United States General Accounting Office Report to the Chairman, Committee on GAO Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate May 1997 BOSNIA PEACE OPERATION Progress Toward Achieving the Dayton Agreement’s Goals GAO/NSIAD-97-132 United States General Accounting Office GAO Washington, D.C. 20548 National Security and International Affairs Division B-272558 May 5, 1997 The Honorable Jesse Helms Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate Dear Mr. Chairman: This report discusses the Bosnia peace operation, specifically the progress made in achieving the operation’s objectives and U.S. costs and commitments in support of the operation. We are sending copies of the report to the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Foreign Relations, and to other appropriate congressional committees. We will make copies available to others upon request. This report was prepared under the direction of Harold J. Johnson, Associate Director, International Relations and Trade Issues, who may be contacted on (202) 512-4128 if you or your staff have any questions about this report. Major contributors to the report are listed in appendix IX. Sincerely yours, Benjamin F. Nelson Director, International Relations and Trade Issues Executive Summary The 1995 General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Purpose Herzegovina and its supporting annexes (also known as the Dayton Agreement) provided the structure and mandates for an international operation intended to promote an enduring peace in Bosnia and stability in the region. While international in scope, the Bosnia peace operation has received important political, military, and financial support from the United States. At the request of the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, GAO reviewed the implementation of the Bosnia peace operation, specifically the progress made in achieving the operation’s four key objectives since the operation began in December 1995 and U. S. costs and commitments in support of the operation. The operation’s objectives are to create conditions that allow Bosnia’s political leaders to (1) provide security for the people of Bosnia; (2) create a unified, democratic Bosnia that respects the rule of law and internationally recognized human rights, including cooperating with the war crimes tribunal in arresting and bringing those charged with war crimes to trial; (3) rebuild the economy; and (4) ensure the right of people to return to their prewar homes. To determine the progress made in achieving the operation’s key objectives, GAO visited numerous locations in Bosnia during July and December 1996, and obtained documentation and interviewed officials from U.S., international, military, and local governmental organizations there. GAO also gathered and analyzed information from the Departments of State, Defense, and the Treasury, and other U.S. government agencies; the World Bank, the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and other international organizations; and several participating foreign governments. In addition, GAO attended the Peace Implementation Council session in London in December 1996 where progress and the future of the peace operation were assessed by the international community. (A complete description of GAO’s scope and methodology is in chap. 1.) The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was fought from 1992 through 1995 Background among Bosnia’s three major ethnic/religious groups—Bosniaks (Muslims), Serbs (Eastern Orthodox Christians), and Croats (Roman Catholics).1 During the war, Bosnian Serbs and Croats fought for and declared the establishment of ethnically pure states separate from Bosnia,2 while 1This report defines “Bosniaks” as “Muslims,” the definition used in State Department human rights reports. The report also refers to any citizen of Bosnia as a “Bosnian,” regardless of ethnic group. 2These states were never recognized by the international community, whereas Bosnia and Herzegovina was granted diplomatic recognition and became a member of the United Nations in 1992. Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-97-132 Bosnia Peace Operation Executive Summary Bosniaks fought for a unified, multiethnic Bosnia. United Nations and other international mediators’ attempts throughout the war to stop the fighting were generally unsuccessful, until U.S.-led negotiations in 1995 culminated in a cease-fire in October 1995 and the Dayton Agreement in December 1995. The Dayton Agreement declared that Bosnia is a single state consisting of two entities that were created during the war: (1) the Bosnian Serb Republic, known as Republika Srpska, and (2) the Federation, an entity that joins together Bosniak- and Bosnian Croat-controlled areas of Bosnia.3 Most areas within Bosnia, with the exception of central Bosnia, are populated and controlled by a predominant ethnic group as a result of population movements during the war. Implementing the Dayton Agreement was a complex, decentralized operation with numerous objectives and subobjectives designed to assist Bosnia’s political leaders achieve the commitments they had made in signing the agreement. On the military side of the peace operation, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) authorized two military forces—first the Implementation Force (IFOR) and later the Stabilization Force (SFOR)—that had responsibility for mainly military objectives and had clear lines of authority for planning and implementation. The United States was the largest force provider to IFOR and SFOR, and Americans occupied the key NATO military leadership positions that controlled their operations. On the civilian side of the operation, the Office of the High Representative was established by the Dayton Agreement to assist the parties in implementing the agreement and to coordinate assistance efforts, but it had no operational authority over either the parties or the civilian organizations and donors active in Bosnia. Other organizations participating in the operation include the United Nations, with its unarmed, civilian police monitoring operation—the International Police Task Force—and other components; the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe; and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The United States has provided important political, financial, and personnel support to organizations participating in the operation, as well as to the international community’s economic reconstruction program for Bosnia. 3U.S. mediation resulted in the establishment of the Federation in March 1994. Prior to this, the Bosniak and Bosnian Croat armies were fighting each other in central Bosnia. The Federation agreement led to a cease-fire between these two armies that held throughout the remainder of the war. Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-97-132 Bosnia Peace Operation Executive Summary The peace operation faced a difficult task in attempting to help rebuild and bring reconciliation to Bosnia. For example, by the end of the war, annual per capita gross domestic product had fallen from its prewar level of $1,900 to $500; less than 25 percent of the prewar working population was employed; and war damage estimates ranged from $20 billion to $30 billion.4 Further, the extreme nationalism that precipitated and grew out of the war had made ethnic identity a critical factor in many aspects of Bosnians’ daily life, and the violence, fear, and collapsed social structure that resulted from the war had eroded support for pluralism. Results in Brief The Bosnia peace operation has helped Bosnia take important first steps toward the Dayton Agreement’s goals. The NATO-led military forces have created and sustained an environment that allows the peace process to move forward and Bosnians to return to normal life. The cease-fire has held, general security has improved, and some progress has been made in establishing political and economic institutions. Additionally, the more secure environment has allowed schools and shops to reopen, and families to start repairing damaged homes. Nevertheless, while the task of implementing the civil aspects of the Dayton Agreement has begun, transition to an effective multiethnic government had not occurred. Bosnia remains politically and ethnically divided, freedom of movement across ethnic boundaries is still very constrained, and economic activity is still at a low level. The limited progress to date has been due principally to the failure of the political leaders of Bosnia’s three major ethnic groups to embrace political and social reconciliation and to fulfill their obligations under the Dayton Agreement. Major obstacles to the vision embodied in the Dayton Agreement remain, particularly the lack of cooperation of Bosnia’s political leaders, and experts say full political and social reconciliation in Bosnia will be a long and difficult process. The Bosnian people are more secure than before the Dayton Agreement. The fighting has not resumed, forces have separated, and force reductions on all sides have occurred. The U.S.-led “train and equip” program intended to help stabilize the military balance in the region is progressing, albeit slower than anticipated. Nonetheless, the Bosnian Serb political leaders have not fully lived up to arms reduction agreements, little progress has been made in reforming police forces so that they operate in accordance with democratic policing standards, and the Department of 4This is a World Bank estimate. The government of Bosnia estimates the damage at