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Title How to whistle-blow: Dissensus and demand

Author(s) Kenny, Kate; Bushnell, Alexis

Publication Date 2020-01-22

Publication Kenny, Kate, & Bushnell, Alexis. (2020). How to Whistle- Information Blow: Dissensus and Demand. Journal of Business Ethics, 164(4), 643-656. doi: 10.1007/s10551-019-04401-7

Publisher Springer

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Item record http://hdl.handle.net/10379/16148

DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10551-019-04401-7

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HOW TO WHISTLE-BLOW: DISSENSUS AND DEMAND

Kate Kenny NUI Galway University Road, Galway, Ireland Tel: +353 (0)91 493472 Email: [email protected]

Alexis Bushnell Queen’s University Management School, Queen’s University Belfast, 185 Stranmillis Road, Belfast BT95EE Tel: +44 (0)28 9097 5619 Email: [email protected]

Funding: This study was funded by NUI Galway’s Millennium Grant

Compliance with Ethical Standards:

Conflict of Interest: Author Kenny declares that he/she has no conflict of interest. Author Bushnell declares that he/she has no conflict of interest. Blinded Manuscript (excluding authors' names and affiliations) Click here to view linked References

How to whistle-blow: Dissensus and demand 1 2 3 4 5 Abstract 6 7 8 9 What makes an external whistleblower effective? Whistleblowers represent an 10 11 important conduit for dissensus, providing valuable information about ethical breaches 12 13 14 and organizational wrongdoing. They often speak out about injustice from a relatively 15 16 weak position of power, with the aim of changing the status quo. But many external 17 18 19 whistleblowers fail in this attempt to make their claims heard and thus secure change. 20 21 Some can experience severe retaliation and public blacklisting, while others are 22 23 ignored. This article examines how whistleblowers can succeed in bringing their claims 24 25 26 to the public’s attention. We draw on analyses of political struggle by Ernesto Laclau 27 28 and Chantal Mouffe. Specifically, we propose that through the raising of a demand, the 29 30 31 whistleblowing subject can emerge as part of a chain of equivalences, in a counter- 32 33 hegemonic movement that challenges the status quo. An analysis of a high-profile case 34 35 36 of tax justice whistleblowing- that of Rudolf Elmer- illustrates our argument. Our 37 38 proposed theoretical framing builds upon and contributes to literature on 39 40 whistleblowing as organizational parrhesia by demonstrating how parrhesiastic demand 41 42 43 might lead to change in public perception through the formation of alliances with other 44 45 disparate interests - albeit that the process is precarious and complex. Practically, our 46 47 48 article illuminates a persistent concern for those engaged in dissensus via 49 50 whistleblowing, and whose actions are frequently ignored or silenced. We demonstrate 51 52 53 how such actions can move towards securing public support in order to make a 54 55 difference and achieve change. 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 1 65 Keywords: Demand, dissensus, hegemony, Laclau and Mouffe, parrhesia, 1 2 whistleblowing. 3 4 5 6 7 8 Introduction 9 10 11 12 Today whistleblowers represent an important source of information about 13 14 wrongdoing in organizations. External whistleblowers highlight misconduct in 15 16 17 government (Harding, 2014), public health services (Ash, 2015; Bourne et al, 2015) 18 19 and commercial institutions (Dyck et al, 2010; Mansbach, 2011; O’Brien, 2003). But 20 21 whistleblowers are frequently ignored. In this paper we investigate why this is so and 22 23 24 how it might be changed. 25 26 In the private sector, information disclosed by whistleblowers is increasingly 27 28 29 important for the maintenance of public safety and corporate accountability (AFCE, 30 31 2018). This is partly due to a decline in regulatory oversight as Western nation states 32 33 34 become increasingly facilitative of the wishes of corporations, upon whom they depend 35 36 for the generation of national wealth and provision of jobs for citizens (Rhodes, 2016). 37 38 This dependency has meant that the requirements of the corporation, which include 39 40 41 increased profits for shareholders and protection of its long-term interests, are 42 43 prioritized over effective oversight and regulation. We see this with tax avoidance 44 45 46 practices, for example, when multinational corporations relocate their corporate 47 48 headquarters to international tax havens in order to avoid paying their share of corporate 49 50 51 taxes. We also see it where large banks encourage private citizens to place assets 52 53 offshore for the avoidance of personal tax. Implicit acceptance of tax avoidance has 54 55 56 become hegemonic in this era of ‘corporate sovereignty’, at the expense of social 57 58 equality (Rhodes, 2016, p.1501). Meanwhile, states cannot be relied upon to question 59 60 61 62 63 64 2 65 excesses in this area. Instead both oversight and challenge increasingly come from 1 2 outside, for example with the civil society organizations that revealed the recent 3 4 5 Volkswagen emissions scandal (Rhodes, 2016). Today the work of challenge and 6 7 critique is increasingly carried out, not by the state, but by activist organizations, 8 9 10 investigative journalists, academics and other agitators who independently gather 11 12 information and place it in the public domain, forcing ethical behaviour on the part of 13 14 corporations (Cox, 2013; Mirowski, 2013; Whelan, Moon & Grant, 2013; Springer, 15 16 17 2011; Fleming & Spicer, 2007; Lipschutz & Fogel, 2002). 18 19 External whistleblowers play a key role here. Employees who speak publicly 20 21 22 about wrongdoing occurring within the confines of their organizations are now more 23 24 than ever a vital source of information. For example, PWC employee Antoine Deltour, 25 26 27 along with other Luxleaks whistleblowers, spoke openly about some of the world’s 28 29 largest companies, including Amazon, Apple, IKEA and Pepsi, channelling billions of 30 31 32 dollars via Luxembourg because of its favourable tax practices, thus avoiding paying 33 34 taxes in other EU countries. These revelations along with other scandals, including the 35 36 Panama Papers, underscored the role of external whistleblowing in ensuring public 37 38 39 accountability of corporations. Such revelations have also led to the recent creation of 40 41 an EU-wide Directive that aims to legally protect whistleblowers who go outside of 42 43 44 their organization to report. Thus, external whistleblowers play a key role in generating 45 46 dissent against encroaching corporate sovereignty in democratic societies; they are 47 48 49 widely considered one of the best instruments to battle against corruption (OECD, 50 51 2011). The question remains: what prevents whistleblowers from making their claims 52 53 heard and effectively contributing to dissensus? 54 55 56 Organizational whistleblowing has lately been described as a process of 57 58 ‘parrhesia’, or speaking truth to power (Andrade, 2015; Barratt, 2008; Contu, 2014; 59 60 61 62 63 64 3 65 Jack, 2004; Kaulingfreks and Kaulingfreks, 2013; Mansbach, 2009; Rothschild, 2013; 1 2 Vandekerckhove & Langenberg, 2012; Vandekerckhove, 2006; Weiskopf & Tobias- 3 4 5 Miersch, 2016). Inspired by Michel Foucault’s study of the concept in Ancient Greek 6 7 texts, parrhesia involves speaking the frank truth as one sees it (Foucault, 2001; 2005, 8 9 10 see also Jones, Parker & ten Bos, 2005; Mansbach, 2009; Munro, 2017; Rothschild, 11 12 2013). This act of frank speech often emerges from the speaker’s witnessing abuses of 13 14 power by prominent actors and institutions, and critiquing these from a relatively 15 16 17 powerless position (Foucault, 2005, 2010, 2011; see Munro 2017 for a discussion). 18 19 Parrhesia can thus involve a risk to the well-being and perhaps the life of the speaker 20 21 22 (Foucault, 2010). Through engaging in the act, the speaker claims the right to articulate 23 24 their truth, emerging as a parrhesiastic subject in the process (Foucault, 2010 in 25 26 27 Weiskopf & Tobias-Miersch, 2016, p. 1625). Organizational parrhesia is thus an 28 29 ‘ethico-political practice’ that generates a new relation to the self and to the world 30 31 32 (Weiskopf & Tobias-Miersch, 2016, p. 1624, see also Jack, 2004, p. 130; Mansbach, 33 34 2009). It is both an acknowledgement of a duty to speak out about injustice and an 35 36 exercise of one’s freedom to do this. Parrhesia is seen as a useful way to depict certain 37 38 39 kinds of whistleblowing as it can encompass, at once, several key aspects of the 40 41 whistleblowing experience: the self-transformation undergone by individuals (Alford, 42 43 44 2001; Kenny et al., 2019), and importantly, the politically-oriented intent to disrupt a 45 46 problematic status quo by speaking from a position of relative powerlessness (Contu, 47 48 49 2014; Mansbach, 2009; Rothschild and Miethe, 1999; Weiskopf & Tobias-Miersch, 50 51 2016, p. 1625). Whistleblowing as parrhesia denotes ‘an act of integrity’ (Rothschild, 52 53 2013, p. 895). It thus represents a helpful counterpoint to more ambiguous and 54 55 56 sometimes pejorative depictions of whistleblowers as transgressors who are disloyal to 57 58 their organization (Andrade, 2015; Jones, Parker & ten Bos, 2005; Mansbach, 2009). 59 60 61 62 63 64 4 65 An important driver of parrhesia is the desire to effect change, and here the 1 2 literature to date is less well-developed. Parrhesiastic acts can prompt an ‘interruption’ 3 4 5 to the status quo and create ‘spaces for potential transformation’ (Weiskopf & Tobias- 6 7 Miersch, 2016, p. 1623). But effective parrhesia – that is, parrhesia that both interrupts 8 9 10 and transforms — can only occur where the truth-teller succeeds in being heard by 11 12 others (Catlaw et al., 2014; Vandekerckhove & Langenberg, 2012). The question 13 14 remains therefore: if the whistleblower is to engage in frank and critical speech from a 15 16 17 position of relative powerlessness, what is the process by which he or she might be 18 19 heard? How might the ‘parrhesiastic game’ be won (Weiskopf & Tobias-Miersch, 20 21 22 2016, p. 1631)? Here, ideas from post-structural political sociology, namely Laclau and 23 24 Mouffe’s theory of discursive change, are fruitful. On this view, power operates 25 26 27 through hegemonic social formations that emerge from the temporary stabilization of a 28 29 field of discursivity. Hegemonic change takes place through destabilization of meaning 30 31 32 via dynamics of articulation. Laclau and Mouffe offer a nuanced theoretical account of 33 34 how such change occurs. They describe how a particular statement or set of demands 35 36 can come to prominence to the extent that it alters the status quo - changing public 37 38 39 discourse on an issue and reframing what can and cannot be said. The theory of 40 41 hegemony is ideally placed to build on understandings of parrhesiastic whistleblowing. 42 43 44 Both share a post-structural theoretical orientation. More broadly hegemony offers a 45 46 way to understand a central concern for whistleblowers and scholars alike: how an 47 48 49 isolated set of observations about injustice that pertains to one whistleblower’s 50 51 experience, might achieve connections to other struggles, and thereby gain a wider 52 53 audience. 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 5 65 In this paper, we explore how parrhesiastic claims can garner public attention 1 2 in order to be heard and potentially effect change. We focus on external whistleblowers 3 4 5 - current or former employees who disclose to external parties (Vandekerckhove, 6 7 2010). The majority of external whistleblowers do not begin as such. Rather, they first 8 9 10 attempt to disclose relevant information to someone inside the organization who is in a 11 12 position to remedy the problem, only going outside of the organization when such 13 14 attempts at internal remedies fail (Miceli et al., 2008; Vandekerckhove and Phillips, 15 16 17 2017). External whistleblowers are more vulnerable to retaliation and reprisal than 18 19 those who disclose internally (Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran 2005; Rothschild 20 21 22 2013; Verschoor 2012). We explore how they prevail despite such obstacles. We argue 23 24 that Laclau’s (2005) concept of the demand provides a powerful lens to understand how 25 26 27 the whistleblower’s parrhesiastic claim can gain purchase with an audience much wider 28 29 and larger than that for which it was originally intended. Laclau demonstrates how a 30 31 32 demand can move from the particular to the general through the formation of 33 34 equivalences. In the case of whistleblowers, we find that their enrolment in a wider 35 36 chain of equivalential demands is important if they are to be heard and taken seriously. 37 38 39 To develop these ideas, we present a case study in which a singular whistleblowing 40 41 claim is elevated to a position of prominence. During the period in question the 42 43 44 widespread and ‘common sense’ acceptance of corporate tax autonomy and practices 45 46 of tax evasion is challenged by an emerging counter-hegemony. Different interests and 47 48 49 demands link together across chains of equivalence under the signifier of ‘tax justice’, 50 51 positioned as antagonistic to the status quo. The whistleblower, Rudolf Elmer, occupies 52 53 an important though precarious position in this. He is at once enrolled in chains of 54 55 56 equivalences while also representing an entity to be rejected and ignored - an 57 58 ambiguous status that renders him particularly vulnerable. 59 60 61 62 63 64 6 65 Through our analysis we illuminate the dynamics by which entrenched power 1 2 can begin to be resisted through the presencing of antagonism and the articulation of a 3 4 5 counter-hegemonic project. Our adopted lens shows how the particularity and 6 7 specificity of a whistleblower’s claim connects to the macro level of discursive change, 8 9 10 even though the challenge represented by this claim is both tenuous and precarious. 11 12 Whistleblowing can be effective as a practice of dissensus, albeit one that renders the 13 14 speaker vulnerable to attack. 15 16 17 Our paper is structured as follows. Presenting literature on parrhesia and 18 19 organizational whistleblowing, we describe debates on how a parrhesiastic subject 20 21 22 requires a listener to hear their claims. This is followed by an introduction to Laclau’s 23 24 ideas on discursive change and the emergence of counter-hegemonies. We demonstrate 25 26 27 our proposed conceptual framing of effective whistleblowing through an analysis of a 28 29 well-known whistleblowing case: Elmer’s disclosure of tax-evasion enabled by a Swiss 30 31 32 bank. Overall our theoretical contribution is the application of Laclau and Mouffe’s 33 34 theory of hegemony and discursive change to highlight how parrhesiastic claims can 35 36 emerge alongside other counter-hegemonic demands, enabling effective 37 38 39 whistleblowing attempts that would otherwise fail to gain an audience. We therefore 40 41 shed light on when and how whistleblowers can act as effective protagonists of 42 43 44 dissensus. 45 46 47 48 Whistleblowing as parrhesia: Gaining an audience 49 50 51 52 In recent years, whistleblowing scholars have drawn upon the concept of 53 54 parrhesia to understand the whistleblower as an ethico-political figure of resistance 55 56 57 within organizations - that is, as a source of disruption that can affect change (Contu, 58 59 2014; Willmott and Weiskopf, 2013; Weiskopf and Tobias-Miersch, 2106; 60 61 62 63 64 7 65 Vandekerckhove and Langenberg, 2012). A term from Ancient Greece, parrhesia 1 2 describes the act of speaking truth to power as encompassing, for the speaker: “a 3 4 5 specific relation to truth through frankness, a certain type of relationship to his (sic) 6 7 own life through danger, a certain type of relation to himself or other people through 8 9 10 criticism (self-criticism or criticism of other people), and a specific relation to moral 11 12 law through freedom and duty” (Foucault, 2001, p. 19). Expressing organizational 13 14 whistleblowing as an act of parrhesia is compelling for scholars because it provides an 15 16 17 association with integrity and courage for whistleblowers who struggle in difficult 18 19 circumstances (Jones et al., 2005; Mansbach, 2009; Rothschild, 2013). Organizational 20 21 22 scholars have focused on the risks of speaking out, and the courage of those who do so 23 24 (Mansbach, 2011; Munro, 2017; Weiskopf and Willmott, 2013). Parrhesia 25 26 27 encompasses a relation to truth such that the self of the subject is constituted through 28 29 their articulation of the bare facts as they perceive them to be (Foucault, 2005, p. 382); 30 31 32 logos (truth) and bios (life) intertwine in the subject that engages in such practice, and 33 34 thus the subjectivity of the speaker is constituted through the act of speaking (Contu, 35 36 2014; Jack, 2004). The parrhesiastic utterance emerges from the courage and freedom 37 38 39 taken up by the subject: one’s “exercis[ing of] power through true discourse” (Foucault, 40 41 2010, p. 159). Thus, parrhesia involves attempts to alter the status quo: it is political 42 43 44 (Contu, 2014; Rothschild and Miethe, 1999). But how exactly can this impetus to 45 46 exercise power manifest in hegemonic change? 47 48 49 The issue of how effective change can occur is relatively under-explored by 50 51 organizational scholarship on whistleblowing parrhesia, with some exceptions. As 52 53 Jones et al. (2005, p. 121) note: “whistleblowing is only possible if there are people to 54 55 56 hear the whistle being blown”. A speech act must gain listeners or else the 57 58 whistleblower’s claims will remain unheeded (Vandekerckhove and Langenberg, 59 60 61 62 63 64 8 65 2012). Parrhesia is thus an interaction between parties, involving both a speaker and an 1 2 audience for their speech (Andrade, 2015; Contu, 2014). This audience must be open 3 4 5 to hearing information that might be both uncomfortable and disturbing (Foucault, 6 7 2010; see also Catlaw et al., 2014; Munro, 2017; Vandekerckhove & Langenberg, 8 9 10 2012). In order to appeal to the audience, once its attention has been secured, the 11 12 speaker must present their claim in a way that will be heard, despite any discomfort it 13 14 may cause. Weiskopf and Tobias-Miersch (2016) argue that to achieve this, effective 15 16 17 whistleblowing must be sensitive to context. Drawing on their case of whistleblowing 18 19 in a European Union bureaucracy, they demonstrate how a parrhesiastic utterance must 20 21 22 engage prevailing discourses if the whistleblower is to convince people of the accuracy 23 24 of their claims and precipitate a parrhesiastic interruption. In their case, the 25 26 27 whistleblower, Guido Strack, presents himself as an expert in his role, evoking the 28 29 ‘techne’- or formal rules and obligations – of his profession as a means of legitimizing 30 31 32 his disruptive statements about financial wastage within the European Union (Weiskopf 33 34 & Tobias-Miersch, 2016, p. 1631). Strack also draws on other discourses to construct 35 36 himself as a ‘legal professional’ (see also Mansbach, 2009). For financial services 37 38 39 whistleblowers, positioning oneself as a committed professional is likewise effective. 40 41 Kenny (2019) shows how UK banking whistleblowers in the period before the 2008 42 43 44 financial crisis described themselves as dedicated to the traditional norms of integrity 45 46 and service that historically marked banking practice. This proved effective when 47 48 49 convincing others of their claims. Meanwhile, United States government 50 51 whistleblowers have found themselves aligning with public discourses around greater 52 53 transparency in national security practices in order to gain support for their struggle, as 54 55 56 in the case of John Kiriakou’s exposure of extreme interrogation practices such as 57 58 waterboarding (Blueprint for Free Speech, 2018; Bushnell et al., 2019). Similarly, the 59 60 61 62 63 64 9 65 ‘Pentagon Papers’ whistleblower, Daniel Ellsberg, drew on an anti-war sentiment that 1 2 was becoming ever more entrenched in the United States during the time of his 3 4 5 disclosures, revealing that successive governments had mislead the American public 6 7 about the Vietnam War (Weiskopf and Willmott, 2011). Reflecting on the question of 8 9 10 how collective, or ‘networked’ parrhesia can be exercised by whistleblowers, Munro 11 12 (2017) shows how Julian Assange and members of the Wikileaks collective drew on 13 14 the concept of courage – to speak truth to power -- when describing the whistleblowers 15 16 17 who came forward via their platform. Overall therefore, successfully challenging the 18 19 status quo involves more than a courageous utterance on the part of the speaker; 20 21 22 parrhesia itself does not guarantee change. Effective whistleblowing requires the 23 24 presentation of information in a specific way, to an audience willing to listen. This 25 26 27 necessitates an engagement in widely shared systems of meaning. The above studies 28 29 demonstrate how the specific and local claim of a whistleblower must somehow 30 31 32 connect with macro discursive formations that characterize a given setting, in order to 33 34 gain an audience for one’s potentially disruptive statements. 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 Theory of hegemony: From claims to social demands 42 43 44 45 Developed with Chantal Mouffe (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001) and later forming 46 47 the basis of his work on populism (Laclau, 2005), Laclau’s theory of hegemony is 48 49 ideally placed to shed light on the questions posed here. It is concerned with political 50 51 52 change; specifically, it examines how some concepts emerge as meaningful and widely- 53 54 shared, thus potentially precipitating an alteration of the status quo, while others do not. 55 56 57 Laclau and Mouffe wrote Hegemony and Socialist Strategy in 1985 to analyze 58 59 contemporaneous problems of social democracy in Western Europe. Growing ever 60 61 62 63 64 10 65 more bureaucratic while ignoring new social movements, including environmentalism 1 2 and feminism, social democracy was in danger of failing. How, asked the authors, 3 4 5 might a new, left-oriented and radical democratic hegemony develop, at once retaining 6 7 social democratic ideals while encompassing plurality and openness to change where 8 9 10 needed? Building on Antonio Gramsci’s ideas in Prison Notebooks, inspired by Karl 11 12 Marx, Laclau and Mouffe (2001) explore the ways in which hegemonic social 13 14 formations emerge and are kept in place by the ongoing operation of power relations 15 16 17 that act to organize the field of intelligibility (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p.93). 18 19 Hegemony is upheld by an ongoing reiteration of meaning across “the entire material 20 21 22 density of the multifarious institutions, rituals and practices, through which a discursive 23 24 formation is structured” (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. 109). As an example from 25 26 27 Gramsci’s work, a sense of coherent “collective will” emerges where there is general 28 29 acceptance of shared basic principles (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. 68). This acceptance 30 31 32 hides the underlying contingency of the situation - it gives the impression that it could 33 34 not have been any other way. As Mouffe (2008, p. 27) explains, “sedimented… 35 36 categories” tend to “conceal the act of their original institution”. In fact, a given 37 38 39 situation is often the result of hegemonic power relations that could conceivably have 40 41 yielded a different outcome (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. viii). Despite their appearance 42 43 44 of objectivity and having ‘always been there’, therefore, social formations are 45 46 necessarily contingent. 47 48 49 The contingency of social formations also means that they are always open for 50 51 potential displacement by counter-hegemonic movement. Such displacements cannot 52 53 simply happen at any time, however, because sedimented discourses can be strongly 54 55 56 entrenched. Even so, instances of “structural undecidability” do emerge (Laclau and 57 58 Mouffe 2001 p. xii), when a social formation is in a state of flux and receptive to the 59 60 61 62 63 64 11 65 construction of “a new system of difference” (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, p. 138). The 1 2 theory of hegemony has inspired a variety of organizational analyses (Bridgman and 3 4 5 Willmott, 2006; Bridgman, 2007; Holmer-Nadesan, 1996; Islam et al., 2017; Kenny 6 7 and Scriver, 2012; McLaughlin and Bridgman, 2017; Spicer and Bohm, 2007; Willmott 8 9 10 2005). 11 12 The demand is central to counter-hegemonic challenge to the status quo. In On 13 14 Populist Reason (2005), Laclau develops his earlier theorization of hegemony in the 15 16 17 context of emergent political change. Here he conceives of the social demand as the 18 19 basic unit of analysis. A demand can emerge initially as a request and then, if it is not 20 21 22 engaged with or acknowledged within a hegemonic social formation, can become a 23 24 claim. The demand is made up of two parts: one particular and one universal (2005, 25 26 27 p.121). In a situation of stability (for example a stable democracy), multiple demands 28 29 can co-exist. Each can be dealt with; either the particular aspect of the demand is met 30 31 32 within the system, or it continues to function as a demand without frustration, for 33 34 example if one expects that those in power will negotiate the need at some point in the 35 36 future. Logics of difference emerge between multiple and co-existing demands in a 37 38 39 hegemonic social formation (Laclau, 2005, p.73-74). 40 41 But counter-hegemonies can emerge. Each hegemonic social formation is 42 43 44 contingent and precarious, subject to “an ‘outside’ that impedes its full realization” 45 46 (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p.18). In some cases a given demand can become open to a 47 48 49 new articulation - it can ‘float’ and form connections with other demands in a chain of 50 51 equivalence. This can occur for example among demands that are somewhat 52 53 underspecified, representing elements “whose own nature does not predetermine them 54 55 56 to enter into one type of arrangement rather than another” – however, they “nevertheless 57 58 coalesce, as a result of an external or articulating practice” (2001 p. xii). The particular 59 60 61 62 63 64 12 65 aspect of a demand remains concerned with the specific issue that caused it to emerge, 1 2 while its universal aspect can move to align with the universal aspect of other, formerly 3 4 5 unrelated demands. Commonalities between demands are emphasized as the ‘chain’ 6 7 solidifies, and differences are downplayed. Differences are not erased altogether; both 8 9 10 the particular and the specific nature of each demand persists. Situations in which 11 12 demands are frustrated can lead demands to float if, for example, the potential for 13 14 negotiation and eventual resolution of one’s need is perceived to be foreclosed. 15 16 17 New chains of equivalence can engender the emergence of counter-hegemony, 18 19 antagonistic to the status quo. When this occurs, one demand accedes to a prominent, 20 21 22 structuring position that enables it to signify across the entire discursive chain. Now 23 24 devoid of its particularistic content it is an effectively ‘empty’ signifier (Laclau and 25 26 27 Mouffe, 2001, p.126). Rather than voided or negated, ‘empty’ here refers to the 28 29 signifier’s new status as representing the ‘absent fullness of the community’, instead of 30 31 32 its own previously particularistic content (Laclau, 2005, p.170). Its universal aspect 33 34 now represents the universal part of all the other demands: the counter-hegemonic 35 36 formation begins to solidify in meaning. The ‘particular content’ of the empty signifier 37 38 39 “is ‘transubstantiated’ into an embodiment of the social Whole” (Zizek, 2006, p. 559), 40 41 an embodiment that is antagonistic to the status quo, in a counter-hegemonic situation. 42 43 44 Meaning has become fixed, albeit partially (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, p.137). The 45 46 demand occupies this central place in Laclau’s theorization of populism because the 47 48 49 subject itself is constituted through the raising of a demand. Collectivities of subjects - 50 51 groups coming together around a shared identity - emerge in and through the generation 52 53 of equivalences between frustrated demands, even demands that were hitherto 54 55 56 unconnected (Zizek, 2006; Laclau, 2005). The emergence of a counter-hegemony is 57 58 therefore “the performative result of raising [these] demands” rather than the 59 60 61 62 63 64 13 65 mobilization of a pre-existing group (Zizek, 2006, p.557). Developed to theorize the 1 2 emergence of populism, these ideas nonetheless represent an exemplary conceptual 3 4 5 framework for engaging with the question of discursive change more broadly (Zizek, 6 7 2006), not least in the context of the complex and heterogeneous hegemonies that make 8 9 10 up contemporary structures of ‘globalized capitalism’ (Laclau, 2005, p.230). 11 12 13 14 Hegemony and Tax Evasion 15 16 17 18 In this article, we draw on Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of discursive change to 19 20 consider an empirical case of one whistleblower in the global financial services sector: 21 22 23 Rudolf Elmer. His case relates to the practice of offshore tax evasion because of which, 24 25 according to HMRC, the UK loses 4.4 billion a year: money that could otherwise be 26 27 used to fund public services and infrastructure (Syal, 2015). 28 29 30 Over a four-year period, Elmer moved from being silenced and ignored for his 31 32 whistleblowing, to being celebrated as a public hero. Since 2001, Elmer had been 33 34 35 trying to draw attention to his whistleblowing claims but was continually ignored. He 36 37 had witnessed, and had evidence of, his bank’s long-term encouragement of tax evasion 38 39 40 by wealthy clients. He tried to alert the authorities in Switzerland to this information 41 42 and when this failed, attempted to go public in the Swiss media. In response, Elmer was 43 44 45 either overlooked or, in the rare cases that his story reached the media, he was publicly 46 47 denigrated with the support of his ex-employer, the bank. He could not draw the 48 49 attention of the public to the wrongdoing about which he was speaking. However, in 50 51 52 2008 his fortune appeared to change when he became a global figure in the struggle for 53 54 ‘tax justice’. Elmer’s truth claims were given credence in the media and online. He was 55 56 57 celebrated and received awards for his whistleblowing practice. In seven years, his 58 59 claims had moved from being ignored and silenced to being publicized around the 60 61 62 63 64 14 65 world. He appeared to have achieved what so many whistleblowers fail to do: he had 1 2 gained a voice. The question remains: how? In what follows we weave Elmer’s case 3 4 5 throughout our presentation of conceptual ideas in order to illustrate theory in action. 6 7 We draw on an author interview, broadcast and online interviews, media articles and 8 9 10 court submissions. We chose this case as an ideal example, forming the basis for theory 11 12 development in the area of external whistleblowing and parrhesia, drawing on studies 13 14 that have adopted a similar approach (Rhodes 2016). 15 16 17 Reflecting on Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, Mouffe has spoken about how 18 19 neither she, nor her co-author, foresaw the emergence of a neoliberal hegemony that 20 21 22 would erode civil and social rights to the degree that it has (Judis, 2016). Elmer’s case 23 24 in many ways illustrates the manifestations of neoliberalism to which Mouffe refers, 25 26 27 specifically the apparent autonomy by which corporations are allowed to operate and 28 29 manage their tax affairs. In so doing, it is an ideal setting by which to interrogate Laclau 30 31 32 and Mouffe’s idea that unmet demands – in our case the unmet demand of the 33 34 parrhesiast whistleblower - can potentially influence wider political change and 35 36 challenge the accepted ‘common sense’ around hegemonic social formations. 37 38 39 40 41 Phase 1: Social identities and logics of equivalence 42 43 44 45 46 Logics and Swiss tax evasion 47 48 49 During his time at Julius Baer private bank (JB), Elmer had become suspicious 50 51 52 about certain practices. A part-captain in the Swiss army and a trained accountant, he 53 54 had worked for JB from 1987 to 2003. Dealing mostly with wealthy individuals, JB is 55 56 57 one of Switzerland’s most respected and oldest private banks, handling approximately 58 59 38bn in assets (The Guardian, 13 February 2009). Initially hired as an auditor, 60 61 62 63 64 15 65 screening complex transactions at the bank, in 1994, Elmer was promoted to Chief 1 2 Operating Officer and Compliance officer in the Cayman Islands branch. By 1998, he 3 4 5 had begun to ask questions about certain financial structures that were set up to facilitate 6 7 tax avoidance in JB’s Cayman branch. He also questioned the policy of providing 8 9 i 10 ‘services’ for tax evasion and secrecy for clients . According to Elmer, he could see that 11 12 the practices were immoral and also perhaps illegal; among the bank’s clients were 13 14 people with criminal convictions, including drug-related ones. 15 16 17 Elmer was dismissed after a data breach to which he claimed no connection. 18 19 When internal documents relating to the formation of anonymous trusts at the Cayman 20 21 22 branch were leaked, the bank searched staff members’ houses and requested lie detector 23 24 tests. Elmer did not complete the polygraph, as he was absent from the office due to 25 26 ii 27 back pain. He was dismissed as a result of not attending the test. He reports that he 28 29 was shocked by his dismissal and made a decision to challenge JB over missing the 30 31 32 polygraph as the reason for his termination. Concomitantly, he was in possession of a 33 34 back-up copy of all the bank’s data on a laptop, because his role encompassed an 35 36 emergency function; he was to keep a copy of data off-site because of the bi-annual 37 38 39 hurricanes that struck the island. On the backup laptop were the names and details of 40 41 thousands of individuals and organizations that JB had helped evade tax, and some 42 43 44 accounts relating to fraudulent and illegal practices including drug money laundering. 45 46 A struggle between Elmer and JB bank followed his dismissal. After Elmer 47 48 49 mounted a legal challenge against JB for unfair dismissal, the organization responded 50 51 by threatening him. Elmer recalls being informed by a senior HR manager that if he 52 53 pursued his dismissal case, he would be “worn down”iii by the bank. 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 16 65 In Zurich we had discussions and they told me look, if you take the bank 1 2 to court, then we are going to finish you up (Elmer Interview). 3 4 5 6 7 He describes that, frightened by these threats and unsure what to do, he began to use 8 9 10 the data in his possession. He wanted to build support for his case of unfair termination 11 12 by publicizing the wrong-doing he had witnessed in the company. Elmer presented the 13 14 data related to questionable bank activity to local tax authorities in Zurich, and to the 15 16 17 federal Swiss tax authorities. He also brought the evidence to the Swiss federal 18 19 prosecutor. No one wanted to know about wrongdoing carried out by the bank. Elmer 20 21 22 was offered a settlement by JB but by this stage, he had become determined to pursue 23 24 his case. 25 26 27 28 29 Taking the money would have meant again being part of the “pack of 30 31 32 wolves”. At that point in time I personally was already in a position where 33 34 I felt, you can talk about ethical issues or whatever, but I felt I want to go 35 36 through that. [I said], “I’m not afraid of any court trial, on the contrary it 37 38 39 will make it visible to society what is happening. I can use the courtroom 40 41 to show what is really going on (Elmer Interview).” 42 43 44 45 46 Elmer describes how, during this period, he and his family were subject to increasing 47 48 49 harassment by the bank. He retained evidence of the persecution and threatening 50 51 behaviour, which, as he noted, was endangering the well-being of his family. Even with 52 53 this material, Elmer’s complaints were ignored. No member of the Elmer family was 54 55 56 questioned by the prosecutor for the Canton of Zurich in relation to the harassment until 57 58 2011, when the Federal Court of Switzerland became involved. The provocation 59 60 61 62 63 64 17 65 continued; his daughter would later receive an undisclosed settlement from the bank 1 2 for these violations (The Economist, July 19, 2014). In 2005, the leak of information 3 4 5 from JB was reported in the Wall Street Journal (Taylor, 2005) and other media, and 6 7 the bank took action. Elmer was charged with violating Swiss bank secrecy, specifically 8 9 10 of releasing data belonging to Julius Bär & Trust Companies Ltd., Cayman, despite the 11 12 fact that this entity is not a bank per se.iv He spent 30 days under ‘pre-trial confinement’ 13 14 and was denied legal assistance by the prosecutor in charge (Liberte Interview, 17 15 16 17 September 2011). Meanwhile Elmer’s health was suffering; he had a medical diagnosis 18 19 that showed 100 per cent incapacity. He was kept in prison regardless of this diagnosis. 20 21 22 Somewhat desperately, Elmer approached the Swiss media to see whether they 23 24 would help to draw attention to his case. However, he found that the media often 25 26 27 appeared to be in favour of JB in the dispute, tagging Elmer as a disgruntled employee 28 29 at best, or at worst, a madman. He was painted in the media as a problematic figure. 30 31 32 33 34 [They] preferred to write about the whistleblower, that is me, as mentally 35 36 ill and/or out for revenge. The articles did not mention any wrongdoing by 37 38 39 the bank in the Cayman Islands (Liberte Interview, 17 September, 2011). 40 41 42 43 44 In the instances that his story was reported on in the newspapers, it became all about 45 46 him - the unreliable, suspect banker who was looking for vengeance. The stories did 47 48 49 not focus on the issue he was trying to raise. Elmer turned to civil society, asking for 50 51 help from the Swiss Foundation of the International Social Service in respect to their 52 53 Rights for Children program, enquiring if they could help protect his daughter, but to 54 55 56 no avail. He contacted a Professor at the University of Zurich who was involved in 57 58 Transparency International. According to Elmer, this man implied that if JB was 59 60 61 62 63 64 18 65 involved in any suspicious activity, it could be assumed that the activity had been 1 2 agreed to with the tax authority and so therefore was within the law. The professor 3 4 5 declined an examination of the facts of the case (Elmer Interview). 6 7 Elmer was desperately trying to make his claims heard, but he could not. His 8 9 10 claim was now twofold: the tax evasion supported by his former employer, but also the 11 12 harassment to which he and his family had been subjected. He was attempting to engage 13 14 in parrhesiastic action--speaking truth to power from below -- about injustice and abuse. 15 16 17 But nobody seemed to care; a fate that befalls many whistleblowing cases. Elmer was 18 19 clearly struggling to gain any voice in the discursive space in which he found himself; 20 21 22 none of the traditional sources of support, including state and non-governmental 23 24 organizations, would help. 25 26 27 In order to understand why Elmer’s whistleblowing claims were stymied, it is 28 29 helpful to draw upon the theory of hegemony. At a given point in time, a discursive 30 31 32 field represents the ‘totality’ that has emerged from repeated articulations of a common 33 34 sense meaning (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, p.106). This totality has been constituted by 35 36 the co-option of previously separate ideas, signs and statements to make up an accepted 37 38 39 framework of meaning. In Switzerland a hegemonic set of ideas and statements around 40 41 tax evasion persists – it is linked to the economic health of the nation and influences 42 43 44 what ‘can be said or done’ legitimately (Torfing, 1999, p.300). Elmer’s statements 45 46 gained little traction with Swiss media or the public, representing unintelligible speech 47 48 49 that made little sense in terms of accepted meanings around banking and tax practices. 50 51 Elmer remained unheard and in the rare cases in which he gained the notice of the 52 53 media, he was depicted as mad. Against this backdrop, violations to Elmer’s own well- 54 55 56 being and that of his family were acceptable, while his bank appeared immune from 57 58 challenges that in other jurisdictions might have been upheld. He was unable to gain 59 60 61 62 63 64 19 65 support within this discursive field; no connection could be made between what he was 1 2 saying and what was perceived to be common sense. He had a specific demand for 3 4 5 justice - both for his family’s suffering and the bank’s wrongdoing - and was requesting 6 7 resolution from the powers that be. The hegemonic authorities in place - the Swiss state 8 9 10 and its institutions - refused to hear either demand, or to recognize Elmer. Elmer was 11 12 speaking in a vacuum; his demand was frustrated, his call for justice ignored. But this 13 14 situation was about to change. 15 16 17 18 19 Phase 2: Discursive change and Tax Justice? 20 21 22 23 24 Over a number of years of struggling to draw an audience for claims in 25 26 27 Switzerland, a conversation with a police officer helped Elmer to understand more 28 29 clearly why he was being ignored: 30 31 32 33 34 The police officer I talked to said, “Look, you work in the State of Zurich. 35 36 You can approach every newspaper editor in Zurich; I’m pretty sure they 37 38 39 won’t support you. You need to go to a newspaper out of the State of 40 41 Zurich and they would report about it, and you need to have that 42 43 44 opportunity to make that case”. It’s a bit of a “dirty boys game”, [as] we 45 46 call it in Switzerland (Elmer Interview)”. 47 48 49 50 51 52 Elmer therefore began to realize that it was futile to continue to pursue coverage of his 53 54 55 story in the Swiss media: 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 20 65 In Switzerland, I could have gone to all the newspapers and told them the 1 2 story. And someone would have reported about it. But the ones who would 3 4 5 report about it would have reported me as a madman, which actually 6 7 happened in Swiss TV (Elmer Interview). 8 9 10 11 12 13 For Elmer, the barrier to his truth-telling was not his failure to contact enough people, 14 15 16 hire sufficiently-skilled lawyers or spend enough time chasing newspapers in his native 17 18 Switzerland. Coverage of his story was simply never going to happen, given the 19 20 economic and political climate in which he was living. At the time, Switzerland was 21 22 23 known as a haven of bank secrecy: 24 25 26 27 28 Switzerland is a fortress of banking and financial services, but famously 29 30 secretive and expert in the concealment of wealth from all over the world 31 32 33 for tax evasion and other extra-legal purposes (The Guardian, 16 January 34 35 2011). 36 37 38 39 40 As this Guardian reporter implies, for other state governments, Swiss secrecy 41 42 represented a significant obstacle to ensuring that their citizens paid taxes to fund the 43 44 45 hospitals and schools in their countries. Realizing this, Elmer decided to seek help from 46 47 concerned parties in jurisdictions negatively affected by Swiss banking practices. First, 48 49 50 he made contact with Wikileaks. He presented Julian Assange with a disc containing 51 52 information on tax evaders in the United States, United Kingdom, Germany and 53 54 55 Austria, among other countries: 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 21 65 I searched the Internet and came across Wikileaks' page. I contacted them 1 2 and discussed the matter at length because I wanted to be assured that they 3 4 5 would not abuse the information to make money (Elmer Interview). 6 7 8 9 10 …I put my name on my first whistleblower letter to Wikileaks… Because 11 12 it was an act of civil disobedience, my name was necessary (Liberte 13 14 Interview, 17 September 2011). 15 16 17 18 19 Elmer presented Wikileaks with a short list of 15 clients and their data, though 20 21 22 the names of the clients were not made public. The Guardian (16 January 2011) 23 24 scrutinized the list and concluded that it gave details of ‘numerous trusts in which 25 26 27 wealthy people have placed capital’. The trusts were listed as Cayman residents and so 28 29 paid no taxes on the profits. In a trust, the trustees are free to distribute money to its 30 31 32 beneficiaries, and the process is completely legal. One example of a client named in 33 34 Elmer’s disclosure is the Carlyle group, a well-known private equity group based in 35 36 Washington DC that counts presidents and prime ministers among its advisers (The 37 38 39 Guardian, 13 February 2009). What Elmer’s information showed was not only how 40 41 many wealthy people seemed to be unwilling to pay their taxes but also how JB and 42 43 44 other banks actively promoted this kind of behaviour and encouraged it. The issue went 45 46 far beyond JB and its clientele, rather it pointed to a whole system of tax evasion that 47 48 49 was supported by many organizations. It was inevitable that bankers in Zurich, Vaduz 50 51 and even Frankfurt were assisting in their clients’ tax evasion. 52 53 The event was covered by international media and Elmer was the focus of many 54 55 56 newspaper articles. In these, he was positioned as something of a figurehead 57 58 representing Wikileaks’ focus on transparency: a symbol of open information, free 59 60 61 62 63 64 22 65 speech and the sharing of secrets. Staff at Wikileaks wrote and published an article in 1 2 support of him (Schmidt, Clouds on the Cayman Tax Heaven, Wikileaks 2008). The 3 4 5 organization also helped Elmer to translate his complaint to the European Court of 6 7 Human Rights and to file it with the Court on behalf of himself and his familyv. Elmer’s 8 9 10 own struggle against JB was taken up by the Guardian, Observer and other Anglo- 11 12 Saxon publications, who contextualized it as a story about tax evasion, a harmful 13 14 practice, with Elmer styled as something of a brave hero for exposing it. 15 16 17 By the time he appeared in a Swiss court for having handed this information to 18 19 Wikileaks, his list of well-wishers had grown to include respected news outlets as well 20 21 22 as influential individuals like Washington DC-based lawyer, Jack Blum. Blum is well- 23 24 known for speaking out against the activities of tax havens and the banks that operate 25 26 27 within them and was able to connect Elmer’s struggle to the wider fight against tax 28 29 evasion. As he told the Guardian: 30 31 32 33 34 What Elmer is doing is extremely valuable in the process of educating 35 36 people of the need for major reform. This is a system for enabling a certain 37 38 39 class of people to avoid their societal duty, which is to pay tax (The 40 41 Guardian, 13 February 2009). 42 43 44 45 46 Jack Blum was more than a lawyer; he had become a public advocate for Elmer. Other 47 48 49 friends included members of French non-profit, Liberte-info who wrote letters on his 50 51 behalf, for example to the European Court of Human Rights, and to the Head of the 52 53 Federal Department of Justice and Police in 2011. Elmer was contacted by a 54 55 56 documentary team about making a film of his story, which resulted in the documentary 57 58 film, Offshore: Elmer und das Bankgeheimnis, in 2016. He was now an international 59 60 61 62 63 64 23 65 figure in the struggle for tax justice. However, at home in Switzerland, attitudes had 1 2 change little. In correspondence with a judge, Elmer learned how he was still perceived 3 4 5 in his native land. The judge commented that: 6 7 8 You [Elmer] are more dangerous for the system than the Red Army 9 10 Faction or the Red Brigade were because you do not use violent action, 11 12 13 you use figures and facts. And that makes you a dangerous person or even 14 15 an enemy of the state (Liberte Interview, 17 September 2011). 16 17 18 19 20 It is useful to examine the context in which these events were unfolding. The US and 21 22 most of Europe were obsessed with addressing tax fraud at the time. Perhaps 23 24 25 unsurprisingly, the vast majority of Elmer’s new supporters were not Swiss but came 26 27 from other countries and regions: 28 29 30 31 32 Strategically I took the position of saying: “Look, you have got the 33 34 35 financial center of Zurich, you have got the financial center of London, 36 37 you have got the financial center of New York… Switzerland will not 38 39 report in my case. Go to a place, London or New York or Germany, who 40 41 42 have an interest in making it public that the financial center of Zurich is 43 44 dirty (Elmer Interview). 45 46 47 48 49 At this time, global interest was focused on Switzerland and its secrecy laws. As a 50 51 52 result of the economic recession that many nations were facing, caused by the banking 53 54 crisis itself, countries needed money. They did not need tax evaders taking the state’s 55 56 rightful property and hiding it away. As The Economist phrased it: 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 24 65 Governments once turned a blind eye to their wealthy citizens' offshore 1 2 tax acrobatics. Now they are strapped for cash and hungrily hunt every 3 4 5 penny in tax revenue. So, a cold war on banking secrecy is turning hot 6 7 (The Economist, 11 February 2012). 8 9 10 11 12 National governments had begun buying copies of databases, such as the one Elmer 13 14 held, for cashvi. Switzerland’s next-door neighbour, Germany, had made such a deal for 15 16 17 information on Swiss bank accounts (The Daily Mail, 20 January 2011). Paralleling 18 19 Elmer’s struggle was that of Bradley Birkenfeld, who spoke out about offshore tax 20 21 22 evasion schemes that enabled US residents to hide assets. His case led to Switzerland 23 24 being forced to hand over the details of over four thousand accounts to US authorities 25 26 27 investigating UBS bank. Across the Atlantic, by 2011, the EU was considering 28 29 sanctions against Switzerland, while the Council of Europe was planning a clampdown 30 31 32 on countries considered to be facilitating tax evasion. In addition to the wagons 33 34 gathering around Switzerland, the Caymans had become a target for politicians all over; 35 36 the issue was raised in the UK commons and, in his pre-presidential campaigns, Barack 37 38 39 Obama had specifically mentioned the islands as a “blot on the U.S. fiscal landscape 40 41 which ought to be investigated” (The Guardian, 12 February 2009). For years tax 42 43 44 evasion had been more or less accepted across Western nations. 45 46 In Switzerland discourses upholding such practices remained prominent. 47 48 49 Around the time that Elmer had begun speaking out however, signs of change were 50 51 emerging from elsewhere. An alternative set of meanings was forming. Sources ranging 52 53 from state governments to media outlets and civil society groups had begun to challenge 54 55 56 the status quo. The displacement of a dominant social formation can only occur through 57 58 the operation of hegemony and the creation of alternative, plausible chains of 59 60 61 62 63 64 25 65 equivalences through ‘articulatory practices’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001 p.138). In a 1 2 stable political setting, multiple potential conflicts exist, and each can be dealt with 3 4 5 individually within the system - no transversal alliances across demands need occur, 6 7 nor are antagonisms with external frontiers created. Sometimes however, demands 8 9 10 emerge that are neither met nor even acknowledged, instead remaining frustrated or 11 12 denied. We see in Elmer’s case the emergence of a logic of equivalence as a particular 13 14 demand is elevated to a position of privilege, coming to represent the entire chain. The 15 16 17 signifier of ‘tax justice’ becomes elevated in this way, acting as an organizing principle 18 19 across a chain of previously disparate, and frustrated, demands. For certain national 20 21 22 governments, protesting widespread tax evasion was beginning to take hold as a clear 23 24 demand. Against a backdrop of failing economies, and popular anger against banks and 25 26 27 bankers, political parties were making the struggle against tax evasion a policy 28 29 principle. This particular demand was rooted in the economic well-being of the nation, 30 31 32 but also encapsulated in a universal call for tax justice. 33 34 Meanwhile a very different set of players in the form of activist groups, such as 35 36 Wikileaks and Liberte-info, were formed around a different demand: radical 37 38 39 transparency of data, yet concurrently found a resonance in the appeal for tax justice. 40 41 Journalists writing for progressive media outlets like the Guardian and the Observer 42 43 44 shared an interest in the critique of powerful corporate interests, again echoing the 45 46 universal demand for tax justice as they positioned their articles, a stance shared by 47 48 49 makers of independent documentary films. In each case of demand, its particularities 50 51 are entirely different and unconnected. State discourses are rooted in national economic 52 53 interests, critical journalists and film makers argue for justice, while Wikileaks 54 55 56 struggles for transparency, but these demands nonetheless coalesce in a chain of 57 58 equivalence. Emerging as a particular demand of civil society actors - tax justice 59 60 61 62 63 64 26 65 campaigners - but acceding to a position of privilege, tax justice links across these 1 2 diverse demands. Drawing together a number of different but related social elements 3 4 5 under one terminological umbrella, tax justice effectively “constitute(s) points of 6 7 condensation for a number of social relations” (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, p. 139). For 8 9 10 each constitutive demand, the universalistic aspect is shared, while the particular part 11 12 remains specific. 13 14 Assuming a “‘universal’ structuring function within [the] discursive field”, the 15 16 17 signifier of tax justice is ‘empty’ in that it is emptied of its particular content in order 18 19 to signify across the chain (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, p.xi). Yet it has sufficient strength 20 21 22 and appeal to dislocate alternative significations that would otherwise link each element 23 24 to the dominant hegemonic formation, or to alternative counter-hegemonies. This is 25 26 27 possible because of the indeterminacy and particular vagueness of this signifier, which 28 29 enables it to function in this way (Torfing, 1999, p.301): tax justice represents a 30 31 32 somewhat generalized call for what Blum called “major reform… (in which) a certain 33 34 class of people (accept) their societal duty, which is to pay tax”. Such vagueness is vital 35 36 for ‘political efficacy’; the function of the empty signifier is precisely “to bring to 37 38 39 equivalential homogeneity a highly heterogeneous reality’ (Laclau, 2005, p. 109, see 40 41 also Dey et al 2016; Cornwall and Brock, 2005). Too much semantic specificity around 42 43 44 tax justice would frustrate its ability to enrol other demands. Thus, the counter- 45 46 hegemony it represents begins to take hold. Suddenly, facts and stories that support tax 47 48 49 justice appeals are both welcomed and listened to, where previously they would have 50 51 been ignored or dismissed. 52 53 Crucially the figure of the whistleblower – Elmer - came to be enrolled in this 54 55 56 chain. As with others, the demand made by Elmer consists both of the particularistic 57 58 (to expose JB’s corruption and treatment of Elmer) and the universal (consisting of 59 60 61 62 63 64 27 65 ‘anti-tax evasion’). By embracing the universalistic - tax justice - the particular 1 2 parrhesiastic claim becomes part of a chain of legitimate demands that are implicitly 3 4 5 connected to others. Thus, Elmer is symbolized in media articles as the embodiment of 6 7 the nation state’s claims for wresting tax income from transgressing corporations in 8 9 10 Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States for example. He is the poster boy 11 12 for civil society struggles; he is the referent point for tax justice lawyers. This gives 13 14 him a voice because it elevates his particular and specific set of issues - JB bank’s 15 16 17 transgressions and his personal mistreatment by this bank - to a level of public 18 19 prominence that was previously beyond reach. Overall, therefore, we see how the 20 21 22 whistleblower emerges as part of a structured, though precarious, totality. This totality 23 24 represents a counter-hegemonic movement, signified by tax justice and formed around 25 26 27 a logic of equivalences that emerge across very different, particular, demands. 28 29 30 31 32 Discussion 33 34 35 36 37 By illustrating the dynamics of discursive change, the theory of hegemony 38 39 enables a deeper understanding of organizational whistleblowing as a parrhesiastic act. 40 41 42 It shows how alternative meanings compete with hegemonic formations, potentially 43 44 moving from a background position to a dominant status. Through this process, a public 45 46 47 audience can be gained for the external whistleblower’s information about 48 49 organizational misconduct, which has until now been impossible to convey. This 50 51 information may in turn represent a vital resource in the struggle against corporate 52 53 54 sovereignty in the context of tax evasion, of which social change is the intended 55 56 outcome. It is important, however, not to overstate the ease by which a counter- 57 58 59 hegemonic situation can emerge, nor its potential for success. While a counter 60 61 62 63 64 28 65 hegemony concerning tax continues to evolve and incorporate various campaign groups 1 2 and political interests, tax justice has by no means gained the status of ‘common sense’ 3 4 5 either in public consciousness or national legislation. As noted earlier, sedimented 6 7 hegemonic social formations and the common sense notions that accompany them can 8 9 10 be extraordinarily resistant to change. Tax remains an ongoing source of contention, 11 12 and attention for tax justice demands is cyclical (Sikka, 2015; 2018; Shaxson, 2018). 13 14 The chains of equivalence described here represent merely the emergence of a renewed 15 16 17 focus on this issue, during a longer-term struggle for change. 18 19 That said, a hegemony lens usefully provides insights into a key issue for studies 20 21 22 of organizational whistleblowing as parrhesia: how the relatively powerless subject, 23 24 who speaks truth to power with few resources or supports, might begin to be heard. 25 26 27 Parrhesia, as an act of speaking which requires courage and risk-taking, receives much 28 29 attention in current literature. Meanwhile the efficacy of this act remains 30 31 32 underexplored. However, as we know from empirical evidence, whistleblowing often 33 34 fails in practice (Devine & Maassarani, 2011). Effective parrhesia relies on the ability 35 36 of the speaker to successfully position him or herself in discourse, including engaging 37 38 39 with the ‘techne’ of one’s profession (Weiskopf & Tobias-Miersch, 2016), the idea of 40 41 courageous whistleblowing (Munro, 2017) or an increasingly vocal anti-war position 42 43 44 (Weiskopf and Willmott, 2011). Building upon this work, our analysis depicts the 45 46 whistleblower as a subject emerging in the process of potential discursive change - 47 48 49 specifically, a counter-hegemonic emergence occurring in a specific time period; the 50 51 first decade of the twenty first century, when tax evasion was being challenged across 52 53 Western nations. Conceiving of the demand as the basic unit of analysis, we see how a 54 55 56 whistleblower claim can begin as a request that is particular to one’s situation and 57 58 workplace observances. Frustrated in this request, an instance of structural 59 60 61 62 63 64 29 65 undecidability emerges, opening the potential for the whistleblower subject to become 1 2 enrolled in a wider collectivity, part of a chain of equivalences with other previously 3 4 5 disconnected demands. A counter-hegemony begins to form, organized around a shared 6 7 ‘universal’ signifier. In this case the chain coalesces around and is organized by tax 8 9 10 justice, a signifier representing the overturning of accepted practices of corporate tax 11 12 evasion. This leads to insights into how whistleblowers can achieve efficacy in 13 14 dissensus through both the gaining of an audience where none was previously available, 15 16 17 and the rendering of one’s claims as intelligible and palatable to this audience. Such a 18 19 framing also highlights the role of the whistleblower in counter-hegemony, and the 20 21 22 complex and multifaceted nature of this role that often leaves the whistleblowing 23 24 subject exposed. Moreover, this lens enables us to move from the micro level of 25 26 27 particularistic, individualized and local demands on the part of the whistleblower 28 29 subject, to understanding how they can draw upon wider, macro level changes that are, 30 31 32 in reality, the manifestation of a collectivity of other local demands. We also see the 33 34 role that the whistleblower can play in shaping these discourses. 35 36 A hegemony lens builds on previous theorizations of the subjectivity of the 37 38 39 whistleblower engaging in parrhesia, by depicting a subject that is both split and 40 41 occupying an ambivalent position, rendering her vulnerable to attack. Under a parrhesia 42 43 44 lens, the subject is constituted and comes into being through the act of speaking out. 45 46 Adding to this, a hegemony lens suggests that subjectivity emerges through the raising 47 48 49 of a demand in and through this act. This is not straightforward however because of the 50 51 inescapable split in each demand. It is this split that enables its contingency, and hence 52 53 its ability, to be enrolled to other demands through chains of equivalence. The particular 54 55 56 aspect of the demand speaks to the whistleblower’s specific situation: in Elmer’s case 57 58 he is pointing out the corruption in JB bank and his own unfair treatment, while the 59 60 61 62 63 64 30 65 universal element relating to tax evasion pulls in another direction - casting him as a 1 2 ‘public critic’ in line with other resistance movements. This helps us to see the 3 4 5 incompleteness and contingency inherent to the whistleblower’s somewhat unique 6 7 subject position. It may be that this split contributes to the situation in which 8 9 10 whistleblowers are famously seen as ambiguous, suspicious traitors to the 11 12 organizational norms. Necessarily pulling away from the specificity of their situation 13 14 of employment, they must abandon the organization to embrace public critique. 15 16 17 This split has further implications for the person occupying this subject position. 18 19 It is clear that for Elmer, the process of dissent was neither benign nor painless. At the 20 21 22 outset of his struggle, his demand is unmet, and he becomes a target of reprisal. His 23 24 claims remain ignored in Switzerland; when he is mentioned, he is painted as ‘mad’ in 25 26 27 order to discredit his statements. As a tax whistleblower he is degraded and his speech 28 29 is perceived to be unintelligible, but mainly he is ignored. Over the years of his struggle, 30 31 32 despite being celebrated in certain corners, this vilification continues. That this was 33 34 legitimated and carried out with impunity suggests a particular and unusual status 35 36 occupied by the whistleblower. First, such figures are famously perceived as a 37 38 39 ambiguous by public opinion, sometimes as heroes but other times as traitors. Second, 40 41 unlike all the other parties across the chain of equivalence described above, Elmer is 42 43 44 alone. He is not a member of a civil society group nor is he part of a government or a 45 46 newspaper team. These twin aspects - his occupying an ambiguous identity and his 47 48 49 solitary status - appear to render him more vulnerable than other subjects of the tax 50 51 justice counter-hegemony. Given his status as a lone figure - albeit one supported by a 52 53 tendential chain - he is open to being scapegoated. Enrolling in a wider chain helps to 54 55 56 protect against this, but Elmer is still exposed to attacks in Switzerland because of the 57 58 particular aspect of his demand. 59 60 61 62 63 64 31 65 The question remains: what might help in such cases? Had Elmer been involved 1 2 in a whistleblowing collectivity from the start, would this have mitigated his 3 4 5 susceptibility to attack? Recent work on ‘networked parrhesia’ depicts the future of 6 7 whistleblowing as potentially involving communal disclosure practices (Munro, 2017). 8 9 10 These practices are enabled by new forms of information and communication 11 12 technologies (ICTs), of which Wikileaks represents an early version, that are ‘designed 13 14 to protect and empower those in weaker positions within institutions to release 15 16 17 information about institutional corruption and the abuse of power’ (Munro, 2017, 18 19 p.536). These ICT structures are effective in protecting whistleblowers from the 20 21 22 retaliation and isolation that can leave the individual whistleblower vulnerable, and in 23 24 many cases cause them to discontinue their struggles (Devine and Maassarani, 2011; 25 26 27 Kenny et al., 2018). Further research into the evolving practices of parrhesia will be 28 29 vital in order to understand whether and how situations in which reprisals against 30 31 32 external whistleblowers are countered by such innovations. Blacklisting is a common 33 34 practice and the devastating potential impact on whistleblowers’ lives, health, finances 35 36 and relationships is well known. This creates a ‘chilling effect’ preventing others who 37 38 39 witness wrongdoing from coming forward (Devine and Maassarani, 2011, p.261; see 40 41 also Alford, 2001). 42 43 44 In addition, future studies will usefully forward the theoretical framework 45 46 presented here, developing methodological approaches to studying the ethico-politics 47 48 49 of whistleblowing as parrhesia and the role of hegemony. Studies would draw on 50 51 interpretations Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of hegemony for use in discourse analysis 52 53 to explore how the transformation of ‘general hegemonic relationships in society’ can 54 55 56 occur through articulatory practices in which relations between signifiers are 57 58 established, or indeed dispersed (e.g. Andersen, 2003, p.59; Torfing, 1999). Potential 59 60 61 62 63 64 32 65 avenues include via a modified approach to grounded theory that remains open to 1 2 combination with new theoretical perspectives, as suggested by Charmaz (2006). 3 4 5 6 7 Conclusion 8 9 10 11 12 Through the proposed framing we see that the ‘power’ to which the 13 14 15 organizational parrhesiastes speaks truth is neither monolithic nor inevitable. 16 17 Displacement of the status quo in order to provide a conducive setting for dissensus can 18 19 20 be possible even in the most apparently entrenched hegemonic social formations. In 21 22 Elmer’s case, an analysis of counter-hegemonic processes points to how the 'common 23 24 25 sense' of global finance manifesting in accepted practices of tax evasion is contingent 26 27 and articulated. This contrasts with the ways in which we are usually presented with 28 29 30 arguments about the difficulties, if not impossibilities, of taxing the rich, and large 31 32 corporations, and challenging the broader neoliberal status quo upon which such 33 34 hegemonies are founded. Viewing this struggle through the lens presented here 35 36 37 showcases the potential of hegemonic movement and micro level articulations. 38 39 In making this point we do not wish to overstate the efficacy of Elmer’s claims. 40 41 42 During the period studied, public opinion in the UK was hardening somewhat against 43 44 tax avoidance and evasion, but the practice was still widespread and the sitting 45 46 47 government largely inactive in terms of meaningful action. Moreover, in 48 49 whistleblowing struggles the balance of power remains weighted in favour of a 50 51 retaliatory organization with more extensive resources and capacity to influence legal 52 53 54 processes and communication outlets (Alford, 2001). In Switzerland Elmer continues 55 56 to struggle for justice. In 2012, he reflected on his story thus far: 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 33 65 If you think about, if you really think about my case, I’m having my eighth 1 2 year of investigation. I have been to prison [for] two hundred and thirty 3 4 5 days. As of today, no one can prove that I violated Swiss bank secrecy 6 7 about Cayman data (Elmer Interview). 8 9 10 11 12 Today his supporters grow in number, but he remains a subject of suspicion in his home 13 14 country. 15 16 17 External whistleblowing is difficult. Those who engage in it are normally 18 19 ignored or silenced. 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1 2 Zizek, S. (2006). “Against the Populist Temptation.” Critical Inquiry 32 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 i 11 For much more on this, see Medhi (2011) and Elmer’s submission to the European 12 13 Court of Human Rights (footnote 3). 14 15 ii 16 The American Polygraph Association (APA) explicitly advises against using the 17 18 tests for such purposes, although it was claimed by JB that such rules apply in the 19 20 21 United States, but not the Cayman Islands (Evidence 29 Consent Form Polygraph 22 23 Test, 21.11.2002). 24 25 iii Evidence 11. In Submission to European Court for Human Rights (ECHR) by 26 27 28 Rudolf Elmer. Translation available: 29 30 https://wikileaks.org/wiki/Rudolf_Elmer_files_against_Swiss_banking_secrecy_at_E 31 32 33 CHR, May 13, 2008. 34 35 Evidence 21. In Submission to European Court for Human Rights (ECHR) by Rudolf 36 37 38 Elmer. Translation available: 39 40 https://wikileaks.org/wiki/Rudolf_Elmer_files_against_Swiss_banking_secrecy_at_E 41 42 43 CHR, May 13, 2008. 44 45 iv Particularly Article 47. He was also charged with document forgery, and for 46 47 sending ‘threatening messages’ to staff at Julius Bär. In response to the charges of 48 49 50 document forgery, Elmer reported that he had altered the names of files to make them 51 52 clearly identifiable. He also wrote false letters to tax authorities, including letters in 53 54 55 which he pretended to be a repentant evader and confessing their misdemeanor. He 56 57 was insistent that he had not altered the actual contents of any documents. Contacting 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 45 65

1 JB for a response, the Guardian asked the bank to identify a single document that they 2 3 4 claim had been forged. They declined to do so. 5 6 http://www.theguardian.com/business/2009/feb/13/tax-gap-cayman-islands 7 8 v His complaint was about Article 47 of Swiss law, which had left him unprotected. 9 10 11 He appealed to the ECHR that the level of threats against his family had risen and that 12 13 they were increasingly afraid. 14 15 vi 16 See the case of Henry Kieber. 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 46 65