Jänos Szabö* After September 11: Challenges and Trends of Response in Domestic and International Institutions
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Südosteuropa , 50. Jg., 10-12/2001 Jänos Szabö* After September 11: Challenges and Trends of Response in Domestic and International Institutions Comparative Analysis of the Counter-Terrorism Measures Taken by Advanced Democracies "If the commoner falling in love with his own market achievements leaves the guarantees of his own security far behind he will have to return for them sooner or later." (Emerson) Some general political science relevance of the September 11 shock The September 11 terrorist attacks - as it read in the western press - took secret services, law enforcement agencies and armies aback. It was proved that the Western World grew indolent - at least from military and security policy aspects. Security policy did not respond in time to the terrorist threat and the institutions of defense, not so much in the field of theory and strategy than in practice, in credibly fell behind in the adaptation to the new hierarchy of security challenges. Four years ago, when Hungary was getting prepared for its NATO accession, one of the most important elements of the persuasion campaign was the claim that the Alliance was not preparing for a new war, but secures the defense of the member states against the new challenges of security policy primarily against ter rorism. For the citizens, however, September 11 indicated that although the gen eral defense strategy of the alliance is correct the substantial changes are consid erably burdened by the inertia of practice. While terrorist threat, migration, or ganized crime, development and management of low-intensity local conflicts are growing into fashionable topics the practice is dominated by forces and means (shaped for the possible conflicts in the previous bipolar world order) and this also refers to the levels of the actual organizational elements, resource distribution and interest enforcement activity too. The rearrangement of forces and resources in accordance with the new prior ity of threats is slower than necessary. Since the cessation of the bipolar world structure the efficiency of defense policy decision-making and execution mecha nism and the new harmony between defense budgets and military-industrial inter ests have been criticized the most vehemently this time. Out of all the players perhaps it was the military that responded the best of all to the changes, by Prof. Dr. Jänos Szabö, Director, Office for Strategic and Defense Studies, Budapest After September 11: Challenges and Trends of Response 503 working out the NATO Modernization Program and the new strategy draft, but due to the specified counteractions the practice is characterized by slow-motion processes. Under the influence of terrorist acts the situation is noticeably chang ing and the transformation must be accelerating in all probability: thus the Ameri can missile defense umbrella was replaced by ways of defense that can be used in operations incomparable with traditional or nuclear warfare. Now the responsibility of politicians and decision-makers both for absence of early warning information on the potential terrorist attacks and for the fact that neither the armed forces nor the law-enforcement agencies were at their best is increasingly scrutinized in public. However, the responsibility of political and governmental decision-makers is not limitless; the most important tasks of the past decades were the modernization, stabilization, and operation of western-type civilian control. This allows the armed forces to ensure the defense and security of the people of a country without posing a threat to society or turning into an in dependent power center. In Hungary this control is exercised by the constituents every four years directly and between two elections by defense politicians and media guarantee the control. Until September 11 the frequently asked questions were: What do armed forces spend their budget on? Is it necessary to spend so very much on the armed forces? There were extreme opinions (even in Hungary) questioning the necessity of maintaining armed forces at all. Since September 11 the importance of state providing security, including armed forces and law en forcement agencies, has significantly increased. Ambitions to professionalism came into prominence which is well illustrated by the fact that in the United States marketable-regarded security services like airport security and baggage control were retaken by federal agencies almost immediately after the terrorist attacks. The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon also mark the end of an idyllic combination of security, welfare growth and post-modern constitution ality as the right to liberty achieved in western societies are forced to compromise and a part of them have to be temporarily suspended. As there are no "standard operational procedures" for the new conflict situation, at the beginning tightening the existing though liberal regulations was the only way of improving the sense of security receiving high priority at an incredibly high speed. This could be experi enced in the United States right at the airports where the rather formal inquiries were replaced by extreme security measures. It was allowed to shoot down civil planes if they were to be used for terrorist acts and the citizens did not protest as these measures significantly increased their sense of security. The rules of tapping telephones and surveillance were also eased and this measure did not trigger off a huge wave of protest either. Holding in respect to the sensitivity human rights this liberalization was adopted only for four years which clearly indicates that the de cision-makers are fully aware of the unprecedented infringement of liberties. September 11 is a tremendous trial of the multicultural global western world order. There is much at stake: will the community of the developed industrial de mocracies box itself up or will it preserve its openness by transforming its defense policy and security policy system in order to guarantee its citizens' security. It 504 Jänos Szabö would be premature to answer which version gets the upper end but it should be hoped for the latter. If the near future were shaped in accordance with the more favorable scenario it would not be necessary to worry about a significant and long-term limitation of liberties as society has its own defense mechanisms and human rights organizations and other NGO's will definitely send their warnings which can hardly be ignored by any decision-maker. More than a decade ago, when the breakup of bipolarity generated huge de bates among experts of conflict theory it became clear for everyone that what had begun was nothing less than a historic experiment with the disintegration of a large-scale destructive global conflict (Nuclear World War) into many minor con flicts in order to manage and resolve them separately. Meanwhile it became clear that these conflicts are not under total control either as they tend to slip out of our hands and live their own lives. Moreover, new conflicts emerged that had not been taken into account before. As for military activities the general ideas were that, especially in the time of mass armies, they were phenomena focused on an exceptional period of time (a war) thus in peacetime it remains latent that is concentrating mainly on prepara tion and readiness. By today, however, it has turned out that if the objective is the stabilization of the peace of the world or at least that of Europe - or the peace of post-industrial developed democracies, to be even more exact - these military ac tivities should be permanent and omnipresent in order to secure this peace. That is military capabilities active only in exceptional, emergency situations were re placed by another, a day-to-day type of very diffuse military activities remaking and exceeding national frameworks. This is the change of paradigm that results from the studying of conflicts and the demand for crisis management making up an inseparable part of the new paradigms in itself. It can be stated that a complete change of the defense structure is in progress and the September 11 shock had a decisive influence of the entire system of institutions. Within it functions, institu tionalized roles are changing moving towards fundamentally new threat priorities. Alas, these organizational structures still have an excessive inertia and an intol erably high level of potential moment of inertia. In short: it is still impossible to respond to the challenges of a changing world, as required by the dynamically changing security necessities. In this field a shift of the adaptive military structures towards multiplicity can be seen. In regions where peace should be preserved or maintained peacekeeping operations will dominate and classic armed combat capabilities should remain "on standby" in a way. In other regions of the world where peace should not only be kept but also enforced in low-intensity (or not so very low-intensity) combat op erations classical military forces should be involved in the processes at a level ac cording to the requirements of the particular tactical-strategic indications. In ac cordance with this, modem and post-modem societies are always forced to face the task of a permanent modification of the distribution of resources in their defense budget. It is still not clear whether the modification of defense resources will be executed on the basis of the relatively simple public opinion approach or the very complex political approach or the also fairly sophisticated professional After September 11: Challenges and Trends of Response 505 requirements. The problem is not easy to solve. In the decision-making process the intentions or articulated requirements of the military technocracy should pass through the filter of logocracy, democracy and bureaucracy and only then a deci sion can be made. The decisions then have to be tested in practice and the feed back of the results should involve every factor in the process (political and mili tary decision-makers) in order to allow them to "see what they have done".