NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN RESEARC H

TITLE : CHANGING PATTERNS OF RUSSIAN POLITICAL DISCOURSE : A Dictionary of Russian Politics, 1985 - Presen t

AUTHOR : Elliott Mossman

CONTRACTOR : University of Pennsylvani a

PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR : Elliott Мossman

COUNCIL CONTRACT NUMBER : 805-04-

DATE : December, 199 1

The work leading to this report was supported by funds provided by the National Council for Soviet and East European Research . Th e analysis and interpretations contained in the report are those o f the author . "Changing Patterns of Russian Political Discourse :

А Dictionary of Russian Politics, 1985 - Present " An Executive Summar y The changing patterns of Russian political speech since 198 5 reflect the breakdown of "command" political structures an d increasing recourse to a "war of words" over the tokens o f legitimacy : nation, the West, the restoration of history , ecology, human rights . Background . Totalitarian states use political discourse t o create an illusion of legitimacy : words in these "logocracies " are stripped of their normative meanings and given new meaning b y those who control usage . As the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu put s it, the Soviet regime historically has been an oligarch y characterized by a monopoly on language . 1 The monopolisti c practices began with Lenin's efforts to replace the Frenc h revolutionary vocabulary with a special terminology of Leninis t coinage and usage, but it was Stalin who perfected the monopol y on language . Linguistic choice diminished as he strove fo r axiological contrast with no linguistic neutral ground ; the regular use of superlatives eliminated grounds fo r differentiation ; the language was extensively bureaucratized an d militarized, in an effort to reduce the dichotomy civil-military ; finally, East and West took on Manichean properties in th e language, with loan words stigmatized and Slavic roots revered . Quantitatively, the end result of this rigid control ove r

1 Libеr, No .2 (August 22, 1990), p .3 . The point is not lost o n such spectator-participants as Vaclav Havel : see his "Words o n Words," New York Review of Books, January 11, 1990, p .6 . language was that, until the 1960's, the standard vocabulary o f Soviet newspapers had been reduced to 1,500 words, wit h practically no new political speech evident . Language dissidence, in reaction to the Leninist an d Stalinist legacy, became the hallmark of political speech in th e 1970's and 1980's . Many of the terms that were canonized earl y in the Gorbachev era derive from the dissident struggle to ope n up a political discourse stifled by the State-Party monopoly . The loan word "consensus" arrives in Russian in the writings o f Andrei Sakharov, and then migrates to Gorbachev's vocabulary, a s do several of Gorbachev's early policy labels : for example ,

Sakharov's "Memorandum to the General Secretary TSK КР SS Comrad e L .I . Brezhnev," 1972, long circulating in and onl y officially published in the registered press in 1990, is th e earliest identified source of the pattern of proximate occurrenc e "' -demokratizatsiia in opposition to zastoi . " Glasnost' . The logocratic practice that dominated Sovie t Russian political speech for seventy years remains visible in th e new words coined since the emergence of glasnost' in 1987 ; indeed, glasnost' is prima facie evidence of logocentric policy . "" is a prominent example of the state's remainin g capacity to strip a word of meaning : it is so discredite d linguistically that it is now the object of parodies, such a s "perestruktirovanie" and the pejorative "perestroishchiki"' Th e tendency in Soviet politics toward "an all-embracing idle chatte r spilling over into linguistic meretriciousness" was criticized a s

2 one of seven centrifugal tendencies in Soviet society in а prominent 1989 analysis of Soviet politics . 2 It is more likely ,

however, that diversification of political discourse is а welcome development in а society starved for pluralism . Countervailing linguistic strategies have also developed i n the period of glasnost', many of them marked linguistically b y the political struggle with the logocracy : -- words coined in the dissident and later the democrati c press are "coopted" into official discourse ;

-- foreign loan words are borrowed heavily from English , mostly from the domain of the social sciences ; -- words with negative, often anti-nationalist connotation s are attributed to the democratic opposition ; -- words from a military vocabulary are used to legitimiz e bureaucratic functions ; -- structural features of the language are employed t o

create categories of political opposition to the status qu о ante ; -- words are coined to fill "empty sets" in the Leninist political vocabulary . It is clear that political discourse is increasingly an arena fo r the struggle to disestablish the centrist logocratic tradition .

Language, Nation and the West . Political speech has bee n most reactive to the idea of nation unleashed by glasnost' . Th e 18th century term "rossiiane" has been retrieved to refer to th e

2Academician G .V . Osipov et al, Sotsial'naiaisotsial'no- politicheskaia situatsiia v SSSR : sostoianieiprognoz, Moscow : Moscow State University Press, p .4 .

3 ethnically Russian population, as distinct from the Russian - speaking (russoiazynchnyi) population that has preempted the ter m russkii . Archaic syntax and other stylistic devices are employed in order to evoke Russian as distinct from modernized Europea n roots . The most heated battles occur over the legitimate term for a political phenomenon . Conservatives introduce veз ternizm as a term to stigmatize the liberal tradition of zapadnichestvo ; entrepreneurial activity is lampooned by the ludicrous coinag e individual'shchik ; overtones of National ("Lebensraum" ) are invoked in zhiznennoe prostranstvo ; Solzhenitsyn bids t o replace perestroika with a set of terms deriving from obustroit' . Structurally, the language is employed to undermine a n opponent's political doctrine, and often etymology (Slavic versu s

Western European) is one of the weapons as well . Thus, th e democratic reformers attack the Center for its psevdoperestroika , while the hardliners counter with lzheperestroika ; Centrists try to retain the socialist mantle with a campaign agains t lzhesotsializm . The language is employed semantically an d structurally in order to fill in the blanks in politica l development that has been retarded by the exclusive Leninist politics . А Leninist language in which there was only the ter m sotsialisticheskii vybor is augmented by the coinag e demokraticheskii vybor . The democratic opposition's policy o f "destructivism" is visible in the category of coinages tha t utilize the prefix "de-" : "deofficialization," "desovietization, "

4

"demonopolization," "departization," "deideologization, " "destatization," "depoliticization . "

It is likely that the August coup d'etat and its aftermat h (dubbed the "August Revolution") will perpetuate the tendencie s the previous six years of linguistic change have established . "Debolshevization" has been added to the list, while th e banishment of the Party has provided Soviet politics with th e

opportunity for a new term -- partization -- that is in harmony with its root . Although Communist authority remains in what ar e now termed "Communist refuges," most former Party members becam e what are derisively termed "Communist mutants ." The struggl e over a Western reference point in new vocabulary continues i n post-coup speech (parteigenosse), as the massive borrowing o f Western terms to describe unprecedented phenomena continues , e .g ., "collaborationist," "Regent of the Russian Monarchy, " "junta" and "putsch . " "A Short Dictionary of Russian Political Terms 1985-Present " (available upon request from the offices of the National Counci l

for Soviet and East European Research), documents the use of a representative 300 new political terms . It is the core of th e 2,500 entry "Keywords in Russian Politics since 1985 : A Lexica l and Critical Commentary," to be completed by September, 1992, an d published by Oxford University Press in 1993 .

September, 1991 Elliott Mossman

5

Changing Patterns of Soviet Political Discourse , 1985 -- Present

Elliott Mossman University of Pennsylvania

1

Soviet political discourse is undergoing а process of change in the era of perestroika. In order to better understand the nature and extent o f these changes we have to compare the patterns of th е present day and traditional Soviet political speech .

The Soviet state as а totalitarian system is often c alled a logocracy, or government by words, functioning to create an illusion of legitimacy, on e that conceals reality while it retains an encoded connection to it . А specific feature of Soviet political discourse has been that its primary element, th e word, is stripped of immanent meaning and given new meaning by thos e who control its use .

Vaclav Havel pointed out in his speech on th е occasion of receiving thе West German publishers' and book dealers' Peace Prize that th е essence of thе dissidents' fight for civil rights against th е communis t totalitarian regime often consisted in unmasking а communist terminology with its fictional semantics and restoring th е real meanings of words . He said :

At last I reach thе beautiful word "peace." I have read it for forty years in our country on every roof and in every report. An allergy to

this beautiful word has been created in me and my compatriots , because I know what it has designated for forty years: armies ,

powerful and gaining in strength, which allegedly ar е defending peace . Sevеral Don Quixotes of "Charter-77" and their younger colleagues of thе Independent Association for Peace succeeded in rehabilitating thi s word and restoring its original meaning despite th е lengthy process of systematically stripping the word "peace" of its proper sense and , moreover, filling it with a meaning opposite to its dictionary meaning .

2 We had to paу dearly for this semantic "perestroika," i .e., for turning thе word "peace" upside down. Almost all the young leaders of th e Independent Association for Peace have served prison terms of several months. But it was important: one word was saved from total

devaluation. And this, as I am striving t о explain here, is far fro m saving only one word. It is saving something more important .

All thе important events of th е real world -- beautiful and ugly - - arе always preceded by a prelude in th е sphere of words . 1 Characteristic features of totalitarian language were described man y times in some detail. The first to do it was Victor Klemperer wh o in 1946 gave a brilliant first-hand description of th е political language of Nazi Germany, calling it "th е Language of th е Third " (Lingua Tertii Imperil) or Nazi-Dеuts сh .2 Thе role of a "new language" as a tool of totalitarian oppression in th е was better understood only after an analogous language ha s been formed in Nazi Germany, although its main features had been properly analуz еd by A.M. Sеlishсhеv as early as 1928 .3 After th е introduction of th е term "Newspeak" by in 1948, has been borrowed into many languages, bringing a better recognition of th е terrible consequences of language manipulation in totalitarian societies . Since Poland began its struggle for reforms earlier than other Fast European communist countries, much has been accomplished there to d еsсribе communist "Newspeak." А special study of thе language of communis t published propaganda was Warsaw in 1979 . 4 In thе most recent Soviet discussions, thе analogy of th е German Nazi language and Soviet Russian Newspeak has been advanced by some democrats as an axiom . 5

3 The main features of thе Soviet political language, which formed in Lenin's time, but achieved full development under Stalin's rule and persis t

to this day ar е the following : 1) a tendency to axiological contrast and a lack of neutral expressions ; 2) ritualism linked with pragmatism ;

3) а magical character, that is, а tendency to create a pseudoreality ; 4) arbitrariness as regards th е choice of themes ; 5) thе redefinition of concepts ; 6) propagandistic expression together with th е widespread use of superlatives ;

7) thе bureaucratization of language ; 8) thе widespread introduction of military terminology ; 9) thе widespread use of abbreviated forms .6 Thе epoch of glasnost initiated an open discussion of many sombre aspects of thе Soviet political system, including th е manipulation of political language. For example, Anаtоlii Strеlianуi, a popular liberal essayist, called thе current practice of tabooing certain concepts by not giving them direct and clear designations "communist bashfulness ." He wrote: "Wе would rather have our tongues ripped out than openly call a private craftsman a private craftsman, a workers' enterprise a workers ' enterprise, а gathering of citizens meeting freely and independently of th е authorities a free and independent gathering ." 7

Commenting on thе fact that even th е latest edition (1 97 9) of thе Soviet Encyclopedic Dictionary omits thе entry ложъ (lie) which is a key notion for thе understanding of thе nature of Soviet political language an d all thе law terminology, th е Soviet philosopher G . Guseinov writes :

4 The key word, rejected from the beginning by ideology .. . is squeezed

into а zone of total specific silence : it the house of а hanged man nobody mentions the rope . The social force, which seized the language, first said that it wil l eliminate only the superfluous in the language, but then promised to

eliminate everything that is not "truth." Thе speaker of language, who

lоуallу adapted himself to the conditions of the experiment to remain its user, needs exact instructions, and he finds them at every step . As every latest instruction, introducing new rules, eliminates all th e

preceding ones, the language speaker is developing strong speec h habits : suspicion of the truthfulness of the text and respect for the truth of the subtext, contempt for dimwittedness, a preference to definen a object instead...8 of its cognition via th e word Speaking of the same techniques of Soviet political language manipulation, a Soviet lawyer, N.S . Barabasheva, observed that Georg e

Orwеll's thesis, "no concept, hence, there are no realia", was widel y practiced in Soviet legal literature . For examрlе, the entry проституция (prostitution) is absent in the latest edition (1987) of the Soviet

Encyclopedic Law Dictionary, which leads to the inference that in 198 7 prostitution did not exist in the Soviet Union. She writes that the formula

" под руководством коммунистической партии" ("under the leadership of the Communist party"), common in Soviet legal acts, wa s endowed with a magic quality -- success in an activity, without Party

responsibility for its ехесutiоп . 9 The description of the brainwashing techniques of Sovie t propaganda is a popular subject in the contemporary Soviet liberal press . These are :

5 1) tagging (positive tags for everything communist, negative fo r everything non-coмmunist) ; 2) preaching of hatred for everything non-communist ;

3) maniрulаtiоn of information (telling of semi-truth and lies) ; 4) concealing th е true views of thеir opponents ; 5) borrowing of slogans (for example, thе "Moral Code of th е Builder of " was modeled on th е Christ's Sermon of thе Mount) . 1 0 Much of what is called thе process of glasnost and perestroika has been played out not in reality, but in th е sphere of words. Leading Sovie t sociologists see one of thе main reasons for thе failure of this process o f glasnost and perestroika in "all-embracing idle talk which is turning into mere verbiage ." 11 In their verbal exchanges both Soviet reformers an d counter-reformers arе using th е same traditional devices of Soviet political discourse. Perestroika did not bring with it th е destruction of th е traditional Soviet political language with its tagging habits and use o f hackneyed phrases . Its main structure and patterns survive, and new branches arе simply grafted onto th е old treе. Vaclav Havel warned th е international community of this phenomenon :

The splendid word 'perestroika' which is giving hope sounds today

throughout thе entire world. All of us believe that hope for Europe and thе whole world looms behind this word . But I confess that in spite of this, I am speaking of fear that thi s word must not become a new incantation, must not turn into a cudgel , with which someone is thrashing us . I am not worried about my own

homeland: on thе lips of its rulers this word sounds approximately th е same way as "Our Gracious Sovereign thе Emperor" on thе lips of Shveik .

б I am worried about something else: that the same statesman wh o

rules now in th е Kremlin is tossing accusations (maybe out of despair ) at thе striking workers, or mutinous nations and minorities, or unwanted ideological minorities that endanger perestroika . I understand that it is immensely difficult to fulfill this gigantic task which he took upon himself, that everything is hanging by a thread ,

and almost anything may tear this thr еаd, and then all of us together will fall into an abyss. But, nevertheless, I ask: this "new thinking, "

does it contain serious traces of thе old thinking? Do not we hearn a echo of old stereotypes of thinking and power-language rituals? Doe s

not thе word "perestroika" begin here, there, and everywhere to remind us of th е word "socialism," especially when it is used to bea t about thе head thе same man who was for so long and so unjustl y 1 2 beaten with thе word "socialism"? Evaluating th е signs of successful survival and persistence of traditional Soviet totalitarian discourse after 1985 we may indicate som e

of thе salient features of the modern Soviet political speech that confirm this trend :

1) prеsегvatiоn of traditional keywords of Soviet political discourse: контрпропaгaнда (counter-propaganda) , эконоmический саботаж (economic sabotage), врaг перестройки, нации (enemy of perestroika, nation), (saboteurs), (terrorists) , заговорщикисаботажники террористы (plotters), духовные диверсанты (spiritual saboteurs), агенты (agents) , Отечество (Fatherland), etc . ;

2) preservation of thе long-practiced and proven techniques of denigratin g an opponent:

7 а) ca ll ing anу opponent of the communist regime а fascist (e.g., демократыфашисты arе often referred to by Soviet conservatives as

[fascists], hence thеу arе also called either)демократы-фашисты [democrats-fascists] and демофашисты [demo-fascists]) ; b) tagging an opponent by a word in inverted commas or precede d

by лже - (false-) and псевдо- (pseudo-) (e.g ., democrats arе called by thе conservatives "демократы" ["democrats"], лжедемократы [false- demoсrats], and псевдодемократы [pseudo-democrats]) ; с ) borrowing th е terminology of th е opponents (e.g ., Sovie t democrats, who were on th е Soviet left, were calling Soviet conservatives правые [thе rightists], the Soviet Communist party in its counterattack o n thе democrats in early 1991 started to call them правые [rightists] in order to denigrate them and to turn thе tables on them) ; 3) preservation of thе traditional Soviet political terminology, and enhancing its status by th е use of th е attributes новый (new) , обновленный (rejuvenated), e .g., новый Союз (new Union) , обновленный Союз (rejuvenated Union), новая Федерация (new ), обновленная Федерация (rejuvenated Federation), or by adding thе word обновление (renovation), e .g., обновление социализма (renovation of socialism), обновление форм и методов работы парторганиза ций (renovation of thе forms and methods of th е work of party organizations), обновление Компартии (renovation of thе Communist party), etc . Soviet rulers over thе years seem to have used up most of th е positive attributes for embellishing th е word социализм (socialism) - победившийсоциализм социализм (triumphant socialism), развитой (developed socialism), зрелый социализм (mature socialism) ; nоw, when

8 call only for thе crisis of socialism in the USSR is an o рen secret, they сап oбновленый социализм (renovated socialism) ; but thеу could not find челоеческимлицомв"any counterslogan to the liberal сoциал изм с ("socialism with a human face"), borrowed into Russian from th е Czechoslovak communist reformers of 1968 and now widely used b y

Soviet democrats while th е Communist ideologists prefer to use its varian t гуманный социализм (human socialism) ; thеу had to adopt th е slogan of Western social democrats "демократический сoциализм - (democratic socialism) ;

4) thе basic structure of core communist slogans has hardly changed i n recent years (thе aim is communism, th е principal moving force -- th е Communist party, th е main subject -- thе Soviet people, thе main function of a man -- work) . But as thе Soviet Union is transforming into a multiparty society there arе certain changes in th е use o f communist slogans . They become more universal in character and more varied .

Comparison of th е October revolution anniversary slogans for 198 8 through 1990 reveals that, as th е party was in retreat under thе pressure of thе democratic forces in these years, thе essence of thе core slogans was preserved, though thе frequency of thе main Communist symbols was decreasing (e.g ., in 1988 Lenin was mentioned twi се as великий Ленин

(great Lenin), once in большевики-ленинцы (Bolsheviks-Leninists), onc e inленинскаямарксизм-ленинизм (Marxism-Leninism), once i n

национальная политика (Lenin's national policy) ; КПСС (CPSU - thе Communistпартия Party of thе Soviet Union) three times, of them once as

(th е Рarty) 13 . In 1989 Lenin was mentioned only once and CPSU twi се , one of them as партия (thе Party), but all other words and expressions abov e (Bolsheviks-Leninists, Marxism-Leninism, Lenin's national policy) wer e

9 dropped . 14 In 1990, Lenin was mentioned once, and CPSU also о nсе , named simply as партия (thе Party), while the other words of the 1988 slogan s mentioned.15 above were not used a t all Gorbachev's aim in introducing perestroika in 1985 was not to destroy thе communist doctrine, but to adapt it to modern conditions . It would be appropriate to mention here that his very choice of thе terms перестройка (restructuring), гласность (glasnost - openness, but not свобода слова [freedom of speech]), демократизация ( , but not демократия []) shows th е limits of his reformist approach. It would be instructive to l еarn what th е Communist Party ideologists understand by glasnost. In thе latest Soviet dictionary of political terms we find :

Glasnost - thе maximal openness and truthfulness in th е activity of state and public organizations. Glasnost presupposes th е absence of zones closed for criticism... But at thе same timе glasnost is not synonymous with universal permissiveness, undermining of Socialist

values; it is invoked to strengthen socialism, th е socialist code of morals . 1 6 Reading this definition it is difficult to understand what glasnost i

е maximum truthful description of events or is it th е necessity to s is it th strengthen "thе socialist code of morals." For in thе past years thе first was often sacrificed for thе sake of thе second in thе USSR .1 7 The limits of Soviet political innovations, as re flected in political vocabulary, can be shown by thе following example. The Moscow mayor Gavriil Popov published in 1990 his program of political and economi c reforms in which he liberally used new political terms coined by th е Soviet democrats, all of which started with th е prefix де - (de-) :

1 0 (desovietization) десов ция (defederalization), a ия тиз , е денационализация (denationalization), etc. Sensing the dangerou s

character of all of these terms which imply th е destruction of existin g Soviet structures, th е conservative Soviet mass media viciously attacke d Popov :

It happens that under th е simple and understandable "Down with .. .!" a pseudo-theoretical basis is built, and then after a naked and primitiv e negation an elegant "de-" is born: defederalization, desovietization ,

depolitization, etc. In order to let you understand th е truth I sugges t that, instead of all of these "de-", use only one: "de-Popovization" . Try it, and you will understand a lot . 1 8

On thе other hand, communist hard-liners ar е calling their opponent s , деструктивные силы (destructive forces) who aim at the "демонтаж социализма" (dismantling of socialism) . The era of perestroika, which lasted for at least five years (1985 -

1990; now we often hear of постперестройка [postperestroika]) may b e

divided into twо periods: 1985-1987 -- aппаратная перестройка (perestroika done by thе apparatus) and after 1988 -- демократи ческая перестройка (democratic perestroika) . If during thе first period it was

thе party and state apparatus who set thе pace of perestroika from above , during thе second period thеir firm control over thе process got out of hand .

It is during thе first period that most of th е terminological innovations came from above and, precisely, from Gorbachev himself. It

was as if thе populace, frightened by decades of repression and used to a carefully supervised political vocabulary, first tasted some new, very

limited freedom of expression . During th е second period, however, thi s

1 1 situation changed drastically and new terms started to b е coined by the larger society .

The real innovator in political vocabulary was not Gorbachev himsel f but his closest advisers and speech writers (such as A . Iakovlev, G .

Shakhnazarov, and others) who, extremely well versed in th е history of Marxism-Leninism and Russian history and well acquainted with th е writings of Soviet dissidents and with modern Western political culture , suggested to Gorbachev new terms and expressions .

Whу does Gorbachev consider перестройка (perestroika) to be th е most important of his thr ее slogans гласность (glasnost), ускор ение (acceleration) and перестройка (perestroika)? А possible explanation for

it was suggested by M. Kaganskаiа. 19 Gorbachev's perestroika is thе second Soviet perestroika. The first one was intrоduсеd by Stalin in th е 1930s . Stalin used twо synonymous terms реконструкция (reconstruction) and перестройка (restructuring) . The first one meant technical reconstruction, thе building of industry, and th е second -- th е restructuring of consciousness, th е creation of a new Soviet man, who wi ll be an atheist and a devoted communist . Stalin also used th е word перестройка to designate restructuring of Communist party organizations . It is symptomatic that L. Kaganovich, who was Stalin's right hand man , suggested recently in an interview that Gorbachev's perestroika is a continuation of a process started in Stalin's times . He said :

We have to act decisively, to explain to th е people what has happened, because thе people suffer without an explanation . А wide discussion should be started, but thеу say that it is against perestroika .

Why? Not at all . I am for perestroika, for reforms . My report of th е XII I

1 2 Party Congress on the organizational proms ems of the Party started

dirесtlу with the word "perestroika" .2 0 Gorbachev defines perestroika as "революция сверху " (revolution from above) which has to create обновленное общество (renovated society) . Developing this idea of renovation, Gorbachev writes : ...It will be a renovated society . We began such a serious matter, a very difficult one. But it is possible to interpret and evaluate facts in various ways. There is a parable: a wayfarer approaches people wh o are building an edifice and asks the builders : what are you doing? One of them answers with irritation: look, we are hauling the devil's stones from morning to evening . . . Another one got up from his knees , straightened himself up and said : you see, we are building a Temple! 2 1 Gorbachev sees Soviet society renovated by perestroik a

as a Temple (he writes the word Храм [Temple] with a capital X) . At the same time he sees perestroika as a direct continuation of the Bolshevi k October Revolution . By using the word perestroika as a key word of hi s reforms Gorbachev is pursuing a polemical objective : his second perestroika will be an exact opposite to Stalin's first perestroika, associated

with terror. His perestroika will be done by the whole Soviet society, an d

not by the proletariat only, and it will bring renovation to the whole society . By the same reasoning the key word glasnost could not serve as the centerpiece key word because it is directly associated with Tsar Alexande r II's liberal policies, removed in time and not immediate in Soviet history .

The teрм "ново е политическое мышление " (new political философия thinking) is a new one (as its synonym Gorbachev use s (philosophy) . Both refer to international relations and are connected wit h

1 3 an appeal to деидеологизация межгосударственных отношений" (de- ideologizationриоритет of intergovernmental relations) an d n общечеловейеских ценностей " (prio гity of universal human values) . But some of his other teðms arе closely connected with thе Russian cultural tradition and Orthodox Christianity . Such ar е thе terms соборность " (conciliarism) and мир " (mir, thе Russian village community) . The first one was introduced by thе founder of thе Russian slavophile movement Alexei Khomiakov (1804-1860), and th е second wa s one of thе main concepts of thе slavophile movement. Other of his terms , such as "духовность" (spirituality), ду ховнoе возрождение " (spiritual revival), "нравственность" (morals), "нрав ственное очи щение (moral purification), милосердие " (charity), refer to purely religious values . It can be easily shown that most of Gorbachev's key words and slogans were borrowed from thе vocabulary of Soviet dissidents of th е 60's and 70's, and particularly from th е Samizdat writings of A. Sakharov and A. Solzhenitsyn, who called for ликвидация застоя (liquidation of stagnation."23), for гласность (glasnost), конвергенция систем (convergence of systems), консенсус (consensus), правoвое государство (law-governed state), (spirituality) , демократизатция духовность (democratization) . For example, Solzhenitsyn wrote in 1969: "Glasnost , honest and full glasnost - this is th е first condition of a healthy state in any society." 22 Sakharov demanded in his memorandum to L. Brezhnev "thе liquidation of stagnation ." 23 The word "glasnost" is mentioned in thi s memorandum nine times . Having heavily borrowed political terms from dissidents, Gorbachev seems to interpret them in his own way . He was more than once accused of it by Soviet democrats . А leading Soviet democrat lu. Afanas'ev wrote :

1 4 e The followers of th е Advanced Teaching in the person of th worst traditions of th President of thе USSR (who was "elected" in thе е Stalinist "constitutional democratism") and his team willingly operat e r within thе whole set of democratic terms borrowed from "the forme dissident" A. Sakharov, among them with th е term "consensus" . However, in this case, as in his other pseudo- гthеtогiсal exercises, M . Gorbachev puts into "consensus" a meaning which is different from th е

one accepted throughout thе world: while thе universal democrati c practice understands by "consensus" a general agreement on the basi s

of mutual compromises, for th е General Secretary of thе Centra l l Committee of thе CPSU this term means a universal unconditiona agreement, in essence, with a directive given from above by th е Central

Committee on thе basis of an "unanimous decision" taken there by th е anonymous "decision makers" 2 4 Other important key words of Gorbachev's program, such a s приватизация (privatization), плюрализм (pluralism), рынок (market) , n рыночная экoномика (market economy) were almost never mentioned i Samizdat and were borrowed by him from th е West, probably mediated through Poland and Hungary, where these ideas were widely discusse d

and tried out.

It would be interesting to compare th е patterns of discourse in th е official Soviet propaganda under Stalin, in th е Samizdat literature of th е 60's and 70's and in thе Soviet mass media today. The most fascinating fac t is thе continuity of key words, ideas and slogans of struggle and confrontation in all these three types of texts . We find in all of them suc h

key words as Браг (enemy), предатель (traitor), борьба (struggle) , война (war), бой (battle), фронт (front), соратник (comrade-in-arms), etc .

1 5 This kind of confrontation mentality developed by th е Soviet system during decades of its indoctrination activity remained and remains a telling characteristic sign of most of th е political texts produced in th е USSRпepec.тройкии It is especially strong today when terms like враги (thе enemies of perestroika) and враги нации (thе enemies of nation) arе freely traded on th е Soviet political scene by all sides involved in politica l debates .

The sources of modern Soviet political terminology ar е multiple : Western ideas, traditional Russian political thought, Russian Orthodo x

religion, Soviet opposition to Stalin in th е 20's and 30's, etc . Western terminology, especially Western economic terms , form perhaps th е most significant stratum of neologisms in modern Soviet political and economic discourse . Such arе thе terms рыночная экономика (market economy), свободный рынок (free market), бизне с (business), бизнесмен (businessman), имид ж (image), рейтинг (rating) , менеджep (manager), презентация (presentation), маркетинr (marketing), (conversion), (pluralism) , фермер конверсия плюрализм (farmer), спонсор (sponsor), etc . It is slightly absurd that th е Soviets arе introducing new designations of institutions and posts according to a Western pattern ,

though th е essence of thе regime has hardly changed : президен т (president), вице-президент (vice president), парламент (parliament) , муниципалитет (municipality), etc . In introducing Western terminology, modern Soviet rulers caused a

wide reappraisal of thе semantics of terms of Western origin which were borrowed into Russian before, when thеy usually referred to Western realia. For example, thе word бизнесмен (businessman) previousl y

1 6 referred only to Western businessman and had thе negative connotation о f a wheeler-dealer . Nowadays, it refers also to Soviet businessmen and it s

connotation is, as a rule, a positive one . Thе words коррупция (corruption , мафия (mafia), рэкет (racket), рэкетир (racketeer) referred once only to Western realia, while now the definition of these words in dictionaries ha s

to be revised as thеy denote also realia of modern Soviet life . Another source of new terms arе authors lik е Trotsky, who was in opposition to Stalin, and leading figures of thе Russian emigration . Trotsky was thе first to introduce into Russian thе expression Сталин и его

команда (Stalin and his team) which has gained wide currency now ; we hear today of Горбачев и его команда (Gorbachev and his team) , Ельцин и его команда (Yeltsin and his team), etc . А term coined by Trotsky in 1932 is сталинщина (Stalinism) which is widеly used today. Thе Russian emigre religious philosopher N .A. Berdiaev (1874-1948) introduced th е term русская èäåÿ (Russian idea) , which espoused Russia's moral and spiritual superiority over the world , particularly over the West, and Russia's mission to save th е world from decadence .25 This notion was also discussed in th е Samizdat in th е 70's and 80's .

Today the term русская ид ея has become common and even acquired an antonym. Speaking of their own national aspirations , individual Soviet republics speak of their националная идея (national idea) which is th е opposite of thе Russian idea . National movements in the present-day USSR provide a ric h vocabulary of new political terms . In this way many new borrowings fro m thе languages of th е repuЫics arе entering modern Russian political discourse . These arе thе new names of repu Ы ics : Татарстан (Tatarstan) ,

1 7 Кыргызстан (Kyrgyzstan), Молдова (Moldova), республик a - (Republic of Iakutia-Sakha) , ЯкутияПриднестровскаяСаха ресиублика (Dniester Republic), Гагазская республика (Gagauzian Republic) ; thе namesАрмянская of armies and military units in th е republics : на национaльнaя армия (Агmenian National Army), Мхедрио ни Щевардени , Тетри Георги (Mkhedrioni, Shevardeni, Tetri Georgi - - names of Georgian military organizations), айсзарги (aiszargs -- th е name of а Latvian voluntary para-military organization), etc ; thе names of Republican national institutions and posts (usually a revival o f designationsпримар used in thе pre-Soviet period), e .g. : in Moldova - - (mayor), примария (municipality), жудец (region), триколор (traditional Rumanianинтерфрoнт flag), etc; names of various national movements : (Interfront -- organizations of th е Russian speaking population, supportin g thе Central Moscow government, in Baltic republics and Moldova) , Народный фронт (рорular front -- organizations in a number of repu Ыic s supporting refoгms and thе national sovereignty of a republic), Рук (Rukh - thе biggest national movement in th е Ukraine), Саюдис (Sajudis - th е Lithuanian national movement), etc .

In thе conditions of confrontation of th е local population and the Russian language population in th е national repuЫics thе following terms have been coined : русскоязычные (Russian-speaking population - - denoting people of any nationality living as a Russian-speaking minority i n a national republic), оккканты (occupiers), мигранты (migrants) , коло исты (colonists) -- names given by th е national majority to thе Russian-speaking minority in a republic ( рarticularlу in Baltic repuЫics and Moldova) .

1 8 The Nazi racist terminology has been borrowed by the members of

the Russian nationalist organization Pamiat' : иудомасоны, жидомасоны (Judeomasons), юде (Jew, cf. German Jude), etc. This movement created terms сионизация (zionization -- the influence of Jews in Russian society ) and десионизация (dezionization -- the freeing of the Russian people o f h Jewish influence), and красные сионисты (Red Zionists -- Jews in hig government positions) .

A. Shafarevich introduced the terms русофобия (Russophobia - - (Big people -- th e hatred of Russians by the Jews), Б о ьшой народ Russians) and Малый народ (Small people -- the Jews) in his book On Russophobia, a genuine Soviet version of Mein Kampf, published in 1989 , y but wгitten and distгibuted in Samizdat for over a quarter of a centur before . 26 Traditional Russian political terminology, swept aside by the Octobe r revolution and used since to denote only historical realia, has been revive d

together with the reinstatement of corresponding realia: гласность

(glasnost), mир (mir, Russian village соmmunity), дворянстю (gentry) , атаман (ataman, Cossack chieftain), казачий крyг (Cossack council) ,

земство (zemstvo, the elective district council in Russia, 1864-1917), уезд (uiezd, the lowest administrative division), биржа (exchange), биржевик (stockbroker), etc . As some of the new political parties in the USSR (by some count s there are over 1500 such parties) accepted names of parties which existe d in tsarist Russia, corresponding terms have been revived : кадет (cadet , constitutional democrat; the constitutional-democrat parry was a majo r , liberal-monarchic party in Russia[1905-1917]), монархист (monarchic member of monarchic organizations in Russia in 1905-1907, which forme d

1 9 in 1911 the Русский монархический союз [Тhe Russian Monarchic Union]) , меньшевик (Menshevik, а member of а social-democratic movement formed after а split with the Bolsheviks in 1903 ; it existed in Russia until 1918), эсер ( а member of the socialist-revolutionary party which existe d in tsarist Russia in 1901-1918), etc . The authorship of many new political terms can be precisely

established. For example, th е term заединщики (zaiedinshchiks - the name of an influential group of Russian nationalist writers, who strive for

anнеде "integralлимую and indivisible Russia" [ за единую и Россию]) was coined by th е literary critic Tatiana Ivanova in 1988 ; thе

term обстроить and обустройство (to organize and organization) was introduced by A. Solzhenitsyn in 1990 as an alte rnative to перестроить and перестройка (to reconstruct and reconstruction) 27 ; thе term манкурт (a person who forgot his historical roots) was first in troduced by

Ch.Aitmatov in 1981, негл асный помощ ник (covert assistant,n a euphemistic designation of a KGB informer) was introduced by thе head of

thе KGB, V. Kriuchkov, in 1990 . One of thе intriguing aspects of thе present liberals' and thе hard- liners' speech is thе use by both sides of basically thе same Soviet political

terminology (th е old Stalinist one plus its many new elements, especia lly in thе sphere of economics) to tu rn thе tables on an opponent. Thus we

have пропаганда and контрпропаrанда (propaganda and counterpropaganda), реформа and контррефорm а (reform an оrm), нежная pеволюция (gentle revolution, i .e . а nonviolend counterref t revolution, a term borrowed in 1989 from Czech) -- нежная

контрреволюция (gentle counterrevolution, i .e ., a nonviolen t

counterrevolution) . While it was th е liberals who started to call the hard -

20 (Neobolsheviks), this term is now applied to them liners необольшевики

byперестройки the hard-liners. Both sides call each other враги (enemies of perestroika) . The prognosis for the future development of the Soviet political terminology looks as follows . The basic body of terms and expressions o f the totalitarian period will remain in use, being permanently revised and enriched by new elements . The main problem seems to be not the conservativism of the terminology itself, but the self perpetuating bureaucratic style of speech used by ^11 the opposing forces . O. Latsis

writes: "We have to admit with sorrow that the democratic press of our day is no less prone to express itself in stock phrases than th e

bureaucratized press of old times. Onlу the set of cliches has changed. The place of the Great Lenin is occupied by the Evil Lenin, the place of th e Glorious Way -- by 73 Years of Continuous Mistakes, and instead of

movement into a Bright Future th еy demand now the Return to Civil izatiоп." 28 The essence of the old Stalinist totalitarian regime has bee n thoroughly described and criticized in the USSR (cf . its description by

termsадминистративныя like тоталитаризм (), командно- (the command-administrative system) , системакомандно-репрессивная система (command-repressive system), советская империя (the Soviet

empire), etc. But the struggle for reforms and for their successful implementation will take a long time and its outcome is far from certain .

The patterns of Soviet bureaucratic speech have pe r meated Russian everyday speech too deeply, and even under the best scenario of quic k

and effective democratic refor ms it may take at least a generation to b e

2 1 gradually squeezed out of usage and replaced by а new, cardinally

different kind of Russian political language .

1 V.Havel, Slovo о slovakh [A Word about Words], "Russkaia Mysl"', " Paris, Nо.3799 , October 27, 1989,1).5 . 2 Victor Klemperer, Die unbewaltigte Sprache . Aus dem Notizbuch eines Philologer "LTI" , Leipzig, 1948 . 3 A.M. Selishchev, Iazyk revoliutsionnoi epokhi. Iz nabliudeni.i nad russkim iazykom poslednikh let. 1917-19 2 6 . [The Language of the Revolutionary Epoch . Some Remarks o n the Russian Language of the R е cent Years 1917-1926], Moscow, 1928 . 4 J"zyk propagandy. Opracowali S . Amsterdаmski, A. Jaw=owska, T. Kowalik, Warszawa , Niezale/na Oficyna Wydawnicza, marzec 1979 . 5 luri Mann, Govorim kak dum ает. Zametki о iazyke, istorii о nas samikh [We Speak th е Way We Think. Notes on Language, History and on Ourselves], "Izvestia", No.16, January 18, 1991, р.7 . 6 Cf. M. Bro

2 2 14 Prizyvy TsK KPSS k 72-i godovshchine Velikoi Oktiabr'skoi Sotsialisticheskoi revoliutsi i [Slogans of the Central Committee of CPSU for the 72 Anniversary of the Great Octobe r Socialist Revolution ], "Рrаvdа", 1989, No .305, November 1, p .1 . 15 Prizyvy TsK KPSS k 73-i godovshchine Velikoi Oktjabr'skoi S оtsi аlisti сh е skoi revoliutsi i [Slogans of the Centrаl Committee of CPSU for 01( 273 Anniversary of the Great Octobe r Socialist Revolution], "Pravda", 1990, No.297, October 24, p .1 .

16 Kratkii politicheskii slovar' [A Short Political Dictionary], Moscow, Politizdat, 1989 , рр.112-113 . 17 A.Iu. Vladimirov, [Letter to the Editor], "Ogonek", 1990, No .32, р.4 . 18 Iu. Golik, Nigiliatina [Nihilism], "Pravda", No.65, March 16, 1991, р.4 . 19 M. Kaganskaia, Marksizm i voprosy iazykoznaniia [Marxizm and the Problems o f Linguistics], "22", Tel Aviv, 1988, No .59, рр.117-1 5 5 . 20 Chto oni govoriat [What They Say Now], "Literatu rnaia gazeta", 1991, No .7, February 20, р.4 . 21 M. Gorbachev, Perestroika i novoe myshlenie [Perestroika and New Thinking] , Moscow, Politizdat, 1988, р.2 . 22 A . Solzhenitsyn, Pis'mo S еkr еtari аtu SP RSFSR [A Letter to the Secretariat of th e Writers Union of RSFSR], 1969, "Arkhiv Samizdata", No .333 . 23 A. Sakharov, Pamiatnaia zapiska LI .Brezhnevu i posleslovie k nei [A Memorandum to LI. Brezhnev and a Postface to It], "Arkhiv Samizdata", No .1136 .

24 A. Afanas'ev, "Mesto i zadachi politicheskoi oppozitsii v SSSR" . Dukhovnyi zave t Sakharova ["Thе Place and Tasks of the Political Opposition in the USSR ." The Spiritua l Behest of Sakharov], "Dov еri е ", 1990, No.8, р.6 . 25 N. Berdiaev, The Russian Idea, New York, Macmillan, 1948 . 26 A. Shafarevich, O rusofobii [On Russophobia], "Nash Sovremennik", 1989, No .6, р.l 1 . 27 A . Solzhenitsyn, Kak nam obustroit' Rossiiu {How We Should Arrange M аtters in Russia], "Literaturnaia gazeta", 1990, No .38, September 18, pp.3-б . 28 O. Latsis, Maski. Kakoi politike sluzhat oni segodnia [Masks . What Politics They Serv e Today], "Izvestia", 1991, No.60, March 11, p .3 .

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