Supreme Court of the United States

No.

In The Supreme Court of the United States

William J. Vajk Petitioner

Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman Brian K. Zahra Bridget Mary McCormack David F. Vivano Richard Bernstein Elizabeth Clement

Respondents

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI To The 6th Circuit Court of Appeals

William J. Vajk Petitioner pro se 5113 US Highway 2 Iron River MI 49935 (906) 265-2198

RE IVEP 3 - 2OB F LERK Questions

Introductory Statement: In the US District Court the underlying case was dismissed on jurisdictional issues and never litigated on merits but despite that the 6'Circuit Court of Appeals rendered a verdict on the merits while lacking jurisdiction in this case where no party in either Court had an

"opportunity to be heard" on those merits. The 6' Circuit held that the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine finding by the District Court was invalid but in an internally inconsistent ORDER affirmed the District Court judgment to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on the same basis on October 26, 2017 and reaffirmed the finding on November 21, 2017. In doing so, the Circuit Court effectively altered the judgment of the District Court to benefit nonappealing parties.

Your Petitioner is not confused. During the tenure of this case before the

6' Circuit, one of the original defendants, Joan L. Larsen, was nominated to a seat on the bench before which she was a defendant, and after the confirmation process she was commissioned to a seat on the 6th circuit as a judge sharing cases for a lifetime with the judges charged with deciding her own case. Inquiries regarding the identity of the judge issuing the decision of the panel was stonewalled by the Clerk for obvious reasons. Once the Ms.

Larsen was nominated, the 6' Circuit Court could never be an impartial and disinterested tribunal for this case. For the reasons above, three of the following questions have to do with the substance of the case, and the fourth is dedicated to the loss of impartiality arising out of a defendant's appointment to the same bench as her judges. The questions follow:

Does a Court of Appeals have jurisdiction to rule on any merit based

issues in a case that was denied all litigation in the District Court.

Does the ORDER issued by the 6t Circuit Court of Appeals in this case

that relies entirely on substantive internal inconsistency fulfill the due

process requirement to "do justice to each litigant?"

May a Court of Appeals ignore a decisive jurisdictional issue,

timely raised, that, as has been ignored in this case, will lead

to piecemeal litigation if left unresolved?

Does a Court that has a defendant assigned a seat on that bench

preserve the appearance and reality of fairness?

Parties: Petitioner is William J. Vajk, pro Se, the plaintiff in the District

Court case and the Appellant in the case before the 6'Circuit Court of

Appeals. Appellees before the above named Circuit Court were Robert Young,

Stephen Markman, Brian Zahara, Bridget McCormack, David Vivano,

Richard Bernstein, and Joan L. Larsen. Larsen is replaced before this Court

by successor Respondent Elizabeth Clement because Joan Larsen was

nominated, confirmed, and sworn in as a judge in the 6' Circuit Court of

Appeals during the pendency of this case in the Court below.

Corporate Disclosure: There is no corporation associated with

Petitioner.

It Table of Contents

Title Page

Introductory Statement 1

Questions 1

Parties 111

Corporate Disclosure 111

Table of Contents iv

Table of Authorities vi

Appendix Contents iv, A

Jurisdiction 1

Concise statement of the case 1

Statutory Provision 2

Constitutional Provision 3

Direct and Concise Argument 3

Opinions, Orders, and Findings of Fact 5

District Court History 6

Court of Appeals History 7

Nitty Gritty 9

First Question Details 11

Second Question Details 15

Third Question Details 17

Fourth Question Details 18

In Summary 18 Epilog 19

Reasons for Granting of the Writ 20

Appendix Contents:

District Court Memorandum & Order 6/28/2016 B

District Court Judgment 6/28/2016

District Court Denying Motion to Vacate 3/30/2017 J

6" Circuit Order Oct 26, 2017 Fol

6 th Circuit Denial for Rehearing Nov 21, 2017 S

iv Table of Authorities

Anderson v City of Bessimer City, North Carolina 470 US 564 (1985) 3

Bonham's Case 8 Co. Rep 107, 77 Eng. Rep. 238 (1610) 13

Clark v. Mitchell 425 F.3d 270 (2005) 14

Code of Conduct for United States Judges Passim

Cohen v Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp 337 US 541 (1949) 12

Deakins v Monaghan 448 US 193 (1988) 4

Desist v United States 394 US 244 (1969) 4,18

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 34(a) 9

Grannis v Ordean 234 US 385 (1914) 3,10

Greenlaw v United States 128 S.Ct. 2559 (2008) 3,7

Madison v Marbury 5 US 137 (1803) 10

Marshall v Jerrico Inc 446 US 238 (1980) 8,9

Michigan Court Rule 7.206(E)(3)(b) Passim

Rooker-Feldman Doctrine Passim

United States v Apfelbaum 445 US 115 (1980) 4

United States v Bass 404 US 336 (1971) 14

United States v Schooner Peggy 5 US 103 (1801) 15

28 USC 1254 2

28 USC 1291 2

42 USC 1331 2

42 USC 1983 2

V Jurisdiction: The initial anonymous judgment by the 6' Circuit Court of Appeals was entered on October 26, 2017 with the denial for petition for rehearing entered on November 21, 2017.

Concise statement of the case: In the US District Court the underlying case was dismissed based on the judicial allegation of jurisdictional issues and never litigated on merits. Despite that the 6' Circuit Court of Appeals rendered a verdict on the merits where no party had an "opportunity to be heard" on any merits.

During the pendency of this case before the 6' Circuit, one of the original defendants, Joan L. Larsen, was nominated to a seat on the bench before which she was a defendant, and after the confirmation process she was commissioned to a seat on the 6th circuit as a judge sworn in on November 8,

2017, destined to be sharing cases for a lifetime on panels with the judges charged with deciding her case at that time. Once the Larsen was nominated, no judge of the Circuit Court could ever be a member of an impartial tribunal that in this case that should have been referred, without a judgment, to the Supreme Court for disposition or reassignment. Larsen and the members of the panel assigned to this case engaged in multiple violations of the ode_of_Conduc for_United tate s_Judges. Whether Larsen disclosed her defendant status before the 6' Circuit has driven inquiry by your Petitioner to Senator Grassley, chairman of the Senate Judiciary

Committee, but in the period this Petition is being written and is due for filing, predictably no answer will be forthcoming. The United States Postal

Service has marked the letter delivered, but as this is written, the return receipt disappeared.

Petitioner did not become aware of defendant Judge Larsen's new status as a proposed, later a factual member of the 6' Circuit, until January

26, 2018 while writing this petition and searching for possible reasons the panel engaged in behavior so outrageous as to be shocking to the conscience.

As an officers of the Court, the judges on the 6' Circuit Panel, and Counsel for the defendants, as well as Judge Larsen herself, had a duty to inform your

petitioner of pertinent changes in the status of this defendant and exparte

communications, and each of those individuals was cognizant of their duty.

Statutory Provision: In the District Court was under 42 USC 1331 and

42 USC 1983 and jurisdiction in the 6' Circuit Court of appeals is under 28

USC 1291. This Petition for a Writ of Certioari is brought before the Court in

compliance with 28 USC 1254(1). Constitutional Provision: Petitioner has been deprived, in conflict with the United States Constitution, of rights secured under the Fifth

Amendment, to wit: "nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;".

Direct and Concise Argument amplifying the reasons relied on for

Allowance of the Writ: The 6' Circuit Court of Appeals has departed from the

accepted course of judicial proceedings to such an extent that requires the

exercise of this Court's supervisory power. Statutory basis for federal

jurisdiction is found in the paragraph with the bold paragraph header

Statutory Provision above. For brevity, departures from an accepted course of

judicial proceedings are provided in a numbered list below:

The Circuit Court ruled on unadjucated merits denying Petitioner's

"right to be heard" aspect of due process. Grannis v Ordean 234 US 385, 394

(1914). 44 ... appellate courts must constantly have in mind that their function

is not to decide factual issues de novo." Anderson v City ofBessemer City,

North Carolina 470 US 564 573 (1985). And "...an appellate court may not

alter a judgment to benefit a nonappealing party." See Greenlaw v United

States 128 S. Ct. 2559, 2564 (2008). Deviance from that principle was thinly

disguised here.

The judgment proffered by the 6th Circuit Court is logically

internally inconsistent, affirming the lower court's decision that it had just denied. See United States v

Apfelbaum 445 US 115, 126(1980).

Despite Petitioner's request that the appellate court find on a decisive jurisdictional issue of legislative immunity of the defendants left unresolved by the district court and timely raised in the Court of Appeals, the 6' Circuit failed to issue such a finding thus encouraging piecemeal litigation which, unlike the problem in Deakins vMonaghan 448 US 193,204

(1988), is, in this case, laid directly at the hands of the federal courts. And,

"...a reviewing court has the obligation to rule on every decisive issue properly raised by the parities on direct review." Desist v United States 394

US 244,260(1969).

The Judges in the 6' Circuit became incapable of adjudicating

Petitioner's case in a manner preserving impartiality and fairness because during the pendency of this case before them one of the defendants, Joan L.

Larsen, was commissioned to a seat on the 6' Circuit Court of Appeals and sworn in to share a place on panels as an equal with all the other judges of that Court presumably for the rest of their working lifetimes. All four judges violated the oe_of_Cndu or_United tes_Judges Canon 2(A). This fact is the reason for the outrageous, actions taken by members of the 6th Circuit panel in rendering the judgment in this case and the subsequent denial of rehearing.

4 5: The opportunity, indeed the normally mandated social interactions between existing workforce and a new employee whenever a new employee joins a workforce resolves to unreported and unrecorded ex-parte communications. Petitioner received no notice of any sort As new peers

Defendant Joan L. Larsen and members of the panel assigned to this case violated the C e_oiAonductIorJJnit StaLudges_Ganon 3(A)(4) and

2(A). Fact: If defendant Judge Larsen and the members of the panel avoided any form of contact during the pendency of this case despite her pending appointment, and subsequently her confirmed appointment, that provides clear and convincing evidence they knew of their wrongdoing because such conduct falls significantly outside the norms of social behavior and established protocol. Otherwise they had exparte communication as a matter of normal office routine, violating the aforementioned code. No middle ground exists.

Opinions, Orders, and Findings of Fact: The District Court and 6th

Circuit Orders are provided in the attached Appendix submitted with this

Petition in the order in which they occurred and are listed in the Table of

Contents with appropriate page numbering. Petitioner cannot improve on the original documents by paraphrasing. Petitioner has retyped original documents as provided by the lower Courts despite being age 78 and not in good health. (Statement deleted here about retyping those documents in their entirety.)

District Court History: Your Petitioner William J, Vajk, proceeding pro se throughout this case, filed the current action alleging that Michigan Court

Rule 7.206(E)(3)(b) was created, promulgated and implemented and by the

Respondents, depriving your Petitioner of his constitutional right to a fair trial.

District Judge Edgar held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine was applicable along with legislative immunity and thus the District Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. Judge Edgar retired within days of entering his dismissal ORDER.

Petitioner timely filed a motion to vacate entered by the District Court

Clerk as a motion for rehearing that was reassigned to Judge Quist who delayed his finding for some six (6) months but reaffirmed Judge Edgar's

Rooker-Feldman based opinion while ignoring the legislative immunity issue.

The two District Court ORDERS and associated documentation are found beginning at Page A in the Appendix attached hereto.

Both District Court Judges reframed and revised Petitioner's

COMPLAINT without his agreement, into a grotesque charicature only

superficially resembling the complaint while deciding jurisdiction and immunity based on such aspects of that fiction not properly before the Court and never intended by Petitioner.

Court of Appeals History: Petitioner timely filed his appeal to the 6'

Circuit Court. Respondents, through their lawyer, filed their reply, their first actual submittal in the case, relying on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine essentially mimicking the District Court opinion(s).

On October 26th, 2017, the 6th Circuit held that "the district court incorrectly determined that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine." This ORDER is found beginning at Page L in the

Appendix. Subsequently the Circuit Court explained the reasoning for this verdict essentially comporting with the arguments made by your Petitioner both in the District Court as well as the Circuit Court. The denial for rehearing, completing the 6' Circuit's business in this case, is found at Page

The 6' Circuit Court ran completely off the rails, thinly disguising the facts of altering the judgment of the District Court to benefit the nonappealing parties to this lawsuit as prohibited by a rule that was

unpublished until the holding by this Court in Greenlaw, supra.

Research by Petitioner demonstrated that a close connection between

judges in the 6' Circuit Court of Appeals and the defendants is irrefutable,

7 violating the basic premise of all US judicial proceedings relating to "...an impartial and disinterested tribunal in both civil and criminal cases."

Marshall v Jerrico Inc 446 US 238, 242 (1980). For judicial efficiency,

Petitioner will not repeat every aspect in the cited case and refers the Court to further citations and text in this Petition fleshing out the violations of the

"appearance and reality of fairness" required by Marshall, supra and additionally cited judgments described within that case.

The reality supporting this fundamental unfairness resulted from the defendant Joan L. Larsen earlier being on President Donald Trump's list of potential candidates for the US Supreme Court but she landed instead a nomination on May 8, 2017 to the 6' Circuit Court, the same Court charged with reviewing your Petitioner's case with Larsen as a defendant.

Petitioner's Notice of Appeal was timely filed and the fees were paid on

April 26, 2017 prior to Larsen's nomination to the post she presently occupies. Petitioner received no notice of Larsen's nomination or subsequent related and relevant events or any communication specific to defendant

Judge Larsen at all.

Needless to say, the three judges assigned to the panel of this case,

Rogers, Sutton, and Bush, could not remain impartial when they faced a probability of a lifetime of sharing cases on panels to judge along with

Defendant Judge Larsen. Even if one assumes that they could remain impartial, with human nature being what it is, they cannot ascribe to the appearance of impartiality, resulting in cause to have recused themselves with a recommendation that this case be immediately referred to the US

Supreme Court for disposition. Instead these judges conspired with Larsen to maintain a fiction of the "appearance and reality of fairness." Marshall, supra at 242 violating your Petitioner's due process rights.

The Code of C u_c1oinitedStates_Jiudges, Canon 2, to which these judges are subject, specifically prohibits the behavior they engaged in during this case.

Nitty Gritty: The subject Michigan Court Rule is very small stating,

"the panel of the court may deny relief or grant peremptory relief without oral argument; or". FRAP 34(a), erroneously used as a parallel comparison by the 6' Circuit, consists of 108 words paying careful attention to the conditions under which the federal Court of Appeals may dispense with oral

argument but such nuance is omitted in the subject Michigan Court Rule and the reason for Petitioner's original COMPLAINT. The FRAP also does not

authorize blanket dismissal without cause as the subject Michigan Court

Rule does.

9 The FRAP carefully avoids the ipse dixit circumstances that underlie the complaint made by Petitioner in the District Court. The FRAP is a properly general rule addressing all cases brought before the Court and is not limited to a particular class of case to be treated differently from others absent any rational relationships, that is true of the subject Michigan Court

Rule (MCR.)

Conversely, the subject MCR is a specific rule applicable to a limited set of cases, that is Headlee Amendment cases, as opposed to the general rule that the Respondents are authorized by the Michigan Constitution to promulgate.

The federal and state rules themselves are significantly disparate, thus invalidating the Court of Appeals comparative analysis on any reasonable logical or legal basis. That is, if one considers that the panel had jurisdiction to do so in the first instance, jurisdiction they never possessed.

If such jurisdiction had existed it would have invalidated Petitioner's due process "right to be heard" see Grannis, supra, a circumstance prohibited by stare decisis that was announced in Madison v Marbury 5 Us 137, 179

(1803). The case is so well known and ensconced in the American judicial system that details do not bear repetition here.

The two court rules do not bear a meaningful rational similarity to one another. Even if they had,

10 that is to make a case that the only premise of the Michigan rule is to

decline oral argument, the basis for Petitioner's original complaint remains

valid because the assembled verbiage into clauses clearly has more than one meaning, and more than one meaning can have validity.

In essence, the 6' Circuit Court of Appeals addressing this case has

compared a rock to a rabbit solely because both identifying nouns start with the letter "r" while lacking any substance. In this case, both the state and federal rules do mention dispensing with oral argument but that is the extent

of the comparison and is not dispositive of the issue presented by the

Petitioner's COMPLAINT.

Finally, the Court below irrationally affirmed the District Court's

holding in a judgment wherein the core of that judgment lacks any rational basis. The 6' Circuit had no jurisdiction to make any finding on the merits of

the Michigan Court Rule challenged by your Petitioner which we cover below

because those merits were not litigated in the District Court and it is not the

province of the Appellate Court to do as it has done.

First Question Details: The first question, "Does a Court of Appeals have

jurisdiction to rule on any merit based issues in a case that was denied

litigation in the District Court?" The answer is clearly NO.

11 Reading judgments from the District Court beginning with Page A clearly shows that the district court never touched on any of the merits of

Petitioner's complaint nor did Petitioner or the defendants carry the merits forward into the appeals phase of this case because no litigation was permitted by the District Court. Once the Circuit Court issued its initial anonymous ruling, Petitioner challenged those aspects of the judgment using merit based arguments suitable only to the only significant issue that Court presented.

The Circuit Court usurped the original jurisdiction of the District

Court as well as that of the requested jury when it wrote, 'But we nevertheless find that his claim fails on the merits.." And a few lines below,

"We will not impugn Michigan's similar provision."

In Cohen v Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. 337 US 541, 546 (1949) this Court held that, "Appeal gives the upper court a power of review, not one of intervention." With no lower court litigation or finding on the merits of your Petitioner's case, the 6' Circuit did not simply review a judgment as it is authorized to do, instead it interveniened violating this Court's limitations established in Cohen for statute 28 USC 1291 that defines and restricts the

jurisdiction of a Court of Appeals. Additionally, Cohen @ 516 held that,

"...this order of the District Court did not make any step toward final

disposition

12 of the merits of the case..." precisely as has happened here.

Therefore the 6' Circuit judgment directly conflicts with directions given to it by this Court. The panel of the 6th Circuit knew and should have understood that conflict, yet issued the judgment while purposely ignoring and conflicting with this Court's directives for the reasons stated above.

The clear intention of the panel of the Court of Appeals in this case

demonstrates another violation of the limitations on judicial authority

defined as early as the famous Bonham's Case, 8 Co. Rep 107, 77Eng. Rep.

638 decided in the winter term of the year 1610, "One cannot be Judge and

Attorney for any of the parties" when the Court of Appeals penned, "we will

not impugn..."

Your Petitioner has significantly impugned the subject Michigan Court

Rule in his District Court complaint, and any judicial decision on this topic

was outside the jurisdiction of the COA panel to participate as attorney for

the defendants which is precisely how the "impugn" statement made by the

Court of Appeals above is framed. There is good reason for the dearth of

similarly framed judicial opinions in the entire history of the United States

Federal Courts.

While the Bonham example is off point in its origins, it is completely

on all fours where the conduct of the 6' Circuit is concerned in this case

13 relative to the modern legal principles involved. At the risk of being repetitive, the panel knew or should have known the legitimate jurisdictional limitations it was exceeding and proceeded anyway, precisely as Judge

Merritt pointed out in his dissent in Clark vMitchell 425 F.3d270, 295

(2005) "Courts sometimes decide that they want to reach a particular result,

come what may, and simply forget about important facts and inconsistent legal principles." In this case we know what the unjustified reasons are.

To touch briefly on the issue of the merits of the underlying case, your

Petitioner has procured and referred to the grammatical authorities utilized

by this Court in United States v Bass 404 US 336 (1971) in footnote 6 as well

as other equally convincing authorities. Beyond that, the issue here, to some

small extent, may also be said to partly revolve around a missing comma as it

did in Bass. And for similar reasons, the missing comma is not dispositive in

this case with proper resolution being at least as complex as it was in Bass,

"we will not attach significance to an omitted comma" (FN6) which is not

amenable to the slipshod and incomplete treatment afforded the subject

Michigan Court Rule by the 6' Circuit panel. Petitioner made a jury demand

because constitutions, statutes and court rules are written to guide and be

understood by "the people" and a jury trial, if necessary, would

14 assure that the intended audience has an appropriate voice in this decision.

To put the finest possible point on this issue, Petitioner refers to

United States vSchooner Peggy, 5 US 103, 109 (1801)wherein this Court held that, "It is in the general true that the province of the appellate court is

only to inquire whether a judgment was rendered was erroneous or not." The

6' Circuit exceeded its jurisdiction and those aspects of the judgment, straying in ways the Court had no authority to venture, should be reversed.