Quine and Whitehead: Ontology and Methodology 3
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World, Senses, Human Spirit: Extrapolating the Direction from the Past Through the Present and Into the Future
International Tinnitus Journal, Vol.ll, No.2, 103-105 (2005) EDITORIAL World, Senses, Human Spirit: Extrapolating the Direction from the Past Through the Present and Into the Future or human life, time is a specific monodirectional The Roman philosopher Lucius Aenaeus Seneca F dimension forcing us into serial development (4 Be - AD 65) then defined the phrase nihil in intel and behavior. We are living in the now, but we [ectu, quod non erat ante in sensu (from Naturales know that we stem from yesterday and that we are fac Quaestiones; "nothing can enter into the intellect if it ing the future: our tomorrow. With respect to bodily ex does not first pass through the gates of the senses"). In istence, every human seemingly has only one life. The this, Seneca coined the essentials of humans' communi human life can be regarded as constructing a wheel : We cation with the world and fellow men within the world. can imagine that year by year we fit a new spoke into We can encode from our surrounding things, facts , pic that circular element, a wheel that we call life and that tures, smells, odors, and sounds only after they have rolls us in only one direction, the future. Through de been perceived by our senses. veloping the species for many generations of humans, This really was an important philosophical step in many of these virtual wheels have been linked serially, the description of how human spirit works. All our un one behind the other. On the basis of culture and civili derstanding within our "now" needs information that zation, many humans have formed swarms of such arrives through the senses. -
PHI 110 Lecture 2 1 Welcome to Our Second Lecture on Personhood and Identity
PHI 110 Lecture 2 1 Welcome to our second lecture on personhood and identity. We’re going to begin today what will be two lectures on Rene Descartes’ thoughts on this subject. The position that is attributed to him is known as mind/body dualism. Sometimes it’s simply called the dualism for short. We need to be careful, however, because the word dualism covers a number of different philosophical positions, not always dualisms of mind and body. In other words, there are other forms of dualism that historically have been expressed. And so I will refer to his position as mind/body dualism or as Cartesian dualism as it’s sometimes also called. I said last time that Descartes is not going to talk primarily about persons. He’s going to talk about minds as opposed to bodies. But I think that as we start getting into his view, you will see where his notion of personhood arises. Clearly, Descartes is going to identify the person, the self, with the mind as opposed to with the body. This is something that I hoped you picked up in your reading and certainly that you will pick up once you read the material again after the lecture. Since I’ve already introduced Descartes’ position, let’s define it and then I’ll say a few things about Descartes himself to give you a little bit of a sense of the man and of his times. The position mind/body that’s known as mind/body dualism is defined as follows: It’s the view that the body is a physical substance — a machine, if you will — while the mind is a non-physical thinking entity which inhabits the body and is responsible for its voluntary movements. -
Plato Aristotle Plato’S “Realm of Being”
Plato Aristotle Plato’s “Realm of Being” P.58 "The philosopher's arithmetic applies precisely and strictly only to the world of Being". I am having a hard time understanding this part which seems to be Socrate's thinking. He is taking about equal and unequal units in math- where he says that the ordinary arithmetician operates with unequal units (becoming) and the philosopher with equal units (being). My question is: why does he think this and does that tell us something about how he sees the nature of numbers ultimately? — Loreta Plato’s “Realm of Being” If the realm is meant to be unchanging, and everything has a form, I find it hard to believe that the realm of being contains every possible object for the rest of time. But when new things such as computers are conceived into this world, does the realm of forms not change to account for a new concept? —Ariel Plato’s “Realm of Being” Just the other day I was thinking about why it is we dream of perfection and yet the world is never perfect in any regard. In that sense, I can understand why Plato posits that there is such thing as a world of Being and a World of Becoming, because I recognize the distinction. However, the World of Forms still seems to be a human's idealistic dream, something we believe will never exist in the physical world but is meant to exist anyway. I'm not sure if I can believe in something that is driven by just the idea of wanting it, since we dream of it. -
1 a REFUTATION of QUALIA-PHYSICALISM Michael
1 To appear in M. O’Rourke and C. Washington (eds.), Situating Semantics: Essays on the Philosophy of John Perry (MIT Press) A REFUTATION OF QUALIA-PHYSICALISM Michael McKinsey Wayne State University Recent defenders of reductive physicalism such as Brian Loar (1990, 1997) and John Perry (2001) have adopted an intriguing new strategy:i (1) accept as so much common sense (nearly) everything that property-dualists want to say about sensory qualia, including the central claims that sensory qualia determine ‘what it’s like’ to have a given sense experience, and that persons are directly aware of these qualia in the having of such experiences; (2) contend that while these common sense facts about qualia may show that our ways of thinking and speaking about qualia are conceptually different from our ways of thinking and speaking about physical properties of the brain, these facts do not show that sensory qualia themselves (as opposed to our ways of thinking and speaking about them) are distinct from physical properties of the brain; (3) use this contention to turn aside the few existing arguments against reductive physicalism by such property dualists as Kripke (1972), Nagel (1974), Jackson (1982), and Chalmers (1996); and finally (4) insist that sensory qualia are in fact just identical with physical properties of the brain, so that consequently, the facts about the sensory qualities of conscious experience are nothing over and above physical facts about the brain. I will call the view that incorporates this strategy ‘qualia-physicalism’, or ‘Q-physicalism’ for short. In this paper I will argue that Q-physicalism is false. -
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Papers, 1646-1716
http://oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/kt2779p48t No online items Finding Aid for the Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Papers, 1646-1716 Processed by David MacGill; machine-readable finding aid created by Caroline Cubé © 2003 The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Finding Aid for the Gottfried 503 1 Wilhelm Leibniz Papers, 1646-1716 Finding Aid for the Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Papers, 1646-1716 Collection number: 503 UCLA Library, Department of Special Collections Manuscripts Division Los Angeles, CA Processed by: David MacGill, November 1992 Encoded by: Caroline Cubé Online finding aid edited by: Josh Fiala, October 2003 © 2003 The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Descriptive Summary Title: Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Papers, Date (inclusive): 1646-1716 Collection number: 503 Creator: Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, Freiherr von, 1646-1716 Extent: 6 oversize boxes Repository: University of California, Los Angeles. Library. Dept. of Special Collections. Los Angeles, California 90095-1575 Abstract: Leibniz (1646-1716) was a philosopher, mathematician, and political advisor. He invented differential and integral calculus. His major writings include New physical hypothesis (1671), Discourse on metaphysics (1686), On the ultimate origin of things (1697), and On nature itself (1698). The collection consists of 35 reels of positive microfilm of more than 100,000 handwritten pages of manuscripts and letters. Physical location: Stored off-site at SRLF. Advance notice is required for access to the collection. Please contact the UCLA Library, Department of Special Collections Reference Desk for paging information. Language: English. Restrictions on Use and Reproduction Property rights to the physical object belong to the UCLA Library, Department of Special Collections. -
JEMH Vol4 No1 Sept
ARTICLE SPECIAL THEME ISSUE ARTICLE Privatization of Knowledge and the Creation of Biomedical Conflicts of Interest Leemon B. McHenry Department of Philosophy, California State University, Northridge Jon N. Jureidini Discipline of Psychiatry, University of Adelaide, South Australia rather than to what is meaningful, so that fi ndings that are Abstract likely to be clinical and meaningful are rejected because they fail to reach statistical signifi cance whereas others that appear Scientifi c and ethical misconduct have increased at an clinically trivial are accepted (Ziliak and McCloskey, 2007). Th e alarming rate as a result of the privatization of knowledge. disenchantment with the psychoanalytic paradigm of psychiatry What began as an eff ort to stimulate entrepreneurship led to a massive investment in psychopharmacology and other and increase discovery in biomedical research by physical interventions. A concession now to the limited benefi t strengthening the ties between industry and academics that psychopharmacology off ers would come at great cost to the has led to an erosion of confi dence in the reporting of profession. A vested interest in protecting the new paradigm of research results. Inherent tensions between profi t-directed neurological models of psychiatric disorders reaches beyond the inquiry and knowledge-directed inquiry are instantiated quest for a secure scientifi c foundation. in psychopharmacology, especially in the co-option of academic activity to corporate objectives. The eff ects of To the vulnerability created by personal bias and questionable these tensions are visible in research agendas, publication methodology we must add the dangers of pervasive fi nancial practices, postgraduate education, academic-industry confl icts of interest, of which we investigate the root cause in this partnerships and product promotion. -
Drugs, Money and Misleading Evidence
Books & arts tallying up the inequalities. She recruited colleagues to gather much more data. The culmination was a landmark 1999 study on gender bias in MIT’s school of science (see go.nature.com/2ngyiyd), which reverber- ated across US higher education and forced many administrators to confront entrenched discrimination. Yet Hopkins would rather have spent that time doing science, she relates. The third story comes from Jane Willenbring, a geoscientist who in 2016 filed a formal com- plaint accusing her PhD adviser, David March- ant, of routinely abusing her during fieldwork in Antarctica years before. Marchant, who has denied the allegations, was sacked from his post at Boston University in April 2019 after an inves- tigation. Picture a Scientist brings Willenbring together with Adam Lewis, who was also a grad- uate student during that Antarctic field season and witnessed many of the events. Their conver- sations are a stark reminder of how quickly and how shockingly the filters that should govern work interactions can drop off, especially in UPRISING, LLC Biologist Nancy Hopkins campaigned for equal treatment at work for female scientists. remote environments. Lewis tells Willenbring he didn’t realize at the time that she had been as they admit on camera. scientists. Its two other protagonists are white bothered, because she did not show it. “A ton The iceberg analogy for sexual harassment is women with their own compelling stories. of feathers is still a ton,” she says. apt. It holds that only a fraction of harassment — Biologist Nancy Hopkins was shocked In stark contrast, the film shows us obvious things such as sexual assault and sex- when Francis Crick once put his hands on Willenbring, now at the Scripps Institution of ual coercion — rises into public consciousness her breasts as she worked in the laboratory. -
Creativity in the Metaphysics of Alfred North Whitehead
CREATIVITY IN WIDTEHEAD'S l\1ETAPHYSICS CREATIVITY IN THE METAPHYSICS OF ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD By JEFFREY A. MCPHERSON, B.A.(Hons.) A Thesis Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts © Copyright by Jeffrey A. McPherson, SEPTEMBER, 1996 MASTER OF ARTS (1996) McMaster University (Religious Studies) Hamilton, Ontario TITLE: Creativity in the Metaphysics of Alfred North Whitehead. AUTHOR: Jeffrey A. McPherson, B.A.(Hons.) (York University) SUPERVISOR: Dr. J.C. Robertson, Jr. NUMBER OF PAGES: vi, 127 ii ABSTRACT This is a study of the role that creativity plays in the metaphysics of Alfred North Whitehead ( 1861-1947). As the title generally indicates, there are two parts to this project. The first part develops an understanding of Whitehead's metaphysics through the careful analysis of two key texts, namely Religion in the Making ( 1926), and Process and Reality (1929). The second part examines and carefully analyses the role that creativity plays within this metaphysic. The second part focuses on two questions. The first question considers the ontological status which creativity requires to perform the role which it is given within the metaphysical system. The second question discusses implications of this status for creativity's relationship to God. This second section further discusses the implications of such an understanding of "process theology" for Christian theology in general. Specifically it comments on the various responses of theology to creatio ex nihilo and the problem of evil. This thesis concludes that creativity functions as an ultimate explanatory principle in Whitehead's metaphysics. -
Mathematics, Time, and Confirmation
Mathematics, Time, and Confirmation Ulrich Meyer Doctor of Philosophy in Mathematics University of Cambridge, 1995 Submitted to the Department of Linguistics and Philosophy in partial fulfil- ment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. September 2001 Author: ................................. .. .... Department of Linguistics aKPhilosophy August 10, 2001 Certified by: .......................... Robert C. Stalnaker Professor of Philosophy Thesis Supervisor Accepted by: .............. Vann McGee Professor of Philosophy Chair, Committee on Graduate Students @Ulrich Meyer 2001. All rights reserved. The author hereby grants permission to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology to reproduce and distribute publicly paper and electronic copies of this thesis in whole or in part. MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY OCT 11 2001 ARCMly LIBRARIES Mathematics, Time, and Confirmation by Ulrich Meyer Submitted to The Department of Linguistics and Philosophy on 10 August 2001 in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy ABSTRACT This dissertation discusses two issues about abstract objects: their role in scientific theories, and their relation to time. Chapter 1, "Why Apply Mathematics?" argues that scientific theories are not about the mathematics that is applied in them, and defends this thesis against the Quine-Putnam Indispensability Argument. Chapter 2, "Scientific Ontology," is a critical study of W. V. Quine's claim that metaphysics and mathematics are epistemologically on a par with nat- ural science. It is argued that Quine's view relies on a unacceptable account of empirical confirmation. Chapter 3, "Prior and the Platonist," demonstrates the incompatibility of two popular views about time: the "Platonist" thesis that some objects exist "outside" time, and A. -
Art3 Frapolli SUBJECT NATURALISM FINAL
Análisis. Revista de investigación filosfófica, Vol. 1, nº 1, 2014, pp. 41-67 YOU AND ME BABY AIN’T NOTHING BUT MAMMALS. SUBJECT NATURALISM AND DEFAULT POSITIONS1 María J. Frápolli RESUMEN Este artículo discute el problema de la localización, tal como Price lo ha definido. En el se distinguen diferentes versiones de naturalismo y se defiende el naturalismo del sujeto. Se asume que el sistema de conceptos humano se ha desarrollado en interacción con el medio natural y social. Por esta razón no podemos evitar ser realistas y representacionalistas por defecto. Las afirmaciones básicas del realismo, el representatcionalismo y la teoría de la verdad como correspondencia son difícilmente rechazables, y esto explica el aire de artificiosidad que acompaña a las posiciones anti- realistas. Sin embargo las posiciones por defecto no apoyan en absoluto a sus versiones filosóficamente desarrolladas. Estas son incompatibles con una visión naturalista sobre la realidad, el significado y la verdad. PALABRAS CLAVE: Correspondentismo por defecto, naturalismo, naturalismo del sujeto, realismo por defecto, representacionalismo por defecto, teoría de la verdad como correspondencia, teoría prooracional de la verdad, verdad aristotélica ABSTRACT This paper deals with Price’s placement problem. In it, different versions of naturalism are distinguished and subject naturalism is defended. It is assumed that human conceptual system has evolved as a result of humans relations with the natural 1 My colleagues Manuel de Pinedo and Neftalí Villanueva have read versions of this paper and made insightful suggestions. I am also grateful to the Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación del Gobierno de España, (project FFI2010-15704), the Consejería de Innovación de la Junta de Andalucía (project HUM-04099), and the Plan Propio of the University of Granada that have supported this work. -
The American Philosophical Association EASTERN DIVISION ONE HUNDRED TENTH ANNUAL MEETING PROGRAM
The American Philosophical Association EASTERN DIVISION ONE HUNDRED TENTH ANNUAL MEETING PROGRAM BALTIMORE MARRIOTT WATERFRONT BALTIMORE, MARYLAND DECEMBER 27 – 30, 2013 Important Notices for Meeting Attendees SESSION LOCATIONS Please note: the locations of all individual sessions will be included in the paper program that you will receive when you pick up your registration materials at the meeting. To save on printing costs, the program will be available only online prior to the meeting; with the exception of plenary sessions, the online version does not include session locations. In addition, locations for sessions on the first evening (December 27) will be posted in the registration area. IMPORTANT INFORMATION ABOUT REGISTRATION Please note: it costs $40 less to register in advance than to register at the meeting. The advance registration rates are the same as last year, but the additional cost of registering at the meeting has increased. Online advance registration at www.apaonline.org is available until December 26. 1 Friday Evening, December 27: 6:30–9:30 p.m. FRIDAY, DECEMBER 27 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING 1:00–6:00 p.m. REGISTRATION 3:00–10:00 p.m., registration desk (third floor) PLACEMENT INFORMATION Interviewers and candidates: 3:00–10:00 p.m., Dover A and B (third floor) Interview tables: Harborside Ballroom, Salons A, B, and C (fourth floor) FRIDAY EVENING, 6:30–9:30 P.M. MAIN PROGRAM SESSIONS I-A. Symposium: Ancient and Medieval Philosophy of Language THIS SESSION HAS BEEN CANCELLED. I-B. Symposium: German Idealism: Recent Revivals and Contemporary Relevance Chair: Jamie Lindsay (City University of New York–Graduate Center) Speakers: Robert Brandom (University of Pittsburgh) Axel Honneth (Columbia University) Commentator: Sally Sedgwick (University of Illinois–Chicago) I-C. -
Academic Publishing and Scientific Integrity: Case Studies of Editorial Interference by Taylor & Francis
Kahr et al. Journal of Scientific Practice and Integrity. 1(1). DOI: 10.35122/jospi.2019.848394 Research Article | Commentary Academic Publishing and Scientific Integrity: Case Studies of Editorial Interference by Taylor & Francis Bart Kahr,i Leemon B. McHenry,ii Mark D. Hollingsworthiii Abstract Editorial independence is a bedrock principle of academic publishing. The growing domination of academic publishing by large, for-profit corporations threatens this independence. There is alarming evidence that large companies too often serve their own business interests and those of powerful clients rather than serving the scientific community and the general public. This evidence includes the publication of infelicitous commercial science and concealing scientific misconduct. We present two case studies in which the UK-based publisher Taylor & Francis interfered in the editorial process by blocking publication of legitimate criticism that had been reviewed and approved for publication by its specialized editors. The integrity of science depends in part on the transparency and intellectual honesty of all stakeholders. The widely- acknowledged inadequacies of English libel law are reviewed as context for some of Taylor & Francis’s fearful decisions. Introduction the editorial independence of the editor, and it should not interfere in the assessment, selection, or editing Editorial independence, the license of editors to approve of journal articles. The relationship between the a contribution for publication free from the influence of editor and the publisher, sponsoring society, or journal owners, advertisers, or media company directors, is a owner should be based on trust and respect.1 bedrock of journalism and academic publishing. This position has been adopted by COPE, the Committee Independence is intended to ensure public access to true on Publication Ethics, an advisory body for its member stories and investigations.