sign in sign up
<<
Home , Adelbert Ames, Alfred Pleasonton, Battle of Fredericksburg, Battle of Piedmont, Benjamin Huger (general), Carnot Posey

NPS Fonn 10-900-b OMB No. 10244018 (March 1992)

United States Department of the Interior NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES MULTIPLE PROPERTY DOCUMENTATIONFORM

This form is used for documenting multiple pmpcny pups relating to one or several historic wnvxe. Sainsrmctions in How lo Complele the Mul1,ple Property D~mmmlationFonn (National Register Bullnin 16B). Compleveach item by entering the requested information. For addillanal space. use wntinuation shau (Form 10-900-a). Use a rypwiter, word pmarror, or computer to complete dl ivms. A New Submission -Amended Submission

A. Name of Multiple Property Llstlng The Civil War in , 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeological Resources - B. Associated Historic Contexts

(Name each acsociated historic conk* identifying theme, gmgmphid al and chronological Mod foreach.)

The Civil War in Virginia, 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeological Resources

- - C. Form Prepared by -- - nameltitle lohn S. Salmon organization Virginia De~artmentof Historic Resourceg smet & number 2801 Kensineton Avenue telephone 804-367-2323 em. 117 city or town -state VA zip code222l

As ~ ~ -~~ - ~ ~~~ -~~ An~~~ ~~ sr amended I the duimated authoriw unda the National Hislaic~.~~ R*urvlion of 1%6. ~ hmbv~ ~~ ccrtih. ha this docummfation form , ~ ,~~ mauthe Nhlond Regutn docummunon and xu forth requ~rnncnufor the Istmg of related pmpnia wns~svntw~thihc~mund Rcglster crivna Thu submiu~onmsm ihc prcce4unl ~d pmfes~onalrcqutmnu uc lath in 36 CFR Pan M) ~d the Scsmar) of the Intenoh Standar& Md Guidelina for Alshoology and Historic Revnation. LSa wntinuation shafor additi01w.I wmmmu.) "4.+?$ Signature and title of certifying official

I hereby certify that this multiple property documentation form has been approved by the National Register as a basis for evaluating related properties for listing in the National Register.

Signature of the Keeper Date Table ofcontents for Written Narrative

Prob~dethe following lnforrnatlon on contlnualon sheelp Cote the lener and the l~lleDefore each sect8on of the namu%e ASSIDpage nurnbcn acwrd~nglo the ~nsmcuonsfor conunuatlon sheets In How ro Complere rhWulr,ple Properly Lhwu)(~n10110t1Form (Nalonal Reglster Bullet~n 168). Fill in page numbers for each reclion in the spa= below.

E. Statement of Historic Contexts (Document historic contexts on one or more continuation sheets. If more than one historic context is documented, present them in sequential order.) ......

F. Associated Property Types (Provide description, signiticance, and registration requirements on one or more continuation sheets.) -

G. Geographical Data -

------H. Summary of ldentiflcatlon and Evaluatlon Methods (Discuss the methods used in developing the multiple property listing on one or more continuation sheets..)

- I. Bibliographical References (List major mitten workc and primary location of additional documentation: State Historic Preservation Oflice, other State agency, Federal agency, local governmeng university, or other, specifying repository.)

Bibliography (Cite the books, articles, and other sources used in preparing this form on one or more continuation sheets.)

1-127 - 1-133

Previous documentation on flle (NPS) -preliminary determination of individual listing (36 CFR 67) has been requested. -previously listed in the National Register -previously determined eligible by the National Register -designated a National Historic Landmark -recorded by Historic American Buildings Survey # -recorded by Historic American Engineering Record # Primary Loeation of Addltlonal Data: -X State Historic Preservation Office -Other State agency -Federal agency -Local government -University Other Name ofrepository: NPSFonn 10-9008 OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section-L Page-L

The Civil War in Vir ini 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolo ical Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

E. STATEMENT OF HISTORIC CONTEXTS BACKGROUND

Virginia (excluding present-day ) is divided into several geographical and cultural regions. The geographical regions include , a relatively flat area from the coast (including the Eastern Shore) west to the "fall line," from which the rolling terrain of the Piedmont then extends to the . West of the Blue Ridge lies the "Breadbasket of the Confederacy," the (from Lexington north to Harper's Ferry, West Virginia), and the Valley of Virginia (south of Lexington to about present-day Roanoke). The valleys are bounded on the west by the Appalachian Mountains, which extend past Roanoke through a cultural region called . Other cultural regions include the , which lies in Tidewater and the Piedmont between the and , and the , a colonial proprietary located in Tidewater and Piedmont north of the . At the time of the Civil War, Virginia was a predominantly rural state. Several large urban areas existed, however, including Richmond, the state capital and capital of the Confederacy; Alexandria, a major port on the Potomac River opposite Washington, D.C.; Fredericksburg, located halfway between the two capitals; Lynchburg, the industrial center of the Piedmont; Norfolk and Portsmouth, large Tidewater ports near the entrances to the ChesapeakeBay and the ; and Petersburg,an important port town on the about thirty miles south of Richmond. Few other commercial and industrial centers existed in the state except for the county seats,which varied in size from bustling large towns such as Winchester and Staunton to small hamlets such as Charlotte Court House and Appomattox Court House. Most industrial sites, including gristmills and ironworks, were scattered over the countryside or stood on the fringes of small towns and villages. By mid-century, a growing network of railroads and turnpikes-in addition to preexisting, notoriously poor roads-linked towns, cities, and industrial centers. Strategically, the railroads held the greatest importance for the contending armies. Among the most significant railroads were the Orange and Alexandria, between Alexandria and Gordonsville, in Orange County; the Manassas Gap, between Manassas Junction on the Orange and Alexandria in Prince William County to Mount Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley; the Virginia Central, between Richmond and Covington in the by way ofGordonsville and Charlottesville; the Virginia and ,between Lynchburg and the Tennesseeline through the Valley of Virginia and Southwest Virginia; the Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac between Richmond and Aquia Landing on the Potomac River; the Richmond and York River; the Richmond and Danville; the Richmond and Petersburg;the Petersburg (often called the Weldon), between Petersburg and Weldon, North Carolina; and the South Side, between Petersburg and Lynchburg by way of Appomattox Station. The most important highways were the Valley Turnpike (present-day U.S. Rte. 11) between Winchester and Sta,unton,and the Staunton and Parkersburg Turnpike (various county roads and U.S. Rte. 250). Many of the railroads and turnpikes passed through mountain gaps, further enhancing their strategic value. NPSForm IO-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page _2-

The Civil War in Vire:inia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeoloe:ical Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

Most of the Civil War campaigns in Virginia were conducted along the principal transportation routes. The Manassascampaign of 186\ and the campaign of 1862 were focused on the vitally important Manassas Junction. During the Peninsula and Seven Days' campaigns of 1862, the relied on the Richmond and York River Railroad as well as Federal shipping on the York and James Rivers for supplies and troop transportation. The Shenandoah Valley campaigns of 1862 and \864-\865 took place on the Valley Turnpike, the Staunton and Parkersburg Turnpike, and other turnpikes and roads in the region. Most of the battles of the Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, and Gettysburg campaigns of 1862-1863 were fought at river crossings and on turnpikes. During the Bristoe Station campaign in \863, most of the fighting occurred on or near the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, as well as on major highways. Turnpikes, road intersections, railroads, and rail junctions comprised key objectives during the Overland, Richmond and Petersburg, Southwest Virginia. and Appomattox campaigns in 1864-1865.

MANASSAS CAMPAIGN

The long-simmering sectional crisis over in the United States reached the boiling point after the election of as president in November 1860. Even before Lincoln's inauguration, several Southern states that felt threatened by his anti-slavery views summoned delegates to consider secession from the Union. Virginia convened a special sessionof the General Assembly on 7 January 1861; on 19January. the legislature called for the election on 4 February of delegates to a statewide convention. The delegates first met on 13 February but delayed action until the results of a peace conference chaired by former president in Washington were known. Although the conference failed and Lincoln's inaugural address was poorly received in the South, the delegates still defeated a motion to recommend secessionto the voters. Then came the attack on in by Confederate forces. The United States garrison at Fort Sumter formally surrendered on 14 April. In Washington the next day, Lincoln issued a proclamation calling for seventy-five thousand volunteers to uphold the laws of the United States. The announcement galvanized secessionconventions in several Southern states. Seven states-South Carolina. , . . . . and -had left the Union even before the fall of Sumter. Virginia seceded on 17 April, followed by , North Carolina. and Tennessee. The seceding statesjoined the Confederate States of America. which had been formed in Montgomery, Alabama. on 4 February 1861. Five days later, the Confederate Provisional Congress elected as president , who had recently resigned as Mississippi's United States senator. He was inaugurated on 18 February. Late- in May, seeking to be close to the anticipated theater of war, the Confederate government moved from Montgomery to Richmond, Virginia. NPS Fonn 10-900a OMS No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page l

The Civil War in Vire:inia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeoloe:ical Resources Name of Multiple PropertyListing

In Washington, Gen. commanded the United States Anny. Born near Petersburg, Virginia, on 13 June 1786, Scott had fought in every American war since the , becoming a national hero. Junior officers, who referred to him as "Old Fuss and Feathers," thought Scott too old and settled in his ways to organize a huge, modem army. They were right, but Scott was astute enough to fonnulate the Union grand strategy, popularly known as the . Blockade the Southern coast. said Scott, cut off the West by securing the , and use the border states as a buffer, thereby strangling the Confederacy and avoiding a costly overland war. Although Lincoln did not adopt Scott's plan at first, eventually it became Federal policy, but in conjunction with the bloody war Scott hoped to evade. The politicians wanteda quick war, not slow strangulation.The Northernpress urged the immediatecapture of the Confederatecapital with the cry "On to Richmond!" Both presidentsprodded their armiesinto the field, and manycitizens on eachside predicted that the war would be settledwith one large battle. On 19 April Lincoln orderedthe executionof part of Scott's plan,a blockadeof Southernports and harborsfrom the Rio Grandeto the North Carolina-SouthCarolina border. He extendedthe blockade on 27 April to includethe North Carolinaand Virginia coast. The Confederatesin Virginia responded quickly by building batterieson the bluffs overlookingthe PotomacRiver to blockadeWashington 'in return. By mid-May, batteriesstood at severalpoints along the Potomac,including Aquia Creek in Stafford Countyand Cockpit Point in PrinceWilliam County. The Union answeredwith the Potomac Flotilla, which consistedof a half-dozensteam-powered vessels. Although the Union vesselskept the Potomacopen to traffic, as long ascrews manned the batteriesthey effectivelyclosed the river to othershipping. In the meantime,both the Unionand Confederategovernments strengthened their armies. After the Federalsburned the HarpersFerry armoryand abandonedthe town on 18 April, Confederatetroops beganto assemblethere. The Confederategovernment commissioned a professorof artillery and natural philosophyat Virginia Military Institute in Lexington,Thomas Jonathan Jackson, a in the Confederateinfantry and sentto train the troops at HarpersFerry. Therehe beganmolding theminto an army,drilling them incessantlyand drawing their ire for his strict discipline. On 15May the Confederate War Departmentordered Brig. Gen. JosephE. Johnston,a widely knownand well-respectedofficer, to ' assumecommand of this army. Soonthe governmentpromoted Jackson to brigadiergeneral as Johnston's secondin command. The HarpersFerry patternwas repeatedin otherparts of Virginia. In Lynchburg,Col. JubalA. Early raised volunteersand organizedthem into .Col. Philip St. GeorgeCocke, at first stationed in Alexandriato keepan eye on Washington,moved to CulpeperCourt House,near the centerof the state, and establisheda largetraining camp. Other Southernstates raised their own regimentsand sentthem to

Virginia. , Exceptfor a few regulararmy units,the Union army also hadto be createdfrom scratch. Its thousandsof new recruitsneeded training as desperatelyas their Confederatecounterparts. Brig. Gen. NPSFonn 10-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section _E- Page .4

The Civil War in Virginia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeological Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

Irvin McDowell undertook the task, using Arlington House,Gen. E. Lee's residence on the Potomac (actually his wife's home), as his headquarters. He did the gentlemanly thing by living in a tent in the front yard and assuring Mrs. Lee by letter that whenever she returned home she would fmd nothing out of place. Across the Potomac, Washington became a training camp. Tents covered the Mall, and thousands of Union troops saw their capital for the first time. When they were not drilling, they climbed into the upper stories of the Capitol for the view or visited the Patent Office to admire the patent models. Some of the bolder -tourists, intent on seeing Abraham Lincoln, wandered through the , as open to the public as any other government building. Outside the city, in western and southern , other regiments trained. They became Maj. Gen. 's army when the sixty-nine-year-old Irishman gathered them to recapture Harpers Ferry in June. Patterson, exhibiting all the caution for which Union generals soon became famous, moved on the arsenal late in May. By the time he approached Harpers Ferry, however, Johnston, who had received ample warning, had salvaged the machinery and tools, burned the key buildings, and marched south, up the Shenandoah Valley. He easily eluded Patterson for the next three weeks and camped at Winchester, which he considered a better post than Harpers Ferry anyway. Meanwhile, Cocke had received orders from Lee, who commanded all state forces from Richmond, to move from Culpeper northeast to Manassas Junction in Prince William County, about thirty miles outside Washington. There, two vitally important railroads met. The Orange & Alexandria Railroad connected Alexandria with Gordonsville, in Orange County, where the Virginia Central Railroad led to Charlottesville. The ManassasGap Railroad extended from the junction through the Manassas Gap near Strasburg in the Shenandoah Valley, less than twenty miles southwest of Winchester, then south to Harrisonburg. If the Confederates held Manassas Junction, they could deny the Federals accessto the Shenandoah Valley and central Virginia while protecting the approachesto Richmond and retaining the option to attack Washington via the valley and western Maryland. Conversely, if the Union army seized the junction, it could more easily protect its capital, march on Richmond~ and ride the rails westward. Lee first sent Brig. Gen. Milledge L. Bonham to command the growing force at the junction, then at the end of May supplanted him with Brig. Gen. Pierre Gustave Toutant Beauregard, who had commanded in Charleston during the bombardment of Fort Sumter. The troop buildup continued, until by mid-July Beauregard had some 22,000 men at the junction. Responding to Northern pressure, on 3 June Winfield Scott asked McDowell to submit a plan for advancing on Manassas Junction. McDowell complied, hoping that a mere show of force would drive away the Confederates. His plan called for three columns, totaling 39,000 men, to approach the junction by way of the Little River Turnpike (present-day Rte. 236) and the Orange & Alexandria Railroad. Patterson, with 18,000 troops, was to prevent Johnston's l2,000-man army from leaving the ShenandoahValley. By the time McDowell's army began trudging and sweating its way through the hot, humid Virginia countryside on 16 July, Beauregard knew his plan. Washington remained at heart, after all, a Southern city, and crawled with Confederate spies. The sheer size of McDowell's force--the largest ever to take the field on American soil until then-the heat, and the inexperience of his all combined NPS Form 10-900a OMS No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page 5:

The Civil War in Virl!inia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolol!ical Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

to slow its progressto a crawl. By noonthe next day McDowell stoodat FairfaxCourt House,about halfwayto his objective. He choseto restthe troopswhile sendingBrig. Gen. and a reinforcedbrigade of about3,000 menon a reconnaissancein force to locatethe Confederateeastern flank. Tyler wasto avoid an engagement,secure Centreville, scout beyond the village,and reportto McDowell. Tyler, like his fellow subordinates,did not care for the youngerMcDowell, who they regardedas rude and aloof. After Tyler enteredCentreville on 18 July and found the Confederateshad abandonedit, he pushed on toward Mitchell's Ford and Blackburn'sFord on Bull Run. Whenhe approachedBlackburn's Ford, he sawonly a Confederatebattery and a handful of pickets. He did not stopto considerwhether the thick underbrushand treesaround the ford might concealmore of the enemy'stroops. From his hilltop position, he thoughthe could seeManassas in the distance. He also thoughthe could seeglory, and a chanceto grab the credit from McDowell, ifhe could presson to thejunction. He was certainthat the Confederateswould fall backbefore his advance,as they had at Centreville. He was wrong. Tyler beganhis assaulton Blackburn'sFord cautiously,opening with his artillery and gradually committing more and moreinfantry. On the otherside, Brig. Gen. led the brigadethat Tyler could not see;Longstreet fed his troops into the fray at a pacematching Tyler's. McDowell, hearing the uproar,rode to the ford, arriving about4:00 P.M. He angrily orderedTyler to breakoff the actionand returnto Centreville,where he establisheda newheadquarters. Tyler andhis men felt frustrated,having fought for hoursto little effect. McDowell fearedthat Tyler's disobediencehad ruinedhis plansto capture ManassasJunction. The Confederates,on the other hand,exulted. Theyhad tested their mettle in a fight and had seenthe enemyleave the field. Perhapsthey could do it again. McDowell fumed and revisedhis plans for the nexttwo days. Far away, in the Shenandoah Valley, Pattersoninched southand then pulled backwhile Johnstonmade military history. Leavinga young cavalryman,Col. JamesEwell Brown "Jeb" Stuart,to screenhis movement,the Confederategeneral led his army out of its defensesat Winchesteron 18 July and marchedtwenty miles southeastto Piedmont Station(present-day Delaplane) on the ManassasGap Railroad. Jacksonled the way, driving his men at a furious pacethrough the villages of Millwood and Paris. On 19 July Johnston'sarmy beganboarding a train of freight and cattle cars for the slow ride to ManassasJunction. It took two daysto move all the troops. For the first time in history,a railroad had beenused to transportan army to battle. Once at thejunction, however,the army rested. Johnstonassumed command and executed Beauregard'sscheme to dispersemost of their combinedforce to guardthe fords andbridges on Bull Run, northeastof ManassasJunction. At last McDowell, havingrevised his plan of attack,pressed forward from Centreville at 2:00 A.M. on Sunday,21 July, beginningthe First Battle of Manassas. His plan called for Tyler to feign an attackon the left of the Confederateline aboutdawn, while McDowell's main force movedupstream to SudleySprings Ford, then to crossand strike the enemy'sleft flank. Tyler executedthe feint so poorly, however,that he fooled no one. The Confederatebrigades of Col. NathanG. "Shanks" Evans,Brig. Gen.Bernard Bee, and Col. FrancisBartow detected McDowell's movementto SudleySprings and counteredit at MatthewsHill, southof the ford. Brig. Gen.,leading the Union attackwas wounded immediately and succeededby Brig. Gen. Andrew Porter, NPS Form IO-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page .6

The Civil War in Vir2inia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolo2ical Resources Name.of Multiple Property Listing

who eventuallyforced the Confederatesoff the hill and into retreattoward HenryHill. Meanwhile, Jacksonhad led his brigadeto the reverseslope of Henry Hill, where it lay hiddenfrom friend and foe alike. Jacksonsat on his horseand calmly watchedthe battle beyond,awaiting orders. WhenBee fmally saw him, he is said by Virginians to havecried "There is Jacksonstanding like a stonewall!" and ordered the remnantsof his commandto rally aroundthe formerprofessor. Although somehistorians believe anger that Jacksonhad not cometo his aid promptedBee's remark, mostagree that he meantit as a compliment. Regardlessof his intention,however, Bee awardedJackson the nomde guerreby which he would be called henceforth,Stonewall. For the remainderof the battle,Jackson especially merited the name. His ,and the others that assembledon Henry Hill, held firm againstone Union assaultafter another. Into the long, hot afternoonthe battleraged, until Johnstonthrew freshbrigades against the Union right and Beauregard ordereda generaladvance. At 4:00 P.M.,the Federalline crumpledand begana retreatthat quickly turned to a rout. The undisciplinedUnion troopsraced for the rear,entangling themselves with the carriagesof civilians who, equippedwith picnic baskets,had driven out from Washingtonto watchwhat they thought would be the only battle of the war. All mixed together,spectators and combatantsstreamed back to the capital in a panickedmob. The victoriousConfederates pursued them toward Centreville but. disorganized and exhausted,soon gave up the chase. . For the Union, First Manassaswas a demoralizingdefeat. Thosewho had cautionedagainst sendinga green,undisciplined army into the field shouted"I told you so!" at the politicians and newspaper editorswho had urged themon. PresidentLincoln, at least,learned from the experience.Six days afterthe battle he replacedMcDowell with Maj. Gen.George B. McClellan,a masterof organizationwho would build and train the army that helpedwin the war. On the Confederateside, sadness over the deathsof many ,Bee and Bartow foremost amongthem, tempered the joy of victory. JeffersonDavis andhis lieutenantsknew that their army-as raw and ill-trained asthe Union force-had beenfortunate. The courageof the menand their officers contributedmore to the victory than did superbgeneralship, for the Confederatepart of the battle had been improvisedfrom beginningto end. Overthe winter both combatantslabored to train and supplytheir armieswhile keepingan eye on eachother. In a futile effort to restorethe Union army's tarnishedprestige, on 21 OctoberBrig. Gen. CharlesP. Stoneattempted to crossthe Potomacat Harrison'sIsland and captureLeesburg. A timely Confederatecounterattack under Col. NathanEvans drove Stone'sforce overBall's Bluff and into the river. The Federalssuffered more than sevenhundred captured and sometwo hundredkilled, including Col. EdwardD. Baker,U.S. Senatorfrom . For daysthereafter, Union corpsesfloated downthe river pastWashington. The Northernarmy at leastwon a technicalvictory on 20 December,however, when Confederate Brig. Gen. JebStuart led a briga4e-sizedforce of , infantry,and artillery to protecta foraging expeditionnear Dranesville. Union Brig. Gen.Edward O. C. Ord, advancingon the GeorgetownPike, NPS Form 10-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page 1

The Civil War in Vir inia 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolo ical Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

encountered Stuart's cavalry. Both sides deployed as more units arrived on the field, and a sharp firefight developed. Stuart withdrew in the mid-afternoon after dispatching his wagons safely to the rear. These were the last actions of note fought in northern Virginia in 1861. In the spring of 1862 the seat of war in Virginia shifted to the Shenandoah Valley, where Union and Confederate armies vied for control, and to the southeasternpart of the state, where McClellan advanced on Richmond from Hampton.

SHENANDOAH VALLEY CAMPAIGN OF 1862

The present-day preeminence of Robert E. Lee in the Southern-as well as the national-pantheon of Confederate military heroes obscures the fact that for the first two years of the war, Thomas J. Jackson, not Lee, was the idol of the Confederacy. At Manassas,Jackson earned his nom de guerre and a reputation for dependability. In the spring of 1862, in the ShenandoahValley, Stonewall led his men in a campaign that brought him and them international renown and a kind of immortality. Among his colleagues in the service, Lee was better known and highly regarded, but little known to the public. By June 1862, in contrast, Jackson's name was on everyone's lips, military and civilian, Northerner and Southerner and European alike. Time has not dimmed the luster of Jackson's Shenandoah Valley campaign, especially among military historians. Our national understanding of the military significance of the Shenandoah Valley to the war in Virginia has faded, however, and today the valley is sometimes erroneously considered a sideshow to the "real war" in eastern Virginia. In contrast, during the war both Union and Confederate commanders recognized the significance of the valley and contested hotly for control of the region. Topography and transportation made the region strategically important. The valley extends from the headwaters of the Shenandoah River near Lexington, Virginia. to its confluence with the Potomac River at Harpers Ferry, West Virginia. about 150 miles northeast, and averages about twenty-five miles in width. Because the Shenandoahdrains from south to north (that is, the altitude in the south near Lexington is higher than at Harpers Ferry, in the north), one goes "down" the valley heading north and "up" the valley traveling south. The Shenandoah Valley itself angles from southwest to northeast, and is bounded on the east by the Blue Ridge Mountains and on the west by the Appalachian Mountains. From Harrisonburg northeast to Strasburg, however, Massanutten Mountain divides fifty miles of the valley into two smaller valleys to its west (the main valley) and east(the Luray or Page Valley). The Blue Ridge Mountains are pierced by a series of gaps; at the time of the Civil War, turnpikes or railroads passedthrough most of the gaps from the eastto major towns in the valley. From Harpers Ferry in the north to Waynesboro in the south, the principal gaps in the Blue Ridge, and the turnpikes and railroads that passedthrough them are Vestal's (now Keys) Gap (Hillsboro & Harpers Ferry Turnpike, present-day Rte. 9); Snicker's Gap (Snicker's Gap Turnpike and the Leesburg & Snicker's Gap Turnpike, Rte. 7); Ashby Gap (Ashby's Gap Turnpike, Rte. 17/50); Manassas Gap (. now paralleled by 1-66and Rte. 55); Chester Gap (Front Royal & Gaines's Cross Roads Turnpike, Rte. 522); NPS Fonn 10-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page .8

The Civil War in Vireinia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeoloeical Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

Thornton Gap (Thornton's Gap Turnpike, Rte. 211); (Swift Run Gap Turnpike, Rte. 33); Brown's Gap (Brown's Gap Turnpike, Albemarle County Rte. 629 and Rockingham County Rte. 663); and (Virginia Central Railroad, Staunton & James River Turnpike, and Rivanna & Rockfish Gap Turnpike, today paralleled by 1-64and Rte. 250). Several turnpikes and roads ran up and down the Shenandoah Valley, joining most of the turnpikes from the east. The best valley highway, the Valley Turnpike (present-day U.S. Route II), linked Winchester and Staunton. East of Massanutten Mountain, the Luray and Front Royal Turnpike (present- day Rte. 340) provided a good north-south road between the mountain and the Blue Ridge. Other principal clay roads included the Middle Road, between the turnpike and the Appalachians to the west, and the Back Road, running along the base of the Appalachian range. Today, a series of paved county roads follow the routes of the Middle Road and the Back Road. The way the valley slants through western Virginia made it an ideal route of invasion for the Confederate army. Movements up or down could be protected from Union attack from the east by guarding the Blue Ridge gaps. The lower or northern end of the valley is only some fifty-five miles from Washington and leads into western Maryland and Pennsylvania. Lee used this route in 1862 and 1863 before and after the battles of Antietam and Gettysburg, while Lt. Gen. Jubal A. Early employed it in 1864 to occupy Hagerstown and Frederick, Maryland, and to threaten the defenses of Washington. From the Union perspective, securing the valley was essential to protecting the national capital and avoiding the embarrassmentof fighting Southern troops on Northern soil. It also provided a "back door" to Richmond and accessto the rear of Lee's army, which Maj. Gen. David Hunter threatened in 1864 until Early drove him into West Virginia. By March 1862, the string of Confederate victories that began with the First Battle of Manassas had been broken. Union victories in North Carolina, , Tennessee,Arkansas, and eroded Confederate morale and boosted that of the Union. In and around Washington, Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, who had reawakened Northern hopes for a great Union victory and a quick end to the war, molded some 150,000 fresh volunteers into a well-equipped and -trained army. Meanwhile, Gen. JosephE. Johnston's Confederates abandoned Manassas Junction to defend Richmond, leaving Quaker guns for the enemy and burning a million pounds of beef. His army marched away ill-supplied and hungry as the scent of steak tinged the winter air-a fitting symbol of last year's successesand this year's failures. Southerners were as starved for victories as the troops were for victuals. McClellan decided against a direct from Washington to Richmond, choosing instead an amphibious landing at and Newport News followed by a march up the Peninsula past Yorktown and Williamsburg to the Confederate capital. Lincoln, anxious for the security of Washington, got a promise from McClellan to protect the city. In February 1862, McClellan detailed the duty to Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks and his , then located in western Maryland, but ordered him first to clear the lower Shenandoah Valley of Confederates by driving them from Winchester. Thereafter, Banks was to post a small force in the tGwnto protect the region's railroads and turnpikes, then proceed with most of his troops to Manassas Junction to guard the approachesto the national capital. By 24 February, Banks NPS Fonn 10-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page .2

Th~ Civil War in Virginia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolol!ical Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

had occupiedHarpers Ferry with his 28,000men and lessthan two weekslater had marchedsouth to within twelve miles of Winchester. Maj. Gen.Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jacksonand his 4,600-manvalley army defendedthe town. To the east,Joseph E. Johnston,the commanderof Confederatetroops in Virginia, expecting McClellan to marchoverland toward Richmondfrom Washington,disposed his army to defendthe Confederatecapital. In early March he orderedJackson to protectthe mainarmy's left flank by guarding the Blue Ridge gapsand advancingor retreatingin concertwith Johnston'sforces near Richmond. Jackson,however, had no intentionof retreatingand insteadrequested reinforcements so he could defeat Banks's army, or at leaststrike the enemyand keephim off balance. Johnstondid not reply, and Jackson soonfound his army furtheroutnumbered when Union Brig. Gen. JamesShields arrived from western Virginia to join his 12,000-mandivision with Banks's. Despitethe numericalodds againsthim, Jacksonpossessed important advantages over his opponents:a knowledgeof the valley and, soon,excellent maps. On 26 March 1862,just three days after his defeatat Kernstown,Jackson told JedediahHotchkiss, a talentedyoung amateur cartographer who had recentlyjoined his command:"I want you to makeme a map of the Valley, from Harper's Ferryto Lexington,showing all the points of offenceand defence in thoseplaces." Hotchkissset to work at once, drawing mapsthat remainremarkable for their clarity, beauty,and accuracy.The mapsbecame Jackson's secretweapon. In contrast,his Union counterpartsmarched up and downthe valley with out-of-date, sketchy,and inaccuratemaps-when they had mapsat all. Whatkind of man wasthis Jackson?To answerthe question,one mustseparate Jackson the legendfrom Jacksonthe man. Fortunately,the notedVirginia historianJames I. Robertson,Jr., accomplishedthat task in his outstanding1997 biography, : The Man, the Soldier,the Legend. This is Jacksonthe legend:"Old Tom Fool," as his young studentscalled him, an eccentricand ineffectualcollege professor. Insane,according to Richard Ewell and others. Jacksonthe legendcould fall asleepinstantly anywhere,anytime; he constantlysucked lemons, even in combat;he avoided pepper becauseit madehis legsache; on occasionhe abruptlyraised his left arm high to allow the blood to flow back downto his heartand therebylessen the imaginedweight of his hand;he preferredstanding to sitting, to align his internalorgans for improveddigestion. He was a religiousfanatic. He oftenrefused to converse,and his subordinatesfound him extraordinarilysecretive. Yet this supposedlycrazy man conducteda perfectmilitary campaignagainst overwhelming odds and outsmarted his opponentsat every turn, accordingto the legend. Jacksonthe manis far more interestingthan Jacksonthe legend. The real Jacksonwas a painfully shyorphan born in present-dayWest Virginia. His consumingambition to improvehis lot and fmd social acceptanceimpelled him to the military academyat West Point,where he overcamehis woefully inadequateelementary education through sheer determination and hard work. After a heroic stint as an artillery officer in the MexicanWar, Jacksonserved unhappily as secondin commandto a martinetin Florida and resignedhis commission. Hejoined the faculty at Virginia Military Institute in Lexington, wherethe samestudents who mockedhim during their freshmanyear admiredhim greatlyby their senior NPS Form IO-900a OMS No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section _E- Page 10

The Civil War in Virszinia. 1861-1865: Historic and ArchaeoloszicalResources Name of Multiple Property Listing

year. Although stiff and awkward in society,Jackson slowly madefriends who discoveredthe kind and generousheart behind his wall of reserve. In the valley town he found a homeat last,something he had longed for all his life. He found love and family there,too, andjoy mixed with tragedy:his beloved fIrSt wife died in childbirth, and the baby was stillborn; lessthan three yearslater he remarried.but his fIrst child died four weeksafter herbirth. Jackson'sown life underwentrenewal when he joined the Presbyterian church. His religious faith sustainedhim in adversityand becameas naturala part of him as his skin. His health,particularly as it relatedto his digestivesystem, remained delicate, and he obsessivelysought treatmentsfor his manyailments; but he basedmany of his seeminglyhypochondriacal remedies on current medicaladvice, or at leasthis own logic. Jacksonoften had difficulty sleepingwhen on campaign,and his famous impromptunaps could be creditedto exhaustion.He did eatlemons, but rarely. He ate any fruit he could put his handson, althoughhe liked peachesbest. He hadno discerniblesense of humorand never understooda joke, but he adoredchildren and lovedto frolic on the floor with them. His secretiveness arosenaturally from his shyness,and also from a desireto confusethe enemy. His valley campaign,while a work of genius in its entirety,was far from perfectin itsparts. Jacksonimprovised in the field, often brilliantly, but oftento compensatefor his own errors of judgment.as well asto take advantageof his opponents'lapses.He learnedquickly from experiencebut was not infallible; Jacksonin June 1862was a far more skillful commanderthan he had beenin February,but still he got caughtnapping at Port Republic. Whatmade Jackson a greatgeneral? Strategic and tacticalbrilliance to be sure,and an unwaveringfaith that God would not permitthe failure of what Jacksonviewed asa just cause,but"even more importantlya grim determinationto defeathis enemies-the sameunyielding will that saw him through four demandingyears at WestPoint. At a time when manymen viewed war as a romantic adventure,Jackson was as utterly unromanticin his attitudeas William TecumsehSherman. Stonewall,in his own words,believed that "war is the greatestof evils," but once underway the 'should inflict "all possibledamage in the shortestpossible time" on the enemy,even to the point of taking no prisoners."To move swiftly, strike vigorously,and secure all the fruits of victory, is the secretof successfulwar," he told a minister. On anotheroccasion, when one of his subordinatesexpressed regret at the deathsof three Union cavalrymenwho chargedhis positionbravely, Jackson responded: "No, Colonel, shootthem all. I don't want themto be brave." Jackson'sseeming ruthlessness concealed an intensedesire for peace,a physicalache to be at home with his wife and. later,his daughter.He believedin fighting savagelyto win the peacesooner. His valley campaignsucceeded because Jackson "moved swiftly and struckvigorously" and followed his favorite maxim: "Nevertake counselof your fears." And it succeeded becausehe inspiredhis soldiersto victory. His mencursed this toughdisciplinarian who refusedto grant furloughs,even to himself,who marchedthem bloody-footed,who urgedthem everforward with a curt "Presson, presson," who rarely praised("Good, good," was aboutas effusive as Jacksonever got),who was quick to punishand slow to forgive. But he gave them victories,and the menof his belovedStonewall Brigade relished their reputationsas his "foot cavalry,"and whenhe rode by they cheeredand cheered. Many soldierswrote home that it was far more pleasantto read aboutJackson's exploits in the newspapersthan to take part in NPS Form 10-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page U

The Civil War in Vir2inia. 1861-1865: Historic and ArchaeolQ2ical Resources Name "of Multiple Property Listing

them, but they all admittedthey would follow him anywhere.Jackson's men savored the memoriesfor the restof their lives. At this momentin March 1862,however, Jackson commanded largely untested as eager for combatas he was,despite odds of nine-to-one againstthem. After preliminary skirmishesin which Col. and his cavalryheld Banksat bay, on the afternoonof II Marchthe Union army beganto advancein earnestagainst Winchester. Jacksonordered his wagonssouth of town, thendirected the infantry to join them,cook rations,and awaitorders. That night, Jacksoncalled his first council of war with his lieutenants. He presentedthem with an audaciousplan: marchhis menback through Winchesterand strike Banks in a predawnattack. The shockof the assault,he reasoned,should unnerve the evenless experiencedFederals and stampedethem. After a brief silence,it probably fell to Brig. Gen. Richard Garnett,the seniorsubordinate present, to clear his throatand inform Jacksonthat his plan could not be executed. His army,he explained,was fartheraway than Jacksonrealized. because the wagonshad gone some six miles southof town beforestopping. The menwould haveto marchabout eight miles in the dark beforethey would be in positionto attack. The army would be exhaustedand incapableof holding its own againsta force so manytimes its size. It could not be done. After futile arguing,Jackson conceded and ordereda retreat. As he andhis headquartersstaff withdrew, however,a perfectfury of frustrationseized him. He ignoredthe fact that his subordinates probablyhad savedhis army from disaster. Never again,he vowed.would he convenea council of war. His first had beenhis last. Thus one of the mostillustrious campaignsin the history of Americanwarfare began with a retreat on the part of the eventualvictor. For ten days,between 12 and 21 March, Jacksonand Banks kept their armiesapart; Jacksonencamped around Mount Jacksonwhile Banksstopped his cautiouspursuit at Strasburg,roughly twenty-threemiles northeastof Mount Jacksonand aboutseventeen miles southwestof Winchester. On 21 March,one of Ashby's troopersinformed Jacksonthat Bankswas moving backtoward Winchester. Jacksonfollowed. sendingAshby aheadto harry the Union rear. Two dayslater, just southof Winchesterat the First Battle of Kernstown,the Federalforce, at first underBrig. Gen.James Shields and then underCol. afterShields fell wounded.turned to fight. Jacksondeployed Col. Samuel Fulkerson'sbrigade to the left and,after some confusion of orders,Garnett joined the line on Fulkerson's right. Jacksonsuffered his first and only defeatat Kernstown,late in the afternoonof23 March, when the Union right beganto overwhelmthe Confederatecenter as Garnett'smen ran out of ammunition. Without orders,Garnett retreated with his command,leaving Fulkersondangling and causinga general collapseof Jackson'sline and a nearrout. Garnett'sdecision earned him the never-endingenmity of Jacksonand an abbreviatedcourt martial-a stainon his record thathe fmally erasedwith his gallant death at Gettysburgtwo years later in '.Pickett's Charge"(actually the Pickett-Pettigrew-Trimble Charge,or Longstreet'sattack). NPS Fonn 10-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section _E- Page 12

The Civil War in Virl!:inia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeological Resources Name Qf Multiple Property Listing

Jackson retreated once more. Strategically, however, he gained more than he lost. The savagery of the Kernstown battle convinced Banks, who had been in the act of leaving the valley for Manassas Junction when Jackson caught up with him, that the little Confederate army indeed presented a threat. He decided to remain west of the Blue Ridge until either he pinned it down and destroyed it, or it fled the valley. For the next several weeks, the armies teased each other with cavalry and artillery engagements as Jackson withdrew to Swift Run Gap. Early in April, the Union strategy in easternVirginia became clear as McClellan began his slow march up the Peninsula toward Richmond. The Confederates feared a second advance against Richmond as Maj. Gen. Irvin McDowell assembled a Union force north of Fredericksburg that in reality was intended to protect Washington. In western Virginia, Brig. Gen. 's 10,000-man augmented Maj. Gen. John C. Fremont's Mountain Department army, on its march eastward toward the valley. Returning to Winchester, Banks once more moved south, up the valley. On the Confederate side, Gen. Robert E. Lee, in his capacity as military advisor to President Jefferson Davis, changed Johnston's orders to Jackson. Abandon the defensive and take the offensive, Lee wrote to Stonewall on 21 April. Jackson quickly formulated a plan of action, sent it to Lee on 29 April, and put his army in motion without waiting for a reply. With the number of his men increased to 14,500 by the addition of Maj. Gen. Richard S. Ewell's division, Jackson marched from Port Republic eastward through Brown's Gap and out of the valley, fueling rumors that he was taking his army to Richmond. At Mechum's River station on the Virginia Central Railroad, he and his men boarded railroad cars and rode west through Rockfish Gap back into the valley to Staunton. Soon the army marched west on the Staunton and Parkersburg Turnpike (present-day Rte. 250), toward Highland County and Fremont. On 8 May, at Sitlington's Hill just east of the village of McDowell, Jackson defeated Fremont's advance force, commanded by Brig. Gen. Robert C. Schenck and Brig. Gen. Robert H. Milroy. After pursuing Fremont for a few days, Jackson returned to the valley and headed north against Banks. Jackson used the Luray Valley to conceal his movements and then, with Ewell, overran the Federal garrison at Front Royal on 23 May, exposing Banks's right flank and causing him to retreat north. Two days later, in the First Battle of Winchester, Jacksonenveloped Banks's right flank and defeated him. Jackson pursued Banks's army until it fled across the Potomac River into Maryland. Lincoln, ever mindful of the Confederate threat against Washington, sent McDowell's divisions at Fredericksburg, recently reinforced by Shields's division, into the Shenandoah Valley under Shields's command. Marching through Manassas Gap, Shields recaptured Front Royal and planned to join Fremont in Strasburg, thereby stranding Jackson between three Union forces (counting Banks's). Jackson, however, abandoned his positions above Winchester on 31 May and slipped south through the pincers, aided by Federal slowness in closing them, up the Valley Turnpike. Two Union forces-Fremont's on the Valley Turnpike and the advance of Shields's on the Luray and Front Royal Turnpike-pursued Jackson down muddy roads through a week ofh~avy rain. At Cross Keys on 8 June, Shields caught Jackson napping, but when Fremont attacked from the northwest, Ewell battled him to a standstill. The next day, Jackson stalled Fremont with a rearguard action NPS Fom1IO-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CO NTINU A TI ON SHEET

Section Page 13

The Civil War in Virginia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeoloe:ical Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

and then burned the bridge over the South Fork of the ShenandoahRiver at Port Republic to isolate him on the western side of the rain-swollen South Fork. Meanwhile, he attacked Shields's vanguard under Brig. Gen. Erastus B. Tyler and drove it from the field. Shields and Fremont withdrew northward the next day with MassanuttenMountain between them, leaving Jackson in control of the southern end of the valley. Jackson's Shenandoah Valley campaign was a spectacular strategic success. During a five-week period, with no more than 17,000 troops, he marched more than 650 miles and defeated three Federal armies numbering 52,000 men by attacking them separately when his own force was numerically superior to his opponent's. He inflicted some 7,000 Union casualties while losing some 2,500 of his own men. He made his name famous throughout and even beyond the country, worried Lincoln endlessly, and, most importantly, caused the diversion of thousands of Union troops toward the defense of Washington and away from McClellan's campaign. McClellan later claimed that the additional troops would have enabled him to capture Richmond. Now, at mid-June 1862, it was Jackson and his army, not Banks's or McDowell's, who were marching toward Richmond.

PENINSULA AND SEVENDAYS' CAMPAIGNS

The Peninsulaand SevenDays' Campaignsconstitute one of the oddestepisodes in the courseof the Civil War in Virginia. Few leadersdisplayed especially brilliant generalship;both commandersmade costly errorsof judgment;the wizard of the ShenandoahCampaign, Stonewall Jackson, was presenton the battlefield physically but not mentally; andthe Confederatearmy, which either lost almostevery battle or foughtto a draw,pushed the vastly largerUnion army to the edgeof the JamesRiver and emergedthe victor. Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, the thirty-five-year-old commander of the Anny of the Potomac, seemed destined for success in the spring of i 862. Born in , the scion of a distinguished family, McClellan entered West Point in 1842 after attending the University of Pennsylvania. He graduated second in his academy class in 1846 and served in the Mexican War, in which he earned two promotions. During his eleven-year military career, he rose to the rank of , built forts, taught at the U.S. Military Academy, and designed a saddle that the army adopted as its standard. He was sent to Europe during the Crimean War as an official observer, and was present at the siege of Sebastopol. After resigning his commission in 1857, he pursued a new career in railroading, becoming president of the and Mississippi Railroad in 1860. When the war began, Ohio governor William Dennison appointed McClellan major general in the Ohio volunteers. In July 186 I, just before the First Battle of Manassas, McClellan won victories at Rich Mountain and Corrick's Ford in western Virginia, helping secure wh~t would become West Virginia for the Union and gaining instant fame. Following the Federal defeat at First Manassas on 21 July 1861, Presid~nt Abraham Lincoln removed Brig. Gen. Irvin McDowell as commander of the principal Union force and appointed McClellan in his place on 27 July. On I November 1861 McClellan replaced Bvt. Lt. Gen. Winfield Scott as general-in- of the United States Anny.

~ NPS Fonn 10-900a OMS No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REG.lSTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E. Page 14

The Civil War in Virl!inia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolol!ical Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

McClellan took command of a demoralized, poorly trained army-essentially an armed mob, some thought. Over the next few months he worked a miracle. The mob became a professional, well- supplied, thoroughly drilled, massive war machine of more than 100,000 men. The soldiers adored McClellan, who had restored their pride and confidence. McClellan loved the army he had created. It was ready to fight. Its general, however, demonstrated an intense reluctance to fight. He was the most politically ambitious general in the Union army, and more than anything he wanted to become president. Ifhe took his great army into battle and lost, he believed, his hoped-for political career would be stillborn. If, however, he delayed his campaign until he had an overwhelming superiority in men and supplies, and fought only when victory was assured, then, he thought, his political successalso would be assured. Also, he did not wish to shame the South by crushing its army if he could help achieve a negotiated settlement. Additionally, if he could convince the public that Lincoln and his Republican administration were not giving him the men he needed to save the Union, then he could shift the responsibility for any military defeat from his shoulders to theirs. McClellan adopted a strategy of delay while constantly soliciting reinforcements from Lincoln, who kept urging his general to take the field and grew increasingly impatient with his demands. Once in the field, McClellan moved with exceeding caution, frustrating not only Lincoln but his own subordinates. McClellan's motives and behavior, his ambitions and his hesitations, have been much debated by historians-and the debate shows no signs of ending. It is fair to say, however, that McClellan's military strategy, as executed, was not so much to fight to win as to fight not to lose. Two Confederate generals, JosephE. Johnston and Robert E. Lee, stood ready to oppose McClellan and his Army of the Potomac. Johnston, a native of Prince Edward County, Virginia, graduated from West Point in 1829 (thirteenth in his class, which included Robert E. Lee) and served for eight years as an artillery officer, then resigned to pursue a civil engineering career. In 1838, on an expedition to Florida, Johnston skillfully defended his party against an Indian attack, thereby earning a first 's commission in the Topographical Engineers. He served with distinction in the Mexican War and remained in the army afterward, eventually rising to quartermaster general with the rank of . He resigned from the U.S. Army on 22 April 1861 and joined the Confederate army, assuming command at Harper's Ferry from Thomas J. Jackson in May 1861. After eluding the Federal force led by Brig. Gen. Robert Patterson, Johnston led his army to Manassas Junction in July 1861, where on 21 July he combined forces with Brig. Gen. P. G. T. Beauregard to turn the tide of battle for the Confederacy. President Jefferson Davis promoted him to full general, although fourth in rank after , , and Robert E. Lee--a move that angered Johnston, who had been the senior brigadier general in the U.S. Army. He reported to Richmond, however, and organized its defenses,a task at which he was an acknowledged master. When McClellan began his march up the Peninsula toward Richmond, Johnston crafted a strategic withdrawal of his army to the strong defensive works protecting the Confederate capital. Wounded early in the fighting there, Johnston was replaced by Robert E. Lee. Lee, like McClellan, de$cendedfrom an illustrious family, although one that had fallen on hard times. Born in 1807 at the ancestral home, Stratford Hall, in Westmoreland County, Virginia, Lee was the NPS fonn IO-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page 15

The Civil War in Vir!!inia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolo!!ical Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

sonof Henry "Light HorseHarry" Lee,a RevolutionaryWar cavalryhero. At the age of three,after his fatherhad beenjailed for debt,young Robertmoved with mostof his family to Alexandria,where he lived in a seriesof dwellings, oftenas a houseguest.In 1813,when he was six, his fatherabandoned the family, fled to the Caribbean,and wandered,dying at CumberlandIsland, Georgia, five yearslater. Robert attendedAlexandria Academyand, as a dutiful son,helped his motherrear his youngersiblings. The family lived somewhatabove the "genteelpoverty" line, but moneyalways was a concern. Lee's elder half-brother,saddled with debt,sold Stratford Hall in 1822;Lee neverowned a home himself, but remained a "houseguest"for the rest of his life. Lee enteredWest Point in 1825and graduatedsecond in his class in 1829without receivinga single demerit(one of five membersof his classto accomplishthat feat). He enteredthe Corps of Engineersas a brevetsecond lieutenant, beginning a military careerthat lastedsome thirty-two years for the United Statesand four yearsfor the ConfederateStates. During his long tenure in the U.S. Army, Lee built forts (including part of Fort Monroe,in Virginia) and otherengineering projects, served with distinction in the Mexican War, superintendedthe academyat West Point,and roseto the rank of colonel. In October 1859he led the contingentof U.S. Marinesthat captured the abolitionistJohn Brown at Harper's Ferry. Lee's fellow officers esteemedhim highly, and Winfield Scottmade him his protege, declaringLee "the very bestsoldier I ever saw in the field." Yet Lee often felt frustratedby military politics, and his desireto care for his growing family (he marriedMary Ann RandolphCustis in 1831and by her fatheredfour daughtersand three sons)and tend for his wife's estate(Arlington) led him to consider resignationmore thanonce. Lee,like ThomasJ. Jackson,tended toward shyness when in the presenceof strangers,but with friendswas highly sociableand flirtatious with women. Physically,Lee was consideredthe handsomest man in the army, five feet eleveninch~s tall, gracefuland athletic,of military bearingbut neverstiff. He had black hair and browneyes, and eventuallygrew a moustachebut remainedbeardless until the fall of 1861. Lee possesseda wry wit, occasionallyrisque but not vulgar. He had a temper,which he controlled with his iron will, sometimeswith difficulty. The most importantwords in his life were duty, service,and honor,and his religious faith was quietand pietistic. For all the excellenceof his character,however, Lee was a humanbeing with ambitionsand self-doubts,overbearing though loving asa father,and sometimes unclear in his ordersas a military leader. As is the casewith Jackson,Lee the mortalman is muchmore interestingthan Lee the myth, Lee the perfect"Marble Man." Early in his careeras a Confederategeneral, the Marble Man showedfeet of clay, for Lee did not meetwith successin his first assignments.Following his resignationfrom the U.S. Army on 20 April 1861 (he had beenoffered field commandof the Unionarmy two days earlierbut declined),Lee was given the rank of major generaland placedin chargeof Virginia's defensesby GovernorJohn Letcher. In August 1861,promoted to full generalto rank from mid-June,he led an unsuccessfulcampaign in westernVirginia thatdid nothing to enhancehis reputationas a field commander.Lee's reluctanceto attackan entrenched Union force with his own poorly organizedtroops led to his beingcalled "Granny Lee" by armchair generalsand newspapereditors. At leasthe found a horsehe liked in westernVirginia: at first called Jeff NPSFonn 10-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page 16-

The Civil War in Vir~inia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolo~ical Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

Davis and then Greenbrier, the dappled gray gelding later was renamed by Lee. Like Jackson's Little Sorrel, Traveller could trot and gallop other into the ground, and his gait. which most riders found bone-jarring, suited Lee. Lee next saw service in South Carolina, where Davis sent him in November to organize the coastal defenses,and where he purchased Traveller. Lee's plans ran counter to the desires of certain Palmetto State politicians and wealthy planters, however, and he found himself increasingly unpopular there. By March 1862 Davis ordered him back to Richmond to serve as the president's military advisor. In that capacity Lee hit his stride, gaining invaluable knowledge of the Confederate command structure, acquiring supporters among Confederate politicians, and beginning (by mail and telegraph) a relationship with the man who would be his most important lieutenant in campaigns to come, Maj. Gen. Thomas J. Jackson. But when he assumed command of the Army of Northern Virginia on I June, after Johnston fell wounded, he withdrew it behind the Richmond fortifications and set the men to digging and strengthening the defenses. This caused some to dub Lee the "King of Spades" and voice fears that Granny Lee would never attack McClellan. Lee's critics were as mistaken in their judgments of him as McClellan's supporters were in their assessmentsof the Union commander. McClellan had been christened "Young ," wishfully, by the newspapers,and "Little Mac," affectionately, by his soldiers. President Lincoln, certain that he had appointed the right man to lead the Army of the Potomac, waited for him to take it into the field, and waited, and waited some more: Finally, exasperated, Lincoln ordered McClellan into battle, to no avail. The general offered reason after reason for not crossing the Potomac ("All quiet along the Potomac," a popular phrase,began to sound ironic) and offering battle to the Confederates who until late in September were entrenched within sight of Washington. Stonewall Jackson eventually delivered his own judgment on McClellan: "He lacks nerve." To be fair, McClellan did have a plan of attack, the so-called Urbanna Plan, which involved a flanking maneuver around Johnston's right near the Middlesex County village for which it was named, but he kept it secret even from Lincoln. When he finally disclosed it to the president. its complexity and the consequences of certain Confederate strategic decisions soon rendered it obsolete. South of the Potomac, Johnston traveled to Richmond to consult with Davis and other Confederate leaders. He was told to withdraw his outnumbered army from northern Virginia and set up a new defensive line closer to Richmond to protect the capital against the campaign that McClellan was certain to launch. Concerned that such a move would expose his left flank to attack from the Shenandoah Valley, where a Union army led by Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks lurked among the hills, Johnston ordered Stonewall Jackson to keep in contact and adopt a defensive mode. Lee later changed these orders to enable Jackson to begin his Valley Campaign. Johnston returned to his lines and carried out the withdrawal as ordered, evacuating his army from Centreville and Manassas Junction on 8-9 March 1862. The troops burned all the stores and baggage that they could not carry, as well as mountains of supplies stockpiled in Confederate magazines. The odor of burning beef and bacon followed the retreating Confederates for twenty miles, adding to their ill humor at turning their backs on their foes. NPS Form 10-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page 11

The Civil War in Virl!inia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolol!ical Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

McClellan,as Davis predicted,at lastdeveloped a plan. After severalevolutions, it called for the generalto transporthis mighty force to NewportNews and Fort Monroe,which remainedin Federalhands, first underthe amiableMaj. Gen. BenjaminF. (later "Beast" or "Spoons")Butler and then underMaj. Gen. JohnA. Dix. Therethe army would disembarkand march up the Peninsula,between the York and James Rivers,to Richmond. There McClellan,as bothhe and his supportersbelieved, would savethe Union with one greatbattle. The Peninsulawas a flat land of largeplantations and smallerfarms worn out by repeatedcrops of tobacco. Locatedbetween the ChesapeakeBay and Richmond,the Peninsulais part of TidewaterVirginia, wherethe terrain is cut by slow-flowing rivers and swamps. Historically, it was(and remains)one of the most significantplaces in Virginia. The list of historic siteswas well-knownto McClellan: Jamestown, wherethe colonistsestablished their first permanentsettlement; at Fort Monroe,the new colony's window on the Chesapeaketo guard againstSpanish marauders; Williamsburg, the second colonial capital; Yorktown, where Washingtoncaptured Cornwallis and his anny, effectivelyensuring the survival of the fledgling United States.Grand plantations,among them Berkeley,Shirley, Sherwood Forest,and Westover,associated with old Virginia names-Harrison, Carter,Tyler, and Byrd-lined the banksof the JamesRiver. McClellan musthave felt thatthe forcesof history summonedhim to reclaimthe land wherethe United Stateswas born. In March 1862the Army of the Potomacmoved at last. First, though,McClellan accededto Lincoln's urging to capturethe Confederatebatteries at Freestoneand Cockpit Pointsand elsewhereto end the embarrassingPotomac River blockadeof Washington.He found the batteriesempty, however, as the menand gunshad withdrawnwith the restof Johnston'sarmy. McClellan also marchedhis army out to Centrevilleand ManassasJunction and back again,finding the Confederatesgone and "Quakerguns" (logs paintedblack to resemblecannon) guarding the emptyearthworks. Although McClellanhad known of the faux artillery for severalweeks, Washington's newspaper reporters had not. Their claims thatpainted logs had fooled him into not attackingJohnston made the Union generallook silly. Beginningon 17 Marchand continuing for the nextthree weeks into early April, McClellan's army steameddown the PotomacRiver from Alexandriaon transportsbound for Fort Monroe and the Peninsula.The logistics of moving so manymen, horses, , and supplieswere daunting. Some389 vessels(ranging from Long Island steamersto Philadelphiaferryboats) transported some 121,500 men, 14,592animals, 1,224 ambulances and wagons,44 artillery batteries,and countlesstons of equipmentand supplies. Accompaniedby bandsand flags,the Anny of the Potomacturned its shortvoyage into a grand procession.The army's destinationalready had experiencedwarfare both on land and on the water. Almost a year earlier,on 18-19 May 1861,two United Statesgunboats dueled with Confederatebatteries at Sewell's Point near Norfolk as they attemptedto enforcethe Union blockadeof HamptonRoads, the main shipping lane betweenthe JamesRiver andChesapeake Bay. Capt. Henry Eagle,U.S.N., ofUSS , with supportfrom USS ThomasFreeborn, fired on the batteries,commanded by Capt. PeytonH. Colquitt, on 18 NPS Fo!'ln IO-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page 18

The Civil War in Virginia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolof!ical Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

May, and then alone the next day, until the gunboat exhausted its ammunition. Neither side suffered serious damage. The next month, on 10 June 1861, the first land battle in present-day Virginia took place on the western edge of Hampton in York County at a community called Big Bethel (an engagement at Philippi, in what is now West Virginia, had occurred on 3 June). Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Butler, commanding at Fort Monroe, sent converging columns from Hampton and Newport News against advanced Confederate outposts at Little and Big Bethel. The 1,500 Confederates, led by colonels John B. Magruder and D. H. Hill, abandoned Little Bethel and fell back to their entrenchments behind Brick Kiln Creek, near Big Bethel Church. The Federals, totaling some 3,500 and under the immediate command of Brig. Gen. Ebenezer W. Pierce, pursued, attacked frontally along the road, and were repulsed. Crossing downstream, the 5th attempted to turn the Confederate left flank, but were likewise repulsed. The Union forces retired to Hampton and Newport News. The Confederates lost 8 men killed and wounded, while Union casualties numbered 79, some from "friendly fire," in this embarrassing Federal debacle that left their opponents in control of the Peninsula. More to the point for McClellan and his men were the recent naval actions at on 8-9 March 1862, the very days that Johnston withdrew from Centreville and Manassas Junction and McClellan found the Potomac River batteries abandoned. In June 1861 the Confederate secretary of the navy, StephenR. Mallory, began an ambitious project to build an ironclad navy that would overpower its wooden Federal counterpart and break the of the Southern Coast. The first such vessel, the former USS Merrimack, was clad in iron plates forged at the Tredegar Iron Works in Richmond and renamed CSS Virginia. Ostensibly taking the boat on a shakedown cruise near Hampton Roads on 8 March, its commander, Capt. , instead engaged the Union blockaders there. Virginia rammed and sank USS Cumber/and, then turned on USS Congress-which ran aground in its futile effort to escape-and set it afire. Wounded in the l~tter action, Buchanan was replacecdby Lt. Cmdr. Catesby ap R. Jones, who brought Virginia out again the next day. This time Lt. John L. Worden's USS Monitor, the Union ironclad, came out to meet it. Neither vessel seriously damaged the other in the ensuing Battle of the Ironclads, although the sailors must have suffered headachesfrom the din of iron projectiles clanging off the metal hulls. Virginia withdrew first, but neither side could claim a victory. Although Virginia retained control of James River, Worden's sturdy defense preserved the Union blockade and made the Hampton Roads anchorage safe for McClellan's convoy. Soon the area around Fort Monroe and Newport News turned into a great tent city as McClellan's army disembarked and encamped. It had scarcely settled in, however, before the general called it out. On 4 April McClellan, with close to seventy thousand men and nineteen artillery batteries in the vanguard of his army, set forth on the march to Richmond. All that stood in his way, he estimated (accurately, for the only time in the campaign), was Magruder with about fourteen thousand Confederate troops. Magruder had built three lines of earthworks and fortifications that stretched southward across the Peninsula: the fITSt, mostly for show, about a dozen miles west of Fort Monroe; the second and strongest from Yorktown to Warwick River, a tributary of the James, down the Warwick to Lee's Mill, then westWard to Skiffe's NPS Fonn IO-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page 19

The Civil War in Virginia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeological Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

Creek,which fed into JamesRiver; andthe third arounda key roadjunction just eastof Williamsburg, betweenCollege Creekand Queen'sCreek. If the conflict could have beenreduced to a battle of egosonly, McClellan may have met his match in "Prince John" Magruder. A manwho carriedflamboyance to new heights,Magruder strutted aboutin a gaudyuniform, gaveexpensive banquets, delivered pompous speeches, and believed his own publicity. He disposedhis troops in a thin array along his defensiveline and calmly awaitedMcClellan. Whenthe Union commanderencountered Magruder's Yorktown defenses on 5 April, his instinct for cautionrose to the surface. Within hoursMcClellan hadconvinced himself(assuming it was not his plan all along), basedon the inflatedclaims of a few Confederateprisoners, that he faceda hundred- thousand-manarmy and thatthe Yorktown line requireda full-scalesiege. On the Confederateside, in contrast,Magruder concluded that an attackwas imminentand that Johnston,who wascoming from Richmondwith reinforcements,would be too late. McClellan sentword to his lieutenantsto preparefor a siege;the resulting delayafforded Johnstonplenty of time to reinforceMagruder. Evenwith more troops, however,the Confederatesnumbered only aboutfifty thousand,roughly half the size of McClellan's army, and severalweak spots existed in the Yorktown-Warwickline. On 16 April, the only battle near Yorktownoccurred when McClellanprobed the line at DamNo. I or Burnt Chimneysbut failed to follow up on early successand was beatenback. McClellandelayed for two more weekswhile he tried unsuccessfullyto convincethe navyto maneuverpast the big Confederateguns at Yorktown and GloucesterPoint and ascendthe York River to West Point,thereby outflanking the Yorktown-WarwickLine. Whenthe Union commanderfinally preparedto launchhis attackon Yorktown on 4 May, he found the worksempty. After a delayof sometwelve hours,he pursuedJohnston's rear guard vigorouslyand caughtup to it at Williamsburgthe nextday. The clashat Williamsburgwas the first major battle of the PeninsulaCampaign. McClellan's vanguard,consisting of almost41,000 troops includingtwo divisions led by Brig. Gen. JosephHooker and Brig. Gen. William F. Smith,encountered Johnston's rear guard,some 32,000 men commanded by Maj. Gen. JamesLongstreet, about two miles southeastof the former colonialcapital. A four-mile-long set of earthworksprepared by Magrudertwo monthsearlier, with Fort Magruderin their center,protected the Confederates.Smith and Hookerattacked, with the latterstriking ,while a brigadeled by Brig. Gen. Winfield Scott Hancockmarched around Longstreet's left flank and assaultedfrom the northeast and rear,occupying two . Longstreetcounterattacked and threatened to overwhelmHooker until Brig. Gen. 's division arrivedto stabilizethe line. A counterattackagainst Hancock, led by Brig. Gen. JubalA. Early, failed becauseit was hastilyprepared and executedpiecemeal. Early fell seriouslywounded, while Hooker,because of his vigorousthough unsuccessful assault on Fort Magruder, earnedthe nom de guerre"Fighting Joe." During the night, the Confederatesslipped away from the field and continuedtheir withdrawal. Federalcasualties totaled 2,283, while thoseof the Confederatesamounted to about1,560. . Johnstonposted Maj. Gen.Gustavus W. Smithand his division at Barhamsville,in New Kent County,to guardthe Confederatewagon train. On 6 May, Brig. Gen. William B. Franklin's division NPS Fonn 10-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page 20-

The Civil War in Vir ini 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolo ical Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

disembarkedfrom Federaltroop transportsat Eltham's Landing,on the southside of the York River across from West Point,and entrenchedabout a mile inland. Smith did not attack,waiting to seewhether Franklin could be lured into the open;he sentfor reinforcementsfrom Johnston.The next day, with the entire Confederatearmy nearby,Smith orderedBrig. Gen. W. H. ChaseWhiting to leadhis division againstthe Federals. Whenhe learnedthat the Confederateartillery could not reachthe Union gunboatsin the York River, and thereforecould not protectWhiting's men from Federalbombardment, Smith broke off the advance.Confederate losses amounted to 48, and Union casualtiestotaled 194. Johnstoncontinued to withdraw,his wagontrain secure,and McClellanfollowed. WhenJohnston pulled his army out of Yorktown,he left behindMaj. Gen. BenjaminHuger, commanderof the Departmentof Norfolk, to protectConfederate interests on the southside of James River. Hugerabandoned Norfolk and marchedto join Johnstonon 10May when pressedby Federaltroops underthe commandof Maj. Gen.John E. Wool. Now exposedto massattack by Union artillery and gunboats,Flag Officer JosiahTattnall, commanderof the ironcladCSS Virginia, blew up his vesselwhen he found he could not lighten it enoughto escapeup JamesRiver. His actionleft the river opento the Union fleet, and a few days later severalgunboats steamed toward Richmondto testthe defensesthere. The Union ironcladsMonitor. Galena,and StevensBattery (Naugatuck)led the way underCdr. John Rodgers,accompanied by two woodenwarships, Aroostook and Port Royal. At Drewry's Bluff, locatedon the southside of JamesRiver in ChesterfieldCounty a few miles below Richmond,heavy guns commandeda sharpturn in the river. Whenthe Union flotilla approachedthe bluff on 15 May, it found that obstructionsand weightedvessels sunk in the river blocked itsway. Thenthe gunsabove opened rITe, damagingGalena, while someof the Union shipscould not elevatetheir cannonenough to hit the fort. The Federalfleet broke off the attackand retired,leaving Richmond's defenses intact. Meanwhile,McClellan continuedhis pursuitof Johnstonup the Peninsula.The Confederate commanderhastened toward the ChickahominyRiver, which originatednorthwest of Richmondand flowed sluggishly,through swamps and floodplains,southeastwardly to the James. In the dry seasonthe Chickahominydid not look like much,but whenthe springrains struck,it flooded easily,becoming a substantialbarrier. Johnstonwanted the now-swollenriver betweenhis army and McClellan's. McClellan, moving slowly, advancedup the PamunkeyRiver, which flows parallelto the Chickahominyon the south andjoins with the MattaponiRiver on the north at West Pointto form the York River. By 15 May he was at White House,the homeof one of RobertE. Lee's sons,Col. William H. F. "Rooney" Lee, wherehe establishedan enormoussupply depot. The army thenslogged slowly on through rain and mud, or heatand dust,along the Richmondand York River Railroadtoward Richmond. Johnstonachieved his goal,crossing most of his army overthe Chickahominyand into strong defensiveworks north and eastof Richmond,to counterMcClellan as he approachedfrom the Pamunkey. Toward the end of May the Union army trudgedinto positionsome six miles eastof Richmond. The weary soldierscould seethe churchspires of the city, andto them as well asto McClellan,victory seemednear at hand. NPSFonn 10-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page _21-

The Civil War in Vir inia 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolo ical Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

McClellan crossed his army over the corps by corps, carefully rebuilding bridges destroyed or damaged by the retreating Confederates. Hearing reports of enemy troops advancing on Hanover Court House, to McClellan's right rear, the Union general dispatched Brig. Gen. , a close friend, and one of his two divisions to eliminate the threat. On 27 May, at a crossroads two miles south of the courthouse village, Porter encountered Brig. Gen. Lawrence O'B. Branch's brigade and defeated it in a confused, bloody fight. The Federals lost 397 men, the Confederates 930, most of the latter as prisoners. By 30 May, McClellan had crossed two corps, his left wing, over to the south bank of the Chickahominy, while three-his right-remained on the north side. Johnston decided to strike McClellan's left flank, the corps of major generals Samuel P. Heintzelman and Erasmus D. Keyes, before the other corps could cross. Nature aided him in the form of a violent thunderstorm that evening; it washed away two bridges and raised the water level, effectively isolating roughly half of the Union army on the south side of the river. On 31 May, Johnston attacked at Seven Pines (Fair Oaks) in three columns. Along Nine Mile Road to the north, Maj. Gen. James Longstreet was to lead his corps, reinforced by Brig. Gen. William H. C. Whiting's division. On Longstreet's right, approaching on Williamsburg Road, would be Maj. Gen. Daniel H. Hill's division, and to Hill's right, Maj. Gen. , on Charles City Road. Johnston's plan fell apart, however, as he had issued orders to Longstreet verbally instead of in writing. Longstreet marched down Hill's and Huger's roads instead of his own, entangling his command with Huger's. By the time the units sorted themselves out, the attack was hours late, and the various divisions entered the battle piecemeal rather than in concert. That evening, Johnston rode along his lines as the battle died away; suddenly, a bullet struck him in the right shoulder, followed immediately by a shell fragment in the chest. Command devolved on Maj. Gen. Gustavus W. Smith. The next day, the Confederates mounted a half-hearted attack, but when Longstreet was repulsed it ended. Smith's role as commander of the Army of Northern Virginia ended too, as President Davis replaced him with Davis's military advisor, Gen. Robert E. Lee. Lee ordered an immediate withdrawal to the previous morning's lines so that his army might recover and reorganize. By the night of 1 June, both armies were in their original positions. Each had thrown about forty thousand men into the fight, but the Federals had suffered fewer casualties, about 5,700 to the Confederates' 6,100. The Confederates had also lost Joe Johnston, but they had gained Robert E. Lee. McClellan lost no ground, but the sight of all the mangled dead shocked him and, coupled with his vast overinflation of his opponents' numbers, reduced his will to fight. McClellan harangued the Lincoln administration for more men and began to believe that he was the victim of a Republican plot to undermine his campaign. He also claimed to be heavily outnumbered by the Confederates. Whether in fact he believed this or inflated the numbers to win sympathy and gain reinforcements is subject to debate. For the next two weeks, while McClellan heated up the telegraph wires to Washington, Lee had his army dig in and improve the trenches protecting Richmond, reinforcing his opprobrium as the "King of Spades." Lee also reconnoitered McClellan's lines, sending Brig. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart on his famous "Ride NPSForm 10-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page 22

The Civil War in Virl!inia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeoloe:ical Resources Name "of Multiple Property Listing

Around McClellan" (an undertakingthat Stuartwould accomplishtwice more againstanother Union general-the third time with graveconsequences for the South)on 12June. The ride costStuart only one death,Capt. William Latane,who was buried in the family graveyardat SummerHill near Hanovertownin easternHanover County, in a serviceconducted by the womenof the house. A paintingof the imagined scene,and the engravingsmade from it, laterbecame cherished Southern icons. For the moment,however, Stuart's achievementbolstered Confederate spirits and gaveLee the valuableinformation that McClellan's right flank was "in the air"-not securedby any naturalor manmade obstacle. On 25 June,Lee preparedto take the offensive,beginning what would be calledthe SevenDays' Campaign. He had neverintended to remainin his earthworks,of course,but insteadstrengthened them so that Richmondcould be defendedby a smallerforce, leaving mostof his army free to attackthe Federalsin the open. He plannedto advanceagainst McClellan's right, consistingof Porter'sreinforced corps (about thirty thousandmen), with somesixty thousand,including the army of StonewallJackson, just arrived from his successfulShenandoah Valley Campaign. The attackwas scheduledfor 26 June,but the day before it began,McClellan senta reconnaissancein force westwardguiding on the WilliamsburgRoad to probethe Confederatelines and bring Richmondwithin rangeof his siegeguns. He struckLee's army at Oak Grove, with Heintzelman'scorps confronting Huger's four . Most of the fighting took placeforward of the Confederatelines; at the end of the day Huger's menwere back in their earthworks,having haltedthe Federaladvance. The Union army suffered516 casualties,the Confederates316. The unexpectedattack did not derail Lee's own plans for the next morning. The Confederates crossedthe ChickahominyRiver and confrontedPorter's corps eastof Mechanicsville.The attacksoon stalled,however, as the Confederatedivisions of major generalsJames Longstreet, A. P. Hill, and Daniel H. Hill awaitedthe arrival of Jackson,who was to strike Porterfrom the north,flanking him. Jackson, mentallyand physicallyexhausted from the valley campaign,and confusedby Lee's orders,never arrived on the field but stoppedjust shortof his objective. In mid-afternoon,an exasperatedA. P. Hill launchedhis own attackacross Beaver Dam Creeknear Ellerson' s Mill, just eastof Mechanicsville.The assault,over swampyground and againstdug-in Federalson a hillside, wasrepulsed with heavylosses as Porter's men threw backsuccessive Confederate waves: some 1,300Southern casualties to 360 Federal. Finally the attacksceased with the darkness.During the night, awareof Jackson'snearness on his right, Porter withdrew on McClellan's ordersa few miles southand eastto a strong positionbehind Boatswain's Creek. There,at Gaines'sMill, Lee struckagain on 27 June. Porterarranged his corps in a semicircleon a bluff, and in mid-afternoonA. P. Hill attackedagain and againacross the soggy, unevenground. Longstreetcame to Hill's support,on his right, and Jacksonand D. H. Hill, late, on Hill's left. Finally, underconcerted Confederate attacks in the evening,Porter's line cavedin. The Federalswithdrew in good order,joining the rest of McClellan's army in its imminentretreat toward James River. The carnage, however,was dreadful: about6,800 Unioncasualties and 8,700Confederate. While the Battle of Gaints's Mill ragednorth of the ChickahominyRiver, to the southoccurred the openingphase of the battlesof Garnett'sand Golding's Farms. Magruderdemonstrated against the NPS Form IO-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 {8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page _23-

The Civil War in Vir~inia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolo~ical Resources Name of Multiple PropertyListing

Union line southof the river at Garnett'sFarm. To escapean artillery crossfire,the Federaldefenders from Heintzelman'scorps pulled back("refused") their line alongthe river. The Confederatesattacked again the next morning a shortdistance away near Golding's (Gouldin's) Farm but were easilyrepulsed. Losses totaled438 for the Confederates,189 for the Federals.Though costly, these sharp probes heightened McClellan's fear that an all-out assaultwas underway both northand southof the river. The ferocity of Lee's attacksshocked the Union commander,who alreadyhad decidedto "changehis base"from White Houseon PamunkeyRiver to one of the JamesRiver landings(ultimately, Harrison's Landing at Berkeley plantation). McClellanjustified the moveas a strategicwithdrawal, but his critics, including his own men, called it the "great skedaddle." By whatevername, it wasa retreat,with Lee in hot pursuit. The aggressiveLee was superblysuited to commandan aggressivearmy, and he cultivatedflrst- rate lieutenantsto compensatefor anygaps in his knowledge. As an engineer,he was expertin fortification design,and also understoodthe weaknessesof fixed positions;his last assignmentin the had beenin the cavalry,so he well knewthe useof that arm,and now had JebStuart besides; he could rely on the judgment of his othersubordinates who wereaccomplished in the useof infantry and artillery; and he had an instinct for thejugular of his opponent."Lee is audacitypersonified," observed one of his aides. Lee's audaciousnature contained potential flaws, however,that could leadto disasterin the wrong circumstances.He commandedthrough discretionary orders, trusting the field officers at the sceneof the fight to adjustto the particularcircumstances they faced,yet still achievetactical success. This style of commandsuited the independent-mindedJackson perfectly, resulting in one of history's greatmilitary partnerships(though not immediately,during the SevenDays), but othergenerals needed closer direction, which Lee did not alwaysprovide. In June 1862,for example,Lee's discretionaryorders only created confusion;Lee and his subordinatesdid not know eachother well enoughyet to be instinctive. And when Lee's "blood was up," as someobservers put it, his aggressivenature could blind him to weaknessesin his plan of attack,as soonoccurred east of Richmond,and as laterhappened at Gettysburg. On 29 June,as McClellan changedhis base,Magruder struck the retreatingFederals at Savage's Stationon the Richmondand York River Railroadnorth of WilliamsburgRoad. Lee had hoped for a more vigorous attackto pin the Union army againstWhite Oak Swampto the south,but Magruderassaulted McClellan's rear guard,commanded by Maj. Gen. EdwinV. Sumner,with only part of his force. Jackson, occupiedwith operationsalong the northside of the Chickahominy,did not supportMagruder's left, and Huger,moving slowly downCharles City Road,failed to supporthis right. Sumnerheld off the Confederateattack, enabling the rest of McClellan's army to escapethrough the swamp. Confederate casualtiesamounted to some400 versusabout 900 for the Federals,but whenthe Southernersswept throughSavage's Station the next day, theycaptured 2,500 wounded or sick Union soldiersleft behind at the field hospitalin and aroundthe Savagehouse. Lee caughtup with McClellan at Glendaleand White Oak Swampon 30 June,sending Huger's, Longstreet's,and A. P. Hill's divisions againstthe retreatingUnion army at Frayser'sfarm nearpresent-. day Glendale,a crossroadsin easternHenrico County. Longstreet'sand Hill's attackspenetrated the UnIon NPS Form 10-900a OMS No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E -Page -~-

The Civil War in Vir!!inia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolo!!ical Resources Name of Multiple PropertyListing

defensenear Willis Church, routing Brig. Gen.George A. McCall's division in McClellan's centerand capturingMcCall. Union counterattacksby Hooker'sand Keamy's divisions sealedthe break,however, and savedtheir line of retreatalong the Willis ChurchRoad, while felled treesstopped Huger's advanceon the CharlesCity Roadand protectedthe Unioncenter. Jackson,directed to attackthe Union right from the north,was delayedby Brig. Gen. IsraelB. Richardson'sII Corps division and Brig. Gen. William F. Smith's VI Corps division under Franklin at White Oak Swamp. ConfederateMaj. Gen.Theophilus H. Holmesmade a feeble attemptto turn the Union left flank at Turkey Bridge but was driven backby Union artillery on Malvern Hill and by Federalgunboats in JamesRiver. Thus,Lee lost his bestopportunity to cut off and destroythe Union army piecemealduring its retreatto JamesRiver at a costof 3,600 casualties to his opponent's2,800. That night, McClellanestablished a strongposition on Malvern Hill, three miles southof the Frayser'sfarm battlefield. The Battle of Malvern Hill broughtthe SevenDays' campaignto a bloodyclose on 1 July. Brig. Gen. Fitz John Porterhad prepareda strongdefensive position there evenas the previousday's battleshad raged. Someforty Union cannonlined the crestof the hill, facing north and west,with anotherhundred and fifty in reserveand on the flanks. The restof McClellan's army movedinto position on ridgesto the eastof Malvern Hill to awaitthe Confederateattack. Lee orderedJackson's divisions into position on the Southernleft, with Magruderin the centerand Hugeron the right. His plans went awry, though,when Magruderwent astrayand spentthree hours marching and countermarching to the front. Other units arrived on the field piecemeal,and Lee orderedhis artillery to engagePorter's; the resulting duelended in the silencing of the Confederateguns. Lee thenfed his infantry into the grinder in one futile after another,and the Union artillery cut themdown. McClellan lost some3,200 men, while Lee suffered more than 5,300casualties. D. H. Hill summedup the scopeof the disasterwhen he later observed,"It was not war-it was murder." Againstthe wishesof his generals,who hopedto counterattackafter their initial success, McClellan orderedthe retreatto continue,and in the night he disengagedand madehis way eastto Harrison's Landing. A memberof the Union picket line left behindon Malvern Hill to observe Confederateactivities noted that as he gazeddown on the field of battle overthe bodiesof fallen Southerners,"enough were alive and moving to give the field a singularcrawling effect." During the SevenDays' campaign,the Army of NorthernVirginia sustainedsome twenty thousandcasualties, while the Union army lost aboutsixteen thousand. The fighting aroundRichmond (including SevenPines) resulted in 20 percentcasualties for McClellan and a staggering30 percentfor Lee. Lee's savageattacks, despite their high cost,drove McClellan from the outskirtsof Richmond,and Southernershailed the Confederategeneral as the city's savior. It was McClellan, not Lee,who emergedfrom the 1862contest with his reputationin tatters. All his boastinghad beenfor naught:with the largestarmy thenon the planet,he failed to defeata force smallerthan his. McClellan's overestimationsof his opponent'sstrength, coupled with his lack of aggressiveness,caused him to losethe campaignalthough he won mostof the battles. NPS Form 10-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUA T.ION SHEET

Section E Page _25~

The Civil War in VirlZinia. 1861-1865: Historic and ArchaeololZical Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

Lee won the campaignbut lost mostof the battlesbecause of poorConfederate coordination, confusingorders, and battle plans that weretoo complicatedfor the terrain. Too often,his forceswere stalled-as were McClellan's-by swollenrivers, murky swamps,thick undergrowth,and abysmalroads. But Lee and his generalslearned much abouteach other during the SevenDays and,once on betterground, Lee's tacticalstyle would comeinto its own. More importantly,the new partnershipbetween Lee and Jacksonsoon would producean almostunbroken year-long string of the Confederatecommander's greatest offensivevictories.

NORTHERN VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN Gen. RobertE. Lee kepta wary eye on Maj. Gen.George B. McClellan and the Anny of the Potomacfor severaldays following the end of the SevenDays' Campaignon I July 1862. The Union army had successfullyevaded Lee's attemptsto crushit, thanksto boththe sturdydefense mounted by its soldiersand the usuallyuncoordinated attacks by Lee's lieutenants,and still presenteda formidable front behind its strongfortifications at Harrison'sLanding on the JamesRiver. Lee musteredabout 72,000 men of his Anny of NorthernVirginia to face McClellan's 90,000. In additionto McClellan's force in CharlesCity County,Lee facedthreats in two otherparts of the state. Maj. Gen.Ambrose E. Burnside,freshly arrived at Fort Monroe with 7,000 menfrom his successful expeditionagainst Confederate strong points on the North Carolinasounds, stood poised to marchto McClellan's aid if summonedfrom the easternend of the Peninsula.To the north, PresidentAbraham Lincoln had given Maj. Gen.John Popecommand of three armies,one of which recentlyhad pursued StonewallJackson unsuccessfully up and downthe ShenandoahValley. Pope'scombined forpe, dubbed the , totaledsome 40',000 men. McClellan claimedto Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck,the newly appointedgeneral-in-chief of the United StatesArmy, that he could defeatLee's force,which he as usualoverestimated at 200,000men, if only he had Pope'sand Burnside'sarmies with him, and some20,000 soldiersfrom the westernarmies as well. He had spelledout his plansto Lincoln as well whenthe presidentmade a visit to Harrison'sLanding on 8 July. Both of McClellan's superiorswere cool to McClellan's ideas,however, and on 3 August Halleckwired him to evacuatehis army from the Richmondfront andjoin forceswith Pope. McClellan objectedto no avail; he had beenreplaced as commanderof an active Union army in the field. About that time, Lee learnedfrom Lt. JohnS. Mosby,who had beencaptured by the Federalsand thenreleased at Fort Monroe(a major mistake,they would later realize),that Burnsidehad beenordered north. Whenhe sawMcClellan's army embarkingon its steamers,Lee knew thatthe campaignagainst Richmondfrom the Peninsulawas over, and thatthe next theaterof war would openin northernVirginia. He also understoodthat ifhe moved quickly enough,his principal opponentwould be Pope,not McClellan. JohnPope was a difficult manto like, and mostof his associatesquickly gave up the effort. Brig. Gen. SamuelD. Sturgisspoke for dozensof officers whenhe declared,"I don't care for JohnPope one pinch of owl dung." Maj. Gen. Fitz John Porter,a closefriend of McClellan,referred to Popeas "an ass." NPS Fonn 10-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page 26

The Civil War in Vire:inia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeoloe:ical Resources Nam~ of Multiple Property Listing

Ifpossible, Pope was even more full of himself than McClellan-pompous, impetuous, abrasive, loud-mouthed, and a braggart. Given to windy proclamations, he allegedly datelined his pronouncements "headquarters in the saddle." Both Union and Confederate wags quickly joked that his headquarterswere where his hindquarters ought to be, and he didn't know the one from the other. Even Pope's detractors, however, usually admitted that the man was highly intelligent and personally courageous as a field commander. His recent promotion had come on the heels of his successful campaign against several Confederate positions along the Mississippi River. A staunch Republican, Pope had the support of his friend PresidentLincoln. Pope's tendency to hog the credit for successwhile delegating the blame for failure to every subordinate from general to private soldier, however, soon made him unpopular in certain quarters of his new command. Officers especially were incensed by a patronizing proclamation in which he stated that "I have come to you from the West, where we have always seen the backs of our enemies." The implication that the reverse was true in the East, and that John Pope had arrived to turn cowards into heroes, angered many in the army. Pope also angered Virginia civilians by threatening to wage war on them as well as on the Southern armies. In Missouri, where Pope had served, a guerrilla war was raging within the state in addition to the larger conflict. Perhaps anticipating similar tactics by supposedly "noncombatant" Virginians, Pope threatened to hold them responsible for actions by Confederates against Union forces in their counties, even to the point of summary execution. He also ordered his army to "subsist upon the country," that is, to commandeer supplies from civilians without recompense. At a period of the war when some semblance of chivalry still existed in both eastern armies, such orders appalled many military men on both sides as well as their intended objects or victims. Some of Pope's officers were in a state of near mutiny as the campaign opened. It must be remembered, however, that although some army commanders were notoriously "political" in their ambitions-McClellan and Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Butler are two obvious examples- the Union army was riddled with officers holding strong political opinions and friendships. Many of them were ready to accuse others of dereliction of duty, refuse to obey orders themselves, or even hold back troops in battle to ensure the failure of those with whom they disagreed. Some, conservatives like McClellan and his friend Porter, opposed Pope's "radical" policies (and opposed Lincoln, who approved them, as well). McClellan was not alone in plotting ways to oust Lincoln and the Republicans from power; on the other side, Lincoln and Pope seized any opportunity to belittle McClellan. A political struggle for control of the United States government was waged simultaneously with the military effort to preserve the Union. Pope'samlY consisted of threecorps spread in an arc acrossnorth-central Virginia from Sperryville,at the easternbase of the Blue Ridge Mountains,to Falmouth,just aboveFredericksburg. Maj. Gen. ,a veteranGerman officer, led Pope'sright flank at Sperryville,replacing Maj. Gen.John C. Fremont,who had resigned. Maj. Gen. Irvin McDowell,the loserat the First Battle of Manass as and subsequentlycommander of the defensesof Washington,held the left flank at Falmouth,with one of his divisions (Brig. Gen.James B. Ricketts's)separated and stationedat WaterlooBridge a few miles west of NPS Form 10-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section .E Page _21_-

The Civil War in Vir2inia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolol!ical Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

Warrenton. Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks led the third corps, which was positioned in the center of Pope's line at Washington (usually called Little Washington), in RappahannockCounty. Brig. Gen. Samuel W. Crawford's brigade was detached from Banks's command and stationed some twenty miles in advance of the main line at Culpeper Court House, accompanied by Brig. Gen. John P. Hatch's cavalry. Banks had been Jackson's unfortunate opponent in the Shenandoah Valley, and he was eager for a rematch. After Lee learned that Crawford was in Culpeper, he countered the threat to his rear even before he was certain of McClellan's intentions. He divided his army and on Sunday, 13 July, ordered Jackson to march toward Pope, "to observe the enemy's movements closely, to avail himself of any opportunity to attack that may arise." While Jackson ultimately would have about 24,000 men with which to confront Pope's growing army (its numbers had risen to almost 50,000), Lee retained most of the Army of Northern Virginia under Maj. Gen. James Longstreet near Richmond while McClellan threatened the capital. Lee gambled in entrusting Jackson with semi-independent command after Stonewall's poor showing during the Seven Days' Campaign, but Jackson soon demonstrated that Lee's confidence was not misplaced. By 19 July Jackson reached Gordonsville, a key railroad junction that was thought to be Pope's objective. There, the Virginia Central Railroad, which linked Richmond with the Shenandoah Valley, touched the southern terminus of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. Gordonsville became Jackson's headquarters,his army's supply depot, and his base for operations against Pope. Jackson's army drilled and resupplied itself until early August, when word arrived that part of Pope's army was moving south from Culpeper Court House. Pope's plan, unknown to Jackson, was to march to the Rapidan River, an east-west tributary of the Rappahannockthat separated Culpeper County from Orange County to the south. Once there, he planned a southwestward feint toward Charlottesville, to compel Jackson either to fall back in that direction, split his force, or head north to offer Pope combat. Jackson chose the last-named course, intending to meet and defeat the van of Pope's army before the rest could arrive in support. His army marched out of Gordonsville on the aftern09n of Thursday, 7 August. August in Virginia means summer at its hottest and most humid, and both Jackson's and Pope's armies suffered dreadfully as they marched toward each other on the Culpeper-Orange Road (today in some parts U.S. Route 15 and in others two-lane parallel county roads). The dust rose in clouds, choking men and horses, and soldiers straggled and fell by the roadside, prostrated by the intense heat. The two armies collided on Saturday, 9 August, at Cedar Mountain in southwestern Culpeper County, about four miles north of the Rapidan River. Maj. Gen. Richard S. Ewell and his division led Jackson's column, followed by Brig. Gen. Charles S. Winder's division, with Maj. Gen. A. P. Hill and his division in the distance bringing up the rear. Late in the afternoon, Jackson deployed his army across the Culpeper-Orange Road, with his right, under Ewell, anchored on the northern base of Cedar Mountain and his left, commanded by Winder, in a woods to the west of the road. Banks threw a division into the fight. Jackson's left crumpled and Winder fell mortally wounded. Just as the Union attack ran out of steam, Hill arrived to reinforce the left flank, and it was the Union line's turn to collapse under the renewed Confederate assault. Jackson's men pursued Banks's even after darkness fell, overrunning Pope's headQuartersfar to the Federal rear before breaking off the engagement. The battle, not well managed by NPS Form IO-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section _E- Page~

The Civil War in Vir2inia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolo2ical Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

Jackson,was nonethelessa clear Confederatevictory. Jacksonhad rnore than 18,000rnen engaged and sufferedsorne 1,300 casualties, while Bankscornrnitted about 8,000 and lost around2,400. Once Jacksonhad accornplishedhis goalof stoppingPope's advance at CedarMountain, he retired with his army to Gordonsvilleand sentcavalry probes northward to searchout otheravenues for attack. Lee arrived by train at the town to confer with Jacksonon the afternoonof 14 August. Pope,Jackson informed Lee, had encarnpedrnost of his army (now sorne70,000 rnen) on the "peninsula"formed by the confluenceof the Rapidanand Rappahannockrivers in the southeasterncorner of CulpeperCounty. Pope'sbest route of withdrawal,should the needarise, was the RappahannockStation railroad bridge at present-day Rernington,on the Union right flank. If the Confederatescould seizethe bridge,Pope would be trapped betweenthe two rivers. Lee graspedthe opportunityat once but pauseduntil his cavalryand the supply train for Longstreet'srnen arrived. He sentJackson stealthily forward to the RapidanRiver, but on 18 August,just before Lee's plannedadvance, fugitive slavesrevealed his scherneto Pope,and the Union army beganto withdraw acrossthe Rappahannock.Lee thenresorted to probesalong the Federalfront. with the idea of swingingJackson's valley army,which now constitutedthe left wing of the Army of NorthernVirginia, aroundPope's right flank for an assaulton the Union flank and rear. At the RappahannockBridge, McDowell's corps still clung to the southbank of the river. Concernedthat Popecould usethe bridgeheadto launchan attackagainst his army's rear as it rnov~d aroundthe Union right, Lee orderedLongstreet to attackMcDowell and capturethe bridge. At the same tirne, Popeordered McDowell to withdrawacross the bridgeand destroyit, and therebysecure his right flank and rear frorn direct assault. Both orderswere executed rnore or less sirnultaneouslyon Saturday,23 August, with Longstreetattacking the bridgeheadas McDowell's rear guarddefended his departurewith artillery fire frorn bothbanks of the RappahannockRiver. The Federalsthen burned the bridge, inadvertentlyaccornplishing Lee's goals as well as theirown. The nextday, Lee rnet with his generals.McClellan, Lee had learned,was rnoving his army to Aquia Creekon the PotornacRiver. Ifhe joined Pope,the cornbinedarmies rnight number130,000 against his own 55,000. Lee had to act before thathappened. He proposedsending Jackson on a broadersweep around Pope's right flank than he had earlier envisioned,to drive toward ManassasJunction, where the ManassasGap Railroadjoined the Orange& Alexandria Railroad. Sucha turning rnovernentwould disruptPope's supply line and put part of the Confederatearmy on a coursetoward the defensesof Washington. SurelyPope would reactto suchthreats without waiting for the slow-rnovingMcClellan, Lee thought. If Popernoved against Jackson, Lee and Longstreetwould presshirn, andthe two wings of the Confederatearmy would crushPope between thern. That afternoon,Jackson prepared his wing to rnoveout at his favorite tirne for suddenrnarches, "early dawn," about3:00 A.M. on Monday,25 August. At the appointedtirne, he rnarchedhis rnen northwesttoward Salern(present-day Marshall) on the ManassasGap Railroad. Pope,to whornthe rnove was reported,thought Jackson was returning to the ShenandoahValley and was unconcerned.Jackson drove his rnenhard all day, forcing thernto eatwhile walking,and by darkthe army had coveredthe twentY-sixrniles to Salern. NPS Form IO-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page _22-

The Civil War in Virl!inia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolol!ical Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

At dawn on Tuesday,26 August,Jackson began his ManassasJunction operations by trekking eastwardtoward ManassasJunction by way of ThoroughfareGap in the Bull Run Mountains,which Jacksonfound unguarded.When the army reachedGainesville, where the road forked, Jacksonswung his army to the right, southeastwardtoward Bristoe Stationon the Orange& AlexandriaRailroad. An hour before sunset,his vanguardswept away a small Union force andtried but failed to derail a passingtrain bound for ManassasJunction. The Confederatessoon had betterluck whenthey threw a switchand deraileda secondnorthbound train, then watchedas a third plowed into its rear. The engineerin a fourth train spottedthe messahead in time to reverseto WarrentonJunction. Now both Washingtonand Pope would know that Confederateswere approaching Manassas Junction. Jacksonordered an unusualnight attackon ManassasJunction; it succeeded,and he now controlledtwo key railroad depots. The Union commandersthought, however, that all this activity meantthat Maj. Gen.J. E. B. Stuartwas on anotherof his famousraids. Telegraphmessages flew up and downthe Federalwires, and a Union brigade underBrig. Gen.George W. Taylor headedto ManassasJunction on 27 Augustto drive the intrudersaway. Meanwhile,Jackson had postedmuch of his army in a strongdefensive position near the junction, leaving most of Ewell's division at Bristoe Stationas a rear guard. WhenTaylor approached Manassas,the Confederatesalmost obliterated the Federalexpedition. Now Popeknew for sure that this was no cavalryraid. Jackson,aware that Lee and Longstreetwould arrive by way of ThoroughfareGap, withdrewhis force from ManassasJunction northwest to Groveton,first destroyingall the suppliesthat could not be eatenor carriedoff. His army occupieda ridge just north of and out of sight of the main east-westroad there,the WarrentonTurnpike, with its left flank on Dogan'sBranch and his right nearthe farmhouseof JohnBrawner. On Thursday,28 August,Pope sent the vanguardof his army northeastthrough Manassas Junction,then west on the turnpike toward Jackson,who was notified of the move early in the afternoon. Neither commanderwas certainof the other's intentions:Jackson thought that perhapsPope was aboutto rendezvouswith McClellan,while Popesuspected Jackson was retreating. Jacksonworried overthe whereaboutsof Lee and Longstreet,hoping that they had passedThoroughfare Gap and were aboutto reinforcehim. . About that time, the headof Longstreet's28,000-man column reached Thoroughfare Gap and fought a brief engagementwith the division commandedby Brig. Gen.James B. Ricketts. Rickettshad marchedhis menfrom their camp at New ,on the WarrentonTurnpike aboutfour miles northeast of Warrenton, along the eastside of the Bull Run Mountainsto the gap. Theyarrived at the gap from one side aboutthe sametime (3:00 P.M.)as Longstreet's vanguard, composed of Georgiaregiments, approached from the other. After a sharpfire fight, Rickettsgave way and Longstreetbegan his marchthrough the gap, with the TexasBrigade in the lead. Locatedsome nine miles.east at the Brawnerfarm, Jacksoncould not hearthe fight at the gap. About 5:00 P.M.,Brig. Gen.'s division, oneof three in McDowell's corps,swung into Jackson'sline of view. At 6:30,as it marchedwithout a cavalry screenup the turnpike,Jackson attacked, beginningthe SecondBattle of Manassas. NPS Fonn IO-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page 30

The Civil War in Vir!!inia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolo!!ical Resources I Name of Multiple PropertyListing

The Brawnerfarm engagementlasted for sometwo anda half hours. After the shockof the initial Confederateassault, King's menrecovered and foughthard. As night fell, the fighting died away,as much from exhaustionas from any otherfactor. The eveningwas given overto tile criesof the wounded. Jacksonrode a mile westof his lines toward ThoroughfareGap, hoping that Lee, who had senthim a messageearlier in the day, had arrived with Longstreet'shalf of the army, but he found the roadempty. He rode backto his lines with someapprehension, because he knew that Popewas now certainof his location, and in the morning he would facethe entire Federalforce. Whenthe dawn came,Jackson found some25,000 of Pope'smen to the east,deploying againsthis own 20,000. Popehoped to positionanother 25,000 to the westof Jacksonand crushthe Confederates betweenthe two forces. Jacksonresponded by drawinghis army backto the gradeof an unfmished railroad that ranto the northeastjust behindthe Brawnerfarm. The bed cut deeplyinto the ridge in places, was built up above it in others,and formeda strongdefensive position. Here Jacksonawaited Pope's attackand Lee's arrival. Popeopened the day's combatabout 6:30 A.M. on Friday,29 August,with probesall along Jackson'sline. Shortlybefore noon,the Union generalprepared to launcha massiveassault against the Confederateleft. To the west,a gray columnappeared on the ThoroughfareGap road,and a courierrode forward to inform Jacksonthat Brig. Gen.John B. Hood's division, which includedthe TexasBrigade, had arrived. Longstreetwas enteringthe field, though mostof his force was still far to the west. Jackson assignedthe Texansto reinforcehis right flank, thenbraced for the attack. It beganabout 2:00, when Pope'smen attacked six or seventimes in successivewaves. At one point, temporarilyout ofarnrnunition but unwilling to retreata single step,some of the Confederatesat the railroad cut grabbedstones and hurled them at the Federals. Finally, as on the day before,darkness ended the fighting, which had beenunusually brutal. Late in the afternoonLee set up his headquarterson Stuart's Hill, a partly woodedknoll to the southwestof the battlefield that affordeda good view of the action. Longstreet'sforces arrived behind Lee, who kept them out of sight in the woods at the hill's easternbase. After the fighting ended,Jackson reportedto Lee but found his tent empty,as the commanderwas awayon a reconnaissance.Jackson laid down in anothertent and promptly fell asleep;when Lee returnedhe refusedto wake him, so Jacksonslept throughthe night for once. The next morning,Saturday, 30 August,the battleresumed about 8:00 A.M. with somedesultory shelling of Jackson'sline by the Federals.Then an ominoussilence settled over the battlefield. Jackson, awakeand refreshed,reviewed his lines and thenreturned to Stuart's Hill, wherehe joined Lee, Longstreet, and J. E. B. Stuart. The silencestretched into the afternoon. For somereason, Pope ignored reports of Longstreet'sarrival on the field. He had convinced himself that Jacksonwould retreatrather than facehis army without support. Popewaited until about3:00 in the afternoon,then unleashed his "pursuit." The attackingFederals marc:hed directly into massedcannon and musketry,and the effectwas devastating.Attack followed attack,and once againsome Confederates ran out of ammunitionand repeatedthe "rock fight" of the daybefore as the artillery blastedholes in the NPS Form IO-900a OMS No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section .E Page 3.1

The Civil War in Virginia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolo2ical Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

oncoming Federal lines. Suddenly, as the third rank of Union soldiers began to crumple, Longstreet's 25,000 men swept onto the field, rolling over the long blue line from the Union left like an irresistible wave. The Federals fled, ironically, to the safety of Henry Hill, where Jackson had stood like a stone wall little more than a year before. Now the Union line re-formed and, as darkness fell, the weary men fended off the last Confederate assaults. All night long, rain poured down on the living, the wounded, and the dead. Lee and Jackson conferred on the gray morning of Sunday, 31 August. Lee's "blood was up," as those who knew him put it, meaning that he was ready to go in for the kill now that he had crippled his prey. He proposed to send Jackson on another flanking march, this time to the north of Pope and into his rear, pin down the Union army, and then follow up with Longstreet and destroy it. The chances of successseemed far better than during the Seven Days' Campaign, as Lee and Jackson and Longstreet now functioned as a team. There would be no more misunderstood orders, uncoordinated attacks, or lost divisions. Jackson set off in pursuit that afternoon. By dark his corps had marched ten miles north and encamped in rain and mud at Pleasant Valley Church after turning southeastward on the Little River Turnpike (present-day U.S. Rte. 50). The rain finally stopped about 8:00 A.M. on Monday, I September, but the sky remained darkly overcast. Jackson resumed his march down the turnpike toward Fairfax Court House. Stuart arrived to report Union soldiers around a plantation named Chantilly, near a low ridge called Ox Hill. Pope may have been a blustering blowhard, but he was no fool; his cavalry had detected Jackson's move, and the Union commander was ready for it. About noon, Jackson halted his column to give Longstreet time to catch up. When he learned that the other corps was now only a couple of miles behind him, Jackson resumed the march. At Chantilly he found the Union line strongly posted and settled down to wait for Longstreet, as Lee had ordered. Pope decided not to wait, however. About 4:00, he launched an assault against Jackson's line. Jackson responded with a strong counterattack just as a massive rainstorm burst over the battlefield. For some two and a half hours, both sides fought viciously while the drenching rain soaked gunpowder, reduced visibility, and so muffled the sounds of combat that commanders could hardly see or hear the enemy. The Union force disengaged first, after Maj. Gen. Philip Kearny, one of the best and most experienced field officers in the Federal army, rode into Jackson's lines in the confusion and was shot down. Jackson remained in place, Longstreet arrived, and darkness fell. The next morning found Pope successfully withdrawing past Fairfax Court House to the defenses of Washington, with the Army of Virginia seriously damaged but not destroyed. Some of the bloodiest fighting of the war had taken place: the Union army suffered some 17,000 casualties during the campaign, the Confederates about 11,000. Most of the dead and wounded fell at Manassas-a bloody precursor of what lay ahead in Maryland. John Pope was the final casualty: on 2 September Lincoln replaced him with McClellan. . The initiative remained with Lee, who decided for several reasonsto move north. Ifhe remained in northern Virginia to await a renewed Union attack, his army would starve. The countryside had been picked clean and the Federal depots at ManassasJunction and other stations had long since been consumed NPS Form 10-9008 OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUAT,ON SHEET

Section _f- Page 32

The Civil War in Virginia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeoloeical Resources, Name of Multiple PropertyListing

or destroyed. Lee's blood was up, and now wasthe time to carry the war into the North and give his adversariesa tasteof what Virginia had suffered. In addition,Lee believedthat Maryland,just acrossthe PotomacRiver from Virginia, was consideredby manyon both sidesto be a Southernstate held in the Union by military occupationalone. Leehoped that sympatheticresidents would respondfavorably to the arrival of his anny by feedingand joining it. Finally, if Lee could operatesuccessfully on Northernsoil, both he and PresidentJefferson Davis believedthat one or more Europeancountries might supportthe Confederacy,at leastwith diplomatic recognitionand, perhaps, with materialand military assistance. Lee's first invasionof the North, latercalled the AntietamCampaign, began when the vanguardof the Army of NorthernVirginia crossedthe PotomacRiver on 4 Septemberat White's Ford northwestof Leesburg,near the Ball's Bluffbattlefield. To protecthis rear and securehis supply line, Lee divided his army again,sending Jackson west to captureHarper's Ferry and then rejoin the main force. A copy of Lee's orderdetailing his strategywas lost, found by a Union soldier,and carriedto McClellan,who had sallied forth from Washingtonwith the Anny of the Potomacin pursuit. Boastingthat he could beatthe separateelements of the Confederatearmy "in detail," McClellan nonethelessdallied, enabling Jackson to reunitehis corps with Longstreet'sat AntietamCreek, just eastof the town of Sharpsburg. On Wednesday, 17 September,the approximately75,000 soldiersin McClellan's commandengaged close to 50,000 in Lee's, in whatwas the bloodiestsingle day of the war. The battle lastedtwelve hours,and at its conclusion 12,469Federals were dead, wounded. or missing,and 10,318Confederates. Neither army drove the other from the field despitea day of desperatecharges and countercharges.The next day they simply faced each other, seeminglytoo stunnedby the carnageto resumethe fight. During the night of 18-19 September, Lee and the Anny of NorthernVirginia withdrewacross the Potomac,while McClellan pursuedcautiously. Lee's invasionof the North endedin failure. The westernMaryland civilians were W,aryof his anny, contributingor selling food grudginglyand hardlyflocking to enlist. Desertions,in fact, increasedin frequency,perhaps because some Confederates could not bring themselvesto do what they accusedthe Federalsof doing-invade another'scountry. Far from encouragingEuropean recognition of the Confederacy,Lee's invasionand repulse became instead a propagandacoup for Lincoln, who issueda preliminary emancipationproclamation freeing slaves in unoccupiedConfederate states on 22 September. Jackson'scorps occupied the northernend of the ShenandoahValley around Winchester,while Longstreet'sencamped at CulpeperCourt House. McClellan eventuallymoved mostof his army to Warrentonand only inchedtoward Lee until anexasperated Lincoln relievedhim for the secondtime on 7 November. In his place Lincoln put Maj. Gen.Ambrose E. Burnside,an amiableman with impressiveside whiskerswho alreadyhad declinedthe appointmenttwice, expressingdoubts in his own abilities. While Lee's army reorganizedand refitted,Burnside seized the initiative by marchingon Richmondby way of Fredericksburg,around Lee's right flank. Lee counteredby moving Jacksonfrom the ShenandoahValley to reunitethe army nearFrederick,sburg.

FREDERICKSBURGAND CHANCELLORSVILLE CAMPA[GNS NPS Fonn IO-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page 11

The Civil War in Vir2inia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolo2ical Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

During the night of 18-19 September 1862, the Anny of Northern Virginia crossed the Potomac River after its unsuccessful foray into Maryland and the bloody on 17 September. The anny's commander, Gen. Robert E. Lee, stationed the second of his two corps at Winchester, in the northern Shenandoah Valley, and the first in Culpeper, in the northern Piedmont. He selected these positions to defend the valley from attack by Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, commander of the Anny of the Potomac, and to defend central Virginia and Richmond, the capital of the Confederacy, should McClellan make a thrust south from northern Virginia instead. Lee's corps commanders, Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson (called "Old Jack" by his men) and James Longstreet (his soldiers called him "Old Pete"; Lee referred to him as "myoId war "), were promoted to the rank of lieutenant general in October 1862 when Lee restructured his anny and formalized the corps arrangement. In contrast, McClellan fared badly. Most of the Anny of the Potomac was encamped near Warrenton, about twenty miles northeast of Culpeper, while McClellan's headquarterswas located in Rectortown, some fifteen miles northwest of Warrenton. Late in the night of Friday, 7 November, as McClellan sat in his tent writing a letter to his wife, a knock came on the tent pole and two general officers entered. One, Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside, sported an awesome set of jaw whiskers (hence the later name for them, sideburns); the other, Brig. Gen. Catharinus P. Buckingham, bore a letter from President Abraham Lincoln that relieved McClellan of command and appointed Burnside in his place. The next day, after his farewell proclamation was read to the anny, McClellan departed. He never again held a military command but ran for president against Lincoln in 1864 on the Democratic ticket. McClellan lost, resumed his career as a civil engineer, served three tenns as governor of , and later wrote his memoirs. was a hearty, likeable man who deeply doubted his own abilities. He had declined offers of high command before, feeling ill-suited for the responsibility. Burnside had performed well in a North Carolina coastal campaign and, rewarded with promotion to major general, seemed adequate as a subordinate commander. At Antietam, however, his blind determination to cross the creek there at a stone bridge that has since been called "Burnside's Bridge" delayed his entry into the battle and perhaps prevented a clear Union victory. Burnside's bullheadednessand self-doubts later would have consequences on another battlefield. In November 1862, however, while most of the officers and men were angered by McClellan's removal, they bore Burnside no grudge and resolved to soldier on under his leadership. Burnside's tenure began well enough, with a reorganization of his l30,OOO-mananny's command structure and plans to seize the initiative from Lee with an aggressive late autumn campaign. Maj. Gen. Edwin V. "Bull" Sumner commanded the Right Grand Division, Maj. Gen. Joseph"Fighting Joe" Hooker the Center Grand Division, and Maj. Gen. William B. Franklin the Left Grand Division. Sumner, a courageous, blustery old soldier whose bellow could be heard above the din of battle, was regarded as a good follower of orders but utterly lacking in imagination. Hooker, an aggressive field commander, was also known for his overweening ambition; in addition, allegations of low moral character had surfaced during the Mexican War and resurfaced during the Civil War. Franklin, a staunch McClellan partisan, NPSFonn 10-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page 14

T~heCivil W~r in Virl!:inia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolol!:ical Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

shared his hero's reputation for slowness on the battlefield. Burnside would be challenged to whip these subordinates, and the demoralized men under them, into fighting shape. Burnside's plan-a turning movement-called for a rapid march by his anny from Warrenton southeastto Fredericksburg, a distance of roughly forty miles, in order to get around Longstreet's right flank and march on Richmond. As Richmond lay to the south of the Rappahannock River, Burnside planned to cross the river at Fredericksburg using pontoon bridges. His maneuver, he reasoned,would impel Lee to waste time changing his front, and would enable the Army of the Potomac to get between him and the Confederate capital. The ruse depended, unfortunately, on speed of execution-a talent that this anny had not exhibited during earlier campaigns. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, on the other hand, possessedprecisely that talent, as well as tactically superior cavalry that served as the commander's eyes and ears. Nonetheless, Lee was surprised when, on 15 November, the Union anny suddenly began disappearing from his front. Sumner's Grand Division covered the distance to Falmouth, just north of Fredericksburg, in two days, and by 19 November the whole anny was in place on the hills east and north of Fredericksburg, with only the Rappahannock River to cross. Unfortunately, Burnside's brilliant maneuver then stopped dead, for the pontoons that he needed to cross the river and that were to be sent to the town from Washington, were nowhere in sight, thanks to logistical bungling in the capital. While Burnside stewed, Lee moved, and by the time the pontoons arrived on 25 November, Longstreet's corps occupied the high ground on the opposite bank. overlooking the town. Now Burnside faced two choices: withdraw, or fight a battle where he had not planned to fight one. Although Burnside was not responsible for the delay in acquiring the needed pontoons, he erred when he did not allow Sumner to force a crossing and establish a foothold on the opposite bank before Longstreet's vanguard arrived there. Burnside probed the downstream fords but found them all covered by Confederates, so he reverted to his original plan, to cross at the town despite the guns bristling from the heights, where Lee waited. The First began in a foggy dawn on Thursday, 11 December. Federal engineers struggled to lay five pontoon bridges across the Rappahannock River, three at Fredericksburg and two downstream. Confederate sharpshooterson the southern bank. some concealed in buildings in the town, drove them off there. As the fog slowly lifted, Union gunners began a daylong bombardment of Fredericksburg that failed to dislodge the sharpshooters. Eventually Union infantry crossed the river in boats and drove the Confederates from the town and the engineers finished their work. The next day, most of Sumner's and Franklin's grand divisions (Hooker's remained in reserve) passed over the pontoon bridges and Burnside gave orders for an assault, over the objections of some of his subordinates. By then the 78,OOO-man-strongConfederate line stretched for some seven miles, with Longstreet on the left, overlooking the town from a series of hills collectively named 's Heights, and Jackson on the right, downriver atop Prospect Hill and in front of it behind a railroad embankment. At dawn on Saturday, 13 December, fog again blanketed the ground (the temperature at sunrise was just above freezing, and by afternoon it was in the fifties). Franklin's Left Grand Division struck Jackson's line and almost NPSFonn 10-900a OMS No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page 35

~e Civ!1 ~ar in Vir!!inia. 1861-1865:Historic and Archaeolo!!icalResources Name of Multiple Property Listing

broke through a gap created by swampy ground, but reinforcements plugged the opening and drove the Federals back. On the Confederate left, wave after wave of Sumner's and Hooker's men spent themselves in brave but futile assaults against Marye's Heights; the slaughter evermore haunted the participants on both sides. Burnside's generals persuaded their distraught commander to cancel his plans to resume the assaults the next day. Lee, contemplating the large number of Federal cannon on Stafford Heights north of the river, refused to attack Burnside, and the day following the battle passed with some skirmishing. During the night of 15 December, the Union army withdrew across the river and the Fredericksburg campaign ended. Federal casualties totaled 12,600; the Confederates lost 5,300. A Congressional investigation followed this crushing defeat, and used the opportunity to advance his own cause while criticizing Burnside, who finally tendered his resignation to Lincoln; in March, Lincoln assigned him command of the . The president appointed Hooker in Burnside's place on 25 January 1863, praising the new commander's military skill while chastising him for undermining his former superior. Hooker set to work at once, reorganizing the army yet again (he abolished the grand division scheme on 5 February) and giving each corps its own badge. A good organizer, Hooker helped restore Union morale and pride. He also created a separate cavalry corps, first under the command of Maj. Gen. and then, after 7 June, under Brig. Gen. . Placing the cavalry under a single command enhanced its performance and soon ended the days of Confederate domination. Hooker was admired for his courage and aggressiveness,as his nom de guerre, "Fighting J.oe," suggested. He also had a reputation, however, as a hard drinker and a man of loose morals dating from the time of the Mexican War. The nickname for prostitutes has, somewhat unfairly, been ascribed to him. In actuality, the name gained popularity in America about 1845 from a section of called the Hook and known for its brothels. It was coincidence that Hooker's name became famous about the same time as the slang term. For the rest of the winter, Hooker's Army of the Potomac trained and refitted while keeping an eye on the Army of Northern Virginia across the Rappahannock. Hooker employed elements of his new cavalry corps to annoy the Confederates and probe their lines, and Maj. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart responded in kind. At dawn on Tuesday, 17 March, Brig. Gen. William W. Averell led about 2,100 troopers from his division across the river at Kelly's Ford to attack Brig. Gen. 's cavalry brigade near Culpeper Court House. Pickets at the ford sent word to Lee, who soon rode to the river with some 800 cavalrymen; Stuart and his brilliant young artillery chief, the twenty-four-year-old Maj. ("The Gallant Pelham," Robert E. Lee called him), rode along to see the action. The fighting started about noon and continued until the Federals withdrew across the ford about dusk. For the first time, the Union cavalry fought its Confederate counterparts almost to a standstill, in what was the largest all-cavalry battle until that time in the East. The combined casualties on both sides amounted to about 200. Tragically, one of them was John Pelham, who fell mortally wounded by a shell fragment while impetuously racing to overtake the hard-charging 3d Virginia Cavalry. Stuart wept bitterly at the news, as did many others in the army, for Pelham was much loved by all who knew him. NPS Forni IO-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page _36-

The Civil War in Vir2inia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolo2ical Resources Name.ofMultiple Property Listing

During the late winter and early spring of 1863, Hooker devised a strategy not only for getting around Lee but for beating him in battle and then marching on to Richmond. Taking a page from Lee's book, Hooker would send his cavalry corps sweeping around the Confederate left flank to cut Lee's communications with the Confederate capital. Then he would assault Lee's left flank and rear by marching north with three corps of his anny, crossing the Rappahannock and Rapidan Rivers, and driving southeast. Three others would attack directly across the river at Fredericksburg, largely as a diversion, while the remaining corps remained conspicuously in sight across from Fredericksburg and at Banks's Ford. "May God have mercy on General Lee, for I will have none," Hooker allegedly boasted. After whipping Lee, he told Lincoln, he would march on to Richmond. It was a solid plan, and it very nearly succeeded. In February 1863, Lee unintentionally assisted Hooker in his plans by reducing the size of his anny near Fredericksburg to about 60,000. Responding to Federal threats in Tidewater Virginia and North Carolina, Lee dispatched Longstreet to southeasternVirginia with instructions to counter any Union initiatives and also to gather supplies for the main army. Accompanied by major generals George E. Pickett and and their divisions (some 20,000 men), Longstreet departed on 17 February on his assignment, and from II April to 4 May conducted the while Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill operated against the Federals in coastal North Carolina. Longstreet's siege of the town and its 25,000 Union defenders under Brig. Gen. John Peck produced two engagements. The first, at Norfleet House, occurred on 1-4015 April when Union gunboats on the Nansemond River attempted to run past the Confederate battery there, just downriver from the town. The attempt failed when the battery's flTe crippled the gunboat Mount Washington. Overnight, the Federals built their own batteries across the river, concealed behind brush and small trees. On IS April, t,heyunmasked their guns and drove the Confederates from the Norfleet house position. The second engagementtook place downriver at Hill's Point, where the Confederate left flank rested on the river in an old fortification that dated to the War of 1812. Renamed Fort Huger, this stronghold was open in the rear toward Suffolk. On 19 April, Union gunboats raced past the fort and landed an infantry force just upstream; it attacked from behind the defenders and drove them off, thereby reopening the river to Federal shipping. The two sides suffered fewer than 200 casualties in these engagements. At the end of April, Lee ordered Longstreet to break off his unproductive siege and return to the main anny. The last of Longstreet's task force left the area on 4 May. On Monday, 27 April, Hooker launched his campaign against Lee. He left 40,000 troops at Fredericksburg under Maj. Gen. to make a diversionary attack that would freeze the Confederates in their works, and marched with the remainder of his anny northwest from Falmouth to Kelly's Ford on the Rappahannock River. Part of his force remained on guard downstream at Scott's Ford and United States Ford while the rest crossed at Kelly's Ford and marched south to pass over the Rapidan River at Germanna and Ely's Fords. Stoneman's cavalry corps had departed on 13 April on its raid against Lee's communications with Richmond; the raid would be largely ineffective and deprive Hooker of essential flank protection. By the evening of 30 April, three of Hooker's seven infantry corps were concentrated near the Chancellor family home on the Orange Plank Road called Chancellorsville. A few miles east, at loan Church, in a desperate attempt to prevent the envelopment of the Army of Northern NPS Fonn 10-900a OMBNo.1024-OO18 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET Section~ Page 31

The Civil War in Vire:inia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeoloe:ica1Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

Virginia, Maj. Gen. RichardH. Andersondug in acrossthe plank roadand the OrangeTurnpike. Lee divided his anny and orderedJackson to marchto Chancellorsvilleand challengeHooker; Maj. Gen. Jubal A. Early and 12,000men remained behind to occupythe Fredericksburgline, and therebyblock Sedgwick from reinforcing Hooker. Thus far, Hooker's plan had succeededbrilliantly: he had virtually enveloped Lee,who had divided his force, alreadyoutnumbered two-to-one, into yet smallercomponents; victory lay within Hooker's grasp. Jacksoncollided with Hookeron Friday, I May. Hooker's menhad emerged from the Wilderness,a tangleof brushand small, second-growthtrees, when Jacksonconfronted them and a fire fight ensued. The soundof battle reachedHooker, who hadoccupied the Chancellorhouse as his headquarters.There, in the early afternoon,with successseemingly assured, Hooker ordered his anny to fall backand assumedefensive positions. As FightingJoe is reputedto haveexplained. "for once I lost confidencein Hooker,and that is all there is to it." The prospectof directly facing Lee in battle with sole responsibilityfor the outcomemay have beenmore than Hookercould bear. His generalsreceived his orderswith stunneddisbelief, then anger. One rode to headquartersto confirm them,threatening the messengerthat if he found themto be falsehe would havehim shot. Hookerhad passedthe initiative to Lee,who reactedwith breathtakingaudacity. During the night of 1-2 May, he and Jacksonsat on hardtackboxes at the intersectionof the OrangePlank Road and a smallerroad that led westwardpast Catharine Furnace and around the Federalright flank, which Stuart reportedto be "in the air" (not anchoredon a naturaldefensive feature). The generalspored over a map and discussedthe situation. Lee madehis decision,confirmed by anotherconference just beforedawn: he would divide his anny yet againand sendJackson and 32,000men on a wide movementto outflank Hooker's envelopment.Lee, meanwhile,would remainin Hooker's front with 14,000soldiers and "demonstrate"to distracthim and his 70,000-mananny. . Jackson'smarch, a twelve-mile-longsweep to the west, south,and north, theneast, got underway about7:30 A.M. on 2 May. It occupiedmost of the dayand remaineda secretonly for anhour. Hooker, like Popebefore him, misinterpretedthe moveand thoughtit augureda retreatby Lee. He did warn his right-flank commander,and he also senta force towardCatharine Furnace to find out whatwas happening, but the warning largely went unheededand the expeditionmerely drew needed troops away from his line. By 5:00 Jacksonwas in position,his battle line formed in a north-southdirection across the turnpike and plank road in the Wilderness. A few minutes later,he launchedthe assault. An "acousticalshadow" hung overthe Wilderness,not unlike that at SevenPines during the PeninsulaCampaign the previousyear. The soldierscooking their supperson the Union right flank heard nothing of the approachingConfederates, but suddenlydeer, rabbits,and wild turkeyscame racing through their camps,driven by the onrushingline. The Confederatesfollowed fast behind,rolling up the Federal flank. As so often happened,Jackson's sudden success resulted in as much confusionamong the attackers asthe attacked. By dark boththe Union andthe Confederatelines were in wild disarray,in somecases intermingled,and little firefights broke out hereand there along the front as unitscollided with one another. NPS Form 10-900a OMBNo.1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page 18

The Civil War in Vir!!inia.1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolo!!ical Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

In the early evening, Jackson and several others rode toward the Union line to reconnoiter in anticipation of continued attacks that night. Jackson turned to reenter his own lines about 9:30 P.M. Just then, another burst of shooting erupted, and the 18th North Carolina Infantry opened fire on the horsemen riding down on them in the dark. Three bullets struck Jackson, and several in his party were killed. Helped down from his horse, Jackson lay on the ground with his left arm shattered; he was nearly captured before his men got him to a safe area, where Dr. Hunter H. McGuire amputated his arm. Soon he was on his way to Guiney Station on the Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad, where his condition improved slowly. Stuart assumed command of Jackson's corps. He pounded the Union line relentlessly from the west and southwest, starting at dawn on 3 May, driving the Federals easttoward Chancellorsville. The Union soldiers fought tenaciously, and casualties mounted on both sides. By 9:00 A.M. the Federal line was almost a perfect circle around the Chancellor house, Hooker's headquarters,where the general stood on the porch to receive a report. A Confederate solid shot struck one of the columns, shattering it and slamming half of it onto Hooker, who fell to the porch floor unconscious. Although he soon regained his senses, Hooker never regained his offensive momentum, and when Lee pressed his army from the south about 10:00, he ordered it to fall back toward the Rappahannock into prepared positions. A sturdy defense by Hooker's artillery held off the oncoming Confederates long enough for the infantry to move back as ordered. With Stuart attacking from the west and southwest and Lee from the southeast, both wings in concert, the commander of the Army of Northern Virginia had accomplished by noon what he tried to do at the Second Battle of Manassas-crush the opposing army in the jaws of a vise-and had achieved his greatest victory. Lee's victory was not quite complete, however, for trouble lurked behind him. In what has been called the Second Battle of Fredericksburg, Union general John Sedgwick overwhelmed and threatened to attack the rear and right flank of Lee's force. In the morning, Sedgwick had attacked Marye' s Heights twice without success,but the third time proved the charm. Early fell back to the south, and word of Sedgwick's breakout reached Lee at noon. Again, audaciously, Lee divided his army; leaving 20,000 men to keep Hooker in his works, he headed east on the turnpike with two divisions. At SaIem Church, atop a long north-south ridge line, the Confederates blocked the Federal advance, and the next day, Lee hemmed them in on three sides and pushed them back toward the river. The next morning he found that Sedgwick had led his army across the Rappahannock at Scott's Ford; at Chancellorsville two days later, Hooker retreated as well. Lee's victory was complete. The victory came at a terrible cost in casualties. About 60,000 Confederate soldiers had fought some 135,000 Union soldiers; 12,764 Confederates were killed, wounded, or captured, compared with 17,287 Federals. One casualty loomed larger than all the rest in consequences: Stonewall Jackson. After a few days of seeming improvement, Jackson began a steady decline. His wife and baby daughter were rushed to his side from Richmond. Despite Dr. McGuire's best efforts, infection and possibly pneumonia set in; Jackson sank into delirium. In his mind he was back on the battlefield, issuing orders: "Push up the columns!" Finally he grew quieter, calmer. The great warrior's last words were of peace: "Let us cross NPS Forni IO-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page 39

The Ci.vil War in Virllinia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolollical Resources Name of Multiple PropertyListing

Overthe river and rest underthe shadeof the trees." He died at 3:15 P.M.on 10 May, a Sunday. He had alwayswished to die on a Sunday,he had said thatmorning. The effects of Jackson'sdeath on the Confederatecause are impossibleto overstate.The soldiers, particularlythose in his corpsand his old brigade,were devastated. When the newsreached the camps, "the soundsof merrimentdied away as if the Angel of Deathhimself had flappedhis muffled wings over the troops." Men wept openly,heaving with sobs. WhenLee first heardof Jackson'swounding, he refusedto acceptthe prospectof his death:"Surely GeneralJackson will recover,"he prayed,"God will not take him from us, now that we needhim so much." Whenhe learnedof Jackson'sdeath, he wept for the passingof his friend as well as his lieutenant,and could not speakof it. In the midst of their greatest victory, Lee and the Army of NorthernVirginia had sufferedtheir greatestloss. A Lexingtongirl echoed the feelings of all Confederates,civilians as well as soldiers,when she wrote that when Jacksondied, "for the first time it had dawnedon us that God would let us be defeated." The war wenton, of course. Having defeatedthe Army of the Potomac,Lee convincedPresident JeffersonDavis that the time was right for anotherinvasion of the North. His army neededfresh supplies, and Virginia's storehouseswere empty. It wasthe North's turn to feed his men. Freshfrom Chancellorsville,their spirits and confidencehigh despiteJackson's death, Lee's soldierssurely would give him anothergreat victory, this time on enemysoil. Surely,foreign recognitionwould follow. Lee's blood was up; he would invadePennsylvania.

GErrYSBURG CAMPAIGN More treeshave beenfelled and more ink spilled for the publicationof booksabout the Gettysburg campaignthan any otherepisode of the Civil War. It is alsosafe to saythat more annchairgenerals and military historianshave delivered themselves of weightyjudgments on the subject-with the benefit of twenty-twentyhindsight-than therewere soldiersin the Army of NorthernVirginia andthe Army of the Potomaccombined. The debateover the campaignand battle beganto rage almostas soonas the guns fell silent. Two questionsare at the centerof the controversy:Should Gen. RobertE. Lee haveinvaded Pennsylvania? Who is responsiblefor the Confederateloss at Gettysburg? Regardingthe first question,it is importantto understandthat despite the brilliant victory of Lee over Maj. Gen. JosephHooker at Chancellorsville,by early May 1863the Confederacywas in a stateof crisis. In the West,along the MississippiRiver, Maj. Gen.Ulysses S. Grantmaneuvered his Federalanny againstVicksburg, a Southernstronghold that controlled shipping on the mighty river. A siegeof the city seemedimminent, and if Vicksburg fell the Confederacywould be split downthe middle. Lee traveledto Richmondin mid-Mayto discussthe situationwith PresidentJefferson Davis and his cabinet. Someof the Confederacy'sproblems resulted from the fact that it consistedofa loose NPS Forni 10-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET'

Section E- Page ~-

The Civil War in Vir!!inia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolo!!ical Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

confederationof stateswithout aspowerful a centralgovernment as its opponentpossessed. The principle of decentralizationaffected the amlYas well, and its effectswere especiallyfelt in the Westat this crucial moment,where the Confederatecommand was divided. Lt. Gen.John C. Pembertoncommanded a 32,000- man garrisonat Vicksburg but Grantoutnumbered him abouttwo to one. Gen. JosephE. Johnston,Davis's theatercommander in the region,led an amlYof some30,000 but was uncertainof his role and authority beyondhis own force. The situationwas ripe for disaster. In Virginia, Lee alonecommanded. He enjoyedDavis's unwaveringsupport and arrived in Richmondon 14May with a plan for carryingthe war north and relieving someof the pressureon Pembertonand Johnston. First, however,he hadto contendwith an alternativeplan. Severalhigh-ranking Confederates,including Gen.P. G. T. Beauregardand Lt. Gen. JamesLongstreet, Lee's seniorcorps commander,favored a strategyof reinforcingthe westerntheater while Lee adopteda defensiveposition in Virginia. Longstreetwould march with his corpsto Tennesseeto reinforceGen. BraxtonBragg and join with Johnstonto defeatfirst the Federalarmy underMaj. Gen. William S. Rosecransand then Grantand his force. Lee's plan called for giving Johnstonthe authorityto redistributetroops as he saw fit and then leaving it to him to attackGrant and relieve Vicksburg. In the meantime,Lee would invadeMaryland and Pennsylvania,in part to resupplyhis amlY with Northerngoods rather than further strip the already depletedfarms of northernVirginia. He wantedto defendthe Southin the North. He wantedto win the conclusivevictory that hadeluded him so far and win it on the enemy'shome soil. Ifhe annihilatedthe Army of the Potomacin Pennsylvania,then whateverhappened to Vicksburgwould be lessimportant. Furthemlore,such a victory as Lee envisionedcould causethe North to sue for a negotiatedpeace, and might evenresult in foreign recognitionof the Confederatestates. Time, Leer~cognized, was not on the side of the South. The weight of Northernmanpower and manufacturingwas beginningto tell; Lee wanted a quick, decisivevictory beforethe scalestipped too far. These,then, were Lee's reasonsfor invadingthe North; their validity continuesto be debated. Davis approvedhis plan, togetherwith Lee's proposedreorganization of the Army of Northern Virginia. Insteadof two large infantry corps,there would be three smallerones, commanded by Longstreet,Lt. Gen. RichardS. Ewell, andLt. Gen.A. P. Hill, andone cavalrydivision (usuallycalled a corps)under Maj. Gen.J. E. B. Stuart. Eachcorps would have its own artillery reserve. This arrangement would remainbasically intact for the restof the war. Lee's four corps commanderswere veteranshe trustedand admired. Longstreet,whom Lee referredto as "my Old War Horse," washis seniorlieutenant, dependable yet sometimesin need of prodding. Ewell, feisty and prickly, had servedLt. Gen.Thomas J. Jacksonas a division commanderand now took over Stonewall'sold corps. Hill, who had feudedwith Jacksonopenly, was often bold but sometimeshesitant; he sufferedfrom the ill effects of gonorrheaand was absentfrom duty frequently. Stuart,Lee's flamboyantand innovativecavalry commander,served as the army's "eyesand ears." Each man. Lee was convinced,was the bestat his job in the Confederatearmy, yet eachwould fall short of his NPS Fonn 10-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8~86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page ~l

The Civil War in Virl!inia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolol!ical Resources Name of Multiple PropertyListing

expectationson this campaign. Lee was fifty-six in the third spring of the war, Longstreetforty-two, Ewell forty-six, Hill thirty-seven,and Stuartthirty. Who wasresponsible for the Confederateloss at Gettysburg?Traditionally, the finger of guilt has beenpointed at Lee's lieutenants. Stuart,perhaps to compensatefor being caughtnapping at Brandy Station,left Lee blind anddeaf to the whereaboutsof the Ant1yof the Potomacby absentinghimself and his corpsto raid Union wagontrains and make anothergrandiose ride aroundthe enemy'sarmy. [fhe had stuck close,the argumentgoes, Lee would not have beensurprised by the initial encounterat Gettysburg and could haveoffered combaton betterterrain. Ewell, "Old Bald Head" to his men,who usuallywas as aggressiveas he was excitable,failed to seizeCemetery Ridge and Culp's Hill on the first day of the battle, therebyyielding the high groundto the Federalsand doomingLee to a seriesof futile, costly assaults. Hill, on the secondday, did not exerciseenough control overhis portion of the attackon CemeteryRidge and contributedto the Confederatefailure there by bringing on a battle prematurelyon I July beforethe army was concentratedand on 2 July by assaultingwith a thin, unsupportedline. For every finger pointed at Stuart,Ewell, and Hill, however,a dozenhave beenpointed at James Longstreet. The chorusof condemnationbegan soon after the war, when Longstreetbegan publishing his reminiscences,most of which soughtto justify his actionsat Gettysburg. His autobiography,From Manassasto Appomattox,fIrSt appeared in 1896. Longstreetsupported the plan to reinforce Johnstonin the Westand requireLee to assumea defensiveposture in Virginia. He claimed that whenthe strategyto invadethe North was adoptedinstead, Lee agreedwith his suggestionthat the army wage an essentiallydefensive campaign there and seekto avoid a pitchedbattle. Longstreettherefore felt betrayedwhen Lee determinedto standand fight at Gettysburg;he arguedagainst the frontal assaultnow popularlycalled Pickett's Chargeand advocated insteada flanking movementaround the Union left flank. But Lee's "blood was up," and whenhe could not be dissuaded,Longstreet hesitated to commit reinforcementsbecause he knewthe tactic would fail and the losseswould be horrific (somehistorians contend Longstreet simply went into a pout whenhe did not gethis way). The blame for the defeatat Gettysburg,Longstreet concluded, rested on Lee's shoulders. Longstreet'sversion of eventsbrought an avalancheof outragedown on his head. Most of it, as ThomasL. Connelly ably pointed out in his seminal1977 work, The Marble Man: RobertE. Lee andHis' Imagein AmericanSociety, was the result of a campaignorchestrated by font1erLt. Gen. JubalA. Early, the self-appointeddefender of the Lost Causeand of the role of Virginians in leadingit. Early,the author of A Memoir of the Last Year of the Warand AutobiographicalSketch and Narrative of the War Between the States,countered any criticism of Virginia generals,particularly Lee, with a blizzard of lettersand articles. [t was largelydue to Early's efforts, Connellyargues, that Lee the fallible, fascinatinghuman being becameLee "the Marble Man," saintlyand perfectand beyondreproach. Longstreetwas guilty of threeunforgivable sins, in Early's eyes:he daredto criticize Lee,his lack of supportfor Lee at Gettysburg costthe Confederacythe victory and ultimatelythe war, andhe was a SouthCarolinian by birth and a Georgianby choice,not a Virginian. Thathe was at leasthalf right in his assessmentsealed his fate as a pariah. NPS Fonn 10-900a OMS No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUA TfON SHEET

Section E Page 42

The Civil War in Vireinia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeoloeical Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

What is the truth about the loss at Gettysburg? Lee, at least, knew where the responsibility lay, and he knew it at once. When Pickett's shattered division staggered back to , Lee said, "All this has been my fault-it is I that have lost this fight." On 31 July, Lee wrote to Davis, "I am alone to blame." A week later, on 8 August, Lee tendered his resignation to Davis as commander of the Army of Northern Virginia; Davis of course declined to accept it. Emory M. Thomas, the author of the acclaimed 1995 biography, Robert E. Lee, agreed with Lee's assignment of blame. Lee, wrote Thomas, relied too much on suggestions, or discretionary orders, rather than explicit commands, once he decided to fight at Gettysburg. Such methods had served him well in the past, most notably in his relations with Jackson, but at Gettysburg, it seems,the law of averages caught up with him. Stuart galloped off on a riding tour, Ewell decided it was not possible to seize and Culp's Hill, and Longstreet sulked. But ifhis subordinates betrayed his trust, it was Lee who decided to stand and fight, Lee who abandoned his flanking tactics, Lee who did not withdraw to more favorable terrain, Lee who did not wait for the Federals to attack him, Lee who ordered the fatal assault on the center of the Union line. Lee made the strategic errors; his lieutenants made the tactical ones. And, as more than one historian has pointed out, the Federals had something to do with the Confederate defeat. Maj. Gen. George G. Meade, commander of the Army of the Potomac after 28 June, and his subordinates took advantage of Lee's and his generals' errors. The Union army occupied a strong defensive position and refused to budge, tantalizing Lee into attacking. The Federal commanders showed initiative and the soldiers fought like demons. The Union artillery devastated the Confederate raI1ks at crucial moments. The Federal cavalry fought well and countered Stuart's every move. The result at Gettysburg was as much a Union victory as it was a Confederate defeat. Coupled with Grant's capture of Vicksburg on 4 July, the day after Longstreet's attack on Cemetery Ridge (popularly called Pickett's Charge), the Union success at Gettysburg dealt the Confederacy a telling blow just two month$ after Lee's great victory at Chancellorsville. Lee began his march to Pennsylvania on 3 June, within two weeks of his return from Richmond to his field headquartersnear Fredericksburg, by moving two of his three infantry corps from the banks of the Rappahannock River to Culpeper Court House. Hill was left temporarily in strong earthworks above Fredericksburg to block any Federal attack in the Confederate rear. Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, commander of the Army of the Potomac, probed Lee's line to find out what was happening, but did not succeed. Rumors ran rampant that Lee planned abig cavalry raid by Stuart, a flanking movement to get between Hooker and Washington, or even an invasion of Maryland and Pennsylvania. Finally ascertaining that the head of the Army of Northern Virginia was concentrating in Culpeper County, on 7 June Hooker ordered Brig. Gen. Alfred Pleasontonto conduct a spoiling raid there, "disperse and destroy" the column and its supplies, and generally disrupt Confederate plans, whatever they might be. Lee arrived in Culpeper the same day and responded affirmatively to an invitation from Stuart to attend a grand review of his cavalry corps on 8 June. Stuart already had held two reviews, the first on 23 May and the second on 5 June, on the plains between Culpeper Court House and Brandy Station, a depot on the Orange & Alexandria Railroad half a dozen miles northeast. The second had been-a grand affair indeed, with mock combats, special trains from the NPS Form 10-900a (8-86) OMS No. 1024-0018

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page 43-

The Civil War in Vir inia 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolo ical Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

-- courthouse town bearing bevies of beauteous belles, and Stuart's horse bedecked in flowers-and Stuart promised to repeat the show on 8 June for Lee's benefit. The third performance was scaled back, but even so both cavalrymen and newspaper reporters groused that the reviews did little more than exhaust the horses and feed Stuart's ego. After the review, which Lee enjoyed and described in a letter to his wife, Stuart and his horsemen moved into bivouacs in and around Brandy Station. Lee intended for Stuart to begin in the morning to screen the infantry's march toward the Blue Ridge Mountains and the Shenandoah Valley by crossing the Rappahannock River and striking the Union army's advance posts. While Stuart slept atop Fleetwood Hill overlooking the depot, however, Pleasonton slipped into position at Beverly's and Kelly's Fords, two important river crossings just a few miles northwest and southeast of Stuart's headquarters. The on 9 June came as a to all on both sides of the river. Pleasonton had divided his II,OOO-man force (seven cavalry brigades, two infantry brigades, and six artillery companies) in two: Brig. Gen. commanded the fIrSt part and Brig. Gen. David M. Gregg the second. Buford approached Beverly's Ford stealthily over two days, bivouacking about a mile from the ford in Fauquier County on 8 June. Gregg encamped farther away from Kelly's Ford, about six miles downstream from Beverly's, and arose before dawn to ride to the crossing. Pleasonton's plan called for both commands to cross simultaneously at dawn, unite at Brandy Station, and ride to Culpeper Court House. Pleasontonknew the fords would be guardedby Confederatepickets on the westernbank of the Rappahannock,hence his methodsof approach. He did not know, however,that Stuart'sentire corps,some 9,500 men,was bivouackedclose by. Brig. Gen. FitzhughLee's brigadewas at Oak ShadeChurch, a few miles northwestof Brandy Station;Brig. Gen. William H. F. "Rooney" Lee's was aroundthe Welford house,Farley; Brig. Gen. William E. "Grumble" Jones'sslept around Saint James's Church on the Beverly's Ford road (present-dayRte. 677); Brig. Gen. BeverlyH. Robertson'swas aroundthe Barbour house,Beauregard; and Brig. Gen. WadeHampton's Legion had encamped just north of Stevensburg, a village aboutfour and a half miles southof Brandy Station. Buford's crossingtook placeon time; Gregg'sdid not. Buford's cavalrymendrove through Stuart'spickets and chargeddown the Beverly's Ford roadtoward Fleetwood Hill, but were stoppedat SaintJames's Church by Jones'shastily assembled defense and drivenback up the road by effective Confederatecountercharges. The Federalsgradually pushed Jones's men back to the church,but Hampton arrived to lengthenand strengthenthe line thereand RooneyLee threatenedthe Union right flank at the northernend of FleetwoodHill, in an areaknown asthe Yew Hills. Buford was forcedto fight on two fronts: the combaton his right flank. focusedon a stonewall seizedby Lee's men on the Cunningham fann, soonreached a stalemate;the fighting straightahead (south) around the churchresulted in Jones's and Hampton'scavalrymen falling back slowly southwestto FleetwoodHill. Their evacuationexposed RooneyLee's right flank, and he was compelledto abandonthe stonewall andretire toward Farleyas Buford pressedwest. Gregg,meanwhile, crossed at Kelly's Ford; the Confederatepickets raced to BrandyStation to bring the newsto Stuart,who at first disbelievedthem. He sentRobertson and his brigadetoward the ford. NPS Form 10-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page 44

The Civil War in Vir inia 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolo ical Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

and they encountereda Union infantrybrigade there. Robertsonfonned his men in a blocking position acrossthe road from Brandy Station(today's Rte. 674) on the Brownand Brannin farms,the sceneof the Battle of Kelly's Ford on 17 March. Therethe two brigadesfaced each other all day, scarcelyfiring a shot, while Greggrode off in the directionof Stevensburg (on present-dayRte. 672) with his cavalryforce. Greggdivided his commandnear Carrico Mill. He and about2,400 of his menrode northwest toward Brandy Station(on today's Rte. 669), while Col. Alfred N. A. Duffie led a smallernumber toward Stevensburg.There, Duffie wasto turn north and ride to Brandy Station(on present-dayRte. 663). About noon,as Jones'sand Hampton'scavalrymen held their own alongthe SaintJames's Church line, Gregg's columnarrived at Brandy Stationand surprisedStuart for the secondtime that day. Stuart's adjutant,Maj. HenryB. McClellan,held off Gregg with a single cannonlong enoughfor someof Jones's troopersto reachthe crestof FleetwoodHill at the sametime asGregg's. Whatfollowed was a classic cavalry confrontationas the two forcescollided: mountedcharges and countercharges,horse against horse and saberagainst saber. None of the participantsever forgot it, andthe fighting raged for severalhours as flfSt one side and thenthe other sweptacross the broadhilltop. The arrival of Hampton'sbrigade finally tipped the scalesfor the Confederates. WhenHampton raced to Jones'said early thatmorning, he left Col. MatthewC. Butler and the 2nd SouthCarolina Cavalryto guardthe road from Stevensburgto BrandyStation. Butler learnedof Duffie's approachand rode throughStevensburg to fonn a mile-long blocking line acrossthe road and along the easterncrest of HansboroughRidge. Meanwhile,Col. ThomasT. Munford, who commanded Fitz Lee's brigadethat day, orderedCol. Williams C. Wickham's 4th Virginia Cavalryto assistButler. Wickhamrode southfrom BrandyStation, arriving just as Duffie chargedButler's thin line, and the 4th Virginia broke and ran for the rear. Pursuedthrough Stevensburg, Butler fonned a new line facing south acrossMountain Run, abouta mile north of the village. A lucky shotfrom a Federalcannon seriously woundedButler and killed Will Farley,one of Stuart'sfavorite scouts. Butler's troopers,and Wickham's, pulled backanother mile to JonasRun; Duffie, receiving ordersto hastento Gregg'sassistance, turned away from this new line, retracedhis route all the way to Carrico Mill, androde to Brandy Stationalong Gregg's path but arrivedtoo late to pitch into the fray. As the afternoonwore on, Stuartat lastorganized an effective counterattackusing reinforcements from Fitz Lee's brigade. While RooneyLee chargedBuford acrossthe Yew Hills, pushingthe Union commanderback toward Beverly's Ford, anotherConfederate charge swept the Federalsfrom Fleetwood Hill, through Brandy Stationand acrossthe easternplain towardthe Orange& AlexandriaRailroad bridge over the RappahannockRiver at Nonnan's Ford (nearpresent-day Remington). As the sunset, Pleasonton'scommand crossed to safetyat Beverly's, Nonnan's,and Kelly's Fords. Pleasontonreported some900 casualties,Stuart 500. Tactically,the Battle of Brandy station-the largestmounted cavalry fight of the war-ended in a draw, althoughboth sidesclaimed victory. Strategically,the advantagewent to Pleasonton,Buford, and the Union cavalry corps,although they had failed in their immediatemission as defmedby Hooker. NPS Form 10-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section _E.~ Page 45

The Civil War in Virl!inia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolol!ical Resources Name of Multiple PropertyListing

Instead,they had surprisedStuart twice, battledhis vauntedtroopers effectively all day long, and withdrawnfromthe field undertheir own steam,not becausethey had beendefeated. While Federalmorale soared,many Southernnewspapers pilloried Stuart,taking satisfactionthat the flamboyantcavalier had receiveda comeuppance.Stuart responded in kind, but privatelyhe felt the sting of his critics. His narrow escapeand the resultingdamage to his ego are thoughtby somehistorians to haveinfluenced his behavior on the remainderof the Gettysburgcampaign, causing him to miss the first day's battle in Pennsylvania while attemptingto recoverhis former glory by riding aroundthe Union army,and therebycontributing to Lee's defeat. Brandy Stationmarked the turning of the tide in favor of the Federalcavalry, although neitherside realizedit. Lee professedpleasure over the outcomeat Brandy Stationand complimentedStuart on his quick reactions. Thenhe continuedhis infantry's marchtoward the ShenandoahValley unimpededby Hooker. Becauseof the army's size, about75,000 men, the threecorps took differentroutes west to the valley and north to Pennsylvania.Ewell, leadingthe advance,marched through the Blue RidgeMountains at Chester Gap, then down the valley through Front Royaltoward Winchester.Longstreet's corps, which Lee accompanied,entered the valley at Ashby's and Snicker'sGaps, while Hill followed Ewell's route through ChesterGap after Hookerabandoned Fredericksburg on 14June to beginhis pursuitof Lee. Stuart's cavalryscreened the army's flank betweenHooker and the Blue Ridge. Ewell and his corps materializedsouth and eastof Winchesteron 13June. The next day, Maj. Gen. Edward"Allegheny" Johnson'sdivision approachedfrom the southand eastwhile Maj. Gen. JubalA. Early's attackedfrom the west; Ewell orderedMaj. Gen. RobertE. Rodesand his division to first to Berryville and thento Martinsburg,north of Winchester.Now the Federalgarrison, commanded by Maj. Gen. RobertH. Milroy, was effectivelysurrounded. The SecondBattle of Winchesterbegan about 6:00 P.M.,when Confederate artillery openedon the Union positionsas a preludeto Early's infantry assaultat 6:45. An earthworkwas overrun before darkness fell, and Milroy decided-as he shouldhave done days earlier-to retreat. The withdrawalbegan at 1:00 A.M. on 15June, and Ewell moved swiftly to block it. Although Rodescould cut off Milroy's retreatinto Maryland, Ewell wantedto stop Milroy beforehe got that far, so he orderedJohnson to marchquickly around Winchesterand interceptthe Federals. At 3:30 A.M.,in a rare night attack.Johnson struck Milroy's columnnear Stephenson'sDepot on the Winchester& PotomacRailroad four miles northeastof Winchester. The fighting was intense,and resultedin a humiliating Union defeatas abouthalf of Milroy's force soonsurrendered (Milroy himself escaped).Some 4,000 Federals were captured and about450 killed or wounded;Ewell lost 50 killed or missingand about200 wounded.The Confederatesalso captured23 cannon,300 wagonsand the samenumber of horses,and a large quantityof stores. More importantly, Ewell had clearedthe way for Lee's advanceinto Marylandand Pennsylvania without the threatof attack by Union forces in the valley or northernVirginia. Rodes'scommand led the way acrossthe Potomac River the sameday. NPS Form 10-900a OMS No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page 46

The Civil War in Virginia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolo2ical Resources Name of Multiple PropertyListing

Stuart, meanwhile,continued to screenthe army's march. On 17 June,Pleasonton sent three brigades underGregg from ManassasJunction to Aldie, a milling village at the intersectionof three highways,to searchout the Confederatearmy. The first highwayat Aldie, Little RiverTurnpike (present-dayU.S. Rte. 50), led eastthrough Fairfax Court Houseto Alexandria. The second,Snicker's GapTurnpike (today's Rte. 734),ran northwestto the gap,where other roads continued to Berryville and Winchester. The third. Ashby's Gap Turnpike (U.S. Rte. 50), extendedsouthwest through Middleburg,Upperville, and Paristo the gap,and eventuallyto the Valley Turnpikejust southof Winchester.Since the Army of NorthernVirginia was marchingby way of, or crossing,the lattertwo of theseroads, driving Greggout of Aldie and eastward becamea priority for Stuart. Gregg's commandconsisted of the brigadesled by Duffie, Brig. Gen. H. JudsonKilpatrick, and Col. J. Irvin Gregg. He orderedDuffie to marchthrough Thoroughfare Gap and thento Middleburg on a roundaboutroute, thenrode to Aldie, locatedsome five miles eastof Middleburg,with his other brigades and accompaniedby Pleasonton.They arrived at the village about4:00 P.M.,just as Fitz Lee's brigade, temporarilycommanded by Munford, preparedto bivouacthere overnight. The resultwas a shoTt.sharp fight. The engagementat Aldie surprisedboth combatants. The Confederatesapproached the village from the west, while the Federalspassed through it from the east.and the two forcescollided just northwest of the village on the Snicker'sGap Turnpike. Dismountedsharpshooters from bothsides skinnished first. followed by mountedcharges and countercharges,then a brief artillery duel. Additional mountedcombat eventuallypushed Munford and his commandwest toward Middleburg,but the Federalssuffered heavy casualtiesin this four-hour-longengagement. Duffie, meanwhile,arrived southof Middleburg in the late afternoonand drove in the Confederate picketsthere. Stuart,who was in the town, evadedDuffie, while Munford's and Robertson'sbrigades attackedand routedhis commandin an earlymorning assaulton 18June as Duffie tried to break out toward Aldie. The principal engagementat Middleburgoccurred the nextday, 19June, when Col. J. Irvin Gregg's brigadeadvanced west from Aldie. Stuartformed his commandin a line just west of Middleburgalong a ridge top and repulsedGregg's charge. Stuart counterattacked,then fell back to anotherdefensive position a half-mile fartherwest. In this action,Maj. Herosvon Borcke,a Prussianofficer and aide to Stuart,fell woundedwith a bullet in his neck; he recoveredand wasat Stuart'sbedside when he died the next year. Little skirmishingoccurred the nextday, but about7:00 A.M. on 21 JunePleasonton made a concertedeffort to pierce Stuart's screenby advancingon Upperville,located about nine miles west of Middleburg. Col. marchedwith his infantrybrigade directly downthe Ashby's Gap Turnpike,along with Col. J. Irvin Gregg'sand Brig. Gen.H. JudsonKilpatrick's cavalrybrigades, while Brig. Gen. JohnBuford led his cavalrydivision north and west in the main attackagainst Stuart's left flank. Buford's maneuverbogged down whenhe encounteredJones's and Col. JohnR. Chambliss'sbrigades; Stuart withdrew,fighting furiously,to take a strongdefensive position in Ashby's Gap. NPS Form IO-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page 41-

The Civil War in Vir2inia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolo2ical Resources Name of Multiple PropertyListing

The week of cavalry combatresulted in some800 Unioncasualties and about240 on the Confederateside. Although Pleasontonthought he haddone well to drive Stuartwest, in fact he had learnedalmost nothing aboutthe movementof Lee's infantry into Marylandand Pennsylvania. Stuart,heartened by his successat screeningthe Anny of NorthernVirginia, now madea fateful decision. He receivedvaguely worded discretionary orders from Lee the next day,22 June,and early on 25 June beganhis ride throughand eastof the Anny of the Potomac,effectively severing communications with Lee. After raiding Union supply lines,Stuart finally rejoinedLee at Gettysburg,but not until the day after the two armieshad blunderedinto one anotheron I July and becomefully engaged. JosephHooker had submittedhis resignationas commander of the Anny of the Potomacon 27 June,and Lincoln appointedMaj. Gen.George G. Meadein his place earlythe next morning. After his victory atGettysburg, Meade was criticized for not pursuingthe retreatingConfederates with vigor, but the Union army was hardly in a conditionto rush into anotherfight. The casualtyfigures afterthree days of combatwere enonnous:on the Union side,3,155 killed, 14,529wounded, and 5,365missing; on the Confederate,3,903 killed, 18,735wounded, and 5,425missing. Both sidesneeded to recuperate. Lee crossedthe PotomacRiver into Virginia at Falling Watersand Williamsport, Maryland, on 13-14 July and withdrew up the ShenandoahValley. Meadecrossed east of the Blue Ridgeand paralleled Lee's route. On 23 July, Meadeordered the III Corpsunder Maj. Gen. William H. Frenchto force a passagethrough Manassas Gap and cut off the retreatingConfederate columns at FrontRoyal. Brig. Gen. HenryH. Walker's Confederatebrigade of Maj. Gen.Richard H. Anderson'sdivision guardedthe gap; at fIrst light, Frenchbegan pushing Walker backslowly. About4:30 P.M.,a strong Union attackdrove Walker's men until they werereinforced by Maj. Gen. RobertE. Rodes'sdivision and artillery. By dusk, the Federalsabandoned their poorly coordinatedattacks, and during the nightthe Confederateforces withdrew into the Luray (Page)Valley. The nextday, the Unionarmy occupiedFront Royal, but Lee's army was safelybeyond pursuit. Lee's invasionof the North accomplishedsome of his objectives,disrupted Federal plans for a summercampaign in Virginia, and enabledhis mento subsiston Unionsupplies instead of Virginians'. But the costhad beenhigh, too high. The Anny of NorthernVirginia hadreceived a blow from which it would neverrecover, Vicksburg had fallento Grant,Maj. Gen. William S. Rosecranshad maneuveredGen. BraxtonBragg's army out of middle Tennessee,and the dreamof Europeanrecognition had vanished. Northernwar aimshad receiveda desperatelyneeded boost. The Confederatetide had crestedat Chancellorsville;it beganrunning out atGettysburg.

BRISTOE STATION AND MINE RUN CAMPAIONS

The Army of NorthernVirginia and its commander,Gen. RobertE. Lee,were neverthe sameafter the GettysburgCampaign. Of the 75,000soldiers who marchedto Pennsylvaniain the summerof 1863, almost28,000 were killed, wounded,captured, or missing by the end of the campaign.The departurein NPS Fonn IO-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section _E- Page 48

The Civil War in Virginia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolol!ical Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

Septemberof Lt. Gen.James Longstreet and his corps for Georgiaand Tennessee reduced the army's strengthto 45,000. Lee's healthdeteriorated. According to Longstreet,that factas muchas his acceptanceof responsibilityfor the defeatat Gettysburgcaused him on 8 Augustto submithis resignationto President JeffersonDavis, who refusedto acceptit. Lee had beenill in March with what he and his doctorscalled "rheumatism" but in fact was likely anginapectoris or a mild heartattack. By late summerLee found himself increasinglyshort of energyand experiencingfrequent bouts of "rheumatism." On 10 Octoberhe felt so indisposedthat he could not mount Travellerand insteadrode in an ambulancewagon. Lee's army faced critical shortagesof manpower,horses, and supplies. Desertionthreatened the life of the army,and to keephis men in the ranks Lee resortedto both carrotsand sticks-furloughs and exhortationsto patriotismon the one hand,courts martial and executionson the other-with modest success.Half of the cavalryand artillery weredismounted due to a shortageof horsesand mules. Southern cavalrymenbrought their own horsesto the war (the United Statesgovernment supplied them to Federal troopers),and whena steedwas killed or lost. its rider becamea foot soldier until he could acquireanother one. The supply shortage,which includedthe slow replacementof armsand equipmentlost at Gettysburg, causedmorale to suffer, which in turn fed the desertionrate. On the Union side,Maj. Gen.George G. Meade'sArmy of the Potomacfaced desertionproblems too, mostlyamong new conscripts, and Meadetried tacticssimilar to Lee's, with similar results. Surprisingly,Meade also facedshortages of cavalryhorses and supplies. Therewas not a horseshortage as such,but rathera lack of mountssturdy enough to withstandthe approachingsummer's heat and humidity. Meade's supply problem,however, was far lesssevere than Lee's; he neededfood for his horses,not for his men. And the numbersof his men kept increasing,from roughly68,000 (Gettysburg had reduced their ranks by 23,000),to about81,000 in the fall. Many of the newmen were draftees,mostly Irish and German immigrants,and ethnic and socialconflicts ran high. Meadeworried aboutthe battlefieldeffectiveness of this newarmy. Despitethese problems, each commander found himself underpressure to resumefield operations. Meadedid not enjoythe full supportof PresidentAbraham Lincoln andhis cabinetmembers, many of whom thoughtthat his pursuit of Lee afterGettysburg had beendilatory. Although Meadehad several excellentmilitary reasonsfor proceedingcautiously, Lincoln andhis advisorswere quick to assumethat Meadesuffered from the same"disease" that had infectedMaj. Gen.George B. McClellan and other Union commanders:reluctance to face RobertE. Lee in combat. This was not true of Meade,but as usual perceptionswere more importantthan reality, and Meaderealized that he would haveto take to the field soon. Lee, too, felt the pressure,although he receivedDavis's unflinching supportand encouragement. It was not so muchthe Confederatepresident's urging as Lee's own natureand the growing predicament facing the army that hurried him toward combat. Lee could not afford to wait for Meadeto attackhis smallerforce; outnumberedand poorly supplied,Lee knew that inactionmeant death for the Army of NorthernVirginia. He mustattack. NPS Form IO-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E -Page ~-

The Civ!\ ~ar in Vir2inia.. 186\-\865: Historic and Archaeolo2icalResources Name of Multiple PropertyListing

As it recuperated, the Confederate amty concentrated in Culpeper and Orange Counties in Piedmont Virginia, north of the Rapidan River and west of the RappahannockRiver. In August and September 1863 the Amty of the Potomac occupied much the same positions on the north bank of the Rapidan as it had the year before when Maj. Gen. John Pope commanded it; Meade ordered cavaIry forays across the river fords to keep the Confederates off balance. Both annies were stripped of divisions or corps to meet the demands of the war in the West: Longstreet and two divisions departed for Georgia and Tennessee in September (and helped secure the victory at Chickamauga) and Meade's XI and XII corps were ordered late in Septemberto the Chattanooga area, to help secure Middle Tennessee for the Union. Later, that gateway town would serve as a base of operations for Maj. Gen. William T. Shemtan's Georgia campaign. Meade sent more troops to Tennesseewhen he learned of Longstreet's reassignment, and Lee decided to resume the offensive when he discovered that the Amty of the Potomac had lost two entire corps. Lee had threeobjectives: to drive Meadeback toward Washington,to defeathis anny, and to preventthe transferof any more Federaltroops to the westerntheater. The Confederatevictory at Chickamaugaon 19-20 Septemberhad heartened Lee, the conditionof the roadsand the weatherwere conduciveto campaigning,and the soldiersof the Army of NorthernVirginia had recoveredphysically from the effects of the Gettysburgcampaign. Theseconditions favored Lee's plans. . Severalfacts militated againstit. however. Longstreet.Lee's ablestcorps commander, was in the West. Neither of the othertwo wasOld Pete'sequal: Lt. Gen.Richard S. Ewell's reputationhad suffered afterthe defeatat Gettysburg,while Lt. Gen.A. P. Hill oftenwas impetuousand sinceGettysburg seeminglyill whenevera crisis threatened.Horses remained in shortsupply, many of Lee's soldierslacked shoes,and Meade'sanny outnumber~dLee's, 76,000to 45,000. After consideringall the factors,Lee choseto take his anny into the field andto employ muchthe samestrategy as he had late in August 1862:leave a rear guardon the RapidanRiver and executea turning movementto the north toward Washingtonwith the rest of his troops,thereby forcing the Federalsto abandontheir Rapidanline to defendthe capitaland fight the Confederateson groundfavorable to the Army of NorthernVirginia. The plan hadworked once before; it might work again. But Lee did not have StonewallJackson to leadthe marcharound Meade's army, nor did he have Longstreeton the Rapidan,nor did he havean entire corpsto stationthere. Instead,he would leaveMaj. Gen.Fitzhugh Lee's three- brigadecavalry division andthree infantrybrigades to guardthe crossingsalong severalmiles of riverfront. He would accompanyEwell and Hill as they sweptaround the Union right. with Ewell swinging farther north than Hill. Maj. Gen.J. E. B. Stuartwould lead Maj. Gen.Wade Hampton's cavalry division aheadof the infantry to clear the way. On Thursday,8 October,Hill's Third Army Corpsbegan its marchnorth from OrangeCourt Housethrough MadisonCourt House. The corpsconsisted of threedivisions. Maj. Gen. RichardH. Anderson'sdivision containedthe brigadesof Col. JohnC. C. Sanders,Brig. Gen. CarnotPosey, Brig. Gen. ,Brig. Gen.Ambrose R. Wright,and Brig. Gen.Edward A. Perry;Maj. Gen. 's consistedof four brigadesled by Brig. Gen. JosephR. Davis,Brig. Gen.James J. Archer,Brig. Gen. NPS Fonn 10-900a OMS No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page ~5Q-

The Civil War in Virginia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolo!!ical Resources Name of Multiple PropertyListing

Henry H. Walker,and Brig. Gen. William W. Kirkland; Maj. Gen.Cadmus Wilcox's musteredfour brigadesunder Brig. Gen. JamesH. Lane,Brig. Gen. Abner Perrin,Brig. Gen. EdwardL. Thomas,and Brig. Gen. Alfred M. Scales. Brig. Gen.John R. Cookecommanded an unattachedbrigade of North Carolinians. Ewell's SecondArmy Corps,like Hill's corps,consisted of threedivisions. The fITSt, commandedby Maj. Gen. JubalA. Early, includedthe brigadesof Brig. Gen. Harry T. Hays,Brig. Gen. RobertF. Hoke, Brig. Gen.John B. Gordon,and Col. JohnS. Hoffman. The second,under Maj. Gen. Edward"Allegheny" Johnson,consisted of the brigadescommanded by Brig. Gen.James A. Walker,Brig. Gen.George H. Steuart,Brig. Gen.John M. Jones,and Brig. Gen.Alfred Iverson. The third, Maj. Gen. RobertE. Rodes's,contained five brigades,commanded by Brig. Gen. JuniusDaniel, Brig. Gen. GeorgeP. Doles,Brig. Gen. CullenA. Battle,Brig. Gen. StephenD. Ramseur,and Brig. Gen. RobertD. Johnston. Stuart's cavalry corps,which had beenreorganized on 9 September,contained two divisions,the fITSt commandedby Hampton(who had beenwounded at Gettysburgand was away recuperating)and the secondby Fitz Lee. Hampton'sdivision consistedof threebrigades commanded by Col. PierceM. B. Young,Col. Oliver R. Funsten,and Brig. Gen.James B. Gordon;Lee's threebrigades were underCol. JohnR. Chambliss,Jr., Brig. Gen. LunsfordL. Lomax,and Col. ThomasH. Owen. Maj. RobertF. Beckhamcommanded Stuart's Horse Artillery, while the restof the army's artillery wasorganized into two five-battaliondivisions to supportEwell's and Hill's infantrycorps, with Brig. Gen.Armistead L. Long commandingone division and Col. ReubenL. Walkerthe other. Meade'sArmy of the Potomacconsisted of five infantrycorps (I, underMaj. Gen.; II, Brig. Gen. GouverneurK. Warren; III, Maj. Gen.William H. French;V, Maj. Gen.; VI, Maj. Gen.John Sedgwick),each with its own artillery brigade;a cavalrycorps commanded by Maj. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton;and an artillery reservewith six brigadesunder Brig. Gen. HenryJ. Hunt. Eachinfantry corps,as well as the cavalry corps,contained three divisions. In [ Corps,they were commandedby Brig. Gen. LysanderCutler, Brig. Gen.John C. Robinson,and Brig. Gen.John R. Keilly; II Corps,Brig. Gen. JohnC. Caldwell, Brig. Gen. AlexanderS. Webb,and Brig. Gen. AlexanderHays; III Corps,Maj. Gen. David D. Birney, Brig. Gen. Henry Prince,and Brig. Gen. JosephB. Carr; ,Brig. Gen.Charles Griffm, Brig. Gen. RomeynB. Ayres,and Col. William McCandless;VI Corps,Brig. Gen. Horatio G. Wright, Brig. Gen. Albion P. Howe,and Brig. Gen. HenryD. Terry; CavalryCorps, Brig. Gen.John Buford, Brig. Gen.David M. Gregg,and Brig. Gen.H. JudsonKilpatrick. Lee's marchdid not go undetectedby Meadeand his generals.Not only were Union spiesmore numerousthan before,and their reportsmore accurate,but watcherswith telescopesoccupied observation postsatop suchheights as Cedar Mountainin CulpeperCounty. In addition,the Federalsignal corps had crackedits Confederatecounterpart's code; by 6 October,Union signalofficers knewan offensivewas imminent. On 8-9 Octoberthey reported Lee's troops on the march,and Federalsoldiers were issuedfive days' rations in preparationfor the comingcampaign. Meade himself climbedCedar Mountain on 9 Octoberto peerthrough a telescopeat his enemy. Meaderemained uncertain, howe;ver, about just whatthe Confederateactivity signified. Was Lee attemptinga turning movementagainst the Union right flank. or washe aboutto fall backtoward NPSForm 10-900a OMS No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E .Page 51-

The Civil War in Vir2inia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolo2ical Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

Richmond? The Union commander ordered Buford to seize Morton's Ford on the Rapidan River in case a push to Orange Court House might be productive against a Confederate retrograde toward Richmond. He also strengthened Kilpatrick. who held James City (present-day Leon) on the Union right flank by dispatching Prince's infantry division to him in support. By 10 October, Meade had positioned troops to counter either move by Lee without overcomrnitting his forces. Lee launched his campaign at 3:00 A.M. on Saturday, 10 October, when Stuart began a diversionary attack down the road to James City with Gordon's brigade in the lead. His troopers struck at Russell's Ford on the Robertson River about 6:30, just after dawn, and broke through the Federal cavalry guarding the crossing. This sector of Meade's line belonged to the youngest general in the Union army, twenty-three-year-old Brig. Gen. , who had leaped to that rank from captain after distinguishing himself in heroic cavalry charges at Aldie and elsewhere. Custer's men withdrew in good order and joined Kilpatrick at James City following a brief engagement with Southern cavalry at Bethsaida Church. A day-long action at James City followed. Kilpatrick's force occupied a ridge north of the village and Stuart's men secured one to the south. Each side shelled the other with artillery, and skirmishers tired their weapons from one crest to the other, while citizens huddled in the village between the two heights and listened tl;?the rounds buzzing overhead. Neither side assaultedthe other; Stuart hesitated to push hard, and Kilpatrick could not persuade Prince to come to his aid. Prince was relieved of divisional command that winter. Buford, meanwhile,had ridden southeastfrom Stevensburgand crossedthe RapidanRiver at GermannaFord, thencircled westto Morton's Ford. The plan called for Buford to attackthe Confederates at the ford on 11 Octoberwhile Newton's infantry assailedit from the north. Meade,however, decidedthat the action at JamesCity meantthat Lee intendedeither to outflankhim on the right or withdraw toward the ShenandoahValley, not Richmond. He canceledNewton's marchand orderedthe army to new positionsnorth of the RappahannockRiver; word did not reachBuford until 7:00 A.M. on 11 October. Buford decidedto pushacross the ford and returnto Stevensburg.After a sharpaction he succeeded. WhenStuart discovered on the sameday that Kilpatrick had withdrawnfrom JamesCity, he set off in pursuit,headed for CulpeperCourt House. Late in the morninghe caughtup with Kilpatrick at Brandy Station,scene of the greatcavalry battle of four monthsearlier. As the fight developed,other columns(those of Buford and Fitz Lee)converged on the battlefieldfrom the southand pitchedinto the fray. The resultwas a wild, disjointed engagementwith chargesand countercharges along the Orange& AlexandriaRailroad line betweenBrandy Stationand the RappahannockRiver bridge to the east. Stuart, hamperedby the exhaustionof his mounts,was unableto trap the Union cavalryas he had hoped,and spectacularcharges led by Custeramong others enabled the Federalsto crossthe river to safety. By nightfall, Meade'sheadquarters were at RappahannockStation (present-day Remington), Lee's were at CulpeperCourt House,and Hill's and Ewell's corpswere marchingnortheast (roughly alongRte. 229) toward Warrenton. NPS Form IO-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page 52

The Civil War in VirlZinia. 1861-1865: Historic and ArchaeololZical Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

Meadeand his commandersspent part of the night revisingorders for the nextday's march. Now that it was clear from scoutingreports that Lee was moving roughly northeast,Meade sought to parallelhis route along the railroad and attackLee if the opportunityarose. In the morning,however, Meade received word thatConfederate infantry had beenengaged at Amissville, aboutten miles west of Warrentonand on the route that Jacksonhad takento ThoroughfareGap in August 1862. WasLee alsoheading for the gap? In reality, the Confederatelogistical situationprecluded such a move. The horseswere in no conditionto take sucha roundaboutroute, forage was scarce, and the soldiersdid not haveenough supplies. The infantry at Amissville wasHill's; it was marchingnortheast ahead of Ewell's and westof him on roughly parallelroads. Hill would unite with Ewell at Warrenton,and then both corpswould headeast. Meade'smisapprehension of Lee's destinationcaused him to changehis plans:he decidedto withdraw up the Orange& AlexandriaRailroad to Centreville,and oncethere to defend Washingtonand to preparea newoffensive. He also alteredthe army's order of march. As corpsattempted to passeach other on unfamiliar roadsto fmd newplaces in line, the resultingconfusion delayed some units for hours. Fortunatelyfor Meade,Lee's army madelittle progressbecause of its supplyshortages. On 13 October,Stuart reconnoitered toward Catlett's Stationon the Orange& Alexandria Railroadto discoverwhat had becomethe Union left flank (sinceMeade's army was marchingnorth insteadof facing south). Lomax's brigadeleft Warrentonand rode southeasttoward the stationby way of Dumfries Road (present-dayRtes. 605 and667). Stuartfollowed an hour or so later with Gordon's and Funsten'sbrigades; Lomax halted at Auburn,a hamletroughly halfwayto his objective,and waited for Stuartto catchup. While he waited,Lomax sentscouts out to checkthe rolling, woodedcountryside for enemytroops. They found a hugewagon park and Buford's cavalrydivision at WarrentonJunction (today's Calverton)but failed to reconnoiterThree Mile Stationon the WarrentonBranch Railtoad,about halfway down that line betweenWarrenton and WarrentonJunction, and somethree miles southwestof Auburn. If they had,they would havefound Kilpatrick's and Gregg's cavalrydivisions andthe II and III Corps. Stuartrode into Auburn about 1:00,noted Lomax's error,and dispatched Capt. William W. Blackford,a memberof his staff, and a small escortto checkThree Mile Station. Thenhe turnedhis attentionto the wagonsat WarrentonJunction, sent word for FitzhughLee to join him quickly, and preparedto attack. Lee left Warrentonabout 4:00 andtraced Stuart's route to Auburn,bringing with him Owen's and Chambliss'sbrigades. He was approachingthe hamletabout 4:15 whenhe encounteredone of Stuart's staff officers riding toward Warrentonwith a dispatchfor RobertE. Lee. The officer had surprisingnews: a Union army corpswas marching up the road from the directionof ThreeMile Station directly for Auburn,thereby threatening to get betweenStuart and the mainarmy at Warrenton. The III Corpshad blundereddown the wrong roadsthat morning underthe leadershipof French. Afflicted with facialtics (accordingto rumor,caused by heavybouts with the bottle), Frenchwas called "Old Blinkey" by his men. Now he led his columninto an unexpectedclash with Lomax at Auburn. The brief actiontook place on the Old CarolinaRoad (Rte. 602)just southof Auburn. Lomax chargedFrench's column,was driven back by effective artillery fire, and thenheld his positionbriefly with supportfrom Lee NPS Fonn 10-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section ~E- Page 53 -

The Civil War in Virginia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolo2ical Resources Name .of Multiple Property Listing

and Chamblissbefore withdrawing to Warrenton. Now Stuartwas alone with two brigades,sandwiched betweenmarching columns of the enemy. Stuartsurveyed the situationand decided to concealhis brigadesin a woodedravine just eastof Auburn. He dressedhalf a dozenvolunteers in capturedFederal uniforms and after dark sentthem through French's column (they would have beenshot as spiesif captured)to inform Lee of Stuart'spredicament. All six madeit through safelyand one reportedto Lee, who orderedEwell's corpsto marchto Auburn at dawn. Meanwhile,Stuart and his menpassed the night nervously. First they listenedto French'swagons creakingand his soldierstalking as they marchedby in the darknessto bivouacat Greenwich;then Warren'scorps pitchedcamp for the nightjust a few hundredyards away. The cavalrychief stood readyto makea run for it with his cavalrymenif necessary,although he understoodthey would pay a high price in casualties. An officer laterwrote that he had neverbefore seenStuart look so worried. Lee's plans for 14October called for dividing his army, thenreuniting it. Hill's corpswould pursueMeade's army eastwardon the Warrentonand AlexandriaTurnpike (present-dayU.S. Rte. 29). Ewell's corps would marchto Auburn,help free Stuart,and thenmarch northeastto rejoin Hill in time to strike Meade. At dawn, Hill's corps left its bivouac westof Warrenton, marchedeast through the town, and set off downthe turnpike, with part of Fitz Lee's cavalry division reconnoiteringin advance. About 5:00 A.M., Ewell beganhis rescuemission. He split his corpsinto two wings and sentthem to Auburn by different routes:Rodes's and Johnson'sdivisions marched down Dumfries Road from the north while Early's, supportedby the rest ofFitz Lee's cavalry, usedDouble PoplarsRoad (Rte. 670)to approachfrom the west. Just south of Auburn, meanwhile, Warren's II Corps, which had bivouacked there for the night rather than risk getting lost on strange roads in the dark. prepared to continue its eastward march. French's corps was now out of the way, followed by Kilpatrick's cavalry division, so Warren's route was clear. He knew of the previous day's engagement,and understood that Lee was in Warrenton trying to find and attack Meade's army at a vulnerable point. Warren, bringing up the rear of the column, was that point, and he took care to protect his line of march against an attack from the north. Caldwell's division was closest to Auburn, about a mile south of the crossroads on the Old Carolina Road between Auburn and Three Mile Station. Hays's division camped just south of Caldwell's, and Webb's division was next, about two miles south of Auburn. Warren's corps supply train, more than two hundred wagons and ambulances, stretched some two miles in length, so it moved out before dawn on the Old Carolina Road and approached the ford at Cedar Run, just south of Auburn. There, slippery mud and early morning fog caused the train to bog down; rather than delay the infantry's march, Warren ordered Caldwell to lead the way through fields and woods west and north of the road and cross Cedar Run over a bridge. Once across, Caldwell's men deployed for defense and then settled down for coffee and breakfast on a hill (thereafter called Coffee Hill) on the north side of the stream while Hays followed them with his division. . NPS Fonn IO-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page S4

The Civil War in Vir!!inia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolo!!ical Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

Stuartwas thus trappedbetween Caldwell halfa mile to the westand Warren's supplytrain the samedistance to the southand eastof his position. He knew that Ewell wasapproaching from Warrenton, and he cautiouslydeployed seven guns of his horseartillery on a hill someeight hundredyards eastof Caldwell's position. Stuartthen awaited the soundof rifle fire from the westto tell him that Ewell's skinnishershad madecontact with Warren'scorps. The secondengagement at Auburn beganabout 6:30 A.M., whenvedettes from Gregg's cavalry division, which had beenproviding securityfor the infantry on the Old CarolinaRoad and Double Poplar Road,opened fire on Ewell's skinnish line. Stuart,as soonas he heardthe shots,ordered his artillery to fire as well. Hays sentinfantry toward Stuart's artillery, which soonwithdrew, while in the meantime Caldwell movedhis division to the reverseslope of Coffee Hill to protectit from the Confederateguns. Warrengalloped to Auburn with his staff,having beeninfonned thatthree enemycolumns were convergingthere (one was Stuart's horsemen,who in reality wereattacking only to escape).To the westof Auburn, Gregg's cavalrymenneeded assistance, and Warrenordered an infantrybrigade to help them. He also orderedWebb's division aheadto supportHays. Stuart,meanwhile, realized that the time had come for his departure.He orderedGordon to lead his brigade in a chargeagainst Hays's infantryapproaching from the westwhile Stuartled Funsten's brigadeeastward through the Union line. The maneuversucceeded; Gordon then followed Stuartin a trek southand westaround Warren's corps,and Stuartsoon reunited his detachmentwith Fitt Lee's. Back on Coffee Hill, Union artillery had replacedCaldwell's division as soonas it movedto cover,to supportHays's infantry marchingeast against Stuart and his horseartillery. To the northwest, Fitz Lee's troopersand the vanguardof Early's infantrycolumn pressedGregg and the supportinginfantry bngadesent by Warren,while Rodesattacked from the west. The Coffee Hill batteriesturned around and beganto fire at Rodes'smen once Stuart had disengagedand escaped eastward. Confederates guns unlimberedto respond. By 10:00the Auburn engagementhad become an artillery duel. Warren,realizing thatthe Confederateswould not attackwith their infantry,used the opportunityto extractmost of his own infantry and cavalry and march southeastto the Orange& AlexandriaRailroad, then northwesttoward Bristoe Stationand ManassasJunction. The cannonfire died away afteran hour,and Warren's artillery pulled out underthe protectionof a combinedrear guard of cavalry andinfantry. For his part, Lee did not plan to fight a battle with Warren,although had he realizedthat the II Corpswas isolatedfrom the main body of Meade'sarmy, he might havechanged his strategy. Instead,he likewise quickly disengagedand marchedEwell's infantryand Lee's cavalry(and Stuart)eastward as plannedto strike Meade'sflank or rear. Hill had marcheddown the turnpike from Warrentonwith Anderson'sdivision in the lead, followed by Heth's and Wilcox's. By 8:30 A.M.,the headof the columnreached New Baltimore,a hamlet somefive miles eastof Warrenton. There, Hill receivedreports of Federaltroops marching eastward south of his position; indeed,he could hearthe rumbling of Unionwagons. He knew thatthe road the Federals were usingcrossed the turnpikethree or four miles ahead,near Buckland Mills, so he sentAnderson NPSFonn 10-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section _E- Page -:1.i.

The Civil War in Virginia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeological Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

hasteningahead to block the intersection.He orderedHeth and Wilcox to leavethe turnpike at New Baltimoreand march southeaston the road to Greenwich(today's Rtes.600 and 215), thento turn left and march northeastback to the turnpike to strike the enemyin the rear. The enemy,however, was not to be found, exceptfor Kilpatrick's cavalryaro~nd Buckland. FitzhughLee arrived with his reunitedcavalry division between9:00 and 10:00and hurried forward to engageKilpatrick, who withdrewtoward Gainesvillewith Lee in pursuit. Finding no otherFederals near Buckland,Anderson turned southon the road to Greenwich. From that village, Hill marchedwith Heth's and Wilcox's divisions easton the road leadingto Bristoe Station(Rte. 215), wherehe expectedto find the rear of Meade'sarmy that had eludedhim so far. He marchedblindfolded, however, for Fitz Lee's cavalry spentthe rest of the day chasingKilpatrick while Stuartcovered Ewell's right flank somemiles behind Hill. Whenhe mostneeded it, Hill's reconnaissancecapability had almostdisappeared. At noon,Meade was at Bristoe Station,pleased with the progresshis army was makingtoward Centreville. He wired Warren,at Catlett's Station,to continuehis march up the railroad but to be aware that Lee was on the Warrentonand AlexandriaTurnpike and might senda columnfrom Gainesvilleto Bristoeto intercepthim. Meadeordered Sykes, who wasapproaching Bristoe Stationwith his V Corps aheadof Warren,to wait there until he spottedWarren's column. About 1:30P.M., Sykes thought Warren had beensighted, so he orderedthe last of his corpsto crossBroad Run. Justthen, Hill and Hetharrived just north of the stationand sawthe end of Sykes'scolumn passingover the stream. Believing that he had found the rear of Meade'sarmy, Hill orderedan immediate attack,sending Heth forward. Although otherFederals were observed near the railroad tracksto the west of Broad Run, Hill assumedthey were a smallrearguard detachment. In reality, they werethe vanguardof Warren'scorps, whichhad marchedup the railroad from Catlett's Station. Most of the Federalswere concealed behind the high railroad bedjust west of Bristoe Station; when Hethdeployed his division to attackthe rear of Sykes'scolumn, Warren struck the Confederateright flank. Heth's commanderswheeled the division in a frontal assaultagainst the unexpectedthreat, but the Confederateline crumpledunder the hail of bulletsand artillery shells. The stunnedsurvivors stumbled to the rear, leavinghundreds of dead,dying, and woundedon the field. Although Ewell's corpsarrived before dark,Lee decidednot to continuethe battle. The Federals withdrew acrossBroad Run in the night, and after dawnon 15 OctoberLee and Hill surveyedthe carnage together. Finally an angry Lee cut off Hill's admissionof responsibilitywith "Well, well, General,bury thesepoor menand let us sayno more aboutit." The Army of NorthernVirginia had sufferedsome 1,400 casualtiesto the Federals'550. A chilly rain fell throughoutthe night afterthe engagement,adding to the miseryof the wounded lying on the battlefield,and continueduntil Sunday,18 October. Despitethe soggyconditions, Lee probed the territory betweenBristoe Stationand Bull Run but realizedthe Federalposition was too strongto attack. Once againthe Army of the Potomachad eludedhis grasp. Lee endedthe Bristoe Stationcampaign and on 16 Octoberordered the Army of NorthernVirginia to withdrawto CulpeperCourt House. NPS Form IO-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page 56

The Civil War in Vir1!inia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolo1!ical Resources Name of Multiple PropertyListing

Lee's campaignwas a failure; he had not broughton a decisivebattle and he had not changed Federalstrategy regarding the West. He had risked his army by marchingbeyond its supplyline to outflank Meade,who had counteredthe Confederatemaneuver effectively eventhough it meantpulling the Union army back to the Centrevilledefenses instead of attackingLee. The outnumberedConfederates could not hopeto drive throughMeade's lines to Washington,so therewas nothingelse for Lee to do but withdraw. Meade,in contrast,was sitting on his supplybase, his army had half againas many menas Lee's, and they had sufferedfar lessduring the campaignthan their Confederatecounterparts. President Abraham Lincoln pressedMeade to attackLee, but he did not presshim too hard. WhenMeade discovered that Lee was withdrawing downthe Orange& AlexandriaRailroad, however, he setoff at once in pursuit. Lee had his mentear up the trackas they went,to hinderthe Federals.About noon on Sunday,18 October,the Confederatesbegan crossing into CulpeperCounty at RappahannockStation. Stuart.who had beenscreening the army's march,fell backto Gainesvilleas Kilpatrick pressedforward. The next day, Kilpatrick found that Stuarthad vanished. Underorders to continueto Warrenton,Kilpatrick assumedthe route was open. Stuarthad ridden downthe Warrentonand AlexandriaTurnpike to BucklandMills, wherethe road crossedBroad Run. There,on the westernbank, he set up a defensiveline and sentword to Fitzhugh Lee at Auburnto come up and protecthis right flank. Meanwhile,Custer approached at the headof Kilpatrick's columnand a sharpfight developed. WhenCuster threatened Stuart's flanks,the Confederates withdrew toward Warrenton. Kilpatrick arrived shortly after 12:00and setoff in pursuit,ordering Custerto follow. Fortunatelyfor the Federals,Custer allowed his mento eatlunch first; just after they crossedBroad Run, Fitz Lee struckthem from the south,causing them to retreatacross the stream. Had Custerfollowed his orders,Lee would have hit him from the rear,catching the entire Federalforce betweenhis division and Stuart. Kilpatrick heardthe shootingbehind him just ashe encounteredStuart's new line at ChestnutHill, eastof Warrenton. Stuartcharged and drove Kilpatrick easton the turnpiketoward BroadRun. Although the Federalsat first fell backfighting and maintainedtheir cohesion,eventually the pressureproved too muchand the retreatbecame a headlongflight thatthe Confederatescalled the BucklandRaces. For some five miles the Confederatespursued them, until the Union cavalrybecame so scatteredthat the chasewas abandoned.Between them, the two combatantslost about230 men,most of them capturedFederal troooers.~ For the restof Octoberand into November,Lee and Meadefaced eachother across the RappahannockRiver. The Confederatesheld the crossingsat RappahannockStation and at Kelly's Ford, which lay aboutfour miles downstreamand hadplayed a significantrole in the cavalrycombats of 17 Marchand 9 June1863. Meadeplanned to crossthe river at Fredericksburginstead, but Lincoln's administrationdisliked the idea,so he decidedto reoccupythe groundbetween the Rappahannockand RapidanRivers by forcing passagesat Kelly's Ford and RappahannockStation. Lee,once he divined Meade'sscheme, planned to allow him to crossat the ford but hold him at the railroad bridge,then NPS Fonn 10-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page 51

counterattackin force. The Confederatefortifications were on the eastside of the river nearthe railroad bridge but on the westside at the ford. On 7 November,Meade's offensive got underway. French'sIII Corpsseized Kelly's Ford while Sedgwick'sVI Corpsattacked at RappahannockStation. Sedgwickencountered resistance at the bridge, , wherepart of Early's division held the Confederateworks asthe afternoonfaded. After somehesitation, Sedgwickdecided on a risky attackat dusk. Lee,assuming that the day's fighting would end at sunset, neglectedto supportthe bridgehead. Sedgwick'sattack succeeded,shocking Lee andEarly. After a brief, vicious bout of hand-to-hand fighting, Sedgwick'smen captured the earthworksand about1,600 defenders who did not swim the river to safety. Early hadthe westernend of the railroadbridge burnt,delaying the Federalcrossing. In additionto the Confederateprisoners, and the two sidessuffered about 900 othercasualties. Lee orderedhis army backacross the RapidanRiver to OrangeCounty, abandoning Culpeper County to the Union army. Lee had crossedthat river for the lasttime. The Army of the Potomacoccupied the Confederates'half-fmished winter encampmentbetween Brandy Stationand CulpeperCourt House,repaired the railroad bridge,and anticipated the end of the campaignseason. Pr~ured by Washingtonpoliticians, however, Meade planned another offensive for the late autumn. Meadediscovered that the right of Lee's line, which stretchedfrom Verdiersville in the eastto Gordonsville in the west,was not anchoredon a naturallydefensible feature such as a river. He also found that small numbersof defendersheld the many RapidanRiver fords. The Confederatesseemed vulnerable. Hill's corpsconstituted Lee's left flank. while Ewell's (temporarilycommanded by Early) formed the right. The two principal east-westroads, the OrangeTurnpike (Rte. 20) and the OrangePlank Road (Rte. 621), ran behindEwell's lines, therebyfurnishing a route of attackagainst the Confederaterear. Meadeplanned to sendhis corpsacross several fords simultaneously,drive southto the highways,and sweepwest, rolling up Lee's right flank. Meade'sMine Run Campaign,as it becameknown, got off to a soggystart. He had scheduledit to begin on 24 November,but rain and high waterforced a two-daypostponement. Lee, learningof the Union army's maneuversin the interim, usedthe delayto preparehis forcesfor battle. He did not know exactlywhere Meade planned to strike, but the sameroads,that afforded the Federalsthe opportunitytb attackalso gaveLee internallines of communicationand movement. The Federaladvance was stalled by mud and cold andthe slownessof French'scorps; Union forceshad to be shifted from one ford to another,further delaying their progress.Meade bivouacked his army, thenresumed the marchand got all his corpsacross the river the nextday, 27 November. Lee's lieutenantsreacted to the reportsof Federalcrossings by acting swiftly to block the avenuesof approach. Early sentHays's (formerly Early's) and Rodes'sdivisions downthe OrangeTurnpike to Robinson'sTavern, and orderedJohnson's division up the roadto Jacob'sFord. Haysand Rodesstopped Warren'sand Sedgwick'scorps at the tavern,while Johnsonencountered French at Payne'sFarm. French might have sweptJohnson aside, but the Union generalallowed the Confederatecommander to bring him NPS Fonn 10-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page ~8-

The Civil War in Vir!!inia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolo!!ical Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

to a dead halt. Meade was furious, for he realized that Lee would grasp his intentions and act to counter them. Lee waspleased that Meadeintended an envelopment,for it gave him an opportunityto fight a defensivebattle and watchthe Federalarmy destroyitself in futile attacks. He withdrewto the western bank of Mine Run,a streamthat ran north and southacross the highwaysthat Meadeintended to take. Throughoutthe night, the Confederateslabored to constructand strengthenearthworks along the stream. Meadeand his generalsspent 28 Novemberstudying Lee's defenses,and Warrensuggested an attackagainst the Confederateright the nextday. On 29 November,however, a Confederatecavalry raid struckMeade's left flank and rear,causing him to wonderwhether Lee intendeda flanking movementof his own. The attackwas postponed until the morning. During the night, Hill's menstrengthened the works on the Confederateright. Whendawn came and Warrenrode forwardto studythe terrain,he realizedthat an assaultwould fail and causeneedless casualties.He canceledthe attackand infon11edMeade, who at first was enragedbut ultimatelyagreed with Warren. Meadeheld a councilof war that night and decidedto concludethe campaignand withdraw acrossthe Rapidanduring the night of 1-2 December. Lee and his men, meanwhile,waited patientlybehind their works for the attackthat would never come. On 1 December,Lee decidedto launchhis own attackthe nextday. Whenmorning arrived. however,Meade and his army were gone,and it was Lee's turn to beangry. He complainedto his staff, "I am too old to commandthis army. We should neverhave pen11itted those people to getaway." Both armieswent into campfor the winter, while Meadesoon traveled to Washingtonto explain himself to Lincoln andhis cabinet. The Mine Run campaignhad costhim some1,300 casualties, while the Confederateslost about700, all to no advantage.Meade can be excusedsomewhat for his lack of success, however,because of the cold. the mud, the rain-swollenstreams, and French'sslowness. Meade's plan was good, but its executionwas execrable. Frenchsoon disappeared from the field, relegatedto garrisonand administrativeduties. Most critics eventuallyforgave Meade,perhaps realizing that it took considerable couragefor him to cancela campaignwhen he undoubtedlyunderstood that a stOn11of outragewould be the consequence,even if his decisiondid savehis army. Meadewent home to Philadelphiaon furlough fora rest. In Washington,Lincoln considered replacinghim as commanderof the An11Yof the Potomacbut decidedagainst it. Instead,he would promoteUlysses S. Grant,who had engineeredthe relief of Chattanooga,Tennessee. The victory, which had come on 23-25 Novemberas Meadecrossed the Rapidan,would enableMaj. Gen.William T. Shen11anto launchhis marchinto Georgiain the spring. Grant wasthe samecommander who had captured Vicksburg,Mississippi, on 4 July 1863and securedthe greatriver for the Union. This man of grim deten11ination,Lincoln believed,might be just the generalhe had beensearching for to lead his miIitary machineto victory. He would promoteGrant to lieutenantgeneral, place him in commandof all Union an11ies,and seewhat he could do whenthe winter ended. NPSFonn IO-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET I

Section E- Page 59

The Civil War in Vir!!inia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolo!!ical Resources Name of Multiple PropertyListing

OVERLAND CAMPAIGN NPS Form IO-900a OMS No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E- Page 60-

confer with Meade, who had steeled himself to be replaced. Instead, Grant confirmed him in his position as commander of the Army of the Potomac. How the monosyllabic, dour Grant managed to charm and win over the prickly, sarcastic Meade is one of the war's great mysteries, but win him he did, at least temporarily. Meade's letters to his wife were full of enthusiasm for his new commander. One line summed up his impression: "I was much pleased with Grant. You may rest assured that he is no ordinary man." The soldiers were not so sure. To them he looked ordinary indeed, short, mud-spattered, careless of his appearance. He did not look like the commanding sort of general that the Army of the Potomac was used to, even astride , a magnificent bay Thoroughbred. He had paid little attention to the fanfare and the welcoming band at the station. Although the troops did not know it, Grant was tone deaf. He admitted that he could recognize only two tunes: one of them was "Yankee Doodle" and the other wasn't. Lee's appearancecontrasted sharply with Grant's. Lee was almost four inches taller (just under six feet), looked handsome with his well-groomed gray hair and beard, and made a striking and dignified appearance in his spotless gray unifonn, especially when mounted on his , Traveller. But both men shared certain "traits, however different their appearance. Each was detennined and aggressive. Neither would quit until circumstances forced them to do so. Each general also rode at the head ofa great anny. Lee's, the Anny of Northern Virginia, numbered about 60,000. Many of the men were experienced, battle-hardened veterans who possessedan unshakable confidence in themselves and in Lee. They had fought the Anny of the Potomac time and again over three years and, except at Gettysburg, had either beaten it or fought it to a draw despite being always outnumbered. Now, in the spring of 1864, their numbers down and their supplies short, they still had each other and Lee, a lethal combination. One brigadier observed, "General Lee, I have always thought, was the most belligerent man in his army." Devotion and aggressioncould be worth divisions. But would they be enough? Meade's army, with Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside's IX Corps (which until the fourth week of May reported directly to Grant), contained some 120,000 men, a two-to-one advantage. Many of the soldiers, however, were new, foreign-born recruits; some spoke no English. And despite the army's superiority in numbers and supplies, serious self-doubts plagued its officers. Discounting the victory in Pennsylvania the year before, many of them doubted that they would meet with easy success on Lee's home ground. Some anticipated "our annual Bull Run Flogging" and greeted their new commander's air of grim detennination with the comment, "Well, Grant has never met Bobby Lee yet." Later, when in the midst of battle in the Wilderness Grant thought his subordinates spent too much of their time worrying about Lee's tactics, he exploded: "Oh, I am heartily tired of hearing what Lee is going to do. Some of you always seemto think he is suddenly going to turn a double somersault and land on our rear and both our flanks at the same time. Go back to your command, and try to think what we are going to do ourselves, instead of what Lee IS going to do." Other Federal officers, however, realized that their new commander had brought a different attitude with him to the Anny of the Potomac. They sensed that Lyman's metaphor about Grant was apt, NPS Form IO-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page 6l

The Civil War in Virginia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeoloeical Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

that he would drive his head,and his army,through the brick wall or die trying. A defeator two or ten would not deterhim. The opposingarmies were organizedalong similar lines. The Army of the Potomacinitially containedthree infantry corps, eachwith threeor four divisions,as well as the remnantsof I Corps, commandedby Maj. Gen.John Newton,which was disbandedon 23 March 1864and absorbedby V Corps. Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott Hancockcommanded II Corps,and Brig. Gen.Francis C. Barlow led the 1stDivision, Brig. Gen.John Gibbonthe 2d, Maj. Gen. David B. Birneythe 3d, and Brig. Gen.Gershom Mott the 4th, with Col. JohnC. Tidball in chargeof the artillery brigade. Maj. Gen. GouverneurK. Warren led V Corps, which containedBrig. Gen.'s 1stDivision, Brig. Gen.John C. Robinson's2d, Brig. Gen. SamuelW. Crawford's 3d, Brig. Gen.James S. Wadsworth's4th, and Col. CharlesS. Wainwright's artillery brigade. Maj. Gen. JohnSedgwick commanded VI Corps,and the 1stDivision was led by Brig. Gen. HoratioG. Wright,the 2d by Brig. Gen.George W. Getty, the 3d by Brig. Gen.James B. Ricketts,and the artillery brigadeby Col. CharlesH. Tompkins. Maj. Gen.Ambrose E. Burnsideled IX Corps,which includedBrig. Gen.Thomas G. Stevenson's1st Division, Brig. Gen. RobertB. Potter's2d. Brig. Gen.Orlando B. Willcox's 3d. and Brig. Gen. EdwardFerrero's 4th (Ferrero'sdivision, which was not engaged,contained six regimentsof United StatesColored Troops). Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan,who Grant broughtwith him from the westernarmy, commanded the cavalrycorps. It containedthree divisions, led respectivelyby Brig. Gen. Alfred T. A. Torbert,Brig. Gen. David M. Gregg,and Brig. Gen.James H. Wilson. Three infantrycorps, commanded by Lt. Gen. JamesLongstreet, Lt. Gen.Richard S. Ewell, and Lt. Gen.A. P. Hill, and Maj. Gen.J. E. B. Stuart'scavalry corps comprised the Army of NorthernVirginia. Eachcorps contained three divisions andan artillery brigade. Longstreet'sFirst Corpsincluded divisions commandedby Brig. Gen. JosephB. Kershaw,Maj. Gen. CharlesW. Field, and Maj. Gen.George E. Pickett(Pickett's initially was at Richmondor Petersburg),and Brig. Gen.E. PorterAlexander's artillery brigade. Ewell's SecondCorps contained the divisions of Maj. Gen. JubalA. Early, Maj. Gen.Edward "Allegheny" Johnson,and Maj. Gen. RobertE. Rodes,as well as the artillery brigadeof Brig. Gen. ArmisteadL. Long. The divisions in Hill's Third Corpswere commanded by Maj. Gen.Richard H. Anderson,Maj. Gen. HenryHeth, and Maj. Gen.Cadmus M. Wilcox, while Col. R. Lindsay Walker led the artillery brigade. Stuart's cavalrydivisions were led by Maj. Gen.Wade Hampton,Maj. Gen.Fitzhugh Lee,and Maj. Gen. William H. F. "Rooney"Lee; Maj. RobertF. Chewcommanded Stuart's Horse Artillery. For most of the winter,the armieshad facedeach other across the RapidanRiver while eachone trained,resupplied, and conductedlimited operations.Perhaps the boredomof camplife, and the knowledgethat the war was aboutto enterits third year,encouraged dreamers and schemersin the Union army to concoctplans to captureQr raid Richmond. In February1864, Maj. Gen. BenjaminF. Butler requestedapproval from Washingtonfor a surpriseraid up the Peninsulato Richmond. Butler reasonedthat because recent operations in North NPS Form 10-900a OMB No.1 024-00 18 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page 61

The Civil War in Virginia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolol!ical Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

that he would drive his head,and his anny, throughthe brick wall or die trying. A defeator two or ten would not deterhim. The opposingannies were organizedalong similar lines. The Anny of the Potomacinitially containedthree infantry corps, eachwith three or four divisions,as well as the remnantsof I Corps, commandedby Maj. Gen.John Newton, which was disbandedon 23 March 1864and absorbedby V Corps. Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott Hancockcommanded II Corps,and Brig. Gen. FrancisC. Barlow led the 1stDivision, Brig. Gen.John Gibbonthe 2d, Maj. Gen.David B. Birney the 3d, and Brig. Gen.Gershom Mott the 4th, with Col. JohnC. Tidball in chargeof the artillery brigade. Maj. Gen. GouverneurK. Warren led V Corps, which containedBrig. Gen.Charles Griffin's 1stDivision, Brig. Gen.John C. Robinson's2d, Brig. Gen. SamuelW. Crawford's 3d, Brig. Gen.James S. Wadsworth's4th, and Col. CharlesS. Wainwright's artillery brigade. Maj. Gen. JohnSedgwick commanded VI Corps,and the 1stDivision was led by Brig. Gen. HoratioG. Wright, the 2d by Brig. Gen.George W. Getty, the 3d by Brig. Gen.James B. Ricketts,and the artillery brigadeby Col. CharlesH. Tompkins. Maj. Gen.Ambrose E. Burnsideled IX Corps,which includedBrig. Gen.Thomas G. Stevenson's1st Division, Brig. Gen. RobertB. Potter's2d, Brig. Gen.Orlando B. Willcox's 3d, and Brig. Gen. EdwardFerrero's 4th (Ferrero'sdivision, which was not engaged,contained six regimentsof United StatesColored Troops). Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan,who Grant broughtwith him from the westernarmy, commanded the cavalrycorps. It containedthree divisions, led respectivelyby Brig. Gen.Alfred T. A. Torbert,Brig. Gen.David M. Gregg,and Brig. Gen.James H. Wilson. Three infantrycorps, commanded by Lt. Gen.James Longstreet, Lt. Gen. RichardS. Ewell, and Lt. Gen. A. P. Hill, and Maj. Gen.J. E. B. Stuart's cavalrycorps comprised the Army of NorthernVirginia. Eachcorps contained three divisions and an artillery brigade. Longstreet'sFirst Corpsincluded divisions commandedby Brig. Gen. JosephB. Kershaw,Maj. Gen.Charles W. Field,and Maj. Gen.George E. Pickett(Pickett's initially was at Richmondor Petersburg),and Brig. Gen.E. PorterAlexander's artillery brigade. Ewell's SecondCorps contained the divisionsof Maj. Gen. JubalA. Early,Maj. Gen. Edward "Allegheny" Johnson,and Maj. Gen. RobertE. Rodes,as well as the artillery brigadeof Brig. Gen. ArmisteadL. Long. The divisions in Hill's Third Corpswere commanded by Maj. Gen.Richard H. Anderson,Maj. Gen. Henry Heth,and Maj. Gen.Cadmus M. Wilcox, while Col. R. Lindsay Walker led the artillery brigade. Stuart's cavalrydivisions were led by Maj. Gen.Wade Hampton,Maj. Gen. Fitzhugh Lee, and Maj. Gen. William H. F. "Rooney" Lee; Maj. RobertF. Chewcommanded Stuart's Horse Artillery. For mostof the winter, the armieshad facedeach other across the RapidanRiver while eachone trained,resupplied, and conductedlimited operations.Perhaps the boredomof camp life, andthe knowledgethat the war was aboutto enter its third year,encouraged dreamers and schemersin the Union armyto concoctplans to captureor raid Richmond. In February1864, Maj. Gen. BenjaminF. Butler requestedapproval from Washingtonfor a surpriseraid up the Peninsulato Richmond. Butler reasonedthat becauserecent operations in North NPS Form 10-9008 OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET v

Section E Page 62

The Ci:vil War in Vir!!inia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolo!!ical Resources Name of Multiple PropertyListing

Carolinahad left Richmondlightly defended,he might seizethe city with little difficulty. To distractthe Confederatesand preventthe capital ftom being reinforced,he requestedthat Meade'sarmy makea demonstrationalong the Rapidan. Overthe objectionsof Sedgwick,the army's temporarycommander while Meadewas on leave,the plan was approved. On 6 February,II Corps (temporarilycommanded by Warren)led the way to Morton's Ford while Newton's ( Corpsbombarded Raccoon Ford a few miles upstreamand Brig. Gen. WesleyMerritt's cavalry division, evenfarther west,crossed Robertson's River and Barnett'sFord on the Rapidan. Brig. Gen. AlexanderHays's division spearheadedthe assaultat Morton's Ford, which at first wassuccessful and caughtthe Confederatesby surprise. Ewell's corpsguarded this reachof the Rapidanand, underEwell's personaldirection, theyreacted quickly. By sunsetthe Federalswere effectivelypinned down. The fighting continuedinto the night, with eachside seizing prisonersunder cover of darkness.When no headwaywas madethe next morning,however, the Unionforce withdrewacross all the fords to safety. The affair cost both sidessome 700 casualties; ironically, Butler alreadyhad aborted his raid after learning that a deserterhad revealedhis schemeto the Confederates.The wasteof lives disgustedWarren and Sedgwick. At roughlythe sametime, Brig. Gen.H. JudsonKilpatrick hatchedanother plan, this time to raid Richmond,ftee Union prisoners,and-if documentsfound laterwere indeedauthentic-bum the city and kill PresidentJefferson Davis andhis cabinet. Kilpatrick, a self-promoting,reckless cavalry division commanderwhose high casualtyrate earnedhim the nickname"Kilcavalry," found an eagerco-conspirator in the personof Col. ,an adventuroustwenty-two-year-old aide to successivecommanders of the Army of the Potomac. The Kilpatrick-DahlgrenRaid beganon the eveningof28 Februarywhen Kilpatrick led some 4,000 horsemenacross Ely's Ford on the Rapidanand souththrough Spotsylvania Court Houseto Mount Pleasantin the southernpart of the county. Therethe force divided, with Dahlgrentaking about500 cavalrymenwith him southwestto GoochlandCourt House,roughly twentymiles west of Richmond,while Kilpatrick led the remaindersouth toward Richmond. The plan called for Dahlgrento crossthe James River and enterthe city ftom the southwhile Kilpatrick executeda diversionaryattack ftom the north. Despitedriving rain and sleet,each part of the force madegood progressthrough 29 February,but the next daythe raid beganto fall apart. Kilpatrick's nervefailed him as he approachedRichmond's lightly held intermediatedefenses on I March,and he quickly withdrew. Although he briefly considereda night attack,he himself was assaultedftom the north by some300 of Hampton'scavalry that had beenpursuing him. Kilpatrick ordereda retreatdown the Peninsulatoward Federallines. Dahlgren,meanwhile, was frustratedby high waterthat preventedhim ftom crossingJames River, and decidedto enterthe city ftomthe westinstead. He had not evenreached the outskirts,however, when the homeguard conftonted him on the afternoonof I March; in the ensuingskirmish he and about 100 horsemengot separatedftom the remainderof his force. Hopingto find Kilpatrick, he gallopednorth in a wide arc aroundthe city to the northand east. NPS Fonn IO-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E- Page _6J-

!he Civ!l- ~~r in Virl!inia. 1861-1865:Historic and Archaeolol!icalResources Name of Multiple Property Listing

On 2 March, Dahlgren and his men crossed the Mattaponi River into King and Queen County and rode east past the hamlet ofWalkerton toward King and Queen Court House. About three miles northwest of the courthouse, at a road junction today called Dahlgren's Comer, the and a detachment of the 9th Virginia Cavalry ambushed Dahlgren. In a brief fire fight, Dahlgren was killed instantly and most of his command was captured. The raid cost the Federals about 300 casualties and the Confederates far fewer. Although the raid itself was a fiasco, it caused a great uproar in the South when Dahlgren's body was examined and papers recovered that called for the murder of President Jefferson Davis and his cabinet, as well as the burning and looting of Richmond. Lee wrote Meade a letter demanding an explanation; Meade and Kilpatrick declared that "neither the United States Government, myself, nor General Kilpatrick authorized, sanctioned, or approved the burning of the city of Richmond and the killing of Mr. Davis and cabinet, nor any other act not required by military necessity and in accordance with the usages of war." Northerners claimed the papers were Southern forgeries calculated to inflame the citizenry. Recent tests have led knowledgeable historians to conclude that the documents were indeed written by Dahlgren. Considering the small number of men he had with him, however, they appear to reflect Dahlgren's wishful thinking, not authentic orders from higher authorities. The failure of the Kilpatrick-Dahlgren Raid put an end to such schemes. For the rest of the winter, the Anny of the Potomac instead prepared for the approaching campaign season. As April 1864 faded into May, the two annies faced each other across the Rapidan River. The Anny of Northern Virginia was encamped south of the river, with Longstreet's headquartersat Gordonsville, Lee's and Hill's at Orange Court House, and Ewell's near Morton's Ford. The Anny of the Potomac, whose camps were visible from the Confederate observation post atop Clark's Mountain south of the river, sprawled across eastern Culpeper County from Culpeper Court House to Rappahannock Station in Fauquier County. Lee ascendedthe mountain on Monday, 2 May, and with his generals studied the peaceful-looking scene north of the river. Unknown to Lee, Grant had selected Wednesday, 4 May, to begin his spring offensive. On or about that same date, Union forces allover the country would launch attacks. Shennan would strike southeast from Chattanooga against Johnston's anny in Georgia. From , Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks was to march on Mobile, Alabam (however, disasters in Louisiana caused the Federals first to postpone and then to cancel Banks's thrust). In Virginia, Maj. Gen. Franz Sigel would drive south up the Shenandoah Valley while Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Butler would lead the Anny of the James on transports up the James River from Hampton Roads to City Point and Bennuda Hundred, a fIrst step on the road to Petersburg and Richmond, which Gen. Pierre G. T. Beauregard defended. Earlier, in southwestern West Virginia and Virginia, Brig. Gen. William W. Averell and Brig. Gen. would launch a series of infantry and cavalry raids against the Virginia & TennesseeRailroad. In a matter of days the Confederacy would find itself under attack everywhere. For Meade's Anny of the Potomac, Grant set the task of crossing the Rapidan River, drawing the Anny of Northern Virginia out, and destroying it in battle. The Federals faced enonnous logistical challenges to accomplish their goals. The anny could stretch for thirty miles if its soldiers were placed in NPSFonn 10-900a OMS No.1 024-00 18 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page 64

The Civil War in Virginia. 1861-1865: Historic and ArchaeololZical Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

double columns,and its six thousandsupply wagons could occupyfifty miles of roads. Grant's plan of attackcalled for Warren's V Corpsand Sedgwick'sVI Corpsto crossthe Rapidanat GermannaFord at dawn on 4 May, with Hancock'sII Corpscrossing halfa dozenmiles eastat Ely's Ford. The wagontrain would crossat Ely's and CulpeperMine Fords,and Burnside's IX Corpswould follow Warren'sand Sedgwick'scorps across Germanna Ford afterdetaching Ferrero's division to guardthe trains. Warrenand Sedgwickwould encampbeyond Wilderness Tavern while Hancockwould headfor Chancellorsville,the sceneof Lee's great victory the year before,and thenon to Todd's Tavernand SpotsylvaniaCourt House. Grant soughtto lure Lee into the openby threateningboth the Confederateright flank and the capital at Richmond. At the sametime, by keepinghis army betweenLee and the RappahannockRiver, Grantwould protecthis army's projectedsupply route via the river and the Richmond,Fredericksburg & PotomacRailroad. The plan had only one obviousweakness: the challengeof gettingthis hugeforce safely throughthe seventy-square-mileWilderness, an area south of the river and westof ChancellorsviI Ie that was thick with scrubpines and briar tanglesand narrowwagon roads, and out onto openground to maneuvereffectively againstLee. Many of the troopsremembered vividly the horrors of the place from the previousyears' battle there-the tangledterrain that destroyedunit coherence,the enemyinvisible in the thick undergrowth,the fires ignited by exploding gunpowderthat burnedalive the helplesswounded. No one wantedto fight there again. Lee knew that Grantplanned to attack. But havingthe smallerarmy, and possessing a ready-made defensiveline constructedin December1863 along Mine Run during Meade'saborted campaign, Lee was contentto let Grantmake the first move. If Grantwaited too long, however,Lee plannedto strike the Federals. The vanguardof Warren's corps,preceded by Wilson's cavalry,left its camp about3:00 A.M. on 4 May and splashedacross Germanna Ford, driving awaythe Confederatepickets there. Sedgwick'scorps followed. The advanceof Hancock'scorps repeated the sceneat Ely's Ford, andthe campaignwas under way. When dawncame about 5:00, greatclouds of dustrevealed the Union troop movementto Confederateobservers atop Clark's Mountain. They sentword to Lee thatthe Federalobjectives appeared to be GermannaFord and thenperhaps Fredericksburg. By midmorning,Confederate columns prepared to marchas the Union columns,slowed by the trains,were compelled to halt in the Wilderness,well short of the day's goals. Ewell's corps,encamped near Morton's Ford on the RapidanRiver, headed southeast to the OrangeTurnpike (present-dayRte. 20) at Verdiersville,then turned easttoward WildernessTavern. Hill's corps,accompanied by Lee,moved eastfrom OrangeCourt Houseto the OrangePlank Road (Rte. 62,1) and thenmarched toward Parker'sStore. Longstreet'scorps, which hadthe greatestdistance to march, approachedthe Wildernessfrom the southwestnear Gordonsville. By late morning elementsof eacharmy were in striking distanceof the other,with Lee readyto smiteGrant's line of marchon its right flank the next morning if it remainedin the Wilderness. NPSFonn 10-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E' Page _65-

The Civil War in Virl!inia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolol!ical Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

About 6:00 A.M. on 5 May, Ewell's columnmade contact with Warren'scorps and began entrenchingat the edgeof Saunders'sField. At middaythe fighting beganin earnestas the Federals attackedEwell unsuccessfully.The tinder-dry brushand grasscaught fire, and muchof the fighting took placeamid smokeand flames in the undergrowthof the Wilderness. To the south,the main conflict eruptedaround the intersectionof the OrangePlank Roadand Brock Road(Rte. 613) as both sidescontended for this crucialjunction. Hill's corps fought elementsof Hancock'scorps and Getty's division of Sedgwick'scorps through the late afternoonand evening for possessionof the place, but at the end of the day it remainedin Federalhands. During the night, eachcorps strengthenedits positionand fed moretroops into its line. Soonafter dawn on 6 May, the Federalscharged out of their hastilyconstructed Plank Roadworks and struckHill's corps,pushing it back. Lee watchedhis artillery buy time for Longstreetand his corps to marchto the front. Whenthe headof Longstreet'scolumn, the TexasBrigade, approached Lee, hejoined it and cheeredthe men forward,waving his hat and shouting"Texans always move them!" Suddenly realizing that Lee intendedto leadthe counterattackhimself, the horrified soldiersgrabbed at Traveller's reins and implored him to "Go back!", thenrefused to advanceunless he rode to the rear. One of Lee's aidesat lastpersuaded him to withdraw. Satisfied,the brigadecharged, was soonreinforced by other brigades,and pushedthe Federalsback. Longstreet'scounterattack culminated in an effective assaulton the Union left flank. By 12:30P.M., after a morning of brutal fighting, Hancock'scorps had beendriven into its earthworksand Lee was planningto take advantageof the Confederatemomentum. At this crucial moment,Longstreet suffered a seriouswound in a "friendly fire" episodereminiscent of Jackson'smortal woundinga year earlier. Unlike Stonewall,however, Lee's "Old War Horse" would recoverin four months' time. Ewell authorizedan attackfor 6:00 thatevening. Although at first he was successful,his attempt soonfailed as Grantfed troops into the fray to reinforceSedgwick's corps. By nightfall the fighting ended with neitherside having gainedor lost ground,and the nextday only desultoryskirmishing occurred. Essentiallya draw,the Battle of the Wildernesshad costthe Federalssome .\8,000 in dead,wounded, and missingand the Confederatesabout 11,000 casualties. Early in the morning on 7 May, whenLee's pastopponents would haveretreated, Grant instead orderedMeade to makea night marchto occupySpotsylvania Court House;accordingly, Meade sent Warren'scorps southeaston Brock Road pastLee's right flank. Grant's decisionsurprised the men in his army,and doubtlesssome of his own aidesas well, who did not think the Army of the Potomacmeasured up to the Federalforce in the West. Granthad not intendedto fight a battle in the Wildernessand therefore refusedto alter his strategyof compellingLee to fight in the open. Lee and his menconsidered the Battle of the Wildernessa strategicvictory; they fully expected Grantto follow the exampleset by Maj. Gen. JosephHooker the yearbefore at Chancellorsville,and retreat. By the early morning of7 May, however,Lee concludedafter the Federalstook up their pontoons at GermannaFord that Grantwas executinga flanking movement,either toward Fredericksburgor in the NPS Form 10-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section £ Page 66

The Civil War in Virginia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolo!!:ical Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

Most Civil War actionswere over in minutes,or perhapsa few hours,and hand-to-hand combat was rare sinceone side or the other usuallygave way quickly. The fight for the Mule Shoewas unique,not NPS Fonn IO-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page-2l

The Civil War in Virl!inia. 1861-1865: Historic and ArchaeololZical Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

only for its length but for the carnageit wroughtas both sidesslaughtered each other with everyresource available. Later,some of the survivorstried and failed to put the experienceinto words in their letters home. Men who had lived throughAntietam and Gettysburgcould only reportthat this battle surpassed them both in its viciousnessand gore. At first Hancock'sattack succeeded. Protected from Confederatefire by a swale at the foot of the ridge, his menwere able to assaulten masseand overwhelmthe Mule Shoe'sdefenders. The Federals drove throughto Ewell's rear, but Lee reactedswiftly and threw reinforcementsinto the breachto push them back, eventrying on two occasionsto leadthe men forward himself until they compelledhim to withdraw. Soonmost of Hancock's menwere driven backto the line of entrenchmentsfirst captured,but they refusedto retreatany fartherand held theirground. Both sidesfought with shotand shelland bayonetsand clubbedmuskets, and with fists and knives whenthe ammunitionran low. The combatlasted far into the night. About 2:00 A.M. on 13 May, an oak tree sometwenty inchesin diameter,its trunk cut through by Union bullets,crashed to the groundbehind the Mule Shoe. The battle for the Mule Shoeleft bothsides sickened and exhausted. During the night, the Confederateswithdrew to a second,more easilydefended line. Two daysof drenchingrain, coupled with the severelosses and the tasksof burying the deadand caring for the wounded,brought a brief pausein the fighting. Casualtyestimates vary, but the Federalsmay have lost between6,000 and 9,000 killed, wounded,and missingto the Confederates'6,000 to 8,000,many of whom were capturedin the initial attack. As horrific as the casualtyfigures were,and as ominousas they were for the Confederateanny, no single deathaffected Lee as muchas one thatwas reportedto him in the midst of the Spotsylvaniabattle. On 12 May, in Richmond,J. E. B. Stuartdied of a mortalwound he receivedthe daybefore at Yellow Tavern. After the ,Sheridan had proclaimed so loudly that his cavalry could "whip Stuart" if only "headquarterswould stayout of our hair" that Meadewanted to presscharges for insubordination. Grant,however, decided to turn Sheridanloose to attackLee's communicationslines with Richmondand seeif he could draw Stuartout. On 9 May, accordingly,Sheridan and some 10,000 cavalrymencircled eastand then southaround Lee's right flank and that eveningstruck Beaver Dam Stationon the Virginia CentralRailroad, then headed for the northernoutskirts of Richmond. Stuart,once he had divined Sheridan'sintentions, countered by dividing his cavalrycorps and sendingpart of it to attackthe Federalrear while he led the restto interceptSheridan near the capital. The two forcescollided on 11 May at Yellow Tavern,an old unpaintedstagecoach stop a few miles north of the city. Brig. Gen.George A. Custer'sdismounted cavalrymen charged through Stuart's line beforethe Confederatespushed them back. Stuart,astride his horse,was shoutingand firing his huge LeMat revolver at the retreatingFederals when on~ of them,Pvt. JohnA. Huff, of the 5th Michigan Cavalry,turned and fired his revolver. The bullet struckStuart in the abdomenand he reeledin the saddle. Led awayfrom the action,Stuart was placed in an ambulanceand takento Richmond. His lastwords on the battlefield, directed at someretreating Confederates, were "Go back! Go back! !'d ratherdie thanbe whipped!" NPSFonn 10-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page 6B

Die he did, in agony,at the homeof his brother-in-law,Dr. CharlesBrewer, on GraceStreet. The end came shortly after 7:30 P.M.on 12 May. Stuarthad hoped to survive long enoughto seehis wife one last time, but shearrived just a few minutestoo late. After a funeralthe next day that wasattended by membersof the ConfederateCongress, Stuart was buried in Hollywood Cemetery. ExceptingStuart's death,the Battle of Yellow Tavernwas a small affair that costthe two sides some 800 casualties.Sheridan's expedition did little damage,but it deprivedboth armiesof their "eyesand ears" whenthey were neededby Grantand Lee in SpotsylvaniaCounty. Lee, visibly distraughtwhen informed of Stuart'swounding and subsequentdeath, commented that Stuart "never broughtme a piece of false information." The battlesaround Spotsylvania Court Houseground on, asthe Federalslengthened their left flank by shifting the II, V, and VI Corpsto the easton 14[j 15 May, to the left of the IX Corps. This maneuver r~alignedGrant's line along the FredericksburgRoad (Rte. 208) in a north-southdirection, with its guns pointing west. Two Union corpsattacked Lee's new line behindthe Mule Shoeon 18 May but were repulsed. The next day, Ewell marchedhis corps northand eastin an attemptto locatethe new position of the Union right flank on the FredericksburgRoad. He collided with someheavy artillerymen newly arrived from the defensesof Washington.After a viciousand bloody engagementin which the gallantgunners fought as infantry, Ewell withdrew. The Battle ofSpotsylvaniaCourthouse had ended. Two days later, Grantdisengaged his army and marchedit south,continuing to maneuveraround Lee. Lee followed suit, marchingthe Army of NorthernVirginia southon roadsparalleling the route takenby the Army of the Potomac.On the afternoonof22 May,the Confederatevanguard arrived at the and stoppedto batheand restwhile the restof the army caughtup. Lee expectedGrant ~d his mento pauseto regroupafter two and a half weeksof near-constantcombat, but the Federal commandersurprised him by pressingon to the North Anna and attemptingto crossthe next day. The battle for the North Anna River beganon the afternoonof23 May, whenHancock's II Corps captureda redoubtguarding Chesterfield bridge on TelegraphRoad just westof today's U.S. Rte. I. The theConfederates Richmond,attempted Fredericksburg to burn& the Potomac bridge thatRailroad nightbridge but failed.just downstreamThey succeeded,(the abutmentshowever, incan destroying still be " seen). Upstreamat JerichoMill, meanwhile,Warren's V Corpsforded the river with little opposition. Hill launcheda counterattackwhile the Federalsprepared their eveningmeal, but Union artillery and infantry reinforcementsdrove his menback. That night, Lee and his generalsconferred at HanoverJunction. With Union forcesacross the river at two points,a defensiveline on the high southbank alone was not tenable. If he withdrew south toward Richmond,Lee would not have roomto maneuverhis army and would be forcedto retreatbehind the city's defensiveworks. But he hadto keephis army betweenGrant and Richmond. The Confederatesstill held Ox Ford, so Lee decidedto makethat the centerof his new line, which would be shapedlike an inverted"V. Hill's corps wasassigned the left flank, which extendedfrom Ox Ford southwestto the Little River, opposingWarren. Anderson'scorps formed the center,from the ford southeastalong the North Anna River,while Ewell's held the right flank facing the TelegraphRoad bridge NPS Form 10-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLAC£S CONTINUATION SHE£T

Section E Page 69

The Civil War in Vire:inia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeoloe:ical Resources Name of Multiple PropertyListing

and Hancock. Grant,Lee reasoned,would haveto divide his army to attack either flank, or hold backlong enoughto captureOx Ford. Lee hopedto stall Grantand then launchhis own attackagainst either Warren or Hancock. . On 24 May, finding Lee's forcespulled back from the II Corpsand V Corps fronts, Grantassumed that they were retreatingto Richmondand ordered a pursuit,strengthening Warren with Wright's VI Corps. The Army of the Potomacpressed forward and ran into a hail of lead. Burnside's IX Corpsfailed to captureOx Ford when,during a thunderstorm,Brig. Gen.James H. Ledlie (who was drunk) led his brigade in a futile chargeagainst the Confederateworks. Along TelegraphRoad, a Confederateskirmish line fought with suchtenacity that it stoppeda II Corpsdivision in its tracks. As darknessfell, Grantrealized that Lee's positionwas virtually impregnableand orderedhis mento entrench. For the nexttwo days,the armiesskirmished but did not engagein heavyfighting. The North Anna campaignhad costthe Federalssome 2,600 casualties,the Confederatesabout 1,800. During the night of26027 May, Grant withdrewto the north side of the river, thenswung eastand continuedsouth aroundLee's right flank. Why did Lee not executethat part of his plan calling for an attackon one of Grant's flanks? On 24 May, Lee fell so ill with diarrheathat he keptto his tent; Hill and Ewell also were unwell. Therewas little Lee could do but mutter,"We muststrike thema blow-we must never let them passus again-we muststrike thema blow." But Grantdid passhim, and Lee orderedhis army to fall backtoward Richmond. As the Army of NorthernVirginia retreated,the Army of the Potomacadvanced, with two of Sheridan'scavalry divisions and an infantry division in the lead. The force marchedeast along the North Anna and thencrossed the PamunkeyRiver. On 28 May, Lee and Grant sentpart of their cavalry on reconnoiteringmissions to locatethe opposingarmy. The horsemencollided at Haw's Shop,a machine shopthat stood at the intersectionof threeroads in easternHanover County. The Federalexpedition consisted of Gregg's division, with Torbert's following in support. Hamptonand FitzhughLee rode towardthem from the westwith partsof their divisions,while two newly arrived SouthCarolina regiments trailed behind. About 10:00A.M., Gregg reached the intersectionand establisheda dismountedskirmish line. Haifa mile west,Hampton's men arrived aboutthe sametime. Hamptonattacked but was driven back by a Federalcounterattack; the Confederatesformed a defensive line near EnonChurch. Greggresumed the assault,and for someseven hours the combatantsfought a bloody, indecisiveengagement. Finally, Hamptondecided to withdraw,since he had learnedfrom prisonersthat Union infantry had indeedcrossed the Pamunkey-the informationhe had beensent to gather. Justas he beganto disengage,however, Custer led the Michigan cavalry in a final assault. The tally of casualtiesfor the day's actionamounted to about340 Federalsand perhaps 400 Confederates.It had beenthe largestand bloodiesteastern cavalry engagementsince Brandy Stationin June1863. On 28 May, Lee set up a newblocking line on the southbank of TotopotomoyCreek, a tributary of the PamunkeyRiver abouthalfway betweenit andthe ChickahominyRiver. More a seriesof swamps thana clear-cutwatercourse, the sluggish,eastward-flowing creek lay only nine miles north of Richmond in easternHanover County. The broadbottomland made infantry assaultsdifficult but not impossible,and NPS Fonn 10-900a OMBNo.1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section _E- Page 2Q

The Civil War in Virl!inia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolol!ical Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

on 29 May the Federals took up positions on the north side of the creek with the intention of dislodging Lee. For two daysLee and Granttraded attacks and counterattacks.The Union corpscommanded by Hancock,Warren, and Burnsideprobed across the creekto Lee's lines on 29 May. Meanwhile,Wright's VI Corps maneuveredeast around the Federalright flank andturned souththe next dayto strike Lee's left flank but boggeddown in swampyCrump's Creekand failed to get into position. On 30 May, Hancock's II Corpsattacked Lee and breachedthe first line of earthworks;the mainConfederate line held,however. Burnside's IX Corpsdrove in Confederatepickets on the ShadyGrove Roadto the left of II Corps,while Early launchedan attackagainst Warren's V Corps on the Union far left at BethesdaChurch. Although Early failed to crushWarren's vanguard,the attackspoiled any plans for an overall Federaladvance, and Warrenfell backto ShadyGrove Road. The two days of fighting resultedin an equalnumber of casualties (about 1,100)on eachside, but neithercombatant gained any advantage. Far more ominouslyfor the Confederates,on 30 May Torbert'scavalry division begansearching for a way aroundLee's right flank. Granthad orderedthe Federalhorsemen to clear a route to Cold Harbor, a hamletwhere five roads intersected,and from which one road led to the Union supplybase at White Houseon the PamunkeyRiver. Torbertfound his pathblocked near Old Churchand Matadequin Creek,a tributary of the Pamunkeythat flows southof and roughly parallelto the Totopotomoy. There Torbertconfronted the SouthCarolinians commanded by Brig. Gen. MatthewC. Butler,who defendedthe steepcrossing point at MatadequinCreek. Theydid not hold for long, however,and soonfell backto Cold Harbor, from which they,although reinforced by Fitz Lee,were driventhe next day by more of Sheridan's cavalry. The captureof the crossroadsmeant that Grantcould changehis front to faceLee's right flank on a north-southline, therebycompelling Lee to do likewise. The fighting at Old Churchand Matadequin Creekcost the Federals90 casualties;the Confederatelosses are notknown. .. Cold Harbor (actuallyOld Cold Harbor; New Cold Harborstood aboutone mile southwest) consistedof little morethan an ancienttavern setamong fields and woodsand a networkof roads. Grant and his staff nevergot the hang of the hamlet's seeminglynonsensical name, rendering it variouslyas "Coal Harbor" and "Cold Arbor." Therewas a clusterof treesthat may have beenconsidered an arbor, but no harbor, or coal either,and it is not particularlycold there exceptat certaintimes of the winter. The nameinstead may havederived from anold Englishtenn for a tavernthat did not offer hot food. On the other hand,the tavernthat stoodthere in 1864had two chimneysand presumablydid preparefresh-cooked meals. Regardlessof the place-name'smeaning, within a few daysCold Harborwould be known for a battle that was as hot as the weatherfrom which the menof both armiessuffered as they filed wearily into their positionson 31 May. Sheridan'scavalrymen had seizedthe crossroadsearlier that day,driving the Confederateswest and repelling severalcounterattacks. During the night, bothsides entrenched and extendedtheir lines north and southas additionaltroops arrived(including Maj. Gen. RobertF. Hoke's Confederatedivision from the Richmonddefenses), a trend that continuedfor two days. On 1 June,Lee orderedAnderson to recapture NPS Fonn IO-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page 71

The Civil War in Virginia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeoloe:ical Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

the ground in coordinationwith Hoke,but Sheridan'shorse soldiers fighting dismountedand using Spencer repeatingcarbines repelled the attempt,and aboutnoon Wright's VI Corpsreplaced the cavalrymen. Grantrealized that his besthope for holding Cold Harborand defeatingLee lay in attackingbefore the entire Army of NorthernVirginia assembledand entrenched.He orderedWright to leadan assaultas soonas Maj. Gen. William F. Smith's XVIII Corpsarrived from BermudaHundred south of Richmond. The attackwas delayed for hours,however, when Smithwas misdirectedby ordersissued by Grant's headquarters;finally, about5:00 P.M.,the Federalscharged Anderson's and Hoke's position. At flTStthey succeededin breakingthrough the Confederateline, but sooncountercharges erased most of their gains. Grant. frustrated,decided to launcha coordinatedattack at dawnon 2 Juneand orderedHancock's II Corpsto march all night to join in the assault. Hancock'smarch did not end until well after the hour appointedfor the attack,however, as his menwere too exhaustedto movequickly. Grantpostponed the chargeuntil late in the afternoonand then,when delay followed delay, until 4:30 the next morning. The postponementsgave Lee the opportunityhe needed.Lee wasa masterat moving his army quickly to block Grant's path,and his menwere expertsat entrenching. By dawn on 3 June,the Confederateshad constructedthe strongestnetwork of fortificationsthey had yet built in Virginia-- s.trongereventhan the works at the North Anna River. Extendingfor almostseven miles, the trencheswere severallines deep,with interconnectingworks to protectthe soldiers,large batteries,and interlocking fields of fire. Sensingthat capturingthem would beno easytask, many Federalsoldiers wrote their nameson scrapsof paperand stitchedthem to their uniformsso that their bodiesmight be identified later. At 4:30 A.M.,almost 50,000 menof the II, VI, andXVIII Corpsattacked along a three-milefront. Only on the Union left. and only for a moment.did they breakthrough the lines. Sheetsof flame greeted the Federals,and men fell in heaps. Within an hour, 5,500of them lay slaughtered,dead or wounded,as the Confederateentrenchments lived up to their promise.Then they simply disintegratedunder the withering fIfe from rifles and cannon,and retreated. Later in the day,attacks and counterattacksalong Warren'sand Burnside's front costthe Federalsanother 1,500 casualties. In retrospect,Grant admitted that the attackhad beena dreadfulmistake. But he had believed that one grand assault.launched before Lee was fully prepared,might haveended the war, and in that he may have beencorrect. Lee had takenGrant's mistakeand turned it into his last major victory of the war. Both sidesreeled from the butchery,and little actionoccurred for the next severaldays. On 12 June,Grant used the cover of darknessto slip away eastand southagain, intent on moving far aroundLee and threateningRichmond from the south;from the directionof Petersburg.The Cold Harborbattles, from startto bloody finish, had costthe Federalssome 12,000casualties and the Confederatesabout 2,500. To distractthe Confederates,Grant had orderedSheridan to ride westwardand destroytrack along the Virginia CentralRailroad, which connectedRichmond with the ShenandoahValley. Sheridandeparted on 7 Junewith some6,000 cavalrymen.Lee, as usual,soon learned of the Federalmovement and sent Hamptonand roughly 5,000 troopersin pursuit. On 11 June,Hampton caught up with Sheridannear Trevilian Station,a stop on the railroad in Louisa Countyjust west of Louisa CourtHouse. NPS Form 10-9008 OMS No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page 72

The Civil War in Virginia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeological Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

The two forces had bivouackedwithin five miles of eachother on 10 June,with Hampton'smen campingnear the stationand Louisa Court Houseand Sheridan'sjust southof the North Anna River. On the morning of II June,opposing patrols encountered each other and the battle began. The day went well at first for Sheridan,who drove a wedgebetween Hampton's and FitzhughLee's divisions and pushedthe fonner back to the station,where Custerhad attackedthe Confederaterear. Hampton'smen quickly regrouped,however, and soonhad Custersurrounded on threesides. He and his trooperscut their way out, and the flfst day of the battle endedas muchfrom mutualexhaustion and ammunitionshortages as from the approachingdarkness. On 12 June,the fighting resumedin the morningwith an unsuccessfulattack by Sheridanagainst the Confederateline along the railroad. Whenhe tried againin the afternoon,Sheridan's assault was brokenby Hampton'sstrong counterattackthat nearlyshattered the Union force. Again darknessended the fighting, and by dawnthe next day Sheridanand his menwere withdrawingtoward White Houseon the PamunkeyRiver. The two-daybattle at Trevilian Stationwas the bloodiestcavalry encounterof the war. Sheridan lost 1,000casualties, Hampton somewhat fewer. The expeditionhad resulted in little damageto the railroad,although it had accomplishedits goalof drawing mostof the Confederatecavalry away from the action at Cold Harbor. Giventhe natureof the fighting in HanoverCounty, however, the absenceof the cavalry meantlittle. After the battle,however, the Confederatecavalry's absencehelped Grant beginhis movementsouth undetected by Lee. Sheridanand Hamptonrejoined their armiesjust after Grantand Lee beganto maneuvertoward Petersburg. Grant's OverlandCampaign had failed in its goalsof drawing Lee into openbattle and crushing him, thencapturing the Confederatecapital. Lee assumedthe defensive,a role dictatedby his decisionto sendEarly's corpsto the ShenandoahValley. It wasa role he kept for the remainderof the war and executedwith precisionwhile searchingunsuccessfully for opportunitiesto attackGrant. For his part, the Federalcommander had continuedto maneuveraround Lee's right flank toward Richmond,thereby reinforcing Lee's defensiveposture. The costwas ghastly,with eachside losing about45 percentof its strength. Grantbegan the campaignon 4 May with about120,000 men, Lee with about60,000. By 12June, when Grant disengaged his army at Cold Harborand began the marchthat would take him to Petersburg,he had sufferedabout 55,000casualties. Lee's lossesamounted to roughly27,000. The total numberof effectives for the Anny of the Potomacstood at about65,000 by mid-June;the Anny of NorthernVirginia had about33,000. Both sidessoon received reinforcements. The OverlandCampaign ended in stalemate,but the horrific losseswere far more seriousfor Lee than for Grant,especially since Grant's overallstrategy had proveneffective. Shennanwas thrusting into northwesternGeorgia, while Maj. Gen.David Hunterwas marchingthrough the ShenandoahValley. Lee could do nothingto help Johnsto~againstShennan, but he could and did divide his army and sendfirst Maj. Gen.John C. Breckinridgeand thenEarly to counterHunter. This decisionvirtually eliminatedany possibility that Lee could maneuveragainst Grant and attackhim successfully.For the restof the war, Lee NPS Fonn IO-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86),

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section ~E- Page 73

The Civil War in Virginia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolo2ical Resources Name of Multiple PropertyListing

and the Army of NorthernVirginia would be restrictedto trenchwarfare and, eventually,a desperate escapefrom Petersburgthat would end at AppomattoxCourt House.

BERMUDA HUNDRED CAMPAIGN WhenLt. Gen. UlyssesS. Grantassumed command of the armiesof the United Stateson 10 March 1864,he initially favoreda major advanceon Richmondfrom Suffolk by way of Raleigh,North Carolina. He reasonedthat suchan approachwould cut Gen. RobertE. Lee's vital supplylines to the rest of the Southand compelhim to fight a majorbattle to restorethem. Eventually,however, Grant abandoned this plan in favor of an overlandcampaign south from the Anny of the Potomac'swinter encampmentin CulpeperCounty. Besidesthe new campaign,Grant ordered two otheroffensive operations in Virginia. Maj. Gen. Franz Sigelwould leada force throughthe ShenandoahValley, and anotherarmy would ascendJames River, land at BermudaHundred, seize City Point.and operate against Richmond from the south,in effect forming the left wing of the Federaloffense. This army alsowould accomplishGrant's earlier goal of severingthe Confederatelines of supplyand obliging Lee eitherto fight in the openor retreatbehind the Richmonddefenses. To leadthis force, Grantwas compelledto appointMaj. Gen. BenjaminF. Butler,the commanderof the Departmentof Virginia and North Carolina. Butler was perhapsthe mostpolitically well-connectedgeneral in the Unionarmy. Many professionalsoldiers, however, such as the formerarmy generalin chief, Maj. Gen. HenryW. Halleck, heartily despisedButler, who in turn scornedthem. Although Butlerwas widely regardedas incompetent in the field, his political associationsand his acknowledgedadministrative skills renderedhim impossible to ignore and all but impossibleto remove. Grantwould havepreferred Maj. Gen. William F. "Baldy" Smithas commanderof whatwould soonbe calledthe Anny of the James,but after conferringwith Butler on 1-2 April 1864he decidedto assignhim the directionof the campaignup the Peninsula. The conferenceestablished Butler's plan of attack,which would begin at the sametime as Grant's overlandcampaign. The Anny of the Jameswould ascendJames River and establisha supplybase about' nine miles eastof Petersburgat City Point.as well as two defensiveposts downriver-Fort Powhatanon the southbank oppositeWeyanoke, and Fort Pocahontasfarther downstream at Wilson's Wharf on the north bank-to protectFederal vessels and the depot. Butler's army would then establishits baseof operationsat BermudaHundred, a peninsulaabove City Point betweenthe Jamesand AppomattoxRivers. After entrenchingthere, Butler would threatenPetersburg, send cavalry against the railroadsto the south, and move on Richmond. If all went well, both armieswould link up somewherewest of Richmondten daysor so afterthe beginningof the campaign. Although Grant's strategyseemed clear, Butlermisinterpreted a key elementof it. Naturally cautious,Butler assumedthat Grantwanted him first to take the time to fortify BermudaHundred strongly so as to securehis base,then march againstRichmond. Gr~t. on the contrary,intended Butler to entrench NPS Fonn 10-900a OMS No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section _E- Page 7A

The Civil War in Virginia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolo2ical Resources Name of Multiple PropertyListing

sufficiently to protecthis army and thento concentrateon gettingto Richmondas quickly aspossible. Many of the subsequentdifficulties betweenGrant and Butlercan be tracedto this misunderstanding. The 39,OOO-manArmy of the Jamesconsisted of two corps: X Corpswas commanded by Maj. Gen. QuincyA. Gillmore and XVIII Corpsby Smith. Eachcorps contained three infantry divisions,each of which was supportedby an artillery brigade. The X Corpsdivisions were led by Brig. Gen. Alfred H. Terry, Brig. Gen. JohnW. Turner,and Brig. Gen. AdelbertAmes, while Brig. Gen. William T. H. Brooks, Brig. Gen. ,and Brig. Gen. EdwardW. Hincks commandedthe XVIII Corpsdivisions. Brig. Gen. AugustV. Kautz led the cavalry division, which consistedof two brigadesand unattached troops and arrived at City Point on 10May. OpposingButler wasthe Confederategarrison at Petersburgcommanded by Maj. Gen.George E. Pickett. Pickettwas not a happygeneral. After his division had beenbadly cut up at Gettysburg,he had beenappointed head of the Departmentof North Carolina,which includedsouthern Virginia. His principal task, defendingPetersburg and the rail connectionswith the restof the South,was renderedvirtually impossiblefor the lack of troops. As April wore toward May and rumorsarose of Federalactivity aimed in his direction, Pickett grew evenmore frustrated,especially when his urgentmessages to Richmond frequentlywere ignored. On 15 April 1864,Gen. P. G. T. Beauregardwas appointed department head to replacePickett. Beauregard,however, was instructedto proceedto Weldon,North Carolina,not Petersburg,to await further orders,while Pickettmarked time in the Virginia city until Beauregardarrived to relievehim. Beauregard'scommand was asspread out as the two commanders:some elements were en routeto Richmondfrom Charleston,South Carolina, others from Wilmington,North Carolina,while still others were engagedin an offensive againstNew Bern,North Carolina. After it fmally assemblednear Petersburg in mid-May,Beauregard's army consisted'of four infantry divisions commandedby Maj. Gen. RobertRansom Jr., Maj. Gen. RobertF. Hoke,Brig. Gen. Alfred H. Colquitt, and Maj. Gen. William H. C. Whiting. Ransom'sand Hoke's divisions containedfour brigades,Colquitt's and Whiting's two. Brig. Gen. commanded the cavalrybrigade, and more than a dozenartillery batteriessupported the infantry and cavalry. Other unitsmoved in and out of the commandat varioustimes during the campaign;probably the total neveramounted to more than 18,O()O troops. On 5 May, Butler's army sailed up the JamesRiver in a wide varietyof military and civilian vessels.Elements of the force boardedtransports at variouswharves en route, gunboatsescorted the flotilla, and the 1stand 2d U.S. Colored CavalryRegiments trotted parallelto the fleet on the north bank of the river. At Wilson's Wharf,half of Brig. Gen.Edward A. Wild's brigade-the 1stand 22d Regimentsof U.S. ColoredTroops and two sectionsof CompanyB, 2d U.S. Colored Artillery -disembarked to constructFort Pocahontasthere. The remainderof Wild's brigade,the lOthand 37th U.S. Colored Troops,supported by two sectionsof CompanyM, 3d New York Artillery, disembarkedat Fort Powhatan severalmiles upstreamon the southbank to occupyand improvethe abandonedConfederate fortification there. NPS Fonn IO-900a OMS No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior Nationa! Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E- Page 25-

The Civil War in Vir~inia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolo~ical R~J>cjJIJ;~s ' Name of Multiple Property Listing

About 4:00 P.M.,the lead elementsof the Army of the Jamesstormed ashore at City Point. achieving tacticalsurprise and capturing severalprisoners. The restof the army steameda mile and a half upriver to BermudaHundred Landing, which it likewise occupiedwithout resistance.There, the disembarkingof the Army of the Jamescontinued throughout the eveningand well into the night. In Petersburg,meanwhile, Pickett sent a steadystream of telegramsto Richmondto inform the Confederate governmentof Butler's progressand beg for instructionsand assistance.The wire traffic only flowed one way, however,as Pickettheard nothing from Richmond. He had betterluck with his telegramsto Beauregard,who immediatelybegan rounding up troops to sendhim. While Pickettand Beauregardstruggled to scrapetogether a defensiveforce, Butler, flush with the expedition's early success,considered a night marchon Richmond. Cooler headsprevailed among his subordinates,however, and the advancewas put off until dawnon 6 May. Soonafter the sun rose,the Army of the Jameswas on the march westfrom BermudaHundred Landing. The XVIII Corpsled the way, with Brig. Gen.Charles A. Heckman'sbrigade ofWeitzcl's division in the vanguard. Two miles inland, at Enon Church,the road forked, with one branchleading southwesttoward Petersburgand the other continuing west. The XVIII Corpstook the left-hand fork while the marchedstraight ahead. At Ware BottomChurch, somefour miles farther on. Gillmore's men haltedand beganconstruction of the northernhalf of Butler's defensiveline. To the south, Smith's XVIII Corps eventuallywould build its half of the line, which would then extendacross Bermuda Hundred from the Jamesto the AppomattoxRiver. In midafternoon,Butler orderedHeckman to advanceto the junction of the Richmond& PetersburgRailroad and an abandonedbranch line that led eastto PortWalthall. Pickett,meanwhile, struggled to anticipate Federaltroop movementsand block them with his scatteredforces. He stationedBrig. Gen. JohnsonHagood's brigade, recently arrived from SouthCarolina, at Port Walthall Junction;the menhad barelysettled into place whenHeckman attacked late ~ the afternoon. As Hagoodhimself had not yet arrived at thejunction. Col. RobertGraham coordinated the defense,which held off Heckmanuntil he withdrew for lack of supportand underthe mistakenbelief that he facedtwo Confederatebrigades. That night. Butler orderedanother attack to seizethe junction and destroytrack, while Pickett strengthenedthe defensesthere with Brig. Gen. BushrodR. Johnson'sbrigade called up from eastern Tennessee,bringing t.~etotal numberto about2,600. Five Union brigadC5,some 8,000 men underthe commandof Brig. Gen.William T. H. Brooks, marchedwest on the morning of 7 May. They encountered stiff oppositionfrom the Confederatesat first. but almostcollapsed the line with an envelopmentof Johnson'sleft flank. The defendersrallied and held, however,and at the end of the day Brooks withdrew afterdestroying very little of the railroad. The Federalssuffered some 300 casualtiesand the Confederates 200. The Confederateswere jubulant over their victory but their high spirits subsidedquickly, however, as late that night Pickettordered Johnson to withdraw southfrom Port WalthallJunction across Swift Creek. Pickett,assuming that Butler's ultimate objectivewas Petersburg,feared he did not haveenough troopsto protectthe city and soughtto tighten his defensiveperimeter. He fretted overthe continuing NPS Fonn 10-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department oCthe Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page 76

The Civil War in Vireinia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeological Resources Name ef Multiple Property Listing

absence of Beauregard and the silence in Richmond, and increasingly felt abandoned. His decision to withdraw Johnson left the rail line to Richmond unprotected, although it did strengthen the Petersburg defenses. Southof the city, in contrastto Brooks's foray,the PetersburgRailroad (also called the Weldon Railroad)to Weldonsuffered serious if temporarydamage as the result of a raid by some2,500 cavalrymen led from Portsmouthby Kautz. The raid, which beganon 5 May and endedfive days later whenKautz's troopersentered the Union lines at City Point,disrupted the transportationof Beauregard'sreinforcements from North Carolinato Petersburg.As a result,the force opposingButler remainedvulnerable. Fortunatelyfor Pickettand Richmond,Butler failed to exploit his opportunity. Concernedabout the fate of the Army of the Potomac,which at that momentwas locked in combatwith the Army of NorthernVirginia in the Wilderness,and aboutthat of his own army shouldthe Confederatesbe able to concentratetheir forces againsthim, Butler was contentto spendthe next day improving his fortifications acrossthe neck of BermudaHundred. On 9 May, Butler resumedhis attemptto cut the rail link betweenRichmond and Petersburg. Severaldivisions from both corps marchedto Port Walthall Junctionand ChesterStation on the Richmond & PetersburgRailroad, then turned southtoward Petersburg. At Swift Creek,they encounteredHagood's and Johnson'sstrong line that protectedthe turnpikeand railroadbridges. The Confederateslaunched a counterattackacross the creekthat wasoverwhelmed by superiorFederal numbers, but Butler did not follow up on his success. In coordinationwith the Swift Creekattack, five Union vesselsshelled Fort Clifton, which was locatedon the Confederateright flank overlookingthe AppomattoxRiver downstreamand north of Petersburg.Counterfire from the batterythere damaged a gunboatand foiled a plannedassault by Hincks's division of U.S. ColoredTroops. The casualtiesfor the day, probablyall sufferedat Swift Creek, numberedabout 140 for eachside. During the night, having receivedoptimistic reportsof Grant'sprogress toward Richmondafter the Battle of the Wilderness,Butler decidedto withdrawhis corpsinside the BermudaHundred line and awaitGrant's seeminglyimminent arrival. To protectthe route of withdrawalfor the troops destroying track at ChesterStation, on 9 Maya smallblocking force had beenplaced at the intersectionof the RichmondTurnpike and the road leadingto BermudaHundred (today's U.S. Rte. I and Rte. 10)and anotherat Ware Bottom Church. A Confederatereconnaissance failed to dislodgethem. On 10 May, Maj. Gen. RobertRansom Jr. led two of his brigadessouth toward the Bermuda Hundredroad to reconnoiterin force. Near the Henry A. Winfree dwelling just westof the turnpike intersection,they encountered the Federalblocking detachment,which had beenreinforced in the night almostto brigadestrength. A heavyaction developed as fresh Union regimentswere fed into the engagementand the Federalline wasextended, eventually threatening to outflank the Confederates.Late in the afternoon,Ransom broke off the engagementand the Union troopsbegan withdrawing to Bermuda Hundred,while the Confederatesretired toward Drewry's Bluff. The Federalssuffered some 280 casualtiesand the Confederatesabout 250. NPS Fonn 10-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E- Page 11

The Civil War in Virginia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeological Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

On the day of the battle, Beauregard,who had beendelayed in part by illness,finally arrived in Petersburg.He relievedthe overworkedPickett, who promptly took to his bed,exhausted. To the north of Richmond,meanwhile, Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridanwas leadingmost of his cavalrycommand on a raid againstthe Confederatedefenses, a raid thatculminated in the Battle of Yellow Tavernon 11 May. Anxious to relieve the pressureand preventan attackon the capitalfrom two directions,President Jefferson pavis and his military advisorsurged Beauregard to attackButler. Beauregardappeared eager to oblige, but complicationsin the deploymentof his commanddelayed a generaladvance. While Butler's menwashed clothes and strengthenedtheir entrenchmentson 11 May, Maj. Gen. RobertF. Hoke led his division north from Petersburgto reconnoiterand to makecontact with Ransom's division. Late in the day,he united with Ransomnear Drewry's Bluff andbivouacked his troopsnear Proctor'sCreek. Therehe formedthe left wing of the Confederateline, Ransomthe right. Butler, meanwhile,had decidedto demonstratein the directionof Richmond. At dawn on 12 May, Smith led the XVIII Corpsthrough the BermudaHundred line to the RichmondTurnpike, then north toward the capitalcity. About a mile up the road, at RedwaterCreek. Smith encountered a Confederate skirmishline; it deliveredsuch a stiff fire that Smithstopped to reconnoiter.His attemptsto determinethe strengthand dispositionsof the Confederateswere hamperedby the weather,as the hot and dusty conditionsof the previousweek had beenreplaced by torrentsof rain and thick mud. After some skirmishing,he stoppedfor the night. Gillmore and X Corps, meanwhile,followed Smith out of the works and thenmarched west on the road to ChesterStation and likewise bivouacked. At dawnon 13 May, Gillmore marchedon in the rain through ChesterStation to ChesterfieldCourt House,then north on a road that led to the westernend of the Confederatedefensive line aboveProctor's Creek. Smith, meanwhile,cautiously crept up the turnpike toward the main part of the line near Drewry's Bluff. Late in the afternoon,wh,ile Smith reconnoitered. Gillmore struckthe Confederateleft flank. Ransom'stroops crumpled under the onslaught,rallied and counterattacked.and finally fell backto the main line. The nextday, Smithand Gillmore launched coordinatedattacks that drovethrough the first defensiveline but stoppedshort of the second.which appearedstronger. The Federalsdug in. On the Confederateside, meanwhile,Beauregard planned an all-out counterattackfor 16 May. While Hoke demonstratedagainst the Federalcenter and left, Ransomwould attackand turn the Union right flank. Whiting, who had beenleft in chargeof the troops in Petersburgwhen Beauregard rode to the front on 13 May, wasto attackthe rear of Butler's army. Shortlybefore 5:00 A.M. on 16 May, Beauregard'soffensive begandespite a thick fog that had rolled in during the night. Ransomattacked first, driving the Federalright flank southto Butler's headquartersat Half-Way House,an eighteenth-centurytavern located on the turnpike midway between Richmondand Petersburg.Butler repeatedlyurged Gillmore,holding the Union left, to attackHoke, but Gillmore delayeduntil he got orqersto withdrawlate in the morning. The Federalsbegan to fall back towardthe safetyof BermudaHundred. NPSFonn 10-900a OMB No.1 024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page 18

The Civil War in Virginia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeological Resources Name of Multiple PropertyListing

Whiting's force had advancedfrom Petersburgas orderedbut haltedat Port Walthall Junctionin the face of slight oppositionrather than pushing forward. There Whiting, who was ill and also had gone without sleepfor three days(Brig. Gen. HenryA. Wise thoughthe was drunk),became increasingly befuddledand uncertainof whathe shoulddo. While he dallied and Beauregardwaited impatiently,Butler and his army slipped out of the Confederatetrap. Eachside lost about3,000 menkilled, wounded,and captured. Once within the BermudaHundred stronghold, Gillmore's X Corpsoccupied the right half of the works, Smith's XVIII Corpsthe left. Beauregardlooked for an opportunityto attack,but President JeffersonDavis orderedhim to sendseveral brigades north to reinforcethe Army of NorthernVirginia, thenembroiled at SpotsylvaniaCourt House. The troopsbegan departing in the eveningof 19May. The next morning at dawn,Beauregard launched a limited attackagainst the Federallines in orderto secure ground that could be defendedwith a relatively shortline of entrenchmentsand a small numberof troops. Most of the combattook placenear Ware Bottom Church in Gillmore's sector. Whiting's division drove in Gillmore's pickets,captured their rifle pits, andpressed forward in someplaces for more than half a mile. In the afternoonGillmore counterattackedand regained some of the lost ground. At the end of the day, however,Beauregard pronounced himself satisfiedthat his goalshad beenaccomplished. The Confederatessuffered about 800 casualties,the Federalssome 700. SoonBeauregard's men would constructfieldworks called the Howlett Line for the farm of Dr. John Howlett that was locatednear the northernend of the line. Butler's BermudaHundred campaign had ended. In the opinion of someobservers, the Howlett Line effectively"bottled up" Butler at Bermuda Hundred. Although any movementoverland to the westwas inhibited, Butler remainedable to crossboth the Appomattoxand the James,as later eventsproved. Butler's naturalcaution and his conclusion,as he wrote his wife, that he had accomplishedmost of the goalsestablished when he met with Grant in April, contributedmore to his decisionto remainon the peninsulathan any immediateConfederate threat. Finally, as Lee fell backtoward Richmond,Butler was well positionedto threateneither Petersburg or Richmond,or to take the field and assistGrant. The outpostat City Point gainedin importance,too, whenGrant arrived in mid-Juneand it becamethe principal supply depot-indeed, one of the largest"ports" in the country-for the Army of the Potomac. Likewise,the fortifications strengthenedor erectedat Fort Powhatanand Wilson's Wharf (Fort Pocahontas)protected the vesselscarrying troops and suppliesto City Point. On 24 May, however,the Confederateslaunched an attackon Wilson's Wharf in CharlesCity County. Incensedby largelycontrived reportsin the Richmondnewspapers of "atrociousoutrages" committedby the U.S. ColoredTroops there againstwhite civilians in the neighborhood,and anxiousto clearthe north bank of the JamesRiver of Federalforces, Maj. Gen.Fitzhugh Lee led some2,500 cavalrymenagainst the place. After Lee's initial attackwas repulsed,he sentforward a flag of truce to demandsurrender, with the promisethat the black soldierswould be treatedas prisoners of war-and an implied threatthat if they resistedthey might be slaughteredas at Fort Pillow. Brig. Gen.Edward A. Wild, NPSFonn 10-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page 19

commander of the 1,500-man garrison, refused to surrender and repulsed Lee's second attack. The Confederates withdrew during the night, having suffered almost all the 165 casualties. Bermuda Hundred, and the James River below it, remained in Federal hands. Soon, Grant would arrive to launch the next phase of his campaign against Richmond and Petersburg.

SHENANDOAH VALLEY CAMPAIGNS OF 1864-1865

WhenLt. Gen.Ulysses S. Grantplanned his campaignstrategy for spring 1864,he decidedon two major Union thrusts. One aimedto destroyGen. JosephE. Johnston'sAnny of Tennesseeand occupy Atlanta,the South's most importantrailroad hub. The other soughtto crushGen. RobertE. Lee's Anny of NorthernVirginia and captureRichmond, the capitalof the ConfederateStates of America. The Virginia campaignconsisted of threecomponents: the attacktoward Richmond,an advanceup the JamesRiver to threatenthe rail centerat Petersburg,and the destructionof the railroad at Stauntonand Lynchburg,thereby severingConfederate links with the fertile ShenandoahValley. To accomplishthe third objective,Grant orderedMaj. Gen. Franz Sigelto leada smallarmy souththrough the Valley, in what Grantconsidered a sideshowcompared to the thrust southfrom GermannaFord. Sigeland his 9,000-manarmy marchedsouth from Winchesteron the Valley Turnpike on 2 May 1864. Sigeladvanced slowly, his progressimpeded by Brig. Gen.John D. Imboden'sConfederate cavalry brigade,which harassedhis column. Imboden'stactics boughttime for Maj. Gen.John C. Breckinridge,a formervice presidentof the United Statesas well as a former senatorfrom Kentucky,to whomGen. RobertE. Lee had assignedthe task of stopping Sigel with a makeshiftConfederate force. By the secondweek of May, as Sigelmarched into ShenandoahCounty, Breckinridge had scrapedtogether a 5,300-manarmy consistingof two infantry brigades,Imboden's cavalry brigade,fourteen pieces of artillery, somemilitia, and 258 teenageboys from the Virginia Military Institute,the entirecorps of cadetsthere. On 15 May the two forcesconfronted each other at New Market,a farming village at the southern edgeof ShenandoahCounty on the Valley Turnpike. Sigelblocked the turnpike a mile north o(town but Breckenridge,although outnumbered, attacked. Puttinghis infantry and a regimentof dismountedcavalrY in line of battle, Breckinridgeordered his force to advancethrough New Market. Sigelordered a withdrawalto a hill half a mile farthernorth and deployedhis cannoneffectively againstthe oncoming Confederates.Reluctantly, Breckinridge gave the commandto "Put the boys in" to attackthe Union artillery positionjust as a batterywas withdrawnto replenishits ammunition. The cadetsadvanced in battle line with the rest of the Confederatesacross a field so muddy that it suckedshoes from many feet, and thencharged the guns underheavy fire. At a cost of 10killed and 47 wounded.some 20 percentof their number,the corpsraced up the hill and captureda cannonabandoned by the fleeing Federal artillerists. His right flank endangered,Sigel retreated across the North Fork of the ShenandoahRiver to NPS Form 10-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page .80-

The Civil War in Vir ini 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolo ical Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

Strasburgand abandonedhis campaign. For the moment,the Valley wassecure for the Confederates.The cost Sigel about840 casualties,Breckinridge 540. Maj. Gen. David Hunterreplaced Sigel four days later. On 26 May, Hunterled his army, now strengthenedto about 12,000,up the Valley from CedarCreek. He plannedto rendezvousnear Staunton with forcescommanded by Brig. Gen.George Crook and Brig. Gen. William W. Averell. By 29 May, Hunter's army was at New Market,where it pausedto restand reburythe deadfrom the earlierbattle there. Once again,the Confederatesscrambled to meetthe Union threat,as Lee had summoned Breckinridgeand his commandto the North Anna River. Brig. Gen. William E. "Grumble" Jones's infantry brigadehurried north from Bristol by rail, while Imboden'scavalry blockedHunte.-'s advance at Mount Crawford. Augmentedby local , Jones'scommand amounted to some5,600 troops. Huntersidestepped the Confederateblocking force by marchingaround it to the eastand crossing the North River at Port Republic. Jonesand Imboden,reinforced by additionalcavaIry underthe command of Brig. Gen.John C. Vaughn,countered by marchingsoutheast and occupyingground around Piedmont,a hamletlocated about seven miles southwestof Port Republic. The infantry formeda defensiveline of fencerails and felled trees in an arc northwestof Piedmont,while Vaughn'scavalry held a position southeastof the hamlet. On 5 June,Hunter crossed the river at PortRepublic and encountered Imboden's cavalry outposts at Mount Meridian. Hunter's cavalryforced the Confederatesback to their main position at Piedmdnt, where they dismountedand joined Vaughn'smen. Shortly after noon,Hunter launched the flfSt of a series of attacksagainst Jones that revealeda gap in his line. A Unionbrigade assaulted the gapwhile Jones dashedfrom one point to anotherto repositionand rally his men. At the heightof the battle,a bullet to the headkilled Jonesinstantly, and the Confederateline collapsed. Only a stiffrearguard actionon the road southof Piedmontheld off the Union pursuit. The Confederatedefeat was costly: 1,600casualties (including more than 1,000captured) versus 875 for the Federals.Now the upperValley lay beforethe Union columns. Hunteroccupied Staunton the next dayand Crookjoined him two days later,swelling his force to some20,000. Hunterthen embarked on a campaignof destructionand pillaging (Granthad orderedhim to live off the land) southto Lexington. There,for threedays, Hunter's army ransackedthe town and burned many buildings, including the Virginia Military Institute. Then Hunterturned his attentionto his primary objective, Lynchburg,and marchedeast through the Blue RidgeMountains. Eastof the mountains,meanwhile, Lee's Army of NorthernVirginia had beenlocked in combat with the Army of the Potomacthroughout May and the first half of June. While Breckinridgefought Sigel at New Market on 15 May, the easternarmies had beenstruggling at SpotsylvaniaCourt House. The news of Jones'sdefeat at Piedmonton 5 Junereached Lee soonafter the Battle of Cold Harbor,as he and Grant probed eachother's lines. Thencame Sheridan's raid againstthe Virginia CentralRailroad and the Confederatevictory at Trevilian Station,which savedthe line at leasttemporarily. Now Hunterwas rampagingthrough the upperValley andthreatening Lynchburg, the rail and canalcenter of the Virginia Piedmont. NPS Form 10-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page 81

The Civil War in Virginia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeological Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

In consultationwith PresidentJefferson Davis and Gen. ,Davis's military advisor, Lee first returnedBreckinridge's division to the Valley and then sentan entire corps of his anny to save both Lynchburgand the Valley. The tactic entailedgreat risk for his anny, but Lee hadto act with vigor to preservethe westernrail links andtake someof the pressureoff Richmond. Lt. Gen. JubalA. Early commandedthis corps,formerly StonewallJackson's. Early, it has been pointed out, was no Jackson,but neitherwas anyone else. "Old Jube"displayed strengths-principally aggressiveness,which earnedhim the enthusiasticsupport of his troops-as well as weaknesses,including rashness,abrasiveness, and feelingsof insecuritythat caused him to mistrusthis mostcapable subordinates. Known for his profanelanguage and acid tongue,Early provokedstrong emotions in thosewho knew him; few were impartial. Lee and Early conferredon 12June. Early wasto defeatHunter, march north down the Valley into Maryland,and threatenWashington. Early's corps,with Breckinridge'sdivision attachedto it, numberedabout 14,000. On 13 June,the corpsbegan its westwardmarch by foot and rail to Charlottesvilleand Lynchburg, while Hunterand his anny approachedthe city from the west. Both anniesreached their objective on 17 June,with Hunterconfronting the southerndefensive works while the vanguardof Early's anny rode railroad cars into the north sideof town from Charlottesville. Early's corpsrushed forward to man the earthworkswhile Hunterprobed cautiously. After severalskirmishes, Hunter ordered a retreatthe next day, in part becausehe was short of supplies. His anny fled southwesttoward Big Lick (present-day Roanoke)with Early in pursuit. The Confederatescaught up with the Federalson 21 Junejust north of Salemat HangingRock. In a small,sharp engagement confined to a narrowvalley by steephills, Early deliveredthe final blow to Hunterthat hastenedhis retreatiI:tto West Virginia. The route Hunterchose to reachthe relative safetyof Harper's Ferry ensuredthat he andhis anny would be out of the war for a month. Now Early was free to carry out the remainderof Lee's orders:invade Maryland and attack Washington. The Confederatesmarched north downthe ShenandoahValley and on 9 July, near Frederick, Maryland,defeated a Union force underMaj. Gen. Lew A. Wallaceat the . Two days later,to the astonishmentof the capital's inhabitants,Early's army appearedbefore the northwestern defensesof Washington. PresidentAbraham Lincoln rode out for a look, while Grantordered two divisions north from the Petersburgsiege lines. Earlyprobed the Federallines but found themunassailable by his relatively smallforce and withdrew shortly after midnight on 12July. Maj. Gen. HoratioG. Wright pursuedEarly with elementsof three anny corps,some 25,000 men. Early's anny crossedthe PotomacRiver at White's Ford and marchedwest through the Blue Ridge at Snicker's Gap (present-dayRte. 7). Roughlythree miles beyondthe gap, wherethe road crossedthe ShenandoahRiver at Castleman'sFerry, Early was broughtto bay at a fann on the westernside called Cool Spring. After Union cavalry ~onfrontedConfederate cavalry at one river crossingon 17 July and another the next day, Wright decidedthat Early's infantryhad retreatedto Winchesterand therefore the Federal infantry might successfullyforce its way across. Early's infantrydivisions werejust out of sightto the west,however, and they quickly movedeast to block Wright's advanceunder Crook and push it into the river. Col. JosephThoburn's Federaldivision, which had crossedthe river and expectedreinforcements NPS Form 10-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SH~ET

Section E Page 82-

The Civil War in Virl!inia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolol!ical Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

that nevercame, found itself pinned down behinda stonewall nearthe riverbank. He and his menheld out. repellingthree Confederateassaults, until darknesspermitted them to retreatacross the river. A night artillery duel endedthe brief but bloody engagement,which costthe Federals422 casualtiesand the Confederates397. Early continuedhis retreatwest to Winchesterand then southto Strasburg,while Wright's force followed slowly. ThenEarly learnedthat a combinedFederal detachment of cavalrysupported by infantry and commandedby Averell was marchingsouth from Martinsburg,West Virginia, on the Martinsburg& WinchesterTurnpike to join Wright. Early detailedMaj. Gen. StephenD. Ramseur'sdivision to defendthe northernapproaches to Winchester.On 20 July, as Ramseurwas getting into positionto attackAverell at John Rutherford's farm northeastof Winchester,the Federalssuddenly struck Ramseur's flank. Overwhelmedby the onslaught,Ramseur's division fled in a rout.and some300 Confederateswere taken prisoner. Becauseof this defeatand Wright's slow approach,Early withdrewhis army to Fisher's Hill, southof Strasburg. Wright concludedthat the Confederatesno longerposed a threatto Washingtonand orderedmost of his detachmentback to the capitalpreparatory to any early returnto the Petersburgfront. He left Crook at Winchesterwith three infantrydivisions and a cavalry division to defendthe northernend of the Valley. No soonerhad Wright departedthan Early struck backat SecondKernstown. There, at the site of Jackson'sdefeat more thantwo yearsearlier, Early's cavalryskirmished with Averell's throughoutthe day on 23 July. The engagementwas renewedthe next day, in part to screenthe marchof Early's infantry north from Strasburgat first light. Crookdeployed his divisions in time to meetEarly's initial probe, which developedinto a strong demonstrationin Crook's front. Breckinridge,meanwhile, led his division in an envelopmentof Crook's left flank. which sooncrumbled. Crook's commandfled norththrough Winchesterand crossedthe PotomacRiver near Williamsport,Maryland. The Federalslost some 1,200 men in the battle,the Confederatesabout 600. Early quickly took advantageof his victory. In retaliationfor Hunter'sdestructive work in Lexington,Early orderedan expeditionaryforce commandedby Brig. Gen.John McCausland to seize Chambersburg,Pennsylvania. McCausland and his troopersrode into town on 30 July and demanded $100,000in gold or $500,000in papercurrency in retribution;when the town fathersrefused, his men burnedthe centerof town and destroyedmore thanfoUr hundred buildings, almost three hundred of them private dwellings. Crook's defeatand the subsequentburning of Chambersburg galvanizedGrant as well as Lincoln, eachof whom now consideredthe ShenandoahValley a sideshowno more. The two menmet at Fort Monroeon 31 July to discussthe organizationof an army to reoccupythe Valley and the appointmentof its leader. Maj. Gen.George G. Meade,commander of the Army of the Potomac,and Maj. Gen. William B. Franklin,the commanderof the Left Grand Division at Fredericksburg,were considered and rejected. Lincoln departedfor Washingtonwith the matterunsettled, leaving the decisionto Grant,and the next morning Grantwired Maj. Gen. HenryW. Halleck,the Federalchief of staff, with the nameof his choice: Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan,Meade's cavalry commander. NPS Fonn 10-900a OMS No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page _83-

The Civil War in Virginia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolo~ical Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

Sheridan, like Grant, was a native of the Midwest. Barely five feet three inches tall with a short torso and long legs, Sheridan was called "Little Phil" by his troops. His bullet-shaped head, accentuated by his close-cropped hair, was remarked on by many who saw him. Like Early, Sheridan was naturally combative; he was also intense and energetic, giving an impression of being in perpetual motion. On horseback, although he cut a peculiar figure becauseof his small stature, Sheridan became particularly animated and charismatic. And few in the Federal army were as adept at inspiring men on the verge of battle. Sheridan's 43,000-man army, called the Army of the Shenandoah,consisted of Wright's VI Corps, two divisions of the XIX Corps commanded by Maj. Gen. William H. Emory, the XIII Corps led by Crook, a dozen artillery batteries, and three cavalry divisions under Brig. Gen. Alfred T. A. Torbert. On 7 August, when Sheridan arrived to take command, the army was encamped at Halltown, West Virginia, about three miles southwest of Harper's Ferry. There, almost 5,000 troops under Brig. Gen. John D. Stevenson also were available to Sheridan. Early and his Army of the Valley, as he styled it, were camped at Bunker Hill, West Virginia, on the Valley Turnpike some fourteen miles west of Halltown. The army consisted of about 14,000 men in three infantry divisions, five cavalry brigades, and three artillery totaling nine batteries. Sheridan's force outnumbered Early's by better than three to one. Grant's orders to Sheridan were clear: push the Confederates south, away from Washington, and strip the Valley of provisions that the enemy would find useful. "Take all provisions, forage, and stock wanted for the use of your command," Grant wrote, "such as cannot be consumed, destroy." Grant added that it was not desirable to destroy buildings-a suggestion that Sheridan later would ignore under Grant's further orders to so strip the Valley that "crows flying over it for the balance of the seasonwill have to carry their provender." The Federals began marching up the Valley on 10 August, and by 13 August were at Cedar Creek with the Confederates ensconced on Fisher's Hill four miles farther south. Word reached Sheridan of Confederate troop movements from Petersburg to the Valley; on Grant's recommendation, he withdrew his force to Winchester. Although Sheridan feared that Lt. Gen. James Longstreet's corps had marched to the Valley to reinforce Early, in fact Lee had dispatched only Maj. Gen. Joseph B. Kershaw's infantry division, Maj. Gen. Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry division, and Lt. Col. Wilfred E. Cutshaw's artillery under the overall command of Lt. Gen. Richard H. Anderson. On Grant's advice, Sheridan began withdrawing through Winchester back to Halltown. On 14 August, Anderson reached Front Royal, where the north and south forks of the Shenandoah River converge north of the town. There, Anderson threatened the Federal line of retreat, which Brig. Gen. 's cavalry division guarded just north of the rivers. On 16 August, when Merritt began moving north, Anderson ordered Brig. Gen. William T. Wofford's infantry brigade and Brig. Gen. Williams C. Wickham's cavalry brigade across the rivers to Guard Hill to watch the roads and river fords. In midafternoon, Wickham advanced from Guard Hill against Merritt, but two regiments of Brig. Gen. Thomas C. Devin's brigade counterattacked, and after a brief clash of sabersthe Confederates retreated across the rivers. Brig. Gen. George A. Custer led another Federal attack against Wofford's infantry on Guard Hill: again the Confederates retreated, and many drowned or were captured as they NPS Form lO-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page 84

The Civil War in Virginia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolol!ical Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

crossedthe forks of the ShenandoahRiver. Having confirn1edthe presenceof Confederateinfantry and cavalry in Front Royal,Merritt's cavalry followed the mainFederal anny toward Halltown. The two sides suffereda total of some550 casualtiesin the Guard Hill engagement. For the next severalweeks, Early probedthe Union lines around Halltown,and Sheridanlikewise skirmishedwith the Confederates.Considerable maneuvering occurred in JeffersonCounty, WestVirginia. and Clarke County,Virginia. On 3 September,most of Sheridan'sanny advancedto Berryville in Clarke Countyand took up defensivepositions north of the town facing west on rolling groundalong present-day Rte.611. The Confederatesoccupied a parallelline abouta mile west. To the westof Berryville, as part of Crook's corps settleddown for the night on the Union left flank. Kershaw'sdivision attackedand met with initial successbut lackedthe manpowerto continue. During the night, Early broughtup the remainderof his anny, but whendaylight revealedentrenchments too strongto attack.he withdrew that night west beyond OpequonCreek. The two sidessuffered about 500 total casualties,and the maneuveringcontinued with little interruption. As the anniesappeared to be stalemated,in mid-SeptemberEarly agreedthat Andersonwould departwith Kershaw'sdivision andCutshaw's artillery battalionand rejoin Lee at Petersburg,leaving Early with some 12,500men againstSheridan's 40,000. Somecontemporaries contended that Anderson's decisionwas basedas muchon havinghad enoughof Early's abrasivenessas on military considerations. On 15 September,Anderson and his menbegan their marchout of the Valley, a movementobserved by Federalspies. The next day, Grantarrived at Charlestownto confer with Sheridan.Asked if he could move on Early in four days,Sheridan replied that he could do it in three;"Go in," Grant said, in the briefest orderhe issuedduring the war. Early approvedAnderson's departure in part becausehe thoughtSheridan timid. In casehe was wrong, however,Early ordereda withdrawalto Winchester.He also scatteredhis infantry divisions and resumedraiding the Baltimore& Ohio Railroadat Martinsburg,West Virginia. About 1:00 A.M. on 19 September,Sheridan's Army of the Shenandoahwas rousedfrom its bivouacand soonbegan marching west on the Berryville Turnpike (present-dayRte. 7). The Third Battle of Winchester(called Opequonby the Federals)was aboutto beginand Early would discoverjust how wrong he was aboutSheridan's aggressiveness. Justbefore dawn, Brig. Gen.James H. Wilson's cavalrydivision trotted acrossOpequon Creek at a ford called SpoutSpring, followed by Sheridan'sinfantry. The arn1Ysuccessfully negotiated the narrow, two-mile-long defile called Berryville Canyonbecause Ramseur, who defendedthis sectorfor Early,had postedonly pickets at the easternentrance. Ramseur'sdivision blockedthe westernend of turnpikeand formedthe Confederateright flank. Maj. Gen. RobertE. Rodes'sdivision held the center,and Maj. Gen.John B. Gordon's division securedthe left. The Federalforces deployed with Brig. Gen. 's and Brig. Gen. 's divisions forming the right flank, Brig. Gen.James B. Rickett's division the center,and Brig. Gen.George W. Getty's the left, facing westto the Dinkle fann. Brig. Gen.David A. Russell'sdivision was held in reserve. The Union attackbegan about II :40 A.M. Grover's division sufferedheavy losses against Gordon, and Dwight's was pinneddown. Rickettsand Getty, however,almost collapsed Ramseur's right flank NPS Form 10-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section -L Page 85 --

The Civil War in Virginia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeological Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

be~oreRodes counterattacked about I :30 P.M. Sheridanordered all of his reserves,including the cavalry,to strike the Confederateflanks, and that actionturned the tide. Early's line dissolvedand the menfled in panic,"whirling throughWinchester" and up the Valley Turnpiketo Kernstown,where a hastilyorganized rearguardaction saved the army from destruction. The battle was hideouslycostly, with the Confederateslosing some3,600 killed, wounded,or captured-almost 25 percentof the force engaged-and the Federalsabout 5,000, or 13percent. The Union XIX Corpssuffered 40 percentcasualties and lost everyregimental commander among the killed or woundedduring the fighting in SecondWoods and Middle Field. In addition,Confederate general Rodes and Union generalRussell both werekilled. Suddenly,Sheridan found himself in control of the northern end of the Valley, and he setoff in pursuitof Early. Early's army wendedits way southto Fisher's Hill, a ridge southof Strasburgthat spannedthe turnpike and providedthe Confederateswith a naturalstronghold that provided the bestchance of stopping Sheridan'sprogress. ReachingFisher's Hill on 20 September,Early deployedhis force, now reducedto about9,500, in a line thatextended almost five miles,with skirmisherson the hills just to the north. Although infantry held the Confederatecenter and right flank. Early stationedMaj. Gen.Lunsford L. Lomax's cavalry division alone on the fragile left as little morethan a skirmishline. Sheridan'sforce of some30,000 arrived at Hupp's Hill north of Strasburgon 20 Septemberas Early completedhis deployment. The Federalsentrenched on a seriesof hills just north of Early's skirmishers. The next day, shortlyafter noon,Sheridan mounted three assaults that succeededin capturing Flint Hill, one of Early's forward positionsnear the centerof his line. During the night and early on the morning of22 September,others of Sheridan'sunits pushedahead until they occupiedvirtually all the ridgesand hills overlookingTumbling Run in front of Early's position. In the meantime,Crook secretlymarched his two divisions in columnswest to the baseof Little North Mountainand aroundEarly's left flank. About4:00 P.M.,Crook orderedhis mento face eastand charge;they rushedpell-mell through Lomax's thin line androlled up the Confederateleft flank until they encounteredstiffening resistanceby Ramseur'sdivision. Simultaneouswith Crook's charge,the rest of Sheridan'sforce attacked,and soonEarly's line collapsedand the menfled southin disarray. Early withdrew to RockfishGap near Waynesboro,having suffered some 1,200casualties (mostly captured)to Sheridan's530. The rout of Early at Fisher's Hill meantthat mostof the ShenandoahValley lay opento Sheridan. Having accomplishedthe first part of Grant's ordersby driving Early far away,Sheridan proceeded to executethe secondpart: to destroythe Valley's ability to sustainthe Confederatearmy. For the next severalweeks, the Union army incineratedbarns, mills, andcrops betweenStrasburg and Stauntonin what becameknown locally as "The Burning" or "Red October." Sheridan'sactivities did not go unchallenged,particularly by Lt. Col. JohnS. Mosby,the "Gray Ghost," and his PartisanRangers (officially, the 43d Virginia Battalion). In operationsince late in 1862, the Rangersharassed the Federalsin northernVirginia so successfullythat the countiesof Fairfax, Fauquier,Loudoun, and PrinceWilliam were knownas Mosby's Confederacy.As soonas Sheridan's army enteredthe area in August 1864,Mosby waged a relentlessand effectivecampaign against its lines of supplyand communication,and he continuedit into the winter. No otherConfederate officer was NPS Fonn 10-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section _E- Page 86

The Civil War in Virginia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeological Resources Name of Multiple PropertyListing

mentionedas frequentlyby Lee in his reports,nor wasany otherthe subjectof suchheated and futile efforts by the Federalsto captureor kill him. An exasperatedGrant finally orderedcaptured Rangers summarilyexecuted, but when Mosbyresponded in kind he canceledthe order. Mosbywas a problemwith no solution. Suddenly,in October, Early demonstratedthat he had not been"solved" by Sheridaneither. After the defeatat Fisher's Hill, Early wrote Lee and askedhim to sendadditional cavalry to his aid, and called as well for the return of Kershaw's infantryand Cutshaw'sartillery. Lee complied,and also dispatched Brig. Gen. ThomasL. Rosserand his brigadefrom Petersburg.They arrived just as Sheridan,who consideredhis work almostdone, began withdrawing north downthe Valley early in October. Assigning Rosserthe commandof all his cavalry,Early orderedhim to pursueand harassthe Federals. By the eveningof8 October,Sheridan, fed up with the severaldays of badgeringthat his horsemenhad endured, angrily orderedTorbert with his cavalrycommand to "start out at daylightand whip the rebel cavalry or get whipped." The Confederatecavalry had bivouacked just southof Tom's Brook, a streamthat flowed across the Valley from northwestto southeastand emptied into the North Fork of the ShenandoahRiver. Lomax's division held the right flank on the Valley Turnpike north of Woodstockwhile Rosser'soccupied the left almosttwo miles west on the Back Road(present-day Rte. 623). North of Tom's Brook, Merritt's division encampeda mile acrossthe streamopposite Lomax, while Custerbivouacked north of Rosser'scamp. Torbertordered a dawnattack for 9 October. While Merritt pressedLomax, Torbert senta brigade to Custer'sassistance. The reinforcedCuster soon overwhelmed Rosser by outflankinghis positionand forcing a retreat. Oncethe Confederateleft gave way, Lomaxcould only follow suit. Despitebrief rearguardactions just north of Woodstockby Lomax and at Pugh'sRun to the westby RQsser,the Union cavalryrouted their once-vauntedopponents. The Confederateslost 11 cannonand some350 menkilled, wounded,and captured,the Federalsfewer than60. Onceagain, Sheridan dominated the Valley. For the next weekand a half, Sheridanand Early playedcat-and-mouse between Tom's Brook and Middletown a few miles north. Despitefrequent skirmishes, Sheridan believed Early's army finished as an offensive force; it had reoccupiedthe Fisher's Hill works and appearedto be on the defensive. The same engagements,however, caused Sheridan to postponehis plan to detachpart of his army to reinforce Grant at Petersburg.In addition,Grant preferred that Sheridanestablish a fortified positionnear Manassas Gap, a proposalthat contributedto the impasse.On 13October, Secretary of War Edwin Stantonwired Sheridan to suggestthat he cometo Washingtonfor a conferencewith chief of staff HenryW. Halleck. Two days later, Sheridandecided to attend;he departedfor Washingtonon 16 October. At the conference,he gained supportfor his plan to leavea smalldefensive force in the Valley and sendthe bulk of the army to Grant. On 18October, Sheridan returned to Winchester,where he spentthe night. Sheridan'sarmy was encampedon low hills andridges north of CedarCreek about fourteen miles southof Winchester.The teriain dictatedthe shapeof the encampment,which took the form of a U centeredon the Valley Turnpike and pointing south,with Col. JosephThoburn's division of Crook's corps in front of the main body at the apex. The Union force numberedsome 32,000 againstthe Confederates' 21,000.

NPS Form IO-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section _E- Page _81-

The Civil War in Virginia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolo2ical Resources N~e of Multiple PropertyListing

Early,who had communicatedwith Lee by telegram,knew he hadto do somethingto keep Sheridanin the Valley and away from Petersburg.On 18October, he held a council of war with all his generals. Gordonproposed to lead mostof the army eastto the baseof MassanuttenMountain, then north toward CedarCreek, and finally againstSheridan's left flank. The rest of the army would march by divisions to attackthe Federalcenter and right. The marchwould take place that night and the attacks would occur simultaneouslyat dawn. Early supportedthis clearly risky plan overa few objections,and Gordon set off with his detachmentat 8:00P.M. The audaciousscheme succeeded brilliantly in one of the greatmaneuvers of the war. Leaving behind their canteens,cooking pots,and anythingelse that might rattle,Early's menmarched silently throughthe night to their assignedattack points. Virtually every unit was in its place at the appointedtime. Aided by a densefog that rolled in about4:00 A.M. on 19October, Early achievedsurprise when the attack beganat 5:40. In a matterof minutesthe Federalleft and centerhad crumbled,and the soldiersfled north well to the rear. Sweepingover the abandonedUnion camps,many Confederates stopped to plundertents and samplethe still-warm breakfastsof their adversaries.Additionally, someunits lost cohesionin the and fog and rush of combat. Federalresistance also stiffenedhere and there,and slowly Early's attack lost momentum. By 10:00,a new Union line had formedsome three miles north on a ridge northwestof Middletownand west of the turnpike. For a while, the battle lapsedinto an artillery duel. On the southernedge of Winchester,just after dawnthe Union picketsthere heard the low rumble of gunfIre in the distanceand reportedit to Sheridan.He mountedhis horseand rode up the Valley Turnpike toward CedarCreek, shouting as he rode for fleeing mento turn backand rejoin their units. About 10:30,Sheridan arrived at the front. After discussingthe situationwith his generals,Sheridan turned westoff the turnpike and gallopedalong the front of his army,waving his hat androaring thatthe army would sleepin its campsagain that night; the men roaredback, and believed. Early, seeingthe Federalsin their new position,with the fog goneand Union cavalry beginningto nip at his own flanks,turned cautious. He launcheda couple of attackswhile the campplunderers were being roundedup, but the assaultslacked vigor. He concludedthat the army had accomplishedall that it could, giventhe imbalanceof numbersand the Federals'strong position. He did not pull his menback, however,but continuedto confrontSheridan. That wasa mistake. At 4:00 P.M.,after his own stragglershad returned to their units,Sheridan launcheda counterattackthat soonbroke Early's left flank and turnedhis center. Retreatturned into rout, and the Confederatesfled south. By sundown,the Federalsonce more held their old campsites. Early's army sufferedalmost 3,000 casualties in the battle,Sheridan'sjust under 5,700. Despite losingthe smallernumber, the Confederatearmy had beenreduced enough to preventits taking the offensiveagain. By mid-November,both armies were being brokenup as they wererecalled piecemeal to Petersburg.In December,the remnantsof eacharmy wentinto winter camp,Early's at Stauntonand Sheridan'sat Winchester. ' In late February1865, Grant ordered Sheridan south to destroythe Virginia CentralRailroad and to captureCharlottesville. With two cavalrydivisions, some 10,000 men, Sheridan left Winchesteron 27 Februaryand by 1 Marchhad occupiedStaunton, which was strippedof suppliesand largely empty of NPS Fonn 10-9008 OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page 88

The Civil War in Vir ini 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolo ical Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

inhabitants. Early's force, now reducedto 1,600men, had abandoned the town and marchedeast to Waynesboro. Early set up a defensiveline on hills westof the town. The next day, Custerled his cavalry division to within reconnoiteringdistance and spentthree hours studying Early's dispositions. Finding a gap in the left flank, Custersent three dismounted regiments slicing throughit at 3:30 P.M. As the Confederateleft crumbled,a Federalbrigade charged the centerand Early's menfled in panic. Early himself barelyescaped and mostof his force wascaptured. The Valley was in Federalhands for good. Early drifted south,eventually reaching his home in Franklin County. Sheridanspent the remainderof Marchraiding eastby way of the Virginia CentralRailroad and the JamesRiver & Kanawha Canal,destroying each as he progressed.On 26 March,he and his cavalrymenjoined Grant at Petersburg in time for the lastcampaign of the war in Virginia. Much criticism has beenheaped on Early's headfor his "failure" to hold the Valley, in contrastto StonewallJackson's earlier success there. Someof Early's faultsinclude impetuousnessand petulance, both of which undoubtedlycontributed to his troublesand the outcomeof his campaign. It has been pointed out that Jackson'squirky temperamentand secretivenesssometimes worked againsthim and that he like Early confrontedsuperior numbers and yet succeeded.But althoughJackson was outnumberedby the totality of the three Federalarmies he faced,he engagedeach one separatelywhen the superiornumbers were on his side. More importantly,his opponents'armies were unseasoned and the generalsthemselves were barelycompetent. Early facedsome of the mostexperienced troops in the Union army,matched wits with the extremelycapable Sheridan, and was outnumberedin everybattle he fought. In addition,his own menwere worn out and ill-supplied,problems the Federalsdid not experience.Despite the odds againstit, Early's army marchedfarther and foughtmore largebattles than Jackson'sand tied up three Union corps for most of the campaignseason. The wonderis not that Early ultimatelywas defeated,but that he and his menaccomplished as muchas they did.

SOUTHWESTVIRGINIA CAMPAIGNS During mostof the Civil War, SouthwestVirginia experiencedlittle military activity asthe majority of significantbattles occurred to the eastbetween Richmond and Washington;The region remainedstrategically important, however, because of its saltand leadmines and its proximity to Kentucky,which remainedin the Union,and to the rail centerof Chattanooga.Tennessee. Southwest Virginia's steephills, poor roads,and remoteness from the primary scenesof activity relegatedit to a secondaryrole throughthe first half of the conflict. Severalsignificant transportation corridors passed through the region. In the eighteenthcentury, the WildernessRoad, which had beenimproved by the explorerDaniel Boone, was the historic route of migrationinto easternKentUcky through Cumberland Gap. The road was furtherimproved during the antebellumperiod, whenthe SouthWestern Turnpike was constructed. During the sameera. the Virginia & TennesseeRailroad was built betweenLynchburg, Virginia. where it connectedwith the Orange& AlexandriaRailroad and the SouthsideRailroad, and Bristol, Tennessee,the northeasternterminus of the NPS Form IO-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section Page

The Civil War in Virginia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolo!!ical Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

EastTennessee & Virginia Railroad,which extendedto Knoxville, Tennessee.The southwesternrailroads would becomeprimary objectivesof Federalraids late in the war. As the gatewaybetween the two principal theatersof operationsin Virginia and the west, CumberlandGap becamethe immediateobjective of both combatantsearly in the conflict. By September 1861,some 4,000 Confederatetroops initially commandedby Brig. Gen. Felix K. ZoIIicoffer and thenCol. JamesE. Rainsoccupied the gap. On 16 March 1862,a Union brigadesome fifty miles northeastcaptured PoundGap from entrenchedConfederate defenders, thereby threatening Cumberland Gap. Several skirmishesensued, and on 18 June 1862,Brig. Gen.George W. Morgan's Federaldivision occupied CumberlandGap. Brief engagementsoccurred in the areathroughout the summeras eachside contended in the surroundingvaIleys. In August 1862,to induce Kentuckyto embracethe Southerncause, the Confederateslaunched a two-prongedinvasion of the borderstate. Maj. Gen.E. Kirby Smithled a Confederateadvance into Kentuckywhile Gen. BraxtonBragg attacked from Tennessee.Smith crushed a Union force at Richmond, Kentucky,on 29030 August,and a few weekslater a Federalgarrison at MunfordviIle surrenderedto Bragg. Brig. Gen. CarterL. Stevenson,who reportedto Smith,then advanced to CumberlandGap and besiegedMorgan until he evacuatedit on 17 September.After Maj. Gen. Don CarlosBueIl's stoppedthe combinedSouthern force at PerryviIleon 8 October,however, the Confederatessoon retreatedthrough Cumberland Gap, and mostof Kentuckyremained in Union hands. In September1863, Maj. Gen.Ambrose E. Burnside'sArmy of the Ohio invadedEast Tennessee and capturedKnoxviIle. Brig. GenJames M. Shackelford,leading a cavalry brigadeof Burnside'sarmy, approachedfrom the southand, on Burnside'sarrival, Union forcesthen converged on CumberlandGap and its Confederategarrison led by Brig. Gen.John W. Frazer. The Federalsdemanded and receivedthe surrenderof the smaIlerConfederate force on 9 Septemberafter a three-daysiege. On 1 January1864, Brig. Gen. WiIliam E. "Grumble" Jonesled his cavalry brigade from Little War Gap on Clinch Mountaintoward Cumberland Gap with the intentionof seizingit. The next day,he learnedthat Federalsunder Maj. CharlesH. Beereshad defeated Lt. Col. Auburn L. Pridemore'scommand earlier that day nearJonesviIle. Jonescrossed PoweIl's Mountainto attackthe Federalsand ordered Pridemore,who had withdrawnfrom the town, to returnand join in the attack. After a night-long marchin the bitter cold, the Confederatesreached JonesviIle early on 3 January. Jonesimmediately attacked the Union encampmenton the westernedge of town, having achievedsurprise. After capturing FederalaTtiIlery in the initial assault,the Confederatesabandoned the guns undera Union counterattack.The outnumberedFederals soon retreated to the Milbourn farmhouseand its outbuildings. Joneskept the force pinned down until Pridemorearrived late in the day,then counteredan attempted Federalbreakout with a generalassault, which was soonfoIlowed by the surrenderof Beeres'smen. The Confederateslost 16kiIled andwounded in the engagement,the Federals12 kiIled, 48 wounded,and 300

captured.On 9 March 1864,President Abraham Lincoln appointedLt~ Gen. UlyssesS. Grant commanderin chief of all Union armies. Grant's plan for the spring campaigncaIled for massiveFederal advances to begineverywhere about 4 May, including PiedmontVirginia, the ShenandoahVaIley, and Southwest Virginia, whereBrig. Gen.George Crook plannedto destroythe Virginia & TennesseeRailroad at Dublin

~ NPS Form 10-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86) United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page 9Q

The Civil War in Vir inia 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolo ical Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

in Pulaski County. Later that month, Gen. Robert E. Lee ordered Jones north to the Shenandoah Valley to cope with the Federal advance there, which threatened Lee's left flank. Crook had marched from the Kanawha River in West Virginia toward Dublin on 29 April with three brigades. After more than a week's march through West Virginia and Virginia. he encountered Brig. Gen. Albert G. Jenkins at Cloyd's Mountain halfa dozen miles north of Dublin on 9 May 1864. The Confederates had prepared defensive positions on each side of the road from Dublin to Pearisburg (present-day Rte. 100). Shortly after dawn, Crook and his force crossed the summit of Cloyd's Mountain and prepared to descend the road toward Jenkins's position. When Crook observed the Confederates' strength, however, he ordered one of his brigades to march through underbrush to the east of the road and strike Jenkins's right flank while the other two assaultedthe front. After a short but hard fight. Crook stormed the Confederate position and captured Jenkins, who had been mortally wounded. Jenkins's, second in command, Brig. Gen. John McCausland, attempted to rally his men but Crook dispersed them with a brisk attack. The Federals then marched on to Dublin, where they destroyed the depot and military stores and burned the nearby New River Bridge. On 11 May, Brig. Gen. William W. Averell, who had tried and failed to raid Saltville two days earlier, joined Crook there. The Battle of Cloyd's Mountain, the largest engagement in Southwest Virginia. resulted in some 538 Confederates killed, wounded, captured, or missing, and 745 Federal casualties. A verell and his brigade had ridden toward Wytheville to prevent the Confederates from concentrating their forces against Crook's and to destroy the lead works there. On the afternoon of 10 May, Averell encountered Jones's brigade on the Raleigh & Grayson Turnpike near Cove Mountain in Wythe County, between Wytheville and Dublin. The fighting began when Averell ordered an attack on the Confederate position. Jones also advanced, pressing the Union flanks, as he hoped to delay the Federals from reaching Crook. Four ho~ later, as Averell prepared to renew the attack near nightfall, the Confederates withdrew. The two sides suffered about 300 casualties. Averell and his brigade marched to the New River and crossed on 11 May on a flatboat and at a ford while Confederate forces watched from the other side of the river. Averell then joined Crook near Dublin. During the summer and fall of 1864, the Shenandoah Valley and the vicinity of Petersburg became the focus of military activity in Virginia. while little of note occurred in Southwest Virginia. Grumble Jones was killed and his army defeated at the on 5 June, thus leaving vulnerable not only the Valley but Southwest Virginia. where Jenkins had been placed in command on 5 May in Jones's

"h~..nr..~u~ Early in October,Federal forces under Brig. Gen. StephenG. Burbridgeattempted. to seizethe town of Saltville and destroythe nearbysaltworks, which produceda large proportionof the salt usedto preservemeat and tan leatherfor the Confederatearmy. A makeshiftConfederate force delayedhim at Clinch Mountainand LaurelGap on I October,however, thereby enabling Brig. Gen.Alfred E. "Mudwall" Jacksonto concentratetroops nearSaltville to meethim. The next morning,the Federalsattacked Jackson but madelittle headwayas Confederatereinforcements continued to arrive during the day and held off successiveattacks. As eveningfell, Burbridgeretired without accomplishinghis objective. Afterwards, Confederatesoldiers under Brig. Gen. Felix H. Robertsonmassacred an undeterminednumber of captured NPS Fonn 10-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTPRIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET I -

Section f Page 2l

The Civil War in Vir ini 1861-1865: Histo ic and Archaeolo ical Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing .

5th U.S. Colored Cavalrytroopers, many of em wounded. One of the Confederateofficers, Capt. Champ Ferguson,would laterbe capturedby Federa forces,tried, andexecuted for the murderson 20 Oct. 1865. The battle may have costthe two sidesas m y as 450 casualties. In November1864, Maj. Gen. Geor e Stonemanled his cavalrydivision on a seriesof raids to destroyiron and lead mines,saltworks, and ilroads in EastTennessee and SouthwestVirginia. Stoneman's4,200-man force defeatedConfe eratesunder Brig. Gen. Basil W. Duke at Kingsport, Tennessee,on 4 December.Two days later, ear Bristol, Tennessee,Stoneman dispersed a smallmounted force commandedby Brig. Gen.John C. Va , therebypreventing it from joining the main body of Confederatedefenders under Maj. Gen.John C. Breckinridgenear Saltville. On 17-18 December, Stoneman'sforce defeatedBreckinridge at arion, thus enablingthe Federalsto attackSaltville. Turning westto Saltville, Stonem madeshort work of the guardson 20-21 December.The Federalsthen captured and destroyedthe sal orks, including betweenfifty thousandand a hundred thousandbushels of salt. Stonemanthen led is troopersthrough Cumberland Gap to Kentuckyand Tennessee.His successfulraid costthe Federalsand Confederates275 casualties. Stonemanreturned to SouthwestVirginia late in March 1865on a raid to destroyrail lines and otherproperty of military valueto the Confederacy.His menwrecked sections of the Virginia & TennesseeRailroad around Salem and Wyt~ Ville, as well as the Piedmont Railroad between Danville, Virginia, and Gre~ns.borough, No~h Carolin Since Confederate resi~tan~e in th~ region ha~ e~ectively ended with Brecktnndge's defeat In Decem r 1864, Stoneman met with ltttle resistance. HIS ratd ended when he learned of the surrender of Gen. Jos ph E. Johnston and the Anny of Tennessee at Durham Station,North Carolina,on 26 April 1865. "

RICHMOND AND PETERSBURGCAMP+IGN From early May to earlyJune 1864 the Army of the Potomacand the Army of NorthernVirginia bled eachother white to little advantagefor ither side. Lt. Gen.Ulysses S. Granthad not defeatedGen. RobertE. Lee nor had Lee vanquishedGran. Despiteenormous casualties, neither side had achievedits goals; in particular,Grant had not captured ichmond. After all the maneuveringand fighting, Lee and Grantwere stalemated. While the two main armiesconten ed from the Wildernessto Cold Harbor,Maj. Gen. Benjan1in F. Butler's Army of the Jan1esfought a seri of desultoryactions and then withdrewbehind its fortifications on the BermudaHundred peni ula. The Confederatedefense force commandedby Gen.P. G. T. Beauregardconstructed a systemoffi Idworkscalled the Howlett Line thatparalleled the Federal works and-assisted by Butler's willingnes to sit and wait for further orders-effectively "bottled up" his army there for severalweeks.. On 9 June,Butler finally acted,a cking Petersburgwith some4,500 cavalryand infantry from City Point (present-dayHopewell) under M ~. Gen. QuincyA. Gillmore. Petersburg's2,500 Confederate defenders-most of themhome guards-w re shelteredbehind the so-calledDimmock Line, a ten-mile- long seriesof fortifications that werename for their designer,Capt. Charles H. Dimmock. The line NPS Form 10-900a OMS No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section _E- Page 92

The Civil War in Virginia. 1861-1865: Historic and ArchaeololZical Resources Name of Multiple PropertyListing

extendedaround the eastern,southern, and westernapproaches to the city on the AppomattoxRiver, and Brig. Gen. HenryA. Wise,a former governorof Virginia, commandedthe garrison. While Gillmore and the infantry demonstratedagainst the northeasternpart of the line, Brig. Gen. AugustV. Kautz led his cavalry division southto the JerusalemPlank Road(U.S. Rte. 301), then north to the underbellyof the DimmockLine. He drovethrough a redoubtdesignated Battery 27 that was defended by the city militia, but was stoppedat the city limits by reinforcementssent from BermudaHundred. By mid-afternoon,Butler's thrust at Petersburghad endedin failure and the Federalswithdrew. The two sides sufferedabout 120casualties. To the north, meanwhile,Grant was facedwith two choices. He could continueto pound Lee's army directly and attemptto drive throughto Richmond,or he could bypassLee's right flank to the James River and points south,thereby threatening both Richmond and Petersburg,and perhapsengage Lee on ground more favorableto himself. Confrontingthe prospectof more bloody but fruitless engagementslike that at Cold Harbor on 3 June,Grant chose the indirectapproach and issuedorders to Maj. Gen.George G. Meade,the commanderof the Army of the Potomac.On 12 June,in the night.the armydisengaged from the Cold Harborline and marchedsouth to the JamesRiver at Wilcox's Landingand Windmill Point. The army's disengagementand crossingof the river was a logistical feat that left Lee seething whenhe found his adversaryvanished on the morning of 13June. After a few days,Lee discoveredthat Grantwas crossingthe river ratherthan massing his army behindMcClellan's old earthworks. The Confederatecommander must have reached his conclusionwith sometrepidation. Earlier,Lee had written that "We must destroythis army of Grant's beforehe getsto JamesRiver. Ifhe getsthere, it will becomea siege,and then it will be a mere questionof time." The Army of the Potomaccrossed the JamesRiver in four daysbeginning 14June, using transport vesselsand a 2,200-footlong pontoonbridge hastilyconstructed at WeyanokePoint. Evenbefore the entire army had passedover the river, however,Grant ordered an assaulton the Petersburgfortifications. His subordinatescarried out a seriesof attacksstarting IS Juneand lastingfour days. Maj. Gen. William F. "Baldy" Smithled XVIII Corpsfrom Point of RocksLanding on the AppomattoxRiver Gustwest of the presentInterstate 295 bridge)and began the attacksin the eveningof IS June. He struckthe northeasternpart of the Dimmock Line, breachedit. and forced Wise's men backto Harrison'sCreek. where darkness ended the day'scombat. After sundown,Maj. Gen. 'sII Corps,which hadjust arrived at Petersburgafter the marchfrom Cold Harbor, relieved Smith's men. Hancockcaptured another part of the Dimmock Line the nextday, and Maj. Gen.Ambrose E. Burnside's IX Corpsdid the sameon 17June. The Confederates,meanwhile, strove mightily to bolsterthe city's defenses.Beauregard stripped the Howlett Line at BermudaHundred of everyavailable resource, and Lee rushedtroops southto reinforce the garrisonat Petersburg.On 18 June,Maj. Gen. GouverneurK. Warren's V Corpsjoined the II and IX Corps in an all-out attack,but it wasrepulsed with frightful casualties.Grant then abandoned the effort and beganwhat he believedwould be a shortsiege of Petersburg.The four days of combatresulted in 8,150 Federaland 3,236Confederate casualties. Severalintermediate objectives eventually comprised Grant's overall strategyduring the siege:cut the city's lines of communicationand supply,divert Lee's attentionand resourcesby attackingRichmond's NPS Form 10-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page ~3

The Civil War in Virginia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolo2ical Resources Name of Multiple PropertyListing

defenses,and stretchthe Confederatedefenses to the breakingpoint by extendingthe Federallines south- and westward. Initially, Grantconcentrated on the first objective by makinga seriesof attemptsto destroy the three railroadsthat servedPetersburg and Richmondthat were not in Union hands. They includedthe PetersburgRailroad (also called the Weldon Railroad),which led southto Weldon,North Carolina,the SouthSide Railroad,which extendedwest to Lynchburg,and the Richmond& Danville Railroad. As the Federals,extended their lines they also constructedthe U.S. Military Railroadto transportfood and ammunitionfrom City Pointto distributionareas near the front. This remarkableengineering accomplishmentwas constructedwith little grading. Ties and rails were laid directly on the groundand, as a train traversedhill and dale, at a distanceit lookedlike "a fly crawling overa corrugatedwashboard." On 21 June,Hancock's II Corps(led temporarilyby Maj. Gen.David B. Birney), supportedby Maj. Gen. Horatio G. Wright's VI Corpsand precededby Brig. Gen.James H. Wilson's cavalry division, struck at the PetersburgRailroad. One day later,assisted by Maj. Gen. CadmusWilcox's division, Maj. Gen. William Mahone'sdivision of Lt. Gen.A. P. Hill's corpscounterattacked and drove the II Corps back eastto the JerusalemPlank Road. Although the Federalshad to abandontheir advancedpositions, they still gainedground at a cost of about4,000 casualtiesfor the two combatants. On the north side of the JamesRiver, meanwhile,Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridanand his cavalry division were returningto the Army of the Potomacafter their unsuccessfulattack on the Virginia Central Railroad at Trevilian Stationon 11-12June. Maj. Gen.Wade Hampton's cavalry division pursuedthe Federalsand attemptedto interceptthem at Samaria(Saint Mary's) Church in CharlesCity County. Sheridanfought a delaying actionthere on 24 Juneto protecthis supplytrain, thenrejoined the Union army at BermudaHundred. This engagementproduced some 630 total casualties. The attackon the PetersburgRailroad on 21 Junesignaled the beginningof whathas come to be called the Wilson-KautzRaid of 22-30 June. Brig. Gen.James H. Wilson and Brig. Gen. AugustV. Kautz led their respectivedivisions, some 3,300 troopers,down the SouthSide Railroad,then southwestalong the Richmond& Danville Railroadto destroytrack. At StauntonRiver Bridge, their principalobjective that was locatedjust southof RoanokeStation, on 25 Junethe cavalrymenencountered a makeshiftdefense force underCapt. BenjaminL. Farinholt. Repeatedattacks failed to dislodgethe Confederatedefenders, which included"old menand boys" aswell asregular troops, and the Federalswithdrew. They lost 42 killed, 44 wounded,and 30 missing or captured,while Farinholtlost 10 killed and 24 wounded. Maj. Gen. William H. F. "Rooney" Lee's cavalrydivision, which had beentrailing the raiders, continuedto pursueKautz and Wilson. At SapponyChurch in SussexCounty, elements of Lee's division and thenHampton's attacked the Federalson 28 June. During the night, Kautzand Wilson disengagedand rode northtoward Petersburg,eager to returnto Union lines. They thoughtthey would be secureonce they reachedReam's Station, where they expectedto find Unioninfantry. Much to the shockof Kautz,who arrivedthere first while Wilson fought a rearguardaction againstLee, Mahone'sConfederate division occupiedthe placeinstead. The Federalswere virtually surrounded,and aboutnoon Mahone attacked their front while Leethreatened their left flank. Abandoning their artillery and burning their wagons,Kautz and Wilson cut their way out of the trap and fled. Kautzand his menreached the Union lines by dark, while Wilson swungeast and then north, eventuallyreaching NPS Fonn 10-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page ~

The Civil War in Vireinia. 1861-1865:Historic and ArchaeoloeicalResources Name of Multiple PropertyListing

safetyon 2 July. Eventhough the Wilson-Kautzraid succeededin tearingup somesixty miles of track. a heavyprice was paid in horsesand men(about 1,800human casualties for the raid). Grantconcentrated on the siegefor the next month but grew increasinglyfrustrated when no resultsseemed apparent. He decidedto attackthe Petersburgdefenses on 30 July after forcing Lee to weakenhis lines there by expendingtroops in the defenseof Richmond. During the night of26027 July, II Corpsand two divisions of Sheridan'scavalry underHancock's overall command crossed to the north side of the JamesRiver at DeepBottom to threatenthe Confederatecapital. The defendersquickly reinforced their lines, however,and foiled Union attemptsto capturepositions at New Market Heightsand Fussell's Mill. Hancockrecrossed the river during the night of29 July but left a garrisonat DeepBottom. The expeditioncost some 1,000casualties. The attackon Petersburgbegan as scheduledat 4:44A.M. on 30 July, but in a shockingmanner. One day nearthe end of June,Lt. Col. ,a civil engineerand commanderof the 48th PennsylvaniaRegiment, had studiedthe Confederatelines from his own a little more thana hundredyards away. It occurredto him that a gallerycould be dug from his lines to the enemy's,filled with gunpowder, and ignited; the explosionwould producea gaplarge enough to pusha division through. He took his idea to Burnside,who approvedit. At noonon 25 June,the digging began,with Pennsylvaniacoal-miners- turned-soldiersdoing the work. They finishedexcavating on 23 July, packedthe far end of the tunnel with four tons of gunpowder,and waited for the day of the attack. At 4:44A.M. on 30 July, the powderexploded in a greatburst of flame and smoke,killing or wounding278 of the 330 Confederatesoldiers and gunners abovethe gallery and creatingan enormouscrater. After that initial success,virtually everythingwent wrong for the Federalsin the . A plan to sendtroops around the sidesof the openinghad beendisapproved by Meade in favor of a direct assaultthrough the gap. The folly of the newplan quickly becameapparent when the attacking brigadesbogged down in the loose soil of the crater,unable to gain footholdsto climb out. One delay followed another,while on the otherside Mahonerushed troops forward to the rim of the crater. Soonthe craterbecame a deathtrap andthe Union breakthroughwas repulsed. The United StatesColored Troops (USCTs)that were orderedto attackeven after it becameobvious that the assaultwould fail suffered especiallyheavy casualties. Whenthe fighting endedin the afternoon,some 5,300 men lay dead or wounded,the Confederateshad recoveredall the ground,and Grant's bestchance of endingthe siegeby a coup du main had evaporated. Grant,disgusted, relieved Burnside of commandand returnedto his strategyof combining demonstrationsagainst Richmond with raids on the railroadsthat servedPetersburg. On the night of 13C 14 August,Hancock led the II and X Corpsand Brig. Gen. David M. Gregg'scavalry division back acrossthe JamesRiver to DeepBottom. After sunrise,X Corpsapproached New Market Heightswith II Corpsto the right nearFussell's Mill. The next day, Union assaultsnear the mill initially succeeded,but Maj. Gen. CharlesW. Field orchestratedConfederate counterattacks that drovethe Federalsout of a line of capturedworks. Hancockbegan to withdraw,and heavyskirmishing continued until his commandcrossed to the southside of the river on 20 August,once againleaving a garrisonat DeepBottom. Some4,600 men had becomecasualties during this diversion. NPS Form 10-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET Section~ Page 95

The Civil War in Virginia. 1861-1865: Historic and ArchaeololZical Resources Name of Multiple PropertyListing

The purposeof the expeditionhad beento divert Lee's attentionfrom yet anotherattack on the PetersburgRailroad. Warrenled the V Corps,with elementsof the II and IX Corps following, on the railroad raid. On 18 August,he attackednear Globe Tavern and drove in Confederatepickets. A subsequentFederal attack was repulsed and bothsides entrenched during the night. The next day, Mahone attackedand rolled up Warren's right flank but Warrencounterattacked and with help from IX Corps recapturedthe ground lost earlier. With the two sideseffectively stalemated, Warren improved and extendedhis entrenchmentson 20 August until they wereconnected with the main Union line from the JerusalemPlank Road and paralleledthe PetersburgRailroad. Hill probedthe new lines the next day but could not penetratethem. The GlobeTavern engagementresulted in the extensionof the Federalsiege lines to the southand west of Petersburg,thereby securing a strangleholdon the PetersburgRailroad some five miles southof the city. Henceforth,the Confederateswould haveto offload suppliesfrom North Carolina at the StonyCreek depot some twenty miles southof the city and haul themto Petersburgby wagonon the Boydton PlankRoad (U.S. Rte. I). About 6,055 menwere killed or woundedduring the four daysof fighting. Not every Federalexpedition met with success.On 23 August,Gregg's cavalry division led Brig. Gen. NelsonA. Miles's division of Hancock'sII Corps southalong the PetersburgRailroad to destroy track. The objectivewas RowantyCreek. about ten miles from the Union lines and five miles beyond Ream'sStation. Brig. Gen.'s divisionjoined Miles's menthe nextday, by which time Lee had dispatchedeight brigades of infantry underHill andtwo cavalrydivisions underHampton to attackthe outpost. The Federalshad begunimproving the old earthworksnear the stationthat had beenbuilt there in June,but they madelittle headwaybefore they wereattacked. Hill, who was unwell, turned over tactical control of the battle to Maj. Gen. Henry Heth,who pressedon with his foot soldierssupported by Hampton'scavalry and Col. William J. "Willie" Pegram'sartillery. Near dark on 25 August,almost encircled,Hancock gave ordersto withdraw. By 9:00 P.M.,the Federalshad disengaged and headedback to the Union lines eastof Petersburg,but not beforelosing some2,600 men, mostof them captured. Heth and Hamptonlost about800. During the next month,Grant's army improvedits siegelines andprepared for the nextround of combat. On the night of 28-29 September,Butler led mostof the Army of the Jamesacross the river-for yet anotherassault on the defensesof Richmond. At dawn,he launcheda two-prongedattack against the outerConfederate fieldworks at Chaffin's Farmand New MarketHeights. The principalobjective was the strongholdof Fort Harrisonat Chaffm's Farm. The attackon the works at the foot of New Market Heights was designedto protectthe right flank of the mainforce as it turnedtoward the fort. The USCTs,whose combatrole Butler had long championed,performed especially well. Fourteenof the sixteenMedals of Honorawarded to black soldiersduring the war wereawarded for gallantryin this action. fell to the Federals,who held it despitea counterattackon 30 Septemberthat was overseenby Lee himself. With Butler's men firmly establishedin the capturedlines, Lee had no choice but to posttroops north of the Jamesto guard againsta renewedUnion advanceon the city. Now it was up to Grantto keepthe pressure on Lee. The Army of NorthernVirginia had lost its ability to maneuver,unless it abandonedRichmond and Peterburgto the Federalsand took to the field again. Politically, it was not possibleto flee the capital; NPS Form 10-900a OMB No. I 024.()() 18 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section .E Page __26-

~e Civ!1 ~ar in Vir2inia. 1861-1865:Historic and Archaeolo2icalResources Name of Multiple Property Listing

strategically, Lee lacked the manpower to defeat Grant or break through the Union lines into the open; tactically, Lee could only delay the inevitable collapse of his own lines as Grant's tactics extended them to the breaking point. Scarcely had the Federals captured Fort Harrison than they moved against the Confederate lines of communication southwest of Petersburg,resulting in the action at Peebles's Farm. On 30 September, two divisions of Maj. Gen. John G. Parke's IX Corps, two divisions of Warren's V Corps, and Gregg's cavalry division marched by Poplar Spring Church to reach Vaughan Road. The initial Federal attack overran Fort Archer and flanked the Confederates, who abandoned their Squirrel Level Road line. Late in the afternoon, Confederate reinforcements arrived and slowed the Federal advance. The next day, the Federals repulsed a counterattack directed by Hill. Reinforced by a II Corps division, the Federals resumed their advance on 2 October and extended their left flank and fieldworks west to Arthur's Swamp. The two sides suffered some 4,200 casualties; once again, the Union lines crept westward. Lee, remaining hopeful of recapturing Fort Harrison, countered Grant's tactics with his own actions. On 7 October, he launched an offensive against the Union right flank that resulted in combat on the Darbytown and New Market Roads. At first, the attack met with successas the divisions commanded by Field and Maj. Gen. Robert F. Hoke routed Kautz's cavalrymen on Darbytown Road and then assaulted the main Union line on New Market Road. There the attack stalled and then collapsed, as the well- entrenched Federals held their ground and the Confederates withdrew. The casualties totaled some 1,750. A week later, on 13 October, Brig. Gen. Alfred H. Terry led two divisions of his corps against the Confederate defenses newly constructed along Darbytown Road. Although most of the engagementwas between opposing skirmish lines, one of Terry's brigades assaulted what appeared to be a weak point in the fortifications and was repulsed with heavy losses. Suffering most of the almost 500 casualties, the Federals retired to their own lines. Grant initiated a combined attack on the defensesof both Petersburg and Richmond on 27 October with little success. Hancock, leading divisions from the II, V, and IX Corps, as well as Gregg's cavalry division, marched west across the Boydton Plank Road toward the South Side Railroad. Although the Federals gained a lodgment on the plank I:oad, an afternoon counterattack by Heth's division of Hill's corps and Hampton's cavalry forced a retreat that was completed the next day at a cost of 3,000 total casualties. North of the James River, Butler attacked the Confederate lines on Darbytown Road and Fair Oaks. The defenders counterattacked and easily repulsed the Federals. The two sides lost some 1,750 men. For the next three months, each army conducted periodic raids but concentrated mostly on conserving its resources and strengthening its lines around the two cities. Early in February 1865, however, Grant broke the stalemate with vigorous drives to extend the Petersburg lines westward and cut off Lee's supply lines for good. The first operation occurred on 5 February in the vicinity of Hatcher's Run, when Gregg led his cavalry division to the Boydton Plank Road in a sweep to the south and west by way of Ream's Station and Dinwiddie Court House in order to intercept a wagon train reputedly hauling Confederate supplies (no train was found there). To protect Gregg, Warren led the V Corps across Hatcher's Run to block Vaughan Road while two divisions of Maj. Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys's II Corps (he had replaced the wounded Hancock in November 1864) covered Warren's right flank at Armstrong's Mill. Late in the day, Maj. Gen. Henry Heth attempted to turn Humphreys's right flank near the mill but NPS Fonn 10-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page 21

The Civil War in Virginia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolol!ical Resources Name of Multiple PropertyListing

was repulsed. During the night, two divisionsreinforced the Federalsand Greggreturned to Gravelly Run on VaughanRoad from his unsuccessfulraid. The nextday, a division of Warren'scorps was attackedby elementsof Brig. Gen. JohnPegram's division, with Mahone'sdivision joining in nearthe site of Dabney's steamsawmill. Although this attackchecked the Union advance,the Federalsnonetheless extended their fieldworksto the VaughanRoad crossing of Hatcher'sRun. His lines now stretchedto the point of rupturing,Lee tried a desperategamble on 25 March. He assembledhalf his availableforces in an attemptto breakthrough the northeasternportion of the deep Federalworks and threatenGrant's supplydepot at City Point. At dawn,Gordon led an attackthat overwhelmedFort Stedmanand nearbyBatteries X, XI, and XII in the IX Corpssector, but the Confederate drive soonsputtered to a halt amid a murderouscrossfire and furious counterattacks.More than 1,900of the attackerswere captured,another 1,000 were killed or woundedagainst 950 Federals,and Lee's last hopewas dashed. Late in the afternoon,Wright's VI Corpsdrove the Confederatepickets from their trenchesnorth of ,thereby advancing the Federalline closerto its objective. Lee's prophecy aboutthe outcomeof the siegehad cometrue: now it was a "mere questionof time" for the Army of NorthernVirginia.

APPOMATTOX CAMPAIGN

The first half of the nineteenthcentury was a period of rapid growth in Virginia's "internal improvements":turnpikes, plank roads,canals, and railroads. By the time of the Civil War, the Southside Virginia Piedmontwas rich in theseresources. Canals aided commerce on the Jamesand Appomattox rivers abovethe falls at Richmondand Petersburg.The Richmondand Danville Railroad.1 inked those two cities and passedthrough Chesterfield. Amelia, and NottowayCounties to the southwest.Petersburg was joined to Lynchburgby the SouthSide Railroad.which ran westerlythrough Dinwiddie, Nottoway,Prince Edward,and AppomattoxCounties. Anotherrail line, the PetersburgRailroad (also called the Weldon Railroad),ran almostdirectly southfrom the city to Weldon,North Carolina. The BoydtonPlank Road (present-dayU.S. Rte. I) extendedto the southwestfrom Petersburgthrough Dinwiddie Countyto MecklenburgCounty, and the JerusalemPlank Road (U.S. Rte. 301)connected the city with the SouthamptonCounty seatmade notorious by Nat Turnera generationearlier. During peacetimeall these transportationroutes were importantfarrn-to-market avenues. During wartimethe railroads in particular becamestrategically important lines of communication,supply, and escape. Lt. Gen. UlyssesS. Grant's OverlandCampaign of May-June 1864forced Gen. RobertE. Lee's Army of NorthernVirginia to maneuverfrom the Wildernessin SpotsylvaniaCounty southward. and eventuallyinto a complexnetwork of fortifications aroundRichmond and Petersburg.The railroads becamelifelines for both sidesin the conflict. Grant's force consistedof two combinedarmies, the Army of the Potomaccommanded by Maj. Gen.George G. Meade,and the Army of the James,which was commandedfirst by Maj. Gen. BenjaminF. Butler and then, after Butlerwas relieved on 8 January1865, by Maj. Gen.Edward O. C. Ord. Direct Federalassaults failed to penetratethe lines,so the Union and Confederatearmies settled into whatbecame a ten-month-longsiege. Lee protectedRichmond with Lt. NPS Fonn IO-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section f Page _28-

The Civil War in Virginia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeological Resources Name of Multiple PropertyListing

Gen. RichardS. Ewell's andLt. Gen.James Longstreet's corps and securedPetersburg with Gen.P. G. T. Beauregard'scommand and Lt. Gens.A. P. Hill's and RichardH. Anderson'scorps; he alreadyhad dispatchedLt. Gen. JubalA. Early's commandto the ShenandoahValley in Juneto protectthe Confederacy'sbreadbasket and threatenWashington. Grantkept up probing attacksagainst Lee's thin defenses,and senthis own army southaround Petersburg and thenwestward in an attemptto turn the Confederateright flank and severLee's lines of communication,particularly the rail lines. By the end of August 1864,Grant's strategyhad securedthe PetersburgRailroad for the Union and cut Lee's most direct route to North Carolina. In the meantime,Beauregard had beenreassigned and his troops incorporatedinto the Army of NorthernVirginia. Late in September,Grant captured Fort Harrisonnear Richmond,thereby forcing Lee to defendthe capitalcity aggressively.Lee thwartedGrant's efforts to someextent by shifting his troops continuouslyto meetUnion threats,but this tactic requiredan expenditureof men, materiel,and energythat he could not replace. The Confederatessuffered during the winter, while the Union army extendedits lines everwestward and bombarded Petersburg. By March 1865,Lee was defendingsome twenty-eight miles of fortificationsaround Richmond and Petersburgwith an army that was daily shrinking from deaths,illness, and desertions. Grantattacked Lee's supplyline along the BoydtonPlank Road southwestof Petersburgearly in February1865. Lee successfullydefended the position,but the Union army retainedmost of the ground it had gained. Soonthereafter, in the ShenandoahValley, Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridandefeated the remnantsof Lt. Gen. JubalA. Early's command,the Army of the Shenandoah,in the Battle ofWaynesboro on 2 March. Lee realizedthat Sheridan'ssizeable force was now free to join Grantat Petersburg.On 25 March Lee launcheda desperateassault on Fort Stedman,hoping to breakthrough Grant's lines and force the Union commanderto shortenthem, thereby enabling the Confederatesto escapeto North Carolinaand join the army led by Gen. JosephE. Johnston. Successfulat first, the tactic failed whenthe Union army counterattackedvigorously. The Confederatesretreated to their own lines,and Grantprepared for what would be the final campaignof the war in Virginia. The campaignopened on Wednesday,29 March,when on Grant's ordersa force of about50,000 troops-the II Corps underMaj. Gen. AndrewA. Humphreys,the V Corps underMaj. Gen. GouverneurK. Warren,and the cavalrycommanded by Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan-marchedaround the Confederate right flank west of Petersburgto seizethe SouthSide Railroad (now the Norfolk Southern). This was Lee's last major supplyline from the westto Petersburg,and its rupture,according to Grant's reasoning,would force Lee to withdraw from the defensesof Petersburgand the Confederatecapital at Richmond. Grant's plan ultimately succeeded,but it took severaldays to execute. Lee,realizing the importanceof protectingthe railroad,dispatched a force of 10,000infantry and cavalry underMaj. Gen.George E. Pickettto hold a strategiccrossroads called Five Forks,just two miles southof the rail line. Ina seriesof sharpengagements over three days, the Union army maneuveredinto positionto attackPickett on '1April. The final week of March broughtheavy rains to the Petersburgarea. Consequently,creeks and rivulets were swollenbeyond their banksby the freshetsthat followed. LeadingGrant's offensive, Warren's V Corpsmoved up QuakerRoad (Rte. 660) on 29 March. At the Lewis Farm,Union forcesled by Brig. Gen.Joshua L. Chamberlainengaged Confederates under Maj. Gen.Bushrod R. Johnson. After

NPSFonn 10-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page 99

The Civil War in Virl!inia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolol!ical Resources Name of Multiple PropertyListing

hard fighting, the Uniontroops entrenched nearby along the BoydtonPlank Road while the Confederates withdrew to their lines on White Oak Road(Rte. 613). The engagementat QuakerRoad (Lewis Farm), then,ended with the Unionarmy straddlingboth the QuakerRoad and the BoydtonPlank Road,thereby severingtwo importanthighways. Meanwhile,Sheridan's cavalry pushed on to Dinwiddie Court Houseon the BoydtonPlank Road,from which point they could headnorthward toward the railroad. The distance betweenDinwiddie Court Houseand Five Forkswas only six miles. Heavyrains beganin the eveningof29 March and continuedthe next day,limiting operations. Humphreys'sand Warren'scorps edged closer to Sheridanand threatened the Confederateright flank. Whenthe rain stoppedon Friday morning,31 March,Sheridan advanced toward Five Forks from Dinwiddie Court Houseon present-dayRte. 627. Aboutthree miles from the village, Sheridan'sleft came underattack from Pickett,who had sallied forth from Five Forks in an attemptto drive Sheridanback. Pickettattacked from westto easton two roads:today's Rte.611 and anotherroad, no longerextant, that joined Brook or Turkey Egg Road(Rte. 740). Sheridan'sadvance was haltedand he fell back in good orderto a positionjust north of the countyseat. Pickett,however, could not keephis force exposedas he found himself threatenedfrom the eastby Humphreys'sand Warren'scorps, and so withdrewto Five Forks. As Pickettand Sheridanstruggled, to the eastWarren confronted Confederate earthworks on White Oak Roadnear the intersectionof ClaiborneRoad (Rte. 631),and soughtto severthe line of communicationwith Pickett's detachmentnear Five Forks,four miles west. Lee personallysupervised the counterattackto Gravelly Run by Lt. Gen.Richard H. Anderson'scorps. After a brief success,the Confederateswere forced backinto their entrenchmentsas Warren's mengained the importantroadway. In addition, Warrenalso senta force westto threatenPickett's left andrear. Seeingthe predicamenthe was now in, Pickett fell backfrom nearDinwiddie CourtHouse to his original positionof that morning. He thenreceived a dispatchfrom Lee: "Hold Five Forks at all hazards. Protectroad to Ford's Depotand preventUnion forcesfrom striking the South-siderailroad. Regretexceedingly your forces' withdrawal, and your inability to hold the advantageyou hadgained." As a resultof the fighting at Dinwiddie Court Houseand White Oak Road on 31 March,the thin Confederatedefenses had beenweakened further by battle losses. Picketthad relinquished his hard-won ground,while Warrenand Sheridanmoved closer to the Confederateworks. Saturday,1 April, found Pickett's menbuilding entrenchmentsparallel to the White Oak Road that extendedalmost two miles eastand westfrom Five Forks. A considerablegap existed between the easternend of the Five Forksearthworks and those near the White Oak Road-ClaiborneRoad intersection, which left Pickett's left flank "in the air." Partlyto mitigatethis defensiveshortcoming, Pickett "returned" his left flank; that is, he orderedthe earthworkthere constructed at a right angleto the rest,bending away from the road to the north for about150 yards,for betterprotection. By noon all seemedquiet in front of the works,so someof the high commandrode north to the rear and partookin a shadplanking, a type of fish bake. Becausethe areawas heavilywooded, Pickett's 10,000infantry and cavalrycould not seeor hear whatwas occurring in front of them exceptfor shortdistances. They were unaware that Sheridanhad left Dinwiddie Court Housewith 3,000cavalry augmented by the 12,000infantry of Warren'scorps. By late NPS Fonn 10-900a (8-86) OMB No. 1024-0018

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E -Page 10°-

afternoon Sheridan's horse soldiers were in position to assault Pickett's front, while Warren was moving into position to attack his left. Finally, about 4: 15 P.M.,the crash of small arms was heard as Warren's infantry appeared. Warren did not know that Pickett's flank was in the air, so at first his own left was subjected to a raking fire from the return. Warren's corps quickly wheeled to face the threat, however, and soon got in the rear of Pickett's defenses.. Resistance was savage at first but weakened as the Confederates fell back toward the forks. Simultaneously, Brig. Gen. George A. Custer's cavalry rode down on Pickett's right flank. By the time Pickett left his meal and reached his men, all was lost. It was each command for itself. There were brief pockets of resistance here and there but nothing could stop Sheridan's momentum. By dark. the road (Rte. 627) to the South Side Railroad was open to the Federals, while more than 2,000 Confederates had surrendered and the rest had scattered. That night, on receiving news of this victory, Grant issued orders for an all-out assault the next day at selected points along the Petersburg lines. At dawn on Sunday, 2 April, the Union army launched its attack, and the VI Corps under Maj. Gen. Horatio G. Wright broke through southwest of the city on the Boydton Plank Road. Southeast of Petersburg, Maj. Gen. John G. Parke's IX Corps attacked along the Jerusalem Plank Road and captured the outer works but could not puncture the inner. Back on Wright's front, the Confederate Third Corps commander, Lt. Gen. A. P. Hill, rode to reconnoiter only to be killed in a confrontation with two Federal soldiers. Wright's breakthrough enabled Ord's Army of the James to capture Forts Gregg and Whitworth, two outposts protecting Petersburg's western approaches,after overcoming a stubborn defense. Ten miles to the west of Petersburg,the day closed with a symbolic stand by a Confederate detachment at Sutherland Station on the South Side Railroad. Maj. Gen. A. Miles's division of Humphrey's II Corps attacked the Confederate line there, which was held by Maj. Gen. Henry Heth's division. After holding off three assaults,the Confederates finally yielded their position, losing a thousand prisoners and two cannon in the process. With the Federals in control of Lee's lifeline to the west, he had no alternative but to evacuate his army from both Petersburg and Richmond. He sent word to President Jefferson Davis in Richmond, who was informed during worship services at St. Paul's Episcopal Church. When Lee ordered the Army of Northern Virginia to evacuate the two cities, his intention was for the separate contingents, which totaled between 55,000 and 58,000 men, to rendezvous about forty miles west at the Richmond & Danville Railroad depot at Amelia Court House. There he would resupply his army, then march to Danville and then into North Carolina to join Johnston. At the beginning of its retreat from Richmond and Petersburg,Lee's army-infantry, cavalry, and artillery-included more than a thousand baggage and supply wagons. The logistics of moving so many men and supplies meant that the Confederates retreated, and the Federals followed, along several different routes. Lt. Gen. Richard S. Ewell's Reserve Corps, Maj. Gen. JosephB. Kershaw's Division, and Brig. Gen. Martin W. Gary's cavalry brigade left Richmond over Mayo's Bridge, then followed present-day Hull Street, Broad Rock Road, and Walmsley Boulevard to Rte. 360. The division commanded by Maj. Gen. G. W. Custis Lee crossed the James River on a to Drewry's Bluff, then followed Walmsley Boulevard to Rte. 360, where it joined the line of march. The departing Confederates set fire to downtown warehouses and also burned the bridges behind them. NPS Fonn 10-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page _101

The Civil War in Vir2inia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolo2ical Resources Name of Multiple PropertyListing

Maj. Gen. William Mahoneled his division from the BermudaHundred front west on present-day Rte. 10through Chesterand ChesterfieldCourt House. Eventuallyhis columnjoined Maj. Gen. JohnB. Gordon's and Longstreet'scorps. Most of the Confederatesin Petersburgcrossed to the northside of the AppomattoxRiver over four bridges:one railroad,two vehicle,and one pontoon. All but the pontoonbridge wereburned, and the variouscorps and divisions thenmarched west on severalroads. The Union armiespursued with about76,000 men, as well as their own lengthy wagontrains. Grant's objectivewas to preventLee from uniting his army with Johnston'sand thensurround and defeat it. His strategyto accomplishthis objectivewas to sendthe infantry in pursuitwhile his cavalry rode to get aheadof Lee. Part of the infantryand cavalryfollowed in Lee's rear,while the remaindermarched on parallelroads to the south,keeping between the Confederatesand North Carolina. Lee's army marchedsome twenty miles on 2-3 April, its progresshampered by swollen watercoursesand washed-outbridges that forcedchanges in the assignedroutes of march. By the evening of3 April, mostof the Army of NorthernVirginia bivouackedjust a few miles short of Amelia Court House. On bringing his army togetherat the county seaton 4 April, Lee found to his dismaythat a mix-up in communicationscaused no subsistenceto be sentthere. Decidingto remainin the areawhile his army foraged,he allowed Grantto eliminatethe one-daylead thathe enjoyed. Consequently,hard riding by Sheridan'scavalry, despitethe occasionalskirmish such as the one at NamozineChurch on 3 April, enabledthe Federalsto move aroundand get in front of the Confederatearmy. This allowedthem to cut the intendedpath of Lee's retreatalong the railroad at Jetersville,the next stationdown the line. On 5 April, whenthe Southernersmarched out of Amelia Court House,they found not only Federalcavalry blocking their way, but fast-marchingUnion infantryarriving in support. Lee, decidingnot to bring on a battle then,changed his plansand ordered a night marcharound the entrenchedUnion left flank. His destinationwas Farmville,where his mencould find rationsat the SouthSide Railroad depot. A Federalcavalry raid that day destroyeda Confederatewagon train nearPaineville. The engagementwas significantas the only documentedinstance of the war in Virginia in which uniformed black Confederatesoldiers saw action. The Federalcavalrymen quickly overwhelmedthe inexperienced recruits,however. Returningto Jetersvillefrom their attack,the Union horsesoldiers encountered part of Maj. Gen. FitzhughLee's cavalry corpsnear Amelia Springs,and the Confederatespursued them backto Jetersville. On 6 April, the opposingarmies fought severalsignificant actions. Riding along roadsparallel to thoseon which Lee's columnwas moving,Sheridan's cavalry interceptedthe Confederateline of march nearLittle Sailor's (Sayler's)Creek. Custer'stroopers drove into a gapthat had openedup between Longstreet'sand Anderson'scorps, blocking two-thirdsof the column. With the II andVI Corpsclosing in from behind,the Confederateshad to makea stand. In threeseparate engagements-at the Hillsman farm, the Lockett farm, and Marshall'sCrossroads (the Harperfarm}-the Federalinfantry and cavalry were able to put 7,700 men horsde combat,mainly as prisoners,almost one-fifth of Lee'sarm~. Eight Confederate generals,including Ewell, wereamong those captured. Lee,observing the conclusionof the disaster, exclaimed,"My God! Hasthe army dissolved?" Thosewho escapedcontinued on anothernight marchto NPS Fonn 10-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E- Page 1Q2-

Farrnville, on the south bank of the Appomattox River, or crossed to the north bank over High Bridge with Gordon. Beforethe actionat Little Sailor's Creek,Ord directeda body of infantry and cavalry from the Army of the Jamesto destroyHigh Bridge so thatthe Confederatescould not use it in their retreat. High Bridge,an enormousSouth Side Railroadtrestle, spanned the AppomattoxRiver aboutfour miles eastof Farmville. Confederatecavalry discovered the raid and overtookthe Union force nearthe bridge. In the fight that ensued,most of the Federalswere eitherkilled or captured,while ConfederateBrig. Gen.James Dearingwas mortally wounded. During the night, Gordonand Mahonecrossed the bridge and in the morning attemptedto bum it as well as the nearbywagon bridge so thatthe Federalscould not follow (the attemptfailed). Longstreet'scorps marched south of the river to Farmville. Longstreet,meanwhile, continued his marchwestward. Whenhe learnedthat High Bridge, locateda few miles north of his route,was threatened,he entrenchedat Rice's Stationon the SouthSide Railroadto block the Union advance. That night, while the bridgeremained in Confederatehands, Gordon's corpsand Mahone'sdivision crossedto an illusory safety. Infantry from Maj. Gen. John Gibbon's XXIV Corps,the advanceof Ord's column,approached Longstreet's position. There was heavy skirmishing,but Longstreetheld Gibbon at bay long enoughto escape. Arriving in Farmville on the morningof 7 April, the ravenousConfederates found some40,000 rations of breadand 80,000of mealaboard the trains at the depot. As rationswere being issued,word camethat the Federalsnot only wereapproaching the town on the southside of the river, but also were pressingGordon and Mahoneon the northside. Lee hadno alternativebut to entrenchhis army around CumberlandChurch, about three miles northof the town and within sightof the Blue Ridge,to protecthis wagontrain. Federalattempts to breakthe Confederateline that afternoonfailed but held mostof the Southernarmy at bay until dark. The Confederateswere compelled to make their third night march in a row. That eveningGrant sentthe first ofa seriesof dispatchesto Lee requestingthe surrenderof his army. From CumberlandChurch Lee plannedto marchhis army westto CampbellCourt House (Rustburg),just eastof Lynchburg. En route,he hopedto resupplyhis menat AppomattoxStation on the SouthSide Railroad,about three miles southwestof AppomattoxCourt House. The Confederatesfaced a thirty-eight-mile marchto the station,but southof the river, the route was eight miles shorterand provided an opportunityfor the Union armiesto get aroundthem. Lee's army was relativelyunmolested on this final day of the march,8 April, althoughtwo Federalcorps (II and VI) pursuedit north of the river. To the south,with Sheridan'scavalry leading,the V Corps andthe Army of the Jameswere taking advantageof the situationthey held. Arriving at AppomattoxStation ahead of the van of Lee's column,the cavalrycaptured the supplytrains and supplies that awaitedthe famishedConfederates and, later that evening,a portionof the artillery and wagontrain. This actionplaced part of the Union force directly in front of Lee's army gatheringaround Appomattox Court House. With the Federalinfantry behind him and Union cavalryacross his line of march,Lee decidedto attempta breakoutthrough the horsemenearly the nextmorning. At daybreakon 9 April, a combinedforce of infantryand cavalry underGordon and FitzhughLee attackedthe Federaltroopers, forcing them to give ground. As the cavalrymenfell back,however, infantry from the Army of the Jamesbegan arriving on the field in support. It becameapparent to Lee that he was NPS Form IO-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page 103

The Civil War in Virl!inia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolol!ical Resources Name of Multiple PropertyListing

aboutto be surrounded,especially when the V Corpsappeared on his flank. The Southernerscarried forward flags of truce,and that afternoon-Palm Sunday-Lee metwith Grant in Wilmer McLean's parlor to discussand acceptsurrender tenDs. The casualtiesfor the AppomattoxCampaign totaled approximately9,000 for the Federalarmy and 28,000,including desertions,for the Confederate.Lee surrenderedmore than 28,000 men at Appomattox,and they were all paroledand allowedto go home. After four yearsof bloodshed,the fighting in Virginia had ended. NPS Form 10-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Sen-ice

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E- Page 104-

~he Civ~1 W~r in Vir2inia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolo2ical Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

F. ASSOCIATED PROPERTY TYPES

NAME OF PROPERTYTYPE: BATTLEFIELD

DESCRIPTION

A battlefield is the area within which combat occurred between Confederate and Union forces. It includes, according to National Register Bulletin 40: Guidelines/or Identifying, Evaluating, and Registering America's Historic Battlefields, "all of the locations where opposing forces, either before, during, or after the battle, took actions based on their assumption of being in the presence of the enemy." It mayor may not contain earthworks, historic roads and fences, buildings used as headquarters or hospitals, historic fields and woodlands, bivouac and camp sites, and archaeological components. It may encompass one continuous area, or it may be divided into several separateareas. The combat may have occurred entirely or partially on land or on water. It may have involved small units or major portions of armies, and it may be classified as a skirmish, a larger engagement, or a full-scale battle. Most Virginia Civil War battles were fought in rural areas on open or wooded ground, usually on farms. The size of rural battlefields depends on several factors: the number of troops engaged, the military branches (artillery, cavalry, infantry, navy) involved, the duration of the battle, whether or not the combatants maneuvered or employed flanking tactics, whether the combatants entrenched, and so forth. The typical rural battleground may include the following components: terrain features (hills, lowlands, ravines, etc.); watercourses (rivers, ponds, streams, wetlands, etc.); transportation resources (roads, turnpikes, railroads, etc.); buildings (dwellings, agricultural buildings, churches, depots, etc.); structures (bridges, walls and fences, forts, redoubts, entrenchments,etc.); and miscellaneous elements such as fords, cemeteries, etc. A battlefield may also retain some or all of its historic patterns of fields, pastures, and woods. Other battles took place as the combatants contended for the possessionof towns, cities, and industrial sites. Examples include the engagements at Norfleet House and Hill's Point during the siege of Suffolk in 1863, the battles for Richmond and Petersburg in 1862 and 1864-1865, and the battles for Jonesville and Saltville in 1864. Still other battles, like those at Fredericksburg in 1862 and at Gettysburg in Pennsylvania, in 1863, were unintended; neither anny planned to fight at those locations, but unanticipated encounters nonetheless resulted in major engagements. Urban or industrial-site battlefields may include dwellings, industrial and commercial buildings, bridges, dams, walls and fences, and streets, as well as such natural features as watercourses, hills, and lowlands. NPS Fonn 10-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section F Page 105

The Civil War in Virginia. 1861-1865: Historic and ArchaeololZical Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

SIGNIFICANCE

A battlefield may be nominatedfor significanceat the local, state,or nationallevel. In the words of National RegisterBulletin 40: Guidelinesfor Identifying,Evaluating, and RegisteringAmerica's Historic Battlefields,

To be significantat the local level,a battle musthave beenassociated with military eventsimportant in the history of a town, city, county, culturalarea, or region. Battlefieldsare significantin a statewide contextwhen they areassociated with an aspectof military history importantto the Stateas a whole. Battlefieldssignificant in a national contextare thoseassociated with a facetof military history that had an importantimpact on the entire nation.

A battle may be evaluatedas significantat the nationallevel becauseit becauseit influenced strategicallyimportant military or political decisions,or becauseit affectedthe outcomeof an important military campaign. For example,the Battle of Ball's Bluff on 21 October1861, a humiliating Union defeat,is an exampleof a relatively minor military engagementthat attained national importance because of its political consequences.It promptedCongress to createthe JointCommittee on the Conductof the War, therebyinjecting congressionalinfluence into the military arenaand furtherpoliticizing the military establishment.By enablingcertain Republicans to gain power in Congress,the battle and its consequences resonatedeven into the Reconstructionera. The Battle of CedarCreek on .19October 1864,in contrast, was a large-scalebattle that effectivelyended Confederate influence in the ShenandoahValley, the "Breadbasketof the Confederacy."This Union victory all but destroyedLt. Gen. JubalA. Early's commandas a fighting force and ultimatelyenabled Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridanto reunitehis command with the principal Federalarmy at Richmondand Petersburg.The battle representsthe culminationof the military campaignin the valley and thereforeis of nationalsignificance. A battle significantat the statelevel maya less significantcombat in an importantcampaign, or one with consequencesthat wereconfined to the statein which it occurred. For instance,the Battle of Kelly's Ford in CulpeperCounty on 17 March 1863was a large combatinvolving severalcavalry divisions from both sides. It endedin a Confederatedefeat, the flfSt of any size in Virginia for Southerncavalry. In addition, it resultedin the deathof Maj. JohnPelham, an innovativeartillerist muchadmired by Gen. RobertE. Lee and Maj. Gen.J. E. B. Stuart. Although it is difficult to measurethe implicationsof his deathand of the Confederatedefeat, it seemsreasonable to concludethat they were somethingless than of nationalimportance but ce~lnly of morethan local significance. NPSFonn IO-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page 106

The Civil War in Virginia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeoloeical Resources Name of Multiple PropertyListing

A battle may be consideredsignificant at the local levelbecause its lastingconsequences are more importantto the history of a communitythan to a campaignor the courseof the war. Obviously,every battle is importantlocally evenif it is more importantnationally, but usuallya battle of only local significancewill be small in scale,brief in duration,and low in numbersof participants. For example,the Battle of Cove Mountainoccurred in Wythe Countyon 10May 1864,during a seriesof Federalcavalry raids. It involved Brig. Gen. William W. Averell's Union cavalrydivision and Confederateinfantry and cavalry underBrig. Gen. William E. "Grumble"Jones and Brig. Gen. JohnHunt Morgan. The combat lastedfour hours,did not involve all of the troops present,resulted in relatively few casualties,and had no long-lastingmilitary effects. Locally, however,the battle is deeplyimbedded in the collective memoryof the rural residentsof Crockett'sCove, as familiesthere nursed the woundedand buried the deadafter the engagement.Stories about the battle have beenpassed down through the generations,and eventuallythe United Daughtersof the Confederacyplaced a plaquein the churchcemetery to commemoratethe event. The selectionof the appropriatelevel of significancemay be difficult. It is suggested,therefore, thatthe writer of a nominationconsult with the StateHistoric PreservationOffice. Battlefieldsare mostcommonly nominated under Criterion A, for their associationwith the Civil War. Theymay be nominatedunder other criteria-usually in additionto CriterionA-as well. A battlefield maybe nominatedunder Criterion B for its associationwith an importantperson, under Criterion C if it includessignificant architectural components, or underCriterion D if it containsimportant archaeologicalresources.

Criterion A Battlefieldsmay be significantunder Criterion A for their associationwith the history of the Civil War in Virginia. 1861-1865. As one of the major theatersof operationsin the East,the Commonwealth was the location of more importantbattles than any otherstate. Accordingto the Civil War Sites Advisory Commission'sReport on the Nation's Civil WarBattlefields (1993), "some 10,500armed conflicts occurredduring the Civil War. ..; 384 (3.7 percent)were identified asthe principalbattles." Of them, 123 were locatedin Virginia; Tennessee,the statewith the next highestnumber, had 38. Besidesthese major battles,most of which were significanton the nationallevel becauseof their strategicconsequences, many otherbattles and engagementsmay be significantunder Criterion A for their statewideor local importance. Examplesof battlefieldslisted on the National Registerof Historic Placesunder Criterion A (or its equivalentarea of significance,in the caseof older nominations)include: AppomattoxCourt House National Historical Park(Appomattox Co.); Ball's Bluff Battlefieldand National Cemetery(Loudoun Co.); Bristoe StationBattlefield (DOE, Prince William Co.); CedarCreek Battlefield andBelle Grove (Frederick and WarrenCos.); Cockpit PpintConfederate Battery Site (DOE, Prince William Co.); Cool Spring OMB No. 1024-0018 NPS Form IO-900a (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page _107

The Civil War in Vir inia 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolo ical Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

Battlefield (Clarke Co.); CumberlandGap NationalHistoric Park(Lee Co.); DamNo.1 Battlefield Site (NewportNews); Five Forks Battlefield(Dinwiddie Co.); Fort Clifton ArchaeologicalSite (Colonial Heights); Fort Pocahontas(Charles City Co.); Fredericksburgand SpotsylvaniaCounty Battlefields Memorial National Military Parkand Cemetery(Fredericksburg and SpotsylvaniaCo.); FreestonePoint Battery(Prince William Co.); ManassasNational Battlefield Park(Fairfax and Prince William Cos.); New Market Battlefield Park(Shenandoah Co.); PetersburgNational Military Park(Dinwiddie Co., Prince GeorgeCo., and Petersburg);Richmond National Battlefield Park(Chesterfield, Hanover, and Henrico Cos.); and Sayler's CreekBattlefield (Amelia and PrinceEdward Cos.).

Criterion B Battlefields maybe significantunder Criterion B for their associationwith noted soldiersor civilians whoseactions directly influencedthe outcomesof battlesor campaignsor advancedmilitary science,or who are significantin their own right. For example,Appomattox Court HouseNational HistoricalPark is listed underCriterion B for its associationwith Lt. Gen.Ulysses S. Grantand Gen. RobertE. Lee. Nominationsunder this criterionare rare, however,since many persons usually can be creditedfor military victories or scientific advancement.The significanceof mostnoted soldiersand civilians will be basedon their entire careersrather than on onebattle or otherhistoric event. Examplesof battlefieldslisted on the National Registerof Historic Placesunder Criterion B (or a similar areaof significance,in the caseof older nominations)include AppomattoxCourt House'National Historical Park (AppomattoxCo.), and Fredericksburgand SpotsylvaniaCounty Battlefields Memorial National Military Park and Cemetery(Fredericksburg and SpotsylvaniaCo.).

CriterionC Battlefields may be significantunder Criterion C becausethey containelements of architectural importance. Typically, thesemay includefortifications and earthworks,such as Fort Pocahontasat the Wilson's Wharf battlefield in CharlesCity County. Structuresnominated under this criterion must be notableexamples of military engineeringand their featuresmust retain sufficient integrityto illustrate their

purposesExamplesand uses.of battlefieldslisted on the National Registerof Historic Placesunder Criterion C (or its equivalentarea of significance,in the caseof older nominations)include: AppomattoxCourt House National Historical Park(Appomattox Co.); CedarCreek Battlefield and Belle Grove (Frederickand WarrenCos.); Fort Pocahontas(Charles City Co.); Fredericksburgand SpotsylvaniaCounty Battlefields Memorial National Military Parkand Cemetery(Fredericksburg and SpotsylvaniaCo.); and Richmond NationalBattlefield Park(Chesterfield, Hanover, and HenricoCos.). NPS Fonn 10-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Sen'ice

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page _lOB-

The Civil War in Vire:inia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeoloe:ical Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

Criterion D

Battlefields may be significant under Criterion 0 for their potential to enhance our understanding of military events based on archaeological remains. Artifacts may reveal the identity of regiments, the types of ammunition used, and information about living conditions, personal possessions,encampments, burials, supplies, areas of heaviest fighting, tactics, and strategy. Examples of battlefields listed on the National Register of Historic Places under Criterion 0 (or its equivalent area of significance, in the case of older nominations) include: Cockpit Point Confederate Battery Site (DOE, Prince William Co.); Fort Clifton Archaeological Site (Colonial Heights); Fort Pocahontas(Charles City Co.); Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania County Battlefields Memorial National Military Park and Cemetery (Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania Co.); and Richmond National Battlefield Park (Chesterfield, Hanover, and Henrico Cos.).

REGISTRATIONREQUIREMENTS

Battlefieldsmay meetthe requirementsfor registrationif they retainsufficient integrity for their period of significance. Most battles in Virginia were foughtalong major transportationroutes, and today developmentalong thosesame routes threatens the integrity of the battlefieldsas once-ruralareas are engulfedby urbansprawl, industrialization,and scatteredresidential communities. To be eligible for listing in the National Registerof Historic Places,a battlefield mustretain the majority of its historic landscapeor other relevantcomponents. The battle,for instance,must still be "readable" or understandablewithout mentallysubtracting subdivisions, shopping malls, and similarly overwhelmingintrusions from the core, or most importantareas, of the battleground. Likewise, contributing structures,buildings, and archaeologicalsites mustretain sufficient integrityto be eligible. Most battlefieldswill containsome noncontributing properties. Their effecton the integrity of the battlefield will dependnot only on their numberbut on their nature,location, and size,as well as the size and topographyof the battlefield. For example,if the noncontributingelement reflects a continuing later developmentof traditionalland use (suchas modemfarm buildings on an antebellumfarmstead), then the effect will be lessthan that of noncontributingstructures reflecting nontraditionaluses (such as a bowling alley on a historic farm). The following evaluationsof integrity shouldbe applied whenassessing potentially eligible battlefiel~, structuresand buildings,and sites. NPSFonn IO-900a OMS No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E- Page 109-

The Civil War in Virl!inia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolol!ical Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

I. Location: The place where a historic property was constructed or where a historic event occurred. A battlefield or contributing building, structure, or site retains integrity of location if it is the place where the historic battle or event took place, or where the structure, building, or site was located. 2. Association: The direct link between a historic event or person and a historic property. A battlefield or contributing building or site retains integrity of association if, in addition to retaining integrity of location, the place is sufficiently intact to convey the relationship between the event and the place to the observer. The physical features of the terrain or structure contemporary with the event must not have been obliterated. 3. Setting: The physical environment of a historic property. A battlefield retains integrity of setting if the physical features or environment that existed at the time of the battle or engagementare largely intact. Such features may include natural elements such as hills, ridges, ravines, and watercourses, and manmade elements such as roadways, rail beds, fence lines, wood lots, fields, and pastures. If changes to the setting have occurred, their extent, visibility, physical effect on the resource, and reversibility must be considered in assessingintegrity. The grading and leveling ofa tactically important hill, for instance, may be of greater concern than the widening of a road or the growth of trees in former fields. If the resource is a contributing building or structure, then the character of its setting is also- important in assessingintegrity. 4. Feeling: A property's expression of the aesthetic or historic sense of a particular period of time. A battlefield retains integrity of feeling if it conveys a senseof time and place within the period of the Civil War. Massive and intrusive alterations to the setting of a battlefield will also adversely affect its integrity of feeling, regardless of their reversibility. Such alterations to the fabric or immediate surroundings of a contributing building, structure, or site will have a similar effect. 5. Design: The combination of elements that create the form, plan, space, structure, and style of a property. Integrity of design may be more relevant to a contributing building, structure, or site than a battlefield, unless manmade features played a tactical role in the engagement. For example, if sunken roads, railroad cuts or embankments, or the arrangementof buildings on a farmstead or in an urban setting were essential to the execution and outcome of a battle, then their modem-day presence or absencemay affect the integrity of the battleground. 6. Materials: The physical elements that were combined or deposited during a particular period of time and in a particular pattern or configuration to form a historic property. Integrity of materials is more relevant to a contributing building or structure than to a battlefield, where time and weather likely will have obliterated them. The presenceof a historic stone wall bordering a field, for instance, would be a remarkable rather than an expected survival. 7. Workmanship: The physical evidence of the crafts of a particular culture or people during any given period in history or prehistory. Integrity of workmanship is more relevant to a contributing building or structure than to a battlefield.

NPSFonn IO-900a OMS No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E- Page 110

The Civil War in Virginia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeological Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

NAME OF PROPERTY TYPE: EARTHWORKS

DESCRIPTION

Most of the earthworksconstructed in Virginia during the Civil War-with notableexceptions- were built in 1864and 1865,when the mode of warfareshifted from activeto static. Earlier,some earthworkswere carefullyplanned and constructedto protecttowns and cities suchas Winchester,Suffolk, and Richmond,and throughoutthe war, soldiersunder fire threw field works togetherusing earthand fence rails or logs. Laterearthworks often were elaborate,highly engineeredstructures designed for the siege warfareconducted around Richmond and Petersburgduring the lasttwo yearsof the conflict. Suchworks frequentlywere severallines deep,with traversingtrenches to sheltertroops enroute to and from the front. "bombproofs" to protectmunitions, and otherfeatures not found in impromptufield works. Manytypes of earthworkswere constructedduring the war to fulfill variousfunctions. Often several typeswere incorporatedinto a sectionof earthworks,particularly if the soldiersremained stationary for a period of time. The following list of typesis meantto be representative,not definitive:

Entrenchmentor trench. The mostcommon type, usuallyconsisted of a ditch and a breastworksor parapetmade of earthfrom the ditch as well asany handystones, logs, or fencerails. Throughoutthe war, soldiersoften constructed such earthworks before or during a battle for temporaryprotection. 2. Fort. A large, enclosed,permanent work that frequentlyincorporated many types of earthworks, approachesincluding batteriesto townsor and redoubts, cities. entrenchments, etc. Fortsusually were constructed to ' guard important 3. Lunette. An earthworksimilar in designand functionto a redan,but with two flanking works extendingrearward from eachwing for additionalprotection. 4. . A many-sidedextension of other earthworks,or a detacheddefensive work (often square) supportinga main fort or fortified line. Redoubtswere largestructures (but smallerthan forts) that usuallyhoused artillery, and werethus sometimesreferred to asbatteries. Theywere intendedto function semi-independentlyof the maindefensive line. 5 Redan. Earthworkshastily constructed in front of a cannonto protectthe crew andthe gun. A redan usuallywas in the shapeof a V pointedtoward the enemy.

SIGNIFICANCE

Earthworks may be nominated for significance at the local, state, or national level. They may be nominated under Criteria A, B, C, or D for significance in the areas of military history, engineering, and historical archaeology.

NPS Form 10-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page 111

The Civil War in Virginia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolol!ical Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

Criterion A

Earthworksmay be significantunder Criterion A for their associationwith the history of the Civil War in Virginia, 1861-1865. Frequently,earthworks are the only tangibleabove-ground evidence that a battle occurred. Theyserve to illustratethe strategyand tactics utilized by the combatantsduring the war, as well as the engineeringskill of their (usually unknown)designers and builders. Earthworksmay be significant at the local, statewide,or nationallevel. Examplesof earthworkslisted on the National Registerof Historic Placesindividually or as a componentof a battlefield underCriterion A (or its equivalentarea of significance,in the caseof older nominations)include: CannonBranch Fort (Manassas);Cockpit PointConfederate Battery Site (DOE, Prince William Co.); CumberlandGap NationalHistoric Park(Lee Co.); DamNo. I Battlefield Site, (NewportNews); Fort Clifton ArchaeologicalSite (ColonialHeights); Fort Pocahontas(Charles City Co.); (Alexandria);Fredericksburg and SpotsylvaniaCounty Battlefields Memorial National Military Park and Cemetery(Fredericksburg and SpotsylvaniaCo.); FreestonePoint Battery(Prince William Co); PetersburgNational Military Park(Dinwiddie Co., PrinceGeorge Co., and Petersburg);Mayfield Fortification(Prince William Co.); Mitchell's Ford Entrenchment(Prince William Co.); Richmond National Battlefield Park(Chesterfield, Hanover, and HenricoCos.); and SpotsylvaniaCourt House Historic District (SpotsylvaniaCo.).

Criterion B

Earthworks may be significant under Criterion B for their association with noted soldiers or military engineers. Nominations under this criterion will be rare, however, since most notable persons are either associated with the overall battle, or becausethe name of the works' designer is unknown. No earthworks are currently registered under Criterion B.

Criterion C An earthworkmay be significantunder Criterion C for its architecturalimportance as a notable and intactexample of military engineering,or a rare or unusualexample, of a specifictype. Fort Pocahontas,located on the Wilson's Wharf battlefield in CharlesCity County,is suchan earthwork. Protectedfrom the elementsby the vegetationthat coveredit whenthe field was abandonedafter the war, the fort containstraces of features,such as firing platformsfor the infantry, that rarelysurvive. It was recentlyregistered under Critcrion C. NPS Forni 10-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E - Page 112

The Civil War in Vir inia 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolo ical Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

Examplesof earthworkslisted on the National Registerof Historic Placesindividually or as a componentof a battlefield under CriterionC (or its equivalentarea of significance,in the caseof older nominations)include: Fort Pocahontas(Charles City Co.); Fort Riverview(Amherst Co.); Fort Ward (Alexandria); Fredericksburgand SpotsylvaniaCounty Battlefields Memorial National Military Park and Cemetery(Fredericksburg and SpotsylvaniaCo.); and RichmondNational Battlefield Park (Chesterfield, Hanover,and HenricoCos.).

Criterion D

Earthworks may be significant under Criterion D for their potential to enhance our understanding of military events based on archaeological remains. Although earthworks may be nominated under Criterion C regardless of their archaeological potential, if investigations reveal significant artifacts, then such sites may also be eligible under Criterion D. Artifacts may reveal the identity of regiments, the types of ammunition used, and the frequency with which units were rotated into and out of the earthworks, as well as information about living conditions, personal possessions,encampments, burials, supplies, areas of heaviest fighting, tactics, and strategy. Examples of earthworks listed on the National Register of Historic Places individually'or as a component of a battlefield under Criterion D (or its equivalent area of significance, in the case of older nominations) include: Cannon Branch Fort (Manassas); Cockpit Point Confederate Battery Site (DOE, Prince William Co.); Fort Clifton Archaeological Site (Colonial Heights); Fort Pocahontas(Charles City Co.); Fort Riverview (Amherst Co.); Fort Ward (Alexandria); Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania County Battlefields Memorial National Military Park and Cemetery (Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania Co.); Mayfield Fortification (Prince WiIliam Co.); and Richmond National Battlefield Park (Chesterfield, Hanover, and Henrico Cos.).

REGISTRA TION REQUIREMENTS

Earthworks may meet the requirements for registration if they retain sufficient integrity for their period of significance. The following evaluations of integrity should be applied when assessing potentially eligible earthworks.

Location: The place where a historic property was constructed or where a historic event occurred. An earthwork retains integrity of location if it is where it was located when it was constructed and used. 2. Association: The direct link between a historic event or person and a historic property. An earthwork retains integrity of asso~iation if, in addition to retaining integrity of location, the place is sufficiently intact to convey the relationship between the earthwork and the purpose for which it was built. NPS Forni 10-900a OMBNo.1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E__- Page 113

!he Civ~l. ~~r. i~ ~ir!!inia. 1_8.61.-1865:Historic and Archaeological Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

Setting: The physical environment ofa historic property. An earthwork retains integrity of setting if the physical features or environment in which it existed at the time of its construction are largely intact. If changes to the setting have occurred, their extent, visibility, physical effect on the resource, and reversibility must be considered in assessingintegrity. 4. Feeling: A property's expression of the aesthetic or historic senseofa particular period of time. An earthwork retains integrity of feeling if it conveys a sense of time and place within the period of the Civil War. Massive or intrusive alterations to the fabric or immediate surroundings of an earthwork will affect its integrity of feeling. 5 Design: The combination of elements that create the form, plan, space, structure, and style of a property. An earthwork will retain integrity of design if substantial above-ground structural remains exist, or if its original design can be discerned through archaeological study. Materials: The physical elements that were combined or deposited during a particular period of time and in a particular pattern or configuration to form a historic property. An earthwork may retain integrity of materials either above or below the surface. 7. Workmanship: The physical evidence of the crafts ofa particular culture or people during any given period in history or prehistory. An earthwork will retain maximum integrity of workmanship if its original design and construction techniques are still discernable.

NAME OF PROPERTYTYPE: CAMPSITE

DESCRIPTION

A campsitemay be defined asa placeoccupied by troops for a shorttime, as a bivouacduring a campaign,or for a long time, asan encampmentfor winter quartersor for training and resupply. During the Civil War, mostcampsites were locatedin rural areasbut somewere adjacentto towns or cities. Campsitesrange in size from very small (for a picket postor regimentalbivouac) to very large(the encampmentof the Army of the Potomacduring the winterof 1863-1864occupied most of Culpeper County). Likewise,the effect of a campsiteon the landscapewill rangefrom negligible,for a bivouac,to considerable,for a winter encampment.Features found at long-tenncampsites may include the remainsof hut sites,earthworks, and otherstructures. Historic resourcesat short-tenncampsites typically include below-groundfeatures such as soldiers' personalpossessions, military weaponsand supplies,and evidence of campfires. Most campsitesof lengthyduration were laid out andconstructed according to military designs.

6.3. NPS Form 10-900a OMS No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section - Page 114

The Civil War in Vir2inia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolo2ical Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

SIGNIFICANCE

Campsitesmay be nominatedfor significanceat the local,state, or nationallevel. They maybe nominatedunder Criteria A, B, or 0 for significancein the areasof military historyand historical archaeology.

Criterion A

Campsitesmay be significantunder Criterion A for their associationwith the history of the Civil War in Virginia, 1861-1865. They will usuallybe significantfor their role in the military history of the war as bivouacs,training and resupplycenters, winter quarters,and the like. An exampleofa campsiteeligible for listing on the National Registerof Historic Placesunder Criterion A is the HansboroughRidge Winter EncampmentDistrict (DOE, CulpeperCo.). This 1863-1864 encampmentof the Army of the Potomacis of nationalsignificance for severalreasons. During the winter, foreign-bornsoldiers, particularly Germans, entered the army in largenumbers and complicated the training process.The successfultraining and drilling programundertaken during the encampmentforged the army that finally defeatedthe Confederatesin Virginia. Perhapsmost importantly,Lt. Gen. UlyssesS. Grantjoined the Army of the Potomacthere, having chosento accompanyMaj. Gen.George G. Meade's armyas commanderof all Federalland forces.

Criterion B

A campsitemay be significantunder Criterion B for its associationwith importantmilitary figures or civilians who are associatedwith the site. Nominationsunder this criterion will be rare,however, since individualstend to be significantfor their overallcontributions to military science,a campaign,or a battle ratherthan to an encampment. No campsitesare currentlyregistered under CriterionB.

CriterionC A campsitemay be significant.under Criterion C if sufficientresources remain above ground to conveyits useand significance. Nominationsunder this criterion will be rare,however, since most camp structurestended to be constructedfor temporaryuse. No campsitesare cur:rentlyregistered under Criterion C.

_F NPS Form t 0-9008 OMBNo.1024-OO18 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page US

The Civil War in Vire:inia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeoloe:ical Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

Criterion D

Campsites may be significant under Criterion D for their potential to enhance our understanding of the history of the site and its role in the Civil War based on archaeological remains. Artifacts may reveal the layout and organization of the campsite, the identity of divisions and regiments, and the types of ammunition used, as well as information about living conditions, personal possessions, burials, military supplies, tactics, and strategy. Examples of campsites listed on the National Register of Historic Places under Criterion D include Hansborough Ridge Winter Encampment District (DOE, Culpeper Co.) and Louisiana Brigade Winter Camp (Prince William Co.).

REGISTRATIONREQUIREMENTS

Campsitesmay meetthe requirementsfor registrationif they retainsufficient integrity for their period of significance. They should be largely intact,and should retainmost of their historic landscape elementsto be eligible. The following evaluationsof integrityshould be appliedwhen assessing potentially eligible campsites.

I. Location:The placewhere a historic propertywas constructedor wherea historic eventoccurred. A campsiteretains integrity of location if it is the placewhere the historic encampmentwas located. 2. Association:The direct link between,a historic eventor personand a historic propertY. A campsite retainsintegrity of associationif, in additionto retaining integrityof location,the place is sufficiently intactto conveythe relationshipbetween the site andthe camp that oncestood there. 3. Setting:The physicalenvironment of a historicproperty. A campsiteretains integrity of setting if the physicalfeatures or environmentin which it existedat the time it existedare largelyintact. If changes to the settinghave occurred,their extent,visibility, physicaleffect on the resource,and reversibility mustbe consideredin assessingintegrity. The continuanceof traditionalland useshelp preservethe integrity of the site. 4. Feeling: A property's expressionof the aestheticor historic senseofa particularperiod of time. A campsiteretains integrity of feeling if it conveysa senseof time and place within the period of the Civil War. Massiveor intrusivealterations to the site will affect its integrityof feeling. 5. Design:The combinationof elementsthat create the form, plan,space, structure, and style of a property. A long-termcampsite will retain integrityof designif substantialabove-ground structural remainsexist, or if its original designcan be discernedthrough archaeologicalstudy. 6. Materials:The physicalelements that were combinedor depositedduring a particularperiod of time and in a particularpattern or configurationto form a historicproperty. A long-termcampsite may retain integrity of materialseither above or belowthe surface. NPS Fonn 10-900a OMBNo.1024-OO18 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page 116

The Civil War in Virginia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolo!!ical Resources Name of Multiple PropertyListing

7. Workmanship: The physical evidence of the crafts ofa particular culture or people during any given period in history or prehistory. A long-term campsite will retain maximum integrity of workmanship if its original design and construction techniques are still discemable.

NAME OF PROPERTYTYPE: MILITARY HOSPITALS

DESCRIPTION Military hospitalsof short- or long-tenDduration were established on or nearbattlefields and in urbanareas in Virginia during the Civil War. The short-tenDhospitals usually were established in tentsor in existing buildings suchas dwellings,churches, and barnsto treatthe woundedmen gathered there from the nearbybattlefield. Long-tennhospitals typically wereestablished in cities andtowns to care for woundedand sick soldierswho requiredextensive care and convalescence.These facilities occasionally utilized existing hospitals(more frequently,warehouses and otherlarge buildings),but speciallymade buildings were also constructedas at Chimborazoand Winder hospitalsin Richmond. Typically, such hospitalbuildings were frame,gable-ended, one-story structures designed and laid out accordingto military specifications.

SIGNIFICANCE

Military hospitals may be nominated for significance at the local, state, or national level. They may be nominated under Criteria A, S, C, or D for significance in the areas of military history, health and medicine, and historical archaeology. Military hospitals were important for the treatment of sick and wounded soldiers, and for their convalescence. Many thousands of soldiers and sailors survived the war because of the care they received in military hospitals.

Criterion A Military hospitalsmay be significantat the local, statewide,or nationallevel under Criterion A for their associationwith the history of the Civil War in Virginia, 1861-1865. Theywere essentialto the welfare of botharmies for sustainingtheir manpower,for providing immediatecare aftera battle,and for minimizing deathsfrom diseaseand combat. No military hospital~are currentlyregistered under Criterion A. NPS Fonn 10-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86) United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page 117

The Civil War in Vir ini 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolo ical Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

Criterion B Military hospitalsmay be significantunder Criterion B for their associationwith notedphysicians or nursesor others importantto the military history of the hospital. Nominationsunder this criterion would be rare becauseof the transitorynature of the hospitalsand because the evaluationof importantpersons are basedmore on their overall careersthan on their activities at a specificplace. No military hospitalsare currentlyregistered under Criterion B.

CriterionC Military hospitalsmay be significantunder Criterion C for their architecturalimportance as notableand intactexamples of hospitalarchitecture. Nominations under this criterionwould be rare becausefew Civil War-era hospitalsbuilt for that purposestill exist. No military hospitalsare currentlyregistered under Criterion C.

Criterion D Military hospitalsmay be significantunder Criterion D for their potentialto enhanceour understandingof a site and its role in the Civil War basedon archaeologicalremains. Artifacts may reveal the identity of regiments,the types of ammunitionused, and the availability of medicalsupplies and surgical instruments,as well as informationabout the layoutor designof hospitalcomplexes, living conditions,personal possessions of patientsand staff members,and burials. No military hospitalsare currentlyregistered under Criterion D.

REGISTRATIONREQUIREMENTS Military hospitals may meet the requirements for registration if they retain sufficient integrity for their period of significance. The following evaluations of integrity should be applied when assessing potentially eligible military hospitals. Location: The place where a historic property was constructed or where a historic event occurred. A I military hospital retains integrity of location if it is where it was located when it was used or constructed for that purpose. Association: The direct link between a historic event or person and a historic property. A military 2. hospital retains integrity of association if, in addition to retaining integrity of location, the place is sufficiently intact to convey the relationship between the hospital and the purpose for which it was

built. NPS Form IO-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior Nationa.1 Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page 118

The Civil War in Virginia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolol!ical Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

3 Setting:The physicalenvironment ofa historicproperty. A military hospitalretains integrity of setting if the physicalfeatures or environmentin which it existedat the time of its constructionor useare largely intact. If changesto the settinghave occurred,their extent,visibility, physicaleffect on the resource,and reversibility mustbe consideredin assessingintegrity. 4. Feeling: A property's expressionof the aestheticor historic senseof a particularperiod of time. A military hospitalretains integrityof feeling ifit conveysa senseof time and place within the period of the Civil War. Massiveor intrusivealterations to the fabric or immediatesurroundings ofa hospital will affect its integrity of feeling. 5, Design:The combinationof elementsthat create the fonn, plan,space, structure, and style of a property. A military hospitalwill retain integrity of designifit possessesa majority of its Civil War- era fonn, plan,and architecturalstyle. Materials:The physicalelements that werecombined or depositedduring a particularperiod of time and in a particular patternor configurationto fonn a historicproperty. A military hospitalwill retain integrity of materialsif it possessesthe majority of original featuressuch as exteriorwalls, fenestration,and porches. 7 Workmanship:The physicalevidence of the crafts of a particularculture or peopleduring any given period in history or prehistory. A military hospitalwill retainmaximum integrity of workmanshipif its craftsmanshipand constructiontechniques are still discernable.

NAME OF PROPERTYTYPE: MILITARY HEADQUARTERS

DESCRIPTION

Military headquartersof short- or long-termduration were established on or nearbattlefields and in urban areasin Virginia during the Civil War. Theywere occupied by the commandinggenerals of armiesand their staffs. They usuallywere establishedin tents,in dwellings,or in the yards of dwellings near battlefields,earthworks, and campsites.They were occupiedfor a shorttime, as during a battle, or for severalmonths, as during a winter encampmentor a siege. Long-termheadquarters complexes, like long- term campsites,were laid out accordingto military specifications.

SIGNIFICANCE

Military headquartersmay be nominated for significance at the local, state, or national level. They may be nominated under Criteria A, B, C, or D for significance in the areas of military history and historical archaeology. Headquarterswere essentialto the conduct of a battle, being the communication and command centers of armies to which intelligence was reported and from which orders were issued.

6. NPSFonn 10-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page _119

The Civil War in Vireinia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeoloeical Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

Criterion A

Military headquartersmay be significant at the local, statewide, or national level under Criterion A for their association with the history of the Civil War in Virginia, 1861-1865. They constituted the centers from which battles were planned and controlled by army commanders. No military headquartersare currently registered under Criterion A..

Criterion B

Military headquartersmay be significantunder Criterion B for their associationwith noted army commanders.Nominations under this criterionmay be amongthe mostcommon because of the role of headquartersas communicationsand controlcenters under the authorityof commandinggenerals during battles,campaigns, and encampments. No military headquartersare currentlyregistered under Criterion B.

Criterion C

Military headquartersmay be significantunder Criterion C for their architecturalimportance as notableand intactexamples of architecture.Nominations under this criterionwould be rare becausefew if any Civil War-era headquartersbuilt for that purposestill exist. No military headquartersare currentlyregistered under Criterion C.

Criterion D

Military headquarters may be significant under Criterion D for their potential to enhance our understanding of a site and its role in the Civil War based on archaeological remains. Artifacts may teveal the identity of headquartersguard units and the types of arms and ammunition used, as well as information about the layout or design of the headquarters,the life of the commanding officers, the living conditions of the staff, and the personal possessionsof the occupants. No military headquarters are currently registered under Criterion D.

REGISTRATIONREQUIREMENTS

Military headquartersmay meet the requirements for registration if they retain sufficient integrity for their period of significance. The following evaluations of integrity should be applied when assessing potentiallyeligible headquarters. NPSFonn 10-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section -E Page 120

The Civil War in Vir2inia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolo2ical Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

1. Location: The placewhere a historic propertywas constructed or wherea historic eventoccurred. A military headquartersretains integrity of locationif it is where it was locatedwhen it was usedor constructedfor that purpose. 2. Association:The direct link betweena historic eventor personand a historicproperty. A military headquartersretains integrity of associationif, in additionto retaining integrity of location,the place is sufficiently intactto conveythe relationshipbetween the headquartersand the purposefor which it was built and used. 3.Setting: The physicalenvironment ofa historicproperty. A military headquartersretains integrity of setting if the physicalfeatures or environmentin which it existedat the time of its constructionor use are largely intact. If changesto the settinghave occurred, their extent,visibility, physicaleffect on the resource,and reversibility mustbe consideredin assessingintegrity. 4 Feeling: A property's expressionof the aestheticor historic senseof a particularperiod of time. A military headquartersretains integrityof feeling if it conveysa senseof time and place within the period of the Civil War. Massiveor intrusivealterations to the fabric or immediatesurroundings of a headquarterswill affect its integrity of feeling. 5. Design:The combinationof elementsthat createthe form, plan,space, structure, and style of a property. A military headquarterswill retain integrity of designif it possessesa majority of its Civil War-era form, plan,and architecturalstyle. 6. Materials:The physicalelements that werecombined or depositedduring a particularperiod of time and in a particular patternor configurationto form a historicproperty. A military headquarterswill retain integrity of materialsif it possessesthe majority of original featuressuch as exterior walls, fenestration,and porches. 7. Workmanship:The physicalevidence of the crafts of a particularculture or peopleduring any given period in history or prehistory. A military headquarterswill retain maximumintegrity of workmanship if its craftsmanshipand constructiontechniques are still discernable.

NAME OF PROPERTYTYPE: MILITARY PRISONS

DESCRIPTION

Military prisons or prisoner-of-war camps were established near battlefields and in urban areas in Virginia during the Civil War. The prisons were usually established in confined natural areas such as ravines or islands, in warehouses, or in other large buildings such as tobacco factories. The prisons may have been occupied for a short time immediately after a battle, or for several months or years, to be emptied periodically by prisoner exchanges or the transfer of captives to new prison sites. Prisons established in natural areas were laid out according to military specifications like long-term campsites. NPS Fonn 10-9008 OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page 121

The Civil War in Virginia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolol!ical Resources Name of Multiple PropertyListing

SIGNIFICANCE

Military prisonsmay be nominatedfor significanceat the local, state,or nationallevel. They may be nominatedunder Criteria A, B, C, or 0 for significancein the areasof military history and historical archaeology.Tens of thousandsof prisonerscaptured during battlesin Virginia wereconfmed in prisons or prisoner-of-warcamps ranging from restrictednaturals areas such as bowls or ravinesor islandsto warehousesand other largebuildings in urbanenvironments. Although early in the war prisonerswere typically paroled or exchanged,by 1863these policies were terminated,thus requiring eachside to devote manpowerto confine,shelter, feed, and care for manythousands of men,great numbers of whom suffered from wounds,illness, or malnutrition. The prisons,most of which providedsubstandard living conditions, playeda majorrole in wartime and postwarpropaganda, and fosteredthe continuationof bad feelings on both sides.

Criterion A

Military prisons may be significant at the under Criterion A for their association with the history of the Civil War in Virginia, 1861-1865. Prisons eligible under this criterion will be significant for the role they played in confining prisoners and in requiring the capturing power to staff the prisons and care for the prisoners. Belle Isle (Richmond) is an example of a military prison registered under Criterion A.

Criterion B Military prisonsmay be significantunder Criterion B for their associationwith noted prisonersor campcommanders. Nominations under this criterion will berare becausean importantperson's overall careeris usuallyof greatersignificance than the portion of it associatedwith a prison. No military prisonsare currentlyregistered under Criterion B.

CriterionC Military prisonsmay be significantunder Criterion C for their architecturalimportance as notable and intactexamples of architecture.Nominations under this criterionwould be rare becausefew if any Civil War-era prisonsor prisonbuildings constructed for thatpurpose still exist. No military prisonsare currentlyregistered under Criterion C. NPS Fonn IO-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page 122

The Civil War in Vir!!inia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolo!!ical Resources Name of Multiple PropertyListing

Criterion D

Military prisonsmay be significantunder Criterion D for their potentialto enhanceour understandingof a site and its role in the Civil War basedon archaeologicalremains. Artifacts may reveal the identity of prisonguard units andthe typesof armsand ammunitionthey used,as well as information aboutthe layout or designof the prison,the living conditionsof the prisonersand guards,and their personal possessions. No military prisonsare currentlyregistered under Criterion D.

REGISTRATIONREQUIREMENTS Military prisonsmay meetthe requirementsfor registrationif they retain sufficient integrity for their period of significance. The following evaluationsof integrity shouldbe applied when assessingpotentially eligible prisons. I. Location: The placewhere a historic propertywas constructed or wherea historic eventoccurred. A military prisonretains integrity of location if it is where it waslocated when it was usedor constructed for that purpose. 2. Association:The direct link betweena historic eventor personand a historic property. A military prisonretains integrity of associationif, in additionto retaining integrity of location,the place is sufficiently intactto conveythe relationshipbetween the prisonand the purposefor which it was built and used. 3. Setting:The physicalenvironment of a historicproperty. A military prisonretains integrity of setting if the physicalfeatures or environmentin which it existedat the time of its constructionor useare largelyintact. If changesto the settinghave occurred, their extent,visibility, physicaleffect on the resource,and reversibility mustbe consideredin assessingintegrity. 4. Feeling: A property's expressionof the aestheticor historic senseof a particularperiod of time. A military prisonretains integrity of feeling if it conveysa senseof time andplace within the period of the Civil War. Massiveor intrusivealterations to the fabric or immediatesurroundings of a prison will affect its integrity of feeling. 5. Design:The combinationof elementsthat createthe form, plan,space, structure, and style of a property. A military prison will retain integrity of designif it possessesa majority of its Civil War-era form, plan,and architecturalstyle. 6. Materials:The physicalelements that werecombined or depositedduring a particularperiod of time and in a particular pattemor configurationto form a historicproperty. A military prison will retain integrity of materialsif it possessesthe majority of original architecturalfeatures in the caseof a building, or if original materialssurvive belowground in the caseof an archaeologicalsite. NPS Form IO-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section E Page 123_-

The Civil War in Virl!inia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolol!ical Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

7. Workmanship: The physical evidence of the crafts ofa particular culture or people during any given period in history or prehistory. A long-term military prison will retain maximum integrity of workmanship if its craftsmanship and construction techniques are still discemable. NPSFonn 10-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF mSTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section G Page 124

The Civil War in Virl!inia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolol!ical Resources Name of Multiple PropertyListing

G. GEOGRAPHICAL AREA

The Commonwealthof Virginia. NPS Forni 10-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section H Page 125

The Civil War in Virlrinia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeololrical Resources Name of Multiple PropertyListing

H. SUMMARY OF IDENTIFICATION AND EVALUATION METHODS

The multiple property documentation form for the historic and archaeological resources related to the Civil War in Virginia, 1861-1865, is based on the Civil War Sites Advisory Commission study conducted between 1991 and 1993. The commission produced the Civil War Sites Advisory Commission Report on the Nation's Civil War Battlefields (1993), which prioritized the battlegrounds according to historical significance, threats, and preservation possibilities. Supporting the report is a vast quantity of primary- and secondary-source research,field work, battlefield assessments,and maps. Copies of the materials that relate to Virginia battlefields are maintained in the state historic preservation office, the Virginia Department of Historic Resources. The form is also based on additional researchby the preparer. In 1995, the Department entered into an agreement with the National Park Service to write a guidebook to Virginia's Civil War battlefields using the sources compiled in the course of the Civil War Sites Advisory Commission study. The first draft of the guidebook has been completed, reviewed by National Park Service historians, and corrected; it employed not only the material compiled during the study but the most authoritative secondary sources on individual battles as well. These books, written by respected Civil War historians (several of whom are employed by the National Park Service), are listed in Section I: Major Bibliographical References. The preparer of this form assisted with the Civil War Sites Advisory Commission study and wrote the above-mentioned guidebook to Virginia Civil War battlefields. He also consulted nominations of Civil War-related resources to the National Register of Historic Places on file at the Department in the preparation of this form. The historic context. the selection and descriptions of resources, the analyses of relevant criteria, and the registration requirements are based on his familiarity with Civil War-related resources in Virginia from more than ten years of involvement with the subject. The significant property types-battlefields, earthworks, campsites, and military headquarters,hospitals, and prisons-were observed by him in the course of researchand field work. Several Civil War-related resources already have been listed on the National Register of Historic Places. With the exception of the battlefields that were the subject of the commission study, however, these resources have not been systematically surveyed throughout the Commonwealth. According to the commission report. "some 10,500 armed conflicts occurred during the Civil War ...; 384 (3.7 percent) were identified as the principal battles." Of them, 123 were located in Virginia; Tennessee,the state with the next highest number, had 38. Most of the Virginia battlefields mentioned in the commission report are of national significance, but there are many more not mentioned that are of local or statewide significance. Likewise, many related resources, including earthworks, campsites, and military headquarters, hospitals, and ~risons, are eligible for registration under one or more criteria at the national, NPS Form 10-9008 OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section H Page 126

Th~ Civil War in Yirl!inia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolol!ical Resources Name of Multiple PropertyListing

state,or local level of importance.The purposeof this multiple propertydocumentation form is to make it easierto registerthese threatened and irreplaceabletreasures as they are identified and evaluated. NPS Fonn IO-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section I Page 127

The Civil War in Virginia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeoloeical Resources Name of Multiple PropertyListing

I. MAJOR BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES

GENERAL Civil War Sites Advisory Commission. Civil WarSites Advisory Commission Report on the Nation's Civil War BattlefieldY.Washington, D.C.: NationalPark Service,1993.

.Virginia Battlefield Filesand Maps. 1991-1993. Photocopies.Richmond, Va.: Virginia Departmentof Historic Resources.

Faust,Patricia L., ed. Historical TimesIllustrated Encyclopediaof the Civil War. New York: Harperand Row, 1986. Kennedy,Frances H., ed. TheCivil War BattlefieldGuide. 2d ed. : HoughtonMifflin Co., 1998. Long, E. B. The Civil War Day by Day: An Almanac,/86/-/865. GardenCity, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1971.

McPherson,James M. BattleCry o/Freedom: The Civil WarEra. New York: Oxford University Press,1988. Robertson,James I., Jr. StonewallJackson: The Man, theSoldier. the Legend. New York: Simon & ShusterMacmillan, 1997. Thomas,Emory M. Bold : The Life of./: E. B. Stuart. New York: Harper& Row, 1986.

", RobertE, Lee: A Biography. New York: W. W. Norton& Co., 1995.

.Travels to HallowedGround: A Historian's Journeyto the AmericanCivil War. Columbia: University of SouthCarolina Press, 1987.

The War ofthe Rebellion:A Compilation of the Official Recordv ofthe Union and Confederate Armies. PreparedUnder the Direction of the Secretaryof War by RobertN. Scott. 129vots. Washington: GovernmentPrinting Office, 1880-1901. NPS Form 10-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section Page 128

The Civil War in Virl!inia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolol!ical Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

MANASSAS CAMPAIGN, 1861

Cooling, Benjamin Franklin, III, and Walton H. Owen II. Mr. Lincoln's Forts: A Guide to the Civil War Defenses of Washington. Shippensburg, Pa.: White Mane Publishing Co., 1988.

Davis, William C. Battle at Bull Run: A History ofthe First Major Campaign ofthe Civil War. BatonRouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1977.

Farwell,Byron. Ball's Bluff" A Small Battle and Its Long Shadow.McLean, Va.: EPM Publications,1990.

Hennessy,John. The First Battle ofManassas: An End to Innocence,July 18-21.1861. Lynchburg,Va.: H. E. Howard, Inc., 1989.

Holien, Kim Bernard. Batt/eat Ba//'s B/uff Orange,Va.: Moss Publications,1985.

Poland,Charles P. Dunbarton,Dranesville, Virginia. Fairfax.Va.: Fairfax CountyOffice of ComprehensivePlanning, 1974.

Wheeler,Richard. A Rising Thunder. From Lincoln's Election to the Battle ofBu// Run: An EyewitnessHistory. New York, N.Y.: HarperCollins,1994.

Wills, Mary Alice. TheConfederate Blockade of Washington,D.C., 1861-1862. Parsons,W.Va.: McClain Printing Co., 1975.

SHENANDOAH VALLEY CAMPAIGN, 1862

Beck,I BrandonH., and CharlesS. Grunder. Jackson'sValley Campaign: The First Battle of Winchester,May 25, /862. Lynchburg,Va.: H. E. Howard,Inc., 1992.

Collins, Darrell L. The Battleso/Cross Keysand Port Republic. Lynchburg,Va.: H. E; Howard, Inc.,1993.

Hotchkiss, Jedediah. Make Me a Map of the Valley: The Civil War Journal of Stonewall Jackson's Topographer. Archie P. McDonald. ed. Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1973.

1 NPS Fonn 10-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section Page 129

The Civil War in Vir!!inia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolo!!ical Resources Name of Multiple PropertyListing

Krick, RobertK. Conqueringthe Valley: StonewallJackson at Port Republic. New York: William Morrow & Co., 1996.

Study of Civil WarSites in the ShenandoahValley of Virginia, Pursuantto Public Law 101-628. Washington,D.C.: U.S. Departmentof the Interior, 1992.

Tanner,RobertG. Stonewallin the Valley: Thomas.! "Stonewall"Jackson'sShenandoahValley Campaign,Spring 1862. GardenCity, N.Y.: Doubledayand Co., 1976. Updatedand revised, Mechanicsburg,Pa.: StackpoleBooks, 1996.

PENINSULA AND SEVENDAYS' CAMPAIGNS

Miller, William J., ed. The PeninsulaCampaign of1862: Yorktownto the SevenDays. Campbell, Ca.: SavasWoodbury Publishers,1993-1995. 2 vols.

Sears,Stephen W. To the Gates ofRichmond: The . New York: Ticknor & Fields,1992.

Wheeler,Richard. Sword OverRichmond: An EyewitnessHistory of McClellan's Peninsula Campaign. New York: Harper& Row, 1986.

NORTHERN VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN Hennessy,John J. Returnto Bull Run: TheCampaign and Battleo/Second Manassas. New York: Simon& Schuster,1993. Krick, RobertK. StonewallJackson at Cedar Mountain. ChapelHill: University of North CarolinaPress, 1990.

Stackpole,Edward J. From CedarMountain to Antietam. Harrisburg,Pa.: StackpoleBooks, 1993.2d ed.

1 NPS Form 10-900a OMB No.1 024..OQ18 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section I Page _130

The Civil War in Vir2inia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolo2ical Resources Name of Multiple PropertyListing

FREDERICKSBURGAND CHANCELLORSVILLE CAMPAIGNS

Furgurson,Ernest B. Chancellorsville/863: TheSouls of the Brave. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992.

Gallagher,Gary Wo,ed. The FredericksburgCampaign: Decision on the Rappahannock.Chapel Hill: University of North CarolinaPress, 1995.

Harrison,Noel G. ChancellorsvilleBattlefield Sites. Lynchburg,Va.: H. E. Howard, Inc., 1990. 2ded. Wheeler,Richard. Lee's TerribleSwift Sword: From Antietamto Chancellorsville,An Eyewitness History. New York: HarperCollins,1992.

GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN Grunder,Charles S. TheSecandBattle a/Winchester: June 12-15,1863. 2d ed. Lynchburg,Va.: H. E. Howard,Inc., 1989. Coddington,Edwin B. TheGettysburg Campaign: A Studyin Command.New York: Charles Scribner'sSons, 1968. 2d ed., Dayton,Oh.: MomingsideBookshop, 1979.

BRISTOE STATION AND MINE RUN CAMPAIGNS Graham,Martin F., and GeorgeF. Skoch. Mine Run: A Campaign ofLost Opportunities.October 2/, 1863-May 1.1864. 2d ed. Lynchburg,Va.: H. E. Howard,Inc., 1987.

Henderson,William D. TheRoad to BristoeStation: CampaigningWith Lee and Meade,AugustI-October 2O,1863. Lynchburg,Va.: H. E. Howard,Inc., 1987.

OVERLAND CAMPAIGN Baltz. Louis J., III. 'The Battle of Cold Harbor, May 27-June /3, 1864. 2d ed. Lynchburg,Va.: H. E. Howard,Inc., 1994. NPS Fom110-900a OMS No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section I Page 131

The Civil War in Vir ini 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolo ical Resources Name of Multiple Property Listing

Frassanito,William A. Grant andLee: The Virginia Campaigns,1864-1865. New York: Charles Scribner'sSons, 1983.

Matter, William D. Iflt Takes~ll Summer:The Battle of Spotsylvania. ChapelHill: University of North Carolina Press,1988.

Miller, J. Michael. TheNorth AnnaCampaign: "Evento Hell /tse/f," May 2/-26, 1864. 2d ed. Lynchburg,Va.: H. E. Howard, Inc., 1989.

Priest,John M. Nowhereto Run: The Wilderness,May 4th & 5th, 1864. Shippensburg,Pa.: White Mane PublishingCo., 1995.

Rhea,Gordon C. TheBattle of the Wilderness,May 5-6, 1864. BatonRouge: Louisiana State University Press,1994.

-.The BattlesforSpotsylvaniaCourt Houseand the Roadto YellowTavern. May 7-/2 1864. BatonRouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1997.

Swank.Wa1brook D. Battle ofTrevilian Station. Shippensburg,Pa.: Burd StreetPress, 1994.

Trudeau,Noah A. Bloody RoadYSouth: The Wildernessto Cold Harbor, May-June1864. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1989.

BERMUDA HUNDRED CAMPAIGN

Frassanito,William A. Grant andLee: The Virginia Campaigns,1864-1865. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,1983.

Robertson,William Glenn. Back Door to Richmond:The BermudaHundred Campaign, April-June 1864. BatonRouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1987.

Schiller, HerbertM. TheBermuda Hundred Campaign. Dayton, Oh.: MomingsideHouse, Inc., 1988. NPS Fonn 10-900a OMB No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Senrice

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section I Page 132

The Civil War in Virl!:inia. 1861-1865: Historic and Archaeolol!:ical Resources Name of Multiple PropertyListing

SHENANDOAH VALLEY CAMPAIGNS, 1864-1865

Davis, William C. The Battle afNew Market. BatonRouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1975. Duncan,Richard R. Lee's EndangeredLeft: The Civil War in WesternVirginia. Spring of1864. BatonRouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1998.

Lewis, ThomasA. The GunsafCedar Creek. New York: Harper& Row, 1988.

Morris, GeorgeS., and SusanL. Foutz. Lynchburgin the Civil War: TheCity-The People-The Battle. 2d ed. Lynchburg,Va.: H. E. Howard,Inc., 1984.

Studyo/Civil WarSites in the ShenandoahValley o/Virginia. Pursuantto Public Law 101-628. Washington,D.C.: U.S. Departmentof the Interior, 1992.

Vandiver,Frank E. Jubal's Raid: GeneralEarly's FamousAttack on Washingtonin 1864. Lincoln: University of NebraskaPress, 1960, 1988.

Wert, Jeffi'yD. From Winchesterto CedarCreek: TheShenandoah Campaign of1864. Carlisle, Pa.: SouthMountain Press, Inc., 1987.

SOUTHWESTVIRGINIA CAMPAIGNS Duncan,Richard R. Lee's EndangeredLeft: TheCivil Warin WesternVirginia, Spring of J864. BatonRouge: Louisiana State University Press,1998.

Johnson,Patricia G. The UnitedStates Army Invadesthe New River Valley,May 1864. Christiansburg,Va.: Walpa Publishing,1986.

RICHMOND AND PETERSBURGCAMPAIGN Frassanito,William,A. Grant andLee: The Virginia Campaigns,1864-1865. New York: Charles Scribner'sSons, 1983. NPSFonn 10-900a OMS No. 1024-0018 (8-86)

United States Department of the Interior National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES CONTINUATION SHEET

Section I Page _133

The Civil War in Vir2inia. 1861-1865:Historic and Archaeolo2icalResources Name of Multiple PropertyListing

Horn,John. The PetersburgCampaign. TheDestruction of the WeldonRailroad: Deep Bottom, Globe Tavern,and ReamsStation, August /4-25, /864. Lynchburg,Va.: H. E. Howard,1991.

Robertson,William G. The PetersburgCampaign: The Battle of Old Men and YoungBoys. June 9. /864. Lynchburg,Va.: H. E. Howard,1989.

Sommers,Richard J. RichmondRedeemed: The Siege at Petersburg.Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday& Co., 1981.

Trudeau,Noah Andre. The Last Citadel: Petersburg,Virginia, June 1864-April 1865. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1991.

APPOMATTOX CAMPAIGN

Calkins, ChristopherM. TheAppomattox Campaign: March 29-ApriI9. J865. Conshohocken, Pa.:Combined Books, 1997.

-.From Petersburgto Appomattox.April 2-9, 1865. Farmville, Va.: Farmville Herald PublishingCompany, 1983. -.Thirty-Six Hours BeforeAppomattox, April 6- 7, 1865. Farmville,Va.: Farmville Herald PublishingCompany, 1980(reprint 1989).