Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy

Volume 28 | Issue 1 Article 9

May 2014 Gerrymandered Gridlock: Addressing the Hazardous Impact of Partisan Redistricting Nathan S. Catanese

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Recommended Citation Nathan S. Catanese, Gerrymandered Gridlock: Addressing the Hazardous Impact of Partisan Redistricting, 28 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 323 (2014). Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndjlepp/vol28/iss1/9

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact [email protected]. 34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 167 Side A 05/07/2014 15:37:06 J., See Five HIRTY With ALEM T -S Id. 5 EPRESENTA- IVE R , F INSTON in Texas Cost Him g , W 2 (July 13, 2012, 8:00 Notre Dame Journal of Law, 3 ROPORTIONAL P ONKBLOG 1 OW 59 (2d ed. 2002). elections.” * , W g : H in gg ress Ever OICES EMOCRACY g ATANESE V D EW 323 S. C /N MERICAN NTRODUCTION I A HOICES ATHAN the Line: Will Tom DeLay’s Redistrictin g C N Districts Dwindle, Can a Divided House Stand? is a political disaster—an enormous political train choose their constituents.” g g EAL EVITALIZE , R wreck that occurs every ten years.” wreck that occurs every Drawin , Mar. 6, 2006, at 35 (quoting Stanford Law School Professor , Mar. 6, 2006, at 35 (quoting Stanford Law R Six Incumbents Are a Week Away from Easy Election MY As Swin for their hard work on this Note. Essentially, this means that congressional districts have Essentially, this means that congressional “We are in the business of ri “We are in the business OF PARTISAN REDISTRICTING OF PARTISAN GERRYMANDERED GRIDLOCK: GERRYMANDERED OULD 4 J. A ORKER C Y , recently estimated that in the House of Representatives, out , recently estimated that in the House EW 14 Reasons Why This is the Worst Con ht ADDRESSING THE HAZARDOUS IMPACT THE HAZARDOUS ADDRESSING OUGLAS TION g , N LECTIONS (Dec. 27, 2012, 9:46 AM), http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/27/ Nate Silver, noted statistician and founder of the popular blog Nate Silver, noted statistician and founder E 3. D 4. Nate Silver, 2. John Hoeffel, * B.A., University of Notre Dame, J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 2014; 1. Jeffrey Toobin, 5. The 112th Congress was the most polarized Congress since Reconstruction. representatives, and now, instead, it’s every ten years the representatives representatives, and “It used to be that the idea was, once every two years voters elected their idea was, once every two years voters “It used to be that the IGHT “To sum up, redistrictin Jan. 27, 1998, at B1 (quoting former North Carolina State Senator Mark McDaniel). Jan. 27, 1998, at B1 (quoting former North AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2012/07/13/13-reasons- why-this-is-the-worst-congress-ever/. Pamela Karlan). of the four hundred and thirty-five districts, there are only thirty-five of the four hundred and thirty-five swing districts. Ezra Klein, His Seat? E as-swing-districts-dwindle-can-a-divided-house-stand/. To contrast today’s numbers with recent history, he said that in 1992 there were as many as 103 swing districts. Thirty Ei 2007. John Copeland Nagle, for his helpful I would like to thank my advisor, Professor feedback.Kristen; my parents, Lisa & Sam; my brother I would also like to thank my wife, support, and comments on earlier drafts. Jason; and my entire family for their love, members of the Finally, I would like to thank the editors and Ethics & Public Policy NOTES \\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\28-1\NDE109.txt unknown Seq: 1 2-MAY-14 7:13 become more polarized—either more Republican-leaning districts are districts are more liberal. conservative or Democratic-leaning more members elected from districts in which there is no threat from more members elected from districts 34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 167 Side A 05/07/2014 15:37:06 Side A 05/07/2014 Sheet No. 167 34929-nde_28-1 34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 167 Side B 05/07/2014 15:37:06 Id. [Vol. 28 of U.S. for the g (Oct. 1, 2013, Gridlock not Gridlock 7 (Jan. 10, 2013), http:// CONOMIST , E 9 rades Debt Ratin g OMMENT C Ultimately, this polarization Ultimately, 6 AILY With such detrimental impact With such detrimental 8 ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY , D S & P Down LAW, Democracy in America , members of the House now come from hyperpar- Most a Better Democracy g note 4. “ Sorry we’re closed Buildin , Aug. 6, 2011, at A1. supra IMES , J.P.P., . g NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF Steve Coll, Silver, , N.Y. T See See e. See Specifically, in Part I, this Note examines the history of gerryman- Specifically, in Part I, this Note examines Supreme Court and Congress In Part II, I argue that because the This Note argues that partisan redistricting, also known as gerry- that partisan redistricting, also known This Note argues This shift has been costly to the United States. has been costly This shift In 2011, citing 9. 7. Binyamin Appelbaum & Eric Dash, 8. 6. 5:30), http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2013/10/americas-gov- ernment-shutdown. www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/comment/2013/01/ending-gerrymandering-and- building-a-better-democracy.html (“[B]ecause many . . . run in super-safe conservative districts, Republican congressional candidates often fear radical-right primary challengers more than the Democrats they will face in the general election.”). First Time tisan districts where they face essentially no threat of losing their seat to the other party. tisan districts where they face essentially no may be the more serious risk.” Instead, primary challenges, especially for Republicans, 324 to Congress of for members incentive is less party, there an opposing deals.bipartisan to make or moderate only likeli- the is because This ideologically a more losing to is from election losing an of their hood election. candidate in a primary extreme \\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\28-1\NDE109.txt unknown Seq: 2 2-MAY-14 7:13 dering in the United States: how various requirements for redistrict- dering in the United States: how ing—both from Congress and from the Supreme Court—were imposed Supreme Court cases have on the states and the effects that historical had on redistricting. at the state of gerrymandering Part I also looks 2012 congressional elections and today by examining its effects in the recent jurisprudence on state exploring some of the Supreme Court’s redistricting laws.Note looks at how the Supreme Specifically, this comprise an unconstitutional Court has been vague about what would face of some outrageous examples, partisan gerrymander, even in the thus permitting the status quo. either the state legislatures or have failed to act on gerrymandering, on the United States, understanding the cause of this problem and tak- understanding the cause of this on the United States, importance. to remedy it are of paramount ing appropriate action Congress because cause of America’s gridlock in mandering, is a major polarized con- of representatives elected from it increases the number gressional districts. districts along Rather than simply trying to draw have tried or municipal boundaries, state lawmakers pre-existing county process. gain through the redistricting to achieve hyperpartisan In so districts.doing, they have created fewer competitive This arrangement candidates that have little to no favors electing ideologically extreme especially since it increases interest in making political compromises, challenger. the likelihood of a primary election leads to less policy-making and more gridlock in Washington. and more gridlock policy-making leads to less United downgraded the & Poor’s in Congress, Standard gridlock in history. for the first time rating to AA+ States’s debt only increases the likelihood that the federal government will default likelihood that the federal government only increases the in general. but is also bad for public policy on its debt obligations, Sim- to shut down the one of causes that led Congress ilarly, gridlock was in the fall of 2013. federal government 34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 167 Side B 05/07/2014 15:37:06 Side B 05/07/2014 Sheet No. 167 34929-nde_28-1 34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 168 Side A 05/07/2014 15:37:06 325 The EGARD- R 12 Specifi- 14 10 SSUES I EGAL , http://www.senate.gov/ 1 (2012). ENATE ., R42483, L Because of this provision, 11 ERV S 13 , U.S. S EDISTRICTING R ESEARCH . R ACKGROUND , http://www.census.gov (last visited Apr. 7, 2014). ONG I. B , C UREAU EE B L GERRYMANDERED GRIDLOCK GERRYMANDERED 7: A Great Compromise 8 ENSUS EAPPORTIONMENT AND IKYUNG R . amend. XIV, § 2. . art. I, § 2, cl. 3. M U.S. C ONST ONST ., g ATA FOR ARGARET D ING See, e. See July 16, 17 In Part III, this Note looks at some of the practical consequences of consequences practical of the at some Note looks III, this In Part with partisan gerry- states have dealt how various Part IV discusses alleviate the I recommend what can be done to Finally, in Part V, But the determination of how many representatives each state But the determination of how many When the Founding Fathers drafted the Constitution, they decided When the Founding Fathers drafted ENSUS 11. U.S. C 14. M 12. U.S. C 13. 10. C artandhistory/history/minute/A_Great_Compromise.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2014). 2014] redistrict- a better to create in order guidance to provide need Congress ing system. partici- that it has on examines the impact and also gerrymandering, policy. and on public the political system pants in it.have done to prevent and what they mandering at the It also looks in those states. legislative initiatives of the various relative success Part have dealt at how the United Kingdom and Canada IV also briefly looks partisan redistricting. with and prevented state legisla- the United States moving forward: gridlock and to help the creation of need to pass legislation mandating tures and Congress to redraw districts.independent commissions Congress is not However, more states pass their own legislation.likely to act until But if more the problems the reform laws, it will help to fix states pass redistricting faces because of gerrymandering. United States currently \\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\28-1\NDE109.txt unknown Seq: 3 2-MAY-14 7:13 receives is not the only purpose of the census—eachreceives is not the only purpose of also state must ensure that all of its citizens have draw districts of equal population to an equal voice in Congress. to determining the apportion- “In addition states, decennial population census ment of Representatives among the provid[ing] state and local data fulfills several purposes [including] district boundaries for congres- governments a basis for establishing bodies . . . .” sional, state legislative, and local representative that the states would have equal representation in the Senate and pro- that the states would have equal representation of Representatives. portional representation in the House the government needed to accurately ensure that each state was allo- the government needed to accurately cated the correct number of representatives. Thus, the Constitution every ten years, stating that an also mandates that a census be held . . . within every subsequent Term “actual Enumeration shall be made shall by Law direct.” of ten Years, in such manner as [Congress] cally, the Constitution states that members of the House of cally, the Constitution states that among the several States accord- Representatives “shall be apportioned the whole number of persons ing to their respective numbers, counting taxed.” in each State, excluding Indians not United States Census Bureau, a division of the U.S. Department of United States Census Bureau, a division Commerce, conducts modern censuses. 34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 168 Side A 05/07/2014 15:37:06 Side A 05/07/2014 Sheet No. 168 34929-nde_28-1 34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 168 Side B 05/07/2014 15:37:06 ANIPU- [Vol. 28 M (Sep. 19, 2012, OLITICIANS P TLANTIC OW , A 20 (2001). : H However, in 1842 Con- However, 15 , http://www.redistricting.state.pa. LECTIONS Each state still has the author- E ULLWINKLES ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY IN 25 erous Mapmakers W g 21 & B LAW, EDISTRICTING The case also applied the “one person The case also applied Other states, like Pennsylvania, pass . R ATA TO 20 . A 24 Some state legislatures, like California’s, D ue of Dan , P g 23 g Policy Matter for the States Matter for Policy USHMANDERS ENSUS The Supreme Court affirmed this principle in The Supreme Court , B California C A. The Lea when it said, “[w]hile it may not be possible to when it said, “[w]hile 18 19 In 1872, Congress added a third criterion—that Congress added a In 1872, the , 16 APS AND ONMONIER Part V.A, M M ressional Redistrictin g at 18. ARK NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF Thus, “[e]ven states not adding or losing congressional repre- not adding or losing congressional Thus, “[e]ven states LATE Id. See infra Con Id. Id. 22 17 LECTRONIC In 1929, Congress established a permanent number of representa- established a permanent number of In 1929, Congress been established by Congress, Other than the criteria that have Generally, states have the authority and prerogative to draw dis- to prerogative and the authority have states Generally, 21. 22. The Reapportionment Act of 1929, ch. 28, 46 Stat. 21 (1929) (codified at 2 23. Of course, it is worth noting that as of the last census in 2010, six states were 24. 25. 19. 376 U.S. 1 (1964). 20. 16. 17. to Congress Among the Sev- An Act for the Apportionment of Representatives 18. Robert Draper, 15. M E U.S.C. § 2a). only allocated one representative, thus nullifying the need for redistricting. 8:56 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/10/the-league-of/ 309084/. us/Congressional-Redistricting.cfm (last visited Apr. 8, 2014). eral States According to the Ninth Census, ch. 11, 17 Stat. 28, 28 (1872). eral States According to the Ninth Census, ch. 326 \\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\28-1\NDE109.txt unknown Seq: 4 2-MAY-14 7:13 tives in the House—435—and set forth a means to reapportion the the states after each decadal number of representatives among census. the courts, the states are essentially along with other criteria set forth by to redraw the congressional dis- able to determine on their own how tricts within their borders. sentatives need new district maps that reflect the population shifts district maps that reflect the sentatives need new no mat- so that residents are equally represented within their borders, ter where they live.” districts must have “as near as practicable, an equal number of inhabi- “as near as practicable, an equal number districts must have tants.” Wesberry v. Sanders that is no districts with mathematical precision, draw congressional of making equal our Constitution’s plain objective excuse for ignoring goal for equal numbers of people the fundamental representation for the House of Representatives.” tricts how they see fit.tricts how federal first fifty years, the nation’s “For no long as a state elected entirely: as ignored redistricting lawmakers could its legislature of representatives, its allotted number more than way it wanted.” boundaries any draw district have delegated the duty to redraw congressional districts to a non-gov- have delegated the duty to redraw congressional ernment or “citizens” panel. as normal legislation needing their new congressional district maps bicameral and gubernatorial approval. one vote” standard to redistricting. one vote” standard ity to change the way in which it redraws its congressional map.ity to change the way in which it redraws In the- partisan gerrymandering through ory, they could do away with gress limited the drawing of districts so that they were single-member of districts so that the drawing gress limited and contiguous. 34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 168 Side B 05/07/2014 15:37:06 Side B 05/07/2014 Sheet No. 168 34929-nde_28-1 34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 169 Side A 05/07/2014 15:37:06 327 The 30 Newspapers 27 29 Id. Alternatively, they could con- they could Alternatively, 26 for Partisan Gain for Partisan g . . Redistrictin GERRYMANDERED GRIDLOCK GERRYMANDERED Florida California note 15, at 1. B. supra Ultimately, Massachusetts Governor Elbridge Gerry Ultimately, Massachusetts , 28 Part V.A, Part V.C, at 2. Even though today’s term gerrymandering is used with a soft “j” sound, ONMONIER Id. Id. See infra See infra In 1812, the Massachusetts legislature redrew its legislative bounda- legislature redrew Massachusetts In 1812, the 29. 30. 28. M 26. 27. Gerry’s last name was pronounced with a hard “g.” 2014] done). have some states (as legislation \\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\28-1\NDE109.txt unknown Seq: 5 2-MAY-14 7:13 signed the new plan into law, even though he disliked it. into law, even though he disliked signed the new plan ries following the 1810 census.ries following Democratic-Republicans The state’s ranks to increase their drew a new map majority party and were the state’s dwindling Federalists.over the Feder- this by “packing They did long, thin Repub- strongholds while carving out a alist voters into a few edges of the northern, western, and southwestern lican district along Essex County.” tinue to allow partisan gain through the political process. political the gain through partisan to allow tinue sympathetic to the Federalist Party were quick to mock the plan in a Federalist Party were quick to mock sympathetic to the dubbing the new district a “Gerrymander.” political cartoon, term for redrawing political districts for partisan gain has been around political districts for partisan gain term for redrawing ever since. 34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 169 Side A 05/07/2014 15:37:06 Side A 05/07/2014 Sheet No. 169 34929-nde_28-1 34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 169 Side B 05/07/2014 15:37:06 OTRE OTRE [Vol. 28 American 32 , 24 N , 88 N (June 19, 2013, 5:05 31 n Partisanship g , Mar. 26, 1812, at 2. The Republicans won OLITICO Beni Richardson Dilworth, 33 ARTOON , P AZETTE C G See also ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY OSTON OLITICAL , B Franita Tolson, LAW, P But see The Democrats’ Lost Decade? 99 (2010) (suggesting that states should be able to redis- Y ’ The Gerry-Mander ERRYMANDER OL . P G note 18. UB HE T supra & P Alex Isenstadt, See . 395, 398 (2012) (arguing that partisan gerrymandering is actually positive . 395, 398 (2012) (arguing that partisan gerrymandering THICS NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF EV Today’s gerrymandering has been called “the most insidious prac- Today’s gerrymandering has been called elections held in November After examining the congressional L. R J.L. E 32. Draper, 33. In fact, the redistricting following the 2010 census may help Republicans for the 31. Elkanah Tisdale, AME AME Cities as Firms in the 21st Century—Or, Should Philadelphia Move to New Jersey? trict major cities into or out of their borders, albeit for urban development policy reasons). next decade. for governance, because it safeguards federalism). D D 328 \\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\28-1\NDE109.txt unknown Seq: 6 2-MAY-14 7:13 tice in American politics—a fol- way, as the opportunistic machinations for our elected leaders to lowing the 2010 census make evident, garrisons from which they can entrench themselves in 435 impregnable demographic realities.” maintain political power while avoiding helped the Republican Party 2012, it is obvious that gerrymandering retain control of the House of Representatives. 34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 169 Side B 05/07/2014 15:37:06 Side B 05/07/2014 Sheet No. 169 34929-nde_28-1 34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 170 Side A 05/07/2014 15:37:06 . 38 329 ITT He , P 37 note 36, Thus, it Yet Penn- supra 35 note 9, (citing 39 , Feb. 3, 2013, at IMES supra Wang, See Nicholas Goedert, a Nicholas Goedert, Coll, , N.Y. T (Nov. 8, 2012), http://blogs. OW N See also HILLY Helped GOP Keep Control of House g , P h Post-Gazette, g Pittsbur e Majorities? g The Great Gerrymander of 2012 How Gerrymanderin GERRYMANDERED GRIDLOCK GERRYMANDERED However, Americans, as a whole, cast more votes cast more as a whole, Americans, However, Pennsylvanians and Americans Voted for a Democratic U.S. House—Pennsylvanians and Americans Voted for a Democratic 34 note 34. note 34. But, Pennsylvania was not the only state in which the supra supra 36 40 (Nov. 28, 2012), http://www.post-gazette.com/stories/news/us/how-gerry- Sam Wang, Op-Ed, Id. See Id. AZETTE In an interview with the In an interview with -G 37. Timothy McNulty, 35. 36. 40. LoBosso, 38. 39. LoBosso, 34. Randy LoBosso, OST So Why Do Republicans Still Hold Hu Samuel Wang and arguing that “twenty-six seats out of the thirty-three-seat Republican Samuel Wang and arguing that “twenty-six gerrymandering in states with legislatures advantage in the House can be attributed to controlled by Republicans.”). P SR5 (stating, “Gerrymandering is not hard. core technique is to jam voters likely to The where the other side will win lopsided favor your opponents into a few throwaway districts victories, a strategy known as ‘packing.’ other boundaries to win close victories, Arrange ‘cracking’ opposition groups into many districts.”). philadelphiaweekly.com/phillynow/2012/11/08/pennsylvanians-and-americans-voted- for-a-democratic-u-s-house—so-why-do-republicans-still-hold-huge-majorities/. at SR1, SR5 (stating that in addition to Pennsylvania, Arizona, Michigan, North Carolina, and Wisconsin were all states in which the party that won a majority of votes failed to win at least half of the delegation’s seats). party that won the most votes did not win at least half the seats. mandering-helped-gop-keep-control-of-house-663716/. AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/06/democrats-lost-decade-house-redistrict- ing-midterms-93018.html. Pennsylvania’s redistricting is a particularly egregious example of parti- Pennsylvania’s redistricting is a particularly 2012, voters cast 2,701,820 san gerrymandering, where in November votes for Republicans. votes for Democrats and 2,626,995 2014] to 233 seats winning of Representatives, House in the of seats a majority 192. the Democrats’ \\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\28-1\NDE109.txt unknown Seq: 7 2-MAY-14 7:13 redistricting expert from Washington University in St. Louis, stated, from Washington University in redistricting expert than its share party is able to win more “The key way a gerrymandering where they con- the opposite partisans into a district of seats is to pack their vote.” of the vote and essentially waste trol a huge amount for Democratic candidates than Republicans—as than candidates for Democratic on Novem- counts of while candidates were cast for Democratic 53,952,240 votes ber 8, 2012, candidates. cast for Republican votes were only 53,402,643 sylvania’s new congressional delegation is not comprised of roughly the sylvania’s new congressional delegation same number of Republicans and Democrats—the state is only sending while it is sending thirteen five Democrats to the 113th Congress, Republicans. can be mathematically deduced that the Democrats elected to Congress elected to that the Democrats deduced can be mathematically counterparts.than their Republican majorities won by larger More districts, where Democrats gerrymandered this was due to than likely, the impact that liberal districts in order to reduce were “packed” into in areas surrounding districts, and were “cracked” they would have in impact among large stronghold, so as to divide their where they had a a majority in any and to prevent them from forming multiple districts single district. also said that Pennsylvania was “arguably the most distorted map in the was “arguably the most distorted also said that Pennsylvania the seats won.” of comparing the vote share and country in terms 34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 170 Side A 05/07/2014 15:37:06 Side A 05/07/2014 Sheet No. 170 34929-nde_28-1 34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 170 Side B 05/07/2014 15:37:06 [Vol. 28 , http:// . (Jan. 4, (Nov. 13, OST OMM . P C ASH EDISTRICTING , W R es g EADERSHIP Furthermore, Demo- Furthermore, L 41 TATE S ENNSYLVANIA , P ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY 43 44 EPUBLICAN errymandered advanta g LAW, , R GOP’s ressional Districts g 46 note 36, at SR1. On the other hand, “[o]f the 13 districts where Republi- On the other hand, supra Pennsylvania Con 42 For a map of the Pennsylvania Congressional districts following the gerry- For a map of the Pennsylvania Congressional NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF Id. REDMAP 2012 Summary Report Id. Id. Simply put, “[t]he $30 million strategy consist[ed] of two steps Simply put, “[t]he $30 million strategy http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/harold-meyerson-gops-gerry- The report provided financial amounts spent in various states to The report provided financial amounts pick on Republican gerryman- The purpose of this Note is not to Understanding the realities of gerrymandering, political parties realities of gerrymandering, political Understanding the Looking at specific examples of how Pennsylvania’s gerry- Pennsylvania’s of how examples specific at Looking Controlling the redistricting process in [states projected to gain or Controlling the redistricting process in would have the greatest lose Congressional representation] legislative and congres- impact on determining how both state Drawing new district sional district boundaries would be drawn. activity presented the lines in states with the most redistricting at the state level opportunity to solidify conservative policymaking in the U.S. House of Rep- and maintain a Republican stronghold resentatives for the next decade. 45 45. 46. Wang, 44. 43. 41. 42. Harold Meyerson, Op-Ed, 2012), 2013), http://rslc.com/_blog/News/post/REDMAP_2012_Summary_Report. www.redistricting.state.pa.us/Resources/GISData/Districts/Congressional/2011/PDF/ 2011-PA-Congressional-Map.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2014). mandering, see mandered-advantages/2012/11/13/4785e4d6-2d2f-11e2-a99d-5c4203af7b7a_story.html? hpid=z2. 330 \\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\28-1\NDE109.txt unknown Seq: 8 2-MAY-14 7:13 support key state legislative races, including $1.4 million in New York, support key state legislative races, including in Ohio, and $1 million in Michi- $1 million in Pennsylvania, $1 million gan. state legislatures before the decen- for tilting the playing field: take over Congressional districts to lock in nial Census, then redraw state and partisan advantages.” ders. as well (although they were Democrats are guilty of the practice know that having partisan and ideologically friendly districts can help partisan and ideologically friendly know that having political forces.them withstand opposing expenditures cor- Political roborate this. in its Republican State Leadership Committee, The itself on the back Report, essentially patted REDMAP 2012 Summary ensure that the in state legislative races in 2010 to for money it spent legislative) redis- control congressional (and state Republicans would tricting in key states: mandered congressional districts played out, “Democrat Allyson “Democrat out, played districts congressional mandered to 92,415 of 205,287 by a tally Rooney Joe Republican beat Schwartz “would- to 39,752,” while 226,189 Brady beat John Featherman and Bob Dem- Keith Rothfus beat saw Republican districts like the 12th be swing to 48.5 percent.” Critz 51.5 percent ocrat Mark cans prevailed, GOP candidates won seven with less than 60 percent of candidates won seven with less than cans prevailed, GOP candidate’s total one district did the Republican the vote; in only of the votes cast.” exceed 65 percent crats “carried both districts in the Philadelphia area in the Philadelphia both districts crats “carried — by 85 percent respectively and 89 percent, — and by 77, 69 and three other districts, 61 percent.” 34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 170 Side B 05/07/2014 15:37:06 Side B 05/07/2014 Sheet No. 170 34929-nde_28-1 34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 171 Side A 05/07/2014 15:37:06 331 For Id. (Mar. 18, LOOMBERG , B , www.republicanmain- g On the Republican , cpc.grijalva.house.gov/cau- 52 which is comprised of the ARTNERSHIP AUCUS So, while this type of result So, while this type 54 C P , bluedogdems.ngpvanhost.com/con- a caucus comprised of moder- 49 51 TREET S And then after the Republican And then after 50 OALITION ROGRESSIVE 48 AIN C P M OG D LUE , B GERRYMANDERED GRIDLOCK GERRYMANDERED EPUBLICAN Increased Partisanship and Gridlock Increased Partisanship note 42. their rep- However, while the Democrats did increase , RSC, http://rsc.scalise.house.gov/aboutrsc/members (last vis- ONGRESSIONAL note 37. , R , C C. supra supra 47 Membership a moderate Republican group, while there are 168 mem- a moderate Republican group, while g 53 Republicans Foil What Majority Wants by Gerrymanderin (citing data from the University of Virginia Center for Politics). (citing data from the University of Virginia Blue Do Id. Id. RSC Member List RMSP Members What is CPC? Looking at the membership of ideological caucuses in the House Looking at the membership of ideological Historically, it has been common to see a disparity between the disparity between to see a it has been common Historically, 51. 48. McNulty, 49. 50. 54. 53. 52. 47. Meyerson, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-18/republicans-foil-what- examples of partisan gerrymander- most-u-s-wants-with-gerrymandering.html (discussing ing in Michigan and Ohio). ited Apr. 8, 2014). cus-members/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2014). street.org/members/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2014). tent/blue-dog-membership-1 (last visited Apr. 8, 2014). resentation in Illinois, Meyerson points out that this more closely resembles the political resentation in Illinois, Meyerson points out Obama by a sixteen-point margin. leanings of the state, which voted for President in other states, see Chris Christoff & additional examples of partisan gerrymandering Greg Giroux, 2014] 2010 the following the cycle during Republicans as the effective not as census). in gerrymander Democratic-controlled after a instance, For del- congressional in their their ranks increased the Democrats Illinois, twelve of for a total of the last election, five members in egation by seats. eighteen \\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\28-1\NDE109.txt unknown Seq: 9 2-MAY-14 7:13 national popular vote for congressional candidates and the percentage candidates popular vote for congressional national House. win in the of seats parties War II the end of World “From of House nationally won a bigger percentage through 1994, Democrats the prevalence of total, probably due to seats than their popular-vote Democrats.” old-time Southern bers of the Republican Study Committee, of Representatives shows how gerrymandering has impacted the make- of Representatives shows how gerrymandering up of Congress. there are fifteen members of In the 113th Congress, the Congressional Blue Dog Coalition, ate Democrats, while there are seventy-four House members of the ate Democrats, while there are seventy-four Caucus. more liberal Congressional Progressive Revolution in 1994, in which the Republicans won control of the House in which the Republicans won control Revolution in 1994, its popu- a generation, “the GOP has outperformed for the first time in two decades since.” lar-vote total in the most conservative members of the Republican caucus.most conservative members of the Republican This shows that and Republican parties the more ideological wings of the Democratic outweigh the moderates. attributed to gerrymandering. This can be Of may seem normal, “[t]he GOP’s nearly 6 percent gap between votes “[t]he GOP’s nearly 6 percent gap may seem normal, either party since Nov. 6 [2012] was the biggest for and seats won on did it in 1992.” the Democrats last side, there are fifty-five House members of the Republican Main Street side, there are fifty-five House members Partnership, 34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 171 Side A 05/07/2014 15:37:06 Side A 05/07/2014 Sheet No. 171 34929-nde_28-1 34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 171 Side B 05/07/2014 15:37:06 , U.S. EOPLE (Nov. P [Vol. 28 Cause Polari- g ROSPECT . P 57 ton Gridlock? M g , A g ENTER FOR THE C This is true, especially Does Gerrymanderin 56 ESEARCH R EW , P ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY Who is to Blame for Washin LAW, Don’t Blame Gerrymanderin Nolan McCarty et al., members of the House now come from members of the But see Most . 666 (2009) (presenting an empirical argument that partisan . 666 (2009) (presenting an empirical argument (Aug. 23, 2012), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/ CI note 4. . S 55 Shannon McGovern, note 9. note 9. EPORT OL R supra 59 supra supra . J. P (June 1, 2012), http://www.people-press.org/2012/06/01/trend-in-party- M ORLD And the gridlock could also lead to shutting down the federal And the gridlock could also lead to NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF Id. See also Trend in Party Identification 1939 – 2012 58 RESS P , 53 A It is important to note that the increased number of ideological the increased number to note that It is important But, the effects are not limited to electoral politics.But, the effects are not limited to In acting to addition to facilitating congres- Common Cause has argued that, in Nate Silver has observed that by not compromising with oppo- that by not compromising Nate Silver has observed [o]ne of the firmest conclusions of academic research into the conclusions of academic research [o]ne of the firmest members first and behavior of Congress is that what motivates foremost is winning elections. If individual members of Congress if they fail to compromise, have little chance of losing their seats them to do so.” there should be little reason to expect & W 59. Coll, 58. Coll, 56. Silver, 57. 55. THE EWS 21, 2011), http://prospect.org/article/dont-blame-gerrymandering (arguing that “there isn’t much evidence for the claim that partisan gerrymandering is responsible for height- ened polarization” and that “[t]he increase in polarization among lawmakers has more to do with changes in political parties, party leadership, and issue priorities than it does gerrymandering.”). zation? hyperpartisan districts where they face essentially no threat of losing where they face essentially no hyperpartisan districts party.their seat to the other especially for Instead, primary challenges, be the more serious risk.” Republicans, may 2012/08/23/who-is-to-blame-for-washington-gridlock. partisan gridlock and that it can be attrib- gerrymandering is not the cause of increased uted to other factors) and Jamelle Bouie, identification-1939-2012/. N & 332 is House, compromise of the members ideologically with more course, gridlocked. is increasingly process legislative and the rare not due to an increasingly Representatives is of the House of members electorate.partisan partisan is actually less today’s electorate In fact, past.than in the for Pew Research Center to a study by the According con- of the electorate thirty-eight percent the Press, in 2012, People and with the identified thirty-two percent independent, sidered themselves with the Republi- and twenty-four percent identified Democratic Party, can Party. more peo- contrast to most years since 1939 where This is in major parties than the Democratic Party or with both ple identified with as independents. \\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\28-1\NDE109.txt unknown Seq: 10 2-MAY-14 7:13 protect themselves from ideological primary challenges, they vote for protect themselves from ideological districts would not long counte- policy “that voters in more competitive nance.” government. sional gridlock, to alienation by reducing “gerrymandering contributes elections; weakens incentives for the impact that voters can have on and weakens political parties by legislators to satisfy constituents; nents, “individual members of Congress are responding fairly rationally members of Congress are responding nents, “individual to their incentives. given that 34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 171 Side B 05/07/2014 15:37:06 Side B 05/07/2014 Sheet No. 171 34929-nde_28-1 34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 172 Side A 05/07/2014 15:37:06 ed g 333 , & g (Sep. 25, EDISTRICT- EPRESENTA- R bringing R IMES Has Chan 69 g 66 EGISLATURES g 65 “the Supreme , L ARTISAN 68 , N.Y. T , g ?: P OURTS These effects could effects These ONGRESSIONAL C 60 : C AND , IFFERENCE h Redistrictin The software is essentially g D 61 UICKSAND y on Gerrymanderin g Q AKE A Davis v. Bandemer M ARTISANSHIP , P INES IN L note 47. Pushbutton Gerrymanders? How Computin EDISTRICTING 11 (1993). RAWING R supra OMPETITION GERRYMANDERED GRIDLOCK GERRYMANDERED They can also take voting trends into considera- They can also take , D : C How to Tilt an Election Throu OES note 60, at 118. 64 , D EHAVIOR INES New software “has vastly increased the speed with New software “has L B supra USH The Influence of Technolo The Influence 63 , UCHMAN However, in 1986, in ARTY B E. R P D. 67 194 (2003). The Supreme Court’s Interpretation of Partisan Redistrictin The Supreme Court’s Interpretation of Partisan 62 in at 186. ARK LECTORAL UCHMAN , EREMY ING g TION AND See id. Id. E E. While Congress has continued to legislate on redistricting and has While Congress has continued to legislate Specifically, new “[t]echnological developments have enabled “[t]echnological developments have Specifically, new not an end in themselves. However, “computers are only a tool, Recent technological advances have allowed gerrymandering to gerrymandering have allowed advances Recent technological 62. 63. B 65. Christoff & Giroux, 66. Micah Altman et. al., 64. 61. Michael Cooper, 67. Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 27 (1975). 68. 478 U.S. 109 (1986). 69. M 60. J 51, 63 (Thomas E. Mann & Bruce E. Cain eds., 2005). EDISTRICTING 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/09/26/weekinreview/26marsh.html. R Redistrictin 1. Early Cases Court has also weighed in established some parameters, the Supreme on the subject. “reapportionment is primarily the In 1975, it ruled that through its legislature or other duty and responsibility of the State body . . . .” 2014] candidates.” less qualified to field them allowing \\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\28-1\NDE109.txt unknown Seq: 11 2-MAY-14 7:13 mapmakers to augment their knowledge of the state’s political environ- their knowledge of the state’s mapmakers to augment and (2) com- data about the electorate ment with (1) precinct-level to meet any can generate maps custom-fitted puter programs that group’s needs.” redistricting plans, but that does They may expand the set of possible to choose any particular one.not mean that those in charge have The the districts . . . .” real choices are made by those drawing which mapmakers can generate plans and calculate the effects of any can generate plans and calculate which mapmakers changes to a plan.” tion. databases with “[t]he state lawmakers can build For instance, population data figures, election results and detailed voter registration demographic trends.” to project campaign outcomes and doing what mapmakers have always done—crackdoing what mapmakers or pack—with more efficiency. become more precise.become more just a more accurate the precision is really But, on for decades. what has been going version of rely on “Both parties programs . . . .” sophisticated computer also be additional causes of gridlock in Congress. in of gridlock causes be additional also Court ruled that partisan gerrymanders were justiciable,” Court ruled that partisan gerrymanders 34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 172 Side A 05/07/2014 15:37:06 Side A 05/07/2014 Sheet No. 172 34929-nde_28-1 34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 172 Side B 05/07/2014 15:37:06 72 , a . [Vol. 28 Id. Bandemer ’s unworkable 75 Veith v. Jubelirer Following his party’s 73 Bandemer 76 Justice White, writing for writing White, Justice ., http://www.texasgop.org/over- 70 EX T ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY ARTY OF LAW, P Therefore, it is still possible for the Therefore, it is still possible for 74 was wrongly decided. EPUBLICAN , R exists. As the following discussion reveals, no exists. As the following Bandemer 71 Bandemer , 478 U.S. at 110. Rush argues that this was actually the “second reapportionment revolution,” Rush argues that this was actually the “second at 317 (Kennedy, J., concurring). at 281. NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF Overview and History Id. Id. Davis Id. While the Court tried to clarify the justiciability issue in to clarify the justiciability issue in While the Court tried After the 2002 elections, Republicans in Texas gained control of After the 2002 elections, Republicans However, although concurring in the judgment, Justice Kennedy However, although concurring in the Eighteen years of judicial effort with virtually nothing to show for effort with virtually nothing to Eighteen years of judicial prom- the question whether the standard it justify us in revisiting ised by and manageable standards for adjudicating judicially discernible emerged. Lacking them, we political gerrymandering claims have claims are nonjusti- must conclude that political gerrymandering ciable and that Disposition of the case does not involve this Court in a matter not involve this of the case does Disposition the Government. coequal branch of decided by a more properly or domestic disturbance.no risk of foreign There is is this Nor and man- are no judicially discernible that there Court persuaded cases are to political gerrymandering by which ageable standards be decided. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry League of United Latin American Citizens 75. 548 U.S. 399 (2006). 76. 74. 72. 541 U.S. 267 (2004). 73. 71. 70. view-and-history (last visited Apr. 8, 2014). Democrats were able to hold on to control of Texas and other southern states following the collapse of the “Solid South” because of with the first “erupt[ing] in the early 1960s, when the Court first chose to hear reappor- with the first “erupt[ing] in the early 1960s, they involved political questions.” tionment cases, previously avoided because Writing for the plurality and acknowledging Writing for the plurality 334 revolution.” itself a “reapportionment upon 2. Recent Cases \\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\28-1\NDE109.txt unknown Seq: 12 2-MAY-14 7:13 plurality sought to overrule that justiciability ruling in overrule that justiciability ruling in plurality sought to the state house for the first time in 130 years. the state house for the first time in disagreed, saying that there are potential cases in which partisan gerry- disagreed, saying that there are potential on constitutional rights.manders could have a negative impact Ulti- result, but not with the mately, he concurred with the plurality’s justiciability issue. standards [on political gerry- He said, “If workable burdens, however, courts should manders] do emerge to measure these be prepared to order relief.” standard, Justice Scalia wrote, standard, Justice Scalia Supreme Court, and other federal courts, to hear complaints regarding Supreme Court, and other federal courts, political gerrymanders. the standard by which a court will Nevertheless, hear such a complaint is still not clear. 3. The Roberts Court’s Jurisprudence on Redistricting a. the majority and establishing the justiciability of partisan gerrymanders, of partisan justiciability the establishing and the majority wrote, 34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 172 Side B 05/07/2014 15:37:06 Side B 05/07/2014 Sheet No. 172 34929-nde_28-1 34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 173 Side A 05/07/2014 15:37:06 , 80 79 335 Texas , http:/ 81 note 18. New York supra , May 16, 2003, islatures on Election g EGISLATURES IMES ressional Districts 2004 L Travis County, g and various other 82 83 ., http://www.agiftx.org/ TATE , N.Y. T S , http://www.tlc.state.tx.us/ EX http://lulac.org/about/ (last T , Texas Con , Dec. 14, 2005, at A34. , http://www.tlc.state.tx.us/redist/ OUNCIL C ITIZENS IMES ORUM OF . C ONFERENCE OF OUNCIL M C C A . GI F It was also evident that the legislation evident that the It was also EGISLATIVE M ATIN Texas’ Republicans Fume; Democrats Remain AWOL . L 78 , A L ATIONAL A GOP Wave Washed Over State Le EX EGISLATIVE islative Dispute Goes National , T g NITED , Editorial, N.Y. T . L U EX GERRYMANDERED GRIDLOCK GERRYMANDERED , NCSL: N , T Texas Le Tom DeLay EAGUE OF g , L .for the 2002 elections, see For a map of Texas’s congressional districts While it was unusual for a state to redistrict congressional a state to redistrict was unusual for While it , May 14, 2003, at A17. Id About the American GI Forum Redistrictin Id. About Us 77 editorial board stated, “Texas’ Congressional district lines threw “Texas’ Congressional district editorial board stated, IMES Various plaintiffs brought suit against Rick Perry, the Republican brought suit against Rick Perry, the Various plaintiffs This gerrymandering was immediately criticized.This gerrymandering The the new [redistricting legislation was] an unconstitutional partisan the new [redistricting legislation was] statewide [violated] §gerrymander and that the redistricting 2 of 437, as amended, 42 U.S.C. the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. § plaintiffs] also [contended] that the use of race and 1973. [The districts [violated] the First politics in drawing lines of specific ressional Districts 2002 Elections 77. David Barboza & Carl Hulse, 79. 83. 80. 81. 82. 78. Philip Shenon, g Con Elections and 2006 Primaries redist/pdf/congress_historical/c_2002.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2014).redist/pdf/congress_historical/c_2002.pdf (last For a map of see Texas’s congressional districts for the 2004 elections, N.Y. T at A18. visited Apr. 8, 2014). /www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/elections/red-tide.aspx (last visited Apr. 8, 2014). /www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/elections/red-tide.aspx pdf/congress_historical/c_2004_2006.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2014). index.php?page=about.the.gi.forum (last visited Apr. 8, 2014). Times only every 10 tradition that new lines are drawn aside the longstanding line-drawing The purpose of this heavy-handed years, after the census. It worked.” the number of Republican districts. was purely to increase For further illustration, in 1990 Republicans did not control any chambers in any south- For further illustration, in 1990 Republicans ern state legislature. Karen Hansen, Day, Red Tide: December 2010 gerrymandering. control of the state legislatures in Alabama Similarly, Republicans won in 2010.and North Carolina for first time since Reconstruction Draper, There were also charges of illegal minority voter voice dilution. of illegal minority voter voice There were also charges 2014] the in Leader then Majority DeLay, Tom Republican gains, electoral pass “legisla- party to the state encouraged of Representatives, House [the Republicans’] map in the Congressional redraw . . . to tion favor.” \\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\28-1\NDE109.txt unknown Seq: 13 2-MAY-14 7:13 Governor of Texas, who had signed the redistricting bill into law. who had signed the redistricting bill Governor of Texas, Such Citizens, an the League of United Latin American plaintiffs included educational “advances the economic condition, organization that of Hispanic influence, health and civil rights attainment, political programs;” Americans through community-based lines in the middle of a decade, the legislation received national atten- received national the legislation middle of a decade, lines in the the state failing effort, fled Democrats, in a the state house’s tion when not allow a quorum. in order to would have ramifications beyond Texas, given that it would ultimately Texas, given ramifications beyond would have keep control of the House of Representatives. help the Republicans Texas (the home of Austin); the American GI Forum of Texas, an Texas (the home of Austin); the addressing problems of discrimina- organization that “is dedicated to veterans;” tion and inequities endured by Hispanic that: citizens groups. The plaintiffs argued 34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 173 Side A 05/07/2014 15:37:06 Side A 05/07/2014 Sheet No. 173 34929-nde_28-1 34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 173 Side B 05/07/2014 15:37:06 EDIS- The R [Vol. 28 Conse- EDISTRICT- 85 R 89 90 So, perhaps in ONGRESSIONAL 87 ue of United Latin Ameri- g ONGRESSIONAL Lea 86 With a different majority ., RS22479, C 4 (2012). 88 ULING IN ., R42482, C R ERV , saying that in order to success- , saying that in order ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY S ERV S OURT VERVIEW Veith C O LAW, ESEARCH EGAL ESEARCH , www.tlc.state.tx.us/redist/pdf/chronology_plans/ . R UPREME . R S : A L ONG ONG CT OUNCIL , C ressional Districts Court-Ordered Districts LULAC v. Perry PLAN g , C A C IGHTS 84 HITAKER HITAKER R NALYSIS OF THE 6 (2008). W A W EGISLATIVE L OTING AIGE For a map of Texas’s congressional districts following changes made from AIGE EGAL TEXAS U.S. Con V at 417. at 418. at 414. NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF TRICTING EXAS ING AND THE Id. Id. Id. Id. : A L , T , see C In terms of partisan gerrymandering, the Roberts Court has left gerrymandering, the Roberts Court In terms of partisan The lawsuit gave the Supreme Court the opportunity to expand or to expand Court the opportunity gave the Supreme The lawsuit holding [in did “not revisit the justiciability Ultimately, the Court Nevertheless, the Court did find that other aspects of the mid-dec- Nevertheless, the Court did find that ] but [proceeded] to examine whether appellants’ claims offer[ed] to examine whether appellants’ claims ] but [proceeded] Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth of the Clause Protection the Equal and Amendment Amendment.” 8 87. 88. L. P 90. 89. L. P 86. 84. 548 U.S. 399, 409 (2006). League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 85. 0143 LULAC PLAN1438C.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2014). can Citizens v. Perry 336 \\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\28-1\NDE109.txt unknown Seq: 14 2-MAY-14 7:13 state legislatures (and potential plaintiffs) with the status quo—essen- potential plaintiffs) with the status state legislatures (and partisan gerrymander- tially, that a justiciable claim of unconstitutional to define.ing theoretically exists, albeit difficult However, the Court legislature “decid[ing] to redistrict did point out that even with Texas’s a Republican congressional major- with the sole purpose of achieving line it drew.” ity . . . partisan aims did not guide every to clarify its jurisprudence on the justiciability of challenges to partisan of challenges to on the justiciability its jurisprudence to clarify gerrymanders. than different make-up the Court had a Though now, previous decisions.during its Chief just been named John Roberts had to the also been named Samuel Alito had year prior, and Justice the Court. Veith for determining reliable measure of fairness the Court a manageable, gerrymander violates the Constitution.” whether a partisan than the majority ruling on the partisan-gerrymander issue, the Court than the majority ruling on the partisan-gerrymander “violated Section 2 of the Vot- ruled that changes to a particular district voting power of Latinos.” ing Rights Act because it diluted the order for redistricting to be unconstitutional, every line drawn would order for redistricting to be unconstitutional, have to be motived by partisanship. but this was because Texas had ade gerrymander were unconstitutional, Act. violated aspects of the Voting Rights fully challenge an overtly-partisan and unconstitutional gerrymander, overtly-partisan and unconstitutional fully challenge an theory . . . must do what appellants’ sole-motivation “a successful claim reliable standard, show a burden, as measured by a explicitly disavows: representational rights.” on the complainants’ quently, after court orders, Texas adopted a new plan redrawing five quently, after court orders, Texas district in question. congressional districts including the Court reaffirmed its standard from Court reaffirmed its 34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 173 Side B 05/07/2014 15:37:06 Side B 05/07/2014 Sheet No. 173 34929-nde_28-1 34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 174 Side A 05/07/2014 15:37:06 , 98 337 225 , and Y BLOG g ’ 95 OL 92 . P UB , SCOTUS lish & P g 99 THICS effectively neutered 96 J.L. E : In Plain En thus implying that courts AME 101 D Thus, although Section 5 was Thus, although Section Essentially, covered jurisdictions Essentially, covered 97 OTRE 93 Race Ipsa: Vote Dilution, Racial Gerrymanderin , 11 N Shelby County v. Holder Shelby County v. Holder GERRYMANDERED GRIDLOCK GERRYMANDERED To do this, states had to demonstrate that a “pro- To do this, states decision, the Supreme Court provided guidelines decision, the Supreme Court provided 91 Details on 94 , 134 S. Ct. at 939. (quoting Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 27 (1975)). at 943. It also gave a specific example, saying that the district court It also gave a specific example, saying at 2616. at 940 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a) (2012)). at 940. effects of race-conscious For a general discussion of the political per curiam Id. Id. Id. See id. Id. Perry Id. 100 In a Since then, however, Since then, however, going to meet its preclearance Nevertheless, because Texas was not Following the most recent round of redistricting after the 2010 after of redistricting round most recent the Following 5 under Section a ‘covered jurisdiction’ “Texas [was] At the time, Perry v. Perez Perry 98. Amy Howe, 96. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 97. 94. 95. 101. 93. 99. Perry v. Perez, 132 S. Ct. 934, 940 (2012). 100. 91. 132 S. Ct. 934 (2012). 92. (1997). (June 25, 2013, 11:03 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/details-on-shelby- county-v-holder-in-plain-english. redistricting, see Stephen Wolf, Note, the Presumption of Racial Discrimination 2014] b. \\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\28-1\NDE109.txt unknown Seq: 15 2-MAY-14 7:13 for district courts on how to best draw maps when the necessary situa- for district courts on how to best draw redistricting policy, it largely con- tion arose, but in terms of general firmed its previous jurisprudence.For instance, the Court reaffirmed duty and responsibility of the that “[r]edistricting is ‘primarily the State.’” in splitting precincts in order to should have followed Texas’s example map, come as close as possible to Texas’s obligation before an upcoming primary election, a district court obligation before an upcoming an election without a pre-cleared imposed a new map to avoid having map. “old district lines could not be This was also because Texas’s rendered them inconsistent with used, because population growth had requirement.” the Constitution’s one-person, one-vote census, additional litigation presented the Court another opportunity presented the Court litigation census, additional gerry- regarding partisan its previous rulings expand or clarify to either mandering. Rick sued Governor Texas, various plaintiffs Once again in the “violate[d] most recent gerrymander that the state’s Perry, alleging and § Constitution United States Rights Act.” 2 of the Voting Act of 1965.” of the Voting Rights posed change ‘neither has the purpose nor will have the effect of deny- has the purpose nor will have posed change ‘neither or color.’” right to vote on account of race ing or abridging the not struck down, “it will have no actual effect unless and until Congress will have no actual effect unless and not struck down, “it covered by it.” to determine who should be can enact a new statute were required to receive federal “preclearance” for their maps before receive federal “preclearance” for were required to they become law. should be as deferential as possible to state redistricting law. should be as deferential as possible the preclearance requirement.the preclearance Section 4 of The Supreme Court held the cover- Act, the section of the Act which contained the Voting Rights unconstitutional. age formula, to be 34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 174 Side A 05/07/2014 15:37:06 Side A 05/07/2014 Sheet No. 174 34929-nde_28-1 34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 174 Side B 05/07/2014 15:37:06 104 and a g 105 [Vol. 28 ue of United g Lea because of the effects But what we are left with what we But 103 . L.J. 1097 (2007). T 102 S ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY HIO ISCUSSION RGUMENT LAW, , 68 O II. A Practical Consequences III. D When Courts Won’t Make Law: Partisan Gerrymanderin A. , “commentators have observed other states may , “commentators have observed other note 88, at 6. The report, however, also noted that “there Id. supra note 3, at 59. , Part I (discussing federal laws requiring states to comply with various supra , HITAKER MY NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF See supra Specifically, after the Supreme Court’s ruling in Specifically, after the Supreme Court’s Gerrymandering is a “political disaster” In summation, the case did not clarify the vagueness that sur- the vagueness clarify did not the case In summation, and Court’s jurisprudence on redistricting, In light of the Supreme will con- is not provided, state legislatures If increased guidance Given that there has not been much guidance from the Supreme Given that there has not been much 103. A 104. 105. W 102. state of partisan gerrymandering For additional information on the muddled does not appear to be any urgency on the part of state legislatures to [redistrict more than once per decade].” Latin American Citizens congressional districts only dispense with the tradition of redrawing census, and instead, redistrict once per decade following the decennial of the state government.” following a change in political control standards when redrawing maps). case law, see Michael S. Kang, states must draw contiguous districts of roughly equal population, and states must draw contiguous districts population following each decadal they must respond to changes in the census. a more frequent They may even make gerrymandering occurrence. 338 \\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\28-1\NDE109.txt unknown Seq: 16 2-MAY-14 7:13 Structural Approach to the Law of Democracy rounded gerrymandering.rounded considered could be what not clear It is still gerrymander. partisan an unconstitutional specifics, there Congress’s historical silence on when coupled with how to redraw guidance for state legislatures on needs to be further the negative partisan consequences.legislative maps without If the that Congress, not supply that guidance, it is critical Supreme Court will or both, provide it. the state legislatures, partisan gain through redistricting.tinue to maximize This will further levels of polariza- in Congress, resulting in higher increase partisanship gridlock.tion and even more public policy Simply put, this is bad for United States. and harmful to the that it has on the political system, on voters, on public policy and gov- that it has on the political system, on ernment services, and on public officials. is that, at this point, both Congress and the Supreme Court have been Supreme Court have and the this point, both Congress is that, at their own redistricting states to determine to the highly deferential policy. to draw districts, as long as they Court, state legislatures have free reign comply with minimal federal restrictions. As previously mentioned, 34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 174 Side B 05/07/2014 15:37:06 Side B 05/07/2014 Sheet No. 174 34929-nde_28-1 34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 175 Side A 05/07/2014 15:37:06 , C. 339 110 Roll , N.Y. 1789- EPORT http:// R 111 ENNETH ONGRESS C Meet the Press OLITICAL Election 2012 P TATES OOK S video available at C , . Similarly, in its final , http://www.rollcall.com/ HE ressional Districts in the United NITED g RESS ALL 109 U , T , included in P (Nov. 2, 2012, 3:25 PM), http:// s C g OLL EPORT , R EET THE R , M ARTIES IN THE ed P gg OLITICAL House Race Ratin P listed twenty-five seats as toss-ups, s for November 5, 2012 OLITICAL Impact on Partisanship Impact on g and the Rothenberg Political Report listed and the Rothenberg Political Report 113 P Increased Partisanship and Gridlock 112 GERRYMANDERED GRIDLOCK GERRYMANDERED B. 108 OTHENBERG note 4. The System is Ri TLAS OF , R The Top Ten Most Gerrymandered Con s A s for 2012 House Elections g g supra Part I.C, New York Times (Nov. 11, 2010, 1:30 PM), http://pjmedia.com/zombie/2010/11/11/ ISTORIAL Silver, Zombie, H EDIA This increases the likelihood that incumbents representing This increases the likelihood that See supra 2012 House Race Ratin House Ratin See Race Ratin See Speaking about what is wrong in Washington on Speaking about what HE This can create confusion for constituents and voters, who may who and voters, for constituents confusion can create This , T 114 107 , http://elections.nytimes.com/2012/ratings/house (last visited Apr. 8, 2014). Nate Silver estimated that out of the 435 seats of the House of Rep- that out of the 435 seats of the House Nate Silver estimated incumbents will face a real As a consequence, the only time many Gerrymandering also causes districts to not have rational shapes. rational not have to causes districts also Gerrymandering As already mentioned, gerrymandering creates more partisan dis- more partisan creates mentioned, gerrymandering As already The fact is the system is rigged. Seventy-five percent of the con- is rigged. Seventy-five percent of The fact is the system they’re gerrymandered districts in which gressmen come from are no only play to one constituency. There bulletproof. They case, don’t go home and have to prove their swing states. They part of a choir back home. And that’s a huge because they’ve got the problem here. 106 , PJ M listed twenty-eight, 107. 113. 108. Tom Brokaw, 110. 114. So, a Democrat may be challenged from the liberal wing of the party while a 109. 111. Jennifer Steinhauer et al., 112. 106. ARTIS IMES M 1989 (1989) (detailing various maps that show the Congressional districts in each of the 1989 (1989) (detailing various maps that show Congresses between 1789 and 1989). politics/race-ratings-chart-2012-house-elections.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2014). rothenbergpoliticalreport.com/ratings/house. Republican may be challenged from the conservative wing of the party. www.politico.com/blogs/politico-live/2012/12/brokaw-the-system-is-rigged-152993.html. Tom Brokaw said, the-top-ten-most-gerrymandered-congressional-districts-in-the-united-states/?singlepage= true. of Congressional districts, see K For a historical perspective on the shape T States (Nov. 5, 2012), http://cookpolitical.com/house/charts/race-ratings/5105. Likewise, the 2014] \\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\28-1\NDE109.txt unknown Seq: 17 2-MAY-14 7:13 non-competitive districts will pander to the ideologically extremes of non-competitive districts will pander extremism in Congress as a their parties, which will generate further whole. resentatives, only thirty-five are swing districts. resentatives, only when they are challenged in a pri- possibility of losing an election is mary. Many are often weirdly shaped, sometimes with no logical bounda- no logical with sometimes shaped, weirdly are often Many ries. live in. which district they not know tricts and thus facilitates the election of more partisan representa- the election of more partisan tricts and thus facilitates tives. eighteen as pure toss-ups. “race ratings” before the November 2012 election, the Cook Political the November 2012 election, the “race ratings” before races in the entire House. Report listed only twenty-nine toss-up Call 34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 175 Side A 05/07/2014 15:37:06 Side A 05/07/2014 Sheet No. 175 34929-nde_28-1 34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 175 Side B 05/07/2014 15:37:06 - g 115 le Lar g NTEREST [Vol. 28 HEOLOGY , I T ORAL is the Sin g M , June 26, 2008, at OST ONSTITUTION . P C ATHOLIC ASH HE This may seem to be a , C : T , W 119 RISIS C Thus, gerrymandering can con- ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY the Vote: How a “Dirty Dozen” States Suppress g 118 lected Scandal g LAW, ’s Ne g House GOP Committee Chairs Will All Be White Men In Next House GOP Committee Chairs Will All Be White Votin Gerrymanderin 138 (1996). EPRESENTATION IN The Kids on the Hill (or How Gerrymanderin 7, DLC, http://www.dlc.org/specials/Gerrymandering_the_ (Nov. 27, 2012, 8:53 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ ,R ARTIES ht and Responsibility to Participation) P YDEN g For instance, if someone lives in a congressional dis- For instance, if someone lives in a Impact on Voter Turnout and Voter Apathy Impact on Voter Turnout it can have the practical consequence of rendering a it can have the practical OLITICS P 116 117 C. K. R OST OLITICAL P Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964). David S. Broder, Jennifer Bendery, P AVID Marc Dunkelman, NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF See See See UFF AND , H , See also While redistricting may be conducted under the guise of “one per- may be conducted under the guise While redistricting Another consequence of gerrymandering is that it facilitates the it facilitates is that of gerrymandering consequence Another People are more likely to vote in competitive races than in races People are more likely to vote in competitive ress 117. D 116. 118. Ramon Luzarraga, 119. 115. g ROUPS as Many as 9 Million Voters Vote.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2014). A19. Con (“House committee 2012/11/27/house-committee-chairs-all-white-men_n_2201136.html on the committee . . . .”). chairs are typically chosen based on their seniority est Barrier to Citizens’ Ri G (Dec. 30, 2012), http://catholicmoraltheology.com/the-kids-on-the-hill-and-how-to-send- adults-there-or-make-the-incumbents-grow-up/. 340 districts—those non-competitive representing The members most likely seniority—areto obtain more ideologi- incentivized to be those who are cally extreme. obtain are not likely to moderate members In contrast, they are chair because a committee necessary to become the seniority extreme elections, either to a more ideologically more likely to lose they represent a or in a general election because member in a primary, swing district. members same logic applies to ranking committee The because com- thus making gridlock more likely in the minority party, ideologically would come from their parties’ more mittee counterparts extreme factions. \\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\28-1\NDE109.txt unknown Seq: 18 2-MAY-14 7:13 son, one vote,” selection of ideologically extreme House members as committee chairs. as committee members House extreme of ideologically selection select circumstances, in most parties, both because is primarily This committee tenure. the length of their chairs based on committee person’s vote pointless. undercuts indi- “[U]nbridled gerrymandering each voter to express a preference vidual choice, eroding the ability of and realistic chance that his candi- for a particular candidate with a fair date may win.” trict in which the results of an election, based on the partisan make-up trict in which the results of an election, a voter may not have an incentive of the district, are easily predictable, to vote. the greatest structural barrier “Gerrymandering . . . is arguably to participate in politics in a to the people’s right and responsibility meaningful and impactful manner.” tribute to complacency or apathy among American voters. tribute to complacency or apathy among 1. Voter Turnout where the outcome appears predetermined. given, but it can have rippling effects. Just like there are “feature acts” on Friday night, “opening acts” ben- that bring people out a the concert the feature brings.efit from the heightened attention Likewise, there 34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 175 Side B 05/07/2014 15:37:06 Side B 05/07/2014 Sheet No. 175 34929-nde_28-1 34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 176 Side A 05/07/2014 15:37:06 , 341 121 Bouie ht: $1.3 g See Fi g 125 It also reduces “the Cost of Debt Ceilin ., Feb. 21, 2013, at 18. The 124 RIB And, America is worse off . T HI 126 , C g 120 Jeanne Sahadi, See also Impact on Public Policy People may be going through the motions People may be GERRYMANDERED GRIDLOCK GERRYMANDERED D. note 7. 123 Jesse and Gerrymanderin note 117, at 139. note 36, at SR5. supra (July 26, 2012, 10:49 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/07/23/ supra supra , ONEY Editorial, YDEN Id. Id. See Some have even called this type of system “a major form of called this type of system “a major Some have even argues that incumbents in heavily gerrymandered districts often have large cam- argues that incumbents in heavily gerrymandered 122 , CNNM Because of gerrymandering, voters may not have a real choice as to voters may not have a real Because of gerrymandering, Similarly, gerrymandering facilitates bad policy outcomes.Similarly, gerrymandering facilitates For Gerrymandering also has a direct effect on public policy, namely, Gerrymandering also has a direct effect note 58 (arguing that “there are reams of political-science research showing that note 58 (arguing that “there are reams of 123. Wang, 124. R 122. increases the number of Some have stated that partisan gerrymandering 125. 126. America is worse off because it has a lower debt rating from Standard & Poors. 120. 121. Abelbaum & Dash, supra factors that explain the rising incumbency partisan gerrymandering is low on the list of rate.”). is not crucial to my argument. However, the rising incumbency rate It is enough likelihood that one party’s candidate will that gerrymandering artificially increases the beat the other’s. Tribune challengers and dissuade them from run- paign coffers, which can intimidate potential ning for Congress. of any incumbent, but the inference is that Of course, this can be true have larger war chests because they do not incumbents in heavily gerrymandered districts need to spend money on campaigning. incumbents who win reelection. are arguments against that. However, there Billion See news/economy/debt-limit/index.htm (saying that the uncertainty in ability to borrow caused the federal government to have to pay an extra $1.3 billion leading up to the debt ceiling showdown). Either the outcome is preordained because the district is so gerry- is preordained because the district Either the outcome the incum- might not even be anyone challenging mandered, or there bent. 2014] elec- lesser polls and to the people that bring elections” are “feature like So, just by themselves. attention generate unable to that are tions act feature if the acts the opening for repercussions can be there if the can be affected the marquee race, races, besides cancels, other race is a snoozer.congressional that if studies have shown The same govern- and thus overall voter turnout, more competitive, races become rates, increases. ment participation 2. Voter Choice a challenger. an election, if there is even who to vote for during \\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\28-1\NDE109.txt unknown Seq: 19 2-MAY-14 7:13 instance, leaving aside the political goals of not raising the country’s instance, leaving aside the political having a lower debt rating than it debt ceiling, America is worse off for 2011. did before the debt ceiling fight of disenfranchisement.” in that it “slow[s] or forestall[s] representative responsiveness to the in that it “slow[s] or forestall[s] representative changes in the current of public sentiment.” when they go to the voting booth on Election Day, or as previously the voting booth on Election Day, when they go to go at all. stated, they may not public’s ability to hold its governors accountable, hence discrediting public’s ability to hold its governors which follow.” the governmental actions and outcomes 34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 176 Side A 05/07/2014 15:37:06 Side A 05/07/2014 Sheet No. 176 34929-nde_28-1 34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 176 Side B 05/07/2014 15:37:06 [Vol. 28 . 2065, 2086 (2013) (citing EV (Jan. 27, 2013), http://www. . 1433, 1440 (1997) (citations EV L. R EPUBLIC AME . L. R R A ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY D They may only listen to special 131 EW , N 130 OTRE Barack Obama is Not Pleased: The President on His , 83 V LAW, Worse yet, there may be members, due Worse yet, there may be members, , 88 N 129 Impact on Public Officials Impact on Rational States? E. note 121, at 18. But if reelection in gerrymandered districts is But if reelection . 273, 297–319 (2011)). y of Gridlock g EV 127 supra Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized Democracy in . L. R ALIF NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF The Phemonolo In an interview, President Obama stated, “The House Republi- In an interview, President Obama , 99 C Finally, gerrymandering reduces the incentive that elected officials the incentive reduces Finally, gerrymandering Essentially, members of Congress from heavily gerrymandered dis- of Congress from heavily gerrymandered Essentially, members 128. the general election outcomes are This can be true of any district in which 129. Franklin Foer & Chris Hughes, 130. “[I]f the combination of partisan primaries and bipartisan gerrymandering are 131. Editorial, 127. Edward Rubin, 128 Richard H. Pildes, America Enemies, the Media, and the Future of Football omitted). redistricting.preordained, whether or not it from partisan However, gerrymandering increases this likelihood. newrepublic.com/article/112190/obama-interview-2013-sit-down-president. Of course the same logic would also apply to Democrats. resulting in a legislature that cannot be said to be broadly responsive to the American people, then we may have identified a cause of actual democratic dysfunction.” Josh Chavetz, 342 could various services because shutdown its government having after be performed.not would Congress that a less-gridlocked is likely It first place. in the situations avoid these acted to have constituents.have to respond to analysis This stems from an economic they are in Con- that members typically have while of the incentives gress. theory makes by law and economics, public choice “Influenced by self- that individuals are motivated exclusively the . . . assumption interest. the desire to be are motivated primarily by Thus, legislators reelected . . . .” \\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\28-1\NDE109.txt unknown Seq: 20 2-MAY-14 7:13 can majority is made up mostly of members who are in sharply can majority is made up mostly safely Republican and may not gerrymandered districts that are very public opinion, because feel compelled to pay attention to broad-based is the opinions of their specific what they’re really concerned about Republican constituencies.” assured, then legislators lose the motivation to act in a manner that lose the motivation to act assured, then legislators their electoral success. would help to ensure in those districts, preordained electoral outcomes tricts, because of the that they will be reelected.take it for granted members Consequently, electorate in not listen to the opinions of the entire of Congress may their district—they vot- may only care about the opinions of primary ers. to a combination of partisan primaries and gerrymandering, who do to a combination of partisan primaries not listen to any public opinion. interests.to members of Congress from ger- When donors give money buying access to members of rymandered districts, they “know they’re Congress who are sure to win the election – the a tacit assurance that contribution is money well-invested.” 34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 176 Side B 05/07/2014 15:37:06 Side B 05/07/2014 Sheet No. 176 34929-nde_28-1 34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 177 Side A 05/07/2014 15:37:06 HE 343 : T , http:// (Nov. 27, N APITAL ’ ATE C OMM Following the , SFG C Proposition 11 OLITICAL 135 Id. 136 132 , P The eight members 134 EDISTRICTING This essentially took the This essentially took R Win for Governor g 133 ressional Map g ERRYMANDERING ITIZENS G . C California AL Victory a Bi g , C A. California’s Con g Redistrictin ESPONSES TO GERRYMANDERED GRIDLOCK GERRYMANDERED Gradin (Dec. 18, 2012, 2:31 PM), http://go.bloomberg.com/political- IV. R round on Commission g OVERNMENT Part of the whittling down process included an opportunity for California G Id. Id. Back The commission was tasked with drawing legislative boundaries fol- The commission was tasked with drawing As previously mentioned, Congress and the Supreme Court have Court the Supreme and Congress mentioned, As previously fight to Schwarzenegger led a ballot initiative Governor Arnold The commission is comprised of eight members: “three who are The commission is comprised of eight [drew] the district lines in conformity with strict, nonpartisan [drew] the district lines in conformity relatively equal population rules designed to create districts of all Californians. The Com- that will provide fair representation for public comment. mission [held] public hearings and accept[ed] drawing the maps for the After hearing from the public and Senate districts, 80 Assembly House of Representatives districts, 40 136. 135. 133. Gregory Giroux, 134. 132. John Wildermuth, URRENCY OF legislative leaders to strike some of those who were in the pool. wedrawthelines.ca.gov/commission.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2014). 2008, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/politics/article/Redistricting-victory-a-big-win- for-governor-3260386.php. capital/2012-12-18/grading-californias-congressional-map/. C 2014] \\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\28-1\NDE109.txt unknown Seq: 21 2-MAY-14 7:13 lowing the 2010 decadal census. Throughout this process, the Commission given states much autonomy in redistricting. much autonomy given states But with this autonomy, responded differently.states have and like Pennsylvania Some states, aiming districts, draft congressional continued to partisanly Texas, have as possible. gain from the process as much political to exact A few of the road approach. taken a middle states have aban- Others have favor of other processes. redistricting in practice of partisan doned the redistricting in have also abandoned partisan Similarly, other countries boundary lines. commissions redraw legislative favor of having neutral redistricting process in 2008. overhaul California’s redistricting power out of the state legislature, and gave it to a non- out of the state legislature, and redistricting power partisan commission. and two who are either Decline- Democrats, three who are Republican, party.” to-State or are registered with another were chosen randomly from a pool of twenty-four people, which had were chosen randomly from a pool of the sixty most qualified indi- been whittled down from a larger pool the commission. viduals who had applied to be on ultimately established the California Citizens Redistricting Commission, the California Citizens Redistricting ultimately established also drafts the to drafting the state’s legislative seats, which, in addition congressional districts. map for all of its selection of the eight members, those eight then chose six more mem- selection of the eight members, those of fourteen. bers to bring the commission to a total 34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 177 Side A 05/07/2014 15:37:06 Side A 05/07/2014 Sheet No. 177 34929-nde_28-1 34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 177 Side B 05/07/2014 15:37:06 , N.Y. (Dec. [Vol. 28 ton g AZETTE 137 , G ressional Races; Bono Mack , http://data.desmoinesre- g islature Linked , http://redistricting.lls.edu/ g Furthermore, Iowa has COM . 143 EGISTER ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY R EDISTRICTING R Iowa Process, Split Le OINES g LAW, M BOUT B. ES A , D Shakes Up California’s Con LL g g California Set to Send Many New Faces to Washin , A However, after the 2012 elections, which were after the 2012 elections, However, Iowa Redistrictin 139 138 141 Redistrictin note 9. Iowa’s non-political process has led to more competi- Iowa’s non-political process has led 142 supra Adam Nagourney, NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF Id. Census 2010: Redistrictin Who Draws the Lines? Id. See 140 144 , 89.3 KPCC – Represent! (Nov. 7, 2012, 8:34 AM), http://www.scpr.org/blogs/ g (Feb. 14, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/14/us/california-congres- Other states that have non-partisan processes include Washington, non-partisan processes include Other states that have Under the new system of redistricting, California saw a lot of saw a lot redistricting, California new system of Under the California essentially commission, a non-partisan In establishing Some states have also successfully utilized non-partisan procedures, Some states have also successfully utilized districts, and four Board of Equalization districts, the Commission the districts, of Equalization Board and four districts, next decade. for the to be used new maps on the [voted] 143. 144. 142. James Q. Lynch, 140. Coll, 141. 137. 138. 139. Kitty Felde, IMES 3, 2012, 7:00 AM), http://thegazette.com/2012/12/03/iowa-redistricting-process-split- legislature-linked/. who.php (last visited Apr. 8, 2014). gister.com/dmr/iowa-census/redistricting-game/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2014). T Trailin politics/2012/11/07/10948/redistricting-shakes-californias-congressional-rac/. sional-delegation-braces-for-change.html?pagewanted=all. 344 \\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\28-1\NDE109.txt unknown Seq: 22 2-MAY-14 7:13 Idaho, and Arizona. change. only one congressional previous ten years, instance, in the For parties. seat changed out of redistricting.tried to take politics are still districts While there political tenden- one party, that is mostly due to the that heavily favor district, rather communities contained within one cies of established line-drawing designed to sway elections.than the artificial The efforts largely been successful.in California have is that California “The result had for the past gridlocked government, as it has no longer has divided, decade.” tive elections, and, because it also draws state legislative districts, has led tive elections, and, because it also draws to small majorities in the state legislature. the first to take place after redistricting done with the new system, four with the new system, redistricting done take place after the first to parties. seats changed while not necessarily handing the entire process over to a non-partisan while not necessarily handing the entire independent entity.“Iowa’s redistricting process is han- For instance, Services Agency.dled by the non-partisan Legislative It draws the and presents it to the Legislature boundaries based on population data for approval.” other rules for redrawing congressional districts, including that districts other rules for redrawing congressional the district must be contiguous, dis- cannot divide counties, counties in and the population of each district tricts should be reasonably compact, size by more than one cannot deviate from the ideal population percent. 34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 177 Side B 05/07/2014 15:37:06 Side B 05/07/2014 Sheet No. 177 34929-nde_28-1 34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 178 Side A 05/07/2014 15:37:06 345 150 148 , KPBS (Feb. g , Feb. 13, 2013, at A10 Raises Questions In regards to congres- In regards g RIBUNE -T 145 ERALD , http://www.fairdistrictsnow.org/redis- 146 , H ORG . Florida OW note 141. N C. supra , ISTRICTS note 145. the Political Game D g GERRYMANDERED GRIDLOCK GERRYMANDERED AIR supra However, the vast majority of states still leave the However, the vast majority of states , , F Fixin International Examples of Redistrictin g g 149 . art. III, § 20(a). In Florida, an Email Trail on Redistrictin D. ONST ´ ate, Editorial, . C There are charges that “Florida’s legislative leaders appear that “Florida’s legislative leaders There are charges LA See Id. See Who Draws the Lines? See Redistrictin See Redistrictin 147 While these are three different methods, other states utilize differ- While these are three different methods, Other countries’ efforts to limit and reduce partisanship through Other countries’ efforts to limit and Unlike California, Florida’s state legislature has not delegated its not delegated has legislature state Florida’s California, Unlike No apportionment plan or individual district shall be drawn with plan or individual district shall be drawn No apportionment or disfavor a political party or an incumbent; the intent to favor of deny- be drawn with the intent or result and districts shall not language the equal opportunity of racial or ing or abridging diminish in the political process or to minorities to participate districts representatives of their choice; and their ability to elect territory. shall consist of contiguous 150. 149. 148. S.V. D 146. F 147. 145. While the new method of redistricting might have had some impact of redistricting might have While the new method (arguing that even after the changes in Florida law, party officials were still able to push- through partisan gerrymandering in the state). 5, 2013), http://www.kpbs.org/news/2013/feb/05/in-florida-an-email-trail-on-redistrict- ing-raises/. tricting/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2014). on the elections, many are not satisfied with the system—peopleon the elections, many want to the hands of poli- takes the process entirely out of have something that ticians. 2014] \\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\28-1\NDE109.txt unknown Seq: 23 2-MAY-14 7:13 to have authorized their staff to use private email accounts, personal their staff to use private email accounts, to have authorized meetings’ with Republi- ‘dropboxes’ and to engage in ‘brainstorming attempting to draw favorable politi- can Party of Florida consultants in ban on such coordination.” cal districts, despite a constitutional partisan gerrymandering.ent systems to try to prevent or limit These backup commissions, and politi- systems include advisory commissions, cian commissions. redistricting are good examples for the United States.redistricting are good examples for In the United as “redistribution.”Kingdom, redistricting is referred to Independent four countries that comprise the boundary commissions in each of the of parliamentary constituen- United Kingdom redraw the boundaries cies. Commission for England is an For instance, “[t]he Boundary which reviews all Parliamentary independent and impartial public body, system to the elected, partisan state officials in the state legislatures. system to the elected, partisan state power to redraw congressional districts to a non-partisan commission. districts to a redraw congressional power to constraint in gerrymandering. Florida has shown However, Specifically, constitu- amend the state citizens voted to 2010, Florida’s in November redistricting. overly partisan tion to prevent sional redistricting, Florida’s constitution now reads: constitution now Florida’s sional redistricting, 34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 178 Side A 05/07/2014 15:37:06 Side A 05/07/2014 Sheet No. 178 34929-nde_28-1 34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 178 Side B 05/07/2014 15:37:06 . ., Id Id. 153 154 LEC- COT E S [Vol. 28 HE ROOKINGS OR Interest- F , B N ’ “A partisan 160 , ACE: T OMM 157 C (Mar. 1, 2011), http:// Similarly, the Bound- the Similarly, OUNDARY 1, 4 (2008). 151 , B 158 ILIBUSTER However, “[a] Secretary of However, “[a] Secretary TUDIES , F S 155 ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY in the U.S.: Can Canada Help? dom: Redistribution Process g g ., http://consultation.boundarycommission NG LAW, E OVERNANCE OR G F N 152 ’ Canada Does Better The Redistribution of Parliamentary Constituencies (and What The Redistribution of Parliamentary Constituencies The United Kin g (July 4, 2012), http://nottspolitics.org/2012/07/04/the- OMM Electoral Districtin SSUES IN , http://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/bd/bdy/bdy_gb (last , http://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/bd/bdy/bdy_gb C : I note 157, at 5. ULLETS : Somethin supra g ETWORK TUDIES OUNDARY & B N S , B 156 . of communities over elec- Previously, the “rules prioritised representation The problems that stemmed from gerrymandering in Mani- The problems that stemmed from ALLOTS NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF Id. Redistrictin Id. The Commission – Functions and Appointments Id About TORAL , B NOWLEDGE 159 OVERNANCE K In Canada, historically “redistributions at both the federal and pro- “redistributions at both the federal In Canada, historically States, Canadian provinces also Like individual states in the United In an effort to address unfairness in a previous method of con- method of in a previous to address unfairness In an effort 153. David Rossiter et al., 159. Courtney, 160. 155. Ron Johnston, et al., 158. 156. 157. John C. Courtney, 152. 154. 151. . G NST http://www.bcomm-scotland.independent.gov.uk/commission/ (last visited Apr. 8, http://www.bcomm-scotland.independent.gov.uk/commission/ 2014). for redistribution for “UK Parlia- Scotland’s Boundary Commission is responsible Parliament constituencies and regions.” ment constituencies in Scotland; and Scottish it Means) www.filibustercartoons.com/index.php/2011/03/01/redistricting-something-canada- does-better/. toral equality – permissible range of constituency they made no stipulation regarding the the electoral quota as is practicable.’”electorates, which merely had to be ‘as near (citations omitted). visited Apr. 8, 2014). forengland.independent.gov.uk/about-the-review/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2014). forengland.independent.gov.uk/about-the-review/ redistribution-of-parliamentary-constituencies-and-what-it-means/. I Ultimately, the Commissions offer their plans to Parliament, “which can offer their plans to Parliament, Ultimately, the Commissions not modify, them.” accept or reject, but 346 five years.” . . . every boundaries constituency and every five years, boundaries are redrawn new legislation, Under the within +/-5 (with four exceptions) have electorates “all constituencies the Commis- . . . and only within that range could per cent of [a] quota boundaries, com- factors such as local authority sions take into account boundaries.” and previous constituency munities of interest \\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\28-1\NDE109.txt unknown Seq: 24 2-MAY-14 7:13 vincial levels . . . were carried out by elected politicians.” vincial levels . . . were province of Manitoba was the first proposed their own solutions. “The mandating the establishment Canadian jurisdiction to pass legislation commission once every ten of an arms-length, nonpartisan boundary years.” led to the change. toba were particularly egregious, which ducting redistribution, Parliament included revisions to its system in revisions to its system included Parliament ducting redistribution, 2011. Act of System and Constituencies Voting the Parliamentary State can modify the recommendations before transmitting them to the recommendations before transmitting State can modify Parliament.” ary Commission for Scotland is an “Advisory Non-departmental Public Non-departmental an “Advisory is for Scotland ary Commission [It is] inde- Office. Scotland by the funded and wholly sponsored Body and non-political.” pendent ingly, Manitoba “looked to Australia and New Zealand as possible ingly, Manitoba “looked to Australia to government-dominated gerry- sources for an acceptable alternative committee of the House itself” drew the boundaries of electoral dis- House itself” drew the boundaries committee of the are called “ridings.” tricts, which in Canada 34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 178 Side B 05/07/2014 15:37:06 Side B 05/07/2014 Sheet No. 178 34929-nde_28-1 34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 179 Side A 05/07/2014 15:37:06 347 , 75 TATES S Specifi- NITED 165 U 166 Commissions g in Other Countries and g 161 As stated in Part III, if note 158. 167 supra EDISTRICTING IN THE 163 , R The Case for Redistrictin note 3, at 52–53 (arguing that “eliminating IGHTS AND supra 162 , ECOMMENDATION R But the Canadians have leeway to meet But the Canadians MY A Canada Does Better 164 g OTING V. R V GERRYMANDERED GRIDLOCK GERRYMANDERED Malapportionment and Gerrymanderin in See also , Jeffrey C. Kubin, Note, : Somethin g enerally g . 837 (1997). Id. Id. Id. See Id. Redistrictin EV The Act also provided guidance for what should be taken into con- guidance for what should be taken The Act also provided to address partisan redis- Even with the advances made by states But Canada’s problems from gerrymandering were not limited to not limited were from gerrymandering problems But Canada’s The guidance, as passed by state legislatures, should be specific The guidance, as passed by state legislatures, Under the terms of the new legislation, parliamentary rid- new legislation, terms of the Under the special non-parti- be modified by henceforth only ings could Each redistricting each province. residing in san committees individu- of one provincial judge and two committee would consist and apolitical Speaker of the House, als appointed by Canada’s the case only be overturned by parliament in their decisions could provable, concern. of exceptional, and 163. 164. 165. Richard S. Katz, 166. 167. 161. 162. . L. R EX gerrymandering in all of its forms can only be accomplished by abandoning the single- member districts that make it possible and by adopting proportional representation elections.”). T Alternative Electoral Systems 245, 253 (Mark E. Rush ed., 1998). 2014] electo- independent in the [its] answer found [Manitoba] . . . . manders countries.” in both used commissions ral boundary \\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\28-1\NDE109.txt unknown Seq: 25 2-MAY-14 7:13 sideration when drawing boundary lines.sideration when drawing district lines For instance, account, and also of interest or identity into were to take communities to deviate from to which borders were allowed “set limits on the degree quo.” their historic status with it, Parts I, III, and IV clearly tricting and the problems associated problem in the American polit- show that gerrymandering is still a huge ical system.institutions have argued that the Many individuals and to be abandoned, and different practice of partisan redistricting needs people have argued for various alternatives. Manitoba, and in 1964, the Canadian government passed the Electoral passed the Canadian government and in 1964, the Manitoba, Act: Readjustment Boundaries these goals because, as it was historically in Britain, they allow a fair as it was historically in Britain, these goals because, in population among their districts. amount of deviation the Supreme Court will not provide guidance on what state legislatures the Supreme Court will not provide that the state legislatures, Con- can do during redistricting, it is critical gress, or both, provide it. are kept in the same congres- and should mandate that communities not drawn solely for partisan gain. sional districts and that districts are districts compact, will help people These guidelines will help to keep cally, each electoral district in a province must be within twenty-five per- district in a province must be within cally, each electoral for the province. cent more or less of the electoral quota 34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 179 Side A 05/07/2014 15:37:06 Side A 05/07/2014 Sheet No. 179 34929-nde_28-1 34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 179 Side B 05/07/2014 15:37:06 [Vol. 28 It fur- It also ONGRESSMAN 172 171 , C Act g ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY LAW, 170 The bill also states that to the greatest 173 In introducing the Act, Cohen said: 169 at § 4(b)(1)(D). Id. (Jan. 16, 2013), http://cohen.house.gov/press-release/cohen-introduces- at § 4(b)(1)(A), (D). The statute gives an order of preference for main- at § 3(a)(1)(A). NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF Id. Id. Id. Cohen Introduces Fairness and Independence in Redistrictin Cohen Introduces Fairness and Independence in This bill had been championed by Congressman John Tanner championed by Congressman John This bill had been OHEN Preferably, Congress would ultimately pass legislation to encourage would ultimately pass legislation Preferably, Congress Specifically, the bill would prevent more than one redistricting Specifically, the bill would prevent C It’s time to take politics out of the redistricting process. Congress It’s time to take politics out of the redistricting to find common ground on is so polarized today that we’re unable Instead of solving our the major issues facing our country. the can down the road nation’s problems, Congress is just kicking answers. I believe that if we and waiting until the next election for we will help get more eliminate the gerrymandering of districts accomplished for our country. 168 173. 170. 171. H.R. 278172. § 2. 168. in Redistricting Act, H.R. 278, 113th John Tanner Fairness and Independence 169. TEVE taining the continuity of subdivisions. They are: counties or parishes, municipalities, and neighborhoods. fairness-and-independence-redistricting-act. Cong. (2013). S 348 of members will help and boundaries, district know and understand community. a cohesive represent Congress would the guidance Ideally, commissions redistricting non-partisan independent, mandate also of interested politicians. out of the hands take the process because they redis- its independent to emulate because system is a model California’s to paying attention to redraw lines without is able tricting commission past to end the state’s and has helped or incumbency, party affiliation gridlock.legislative to have for citizens because it is important Finally, the United King- guidelines should model some say in redistricting, on new district giving Parliament an up or down vote dom’s practice of submitted by the boundary commission. lines after they are the aforemen- the states that have not yet adopted or mandate that so.tioned practices do introduced Members of Congress have already commissions. independent state redistricting legislation to mandate In Tennessee intro- Congressman Steven Cohen of the 113th Congress, in Redistricting Fairness and Independence duced the John Tanner Act. \\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\28-1\NDE109.txt unknown Seq: 26 2-MAY-14 7:13 after each apportionment of Representatives in Congress. after each apportionment of Representatives of Tennessee during his two-decade career in the House of Representa- his two-decade career in the House of Tennessee during Heath Shuler in been introduced by Congressman tives, and had also the 112th Congress. requires that “the redistricting plan [is] developed by [an] indepen- requires that “the redistricting plan in the State . . . .” dent redistricting commission established ther requires that the independent redistricting commissions adhere ther requires that the independent standard and other requirements “to the ‘one person, one vote’ the United States,” and “[t]o the imposed under the Constitution of of geographic continuity greatest extent practicable, the maintenance which are included in the same of the political subdivisions of the State Congressional district . . . .” 34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 179 Side B 05/07/2014 15:37:06 Side B 05/07/2014 Sheet No. 179 34929-nde_28-1 34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 180 Side A 05/07/2014 15:37:06 349 VOIDING : A 179 Part IV. Aus- stated that the See supra EDISTRICTING R UIDE TO Previous deviations of only a ’ G 178 However, this is not likely to be EALISTS 176 Wells v. Rockefeller 180 R note 165, at 253. HE Court said that the “Constitution’s plain Court said that the “Constitution’s supra ., T GERRYMANDERED GRIDLOCK GERRYMANDERED Wesberry Finally, as in the British system, the bill would give the bill would in the British system, Finally, as EBERT ET AL 175 Stephan v. Graves, 796 F. Supp. 468, 472-73 (D. Kan. 1992) (three- H 6 (2000). 177 ex rel. ERALD at § 4(c)(2). at § 4(b)(2) (A)–(C). at § 4(b)(1)(E). ITFALLS It also prohibits the commissions from considering “voting considering from commissions the prohibits It also Id. Id. Id. P THE 174 EGAL Precedent suggests that the largest population deviation that a fed- Precedent suggests that the largest population to revise his bill so that it spe- Perhaps if Congressman Cohen were One big concern with this legislation is that if there is not enough legislation is that concern with this One big downgrade[s] a restraint on a far greater potential threat to equal- on a far greater potential threat downgrade[s] a restraint intent on the gerrymander. Legislatures ity of representation, selected political or racial minimizing the representation of and compact dis- groups are invited to ignore political boundaries equality among districts tricts so long as they adhere to population they know are sometimes using standards which we know and in such a confusion of quite incorrect. I see little merit priorities. 177. (White, J., dissenting). Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 555 (1969) 178. J. G 176. 175. 179. State 180. As previously mentioned, Britain allows for a five percent population deviation 174. L judge court). in its districts while Canada allows a twenty-five percent deviation. tralia allows a plus or minus ten percent deviation, while New Zealand allows a plus or minus five percent deviation. Katz, 2014] dis- compact maintain should commissions the practicable, extent tricts. \\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\28-1\NDE109.txt unknown Seq: 27 2-MAY-14 7:13 eral court will allow is a little over .8%. deviation, such as what is cifically allowed for additional population for redistricting would be allowed in other countries, those responsible of preexisting governmen- able to focus on maintaining the continuity tal subdivisions and compactness. history,” “political party affiliation of the population of the district,” and district,” of the population of the affiliation party “political history,” the House of Representa- Members of of incumbent “[t]he residence State.” tives in the legislators, or population deviation among districts, leeway given for the “one person nonpartisan commissions, will cite even members of as a cause for further gerrymandering.one vote” principle Essentially, members of the listed in the legislation that all of the other factors be secondary to are supposed to consider will redistricting commissions as possible.population of each district is as equal ensuring that the In equality that the requirement for mathematical discussing his concern Justice actually enable further gerrymandering, for redistricting will his dissent in Byron White, in requirement: state legislatures an opportunity to vote for the proposed redistricting, to vote for an opportunity state legislatures it. it, but not to amend or to reject enough. Because the objective [was to] mak[e] equal representation for equal numbers of objective [was to] mak[e] equal representation bit more were struck down. a federal court rejected a For instance, deviation was .94%. previous Kansas plan where population 34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 180 Side A 05/07/2014 15:37:06 Side A 05/07/2014 Sheet No. 180 34929-nde_28-1 34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 180 Side B 05/07/2014 15:37:06 , ON- GOV . , C [Vol. 28 Act only gar- g ONGRESS 184 , C Act of 2009 g ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY LAW, ONCLUSION C Similarly, the bill in the 111th Congress Similarly, the bill 183 185 any fundamental deviations from “one person one vote” person “one from deviations fundamental any NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF GRESS H.R.3025 – Fairness and Independence in Redistrictin H.R.453 –Redistrictin John Tanner Fairness and Independence in 181 , http://beta.congress.gov/legislation (search for “John Tanner Fairness and only garnered twenty-one cosponsors and was never reported out cosponsors and was never reported only garnered twenty-one GOV Nevertheless, it does not look like this legislation will move out of will move out like this legislation it does not look Nevertheless, Since the early days of the United States, redistricting has been Since the early days of the United for public policy.Gerrymandering causes problems Specifically, So while it appears as though Congress, like the Supreme Court, as though Congress, like the Supreme So while it appears is for states to pass legislation The easiest and most feasible option . 184. Fairness and Independence in in Redistricting Act, H.R. 3025, 111th Cong. 185. 181. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964). 182. in Redistricting Act, H.R. 453, 112th John Tanner Fairness and Independence 183. 182 http://beta.congress.gov/legislation (search for “Fairness and Independence in Redis- tricting Act of 2009”; follow the “H.R.3025” hyperlink). Independence in Redistricting Act”; follow the “H.R.453” hyperlink). (2009). Cong. (2011). 350 people,” \\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\28-1\NDE109.txt unknown Seq: 28 2-MAY-14 7:13 used for partisan gain. has been mastered in order to Gerrymandering and to preserve majorities in legis- protect incumbents from challengers latures. gerrymandering has gotten more But with modern technology, have gotten worse. precise and the problems it brings of more partisan members of gerrymandering facilitates the election incentive to work with members Congress that do not have an electoral would probably need to be in an amendment to the Constitution. to amendment be in an need to probably would This ideal—thatis an to prevent in a way amended will be the Constitution redistricting.future partisan address though it will not However, even 278 is a Justice White, H.R. brought up by that were originally the issues right direction. step in the any time soon.committee the the 112th Congress, Unfortunately, in bill states to continue anytime soon, it will be valuable for will not be acting reform measures.to pass redistricting members of Eventually, as more gerryman- from states that do not have partisan Congress are elected to pass legislation be enough supporters in Congress dering, there may Redistricting Act. Fairness and Independence in like the John Tanner of the possibility more people will become aware It is also possible that Congress to enact call upon their representatives in of reform and will that pledge to do so. such legislation, or support candidates like California’s legislation. passing this type of legislation While states something at the national level, the may put pressure on Congress to do would be more members of Con- immediate effect would be that there districts, and thus more centrist gress elected from non-gerrymandered compromises.members willing to make bipartisan This would help to reduce gridlock in Congress. of committee. nered thirty-three cosponsors and also was not reported out of cosponsors and also was not nered thirty-three committee. 34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 180 Side B 05/07/2014 15:37:06 Side B 05/07/2014 Sheet No. 180 34929-nde_28-1 34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 181 Side A 05/07/2014 15:37:06 351 GERRYMANDERED GRIDLOCK GERRYMANDERED In the past, Congress and the Supreme Court have provided mini- Supreme Court Congress and the In the past, and their addressed partisan gerrymandering, Many states have 2014] party. their own not in gridlock of partisan high level led to a This has public policy.is bad for that country generally. for the is also bad It It in democracy—it participate who for those problems causes negatively voting or apathetic about voters to be turnout, causes impacts voter in the system. wanting to participate voters from even disenchants Ger- elected the behavior of influence can also negatively rymandering officials. maps.the states for when they redraw district mal guidelines to These the egregious important, but they do not prevent guidelines have been cases, more fre- place every decade, or in some partisanship that takes quently. of there the Court has left open the possibility Even though has not defined partisan gerrymander, it being an unconstitutional what that is. has left states to pursue unbridled partisanship. That diverse with varying success.methods have been if there is to be But to come from on the issue, it will ultimately have national progress or from Congress.many more states not enough There is currently to mandate of Representatives to pass legislation support in the House and it is not non-partisan redistricting commissions, that states create until other states pass similar likely that there will be enough support laws. stems from partisan gerryman- Given the hazardous impact that policy that progress is made to dering, it is crucial for positive public address the redistricting process. \\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\28-1\NDE109.txt unknown Seq: 29 2-MAY-14 7:13 34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 181 Side A 05/07/2014 15:37:06 Side A 05/07/2014 Sheet No. 181 34929-nde_28-1 34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 181 Side B 05/07/2014 15:37:06 \\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\28-1\NDE109.txt unknown Seq: 30 2-MAY-14 7:13 34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 181 Side B 05/07/2014 15:37:06 Side B 05/07/2014 Sheet No. 181 34929-nde_28-1