sign in sign up
<<
Home , Physical object, Physics (Aristotle)

Traektoriâ Nauki = Path of Science. 2018. Vol. 5. No 3 ISSN 2413-9009

Qualitative in a Metaphysical Perspective

Aleksandr Kulieshov 1

1 Cherkasy State Technological University 460 Shevchenko Boulevard, 18006, Cherkasy, Ukraine

DOI: 10.22178/pos.44-5 Abstract. The article deals with the problem concerning the possibility of qualitative physics paradigm development and its close connection with . The LСC Category: BD95- of qualitative physics is based on the of and is 131 opposed to quantitative modern physics (classical and non-classical). It is stated that the essential difference between the two physical paradigms lies in the ways of Received 20.02.2019 describing physical objects. Qualitative physics presuppose the qualitative Accepted 20.03.2019 description of physical objects independent of their quantitative description. In Published online 31.03.2019 normal nowadays physics, on the contrary, physical objects are regarded to be fully determined through quantitative (numerical and structural-analytical) relationships with other objects. The statements of modern physics are considered reasonable if Corresponding Author: they can be self-consistently expressed by the apparatus of . The article [email protected] shows that this way of describing and explaining physical is incomplete. There is ground to assert that the quantitative of physical objects do not encompass that exists in the relations of physical objects. It is argued that there are qualitative aspects of physical reality that are not defined quantitatively and may become the content of special qualitative physics. The conclusion is made that © 2018 The Author. This such qualitative physics in its principles and language must be close to traditional article is licensed under a metaphysics and can appear to be an application of metaphysics to the field of Creative Commons physical reality. Attribution 4.0 License Keywords: physical paradigm; qualitative physics; quantitative physics; metaphysics;

the way of describing physical objects.

INTRODUCTION objects that are differently described quantita- The term “qualitative physics” has nowadays at tively. The peculiarity of qualitative methods least two spheres of application. One concerns a consists in taking into account only qualitative parameters. “As a of fact, one important branch of physical research connected with arti- of qualitative physics is to support reasoning ficial having been formed in USA in about physical systems that does not require (or 80-90-ies of the 20th century. It is characterized by the general understanding of qualitative phys- pretend to have) exact numerical ics as a of methods which can help in achiev- about them” [4, p. 124]. Qualitative physics un- derstood in this way does not preclude the for- ing some results within physical science. In [4] this research branch is depicted in such a way: malization of qualitative parameters, their ex- “In most qualitative physics approaches, systems pression in mathematical form (in the form of a are characterized in terms of parameters that special algebra), which should facilitate the transfer of qualitative physical reasoning to the take on “qualitative values”. Such qualitative val- ues may be obtained from the respective quanti- level of machine intelligence. As it was stated by tative (i. e. real-valued) description by consider- K. D. Forbus, “Qualitative physics arises from the need to share our intuitions about the physical ing significant “landmarks” which discriminate world with our machines” [5, p. 241]. In general, qualitatively between different states or modes of behaviour (e. g. the freezing point and the boil- such qualitative physics does not differ from ing point of a fluid , or the maximal opening mathematical physics by its objects, , and of a valve) [4, p. 124]. Thus, qualitative physics is general principles of research. It differs only in specified parameters and in methods of operat- reduced to a set of qualitative methods applied to ing with them. Qualitative physics refines and

Section “Philosophy” 1010 Traektoriâ Nauki = Path of Science. 2018. Vol. 5. No 3 ISSN 2413-9009 complements the results obtained by using quan- grounding its statements. This aspect of Aris- titative analysis, and in this , qualitative totle’s physics does not escape researchers` at- physics remains entirely within the science of tention. J. Schummer argues that “for physics as it is now understood. Experts in the and his followers, mathematics was clearly dis- field of qualitative physics agree in viewing tinct from physics, because it only described na- “qualitative physics as an of existing ture in geometrical or numerical terms. The task scientific disciplines rather than as an entirely of physics was, however, to explain ” [9, new field of endeavour” [8, p. 19]. p. 760]. The absence of the mathematical form of Another interpretation of qualitative physics is expression means that in the explanation of present in the historical analysis of early physical physical objects their measurable (homogene- theories, especially ancient ones. First of all, this ous) attributes are not highlighted, these attrib- term refers to the physics of Aristotle. Qualitative utes are not formalized in the form of variables physics means here not one of the aspects of and constants. In , numerical or analyti- physical research, but physics in general. This cal (in terms of sets and their elements) relations physics appears to be an alternative to classical between selected physical objects are not estab- and modern physics which is mathematized and lished. In this respect, the of qualitative based on experiment and measurement. At the physics is opposed to the concept of not just same , Aristotle's physics is closely con- quantitative, but mathematized physics. It seems nected with metaphysics, is an application of like this is the main sense of qualitative physics. metaphysics to the field of physical phenomena. Qualitative physics is the physics without I. Bodnar notes that “Aristotle’s metaphysics and mathematics, serving at least as the background physics use a common conceptual framework, for physical research. This is the physics without and they often address similar issues. The prime measurements or descriptive physics, which is and distinctive task of first philosophy is an in- reduced to the selection of qualitative differences quiry into first entities; these, however, are not in physical reality. perceptible entities, and as a result they have to It is established that the transition from Aristote- be investigated through a metaphysical investi- lian physics to modern one occurred in the 17th gation of physical entities. Hence the overlap be- century. And although there are doubts about the tween the two disciplines, which often verges on chronological framework of this process [7], the inseparability” [1]. Aristotle’s Physics, as general shift from qualitative physics to mathe- C. Shields notes, “is not, of course, a work of the matized one is obvious. The idea of the sort we find in modern quantitative physics. It is, “grand narrative” (as it is called by S. Roux) about rather, a puzzle-driven inquiry into features and the seventeenth century Scientific Revolution is facets of nature at their most general level” [10, that mathematization should be taken “as the cri- p.196]. Aristotle's physics is qualitative in two terion for distinguishing between a qualitative ways. First, we are talking about a qualitative un- Aristotelian philosophy and the new quantitative derstanding of the empirical basis of science. physics” [7, p. 320]. It may be that the introduc- Perceived qualities underlie the reasoning in the tion of mathematics in had physics of Aristotle. According to M. Mouzala, been more gradual and less revolutionary during “The crucial point of Aristotle’s theory of method the Renaissance and the Early Modern period but in the Physics I.1 is that , the only fac- it cannot be denied that “for Aristotle, mathemat- ulty of human that can have access to the ics merely captures the superficial properties of composite natural thing, naturally grasps it as an things” and this position is vastly different from indiscriminate, inarticulate and confused whole” the modern physics. Classical physics had [6, p. 48]. The purpose of the analysis in Aris- emerged to the great extent by overcoming the totle’s physics is to explain the qualitative trans- flaws of qualitative physics. A new understanding formations to which the quantitative ones are of empirical basis had appeared. It consisted in also reduced (increase and decrease in quantity, the formalized observation and experiments me- movement). thodically subordinate to the process of measur- More importantly, another feature of Aristotle’s ing physical quantities and their relations. But qualitative physics is that it lacks mathematical even more important thing – principally impor- apparatus as a means of expression and a way of tant for all modern physics, from the 17th cen- tury to the present day – was the conviction ex-

Section “Philosophy” 1011 Traektoriâ Nauki = Path of Science. 2018. Vol. 5. No 3 ISSN 2413-9009 pressed at the time by Albert Einstein: “Our ex- opment of science. Here is one of the characteris- perience up to date justifies us in feeling sure tic estimates for the work on the history of an- that in Nature is actualized the ideal of mathe- cient physics, giving preference to the physics of matical simplicity. It is my conviction that pure Democritus over the physics of Aristotle: mathematical construction enables us to discover “…classical was far superior to the phys- the and the connecting them ics of Aristotle, which upheld real qualitative dif- which give us the key to the understanding of the ferences between the four – or rather five – het- phenomena of Nature. can of course erogeneous elements and which, in regarding, for guide us in our of serviceable mathemati- instance, the process of evaporation as a real cal concepts; it cannot possibly be the source transformation of one element – water – into an- from which they are derived; experience of other – air – also believed in real qualitative course remains the sole criterion of the service- changes in nature. The modern concept of matter ability of a mathematical construction for phys- as homogeneous stuff differentiated only by the ics, but the truly creative principle resides in quantitative differences between the ultimate mathematics” [3, p. 167]. It should be added that – that is, their size, shape, position, and the new, non-Aristotelian and, in this sense, non- – was fully anticipated by Democritus qualitative physics also presupposed its separa- while it remained completely foreign to Aris- tion from metaphysics, along with reliance on totle`s qualitative physics. …There is no question one’s own capabilities in solving fundamental now which of these views was superior and . which was closer to the spirit and even to the let- The physics of nowadays looks like a set of for- ter of Newtonian physics [2, p. 4–5]. So, Aris- mulas, at least it can be most fully expressed in totle’s physics is an alternative physical paradigm this way. Physical entities are defined by their – this is recognized. However, this paradigm is formal (quantitative) relations to other entities. fundamentally wrong (it can be put in this sense The qualitative parameters are derived from next to the Ptolemy astronomical paradigm). A more general inference is also legitimate here: numerical-analytical. By virtue of this, a qualita- tive description is embedded in a quantitative qualitative physics is completely archaic and one and cannot be an alternative to it. Physics is does not deserve attention. It is advisable not to an external area of knowledge for metaphysics take it into account in modern thinking about the (in general – for philosophy). Moreover, in a dis- world. Though we can accept it in another sense pute about who will establish the ultimate indicated above – as a set of methods comple- regarding the , physics looks more con- menting the basic physical research. vincing. The objective of the article is to show that such a This state of affairs causes concern among phi- complete negation of qualitative physics as an losophers and, in part, among physicists them- alternative physical paradigm is excessive. There selves. Some paradigmatic problems of modern are limitations and uncertainties in modern mathematized physics, which make it impossible physics and its impact on physics-metaphysics relation can be found in materials of Scientific to present a complete picture of reality. Models and a Comprehensive Picture of Reality It will be argued, that there is the possibility to workshop, arranged by the Finnish Society for have a qualitative point of view on physical real- natural philosophy together with the physics ity, which is to some extent an alternative view of Foundations Society (Helsinki, 2016). One of things and which may fill those gaps in the pic- conclusions made is that today`s physical theo- ture of reality that are inevitable when explaining ries obtain the role of mathematical descriptions the world by means of mathematized physics. of observations instead of serving as real building This is, of course, not the restoration of Aris- blocks for a comprehensive picture of reality [11, totle’s physics in the form in which it existed. One p. 7]. may talk only about the efficiency of the very principle of qualitative physics as a complemen- Nevertheless in modern physics, the history and tary alternative to mathematized physics. It will the , the attitude towards also be demonstrated that in addition to the qual- qualitative physics as a special physical paradigm ity principle itself, such physics is similar to the remains in general negative. Aristotelian physics Aristotelian one in its closer connection with is estimated as a dead-end branch of the devel- metaphysics.

Section “Philosophy” 1012 Traektoriâ Nauki = Path of Science. 2018. Vol. 5. No 3 ISSN 2413-9009

RESULT AND DISCUSSION as being defined by their numerical or structural- analytical relations does not change. New theo- Almost all objects of modern physics are de- ries in physics of the late twentieth – early scribed by mathematical formulas. They are be- twenty-first century are also introduced through ing installed by numerical relations as well as the complication of mathematical apparatus, structural-analytical relations (relations of inclu- which does not change the nature of the relations sion) with other objects. A exists defining physical objects. Thus, the now popular in a physical theory as a side or a part of a certain hypothesis of fundamental physics – string the- equation (or rather equations). Other parts of the ory – involves one-dimensional (in some cases, equation are defined similarly. Thus, the com- multidimensional) spatial objects, defined by plete definition of a physical object is reduced to -time parameters, which, in turn, are de- a set of values (variables and constants) ex- termined by their movement. It seems that any pressed eventually through this object. Like any objects detected by physics are not defined oth- mathematical theory, modern physics is implic- erwise than by quantitative (numerical- itly tautological. The basic concepts in it refer not analytical) relationships with other objects de- to actual physical objects, but to the meanings of fined in the same way. elementary mathematical expressions. Do the quantitative (further we will use this term As an example we can take the concept of the in a broad sense – that is, non-qualitative) defini- of a physical body. In classical physics, the tions exhaust the of physical objects? inertial mass is determined through external The answer to this question must be negative. and acceleration, and the gravitational Quantitative definitions express exclusively rela- mass through the force of and gravita- tionships, but relationships cannot be only rela- tional acceleration. In its turn, force is deter- tionships. In relationships, there is always some- mined through mass and acceleration. The force thing that relates (relata). Even if the relata of a of gravity is determined through the mass and relationship are determined by the relationship acceleration of or through other values, itself, they are not identical to the relationship including the gravitational constant and the dis- itself. In relata there is something that makes tance between the centres of mass of attracted them the related sides of a relationship, and not bodies. The distance can be determined through the relationship itself, something that distin- acceleration and time, time – through the path guishes them from the relationship as such. In length and the average speed, which, in turn, is other words, something must acquire some form determined through acceleration, etc. All values in specific relationship and this substratum in no are interrelated or related to values that are con- case is quantitative. When we define the parame- stants. The extension of classical physics to rela- ters of a physical object, we define the parame- tivistic is carried out through the complication of ters of something which is out of all parameters. mathematical apparatus. In relativistic mechan- It is impossible for pure quantities or pure ics, mass is determined through the total mathematical objects to exist in material physical of a body, its (the product of mass reality. This is impossible by definition (physical and ) and the speed of light. Each of the reality is not identical to a mathematically con- objects determining mass, in turn, is determined structed reality). If all physical objects have through other values, indirectly including mass. quantitative definitions, then this means that Thus, the relativistic mass is a side of the ratio of there is something and there are quantitative quantities and does not differ from other quanti- definitions of it. Obviously, this something eludes ties as a quantity (in other words, a mathematical quantitative physics. object). In classical and relativistic physics it is customary Physical objects in another basic theory of mod- to talk about body mass. Mass is defined by its ern physics – quantum – are deter- relations with other quantities. But what is a mined in a similar way. The specificity of quan- body? Outside the mass (the quantitative pa- tum mechanics is a much greater complexity of rameter determined by other quantitative pa- relations, including the use of such branches of rameters) it turns out to be just a part of the mathematics as statistical mathematics and space associated with the mass parameter. How- probability theory and the supplementation of ever, a part of the space as such is not necessarily relations with new constants (in particular, the connected with mass, it needs further definition ). The nature of correlated values applying the factor that remains indefinable in

Section “Philosophy” 1013 Traektoriâ Nauki = Path of Science. 2018. Vol. 5. No 3 ISSN 2413-9009 quantitative physics. A physical body must have fairs it is impossible to explain variety of physical some entity besides all its quantitative and spa- objects quantitative relationships with other ob- tial definitions. This concerns not only to the con- jects. cept of a physical body. What is a string in string It follows that in addition to any quantitative dis- theory? It is a one-dimensional physical object tinctness, physical objects have some qualitative that changes its position in multidimensional differences. It is reasonable to think that these space. One-dimensionality, multidimensionality, qualitative differences are not determined by the spatial position are quantitative determinants quantitative relations of physical objects. In other (given by the corresponding formulas). In addi- words, physical objects outside their quantitative tion to them, there is a physical object which has definitions are not qualitatively neutral. This is quantitative definitions. The concept of a physical explained by the fact that qualitatively neutral object is empty. We do not know what exactly is physical objects cannot be different, they are all designated by this term. It is unlikely that re- the same. There is, therefore, some initial (rela- searchers engaged in can answer tive to quantitative relations) qualitative dis- the question of what exactly is that is one- tinctness of physical objects. Whether such quali- dimensional and fluctuating in their theory. On tative distinctness is fundamental to all that ex- the other hand, it is impossible to identify a ists is a metaphysical and debatable question. physical object with its properties, in this case Rather, it may be assumed that the primary with one-dimensionality and oscillatory motion. qualities of physical objects are given by their One-dimensionality and oscillatory motion can- special qualitative relations with other physical not be identified with a physical object, they re- objects. There is also reason to think that, in gen- quire some substratum. What is such a substra- eral, the defining qualitative relationships are tum? Nothing or something? asymmetric and represent grounding relation- The question of a substrate appeals to ships. One may add that the types and ranges of metaphysics and is the subject of discussion. values of the physical objects` quantitative rela- There are metaphysical concepts (so called tions are determined by their qualitative differ- “bundle theories”) stating that the totality of ences. qualities exhausts any existing object. This view The peculiarity of the qualitative description of does not exclude the existence of a substrate or physical objects is that such a description does rather something which performs the function of not require an answer to the question: what is a substrate. The substrate can be defined as the the carrier of qualities. Qualities are identifiable that is identical with combining or linking with physical objects, whereas quantitative pa- a of other qualities. In this case, it would rameters are identifiable with relations of ob- be possible to adopt the viewpoint that there are jects. You can separate quantitative relationships neutral physical objects (substrates) completely from objects, leaving objects essentially identical determined by their quantitative relations with but you cannot separate qualities ( pri- other objects. The of a physical object thus mary, substrate qualities or attributes) from ob- refers to the ability to be determined by concrete jects without destroying the objects themselves. quantitative relationships. Thus, it is plausible that the qualities of the sub- But this assumption does not explain the fact that strate of other qualities and of quantitative rela- physical objects are different. Let`s assume that a tions are identical with the substrate itself. This physical object is identical with the ability to be removes the question of the carrier of qualities determined by some quantitative relations. A being separate from all qualities. Substrate quali- question should be asked: is this ability the same ties of specific objects can be generated by other for all physical objects or are objects different in qualities identical to other substrates, which, in this ability? If the ability is the same, then all the end, leads to fundamental qualities identical physical objects must also be the same (at least to the primary ungrounded substrate or funda- qualitatively). Such a conclusion contradicts the mental reality. Such a picture of the world is hy- empirical data we have. If this ability is different pothetical, but at least consistent. for different physical objects, then there must be Qualitative description requires an appropriate some ground for this. And this ground must be in terminological apparatus. It looks obvious that at the objects themselves, which makes them dif- least some of the terms referring to objects that ferent initially, before any quantitative relations differ qualitatively, regardless of their quantita- they are in. Without admitting such a state of af-

Section “Philosophy” 1014 Traektoriâ Nauki = Path of Science. 2018. Vol. 5. No 3 ISSN 2413-9009 tive parameters, should differ from the terms of stract point of view, by expanding its search up to quantitative physics. Conversely, not all the elementary entities (we do not here solve the terms of quantitative physics should be applica- metaphysical question of whether these entities ble in the qualitative description. The rules for should be simple or complex). It is clear that in joining terms and the of relations between this sense, qualitative physics is inferior to meta- them may differ. So the description of purely physics in scope and level of abstractness. qualitative physical objects needs a special lan- The language of metaphysics, as well as the lan- guage. It seems not ungrounded to talk about guage of supposed qualitative physics, is qualita- qualitative description as a different physical dis- tive. It is the language reflecting reality prior to cipline, qualitative physics. its quantitative differences. It can be called the Of course, there are doubts. Isn't the project of language of differences as such. This homogene- qualitative physics an attempt to multiply enti- ity of the languages of metaphysics and qualita- ties without need? Shouldn't Occam's razor be tive physics suggests that the terms of qualitative used here? It is customary to think that physical physics could constitute a sublanguage of the reality is one. What will be given to us by its de- language of metaphysics. In the absence of spe- scription, based on different principles? Quanti- cific theories of qualitative physics, it is now diffi- tative physics demonstrates the ability to show cult to establish more precisely the relationship what exists in the physical world. It also exhibits between the two disciplinary languages. the way physical objects interact, how they move, In general, it is obvious that metaphysics and the points out to the immediate causes of physical alleged qualitative physics compose a fundamen- phenomena. This result obtaining is sufficient to tal unity. At that, qualitative physics directly fol- create a plausible picture of physical reality, to lows from metaphysics and is based on it. Per- have some theoretical understanding of the haps it would be permissible to speak of qualita- physical world and to use it for practical pur- tive physics as an applied metaphysics in the field poses. of physical reality. Or about borderline discipline The sense of qualitative physics, if such physics is on the verge of metaphysics and physics. In any ever to arise, will be the explanation of why cer- case, such a project would revive the unity of tain physical objects exist at all. Qualitative phys- metaphysics and physics, from which Aristotle ics should be engaged in figuring out how certain proceeded. physical events and processes are possible in the physical world, defining what can and what can- not physically exist, and in particular what does CONCLUSION not exist in the physical world, but could exist. The two most fundamental paradigms are distin- Without the implementation of this research guishable in the . The first is the program, it seems that a complete understanding paradigm of Aristotle. Aristotelian physics is or- of physical reality is impossible. ganically connected with metaphysics and based It is clear that qualitative and quantitative phys- on a qualitative description of physical objects. ics must be interconnected. In quantitative phys- The other is the paradigm of modern physics ics, the validity of fundamental physical concepts, (classical and non-classical), formed around the as a rule, boils down to the consistency of their 17th century. The physics of this paradigm can mathematical models. There may be more than be called quantitative. Physical objects in it are one such models. Qualitative physics could pro- determined through quantitative (numerical and vide decisive arguments for choosing one or an- structural-analytical) relationships with other other interpretation of quantitative physical data. objects. The statements of modern physics are considered reasonable if they can be self- There is no doubt that qualitative physics objec- consistently expressed by the apparatus of tives in general coincide with the goals of meta- mathematics. The article shows that this way of physics. The metaphysics in its traditional form describing and explaining physical reality is in- has always been searching for the same as it complete. would be natural of qualitative physics – to find out how it is possible for something to exists in There is ground to assert that the quantitative the world. At the same time, metaphysics en- relations of physical objects do not encompass deavours to represent that which exists with ut- everything that exists in the relations of physical most completeness and from an extremely ab- objects. So there are qualitative aspects of physi-

Section “Philosophy” 1015 Traektoriâ Nauki = Path of Science. 2018. Vol. 5. No 3 ISSN 2413-9009 cal reality that are not defined quantitatively. physics in its principles and language must be They require a separate qualitative description, close to traditional metaphysics and can appear independent of a quantitative (mathematized) to be an application of metaphysics to the field of one. Such a description can shape the content of physical reality. This corresponds to the initial qualitative physics paradigmatically different physical paradigm of Aristotle. from modern . The qualitative

REFERENCES 1. Bodnar, I. (2018). Aristotle's Natural Philosophy. In E. Zalta (Ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2018 ed.). Retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle- natphil/ 2. Cohen, R., & Wartofsky, M. (1983). Physical Sciences and History of Physics. Dordrecht: Springer. 3. Einstein, A. (1934). On the Method of Theoretical Physics. Philosophy of Science, 1(2), 163–169. 4. Faltings, B., & Struss, P. (Eds.). (1992). Recent Advances in Qualitative Physics. Cambridge: The MIT Press. 5. Forbus, K. D. (1988). Qualitative physics: Past, present, and future. In H. Shrobe, Exploring Artificial Intelligence (pp. 239–296). San Mateo: Morgan Kaufmann Publishers Inc. 6. Mouzala, M. G. (2013). Aristotle’s Method of Understanding the First Principles of Natural Things in the Physics I.1. Peitho. Examina Antiqua, 1(3), 31–50. doi: 10.14746/pea.2012.1.2 7. Roux, S. (2010). Forms of Mathematization (14th-17th Centuries). Early Science and Medicine, 15(4), 319–337. doi: 10.1163/157338210x516242 8. Sacks, E. P., & Doyle, J. (1992). Prolegomena to any future qualitative physics. Computational Intelligence, 8(2), 187–209. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8640.1992.tb00344.x 9. Schummer, J. (2008). Aristotelian Physics. In K. L. Lerner & B. W. Lerner (Hg.), Scientific in Context (Vol. 2, pp. 759–768). Detroit: Gale. 10. Shields, C. (2007). Aristotle. London: Routledge. 11. Suntola, T., & Styrman, A. (Eds.). (2016). Scientific Models and a Comprehensive Picture of Reality. Rome: La Nuova Critica.

Section “Philosophy” 1016