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38Th Infantry Regiment - Command Report - May - September 1953

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38Th Infantry Regiment - Command Report - May - September 1953 Korean War 38th Infantry Regiment - Command Report - May - September 1953 2nd Infantry Division Korean War Project Record: USA-159 Folder: 060011 Box: 06 File: 11 National Archives and Records Administration College Park, Maryland Records: United States Army Unit Name: Second Infantry Division Record Group: RG407 Editor: Hal Barker Korean War Project P.O. Box 180190 Dallas, TX 75218-0190 http://www.koreanwar.org Korean War Project 2ID-00401194 ~/~\\""'~~-_--'.-!""'. -•-•t..., . ..., .. ..., ... _,r·~·~i -~ \ DEQLASSIFIED I J \ ~·~·· ·. :L'Y·- SECRET ..__... ' ~~~URITJ INFQRMA TION~ ~--~.! .,._/ : HEADQUARTERS 38th Intantry Reg:lment APO 248 15 J~e 1953 SUBJl!XlT: CCIIIID.a.Di Report .for May 1953 THRUa Chief of .Army Field Forces Fort Monroe, Virginia TO: The Adjutant Genera]. Department of the Army' Washington 25, D. c. In compliance with paragraph 4 Special .Regulations 525-45-l Department of · the Amy, Washington 25, D. c., dated 24 March 1953 the following comani report is submitted: a. Section It Unit Activities. A.s the period opened, the 38th Intantey Regiment was continuing the develop.. ment ar.d improvement of defensive positions on LilE KAl6.AS. On 3 May 1953 tbe Regiment moved to a new reserve position at Yami-ri (CT48.312'7), Korea, where preparations were made to conduct a vigorous ani aggressive training progr8)11. The 2rrl Infantry Division comucted a commalrl post exercise on 21 May 1953 for all headquarters down to aiX1 including battalion. One (1) rifie platoon was attached to IX Corps for a security mission at IX Corps rear. During the period necessary reconnaissame ani planning were accaaplished for the formulation or IX Corps counterattack plans "Iboker I, II, fii and IV". On 30 May 195.3 "A" Company (_) ·relieved 2tti Reconnaissance Company of their security mission at IX Corps main cormnar.d post; one (1} platoon of "A" Company assumed the security mission at IX Corps rear commatrl post. As the period erded, the Regiment remained in. .,IX .corJ1S reserve ani continued to corrluct unit and specialist training. The work accomplished on LINE KAl'BAS consisted mainly of digging and deepening trenches ani weapons positions. A mexmum effort expetrled·by all units resulted , in gree;tly improved defensive positions. 7 During this period the Regiment acted as part' of a coverirlg force in a tactical exercise where the 2d ROK Division sim- v ulated a witl:drawal through friendly positions. Active arrl passive air defense ~ i measures ...were. stressed during the exercise with special emphasis placed on camouflage ~ i ani dispersal of comma:rxl posts and other installations. -t "" .. ......... SECRET f • • • :.' SLCURITY INFO ...{MATION ... 133822 '- /lt,,vJ_/-t;::;:-~ ' f N Korean War Project 2ID-00401195 .• ;;;lEPROOUCEO AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES f I'··~···~~,·-··· "\ ,,.___.__ ___ - ·- ·sECRET iCURITY INFOi~MA TION -~ - Ccmnnani Report for May 1953 (Contd) On 4 May 1953, the .38th Infantry Regiment completed a foot march to tm regimental reserve area vacated by the 27th Infantry Regiment at Yand-ri, Korea. A.fter three (.3) d~ or rehabllitation, the Regiment started a five (5) week training program, with stress being placed on the tactical training or units. Training problems were effectively planned ar.d conducted, airl a high starxla.rd or efficiemy is being reached. Unit problems, when the terrain allowEd, were con:lucted with live anmunition a.td the maximum participation of supporting weapons. At the close of the period, battalion tactical exercises were being conducted which -, emphasized the comuct of the battalion in the approach march, the attack ani reorganization phases. Inexperience of squad leaders which is a constant concern to commar.ders has been noted during the platoon am higher unit exercises. With the accelerated trainiz:g program, the trainizg of fire am maneuver teallls ani of squads was limited to five (5) d~. It is felt that more time slx>uld have been allocated to irdividual an:l small unit training initially. Ibwever, this weakness in the unit structure will be eliminated by additional training at the completion or the battalion problems, by emphasis on correction az:d assistame by conmamers during higher unit exercises, ani by constant supervision. In addition to unit training, comman:l inspections, parades and athletics were imlu:led in the progralll to develop esprit, discipline ani morale or the ir.dividuel soldier. · The participation in the 2n:i Infantry' Division commani post exercise involved the movement of regimental ani battalion cotniDa.ni posts forward to an assembly area.. Comma.mers then conducted reconnaissa.me and fomulated plans to counter- attack an enemy penetration into the 2m ROK Division sector. This brief exercise l was highly et.f'ective toward development of smooth, efficient co1llllla.lXJ. ani staff functioning. SpeciaJ.,ist schools were conductErl simultaneously with the sched:ul.ed unit training. The classes were organized. and presented by the various tee hnical services an::1 included mines and demolitions training for the regimental anti­ tank ani mine atrl all the battalion pioneer and ammunition platoons. Throughout the period covered by this report, comma.niers at all levels con­ t.inu~ a..p. atltive program of supply economy and constantly stressed the principles of "cost consciousness". Reports or survey were closely scrutinized. ani units were directed to turn in all excess clothing and equipment. 1 . ~. Section II: Recommendations: _ Since training, to be effective must be progressive, the large influx of replacements during the month could be considered a training haniicap. We received over nine burrlred replacements after we had completed refresher training ·in basic subjects • .1 ; · lt ;s believed that the time of· relief for a unit on line can 'Q~ predicted, as well as the anticipated losses due to rotation during a normal. reserve period. :.' SECRET· SECURITY INFO~MA TION 133822 Korean War Project 2ID-00401196 DECLASSIFIED ~-, I SECRET I' -SECURITY IN FORMA TIOh j OC1DDlalli Report for Mq 1953 (Oontd) The value of a training program would be greatly enhanced if the Infantry Regiments· were filled up to an over-strength that equaled their anticipated losses for a three (3) month period before beginning their training cycle. As the situation now stan:ls we train a large group of men who will not be with us when we go back on line. Likewise we complete our program with a large segment of our comman:l missing the fun:la.mentals of small unit training. The difficulties in implementing this program are considered negligible in comparison to the benefits that would accrue to the units in training. ·iLl 0 J.. .__, - ~,uo: :U~l; Col Ini' Oommarxling SECRET S~.CU1~ITY· INFORMATION 133822 Korean War Project 2ID-00401197 SECRET ~.s....,...;URITY.. INFORMATION · HEA.DQTTA.RTERS 3Sth Infantry Regiment APO 21$ 10 JuJ.y 1953 SUBJECT: Command Report for June 1953 /':--,. THRU: Cbief of Army Field Forces Fort MOnroe, Virginia TO: The A.d.jutl'lnt · Gener~ Department of the Army Washingtori.25, D.C. · i ' In compliance with paragraph 4 Special }iegUlations 525-45-1 Department of the Army, Washington 25, D.C., dnted 24 Harch 1953 the following cornmand report is submitted: a. Secti_.,r, I: Uni..t Activities. A.s the period opened, the 3Sth Infantr:r Re~T,imer;t remrd.ned in IX Corps reserve and conti.nued to conduct unit an:1 speciali::rl:. t.raining. "A" Company (_) continued their security mission A.t IX Corps main commarrl post; one (1) platoon of ''A." Company continued the sec.ur:tty mtssion at IX Corps rear command post. IX US Corps conducted a command post exercise on 10 June for all headquarters down to and including company. On 11 .Tune Heav;r Hortar Company '"as attached to the 955th Field Artillery BattaJ.j_on and was placed in general SUDPOrt of the 9th ROK Division. The 2d Infantry Divtsion conducted a tactical exercise, "Trainer Six'', on 17 Junel953. On 25 June the Counterfire Pl::rcoon wn.s attached to the 3Sth Fi.eld Artillery Battalion. On 27 June 11 K11 Company (-) relieved ''A" Company ·. (_) of their security mission at IX Corps maln commarrl post; one (1) platoon •· of•"1tKt~w> Co!'lp.'lny relieved one (1) platoon of 11 11. 11 Company of their securi·ty mission • at IX Corps rear command pos·t. .As the perio(l ended, the Regiment remained in · IX Corps reserve and continued to conduct uni.t a:nd speci.ltilst training. ·. · · Dtl.rir>g ·the period 9-11 Jun~.J 953 the~ IX Corps regimer~tal tact:i.cal exercis was corrlucted by the 38th Infan~cy. This, _e:;<erc:tse emph'lsized the planning and .. conduct of nn Infantry Regime11t. ',in ·an ,9ffensive ,role. Upon completion of this .· exercise""the Regimen·t entered,~~l'lto a nE)."f·_:pl1ase-o:f trai.ning which stres::;ed "t;.actics and related subjt'lCtsl •,; This;p}~s13''was climaxed with a battalion in d~fe and night relief exercise conducted by Regiment jon a portion of LI!JE KI\.HSAS. SECRET i .. r"·\~ I.N·l~OR1\If A TION SECURll ~. l'Vl.J:L • l ... ·~· i :! Korean War Project 2ID-00401198 ~ . ~ j\EPROOUCEO AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES\ l1~;., •..•. --- ~'.--~- ~. - - ··--- ________ _.,.)· ----------··------·-----------·-------· ·---· ..........------------··--·--·--- ------------------ SECRET , ·-. ~~~FCUT<ITY rNFo: :rvr \ TJ,·~N O~m Report for June 19)3 (Oontd) lfoo.el ivCapons positions were built for eac l; type of cre\..r servEd weapon organ1.c to the Ri'.>gimcnt. Thny HCl:'G ber:eficif1l in Ul1wtrating to the troops the r>ropcr me tJY.~ds of' cons truct.ion, Qmplflc ernent ar:d c::lJnouflage. Qua11.fication :firh•r; of ir.d~tvit1u0l i.JCa:po:·is and fGmiliarization n.Yicl service nractico f4 ring of crew serv-etl.
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