DOCSLIB.ORG

In Iran, a Father and Son Vie for Nation's Future

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
In Iran, a Father and Son Vie for Nation's Future September 11, 2015 15 News & Analysis Iran In Iran, a father and son vie for nation’s future Ali Alfoneh approve parliamentary legislation before it becomes law. He also has a seat in the Assembly of Experts, Washington so he will be among the clerics who will appoint a successor to Su- hmad Jannati and his preme Leader Ali Khamenei when son Ali Jannati are sym- he steps down or dies. bols of the growing gen- The elder Jannati made great sac- erational gap within the rifices as he climbed the ladder of political elite of Iran. power. Before the revolution, he AJannati the elder perceives him- was imprisoned three times during self to be the custodian of the revo- the reign of the shah and endured lutionary legacy of the late Grand three years of internal exile in Asa- Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. dabad, close to the north-western Jannati the younger has dedicated mountain city of Hamadan. himself to reforming the Islamic After the 1979 Islamic Revolu- Republic in an attempt to adapt the tion, he sacrificed his own son Mo- regime to a society very different hammad-Hassan, who was a mem- than the one seized by Khomeini ber of the Mujahideen-e Khalq in 1979. opposition group and was killed in Both men can’t win. One is a gun battle with the Islamic Revo- bound to prevail over the other and lutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) in the winner will play a major role in 1982. defining the values of the Islamic Ali Jannati, 66, also started his Republic as it emerges into what career as a radical and was a com- Older Jannati. June 2014 photo shows Guardian Council’s Chief Ahmad Jannati (L) attending an could be a new era. rade-in-arms of Mohammad Mon- event with Iranian leaders on the 25th anniversary of the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in Tehran. Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, 89, a tazeri, the militant son of Grand native of the village of Ladan near Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri. Isfahan, south of Tehran and capi- With the SAVAK, the shah’s infa- suburbs. In Syria, and later in Ku- ing organisation as an alternative to The critics of the minister in- tal of the Safavid dynasty in the mous secret police, hunting him, wait, the men established the core the futile effort of jamming foreign clude his own father. 16th century, patiently climbed the Ali fled in 1975, first to Pakistan of what is known as al-Quds Force, media broadcasts to Iran. “The enemy is engaged in soft ladder of power in the regime and and then, with help from the Fatah the extra-territorial operations On top of this, Ali Jannati has warfare against the regime of the has a seat at the apex of power. Movement, to Syria. branch of the IRGC that is active in also had publicised meetings Islamic Republic… People who fun- He serves as secretary of the There he was reunited with Mo- the Syrian and Iraqi wars. with former President Moham- damentally do not believe in the Council of Guardians, which vets hammad Montazeri in Palestinian But after the 1979 revolution, Ali mad Khatami, which the hard-line path of the Imam and the martyrs candidates for elections and must training camps in the Damascus gradually distanced himself from media, such as the Kayhan daily, and want to allow Western culture paramilitary activities and by the condemns as acts of “reconcilia- to enter this country are trying to early 1980s, he had become a pro- tion with the leaders of sedition”, a be in control of the affairs,” Ayatol- tégé of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, reference to the Green Movement’s lah Jannati said a few months after then parliamentary speaker and protests against the fraudulent Rohani was elected president. later president. June 12, 2009, presidential election. “They’re trying to get hold of Today, Ali Jannati, the minister money and power by cooperating of culture and Islamic propagation, Ahmad Jannati and with the foreigners.” The person remains in the camp of Rafsanjani in charge of cultural affairs in the and President Hassan Rohani, seen his son Ali Jannati Islamic Republic, of course, is his in the West as pragmatists seeking are symbols of the son Ali. to open Iran to the outside world. growing For now, Ali Jannati has managed In this capacity, Ali Jannati has generational gap to stay on course and ignores the launched a debate about allowing critics but the regime in Tehran is women to sing in public and even within the political at a crossroads and must soon de- for the legal production and dis- elite of Iran. cide between the father or the son, tribution of Persian language rap the legacy of the Khomeinist revo- music. After a few attempts to ease The younger Jannati’s attempts lution or reform and liberalisation. restrictions on publishers and au- to liberalise the cultural policies of The Islamic Republic can’t have it thors, Jannati also called for easing the Islamic Republic, along with his both ways. internet filtering in Iran. widely publicised meetings with Separately, Ali Jannati consist- Khatami, have provoked strong Ali Alfoneh is a specialist on Iran ently emphasises the importance criticism from the conservative- and the Islamic Revolutionary Younger Jannati. Iranian President Hassan Rohani looking at a of improving the quality of the pro- dominated parliament, which, on Guards Corps. He is a senior fellow book alongside Culture Minister Ali Jannati (R) during the ope- grammes produced by the state-run several occasions, tried to remove at the Foundation for Defense of ning of the 28th Tehran International Book Fair, last May. Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcast- him from the cabinet. Democracies in Washington. Pushing back against Iran after the nuclear deal Daniel Serwer these efforts, which are under the Houthis. He also proposes desig- likely counter that most of them it would deprive the Iran-backed control of the supreme leader and nating as terrorists more leaders of already are being implemented. Assad regime of any pretence of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Iranian-backed Shia militias in Iraq Certainly there have been efforts sovereignty in a border area of the Washington Corps (IRGC), as protecting its that are committing atrocities, as to interdict weapons going to the country and would begin to offer an homeland from Sunni extremists well as expanding the training and Houthis and Assad, and missile opposition alternative. This would he biggest downside of and possible Israeli attack. The ad- arming of Iraqi security forces and shipments to Hezbollah have been amount to a significant push back the Iran nuclear deal is ministration’s logic seems to be that Kurdish peshmerga forces in the repeatedly attacked by the Israelis. against Iran’s continued support for what the Iranians will pushing back harder might have north and vetted Sunni forces in Training of the Kurds and Sunnis Assad. receive once economic weakened Iranian President Hassan western Iraq. in Iraq began some time ago, as has But for such a safe haven to be vi- sanctions are lifted: be- Rohani’s standing within the Islam- Finally, Satloff suggests that the training and equipping non-ex- able, five basic requirements must Ttween $50 billion and $100 billion ic Republic and made conclusion of United States work with Turkey to tremist opposition fighters in Syria be met: in unfrozen assets. The deal ne- a deal on the nuclear programme, create a true safe haven in northern — although the numbers trained Security gotiated between Iran and P5+1 is which is also ultimately under su- Syria where refugees can obtain hu- have been ridiculously low. More Governance worth supporting because it delays preme leader/IRGC control, impos- manitarian aid and vetted, non-ex- and better can and should be done. Rule of law any Iranian attempt to get nuclear sible. So what about now? There is tremist opposition fighters can be The only really new idea Satloff Economic activity weapons by at least 10-15 years (and still an argument to be made that trained and equipped to fight both offers — new in the sense that the Social services, including hu- possibly forever). However, it can- pushing back against Iran’s regional the Islamic State (ISIS) and the Iran- administration has not yet signed manitarian aid not be denied that some portion of troublemaking could stiffen Iranian backed Assad regime. on to it — is that of creating a safe Without these prerequisites, Syr- the unfrozen assets and increased hardliners and make implementa- All of these ideas have merit but haven in northern Syria. ians will not move to a safe haven revenue from future oil and gas tion of the deal more difficult. But the Obama administration would If this were to be implemented, and the effort will fail, like many sales will be used for activities that that argument is inconsistent with others before it. The conditions cre- destabilise the Middle East and po- the administration’s claim that the ated don’t have to be perfect but tentially areas beyond. historic deal concerns only the nu- they need to be better than what clear file and nothing else. people can find in Syria outside the We should not have The West is paying for this deal safe haven. to pay for it by by lifting sanctions but we should That might appear a low bar but tolerating Iranian not have to pay for it by tolerating really it isn’t: there are regime- Iranian subversion using money controlled areas in Syria that have subversion using derived from lifting sanctions.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Iran's New Assembly Chair Shows Who Really Won the Elections by Mehdi Khalaji
    MENU Policy Analysis / Policy Alert Iran's New Assembly Chair Shows Who Really Won the Elections by Mehdi Khalaji May 24, 2016 Also available in Arabic ABOUT THE AUTHORS Mehdi Khalaji Mehdi Khalaji, a Qom-trained Shiite theologian, is the Libitzky Family Fellow at The Washington Institute. Brief Analysis Despite weeks of reformist spin about the spring election results, the decision to name a notorious hardliner as head of the Experts Assembly shows that Khamenei is intent on making life even more difficult for President Rouhani's camp. hen members of Iran's fifth Assembly of Experts gathered on May 24 to choose a new chairman, they W confirmed what many already knew: that the recent election did not change the body's hardline fabric or the Supreme Leader's ability to exert his will over supposedly democratic processes. Since February, reformists and other supporters of President Hassan Rouhani have been claiming victory in both the assembly and parliamentary elections. The regime had taken pains to disqualify their favorite candidates before the race, so they produced an unorthodox list of "reformist" contenders that included many hardliners and conservatives. Yet today's inaugural assembly meeting indicates that this strategy will fail to influence decisionmaking in a body that could eventually be tasked with naming the next Supreme Leader. Veteran hardliner Ahmad Jannati won fifty-one of eighty-six votes at the meeting to become chair for the next two years. Rouhani's camp had hoped that former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, one of their most popular allies, would compete for the position, but he declared a few days ago that he would not be running.
    [Show full text]
  • Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads: an Exploration of Iranian Leadership
    THE ARTS This PDF document was made available CHILD POLICY from www.rand.org as a public service of CIVIL JUSTICE the RAND Corporation. EDUCATION ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT Jump down to document6 HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit NATIONAL SECURITY research organization providing POPULATION AND AGING PUBLIC SAFETY objective analysis and effective SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY solutions that address the challenges SUBSTANCE ABUSE facing the public and private sectors TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY around the world. TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE Support RAND WORKFORCE AND WORKPLACE Purchase this document Browse Books & Publications Make a charitable contribution For More Information Visit RAND at www.rand.org Explore the RAND National Defense Research Institute View document details Limited Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non-commercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND PDFs to a non-RAND Web site is prohibited. RAND PDFs are protected under copyright law. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see RAND Permissions. This product is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series. RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND mono- graphs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity. Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads An Exploration of Iranian Leadership Dynamics David E.
    [Show full text]
  • Implications of Iranian Elections
    CRS INSIGHT Implications of Iranian Elections March 4, 2016 (IN10457) | Related Author Kenneth Katzman | Kenneth Katzman, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs ([email protected], 7-7612) Summary An apparent strong showing by supporters of President Hassan Rouhani might reflect broad support for the nuclear agreement between Iran and major international powers ("Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action," JCPOA) that is providing significant sanctions relief. Iran's core national security goals are unlikely to change, and with runoffs still to come, any possible easing of social and political restrictions is difficult to predict. The results could affect the choice of the next Supreme Leader. Election Processes On February 26, 2016, Iran held elections for the 290-seat Majles (parliament) and for the 88-seat body called the "Assembly of Experts," which is empowered to choose a successor to the Supreme Leader and rewrite Iran's constitution. The Majles plays a significant role on budgetary and economic decisions, but less of a role on issues of national security. The Majles seats are allocated to 207 geographic constituencies, meaning that some constituencies send more than one person to the body. Tehran, for example, sends 30 members to the Majles. The Assembly of Experts seats are divided among Iran's 31 provinces. The largest constituency in both elections is Tehran, which sends 30 persons to the Majles and 16 to the Assembly of Experts. Five Majles seats are reserved for members of the "recognized" religious minorities (Zoroastrians, Jews, and several Christian denominations). Political parties are generally banned, and factions compete as loose alliances of candidates based on ideology.
    [Show full text]
  • Beyond Borders the Expansionist Ideology of Iran's Islamic
    Beyond Borders The Expansionist Ideology of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps KASRA AARABI FEBRUARY 2020 Contents Executive Summary 5 The Approach: Understanding the IRGC Training Materials 7 Key Findings 7 Policy Recommendations 8 Introduction 11 A Common Ideology 14 Our Approach 15 Background – The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 17 Indoctrination: An Increasing Focal Point for the IRGC 19 Inside the IRGC’s Ideological Training Programme 25 Objectives: The Grand Vision 27 Group Identity: Defining the ‘Ingroup' 31 Conduct: Actions Permissible and Necessary 36 The Enemy: Defining the ‘Outgroup’ 44 Conclusion 53 Endnotes 55 Appendix 67 3 4 Executive Summary Unlike the Iranian army that protects Iran’s borders, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is mandated by Iran’s constitution to pursue “an ideological mission of jihad in God’s way; that is extending sovereignty of God’s law throughout the world.”1 Since the inception of this paramilitary force in 1979, the Guard has emerged as the principal organisation driving the Iranian regime’s revolutionary Shia Islamist ideology, within and beyond the regime’s borders. Over these 40 years, it has been linked to terrorist attacks, hostage-takings, maritime piracy, political assassinations, human rights violations and the crushing of domestic dissent across Iran, most recently with bloodshed on the Iranian streets in November 2019, leaving 1,500 people dead in less than two weeks.2 Today, the IRGC remains Lebanese Hizbullah’s prime benefactor, with the Guard known to be providing arms, training and funding to sustain the group’s hostile presence against Israel and its grip on Lebanese society, and key operational assistance that has resulted in attacks on civilians stretching from Argentina, Bulgaria to Thailand.
    [Show full text]
  • POWER VERSUS CHOICE Human Rights and Parliamentary Elections in the Islamic Republic of Iran
    Iran Page 1 of 10 March 1996 Vol. 8, No. 1 (E) IRAN POWER VERSUS CHOICE Human Rights and Parliamentary Elections in the Islamic Republic of Iran SUMMARY Iranians will vote on March 8, 1996, to elect 270 members of the parliament, or Majles, in an election process that severely limits citizen participation. Parliamentary elections could represent a real contest for power in Iran's political system-but only if arbitrary bans on candidates and other constraints on political life are lifted. As the campaign period opened on March 1, the government-appointed Council of Guardians had excluded some 44 percent of the more than 5,000 candidates on the basis of discriminatory and arbitrary criteria, significantly impairing access to the political process and citizens' freedom of choice. The council vetoed candidates by calling into question such matters as their commitment to the political system, their loyalty, and their "practical adherence to Islam," or their support for the principle of rule by the pre-eminent religious jurist (velayat-e faqih). At the invitation of the Iranian government, Human Rights Watch was able to travel to Iran in early 1996 to investigate and discuss the human rights dimension of Iran's political process, and in particular the guarantees and restraints placed upon international standards of freedom of expression, association and assembly during the pre-election period. During this unprecedented three-week mission Human Rights Watch/Middle East interviewed dozens of political activists, lawyers, parliamentarians, writers, journalists, senior European diplomats and government officials in Tehran and Isfahan. Although denied permission to visit the city of Qom, where leading clerical critics of the government are imprisoned, Human Rights Watch was otherwise allowed broad access, including a private meeting with one of the longest-term political prisoners still in detention, former Deputy Prime Minister Abbas Amir Entezam.
    [Show full text]
  • Iran: a Revolutionary Republic in Transition
    Iran: a revolutionary republic in transition in republic a revolutionary Iran: This Chaillot Paper examines recent domestic developments in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The volume presents an in-depth assessment of the far- reaching changes that the Iranian state and Iranian society have undergone since the 1979 revolution, with a particular focus on the social and political turmoil of the past five years. IRAN: It is clear that in many ways the Islamic Republic is in the throes of a transition A REVOLUTIONARY REPUBLIC where many of its fundamental tenets are being called into question. Profound and ongoing internal transformations in Iranian society already affect the country’s foreign policy posture, as some of its domestic and external issues IN TRANSITION converge and will most likely continue to do so. Pertinent examples are the nuclear issue and the socio-political upheaval in neighbouring Arab countries. Edited by Rouzbeh Parsi Edited by Rouzbeh Parsi, the volume features contributions from five authors who are all specialists in various aspects of Iranian politics and society. Each Edited by Rouzbeh Parsi by RouzbehEdited Parsi Chaillot Papers | February 2012 author explores some of the most crucial variables of the Iranian body politic. Their focus on distinct dimensions of Iranian society and culture casts light on the changes afoot in contemporary Iran and how the political elite controlling the state respond to these challenges. ISBN 978-92-9198-198-4 published by phone: + 33 (0) 1 56 89 19 30 ISSN 1017-7566 the European Union fax: + 33 (0) 1 56 89 19 31 QN-AA-12-128-EN-C Institute for Security Studies e-mail: [email protected] doi:10.2815/27423 100, avenue de Suffren www.iss.europa.eu PAPER CHAILLOT 75015 Paris - France 128 128 CHAILLOT PAPERS BOOKS In January 2002 the Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) became an 127 120 2010 QUELLE DÉFENSE EUROPÉENNE autonomous Paris-based agency of the European Union.
    [Show full text]
  • Understanding Iran's Assembly of Experts Vote | the Washington Institute
    MENU Policy Analysis / PolicyWatch 2558 Understanding Iran's Assembly of Experts Vote by Patrick Schmidt Feb 16, 2016 Also available in Arabic ABOUT THE AUTHORS Patrick Schmidt Patrick Schmidt is a U.S. naval officer stationed in Washington; he previously served in Bahrain and onboard the USS Ronald Reagan. Brief Analysis The victors, winnowed from an especially large field, will serve until 2024 and therefore may play a role in choosing a new Supreme Leader. n February 11, campaigning began for the February 26 elections for Iran's Assembly of Experts, held on the O same day as the vote for parliament (Majlis). The assembly is charged with selecting the Supreme Leader in case the current leader dies or becomes incapacitated, although it is not clear how large a role the assembly would in practice play (see "Choosing Iran's Next Supreme Leader," PolicyWatch 2553). Given Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's advancing age and uncertain health -- he turns seventy-seven this year -- many in Iran assume a new leader or leadership council will be selected during the assembly's next term. Indeed, the current race has attracted a record number of candidates and disqualifications by the Guardian Council. On February 10, the Ministry of Information released the final list of 161 candidates as approved by the Guardian Council. COLLEGE OF CLERICS T he Assembly of Experts consists of eighty-eight Islamic jurists elected to eight-year terms. Tehran is the largest of the Experts Assembly electoral districts -- which are based on province and demographics -- with sixteen seats; the provinces of Razavi Khorasan and Khuzestan are the two next largest districts, with six seats each.
    [Show full text]
  • THE NEAREST and DEAREST ENEMY: IRAN AFTER the IRAQ WAR by Abbas William Samii*1
    THE NEAREST AND DEAREST ENEMY: IRAN AFTER THE IRAQ WAR By Abbas William Samii*1 Tehran's stand towards events in Iraq developed chronologically and against a backdrop of continuing hostility to the United States. From 2001 until the beginning of Operation Iraq Freedom in March 2003, Iran called for resolution of the issue through international organizations, while simultaneously interacting with Washington, Baghdad, and the Iraqi opposition. The next stage was marked by allegations of Iranian support for Iraqi insurgents. These allegations continued in the third stage, from July 2003 to the present, as did a warming of Tehran-Baghdad relations. With the end of the war in Iraq, Iran found itself surrounded on all sides by what it perceives as its greatest enemy -- the United States. It was also faced with the possibility of Kurdish autonomy and being surpassed by Iraq as the center of Shi'a Islam. This article was originally written for a project and conference on "After the Iraq War: Strategic and Political Changes in Europe and the Middle East," co-sponsored by the GLORIA Center and The Military Centre for Strategic Studies (CeMiSS) of Italy. One would expect Tehran to welcome the Nevertheless, the conclusion of Operation ouster of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. He Iraqi Freedom has placed Iran in an was a man responsible for an eight-year war uncomfortable political and strategic position (1980-1988) against Iran that cost hundreds in which it is surrounded on all sides by what of thousands of lives, who forced thousands it perceives as a greater enemy than Saddam of Iraqis to become refugees in Iran, used Hussein-- the United States.
    [Show full text]
  • The Iranian Revolution at 30
    Viewpoints Special Edition The Iranian Revolution at 30 The Middle East Institute Washington, DC Middle East Institute The mission of the Middle East Institute is to promote knowledge of the Middle East in Amer- ica and strengthen understanding of the United States by the people and governments of the region. For more than 60 years, MEI has dealt with the momentous events in the Middle East — from the birth of the state of Israel to the invasion of Iraq. Today, MEI is a foremost authority on contemporary Middle East issues. It pro- vides a vital forum for honest and open debate that attracts politicians, scholars, government officials, and policy experts from the US, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. MEI enjoys wide access to political and business leaders in countries throughout the region. Along with information exchanges, facilities for research, objective analysis, and thoughtful commentary, MEI’s programs and publications help counter simplistic notions about the Middle East and America. We are at the forefront of private sector public diplomacy. Viewpoints are another MEI service to audiences interested in learning more about the complexities of issues affecting the Middle East and US rela- tions with the region. To learn more about the Middle East Institute, visit our website at http://www.mideasti.org Cover photos, clockwise from the top left hand corner: Shahram Sharif photo; sajed.ir photo; sajed.ir photo; ? redo photo; sajed. ir photo; Maryam Ashoori photo; Zongo69 photo; UN photo; and [ john ] photo. 2 The Middle East Institute Viewpoints: The Iranian Revolution at 30 • www.mideasti.org Viewpoints Special Edition The Iranian Revolution at 30 The Middle East Institute Viewpoints: The Iranian Revolution at 30 • www.mideasti.org 3 Viewpoints: 1979 The year 1979 was among the most tumultuous, and important, in the history of the modern Middle East.
    [Show full text]
  • The National Iranian Oil Company in Iranian Politics
    THE JAMES A. BAKER III INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RICE UNIVERSITY THE NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY IN IRANIAN POLITICS BY DANIEL BRUMBERG GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY ARIEL I. AHRAM GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY PREPARED IN CONJUNCTION WITH AN ENERGY STUDY SPONSORED BY THE JAMES A. BAKER III INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY AND JAPAN PETROLEUM ENERGY CENTER RICE UNIVERSITY – MARCH 2007 THIS PAPER WAS WRITTEN BY A RESEARCHER (OR RESEARCHERS) WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE JOINT BAKER INSTITUTE/JAPAN PETROLEUM ENERGY CENTER POLICY REPORT, THE CHANGING ROLE OF NATIONAL OIL COMPANIES IN INTERNATIONAL ENERGY MARKETS. WHEREVER FEASIBLE, THIS PAPER HAS BEEN REVIEWED BY OUTSIDE EXPERTS BEFORE RELEASE. HOWEVER, THE RESEARCH AND THE VIEWS EXPRESSED WITHIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL RESEARCHER(S) AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF THE JAMES A. BAKER III INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY NOR THOSE OF THE JAPAN PETROLEUM ENERGY CENTER. © 2007 BY THE JAMES A. BAKER III INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY OF RICE UNIVERSITY THIS MATERIAL MAY BE QUOTED OR REPRODUCED WITHOUT PRIOR PERMISSION, PROVIDED APPROPRIATE CREDIT IS GIVEN TO THE AUTHOR AND THE JAMES A. BAKER III INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY ABOUT THE POLICY REPORT THE CHANGING ROLE OF NATIONAL OIL COMPANIES IN INTERNATIONAL ENERGY MARKETS Of world proven oil reserves of 1,148 billion barrels, approximately 77% of these resources are under the control of national oil companies (NOCs) with no equity participation by foreign, international oil companies. The Western international oil companies now control less than 10% of the world’s oil and gas resource base. In terms of current world oil production, NOCs also dominate.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 a Comparison: the Islamic Revolution of 1979 And
    A COMPARISON: THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION OF 1979 AND IRAN’S GREEN MOVEMENT OF 2009 By [Name Withheld] Political Science, University of Pittsburgh, 2011 Submitted to the University Honors College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Philosophy University of Pittsburgh 2011 1 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH School of Arts and Sciences This thesis was presented by [Name Withheld] It was defended on April 8th, 2011 and approved by Professor Ronald Linden, PhD., Department of Political Science Professor Ahmad Khalili, PhD., Department of Professional Studies, Slippery Rock University Professor Daniela Donno, PhD., Department of Political Science Thesis Advisor: Professor Jonathon Harris, PhD., Department of Political Science 2 Copyright © by [Name Withheld] 2011 3 A COMPARISON: THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION OF 1979 AND IRAN’S GREEN MOVEMENT OF 2009 [Name Withheld] University of Pittsburgh, 2011 In the summer of 2009 thousands of voices combined as Iranians, young and old, cried out in reaction to the presidential election from their rooftops—“Marg Bar Dictator” (death to the dictator) and “Allahu Akbar” (God is great). In the weeks following President Ahmadinejad’s “victory”, voices from the rooftops of Tehran and other major Iranian cities reverberated with revolutionary phrases that had not been heard in almost thirty years. This widespread civil disobedience, along with the daily demonstrations taking place on the street, signaled the Iranian people’s challenge of the Islamic government. But after months of mass protests, why was there no political change after the 2009 Iranian presidential election? Why did the demonstrations that had up to 3 million protestors stop while in 1979 similar dissent developed into a revolutionary movement? These questions will be addressed by comparing four significant variables common to both the 1979 Revolution and the 2009 Green Movement; international pressure, internal pressure, strength of opposition, and governmental tactics used against the opposition.
    [Show full text]
  • Will the Sanctions Revive the Role of “Shadow Institutions” in Iran?
    Artical Name : Curbing Moderates Artical Subject : Will the Sanctions Revive the Role of ³Shadow Institutions´in Iran? Publish Date: 21/10/2018 Auther Name: Future for Advanced Research and Studies Subject : 10/2/2021 10:47:00 AM 1 / 2 As the second batch of US sanctions, which are set to focus on oil exports, approaches, the government of President Hassan Rouhani are taking proactive measures to ease the sanctions that coincide with the spiraling internal protests due to the failure of handling various crises affecting living conditions.However, many obstacles continue to undercut the ability of government to pass its plans to cope with the sanctions, most notably the regime¶s attempts to revive the roles of certain institutions that have oversight powers over government programs, such as the Expediency Council, and to continue questioning the ministers, such as the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance on some security and cultural issues.Incomplete ApprovalRouhani¶s government has narrowly obtained the approval of the Islamic Consultative Assembly to accede to the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. To do that, it relied on the support of most of the moderates and some of the leading fundamentalist conservatives, as the only mechanism through which it can facilitate banking dealings with other international powers, especially European countries, which continue to insist on neutralizing the effects of US sanctions on bilateral relations between them and Iran. The difference
    [Show full text]