The Muddled Legend of Yalta

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

The Muddled Legend of Yalta The ill-fated Big Three summit is bigger in symbolic meaning than it was in actual achievement. The Muddled US Army Signal Corps photo Legend of Yalta By John T. Correll National Archives photo AIR FORCE Magazine / September 2012 107 he war in Europe was not but the legend is muddled. Some of the others flew without protection. From over yet as 1945 began, things attributed to the conference hap- the landing field at Saki, 85 miles from but the outcome was not in pened there. Some didn’t. However, it is Yalta, the delegations traveled south doubt. The Germans were Yalta that is linked—sometimes fairly, to the “Russian Riviera” by a six-hour in retreat everywhere. The sometimes not—to the beginning of the motorcade over rough roads. Allies were about to enter the Rhineland Cold War and the takeover of eastern Roosevelt and his party were lodged Ton the western front. To the east, the and central Europe by the Soviet Union. about five miles from the small town Soviets were within 400 miles of Berlin. Stalin refused to travel, so war-torn in the 116-room Livadia Palace, built The prewar governments of most Yalta in the Soviet Union was chosen in 1911 as a summer residence for Tsar European nations were defunct, having as the venue. Churchill said, “If we had Nicholas II and his family. More recently, fallen to invasion between 1938 and spent 10 years on research, we could it had been occupied by German Army 1941. Borders had been moved and not have come up with a worse place Group South. Stalin’s headquarters was moved again. Industries, economies, in the world.” just down the shore at Koreiz Palace, and and national infrastructures were in the British were at Vorontsov Palace, ruins. Refugees were a common sight, Coffee? No, Vodka some 12 miles farther along. displaced by war and political turmoil. Yalta offered a panoramic view of the Amenities, especially restrooms, were Germany itself would soon be in the Black Sea from the tip of the Crimean in short supply. Everyone except the most hands of its former enemies. peninsula, not far from Balaclava, where senior individuals lined up to wait their The allied Big Three leaders—Presi- the British Light Brigade charged into turn. In a rare concession to luxury, the dent Franklin D. Roosevelt of the United the “Valley of Death” against Russian Russians brought a double bed down States, Prime Minister Winston Churchill guns in 1854. Yalta was an imperial from Moscow for Churchill, who liked of Great Britain, and Premier Joseph resort in the days of the Romanovs, but to work in bed and spread out his papers. Stalin of the Soviet Union—met at the Germans did not leave much of it Cabbage soup was served every day Yalta in the Crimea on the coast of the standing when they pulled out in April for lunch. For breakfast there was Cream Black Sea Feb. 4-11, 1945, to decide the 1944. The Soviets managed to refurbish of Wheat and butter spiced with garlic. postwar fate of Europe. In eight days, just enough to house the conference One morning, Adm. William D. Leahy, they agreed among themselves on new participants. Roosevelt’s Chief of Staff, asked for egg, governments and boundaries for the The Americans and British, some 700 toast, and coffee. Fifteen minutes later, defeated and liberated nations. of them, gathered in Malta and flew the the waiter brought caviar, ham, smoked Yalta, initially heralded as a success, rest of the way. The transports, mostly fish, and vodka. is mostly remembered today as a failure, C-54 Skymasters, took off singly and The American delegation included se- On the previous page. Top: Livadia made their 1,500-mile journey by night nior administration officials and military Palace, where Roo sevelt was lodged to avoid detection by scattered Luftwaffe leaders. The new Secretary of State, Ed- and most of the Yalta meetings took interceptors still operating in the Balkans. ward R. Stettinius Jr., was a lightweight place. Bottom: The Big Three—(l-r) The aircraft carrying Roosevelt and on foreign policy but was offset by the Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin—pose for photos on a patio at Livadia. Churchill had P-38 fighter escorts. The presence of W. Averell Harriman, the German troops, such as those pictured here in Crimea after being captured by the Russians in 1944, left much of the former RIA Novosti photo Tzarist resort Yalta in ruins. 108 AIR FORCE Magazine / September 2012 RIA Novosti photo A Russian artillery crew in Poland able US ambassador to the Soviet Union. of the Big Three. Ravages of chronic in 1945. A USSR puppet government Alger Hiss, a Soviet agent embedded in illness made him look older and he retained control of Poland after the war, the State Department, was also there, but had two months left to live. Despite his despite Stalin’s promises at Yalta of free it does not appear he did any damage frailty, his mental capacity at Yalta was elections. at Yalta. Hiss reported through Soviet not impaired. His political style was military intelligence channels but his intuitive and personal. He saw the Soviet seeking to induce the United States to keepers were not particularly interested Union as an ally rather than a potential enter the war. He did not regard the in the agenda of the conference. threat. Despite cautions from Harriman, principle of self-determination as ap- Churchill led a strong British team he was inclined to trust Stalin. plying to colonies of the British Empire. anchored by his friend and longtime Unlike Roosevelt, Churchill did be- colleague, Foreign Secretary R. Anthony The Atlantic Charter lieve in spheres of influence. He and Sta- Eden. Stalin’s right hand man at Yalta Like many Americans, Roosevelt had lin met bilaterally in Moscow in October was his protégé, V. M. Molotov, the a distaste for “spheres of influence,” the 1944 and settled on a division of influence Foreign Minister. 19th century practice in which strong in the Balkans. By a formula proposed At Stalin’s initiative, conference nations established domination—if not by Churchill, Britain got predominance sessions were held at Livadia for the outright rule—over their weaker neigh- in Greece—traditionally a British sphere convenience of Roosevelt, who was bors. He was committed to the principle of influence—in exchange for Soviet in a wheelchair. The plenary, or main of self-determination and looked forward hegemony in Rumania and Bulgaria. sessions, always chaired by Roosevelt, to the breakup of the European colonial The Russians did not interfere as British began around 4 p.m. and ran until the empires. troops disarmed pro-communist forces early evenings. Diplomatic and military Churchill, 70, had led Britain through in Greece and installed a government members of the delegations held their the darkest days of the war. By 1945, favorable to Britain. own meetings earlier in the day. British power was in decline relative At Yalta, Churchill wanted to pro- The Yalta conference was not paper- to that of the United States, which had vide for a postwar balance of power in work intensive. There was no official more than twice as many forces engaged Europe, offsetting Soviet expansion. record. Each of the nations kept their and had assumed the leadership position An independent Poland, if it could be own notes and contributed to a sum- previously held by the British. Churchill achieved, would be of enormous value. mary joint communiqué at the end. The understood, but he did not like it. With US troops expected to go home looseness of the plenary sessions suited He had joined Roosevelt in 1941 in soon after the victory, Churchill also Roosevelt and Churchill. Both of them proclaiming the Atlantic Charter, which sought to strengthen France to help with liked to talk and often improvised as promised “the right of all peoples to defense of the west. they went along. choose the form of government under Stalin, 66, felt that the Soviet Union At Yalta, Stalin ran rings around them. which they will live.” had carried the war in Europe without At 63, Roosevelt was the youngest At the time, however, Churchill was much help from the Western Allies, who AIR FORCE Magazine / September 2012 109 did not open a second front until D-Day republics in their own right. Roosevelt German-Polish border was deferred, and in 1944. He saw no reason to negotiate agreed, although the extra memberships the border was not set until the final Big about territory the Red Army had taken for the Soviet Union were not disclosed Three meeting at Potsdam in 1945. and now held. From Stalin’s perspec- publicly. France was added as a fifth UN Two groups of Poles were competing tive, freedom for his neighbors was a executive “policeman” and approved as for postwar control. The government security risk. Germany had twice invaded a fourth occupation power in Germany. in exile group operated from London the Soviet Union through Poland. Self- Roosevelt was elated with the success and was supported by the British. The determination for eastern Europe was of his two priorities and wanted to secure Soviets supported the “Lublin Poles,” not part of Stalin’s plan. them from risk. He softened the United so called for the city in eastern Poland The Americans and the British had States position on issues of importance where they began. already revealed they would not risk to Stalin, including the war reparations The Lublin Poles had gained con- the cohesion of the alliance for the sake to be imposed on Germany and the new siderable advantage in 1944 when the of small nations.
Recommended publications
  • UNDER ORDERS: War Crimes in Kosovo Order Online
    UNDER ORDERS: War Crimes in Kosovo Order online Table of Contents Acknowledgments Introduction Glossary 1. Executive Summary The 1999 Offensive The Chain of Command The War Crimes Tribunal Abuses by the KLA Role of the International Community 2. Background Introduction Brief History of the Kosovo Conflict Kosovo in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Kosovo in the 1990s The 1998 Armed Conflict Conclusion 3. Forces of the Conflict Forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Yugoslav Army Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs Paramilitaries Chain of Command and Superior Responsibility Stucture and Strategy of the KLA Appendix: Post-War Promotions of Serbian Police and Yugoslav Army Members 4. march–june 1999: An Overview The Geography of Abuses The Killings Death Toll,the Missing and Body Removal Targeted Killings Rape and Sexual Assault Forced Expulsions Arbitrary Arrests and Detentions Destruction of Civilian Property and Mosques Contamination of Water Wells Robbery and Extortion Detentions and Compulsory Labor 1 Human Shields Landmines 5. Drenica Region Izbica Rezala Poklek Staro Cikatovo The April 30 Offensive Vrbovac Stutica Baks The Cirez Mosque The Shavarina Mine Detention and Interrogation in Glogovac Detention and Compusory Labor Glogovac Town Killing of Civilians Detention and Abuse Forced Expulsion 6. Djakovica Municipality Djakovica City Phase One—March 24 to April 2 Phase Two—March 7 to March 13 The Withdrawal Meja Motives: Five Policeman Killed Perpetrators Korenica 7. Istok Municipality Dubrava Prison The Prison The NATO Bombing The Massacre The Exhumations Perpetrators 8. Lipljan Municipality Slovinje Perpetrators 9. Orahovac Municipality Pusto Selo 10. Pec Municipality Pec City The “Cleansing” Looting and Burning A Final Killing Rape Cuska Background The Killings The Attacks in Pavljan and Zahac The Perpetrators Ljubenic 11.
    [Show full text]
  • International Crimes in Crimea
    International Crimes in Crimea: An Assessment of Two and a Half Years of Russian Occupation SEPTEMBER 2016 Contents I. Introduction 6 A. Executive summary 6 B. The authors 7 C. Sources of information and methodology of documentation 7 II. Factual Background 8 A. A brief history of the Crimean Peninsula 8 B. Euromaidan 12 C. The invasion of Crimea 15 D. Two and a half years of occupation and the war in Donbas 23 III. Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court 27 IV. Contextual elements of international crimes 28 A. War crimes 28 B. Crimes against humanity 34 V. Willful killing, murder and enforced disappearances 38 A. Overview 38 B. The law 38 C. Summary of the evidence 39 D. Documented cases 41 E. Analysis 45 F. Conclusion 45 VI. Torture and other forms of inhuman treatment 46 A. Overview 46 B. The law 46 C. Summary of the evidence 47 D. Documented cases of torture and other forms of inhuman treatment 50 E. Analysis 59 F. Conclusion 59 VII. Illegal detention 60 A. Overview 60 B. The law 60 C. Summary of the evidence 62 D. Documented cases of illegal detention 66 E. Analysis 87 F. Conclusion 87 VIII. Forced displacement 88 A. Overview 88 B. The law 88 C. Summary of evidence 90 D. Analysis 93 E. Conclusion 93 IX. Crimes against public, private and cultural property 94 A. Overview 94 B. The law 94 C. Summary of evidence 96 D. Documented cases 99 E. Analysis 110 F. Conclusion 110 X. Persecution and collective punishment 111 A. Overview 111 B.
    [Show full text]
  • 5.4 Origins of the Cold
    Origins of the Cold War Truman is NOT FDR • Didn’t trust Stalin & did not feel connection to Allies – Doesn’t listen to WC on keeping troops east of line to see what Stalin will do in SoIà Withdraws troops to line & UK follows. – Thinks he can mediate like FDR • Stalin: Why do these silly Americans negotiate E.EUR on moral/legal grounds? Objective reality. Potsdam Conference • July-Aug, 1945 in eastern GER • New Big Three: Stalin, Truman, Attlee • $20B in GER reparations (1/2 to USSR) • Neisse River confusion; USSR obviously wants eastern one to make POL smaller • Stalin wants, but doesn’t get: – Base in Bosporus, Soviet trusteeship of ITA-Afr. Colonies, four- power control of Ruhr, Western recognition of Soviet govs. in ROM & BUL • Agreement: Four powers take reparations out of Zones, W. Neisse border, Stalin helps w/JPN Truman’s Journal 8/2/1945 Peace? • Sept.-Dec. 1945 – Foreign ministers meet to draw up peace treaties for FIN, HUN, ROM, BUL – Stalin accepts some democratic measures in E.EURà Basically lies. • No more Four Policemen idea • KISSINGER: Despite losing 20M people in WWII 20M in purges, and devastating W. RUS, Stalin was aggressive and had no fear of bomb. Didn’t think US would use it. – Aggressive pro-war propaganda campaign post-war because he realized USSR couldn’t exist w/ a peaceful foreign policy Iron Curtain • 3/5/1946 – Churchill gives “Iron Curtain” speech – Russians will control E.EUR, US/UK need to ally and avoid war at all costs – Sept. 1947 – Cominform – group of worldwide Communist parties in FIN, YUG, POL, CZE, ALB, BUL, ROM, HUN George Kennan • Leading anti-Soviet advisor under HST – E.EUR occupation inevitable b/c USSR forces already occupied area – BUT believed USSR couldn’t maintain domination – AMBROSE: All his predictions come true, but not for four decades – “Long Telegram” (1946) – “[USSR needed to be] contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counterforce at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points”à Foundation for Truman Doctrine (“Containment”) Brisk • Amb.
    [Show full text]
  • A Krím Földrajzi Nevei
    EÖTVÖS LORÁND TUDOMÁNYEGYETEM INFORMATIKAI KAR TÉRKÉPTUDOMÁNYI ÉS GEOINFORMATIKAI TANSZÉK TÉRKÉPÉSZ MESTERSZAK A Krím földrajzi nevei DIPLOMAMUNKA Készítette: Bánkúti Balázs térképész hallgató Témavezető: Faragó Imre mérnöktanár ELTE Térképtudományi és Geoinformatikai Tanszék Budapest, 2016 Ez a néhány vár - most rom, alaktalan, csupasz - Ez volt, óh, hálátlan Krím, őrződ és ékszered. Ma órjás koponyaként a hegy ormán mered, Féreg lakja s féregnél rusnyább ember-kukac. A toronyba fel! Ha ott címer után kutatsz, Felirást is találhatsz - tán épp egy hős-nevet, Tűnt hadak rémét, melyet a múlt fátyla befed, Mint begubózott hernyót szőlőlevél-kupac. Athén jeleit véste itt falba a görög, Itt verte bilincsekbe az olasz a mongolt, A Mekkából érkező itt namáz-dalt mormolt. Ma fekete keselyűk szállnak e sír fölött, S miként ott, hol egykoron gyilkos dögvész tombolt, E bástyák ormán a gyász lobogója örök. (Adam Mickiewicz: A balaklavai várromok. Radó György fordítása) - 3 - Tartalomjegyzék I. Bevezetés ........................................................................................................................................ - 5 - II. A Krím természetföldrajzi jellemzői ......................................................................................... - 7 - II. 1. Elhelyezkedése, határai ....................................................................................................... - 7 - II. 2. Tájfelosztása .........................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Yalta, a Tripartite Negotiation to Form the Post-War World Order: Planning for the Conference, the Big Three’S Strategies
    YALTA, A TRIPARTITE NEGOTIATION TO FORM THE POST-WAR WORLD ORDER: PLANNING FOR THE CONFERENCE, THE BIG THREE’S STRATEGIES Matthew M. Grossberg Submitted to the faculty of the University Graduate School in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts in the Department of History, Indiana University August 2015 Accepted by the Graduate Faculty, Indiana University, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts. Master’s Thesis Committee ______________________________ Kevin Cramer, Ph. D., Chair ______________________________ Michael Snodgrass, Ph. D. ______________________________ Monroe Little, Ph. D. ii ©2015 Matthew M. Grossberg iii Acknowledgements This work would not have been possible without the participation and assistance of so many of the History Department at Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis. Their contributions are greatly appreciated and sincerely acknowledged. However, I would like to express my deepest appreciation to the following: Dr. Anita Morgan, Dr. Nancy Robertson, and Dr. Eric Lindseth who rekindled my love of history and provided me the push I needed to embark on this project. Dr. Elizabeth Monroe and Dr. Robert Barrows for being confidants I could always turn to when this project became overwhelming. Special recognition goes to my committee Dr. Monroe Little and Dr. Michael Snodgrass. Both men provided me assistance upon and beyond the call of duty. Dr. Snodgrass patiently worked with me throughout my time at IUPUI, helping my writing progress immensely. Dr. Little came in at the last minute, saving me from a fate worse than death, another six months of grad school. Most importantly, all credit is due Dr.
    [Show full text]
  • Liberation in China and the Pacific
    LIBERATION IN CHINA AND THE PACIFIC RANA MITTER, PHD (Image: National Archives and Records Administration, 520868.) Between 1937 and 1945, war raged between Japan and its planes destroyed. More devastating, the Japanese attack enemies, first China, and then the United States and the killed 2,403 and wounded 1,178. President Roosevelt, British Empire. The war ended in Asia only with the atomic announcing the news to a shocked nation, declared it a bombings of Japan, but the continent failed to find peace “day which will live in infamy.” as new Cold War conflicts emerged from the rubble. When Japan decided to declare war on the United States, it ORIGINS OF THE WAR IN ASIA knew that it was taking a huge risk. One leader compared the decision to throwing himself off the Kiyomizu-dera World War II began on July 7, 1937—not in Poland or at Temple in Kyoto. However, Japan’s leaders were gambling Pearl Harbor, but in China. On that date, outside of Beijing, on winning this war swiftly by crippling America’s naval Japanese and Chinese troops clashed, and within a few capacity in the Pacific, thus preventing the United States days, the local conflict had escalated to a full, though from interfering with Japan’s expansion into Southeast undeclared, war between China and Japan. Asia. They knew, as did Britain’s Prime Minister Winston Churchill and China’s leader Chiang Kai-shek, that the industrial capacity of the United States meant that it could The war between China and Japan was at first a conflict win a war through its sheer capacity to renew its supply of in which no western powers were openly involved.
    [Show full text]
  • Were Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt the True Architects of the United Nations?
    Faculty of Arts and Philosophy Department of literary studies Were Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt the True Architects of the United Nations? Jens Vermeulen (01309561) Master of Arts in American Studies 2014-2015 Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Ken Kennard Table of Contents Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 2 Vision of Peace and Prosperity ........................................................................................................ 6 Negotiations and Results ................................................................................................................ 19 The Creation of the United Nations: The San Francisco Conference ............................................ 34 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................................... 38 Bibliography ................................................................................................................................... 41 1 Introduction The United Nations (UN) was founded after the Second World War by 51 countries committed to maintaining international peace and security. Besides collective security, it is also an environment where countries meet and develop friendly relationships. It promotes social progress and advocates for better living standards and human rights. The UN has four main purposes: to keep the peace throughout the world; to develop friendly relations
    [Show full text]
  • Shifting US Racial Perceptions of the Japanese and Chinese Peoples
    Asia Pacific Perspectives ∙ Spring/Summer 2015 Paternalism and Peril: Shifting U.S. Racial Perceptions of the Japanese and Chinese Peoples from World War II to the Early Cold War Brandon P. Seto, Loyola Marymount University Abstract: Long before the carnage of the Pacific Theater in the Second World War commenced, U.S. government officials, scholars, shapers of public opinion, and the general public questioned the nature of Asian peoples. At the war’s outset, when faced with a visceral enemy and a prominent ally amongst the countries of Asia, officials and opinion-makers alike set out to educate the citizens of the United States about their Asian friends and foes. Many eminent historians such as John Dower, Yukiko Koshiro, and Christopher Thorne have chronicled the racial perceptions of the peoples of the United States and Japan towards one another during World War II and in the early stages of the Cold War, while other scholars have examined the U.S. racial perceptions of the Chinese in these same periods. Members of both scholarly groups acknowledge the transference of various stigmas and associations from Japan to China in the postwar period. As an analysis that looks at prevalent American racial attitudes toward the Japanese and Chinese peoples in both World War II and the Early Cold War, this article will help readers to understand better the nature of this transference. It will provide an introductory assessment of the varying U.S. orientalist and racial perceptions of the Chinese and Japanese peoples from World War II to the early postwar period. Key Words: race, foreign policy, World War II, Cold War, China, Japan Introduction and Background http://www.usfca.edu/center-asia-pacific/perspectives/ Working from the assumption that racial attitudes and perceptions are fluid social constructs, this article examines the shifting American definitions of the Japanese and Chinese in terms of either paternalism or fears of the Yellow Peril.
    [Show full text]
  • Midterm Study Guide
    History 485 Devine Midterm Study Guide The midterm exam will consist of two parts: SEVEN short essay questions and ONE long essay question. In Part One, I will give you ten short essay questions – taken verbatim from the questions below; you will answer seven of your choice. In Part Two, I will give you three long essay questions, also taken verbatim from the questions below; you will answer one. There will be no questions on the exam that do not appear below. In answering the midterm questions, be sure to include as much specific evidence as possible to explain and support what you assert. In short, show me what you are claiming is true. 1. According to Walter MacDougall (“Wilsonianism or Liberal Internationalism (so called),” how did Woodrow Wilson’s personal qualities and unique quirks and prejudices shape how he formulated foreign policy and reacted to international events? 2. According to John Coogan (“Wilsonian Diplomacy in War and Peace”), why do Wilson’s foreign policies often appear to be contradictory? Why have historians drawing on the same documentary evidence from the Wilson administration produced historical interpretations of Wilson’s policies that directly contradict one another? 3. According to Erez Manela (“A Man Ahead of his Time?”), why did Article X reflect a vision of the League of Nations that was, arguably, precisely the opposite of (and not as radical as) what Woodrow Wilson originally had in mind? 4. Why does Randolph Bourne (“The War Diary”) argue that progressives are being “utopian” if they believe American involvement in the Great War will advance their liberal reform agenda? 5.
    [Show full text]
  • The "War on Terror" Is Over--Now What? Restoring the Four Freedoms As a Foundation for Peace and Security
    Pace University DigitalCommons@Pace Pace Law Faculty Publications School of Law 2009 The "War on Terror" is Over--Now What? Restoring the Four Freedoms as a Foundation for Peace and Security Mark R. Shulman Pace Law School Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty Part of the International Law Commons, and the Military, War, and Peace Commons Recommended Citation Shulman, Mark R., "The "War on Terror" is Over--Now What? Restoring the Four Freedoms as a Foundation for Peace and Security" (2009). Pace Law Faculty Publications. 564. https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty/564 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The “War on Terror” is Over – Now What? Restoring the Four Freedoms as a Foundation for Peace and Security Mark R. Shulman* As for our common defense, we reject as false the choice between our safety and our ideals. Our founding fathers faced with perils that we can scarcely imagine, drafted a charter to assure the rule of law and the rights of man, a charter expanded by the blood of generations. Those ideals still light the world, and we will not give them up for expedience’s sake. And so, to all other peoples and governments who are watching today, from the grandest capitals to the small village where my father was born: know that America is a friend of each nation and every man, woman and child who seeks a future of peace and dignity, and we are ready to lead once more.
    [Show full text]
  • The Influence of Major Geopolitical Factors on a Region's Tourist Industry and Perception by Tourists
    Cactus Tourism Journal Vol. 12, Issue 2/2015, Pages 22-32, ISSN 2247-3297 THE INFLUENCE OF MAJOR GEOPOLITICAL FACTORS ON A REGION'S TOURIST INDUSTRY AND PERCEPTION BY TOURISTS. CASE STUDY: CRIMEA Constantin Ștefan1 Bucharest University of Economic Studies, Romania ABSTRACT Periodically certain countries or regions of the world are affected by various types of political unrest, such as wars ‒ including civil, revolutions, power struggles etc. In some cases, these regions have significantly developed tourist industries. In case these political events are violent, the result is predictable: a complete or almost complete halt of tourism in the region, most often accompanied by the destruction of the tourist infrastructure. But when these events are not violent, the effects on tourism may vary. As of 2015, the Crimean Peninsula is one of Europe's geopolitical hotspots and one of the world's disputed territories. This reputation comes from the fact that in March 2014 the territory switched sovereignty from Ukraine to Russia, following what many other states have qualified as an invasion and/or an illegally-held referendum. The purpose of this article is to examine the effects this series of events has had on the area's tourist industry. The article features the results of a research based on a survey, which was meant to evaluate the respondents' perception of the region. This survey was conducted among subjects from numerous European and former Soviet countries. The results have shown that there are certain differences in the perception of Crimea between Europe and the former Soviet states. These differences have the potential to shape the tourist industry of the region in the near future.
    [Show full text]
  • Course Outline
    COURSE OUTLINE OXNARD COLLEGE I. Course Identification and Justification: A. Proposed course id: HIST R125H Banner title: Honors: U.S. Foreign Policy Full title: Honors: U.S. Foreign Policy & Covert Action B. Reason(s) course is offered: This is the honors version of HIST R125 II. Catalog Information: A. Units: Current: 3.00 to B. Course Hours: 1. In-Class Contact Hours: Lecture: 52.5 Activity: 0 Lab: 0 2. Total In-Class Contact Hours: 52.5 3. Total Outside-of-Class Hours: 105 4. Total Student Learning Hours: 157.5 C. Prerequisites, Corequisites, Advisories, and Limitations on Enrollment: 1. Prerequisites Current: 2. Corequisites Current: 3. Advisories: Current: 4. Limitations on Enrollment: Current: D. Catalog Description: Current: This course is a survey of selected themes, problems, and personalities which have been associated with the creation of both official and covert American relationships with foreign powers. The course examines how U.S. involvements with nations in Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia have interacted with and impacted American society, economics, and democratic institutions with an emphasis on CIA actions performed by the U.S. in the latter half of the 20th Century. Honors work challenges students to be more analytical and creative through expanded assignments, real-world applications, and enrichment opportunities. Credit will not be awarded for both the honors and regular versions of a course. Credit will be awarded only for the first course completed with a grade of C or “P” or better. E. Fees: Current: $ None F. Field trips: Current: Will be required: [ ] May be required: [X] Will not be required: [ ] G.
    [Show full text]