How to Whistle-Blow: Dissensus and Demand
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Provided by the author(s) and NUI Galway in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite the published version when available. Title How to whistle-blow: Dissensus and demand Author(s) Kenny, Kate; Bushnell, Alexis Publication Date 2020-01-22 Publication Kenny, Kate, & Bushnell, Alexis. (2020). How to Whistle- Information Blow: Dissensus and Demand. Journal of Business Ethics, 164(4), 643-656. doi: 10.1007/s10551-019-04401-7 Publisher Springer Link to publisher's https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-019-04401-7 version Item record http://hdl.handle.net/10379/16148 DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10551-019-04401-7 Downloaded 2021-09-29T05:40:28Z Some rights reserved. For more information, please see the item record link above. Title Page (containing all authors contact details) HOW TO WHISTLE-BLOW: DISSENSUS AND DEMAND Kate Kenny NUI Galway University Road, Galway, Ireland Tel: +353 (0)91 493472 Email: [email protected] Alexis Bushnell Queen’s University Management School, Queen’s University Belfast, 185 Stranmillis Road, Belfast BT95EE Tel: +44 (0)28 9097 5619 Email: [email protected] Funding: This study was funded by NUI Galway’s Millennium Grant Compliance with Ethical Standards: Conflict of Interest: Author Kenny declares that he/she has no conflict of interest. Author Bushnell declares that he/she has no conflict of interest. Blinded Manuscript (excluding authors' names and affiliations) Click here to view linked References How to whistle-blow: Dissensus and demand 1 2 3 4 5 Abstract 6 7 8 9 What makes an external whistleblower effective? Whistleblowers represent an 10 11 important conduit for dissensus, providing valuable information about ethical breaches 12 13 14 and organizational wrongdoing. They often speak out about injustice from a relatively 15 16 weak position of power, with the aim of changing the status quo. But many external 17 18 19 whistleblowers fail in this attempt to make their claims heard and thus secure change. 20 21 Some can experience severe retaliation and public blacklisting, while others are 22 23 ignored. This article examines how whistleblowers can succeed in bringing their claims 24 25 26 to the public’s attention. We draw on analyses of political struggle by Ernesto Laclau 27 28 and Chantal Mouffe. Specifically, we propose that through the raising of a demand, the 29 30 31 whistleblowing subject can emerge as part of a chain of equivalences, in a counter- 32 33 hegemonic movement that challenges the status quo. An analysis of a high-profile case 34 35 36 of tax justice whistleblowing- that of Rudolf Elmer- illustrates our argument. Our 37 38 proposed theoretical framing builds upon and contributes to literature on 39 40 whistleblowing as organizational parrhesia by demonstrating how parrhesiastic demand 41 42 43 might lead to change in public perception through the formation of alliances with other 44 45 disparate interests - albeit that the process is precarious and complex. Practically, our 46 47 48 article illuminates a persistent concern for those engaged in dissensus via 49 50 whistleblowing, and whose actions are frequently ignored or silenced. We demonstrate 51 52 53 how such actions can move towards securing public support in order to make a 54 55 difference and achieve change. 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 1 65 Keywords: Demand, dissensus, hegemony, Laclau and Mouffe, parrhesia, 1 2 whistleblowing. 3 4 5 6 7 8 Introduction 9 10 11 12 Today whistleblowers represent an important source of information about 13 14 wrongdoing in organizations. External whistleblowers highlight misconduct in 15 16 17 government (Harding, 2014), public health services (Ash, 2015; Bourne et al, 2015) 18 19 and commercial institutions (Dyck et al, 2010; Mansbach, 2011; O’Brien, 2003). But 20 21 whistleblowers are frequently ignored. In this paper we investigate why this is so and 22 23 24 how it might be changed. 25 26 In the private sector, information disclosed by whistleblowers is increasingly 27 28 29 important for the maintenance of public safety and corporate accountability (AFCE, 30 31 2018). This is partly due to a decline in regulatory oversight as Western nation states 32 33 34 become increasingly facilitative of the wishes of corporations, upon whom they depend 35 36 for the generation of national wealth and provision of jobs for citizens (Rhodes, 2016). 37 38 This dependency has meant that the requirements of the corporation, which include 39 40 41 increased profits for shareholders and protection of its long-term interests, are 42 43 prioritized over effective oversight and regulation. We see this with tax avoidance 44 45 46 practices, for example, when multinational corporations relocate their corporate 47 48 headquarters to international tax havens in order to avoid paying their share of corporate 49 50 51 taxes. We also see it where large banks encourage private citizens to place assets 52 53 offshore for the avoidance of personal tax. Implicit acceptance of tax avoidance has 54 55 56 become hegemonic in this era of ‘corporate sovereignty’, at the expense of social 57 58 equality (Rhodes, 2016, p.1501). Meanwhile, states cannot be relied upon to question 59 60 61 62 63 64 2 65 excesses in this area. Instead both oversight and challenge increasingly come from 1 2 outside, for example with the civil society organizations that revealed the recent 3 4 5 Volkswagen emissions scandal (Rhodes, 2016). Today the work of challenge and 6 7 critique is increasingly carried out, not by the state, but by activist organizations, 8 9 10 investigative journalists, academics and other agitators who independently gather 11 12 information and place it in the public domain, forcing ethical behaviour on the part of 13 14 corporations (Cox, 2013; Mirowski, 2013; Whelan, Moon & Grant, 2013; Springer, 15 16 17 2011; Fleming & Spicer, 2007; Lipschutz & Fogel, 2002). 18 19 External whistleblowers play a key role here. Employees who speak publicly 20 21 22 about wrongdoing occurring within the confines of their organizations are now more 23 24 than ever a vital source of information. For example, PWC employee Antoine Deltour, 25 26 27 along with other Luxleaks whistleblowers, spoke openly about some of the world’s 28 29 largest companies, including Amazon, Apple, IKEA and Pepsi, channelling billions of 30 31 32 dollars via Luxembourg because of its favourable tax practices, thus avoiding paying 33 34 taxes in other EU countries. These revelations along with other scandals, including the 35 36 Panama Papers, underscored the role of external whistleblowing in ensuring public 37 38 39 accountability of corporations. Such revelations have also led to the recent creation of 40 41 an EU-wide Directive that aims to legally protect whistleblowers who go outside of 42 43 44 their organization to report. Thus, external whistleblowers play a key role in generating 45 46 dissent against encroaching corporate sovereignty in democratic societies; they are 47 48 49 widely considered one of the best instruments to battle against corruption (OECD, 50 51 2011). The question remains: what prevents whistleblowers from making their claims 52 53 heard and effectively contributing to dissensus? 54 55 56 Organizational whistleblowing has lately been described as a process of 57 58 ‘parrhesia’, or speaking truth to power (Andrade, 2015; Barratt, 2008; Contu, 2014; 59 60 61 62 63 64 3 65 Jack, 2004; Kaulingfreks and Kaulingfreks, 2013; Mansbach, 2009; Rothschild, 2013; 1 2 Vandekerckhove & Langenberg, 2012; Vandekerckhove, 2006; Weiskopf & Tobias- 3 4 5 Miersch, 2016). Inspired by Michel Foucault’s study of the concept in Ancient Greek 6 7 texts, parrhesia involves speaking the frank truth as one sees it (Foucault, 2001; 2005, 8 9 10 see also Jones, Parker & ten Bos, 2005; Mansbach, 2009; Munro, 2017; Rothschild, 11 12 2013). This act of frank speech often emerges from the speaker’s witnessing abuses of 13 14 power by prominent actors and institutions, and critiquing these from a relatively 15 16 17 powerless position (Foucault, 2005, 2010, 2011; see Munro 2017 for a discussion). 18 19 Parrhesia can thus involve a risk to the well-being and perhaps the life of the speaker 20 21 22 (Foucault, 2010). Through engaging in the act, the speaker claims the right to articulate 23 24 their truth, emerging as a parrhesiastic subject in the process (Foucault, 2010 in 25 26 27 Weiskopf & Tobias-Miersch, 2016, p. 1625). Organizational parrhesia is thus an 28 29 ‘ethico-political practice’ that generates a new relation to the self and to the world 30 31 32 (Weiskopf & Tobias-Miersch, 2016, p. 1624, see also Jack, 2004, p. 130; Mansbach, 33 34 2009). It is both an acknowledgement of a duty to speak out about injustice and an 35 36 exercise of one’s freedom to do this. Parrhesia is seen as a useful way to depict certain 37 38 39 kinds of whistleblowing as it can encompass, at once, several key aspects of the 40 41 whistleblowing experience: the self-transformation undergone by individuals (Alford, 42 43 44 2001; Kenny et al., 2019), and importantly, the politically-oriented intent to disrupt a 45 46 problematic status quo by speaking from a position of relative powerlessness (Contu, 47 48 49 2014; Mansbach, 2009; Rothschild and Miethe, 1999; Weiskopf & Tobias-Miersch, 50 51 2016, p. 1625). Whistleblowing as parrhesia denotes ‘an act of integrity’ (Rothschild, 52 53 2013, p. 895). It thus represents a helpful counterpoint to more ambiguous and 54 55 56 sometimes pejorative depictions of whistleblowers as transgressors who are disloyal to 57 58 their organization (Andrade, 2015; Jones, Parker & ten Bos, 2005; Mansbach, 2009). 59 60 61 62 63 64 4 65 An important driver of parrhesia is the desire to effect change, and here the 1 2 literature to date is less well-developed.