodological empathy, devel- 3) the online programme, Our Path, by oped by the two central authorities on the Nordic Resistance Movement aka the study of historical fascisms, George L. NordFront, with its home base in the Mosse and Roger Griffin, and conceptu- Nordic countries, operating online in alised by the latter (Griffin 2008: xiv, xxiv, local languages but also in English, 21, 99, 2012: 18, 144, 206–11 and 2018: 27, whose riot-prone public appearances are 34–40, 47, 50). Simply put, the approach designed to maximise negative visibility consists of taking an ideological message in the media. seriously and at face value, for the sake of study, regardless of how aggressive or dis- As such individuals, movements and tasteful its contents may be, analysing it in incidents, so far, thankfully, are rare, as its political, economic, geographical and well as for the sake of broader scope and temporal context to find out why it is sup- context, I include a secondary layer of ported, by whom, and to what end. ideological texts, by authors belonging to In relation to the 2010s Northern Euro older age groups that have contributed to pean extra-parliamentary radical right, a the development of the ideology. My choice list of focal questions that need to be ten- of source materials may thus be termed tatively asked, even though many of them cumulative; however, I try my best not to cannot yet be definitely or completely be eclectic. The ‘founding fathers’ include answered, include the following. the French veteran philosopher Alain de Who are the leaders of the extreme right, Benoist (b. 1943), his late countryman and what is the essential societal change or Dominique Venner (1935–2013) and the new conflict they react to? How do they see British ethno-nationalist Arthur Kemp (b. the present situation? What are their hopes 1962). and fears?8 What do they want to remove, Utilising a recent comparison oppor- stop, change, strengthen, or bring about? tunity, I analyse the manifesto The Great What kind of meaning do they invest in Replacement, by a Westerner anti-Islamist the cultural, religious, communal, social, of European descent, namely the Australian legal and administrative traditions, history, Brenton Tarrant (b. 1991), who in Christ church, New Zealand, on 15 March 2019 8 I find Angela Merkel’s much-quoted phrase attacked worshippers in two local mosques, ‘Must not give in to fear’ very problematic. killing 50. The author professed a depend- As a strong primal emotion, fear cannot ence on Breivik’s ideology, as well as a be managed at will, nor dismissed only strong identification with his own ‘white’ by being told to do so (see Bourke 2005). As witnessed by the recent climate scare, European ethnic origin (Tarrant 2019). The fear, like hope, is a powerful incentive for religious contents of the 2011 manifesto, political action.
Approaching Religion • Vol. 9, No. 1–2 • October 2019 81 geography and the natural features of their Breivik, titled 2083: A European Declaration local and national environment? In whose of Independence and released on the inter- interest and on whose mandate do they see net only hours before he set out on his kill- themselves as acting, and by what means? ing spree. Breivik (2011: chs. 1.1–1.30) Is the division into moderate parliamen- describes Islam as being incompatible with tary and extreme extra-parliamentary fac- the fundamental Western social and politi- tions going to die down with the establish- cal values, including secular democracy, a ment of regular parliamentary groups with secular judicial system, the rule of law, free- moderated versions of the shared ideology? dom of speech, the work ethic, religious Or, will the extreme factions develop into and sexual tolerance, and gender equality. outlets for romantic desperados, with even As the exact opposite of Western ideals, more extremist, and potentially violent, he associates Islam with theocratic polit antisocial aspirations? ical rule, cruel punishments, and Sharia courts. Compulsory veils and other cover- World religions according to neo-nationalism ing garments for women as well as the prec- Anti-Islamism edence given to men in the Islamic family For Northern European and Nordic neo- law are presented as tokens of gross gender nationalists, opposing Islam is mainly based inequality. Contrary to the explanation of on mundane matters, with the focus on cul- it as a moderate spiritual struggle, Breivik tural, political, societal and legal issues. construes jihad or Holy War literally, as the Muslims are targeted for problems related incitement to continuous violent hostil- to mass immigration, from terrorist inci- ity towards non-Muslims. Yet, as an indi- dents to burdening social security systems cation of the basically non-religious, polit at the expense of the native European poor. ical nature of his antagonism, he stresses The main points of interest are the hypo- that all Muslims, and indeed anyone who thetical cultural and demographic threats, accepts the Western societal values and related to the birth-rates of Muslim fam wish to partake in the European-style com- ilies, of a gradual Islamisation of European munal life are welcome to do so.10 culture and a replacement of her ethnic As character evidence of the assumed stock. The animosity towards Islam as a Islamist conspiracy, Breivik lists historical religion appears as a corollary of what the practices used to manifest the inferior neo-nationalists see as an attempted colon status of Christians and Jews in the Muslim- isation of Europe. Nevertheless, the authors dominated societies of the past – from take the trouble of acquainting themselves with those aspects of Islamic dogma that available at
Approaching Religion • Vol. 9, No. 1–2 • October 2019 82 slave markets, selling infidel women taken his attack on the particular mosques with as spoils of war, to the jizya tax collected political and security reasons, referring to from Christians and Jews, their restricted their alleged prior online history of jihad- right to worship, and a particular dress style extremism. Along ethno-nationalist code – claiming that Muslim immigration lines, he pronounces that Muslims should into Europe is a new form of religious taxa- remain in their own homelands, not invade tion, justified by the supposed superiority ‘our lands’ where their high fertility rates of Islam. In addition, he mentions the alleg- cause distress to the native populations. He edly Koran-inspired al-Taqqiya, or right also refers to converts from Christianity to to deceive non-Muslims without punish- Islam as ‘traitors’. ment in order to save one’s life, as a further The Nordic Resistance Movement is justification for financially exploiting the an anti-immigrationist, Pan-Nordic nativ- non-Muslims. Furthermore, the supposed ist group, which proudly displays its rather right/duty to kill particularly Jews, but also showy Nazi sympathies on its webpages. Christians, when sighted, is presented as a Its online programmatic publication, Our justification for both the Islamist terror in Path: New Politics for a New Time (2016: Europe and the oppression of Christian and 9–14, 18–19 and passim) directly men- other religious minorities in the Middle tions neither Islam nor Christianity, being East (Breivik 2011: chs. 1.1–1.30). content to condemn ‘parasitic’ mass immi- Brenton Tarrant, the New Zealand gration from outside the Nordics as ‘new shooter, saluted ‘Commander Breivik’ in colonialism’, while preparing to defend his manifesto The Great Replacement11 the rights of the Nordic races with arms. not only as a source of inspiration, but as However, when describing a post-collapse a trailblazer and fellow combatant. Tarrant future society reorganised according to fully shares Breivik’s ideal of fighting Islam traditional principles – with women active ism and Muslim immigration, to protect as mothers and homemakers, men as pro- the Christian faith, Western nations and viders and defenders – they draw a distinc- European ethnic stock from what he sees tion between the Nordic and the apparently as an ongoing white genocide by Muslims Islamic way of treating womenfolk: (Tarrant 2019: 2–3 and passim). Like Breivik, Tarrant also included links to vari- Our views on women are not inspired ous internet pages with contents that sup- by any desert religion but are derived port his views. directly from the natural and egali- In his manifesto, Tarrant (2019: 11–13, tarian vision of our Nordic ancestors 20–1) presents himself as a modern Cru (Our Path 2016: 38; my italics). sader, re-enacting the original religious- military conflict between Christianity and In a similar vein, the Generation Identity newly-established Islam in the distant movement (generation referring roughly to past. In a more current tone, he justifies those born in the 1980s and 1990s) declare their respective homelands, as well as 11 Published online immediately before the Europe in general, to be off-limits for all, attack, like Breivik’s. ‘Replacement’ refers including Muslim, immigrants. Taking as a to the perceived threat of ethnic Euro peans being replaced by immigrating non- starting point exclusive nativist and ethno- Europeans, with big families and mainly of nationalist principles, they introduce an Islamic faith. inverted, positive version of the restricting
Approaching Religion • Vol. 9, No. 1–2 • October 2019 83 principle. The globally applicable ethno Mosques are not mere places of wor- pluralist ideal allows nations and cultures ship but cultural centres, places for to prosper, each in its own way and, most strengthening the community, embas- importantly, in its own space, in an atmos- sies of Islam and bases for conquest. phere of mutual respect, separate but equal, Your claim that constructing mosques thus genuinely preserving cultural diversity will stop praying in the streets is utter and ensuring peaceful conditions for all nonsense. Those street prayers are (Generation Identity 2013: 7–12; Willinger political instruments which serve 2013: 41–4, 71–7, 82–3; Willinger 2014: 19, to impose further mosques on us! 21, 38–40). (Generation Identity 2013: 18, 25) The original French Identitarian ‘fight- ing community’ proudly counts itself as The religiously motivated anti-Islam- having begun the October 2012 dem- ism, expressed by references to the Cru onstration at the construction site of sades, is complemented by a mundane cri- the Grand Mosque in Poitiers – a loca- tique of the current multiculturalist society, tion of great symbolic importance as the in desperate nationalistic tones that at battle site where Charles Martel defeated times verge on racism, at others borrow the a Muslim army in 732. Equating religious Nazi Blut-und-Boden vocabulary. and political Islam, the movement declares a modern French Reconquest, modelled We are the generation of ethnic frac- in the vein of the original Reconquista ture, of the total failure of integration, which reclaimed Spain from Muslim rule the generation of forced cross-breed- by means of Catholic forces in the eighth ing. … We have stopped believing that to fifteenth centuries (Generation Identity Abdul is our brother, the planet our 2013: 7, 12–13, 18–9, 28–9, 37). village, and humanity our family. We have discovered that we have roots A hundred youths, men and women and ancestors – and thus a future. Our from all over France, have just entered only inheritance is our blood, our soil the future Grand Mosque and occu- and our identity. We are the heirs of pied the roof. Across the front façade, destiny. (Generation Identity 2013: facing the minaret, we have un 9–10) furled a banner with a clear message. ‘Immigration, mosque construction, A nation can recover from an eco- REFERENDUM’. By this, its first nomic crisis or a war, but not from major act, Generation Identity intends the replacement of its population. to place itself in the front line of the Without the French, France will no fight for our identity. longer exist. (Generation Identity 2013: 19) It will soon be 1,300 years since Charles Martel stopped the Arabs at Poitiers In his two booklets, titled Generation following a heroic battle which saved Identity: A Declaration of War against the our country from Muslim invasion. It ‘68ers (2013), and A Europe of Nations happened on 25 October 732. Today, (2014), Markus Willinger blames the we have reached 2012 and the choice 1968 generation of importing foreign- is still the same: live free or die. ers, mainly of Muslim origin, in order to
Approaching Religion • Vol. 9, No. 1–2 • October 2019 84 create a multicultural society for what the because the Muslims are the embodi young generation sees as frivolous rea- ment of pure evil, but because your sons – to add ‘diversity’ and ‘colourful’ multicultural society does not work. cultural attractions, in the process happily (Willinger 2013: 63–6) shattering what they despised as ‘boring’ European traditions – all the while expect- Towards the end of the above argu ing the newcomers to immediately mod- mentation, there is, however, a passage that ernise and adapt to their liberal European stands out for its expression of basic reli- ways. To curb the unfortunate experi- gious tolerance. ment, the Identitarians, acting as the young indigenous Europeans – ‘the rightful heirs’ We condemn neither Muslims nor – now claim back the continent. However, Islam. Here we are a thousand times they also claim to be willing to maintain more tolerant than you ever were. We peaceful political relations with the Arab neither hate nor demonise. We don’t world, provided that the cultural spheres claim to have found the absolute truth are kept separate in the future (Willinger but recognise the unique and legitim 2013: 17, 38, 95–9, 102–3 and 2014: 38–40, ate truths of each and every culture. 59–60, 88–90). (Willinger 2013: 66) The author openly mocks the multicul- turalist generation for their apparent con- Later on, Muslim immigrants are never descending attempt to enlighten and edu- theless dismissed in no uncertain tones, cate Muslim immigrants, in order to make patronising them while offering safe pas- them into modern Westerners. Instead, sage home, as well as support in developing their communities of origin. Associating Muslims opposed your fanatical and Muslims with tents may have several impli- heedless ideology with an equally cations, from actual Calais-style tent camps fanatical religion, the political Islam. of hopeful migrants, or a pejorative associ- … Today millions of Muslims live in ation with poor housing conditions in gen- Europe and laugh at your ideology eral, to a more archaic image, referring to with contempt. You still hope to be an imagined nomadic Arab culture or even able to win them over. You call this to the tents used by the Muslim armies integration. Yet it’s time to recognise during the Crusade period (see below). one thing: the proud Muslims of the East will never accept your beliefs Muslims and Africans! Take down and theories. … For some time now, your tents and leave this continent. the most radical of the Muslims, also Entire regions of the world already known as Salafists, have been on an belong to you. We’ll gladly help you aggressive counteroffensive. They are make your homelands better places, proselytising in the heart of Europe. help you to build and shape them. Among the uprooted and disori- Even more so than European help, ented Europeans, there are a few who Africa and the global East need you apparently find Islam an anchor in the and your strength. (Willinger 2013: storm. … The presence of millions of 88) Muslims in Europe represents a con- tinuing threat to the continent. Not
Approaching Religion • Vol. 9, No. 1–2 • October 2019 85 The racially oriented British ethno- themselves as having a divine right to rule nationalist Arthur Kemp (2012 and 2013: the world. They are said to work towards 36–41 and passim) lists Muslims among multiculturalism, mass immigration and the many equally unwelcome extra-Euro- liberalism with the aim of dividing and pean immigrant groups. As his main focus conquering all other bases of political is on Europeans as indigenous peoples – as power besides themselves, at the same time carriers of a plethora of valuable local and destabilising and eventually dissolving all national cultures, threatened by demo- other national cultures and traditional graphic pressure – he has little interest in social norms. Echoing older conspiracy religions as such. Meanwhile, the French theories about Jews, the Nordic Resistance philosopher-soldier Dominique Venner Movement claims that once in power it will (2015: 3, 18–25, 56, 63–80, 130–1) claims prohibit such ‘malicious and secret soci to recognise an essential difference between eties engaging in subversive operations’. Christianity and Islam: while the one is a However, a person’s ‘Jewishness’, in the religion, the other is also a community, a ideological sense, ultimately depends on law and a civilisation. Like Breivik, Venner their choices and actions, not on an ethno- also points out the traditionally inferior religious essence: position of Muslim women and the violent conquests made in the name of Islam. As he Even non-Jews include themselves sees it, the weakness of post-WWII Europe in the global Zionist elite, motivated has indeed developed into a Spenglerian by their own religion or egoism. It moment, allowing ‘tired old Europe’ to be should be noted that not all Jews are colonised by vigorous Islamic migrants. Zionists and that there are Jews who stand against the Zionist endeavour Judaism: antisemitism and pro-Israel attitudes for power. (Our Path 2016: 7, 16–7) When it comes to Jews, Judaism and the state of Israel, opinions are divided among The rest of the neo-nationalist authors the neo-nationalists. The starkest hostil- have a more positive take on Judaism. The ity is expressed by the Nordic Resistance long-standing conflict between Islam and Movement. Their take is not ethnic-racist Judaism in the Middle East gives incentive as such, nor is it very religion-oriented to Breivik’s (2011: 186, 202, 206–8, 337, either, but is based on a ‘World Jewry’ type 1373 and passim) appreciation of the state of concept, formulated into a Nazi-style of Israel, and the Jewish diaspora, as nat economic and cultural critique. ural allies in the fight against Islamism. He The short second chapter of Our Path also expresses admiration towards Judaism (16–17) focusses on the issue of a sup- both as a religion and as a cultural trad posed ‘global Zionist elite’, allegedly acting ition. Tarrant’s (2019: 14, 18) is a straight- in the interest of the state of Israel and of forward ethno-nationalist attitude towards what is termed (positive) Jewish racism. Judaism: as long as they live in Israel, it is Zionists are presented as a parasitic class ‘ok’ with him. Kemp (2013: 52–63) admires of international capitalists, a hidden power the Zionist project as ‘the only practical and that controls not only the global monet surviving ethnostate in the world’, while ary infrastructure, but also all major mili- recognising the crucial role of widespread tary resources and media houses. As ‘God’s antisemitism in its creation. chosen people’, Zionists allegedly consider The most neutral reaction to the
Approaching Religion • Vol. 9, No. 1–2 • October 2019 86 current conflict of Islam and Judaism in the Venner, in more ways than one, was the Middle East comes from the Identitarians. Roman among the neo-nationalist authors. Willinger expresses sympathy for both His military-masculine ethos is inspired sides of the dispute over the Temple Mount by a mixture of the glorious history of the in Jerusalem, recognising the special signi Roman legions, the medieval knighthood ficance of the ancient religious site. and the heroes of classical Greek narra- tives from Homer onwards, with the addi- In the deserts of the holy land, the tion of the modern bravery of Claus von ancient traditions of two peoples col- Stauffenberg and others, who attempted lide, and they both fight for their to murder Adolf Hitler in 1943. His deci- highest values, the holy sites of their sion to take his own life was carried out as national, cultural, and religious iden- a Roman-style public suicide. Venner shot tities. … The conflict is neither of an himself in 21 May 2013, in Nôtre Dame economic nor a political nature; it is Paris, apparently in protest against multi- entirely cultural. This struggle isn’t culturalism, feminism, the legalisation of about money or resources, but sym- gay marriage, and the inability of the French bols and holy places. (Willinger 2013: government to curb Muslim immigration, 91–2) thus allegedly bringing down European civilisation. The Central-European streak Recounting the long history of cruel- of Venner’s paganism manifests itself in ties on both sides, Willinger (2014: 88–90) powerful imagery of sacred forests, nature doubts there is any possibility of ever animated with spirits, and ritual sacri- resolving the conflict. Seeing that outside fice, related to the hunter-warrior identity meddling mainly aggravates the situation, of male brotherhoods. Being no egalitar- he declines any unconditional crusade- ian when it comes to gender roles, Venner style support for Israel. Utilising the situ- nevertheless stressed the importance of the ation to demagogically argue for his own mystical sexual union of male and female, ideas, he points out the folly of expecting particularly as described by the classical any two religions – in this case, Christianity pagan authors (Venner 2015: 17, 26–54, and Islam – to live in peace with each other 81–91; Gottfried 2015). in a shared space, for example, in Europe. Venner’s countryman Alan de Benoist (2004) is remarkably sober in compari- If anything can be learned from the son. For him, Greek and Roman paganism conflict in the Middle East, it’s that as well as traditional Catholicism are the having two entirely different peoples core ingredients of European cultural and in one territory is an atrocity and a religious heritage, invaluable as a spiritual crime. (Willinger 2014: 89) resort in the imminent crisis of individual- istic modernity. Neo-pagans of Roman and Nordic varieties Compared to the founding fathers dis- The main neo-pagan trends within neo- cussed above, the history-conscious and nationalism relate to ancient Roman and emotional paganism of the Identitarians Nordic-German cultures – the former is softer and somewhat less erudite, often added with Central-European local colour, manifesting itself as a quasi-religious love the latter tinged, at least in the eyes of out- of the natural and cultural landscapes of siders, with Nazi antecedents. the Fatherland.
Approaching Religion • Vol. 9, No. 1–2 • October 2019 87 As a collective, Generation Identity It’s a struggle for our homeland, and (2013: 37) is content to mention the ancient we are losing. (Willinger 2014: 19) pagan cultures of Athens and Rome, as well as of the Celts, as important sources In a more sober tone, Willinger (2014: of current European identity, expressing 75–7) recognises the importance of Roman respect for and identifying with the prehis- and Germanic pagan heritage for the cur- toric pagan ancestry as original Europeans. rent European cultural identity – spread In his foreword to Willinger’s first book, during the period of migration and mixed French Identitarian Philippe Vardon (b. with the local beliefs, thus forging conti- 1980) evokes images of romantic, pastoral nent-wide common traditions. According nationalism mixed with modern symbols to Willinger, they still persist, even though of state power, adds the chain of gener Christianity has always sought to hush up ations, and wraps the lot up in a powerful, the existence of preceding religions. He if also potentially alarming, rhetoric of Us even declares that old-style traditional vs. Them – the latter identifiable as multi- Christianity is no longer a living influ- culturalist EU elites, liberal modernists and ence. Rather, Europeans are what he terms immigrants. ‘pagan Christians’, lax in worship and tol- erant of other gods, not proselytising. To They have defiled our flags, erased our regain genuine spirituality and revitalise frontiers, twisted the very names of their culture, Europeans should embrace things. With them, the homeland is no both pagan and Christian heritage, especi longer the land of one’s fathers! It runs ally by reviving the Greek and Roman, as into a nebulous idea, an abstraction, well as Germanic festivals. a construct. For us it represents the The Nordic variety of neo-pagan- most concrete things of all: our words ism borrows from Scandinavian sources. and songs, our forests and mountains, While Breivik (2011: 742, 901, 1400) con- our bell-towers and castles, our rela- tents himself with referring to his Viking tives’ graves and our babies’ cradles. ancestry as inspiration and source of pride, We carry our flag within us and trace Nordic Resistance Movement proudly flies the frontiers ourselves: this is our iden- a flag adorned with the Scandinavian Tiwaz tity! The agents of systems of killing rune, signifying Tyr, Odin’s son, and asso- peoples – to quote Guillaume Faye’s ciated with war.12 The movement’s overall formidable formula – would like to ideological take capitalises on the heritage break the chain of our heritage: we’re of the Nordic cultural sphere, such as the here to fix its links. (Vardon 2013: 8) promotion of indigenous peoples (includ- ing minorities), languages and pagan folk- In his second book Willinger emulates lore, spiritually accentuated environmen- Vardon’s romantic despair when contem- talism and respecting their Nordic ancestry plating the allegedly threatened ancestral (Our Path 2016: 12–5, 18, 29–31). landscapes, mixing it with paranoid ‘camp Tarrant (2019: 13, 37, 40–2, 72) gener- mentality’. ally recommends that the peoples remain true to their native faiths. Ending his It is a struggle for Europe itself, for Europe’s cities, streets and homes, for 12 For details, see Wikipedia entries on ‘Tyr’ our meadows, mountains, and lakes. and ‘Tiwaz’.
Approaching Religion • Vol. 9, No. 1–2 • October 2019 88 manifesto with a ‘Goodbye, god bless and towards Middle East Christians, persecuted I will see you in Valhalla’, he mixes the by Muslims. As became apparent from flippant with the solemn, and Christian their statement, released at the building with pagan. However, his environmental- site of the Poitiers mosque in 2012, quoted ism, veneration of ancestors while look- above, they also strongly associate them- ing towards future generations, as well as selves with the Christian Crusaders who the idea of a ‘Roman’ death of a heroic sol- defended European lands against Muslim dier are well in harmony with the different invaders and settlers (Generation Identity aspects of neo-pagan ideology. 2013: 37–40). Willinger’s take is more complex. Asso Christianity and neo-Catholicism ciating the present Church with primitive Many supporters of the current 2010s fanaticism, intolerance and general back- European radical right movements embrace wardness, he refuses both High-Church traditional Christianity. Along with nation- and atheist options, looking instead for alism, the Christian religion functions a church that would genuinely support a as the logical antithesis of both their per- community of modern Christians. ceived main adversaries; that is to say, the recent mass immigration and the secular/ Religious [Christian] fanaticism in all atheist post-1968 spirit of the liberal Left, of its forms is incomprehensible to us, particularly in its present guise as the pro- and often seems primitive and stupid. moter of individualist, multi-gender, multi- Yet deeply religious people and cul- culturalist, multi-religion ideals of society. tures fascinate us, for we know they In the Northern and Central European have something we lack: a deep, inner countries, religiously more mixed in regard feeling that they are sheltered and pro- to Christian denominations, extra-parlia tected. A lucid certainty in matters of mentary right-wing movements tend to right and wrong. produce thinkers who, without always being anti-modernist or pro-Catholic as We can only imagine how it might such, nevertheless share the romantic and feel not to be plagued by constant intensely emotional religious tradition- self-doubt. We will never feel that way alism of their Nordic fellow ideologues ourselves, for religion has become (Vuorinen 2014: 188–9 and 2016: 145–51). unthinkable. We can’t obey dogmas, In mainly Catholic countries, Catholi and so we feel ourselves at once su cism is part and parcel of the received perior and inferior to the fanatics, … Christian heritage. For de Benoist (2004; de Benoist and Champetier 2012) and Venner Yet even nothingness itself makes (2015) as well as the Identitarians, Catholi no sense to us. How are atheists sup- cism appears as a normal, uncompli- posed to know that there is no God? cated European practice, albeit threatened In this sense we believe in an indefi- by both home-grown secular modern- nite higher power that may or may not ism and immigration from non-Christian exist. (Willinger 2013: 21–2) countries. The French Identitarians recognise In mainly Protestant countries the atti- the Christian roots of European culture tude towards Catholicism varies from dis- and society; they also express compassion interest and hostility to an ardent wish
Approaching Religion • Vol. 9, No. 1–2 • October 2019 89 to return to the original Mother Church. a hero’s death. A third case in point is the For converts, Catholicism often appears public suicide, committed by another self- as undiluted Christianity, with a long his- publicised knight, Venner, who did not take tory of earthly and spiritual power, grand others with him when shooting himself in ceremonies and a full palette of sacra- the Paris Notre Dame on 21 May 2013. ments, many of which have been stripped Breivik claims membership of a from the Protestant versions of Christian modern order of Knights Templar, alleg- ritual. Combining the ornamental with edly recently revived in Great Britain, the mystical, neo-Catholicism often mani- to combat Islam in present-day Europe. fests as romantic, intensely emotional and His manifesto includes a detailed trea- personal, sometimes admixed with anti- tise on the history, ideology, symbols and modern and anti-liberal traits. Combined battle gear of the original Templars, com- with neo-masculinity, neo-Catholicism plete with a sample of his own modern- produces the romantic ideal of the medie- day designs based on them. He recounts val Christian Knight, embodying a selfless the histories of two great battles in which commitment to defending the Faith and the Christian Europeans defeated Muslim Crown, as well as protecting the defenceless armies, praising Charles Martel, the hero and the poor. On a personal and emotional of the battle of Tours (Poitiers), as a great level, an imagined knighthood provides strategist and leader of men. The cryp- both an ideal community, a sense of his- tic digit 2083 in the title of his manifesto tory and destiny, trans-generational con- refers to the incoming 400th anniversary tinuity as a member of an ancient institu- of the second battle at the gates of Vienna tion, a moral tradition, and an ethic code in 1683, where the Catholic Christian lead- of self-discipline, self-respect, loyalty and ers of the Holy Roman Empire and the sacrifice.13 Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth jointly In the case of both Breivik and Tarrant, defeated the Ottoman Turks for the second modern knighthood involves a commit time. His motto, De laude novae militia (‘In ment to one’s race and the Western nations. praise of the new militia’) – is a quotation They see their personal quests as part of of St Bernhard of Clairvaux, the patron a great battle between Christianity and saint of the original Templars, celebrating Islam, a re-enactment of the Crusades the victorious Templars as the liberators of (Breivik 2011: 1:11–14, 1:20–2, 3:11–20, the Temple Mount in Jerusalem; the text is 3:62–70, 3:72, 3:153 and passim; Tarrant quoted mainly for the description of ideal 2019: 4–5). Both also include the element knighthood it includes (Breivik 2011: 3:11– of martyrdom, or voluntary self-sacrifice. 20, 3:72). When it comes to his personal Breivik (2011: 858, 867, 913, 947, 1328–9) ‘Justiciar Knight Commander’ Templar manifestly expected to be killed in action, avatar, it is anybody’s guess whether he while Tarrant (2019: 12–3, 55) expressed originally meant it as an abstract romantic doubts about his survival, urging his fellow pose, appropriated it as a usable, readymade Christians and Westerners to follow his identity, or contemplated it as an archetypal example, joining the grand crusade to die personification of a moral philosophy. Like Breivik, Tarrant expressed sym- bolic allegiance to the historical defence of 13 See Fukuyama (2018: 18–22) on the history Europe against Islamic invaders by inscrib- and philosophy of the warrior-defender identity. ing the names of Charles Martel and other
Approaching Religion • Vol. 9, No. 1–2 • October 2019 90 Crusaders on the weapons he used (see for them alive. Apparently, those who love example The Guardian 15.3.2019). He, too, traditions have the most to lose in times claims to have contacted reborn Templars, of rapid change, while others embrace the to ask for their blessing in support of the change and expect to fare better because of attack. In addition, he salutes Breivik, it. As neo-nationalists see it, the difference thanking him ‘for receiving his blessing between conservative traditionalists and for my mission after contacting his brother progressive modernists is a major schism Knights’. As further, historical inspiration of our time. he mentions Pope Urban, who in 1095 The current extreme-right neo-nation- called Christians to the First Crusade, to alist thinking represents the renewal, re- take the Holy City of Jerusalem back from enactment and /or revival of several old Seljuk Turks, as well as the victory of the schools of thought. The programme thus Battle of Vienna in 1683 (Tarrant 2019: 17, embodies an impressive array of what 25, 29, 41–2). might be termed neo-tendencies – from neo-nationalist and neo-conservative to Conclusion: a clash of civilisations, neo-romantic, neo-collective and neo- and what comes after? masculine. Neo-spiritual and neo-religious This article deals with aggressive political notions combine well with the general neo- ideologies that preach against multicultur- traditionalist frame. alist ideology, favouring instead the nativ- Both religious and nationalistic tenden- ist or ethno-nationalistic principle; that is cies connect to the idea of an emotional to say, for each nation their own country, community, as they both produce a feeling or, for each culture its own geographical of being a part of something bigger than space. Their most prominent feature, as oneself. Instead of the modernist ideal of opposed to other, more moderate neo- human beings as separate, independent, nationalist schools of thought, is that they free individuals, neo-nationalists empha- openly oppose the presence of newcomer size belonging and togetherness. National religious-cultural-ethnic minorities, chiefly and religious communities as well as estab- Muslims, on European soil, toying with lished religious-cultural traditions, collec- designs of forced eviction or even destruc- tively shared, not only join people together tion of recent immigrant groups. Many temporarily, but offer a sense of continuity of them also flirt with notorious histor beyond the individual life span (Staub ical precursors with impressive death tolls, 1989: 15–6, 21–2, 32, 39–42, 53–5, 99, 105; from the Crusaders to the Nazis. Waller 2007: 146–61, 172; Griffin2012 : 18, Seen from the outside, their expressed 144). ways of thinking easily fall into the category In an age of singleness and childless- of hate speech, with intolerant, anti-Islamist ness, a perceived/imagined continuity and racist undertones. Seen from the inside, from ancestry to future generations may they equally acknowledge many objects of provide emotional stability for those who collective love, including Christian heritage have neither siblings, spouse nor offspring. and pagan folklore, the homeland, local The contemporary togetherness with like- and national traditions, and the family, to minded coevals and the vertical cross- be fought for and protected. Cultural trad generation continuity combine, ground- itions cannot be secured by owning them, ing an individual both into a present-day but must be cherished collectively to keep collective and a cross-period continuum.
Approaching Religion • Vol. 9, No. 1–2 • October 2019 91 Close togetherness, in turn, creates both Templar terrorists, plus the lesser mayhem in-group affiliation and enmity towards caused by the Identitarians and the Nordic others. In the current situation, the reli- Resistance Movement, on the one hand, gious divide provides a powerful ideolog- and the deeds by the now nearly defeated ical engine for both identity-building and Middle-Eastern Caliphate, founded by pan- for drawing boundaries between in-groups nationalistic, neo-Islamist ISIS, notorious and out-groups. also for terror attacks, on the other. It is Another neo-traditionalist, anti-mod- also worth noting that the exact same mili- ernist streak of neo-nationalist thinking is tant ethos, combined with romantic ultra- its expressed wish to reinstate the positive masculine warrior hero imagery, were typi- role of men in society: as spouses, fathers, cal for the broadly mediatised propaganda providers and defenders. Combined with by the opposing side of modern anti-Islam- religion, the neo-masculine ideal produces ism, namely the ISIS, at its peak. the image of the Christian Knight – emi- In a potential best-case scenario, the nently applicable in a perceived context aggressive ideology formation, even as of European nations being once again in practised by the above individuals and danger of succumbing to the expansion groupings, may eventually function as a of Islam, enabled by globalist, liberal EU political safety valve, keeping most individ- elites. Heated nationalist conflicts easily uals from resorting to actual violence while give rise to political violence, with opera- venting an otherwise suppressed grievance. tives motivated by an idea of potential self- The exclusivist and aggressive expressions sacrifice for one’s national community – the typical of the radical neo-nationalists and latest case being the New IRA, defending a nativists can be perceived as symptoms of united Ireland against the establishment of a new type of social friction, with a strong a so-called hard border between EU Irish potential of bringing on a societal conflict Republic and post-Brexit Britain. that ends in violence. However, the situ The neo-masculine streak, introduced ation may also calm down, for example by the founding fathers of neo-national- with the emergence and gradual establish- ism, de Benoist and Venner, is particu- ment of moderate neo-conservative par- larly strong among its youngest generation. liamentary parties within the European The youth-movement aspect, though far political scene, able and willing to negotiate removed from the usual Youth Studies cur- an eventual peaceful solution. ricula, is nevertheless essential for assessing Taken at face value, the positive, in- the future and potential significance of the group related emotional aspects of neo- phenomenon. Combined with patrimony nationalist programmatic texts appear to issues, the struggle for a right of inherit- be intensely romantic. Theirs is not the ance has the makings of an epic conflict modern aspect of ‘romance’ as something over the symbolic ownership of Europe. bright, cute and harmless, painted in light Some obvious worst-case scenarios pink shades, but its opposite appeal – the related to the current developments have darker shades of passion (in both senses of already come into being. An historical re- intense love and equally intense suffering) enactment of an ancient conflict that gave and perceived destiny consciousness. To rise to the original Crusades seems to be dismiss this as something naïve, feeble or in progress. Instances of actual violence ridiculous is to ignore the main appeal and include the deeds of the two self-styled strength of radical neo-nationalism.
Approaching Religion • Vol. 9, No. 1–2 • October 2019 92 Marja Vuorinen, PhD, Anthropology, eds. Andre Gingrich and is a historian and social Marcus Banks (New York and Oxford, scientist whose areas Berghahn Books), pp. 1–26 of expertise include the Bat Ye’or, 2006. Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis history of elites, nation- (Madison NJ, Fairleigh Dickinson Univer- alisms and propaganda, sity Press) the interplay of enemy- Benoist, Alan de, 2004. On Being Pagan [Com- images and in-group ment peut-on être paîen? 1981], trans. Jon identities, and theories Graham, ed. Greg Johnson (Atlanta GA, and semiotics of power. Ultra) Her current research topic is ‘Finnish hate Benoist, Alan de, and Charles Champetier, speech throughout the ages’. From 2006, 2012. Manifesto for a European Renaissance she acts as the Chair of the Elites and Fore- (London, Arktos) runners theme network within the European Bourke, Joanna, 2005. Fear: A Cultural History Social Science History Conference (ESSHC). (London, Virago Press) From 2014, she is a member of the organising Breivik, Anders Behring, 2011. 2083: A Euro committee of the biannual Finnish–Russian pean Declaration of Independence,
Approaching Religion • Vol. 9, No. 1–2 • October 2019 93 Venner, The Shock of History: Religion, Mem Kellner, Manuel, 2015. ‘Introduction’, The Far ory, Identity (London, Arktos), pp. vi–ix Right in Europe, ed. Fred Leplat (London, Griffin, Roger, 2008. A Fascist Century, ed. Resistance Books, International Institute for Matthew Feldman (Basingstoke, Palgrave Research & Education), pp. 9–27 Macmillan) Kemp, Arthur, 2012 (2008). Folk and Nation: ——2018. Fascism: An Introduction to Compara Ethnonationalism Explained (UK, Ostara tive Fascist Studies (Cambridge, Polity) Publications) ——2012. Terrorist’s Creed: Fanatical Violence ——2013. Nova Europa: European Survival and the Human Need for Meaning (Basing Strategy in a Darkening World (UK, Ostara stoke, Palgrave Macmillan) Publications) The Guardian 15.3.2019.‘Right-wing extrem- Larsson, Göran, 2014. ’Islamophobia or legit- ist wrote manifesto before livestream- imate concern? Contrasting official and ing Christchurch shooting’, The Guardian, Populist understandings of opposition to 15.3.2019,
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Approaching Religion • Vol. 9, No. 1–2 • October 2019 95