A Disappointing War Against Fascism: Left-Liberal
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Frank A. Warren. Noble Abstractions: American Liberal Intellectuals and World War II. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1999. xxii + 330 pp. $40.00, cloth, ISBN 978-0-8142-0814-4. Reviewed by Brett Gary Published on H-Pol (June, 2000) Frank A. Warren, historian at Queens College formance" (p. xiv). For Warren, those gaps be‐ and author of earlier studies of American leftists tween ideals and actions produced "political and in the 1930s, has written a valuable and learned moral dilemmas" that became irresolvable contra‐ study of left-liberal intellectual journalists and dictions within American liberalism at war's end. their unmet goals for US social, economic, and for‐ If the issues, debates, and terminological bat‐ eign policies during WWII. As Professor Warren tles vetted in Professor Warren's book were the makes clear in his acknowledgments, this is a sub‐ same ones suffusing his boyhood home, then his ject dear to him because the "noble abstractions" parents must have subscribed to a host of political espoused by his cast of writers and critics were journals, especially the Nation, the New Republic, those embraced by his parents. The book's sub‐ Common Sense, and PM, among others. Warren jects offered a humane vision of social and eco‐ draws on these journals as his primary sources to nomic justice, and helped define the larger mean‐ produce a tightly focused and wide-ranging intel‐ ing of WWII as a revolutionary struggle against lectual history of the left-liberal press from the be‐ fascism, both in the US and across the globe. This ginning of US direct involvement in the war in vision, Warren argues, not entirely realistic to be‐ 1941 to the war's aftermath. Freda Kirchwey, Max gin with, was "betrayed" (p. xii) by the increasing‐ Lerner, Bruce Bliven, Reinhold Niebuhr, Michael ly limited notions of the war's purposes as defined Straight, James Loeb, Louis Fischer, and a host of by President Roosevelt (in his incarnation as "Dr. other influential left-liberal writers and editors Win the War") and by the State Department. The take center stage, as they provided the ideas and key to both the analytical and narrative tension at critical analysis for those publications. Warren be‐ the book's center is in Warren's assessment of the gins with his principles' "interpretation of World gulf between the reality of the war and those "illu‐ War II as a democratic revolution and an interna‐ sory" but "also noble" abstractions articulated by tional civil war between democracy and fascism" liberal intellectuals -- he refers to it as "the dis‐ -- the noble part of their aspirations -- and shows, tance between those abstractions and liberal per‐ H-Net Reviews in each chapter, how their ideals were invariably tablishes as mounting evidence of FDR's indiffer‐ (for him, inevitably) unrealized because of "their ence to progressive liberal goals. For Warren this continued commitment to Roosevelt and the New points to the fundamental faw in liberals' exces‐ Deal" (p. xiv). In most chapters the same useful, if sive commitment to the Democratic Party, and somewhat predictable framework holds. consequent failure to adopt an available option -- Warren frst allows his main cast of charac‐ withholding all but "critical support" for Roosevelt ters to define through richly textured debate some and the war effort. This was the policy proffered political, economic, or diplomatic problem of the by Norman Thomas and the Socialist Party, and war. Then he examines the gulf between the left- the one Warren would have chosen. Critical sup‐ liberals' idealized rhetoric and goals and the war's port would have focused on the "administration's reality as defined by the Roosevelt administration. inequalities and failures" instead of justifying Thereupon he shows how this gulf produced Roosevelt's expedience by blaming others; it moral and political dilemmas for the liberal intel‐ would have positioned them to sustain their cri‐ lectual community and concludes most chapters tique of the capitalist system rather than acceding by showing how his journalists' inability to dis‐ to a policy of reforming large-scale consumer- tance themselves from their affiliation with the based capitalism; it would have severed them Roosevelt administration (especially their tar‐ from any affiliation with reactionary Democratic nished hero FDR) and the Democratic Party result‐ Party policies on racial justice questions, from in‐ ed in a weaker, increasingly compromised liberal‐ ternment of the Japanese-Americans, to poll-taxes, ism. Across a whole range of issues President Roo‐ thereby giving them the high moral ground; it sevelt failed to act upon their definition of and might have allowed vociferous critics like Tom prescription for the war as a moral struggle Amlie to stay inside the liberal community be‐ against fascism; they in turn offered trenchant cause there might have been a place for his orga‐ critiques of his inadequate social, economic, per‐ nizing energies were his colleagues not intent on sonnel, and foreign policy decisions, and yet he staying close to the exercise of power; and liberal remained their leader and they never broke from ineffectuality in influencing administration policy him. Had they made the break, Warren avers, and expectations for the war would not have been they might have had more influence because they so pronounced. would not have been taken for granted and their As Warren writes, "What my reading of the ideas would have at least been understood as history of the liberal intellectuals during World "critical" analysis and not failed and disregarded War II suggests is that their goals would have policy prescriptions by unrewarded, cranky loyal‐ been better served if they had dropped their strat‐ ists. egy of building liberal influence within the Demo‐ Warren is generally, but not entirely, sympa‐ cratic Party and devoted their energy to building thetic to the main cast of characters and their pro‐ a democratic left movement detached from the gressive world view, and he lukewarmly endorses Democratic Party" (p. xiv). Professor Warren's the "Union for Democratic Action-New Republic- democratic socialist aspirations frame the implicit Nation-PM circle's" (p. xvii) vision of the war as "what if?" questions that form the core of the global "civil war" between democracy and fas‐ book's overall assessment of left-liberal intellectu‐ cism. He also agrees with their repudiation of als' ineffectuality and those dashed left-liberals as‐ Communism (both Soviet and American), but ex‐ pirations shape the arc of the book's narrative. In coriates their inability to cut their ties to the Roo‐ short, the book is a study of liberal idealism con‐ sevelt Administration, especially with what he es‐ strained by liberalism's political alliance with the Democratic Party. "Perhaps it was inevitable," 2 H-Net Reviews Warren argues, "that the desperate war situation Moreover, the liberal intellectuals in this study and the horror of fascism should have produced a are virtually all outside the policy-making and ad‐ political vision high on idealistic goals but minus ministrative apparatus. We never hear from a the power or the ability to implement the goals. whole generation of liberal intellectuals -- govern‐ But what the liberal intellectuals did was to invest ment officials, scientists, political scientists, jour‐ in Roosevelt as the leader and in the New Deal as nalists, historians, sociologists, lawyers, writers the administration that represented progressive and others -- who threw themselves into the fray forces that could achieve those idealistic goals" as government policy-makers, researchers, intelli‐ (p. 36). That was fatal thinking, he argues, by gence officers, propagandists, mid-level bureau‐ those who should have known better. crats, and so on. We hear from policy-makers As an intellectual history of war-era journal‐ (many of whom were also liberal intellectuals) ists' ideas and moral fervor, the book captures the only as their decisions are interpreted by War‐ hothouse atmosphere of political journalism in a ren's cast, and much of the book's discussion is time of extraordinary crisis. Warren offers a about frustrated responses to good ideas gone un‐ broad sampling of debates and pronouncements heeded and in reaction to ill-formed decisions and about highly specific time-bound issues that policies implemented by powerful men at the cen‐ quickly became ephemeral due to the rapid suc‐ ter of power but at the periphery of the book's at‐ cession of events and new crises to be managed, tention. and he succeeds in drawing larger patterns of This is not to diminish the importance of jour‐ thought and analysis out of that atmosphere; at nalists as intellectuals, intellectual history, or the same time, he shows how quickly changing Warren's particular history. I learned a great deal events often caught his cast of writers in cycles of about dozens of issues as they were discussed in overstatement, tendentiousness, backpedaling, the Nation, the New Republic, PM, Common Sense and retrenchment, illustrating how they were also and war-related works produced by writers for trying to discern larger patterns and hang onto those publications. The intellectual community their moral bearings. As an intellectual history of comprised by Bruce Bliven, James Loeb, Freda the era, it offers a valuable, focused lens on an im‐ Kirchwey, Robert Bendiner, Reinhold Niebuhr, portant group of left-liberal journalists and their Max Lerner, Louis Fischer, I.F. Stone, Michael responses to policies with which they often dis‐ Straight, Alfred Bingham, and Tom Amlie (and agreed. At moments Warren's nuanced, careful re‐ others) is indeed compelling, and I learned much counting of passionate debates is stunningly re‐ about how they thought and argued about the warding, such as his discussion of the exchanges war and its aims and the excuses they made for between Kirchwey, Fischer, and Niebuhr over So‐ FDR.