“The Most Important Factor in the Whole East”: Fdr's Vision For
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chapter 3 “The Most Important Factor in the Whole East”: fdr’s Vision for Sino-us Relations Introduction Having explored leadership theories and having made some observations about fdr’s leadership style, a more specific historical analysis can be under- taken. Sino-us relations provide an interesting case study because of the com- plexities of the relationship and the nature of us interests in China during World War ii. By acting as a good friend to China during the war, fdr hoped to gain a significant level of influence over Chiang Kai-shek, the leader of the Nationalist government of China.1 fdr wanted Four Policemen (the us, Britain, Russia and China) to control global peace in the post-war world through the institutional arrangements of the United Nations Organization, and having China as part of that group would help the us hold the balance of power in international relations.2 To achieve that end the us needed to ensure that China emerged from the war as a united and secure state, but one that was not so powerful that it would challenge the us directly. He thought that his best chance to achieve this was to have Chiang Kai-shek in power. fdr’s poli- cies towards China sought to achieve these us interests. The methods he used to devise and implement these policies and his conduct of relations with China limited the effectiveness of these policies and his opportunities to achieve what best served us interests. fdr’s China policy can also be contextualized in the long history of Sino-us relations that preceded his presidency, and the relationship that followed it. 1 Chiang Kai-shek was born in 1887 and was a protégé of the revolutionary Sun Yat-Sen. He became Supreme Commander (Generalissimo) of the National Revolutionary Army in 1926. He emerged as a strong military commander from the struggle for power in China that took place after the end of the Qing Dynasty in the early 1900s. He led the Nationalist government in China throughout the war, but it, and he, continually faced challenges from the Chinese Communists and other factions within the Nationalists. The war with Japan limited the open hostility between these different groups as they fought to save China first. For a comprehen- sive explanation of the politics of China in this period and of Chiang Kai-shek’s life and rise to power, see, Jay Taylor, The Generalissimo (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009). 2 A deeper explanation of this concept and fdr’s intent is provided in the next chapter. © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2015 | doi 10.1163/9789004288249_005 <UN> 50 chapter 3 Franklin Roosevelt was not the first president to feel a special affinity for China. The policy of the Wilson Administration during the First World War provides a good comparison, as Wilson was also sympathetic towards China. It is also important to understand interwar Sino-us relations and the path the relationship took in the lead up to us entry into the Pacific War in 1941. By developing an understanding of the context of both Roosevelt’s leadership style and its impact on Sino-us relations the problems in that relationship become clearer. The United States’ Interests in China Franklin Roosevelt had a notion of what he wanted Sino-us relations to be like in the post-war world. He wanted a united China, free from the destabilizing competition between warlords and other political figures that had plagued the development of the Chinese Republic. Under a stable regime the Asian power would be better placed to advance the plight of its population. From the end of the dynastic period, China had been challenged externally by its neighbors seeking to garner its border regions, and internally by power struggles from rivals across the political spectrum. The instability these challenges created did not serve us interests. us interests in China can be divided into several categories: economic and commercial, security and political. In terms of economic and commercial relations, China did not hold a par- ticularly special place in us trade policy, but in order to maximize commercial and economic opportunities the us was best served by a stable and open Chinese market. The constant competition and conflict between political opponents did not create an environment conducive to us investment or trade in China. In terms of security interests, the us needed China to provide effec- tive opposition to the other significant powers in the region: Japan and Russia. From the beginning of the Chinese Republic both of these powers had threat- ened its sovereignty and territorial integrity. us policy focused on keeping China fighting in the war and making it an effective enough military ally that, with us support but without the direct use of the us army, it could defend itself properly against Japan and resist any future threats from Russia.3 Although the most significant wartime aim was to keep it strong enough to keep the Japanese army busy on the Chinese mainland, the longer term aim was to ensure that 3 Summary of report “The President and us Aid to China” by Navy Lt. George Elsey, 15 November, 1944, “Map Room Files,” (Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park), Box 165, A16, Warfare—China to Crimean Conference, Folder: Naval Aide’s Files: China. <UN>.