Appendix of the Republican Members of the Connecticut Reapportionment Commission
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Plaintiff's Motion for the Court to Issue Direction To
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA IN THE GENERAL COURT OF JUSTICE SUPERIOR COURT DIVISION COUNTY OF WAKE 18CVS 014001 COMMON CAUSE,etal, Plaintiffs, PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR THE COURT TO ISSUE DIRECTION TO LEGISLATIVE DEFENDANTS DAVID LEWIS,IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SENIOR CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON REDISTRICTING, et al., Defendants. m a EXHIBIT A STEPHANIE HOFELLER May 17, 2019 STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA GENERAL COURT OF JUSTICE 1 A P P E A R A N C E S (continued) SUPERIOR COURT DIVISION 2 Counsel for the Defendant-Intervenors: COUNTY OF WAKE 18 CVS 014001 3 Shanahan Law Group BY: John E. Branch, III COMMON CAUSE, ET AL., ) 4 128 E. Hargett Street, Suite 300 ) Raleigh, North Carolina 27601 Plaintiffs, ) 5 (919) 856-9494 ) [email protected] vs. ) 6 ) Counsel for the Deponent: DAVID LEWIS, IN HIS OFFICIAL ) 7 CAPACITY AS SENIOR CHAIRMAN ) Fiduciary Litigation Group OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ) 8 BY: Tom Sparks ON REDISTRICTING, ET AL., ) 223 South West Street, Suite 900 ) 9 Raleigh, North Carolina 27603 Defendants. ) (919) 229-0845 10 [email protected] 11 VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION OF 12 Also Present: Trae Howerton, Videographer STEPHANIE HOFELLER 13 ________________________________________________ 14 9:38 A.M. 15 FRIDAY, MAY 17, 2019 16 Reported By: Discovery Court Reporters and Legal ________________________________________________ Videographers 17 BY: Lisa A. Wheeler, RPR, CRR POYNER SPRUILL 4208 Six Forks Road, Suite 1000 18 Raleigh, North Carolina 27609 301 FAYETTEVILLE STREET, SUITE 1900 (919) 649-9998 19 RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA --oOo-- 20 21 22 23 BY: LISA A. WHEELER, RPR, CRR 24 25 1 3 1 A P P E A R A N C E S 1 I N D E X 2 Counsel for the Plaintiffs: PAGE 3 Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer 2 BY: R. -
Bios for Commercial Speech 2020
Bios for Commercial Speech 2020 Floyd Abrams Floyd Abrams is Senior Counsel in Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP's litigation practice group. Floyd has a national trial and appellate practice and extensive experience in high-visibility matters, often involving First Amendment, securities litigation, intellectual property, public policy and regulatory issues. He has argued frequently in the Supreme Court in cases raising issues as diverse as the scope of the First Amendment, the interpretation of ERISA, the nature of broadcast regulation, the impact of copyright law and the continuing viability of the Miranda rule. Floyd Abrams is a member of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences. He has been an active member of both federal and New York City bar associations and has chaired committees for both. He has been the recipient of numerous awards, including Yale Law School’s prestigious Award of Merit in 2015. He has appeared frequently on television and has published articles and reviews in The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Yale Law Journal, The Harvard Law Review, and elsewhere. For fifteen years, Floyd was the William J. Brennan, Jr. Visiting Professor of First Amendment Law at the Columbia Graduate School of Journalism. He has, as well, been a Visiting Lecturer at Yale Law School and Columbia Law School and he is author of Friend of the Court: On the Front Lines with the First Amendment, published by Yale University Press (2013) and Speaking Freely: Trials of the First Amendment, published by Viking Press (2005). Alex Abdo Alex Abdo is the inaugural Litigation Director of the Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University. -
Legislative Staff: 86Th Legislature
HRO HOUSE RESEARCH ORGANIZATION Texas House of Representatives Legislative Staff 86th Legislature 2019 Focus Report No. 86-3 House Research Organization Page 2 Table of Contents House of Representatives ....................................3 House Committees ..............................................15 Senate ...................................................................18 Senate Committees .............................................22 Other State Numbers...........................................24 Cover design by Robert Inks House Research Organization Page 3 House of Representatives ALLEN, Alma A. GW.5 BELL, Cecil Jr. E2.708 Phone: (512) 463-0744 Phone: (512) 463-0650 Fax: (512) 463-0761 Fax: (512) 463-0575 Chief of staff ...........................................Anneliese Vogel Chief of staff .............................................. Ariane Marion Legislative director .....................................Jaime Puente Policy analyst ...........................................Clinton Harned Legislative aide....................................... Jennifer Russell Legislative aide.............................................Brian Aldaco ALLISON, Steve E1.512 BELL, Keith E2.702 Phone: (512) 463-0686 Phone: (512) 463-0458 Chief of staff .................................................Rocky Gage Fax: (512) 463-2040 Legislative director ...................................German Lopez Chief of staff .................................... Georgeanne Palmer Scheduler ...............................................Redding Mickler -
Computer Models and Post-Bandemer Redistricting
Computer Models and Post-Bandemer Redistricting Michelle H. Browdy Since the Supreme Court first held political redistricting1 to be justicia- ble in Baker v. Carr,2 legal challenges to districting plans have increased dramatically.3 Because the Court's 1986 decision in Davis v. Bandemer4 held partisan gerrymandering5 to be justiciable for the first time,6 even more litigation will likely accompany redistricting following the 1990 cen- 1. States are divided into geographical districts from which representatives are elected either for the United States House of Representatives or for state legislative bodies. Political redistricting occurs when states redraw their political boundary lines after each decennial census. Since the benefits and detriments of automated redistricting apply equally to both congressional and state legislative redis- triting, this Note will not distinguish between them. The Supreme Court, however, does treat chal- lenges to the two types of districts differently, applying tighter standards of population equality to congressional districts than to state legislative districts. Compare Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983) (invalidating plan for New Jersey's congressional districts with average deviation from perfect population equality of 0.1384%) with Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835 (1983) (upholding plan for Wyoming state legislature with maximum population deviation of 89%). 2. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). In Baker, the Court held that a challenge to the disparity of population size in districts of the Tennessee General Assembly was justiciable under the equal protection clause, U.S. CoN sT. amend XIV, § 1. A previous challenge to the lack of population equality in districts in Illinois had been held nonjusticiable when it was brought under the guaranty clause, U.S. -
Gerrymandered Gridlock: Addressing the Hazardous Impact of Partisan Redistricting Nathan S
Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy Volume 28 | Issue 1 Article 9 May 2014 Gerrymandered Gridlock: Addressing the Hazardous Impact of Partisan Redistricting Nathan S. Catanese Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndjlepp Recommended Citation Nathan S. Catanese, Gerrymandered Gridlock: Addressing the Hazardous Impact of Partisan Redistricting, 28 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 323 (2014). Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndjlepp/vol28/iss1/9 This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact [email protected]. 34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 167 Side A 05/07/2014 15:37:06 \\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\28-1\NDE109.txt unknown Seq: 1 2-MAY-14 7:13 NOTES GERRYMANDERED GRIDLOCK: ADDRESSING THE HAZARDOUS IMPACT OF PARTISAN REDISTRICTING NATHAN S. CATANESE* “It used to be that the idea was, once every two years voters elected their representatives, and now, instead, it’s every ten years the representatives choose their constituents.”1 “We are in the business of rigging elections.”2 “To sum up, redistricting is a political disaster—an enormous political train wreck that occurs every ten years.”3 INTRODUCTION Nate Silver, noted statistician and founder of the popular blog Five Thirty Eight, recently estimated that in the House of Representatives, out of the four hundred and thirty-five districts, there are only thirty-five swing districts.4 Essentially, this means that congressional districts have become more polarized—either Republican-leaning districts are more conservative or Democratic-leaning districts are more liberal.5 With more members elected from districts in which there is no threat from * J.D. -
Does the Introduction of Independent Redistricting Reduce Congressional Partisanship?*
Does the Introduction of Independent Redistricting * Reduce Congressional Partisanship? By David G. Oedel[1], Allen K. Lynch,[2] Sean E. Mulholland[3] and Neil T. Edwards[4] Draft Copy of November 11, 2008; Not Ready for Quotation or Citation Until Published Abstract In contemporary American politics, partisanship is frequently seen as excessive, even if some aspects of partisanship may fundamentally characterize the U.S. political system. To reduce partisanship in the process of drawing political districts, independent redistricting commissions and related forms of de-politicized systems for redistricting have been implemented in some states. This paper analyzes whether the presence of relatively independent redistricting also reduces partisanship in the voting behavior of congressional representatives elected from the relevant redefined districts. Contrary to the initial expectations of the authors, the evidence reviewed here suggests that politically independent redistricting seems to reduce partisanship in the voting behavior of congressional delegations from affected states in statistically significant ways. The authors conclude with notes about the study’s implications for further research into redistricting and partisanship. Contents The Perceived Problem of Excessive Partisanship, p. 2 How This Paper Fits in With Other Literature, p. 3 The Hypothesis that Strategic Redistricting Causes Excessive Partisanship, p. 8 Independent Redistricting as a Proposed Antidote, p. 13 The Types of Redistricting Processes, p. 16 Results of the Mercer Study of Redistricting Systems, p. 17 The “Before and After” Test: Did Adoption of Independent Redistricting Change The Voting Behavior of those States’ Congressional Representatives? p. 27 Measuring Changes in Partisanship in Congressional Voting Behavior, p. 29 * Copyright © 2008; all rights reserved. -
Districting Criteria and a Proposal for Their Empirical Redefinition
GERRYMANDERED BY DEFINITION: THE DISTORTION OF “TRADITIONAL” DISTRICTING CRITERIA AND A PROPOSAL FOR THEIR EMPIRICAL REDEFINITION YUNSIEG P. KIM* & JOWEI CHEN† What are “traditional” districting criteria? The meaning of that term is critical to curbing abusive districting practices because adherence to traditional criteria grants districting plans a prima facie impression of constitutionality and serves as a strong defense to racial gerrymandering claims. Yet, the Supreme Court has never intelligibly defined “traditional” districting criteria or its indicative qualities. Exploiting this silence, various actors are attempting to define that term in service of their own interests, usually at the expense of the public’s. For example, legislatures pushing redistricting plans that would advantage certain parties or incumbents claim that those districting goals are “traditional”—and therefore must be judicially protected—by relying on anecdotal examples of a state having used them. This Article proposes a definition of “traditional” districting criteria that would both reduce such abuse and adhere to a commonly understood meaning of that word: widely accepted as standard practice. Under this alternative, which we call the empirical definition, a criterion is “traditional” only if a majority of states require or allow it and fewer than a quarter prohibit it in state constitutions, statutes, or legislative guidelines. According to the empirical definition and our database of the fifty states’ redistricting laws, compactness, contiguity, equal population, and preserving county and city boundaries are traditional criteria. Among others, partisan advantage, incumbent protection, and preserving communities of interest are nontraditional. The empirical definition would not only curb abusive districting but also reduce the influence of undesirable judicial activism by binding judges’ discretion to an objectively discernible definition of “traditional” criteria. -
Nathaniel Persily
5/16/2017 NATHANIEL PERSILY Stanford Law School 559 Nathan Abbott Way Stanford, CA 94305-8610 Phone: (917) 570-3223 Email: [email protected] Fax: (650) 725-9875 Web: http://www.persily.com/ ACADEMIC APPOINTMENTS STANFORD LAW SCHOOL STANFORD, CA JAMES B. MCCLATCHY PROFESSOR OF LAW 2013 – present • Courtesy Appointments: Departments of Communication and Political Science • Courses: The Law of Democracy; Regulation of the Political Process; Contemporary Issues in Law and Politics; Constitutional Law, First Amendment, Political Campaigning and the Internet, Policy Practicum on Campaign Finance. • Service: Appointments Committee, Careers in Teaching Committee. • Significant Grants, Awards, and Fellowships: Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences (2017-2018); Andrew Carnegie Fellowship (2016- 17); Stanford Cyber Initiative Grant (2016-17); Hewlett Foundation and Democracy Fund Grants for Campaign Finance Task Force (2016-17). COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL NEW YORK, NY CHARLES KELLER BEEKMAN PROFESSOR OF LAW AND PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 2008 – 2013 PROFESSOR OF LAW 2007 – 2008 • Courtesy Appointment: Department of Political Science (2007– 2013). • Courses: Constitutional Law; Advanced Constitutional Law: The Political Process; Freedom of Expression; Contemporary Issues in Law and Politics; Redistricting and Gerrymandering. • Service: Lateral Appointments Committee Chair (2010-2012), Curriculum Committee Chair (2009-2010), Advisory Committee Chair (2008-2009), Intellectual Life Committee; Resources and Development Committee, Committee on Professional Development. • Center for Law and Politics: Founding Director. • DrawCongress.org: Founder. • Instructor in University of Amsterdam Summer Program, July 2011. UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW SCHOOL PHILADELPHIA, PA PROFESSOR OF LAW 2005 – 2007 ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF LAW 2001 – 2005 1 5/16/2017 • Secondary Appointment: Department of Political Science (2003-2007). -
Brief of Amicus Curiae University Professors Concerned About Equal Representation for Equal Numbers of People in Support of Appellants ------♦
Nos. 05-204, 05-254, 05-276 and 05-439 ================================================================ In The Supreme Court of the United States --------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS, et al., Appellants, v. RICK PERRY, et al., Appellees. --------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS, et al., Appellants, v. RICK PERRY, et al., Appellees. --------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- On Appeal From The United States District Court For The Eastern District Of Texas --------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS CONCERNED ABOUT EQUAL REPRESENTATION FOR EQUAL NUMBERS OF PEOPLE IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANTS --------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- LUCAS A. POWE, JR. Counsel of Record 727 East Dean Keeton Street Austin, Texas 78705-3299 (512) 232-1345 ================================================================ COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO. (800) 225-6964 OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831 EDDIE JACKSON, et al., Appellants, v. RICK PERRY, et al., Appellees. --------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- GI FORUM, et al., Appellants, v. RICK PERRY, et al., Appellees. i QUESTION PRESENTED May a legislative body, in mid-decade, voluntarily and without a compelling reason replace a valid districting plan with a new one relying on the population data from the last census? ii TABLE OF CONTENTS -
Nathaniel Persily
2/8/2015 NATHANIEL PERSILY Stanford Law School 559 Nathan Abbott Way Stanford, CA 94305-8610 Phone: (917) 570-3223 Email: [email protected] Fax: (650) 725-9875 Web: http://www.persily.com/ ACADEMIC APPOINTMENTS STANFORD LAW SCHOOL STANFORD, CA JAMES B. MCCLATCHY PROFESSOR OF LAW 2013 – present Courtesy Appointments: Departments of Communication and Political Science Courses: Regulation of the Political Process; Contemporary Issues in Law and Politics; Constitutional Law, First Amendment. Service: Appointments Committee, Careers in Teaching Committee. COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL NEW YORK, NY CHARLES KELLER BEEKMAN PROFESSOR OF LAW AND PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 2008 – 2013 PROFESSOR OF LAW 2007 – 2008 Courtesy Appointment: Department of Political Science (2007– 2013). Courses: Constitutional Law; Advanced Constitutional Law: The Political Process; Freedom of Expression; Contemporary Issues in Law and Politics; Redistricting and Gerrymandering. Service: Lateral Appointments Committee Chair (2010-2012), Curriculum Committee Chair (2009-2010), Advisory Committee Chair (2008-2009), Intellectual Life Committee; Resources and Development Committee, Committee on Professional Development. Center for Law and Politics: Founding Director. DrawCongress.org: Founder. Instructor in University of Amsterdam Summer Program, July 2011. UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW SCHOOL PHILADELPHIA, PA PROFESSOR OF LAW 2005 – 2007 ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF LAW 2001 – 2005 Secondary Appointment: Department of Political Science (2003-2007). Courses: Law and the Political Process; Contemporary Issues in Law and Politics; Constitutional Law, First Amendment. 1 2/8/2015 Service: Tenure and Promotion Committee, Judicial Clerkship Committee, Nominations Committee, Committee on Academic Standing; Coordinator of Faculty Retreat and Legal Studies Workshop. Teaching Award: Winner of the Robert A. Gorman Award for Excellence in Teaching. -
The Gerrymandering Orgy Begins
American University Washington College of Law Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law Popular Media Public Discourse 2011 The Gerrymandering Orgy Begins Herman Schwartz Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/pub_disc_media Part of the Election Law Commons, and the Law and Politics Commons Page 1 of 6 The gerrymandering orgy There are two kinds of political begins gerrymandering and both are common. One is bipartisan or “sweetheart” By: Herman Schwartz January 14, 2011 04:42 AM EST gerrymandering, by which neither party fully controls the redistricting process. To It is almost time for the decennial assault protect powerful incumbents, friends and on U.S. democracy to begin: a great allies, the two parties divide the electoral gerrymandering orgy in which voters will be districts, generally in proportion to their “packed” and “cracked,” incumbents relative share of the electorate. In 2004, “kidnapped” and new electoral districts devised using computer programs that can distinguish between voters on the same block. The result: a bizarre menagerie of electoral districts shaped like snakes, dragons and other exotic creatures that make a travesty of democracy. This year, the Democrats will be the big losers. In a true democracy, people choose their rulers. Gerrymandering turns that upside down, so instead of government “by the p eople and for the people,” it becomes “by the politicians and for the politicians.” We are the only major country that puts virtually its entire electoral process, including drawing districts, in the hands of partisan politicians like former Rep. Katherine Harris of Florida or her Democratic counterparts. -
RUCHO V. COMMON CAUSE
(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2018 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus RUCHO ET AL. v. COMMON CAUSE ET AL. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA No. 18–422. Argued March 26, 2019—Decided June 27, 2019* Voters and other plaintiffs in North Carolina and Maryland filed suits challenging their States’ congressional districting maps as unconsti- tutional partisan gerrymanders. The North Carolina plaintiffs claimed that the State’s districting plan discriminated against Demo- crats, while the Maryland plaintiffs claimed that their State’s plan discriminated against Republicans. The plaintiffs alleged violations of the First Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause of the Four- teenth Amendment, the Elections Clause, and Article I, §2. The Dis- trict Courts in both cases ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, and the de- fendants appealed directly to this Court. Held: Partisan gerrymandering claims present political questions be- yond the reach of the federal courts. Pp. 6–34. (a) In these cases, the Court is asked to decide an important ques- tion of constitutional law. Before it does so, the Court “must find that the question is presented in a ‘case’ or ‘controversy’ that is .