Democracy, Identity and Anti-Americanism in Turkey: Implications for United States-Turkey Relations

Jeff Easterling

Honor Scholar

April 9, 2013

Abstract

In light of persistent anti-American in Turkey and nascent populism in Turkish foreign policy, this article will investigate how anti-Americanism is created in Turkey and it's meaning for Turkish-American bilateral relationship. Because anti-Americanism is generated by conflicts in national values, this article historically and socially constructs the two predominant political culture types in Turkey: Kemalism and Islam. This article will then identify the governmental, societal, and systemic factors contribute to antagonization of Turkish national identity by

American foreign policy.1 In turn the article will offer methods as to how the United States can confront anti-Americanism and reconcile its actions with Turkish society. In my findings, anti-

Americanism does not dictate all policy actions that are against American positions, but the current government, accountable to a newly emergent national identity, is susceptible to this sentiment.

1 Three of five levels of Rosenau’s International relations pre-theory.

A Paradigm Shift

People trying to label the United States-Turkey bilateral relationship will find it more

difficult to do so than they expect. All White House administrations since Bush senior have

given special titles to the country, considering it a valuable ‘strategic partner’, ‘model country’,

an example of ‘Muslim democracy’, etc. Both countries have significant military uses for the

other. Turkey imports many of its arms from America and earns money renting out valuable

military bases to the United States.2 Yet, beyond the military needs of both countries, it is a

partnership without much depth. Economic ties are substantial in and of themselves, but neither country is a truly a significant trading partner of the other. Institutional links are likewise rather scarce. In America, Turkey only occasionally registers in the mass media is not subject of

common discussion or debate. For Americans, it is only a rather distant country.

But the United States is not very far away from the thoughts of Turks. American events

in the Middle East concern them all too well, and American soldiers are stationed in their own

land. There is no proof for any takeover of Turkey by the United States, but as their fears are

supplied by past American behavior in the region and reinforced through sensational rumors of

American conspiracy against Turkey, and both of these factors are reinforced by a political

culture that developed largely out of opposition to foreign powers. By several estimates, most of

the Turkish people regard the United States as their greatest security threat. However

extraordinary these beliefs might seem to an American reader, who would know of their

country’s war weariness, one cannot be patronizing. The assumption that Turkish fears have, that

American power can be effectively projected throughout the world, and therefore at Turkey, is

2 United States, Congressional Research Service, Turkey Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti ([Washington, D.C.]: Congressional Research Service, 2012), pg. 33.

mostly correct. They only need to travel the massive American Airbase outside of Adana,

Incirlik, within their own borders to confirm their beliefs of America as a global power that can

project its power throughout the world. More troublingly, a number of politicians even harbor

these beliefs.3

Of course, there is a difference between capability and intention. While Washington can

project its power into Europe and the Middle East, there is no reason to suppose that it is actively

working against Turkish interests. Nevertheless, because many Turkish people consider the

United States a legitimate threat, it is important to consider why a security dilemma is assumed.

A strict realist reading of the situation fails to explain the situation: Turkey is a member of

NATO and military ally of the United states, and while the Soviet Union no longer borders

Turkey, Russia is not very far away. If Turkish perceptions are not strictly realist, how do they

rationalize the international system?

Many Turks began to assume a security dilemma against the United States when United

States policy inadvertently lead the to the creation of a Kurdish safe zone in northern Iraq, out of

which an autonomous Kurdish majority polity has emerged. As the United States unintentionally

offended the idea of the Turkish Anatolian homeland, Turkish fears were informed by their

country’s foundational history, in which the West tried to extinguish the newly formed

republic.()

This triggered what Katzenstein and Keohane term as sovereign-nationalist anti-

Americanism. According to them, “sovereign nationalists focus on two values: the importance of

not losing control over the terms by which polities are inserted in world politics and the inherent

3 Claire Berlinski, "A Nation of Conspiracies," Wall Street Journal, March 13, 2010, accessed November 4, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870413140457.

importance and value of collective national identities.” 4 In the case of Turkey, the latter has

occurs. Ankara and Washington are not strategic rivals. They are not locked against each other

for regional political supremacy, so Turks do not resent The United States as the Germans

resented the British empire in years prior to the first world war. However, the United States has

inadvertently offended both of the predominant sets of political values in Turkey, and has thus

confronted the Turkish people’s collective identity.

In the past, this might have led to a conflict with the military establishment alone, as it

was the highest political power in the country. This would have made it an easier situation to

handle diplomatically, as demonstrated by the Cyprus dispute, in which the United States needed

only to contend with the attitudes. Yet, now the United States must contend with a foreign policy

that is, to significant measure, popularly determined, as democratization in Turkey has placed

legitimacy in the majority, rather than a political ideal. Washington must now mind how the

majority of Turks think in conducting its policy with Turkey. Likewise, the Turkish government

must do the same.

The people of Turkey did not always fear the United States as it does now. There was a

time in which U.S military presence elucidated praise instead of spite. Istanbulites could hardly

be any happier to see the USS Missouri, delivering the body of a respected Turkish ambassador

to America drop anchor on April 5, 1946. For the Turks at harbor, the popular attitude was that

the Russians were still their chief threat after hundreds of years and America was an esteemed

protector that respected its allies’ territorial integrity. Despite Turkey’s distrust of foreign

4 Robert O. Keohane and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Anti-Americanisms," Policy Review 139 (October/November 2006): pg. 5, accessed February 4, 2013, GALE.

powers, America was very far away and did not have the imperial notoriety that the Russians,

British or French had.5

Yet, as cold war politics ensued for another forty years, Turkish attitudes changed as

America was no longer a distant friend as much as an interfering, but necessary, security partner.

However, Turkey and the United States merely disagreed upon a few security matters. The

United States did little to offend Turkish national psyche, and, also importantly, the people

themselves had little means of airing these grievances.

However, political developments in the Middle East through the 1990s and early 2000s

changed this. The establishment of de facto independent Kurdish-majority polity in Northern

Iraq was made possible by the U.S. enforced no-fly zone. As conflict against the Kurdistan

Worker’s Party persisted in Turkey, both the Turkish state and its people felt threatened by the presence of this polity that seemed a plausible foundation for an irredentist Kurdish state.6

United States’ actions, and many began to suspect that America actively worked against Turkish interests. Yet, it was not until the historical 2002 parliamentary elections were held that the people’s views were more integrated into government policy.

Thus, the AK party, the victorious party of the 2002 elections, would act more in line with the people’s wishes. Although this would not be the first time elections have occurred in

Turkey, it can be characterized as a regime change. The established general and officer political class, which had long dominated Turkish politics, lost legitimacy in the eyes of the Turkish people. The Kemalist principles they used as a mandate by which they ruled the country, are still elemental features of Turkish politics, but Islam and democracy gained traction. Although a major economic downturn greatly contributed to the AK party’s electoral victory, other

5 Stephen Kinzer, Reset: Iran, Turkey, and America's Future (New York: Times Books, 2010). 6 United States, Congressional Research Service, Iraq Regional Perspectives and U.S. Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard ([Washington, D.C.]: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2007), pg. 12.

oppositional parties, most notably the CHP, did not perform nearly as spectacularly as the AK party in areas that secularist parties tended to perform well.

The legitimacy of the current government, unlike past governments, is not founded upon the memory of Atatürk, but unprecedented popular mandate. Civil liberties remain weak. The current government blatantly resorts to widespread media repression. Yet it is still the strongest civilian government Turkey has ever had and widespread support remains. By and large, Turkey has become more democratic.7 This is not to ignore that a rather large number of journalists have been jailed in the last several years for speaking out against government policies against the

Kurdish minority, and many other persistent issues remain.8 Civil liberties, thus, continue to suffer as they did prior to the AK government, but for the first time, legitimacy lies in how the people vote.

The political culture has legitimized more popular values, most notably Islamic values.

As has been made clear by successive landslide electoral victories by the AK party, any party that wishes to form a government will now appeal to the majority, rather than to Kemalist ideals.

The government is well aware of this, taking steps to ensure that the political class that elected it still votes for it. Therefore, when the people are vocally against American policy, the Turkish government will know that acting against American wishes will earn it popular support, while failure to do so will cost it votes.

As is true with domestic policy, the government’s foreign policy is already aligning with popular attitudes in many ways and coincides with American interests less. As the people have become less enthusiastic about European Union membership, the government has seen little reason to implement more EU candidate requirements. Turkey has also decidedly joined the pro-

7 7 "Turkey," Freedom House, accessed January 04, 2013, http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom- world/2012/turkey. 8 Ibid.

Palestinian camp. Despite threats of military action against Syria, vehement protests against war

in Turkey are causing hesitation amongst even hawkish politicians. Likewise, Israel’s policies

were never popular among the Turkish people,9 but a previously active security alliance between

Turkey and Israel deteriorated to an all-time low as a result of continued conflict between the

Israel and Palestine and the Mavi Marmara incident.

Unfortunately for the United States, it can get worse. Anti-American sentiment in Turkey is almost as strong as anywhere else. Numerous polls conducted by the Pew Research Center indicate that opinions of Westerners, particularly Americans are considerably low in Turkey, even in relation to nearby Muslim countries.10 Likewise, Westerners are judged by most Turks to

be hostile towards Turkey.1112 This should be worrying for Americans that notice Ankara’s recent embrace of majoritarian opinion, because if the foreign policy decision making body considers and adjusts policy accordingly, America might not have a partner in Turkey for much longer.

Research design

Rosenau’s international relations pre-theory will be used as a template for analysis of

Turkey. It will demonstrate that anti-Americanism in Turkey reacts to perceived security threats as framed by Turkish political culture, and that it can, in turn, influence Turkish foreign policy.

9 "Muslim-Western Tensions Persist," Pew Global Attitudes, July 21, 2011, accessed September 28, 2012, www.pewglobal.org/. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. 12 "Turkey and Its (Many) Discontents," Pew Research Center, October 25, 2007, accessed September 22, 2012, http://www.pewglobal.org/2007/10/25/turkey-and-its-many-discontents/.

Therefore, this article will also demonstrate that non-material factors contribute decisively in

Turkey’s foreign policy to America.

Ankara’s current foreign policy is not essentially anti-American, and Ankara itself has not been observed to spout anti-American rhetoric. However, anti-Americanism compels it to an

extent since Ankara’s populism follows popular direction. This phenomenon will be further

explored by following cases: (1) the 2003 vote against granting access to American soldiers, (2)

Turkey’s recall of its ambassador to the United States in 2010 in response to imminent

Congressional recognition of the Armenian Genocide and (3) Turkey’s reluctance to comply

with the UN sanctioned trade embargo against Iran in 2010.

Systemically, America unintentionally acts against Turkish interests as defined by

Turkish political values. Strictly within Turkish foreign policy, there will be an emphasis societal

forces acting upon government when the latter fails to act against American policies that

contradict Turkish national identity. Naturally, governmental forces can influence society, but as

this phenomenon has only recently become common in Turkish politics, it is this type of

relationship that this article has chosen to focus upon. Although not as intensively studied, roles

and individuals, particularly in the form of parliamentary membership and Ahmet Davutoğlu,

will be shown as having significant, and certainly there is plenty to suggest that new data that

reflects the power of roles and individuals is needed for a more comprehensive understanding of

Turkish politics.

Avoiding an essentialist approach, the political culture of Turkey will be shown to be a

culmination of Kemalist ideas and newly emergent and legitimized identities - such as Islam and regional affiliations. As Dr. Erika Harris argues, “national identities, with its close connection to

the state and its reliance on culture and identity rooted in perceptions and beliefs, fits the

constructivist approach.”13 Therefore, this paper will analyze Turkish foreign policy towards

America, as it is affected by national culture, primarily through a constructivist lens. In several instances, economic considerations and military power are key to fully understanding the outcome of these events. Yet, as the 2002 parliamentary election suggests, an understanding immaterial factors and ideas is critical for any comprehensive understanding of political events.

Relations between Washington and Ankara have never been smooth, but now that the

Kemalist establishment, which was almost exclusively concerned with realist security risks, is

weakening by the day, the United States needs a new understandings of Turkish foreign policy.

The Turkish people’s civilian representatives will have a larger say for their government’s

policies. Because elite attitudes differ substantially from popular attitudes, Ankara is already

beginning to posture itself in relation to Washington very differently. This already complicated

relationship is becoming even more precarious.

For the sake of comparison, in the case of the United States, one can easily point to linkages between the American public and Washington foreign policy making body. There are many examples of unpopular wars that force incumbent representatives in Washington to change their previous positions. This is little surprise because of the United States’ liberal democratic tradition, which makes it less common for foreign policy decision makers to implement policies that the public is strongly against.

There are few cases of this in Turkey’s history. While there are many examples of protests forcing the hand of American politicians, it difficult to find such events in Turkey’s foreign policy history. Yet, now that it is clear that the political culture of Turkey has changed

decisively, and it has allowed for Turkish political culture and values, be it Kemalism, Islam and

13 Erika Harris, Nationalism: Theories and Cases (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), pg. 177-178.

synthetic values, to come into fruition. This kind of analysis, as I argue, is very necessary

because (1) the Ankara finds it difficult to ignore popular demands that are affected by these

political values and (2) Ankara has demonstrated that its foreign policy that appeals to popular

attitudes. As Dr. McCrone asserts, the very legitimacy of the nation-state rests upon its recognition as political representative of the nation itself14. The ascendence of civilian

government over the military demonstrates that the values of the nation are increasingly

determined by the majority. The state itself not only less power in determining national identity,

it is no longer the ultimate authority as to what constitutes as legitimate identity.

Turkish National Values

Political identities in Turkey are diverse, but the two predominant strains: the Kemalist

and Islamic identities, are of the most relevance to the United States because United States’

foreign policy actions contradict their values. These do not mirror views of the people perfectly,

but, in multi-party elections, the electorate does choose between these values.

Kemalism

14 Murat Somer, "Why Aren't Kurds Like the Scots and the Turks Like the Brits? - Moderation and Democracy in the Kurdish Question," Journal of the Nordic International Studies Assoication 43, no. 2 (May 7, 2008): pg. 225, SAGE.

Kemalism is the secular and nationalist political ideology and legacy of Mustafa Kemal

Atatürk (1880 - 1938), the founder of the Turkish Republic and its first president. Established in

the aftermath of the Turkish War of Independence, it was the political tradition of the new

political regime that dissolved the Caliphate and consolidated the new Republican tradition. As

summarized by Cizre and Çınar, it is a Westernizing ideology whose maxims are secularism, a

Western identity and lifestyle, and the cultural homogeneity and territorial unity of the nation.15

In its original form, it demanded that Turkey become modern and attempted to reorganize

all Turkish culture and tradition to that end. Despite its Republican label, which contemporary

readers may read as “democratic”, it was very hierarchical in character. To achieve rapid

Westernization, civil society was to be created by the state and controlled by it. Pre-existing

educational, administrative and legal bodies, all of which had ties with Islam were secularized.

Above all, “backward” Islamic and Arab values were targeted and blamed by the

Republic for Turkish stagnation and decline in the Ottoman period. For example, the fez and

headscarf were banned, cultural headwear with religious attachments. A new Turkish alphabet

was created with Latin characters to replace the language’s Arabic script. More dramatically, the

entirety Muslim clergy was incorporated into government to insure its compliance with laicist

policies (to this day, Mullahs are state employees). Thus, in Islam’s place, a new, Turkish,

national identity came to the fore.

As with many theories of nationalism, crucial to Kemalist nationalism is the concept of

the Anatolian homeland. Atatürk, along with his supporters, promoted the idea, that what

remained of the Ottoman Empire was the Turkish Anatolian homeland. This defined Turkey for

the Turks in a way the Ottoman empire was unable to define its land as being for an overarching

15 U. Cizre and M. Çinar, "Turkey 2002: Kemalism, Islamism, and Politics in the Light of the February 28 Process," South Atlantic Quarterly 102, no. 2-3 (Summer 2003): pg. 310, doi:10.1215/00382876-102-2-3-309.

Ottoman identity.16 Late attempts in the Ottoman empire to construct an Ottoman identity (which

included minorities such as Armenians and Kurds) failed in their object to consecrate what

remained of empire, whereas a regime that propagated an exclusionary Turkish identity took

succeeded.

Kemalism calls for a strong and intervening state. Before his death, Atatürk named the

army as guardians of Republican values, which has given the government Although civilian

democracy was seen by many as its ultimate goal, any threat to the Kemalist principles is a

justification for intervention by the state and military to restore the political order.() Following

the first multi-party elections (1946), the army has deposed four governments and demanded the

drafting of two constitutions. These interventions occur whenever there is either widespread

political unrest that the civilian government is deemed unable to control (1971, 1980), or if the

elected government is deemed too Islamic (1960, 1997).

Although Kemalist parties have had relatively little success in more open elections with

less parties banned, they consistently draw large amounts of electoral support. Somewhat

ironically, Kemalism has proven to be very adaptable, with ideologues that espouse

conservatism, economic and social liberalism, state capitalism and more. A plethora of Turkish

political organizations identify themselves with Atatürk in one way or another. Kemalism has

probably been rationalized as all of the above as a result of its legitimizing effect. Even Islamic

political actors will associate Atatürk with Islamic piety.17

16 Hasan Kayalı, Arabs and Young Turks (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1997), accessed September 30, 2012, http://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft7n39p1dn;brand=ucpress. 17 B. Turkmen, "A Transformed Kemalist Islam or a New Islamic Civic Morality? A Study of "Religious Culture and Morality" Textbooks in the Turkish High School Curricula," Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 29, no. 3 (2009): pg. 394, doi:10.1215/1089201X-2009-026.

Notably, a branch of ultra-nationalism has emerged from a fringe military contingent emerged. Politicized as the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), it has had mixed electoral and political success. Its association with far-right terrorism in the country has led to its probation on numerous occasions by the secularist establishment. It is particularly active in upholding an unapologetic Turkish nationalism through intimidation or worse. This is perhaps best exemplified by the murder of Turkish-Armenian journalist named Hrant Dink, who wrote frequently about the exclusion of the remnant Armenian minority in Turkey, at the hands of the

Grey Wolves in 2007.

Political Islam

The influence Islam has had on Turkish society is immeasurable, but one can examine its expression as a political position. Political Islam has generally manifested itself as a political position in opposition to Kemalism, and, to a much smaller extent, the political left. Generally speaking, its goals include lifting Kemalist restrictions on religious expression, implementing more socially conservative policies. Occasionally, Islamic parties oppose the West’s foreign policies. In the realm of foreign policy, several Islamic parties have challenged the Kemalist and the center-right, but many Islam inspired politicians also had to

Political organizations that accommodate Islam in republic-era Turkish politics come in the form of three types of organization: (1) under the umbrella of the secular center-right, (2)

Islamic party organization, and (3) in non-party movements.

Islamic movements have had an important role for Islamic politics in Turkey as both affecting the political opinions. The Millî Görüş and Gülen movements are the most prominent

Islamic political movements in present day Turkey. Of the two, Millî Görüş is more

confrontational, warning against increasing ties with Europe, which members regard as actively

working against Islam. It advocates for closer ties with other Muslim countries instead. It’s

founder, Necmettin Erbakan, also led various political Islamist parties whose positions mirror

Millî Görüş for over forty years.

The Gülen movement, named after founder Fetullah Gülen, another political significant

Islamic movement. Unlike Millî Görüş, however, it has considerably less hostile attitudes toward

the West. It does not even have a formal political agenda, though it certainly is not above

participating in politics. Notably, the organization is welcoming of modernity, and is known to

embrace science and western-style education.18 The Gülen movement usually supports the AKP

through its members’ vast media holdings, which include Turkey’s largest circulation

publication, Zaman.19 Due to its non-hierarchical structure and its lack of a formal political

agenda, it is difficult to assess its impact Turkish foreign policy. However, observers of Turkish

politics, such as Claire Berlinski, have theorized that Gülenists are not only affecting domestic

policies, but also conflict with AK party more loyal to Erdogan than Gülen.20

Sufi lodges, although not explicitly political organizations, are known for espousing

particular societal and cultural attitudes. The Nakşibendi order is particularly notable its

distinction of the religious and private lives, meaning that its members can lead both a secular

and sacred lifestyle. A number of very influential politicians on the secular center-right and AKP

have been associated with it, including the current prime minister.21 Furthermore, Nakşibendi

18 United States, Congressional Research Service, Turkey Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti ([Washington, D.C.]: Congressional Research Service, 2012), pg. 9. 19 Ibid., 6. 20 Claire Berlinski, "Anatomy Of A Power Struggle," American Foreign Policy Council, December 18, 2012, accessed December 27, 2012, http://www.afpc.org/publication_listings/viewArticle/1792. 21 Angel Rabasa and Stephen F. Larrabee, The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008), pg. 14.

leaders have been known to support center-right and Islamist parties.22 It might be said that these

social spaces, the Nakşibendi order in particular

The electoral success of the secular center-right was crucial to the rise of political Islam

in Turkey, because under it, Islamic politicians were able to pretend to a social right position. It

was not until the electoral victory of the Democratic Party (DP) in 1950 that the government

allowed for open Islamic expression. One notable action the DP took was lifting the ban on the

Muezzins’ calls to prayer, which had been prohibited under single party CHP rule. Yet, for the

most part, center-right parties have been complicit with secularism and modernity. However,

even center-right parties were vulnerable to accusations from the secular and military

establishment as not being “Turkish” enough and being too Islamic. In both 1960 and 1980,

center-right led governments, led by the DP and Justice Party (AP), respectively, was declared

by the secularist establishment as such and was deposed, in part, on this pretext.

Not all center-right governments were removed from power. In the eight years it formed

government (1983-1991), the Motherland Party (ANAP) contained Islamic elements without

confronting the secular establishment in the way its predecessors had. This was partially due to

the aftermath of the 1980 coup and subsequent military rule, under which a policy of “Turkish-

Islamic” synthesis was officially sanctioned. The military’s aim, as argued by Hakan Yavuz, was

to legitimize Islam insofar as it would no longer constitute as a political issue, or a challenge to

the secular order.23 Thus, a center-right government which accommodated Islamic elements

actually coincided with the military’s agenda.

Yet, one must note that both of these governments were largely based on fiscal conservatism and business interests as much as they were socially conservative. This is an

22 Ibid. 23 M. Hakan. Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity in Turkey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pg. 38.

important distinction to make when comparing these parties to party organizations that were run

almost exclusively by Islamist politicians, particularly those of the Millî Görüş variety. These

parties are known to be much more vocal against Kemalist restrictions and embrace Islamic

symbolism in ways that center right parties would avoid.

The Islamists, unlike the secular right, are also more critical of secular and pro-Western

foreign policies. The RP was particularly outspoken against Turkey’s strategic partnership with

Israel and, when it was briefly in power in the late 90s, unsuccessfully (and quite

embarrassingly) tried to establish ties with Libya and cut security agreements with Israel. Despite

the RP’s limited political success, it was dissolved in 1998 under the pressure of the military, as

most other Islamic parties have.

The AKP arguably establishes a new tradition in Turkish politics, but it is directly

descended from the Millî Görüş tradition. Although it might be identified as a center-right party,

it’s certainly not of the secular tradition as ANAP or even the DP governments were. The party is

a successor to Turkish-Islamist politics tradition, but, unlike its predecessors, it is only passively

Islamist and embraces modernity. Notably, the AKP does not shy away from the West, as EU

integration is a central part of its foreign policy agenda. They are by and large dedicated

Muslims, and identify as such, but they generally remain silent when the hard-liner elements

would protest.24 That said, the AKP is a very large party, with its members including center-right

secularists (such as former ANAP members), bankers, small business owners and traditional

Islamists disenchanted with Erbakan’s leadership.25 This might very well reflect the leadership’s following the Nakşibendi order, which allows for both a secular and sacred way of life that many other Islamists would not follow. They are of the belief that changing society is more effective

24 Sultan Tepe, "Turkey's AKP: A Model "Muslim-Democratic" Party?," Journal of Democracy 16, no. 3 (July 2005): pg. 75, doi:10.1353/jod.2005.0053. 25 Ibid., 71.

from the bottom than above, so their positions are more conciliatory toward societal attitudes

than most parties are.

Strategic Depth: A Turn Toward Identities

Although this article derives its argument primarily from systemic, societal and

governmental factors, Ahmet Davutoğlu’s Strategic Depth foreign policy warrants him special

attention because of his uniquely influential role in Turkish foreign policy. Appointed in 2002 as

Chief advisor to the prime minister, he essentially ran the government’s foreign policy even

before he became Turkey’s foreign minister in 2009.26 During that time period, he has framed

Turkish foreign policy that complements the AK government’s aspirations to the West and its

openness of Islamic identity.

Before he was recruited by the AK government as senior foreign policy advisor,

Davutoğlu’s book Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye’nin Uluslararası Konumu (Strategic Depth:

Turkey’s International Position), in which Strategic Depth was first articulated, was published. It

departs from more traditional Turkish foreign policy in several ways. The strategy of Strategic

Depth is to place Turkey at the center of its geography. Instead of being a merely bridge between

the “East” and the “West”, it becomes an actor that has a “center” of its own that relates with neighboring countries using shared identity.27 This distinction is significant because the latter

allows for Turkey to relate to neighboring countries as something else besides being a European

country or a western power by virtue of its membership in NATO. Thus, rather than relating to

its eastern neighbors primarily its strategic affiliations, Turkey is able to use the cultural values it

shares with these neighbors to enhance diplomatic ties with them.

26 Bülent Aras, "Davutoglu Era in Turkish Foreign Policy," SETA Policy Brief, no. 32 (May 2009): pg. 3. 27 Ibid., 6.

This strategy also allows for an element of populism that was prohibited by the Kemalist

political regime. As Kemalism focuses upon transforming Turkish culture by means of social

engineering, or, at the very least, denying Turkey’s non-Western elements, it prohibits itself from

appealing to the people within Turkey’s borders and beyond. Most notably, Turkey’s cultural

and political estrangement from the Middle East prevented it from engaging its Middle Eastern

neighbors my means other than confrontational security policies.

Strategic Depth is certainly not the first culture-based strategy envisioned. In the decade

following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Pan-Turanism, or unity of the Turkic peoples, was a

recurring element in Turkish foreign policy. Unlike Strategic Depth, it emphasized upon on

building relations with newly independent Turkic states, such as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and

Kyrgyzstan, thus filling the power vacuum left behind by a retreating Moscow.28 Yet, with the

exception of Azerbaijan, this policy proved to be mostly anemic.29 Moscow remained a more

influential actor in the region by virtue of its economic and strategic ties, and Washington

asserted itself more in the region than Turkey.30 Pan-Turanism possibly did more to limit

Turkish soft power than enhance it, as it focused upon a Turkic identity rather than utilizing all

the cultural tools it had at its disposal, particularly religion.

In the latter half of the decade, the Refah government of Erbakan unsuccessfully pursued

a confrontational policy against Israel and rapprochement with the Muslim world in trying to

engage with Libya. However, the Refah government not powerful enough to resist Kemalist

interests, nor was it able to extricate its Western orientation even when it appeared to be in the

position to do so. In trying to extricate itself from the Western security arrangements, i

28 Hakan Fidan, "Turkish Foreign Policy towards Central Asia," Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 12, no. 1 (March 1, 2010): pg. 109, doi:10.1080/19448950903507560. 29 Ibid., 116. 30 Ibid.

Strategic depth favors a soft-power over hard-power. Since the beginning of Davutoglu’s

tenure, diplomatic missions have been bolstered and trade agreements ties are emphasized. Over

the last decade Turkish foreign policy has become more multilateral and soft-power oriented.

Although military strength and intimidation remains a pillar of policy, as demonstrated by the

Syrian conflict, Turkey has generally concentrated on resolving conflict with neighbors.

Turkey’s change it in its policies concerning Iraq provides the best example of Turkey’s change

in its foreign policy approach. Instead of only using military force to neutralize Kurdish targets

in Iraq, it has also established communications with all Iraqi parties, especially the KDP and

KDU, both of whom dominate Iraqi Kurd politics.31 This dialogue is then sustained by increased

economic relations. Much of this phenomenon owes itself to Davutoğlu being at the helm of

Turkish foreign policy.

However, this is not to say that Strategic Depth is without drawbacks. In pursuing better

relations with its neighbors with the goal of reaching “zero problems”, other countries may find

offense. This has been the case with not only the United States, but Israel and Azerbaijan too.

Turkey enjoyed good relations with these countries in the 90s, when its foreign policy revolved

more around building security partnerships against its immediate neighbors. When Turkey began

to pursue better relations with Syria and Iran, Washington began to worry about Turkey’s

strategic drift.32 As will be elaborated in the third case study below, Azerbaijan reacted similarly

to Turkey’s failed rapprochement with Armenia.

31 United States, Congressional Research Service, Iraq Regional Perspectives and U.S. Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard ([Washington, D.C.]: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2007), pg. 13. 32 United States., Congress., House., Turkey's New Foreign Policy Direction: Implications for U.S.-Turkish Relations : Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Eleventh Congress, Second Session, July 28, 2010., by Ross Wilson, Michael Rubin, Ph.D, Ian Lesser, Ph.D, Soner Cagaptay, Ph.D, and Howard L. Berman, 113th ed., vol. 111 (Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 2010), pg. 4.

Case studies

Turkey says, “No”: The Iraq War

As a member of NATO on Iraq’s northern flank and an ally of America in the first Gulf

War, many in Washington were shocked by Turkey’s refusal to allow American troops to invade

Iraq through its territory. Many in Ankara were just as surprised, although it was more clear there

that the vote was going to be very close.33 The vote by the National Assembly was nearly tied; it

was only short three votes for approval. More voted yes than no, but there were enough

abstentions to prevent the resolution from being passed.34

Many in Turkey argued that it was better to leave Iraq undisturbed, for fear that war

offered an opportunity for the Kurd majority region bordering Turkey to break from Iraq and

form an independent Kurdish state, and setting a standard for Turkey’s own Kurd majority

region to follow.

Allowing American soldiers to invade Iraq through Turkey also presented many

perceived benefits. The army would be allowed to attack PKK bases in Iraq at will and allow it

to protect and privilege the substantial Turkoman minority in northern Iraq.35 If there were

American designs to establish a Kurdish state in northern Iraq, Turkey would not only have a

say, but a physical presence. “Besides all of this, the removal of Saddam Hussein and the

dismantlement of his weapons of mass destruction would add to Turkey’s security.”36 Economic

33 Mustafa Kibaroglu, "Turkey Says No," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 59, no. 4 (July 1, 2003): 24, accessed October 10, 2012, doi:10.2968/059004007. 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid., 23. 36 Ibid., 24.

factors were also heavily considered, but those favored a ‘yes’ vote. Still in the thralls of

recession, Turkey was dire need of money and Washington offered Ankara six billion USD, and

other credits that would boost the economy.37

Not only were imagined carrots at play, but perceived sticks as well. Among those that

voted yes, there was great fear of American economic power. For example, many in Ankara

believed the American-controlled IMF and World Bank would constrict credits to Turkey. Many

predicted that currency rates would rise to untenable levels and the stock market would reach a

new low.38 These perceived threats were all the more frightening in a country that was still in

intensive care from a severe recession.

Mr. Erdogan’s personal support of the measure makes the measure’s failure to pass

surprising, even in hindsight. Erdogan saw the vote as an opportunity to ensure Turkey’s loyalty,

regardless if it was run by Islamists or secularists, of its loyalty to it’s traditional western allies.39

He also decided that Turkey would benefit economically and politically in allowing Americans access.40 Other powerful political allies, such as President Abdullah Gül, also supported the

measure for similar reasons.41

Case 1 Analysis

37 Ibid. 38 Ibid. 39 Recep Tayyip Erdogan, PM, "'We Will Incur Another Loss': The Iraq War Began without U.S. Military Access via Turkey. But Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan Insists His Country Is Part of the American Coalition," interview by Lally Weymouth, Newsweek, March 31, 2003, accessed November 15, 2012, http://ic.galegroup.com.ezproxy.depauw.edu/ic/scic/Magazines. 40 Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, "Friends No More?: The Rise of Anti-American Nationalism in Turkey," The Middle East Journal 64, no. 1 (Winter 2010): pg. 56, accessed March 20, 2013, Project MUSE. 41 Ibid.

With so much in favor of a yes vote, it is difficult to see how the resolution could

possibly have failed to pass. The often resolute Prime Minister’s repentance for supporting the

resolution can be confirmed in considering his interests for supporting the West and his apology

tour after the resolution’s failure. In an interview for Newsweek shortly after the vote, he insisted

that Turkey was still a coalition member in response to the interviewer’s skepticism.42

Yet, three factors played heavily in favor of the ‘no’ vote: the new AKP government, the

public’s heavy opposition to the war in Iraq and memory of the Gulf War. The AKP was elected

to power on November 3, 2002 and the vote over the matter was held on 3 March, 2003. The

government was just getting settled as war against Iraq was becoming a near certainty for

American politicians. As the politicians would have been more fixated on issues addressed in

their campaigns, which did not include America and Iraq, the majority of their views on the

matter were yet publicly addressed.

Those that were strongly against the American troops in the AKP itself tended to be more conservative and Islamist. They gave pause to allowing Americans invade a Muslim-majority

country through their own borders, betraying Ummah (the collective community of Islamic

peoples). BBC polling indicated a month before the invasion that the war was deeply unpopular

in Turkey among the pious, reported of mass demonstrations outside mosques.43 As Mustafa

Kibaroglu observed, it didn’t help that President Bush labeled the invasion a “crusade”.44

The military also played a role in the resolution’s ultimate failure. Unlike more religious

lawmakers, Turkish military leaders were widely believed to support the resolution. Yet, they

42 Recep Tayyip Erdogan, PM, "'We Will Incur Another Loss': The Iraq War Began without U.S. Military Access via Turkey. But Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan Insists His Country Is Part of the American Coalition," interview by Lally Weymouth, Newsweek, March 31, 2003, accessed November 15, 2012, http://ic.galegroup.com.ezproxy.depauw.edu/ic/scic/Magazines. 43 William Horsley, "Polls Find Europeans Oppose Iraq War," BBC News, November 02, 2003, section goes here, accessed December 16, 2012, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2747175.stm. 44 Mustafa Kibaroglu, "Turkey Says No," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 59, no. 4 (July 1, 2003): pg. 24, accessed October 10, 2012, doi:10.2968/059004007.

never gave any official approval or disapproval on the matter and remained silent. Under a more

typical Turkish political climate, they would have almost certainly approved of the measure, but,

as Frank Bruni of the New York Times observed, they did not want to help Mr. Erdogan.45

Furthermore, the old guard was resentful of America’s vocal support for “Islamic democracy” in

Turkey, and was much less inclined to assist Washington as a result.46 Thus, the CHP also voted

against the measure, largely to spite the ruling government and United States in accordance with

the competing military regime instead of pressure from below.

The remaining AK party MPs feared potential American diplomatic retribution, but were

more afraid of their constituents. Several MPs confided to Swedish diplomat Ann Dismor that

they were besieged with so many phone calls and letters against allowing American passage, that

they felt that they had no choice in the matter but to refuse to allow the Americans to invade

through Turkey.47 Thus, the newer and younger members of parliament [look at rate of turnover] were particularly more affected by voters.

Many Turks suspected that allowing the United States to invade through Turkey would

help the Kurds establish a state, despite American insistence that they would allow the Turks

unprecedented access into northern Iraq to hunt down PKK militants. It is not so much the PKK

themselves that Turkish people feel threatened by as much as its perceived potential to instigate a

mass, nationalist Kurdish uprising where Kurds constitute a majority. If this were to happen, it

would constitute a direct threat to the deeply embedded conception of the Turkish Anatolian

homeland.

45 Frank Bruni, "Turkey Works to Allay Western Fears," New York Times, April 1, 2003, accessed October 10, 2012, ELibrary. 46 Ömer Taşpınar, "The Anatomy of Anti-Americanism in Turkey," November 16, 2005, pg. 9, accessed January 6, 2013, The Brookings Institution. 47 Ann Dismorr, Turkey Decoded (London: Saqi, 2008)

Although Iraq was not the first time Turkey refused to cooperate with the United States in a foreign policy issue, it was a major one. It is in itself a dramatic event, but all the more so because popular opinion played a decisive role in the resolution’s ultimate failure. The economic aid and military intervention against the militant Kurds appealed greatly to many members of the Turkish Grand Assembly (TGA), and, since trade with Iraq was already low from the aftermath of the first Gulf War, Turkey had little to lose militarily or economically.

However, the identity politics of the masses was crucial to the reversal of what otherwise would have been a easy vote for Erdogan. Going to war against another muslim country was for some a betrayal of their Islamic identity and, for others, allowing the United States to invade north would only reinforce the Kurdish position, which potentially would lead to the creation of a state with nationalist claims contradicting the Turkish state’s territory. Thus, government’s fear of popular opinion reflected a sea change in Turkish political culture, but, meanwhile, it also reflected deeply seeded political values.

Armenian Genocide Resolution: Turkey withdraws its Ambassador

A continuous point of contention between Turkey and America is US Congress’ would be recognition of the Armenian Genocide. Although successive administrations block attempts recognize the 1915 mass killings of Armenians as genocide, the efforts of Armenian-American community to convince Congress continue and several times recognition has come close.

In the fall of 2007, Congress nearly passed a bill giving official recognition by the United

States of the Armenian Genocide. The Bush administration then convinced Congress that Turkey

was too critical an ally to alienate, so the bill was withdrawn.48 Turkey responded with threats, namely limiting American use of Incirlik, but no action was taken.

It was only two and a half years later, in spring of 2010, that the resolution passed, and reignited Turkish distrust of the United States.49 By then, the Obama administration went into

power and, like the Bush administration, pled to Congress not to pass any resolution recognizing

the Armenian Genocide. However, the House Foreign Affairs committee once again endorsed

the resolution after a close 23-22 vote.50 The Turkish government swiftly condemned the

resolution, and recalled its ambassador to the United States. While this in itself is a minor action,

it is a diplomatic tool that rivals, not friends, typically reserve for each other.

Foreign policy officials were quick to make statements regarding the vote. “We expect a

more effective policy from the administration,” said Ahmet Davutoğlu, also adding that

Washington had displayed “a lack of strategic vision”. Mr. Erdogan remarked that the United

States had little business in an argument solely between Turkey and Armenia.

There was significant anger in Turkey against America. In Turkey, non-violent protests

against the United States occurred just outside of the American embassy in Ankara and the

American consulate on the outskirts of Istanbul.51 The cries of the protestors were not only

linked to the Armenian genocide vote. Similar to the outcry that erupted at the pending vote over

Iraq in 2003, many cried also of the American occupation of Turkey appeared at these protests.

48 United States, Congressional Research Service, Turkey Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti ([Washington, D.C.]: Congressional Research Service, 2012), pg. 35. 49 "HR252: U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee Schedules Panel Vote on Armenian Genocide Resolution - Genocide | ArmeniaNow.com," HR252: U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee Schedules Panel Vote on Armenian Genocide Resolution - Genocide | ArmeniaNow.com, accessed November 57, 2012, http://www.armenianow.com/genocide/20719/armenian_genocide_resolution. 50 Steven A. Cook, "Congress, Genocide, and a Turkish Rift," Council on Foreign Relations, March 5, 2010, accessed December 04, 2012, http://www.cfr.org/turkey/congress-genocide-turkish-rift/p21583. 51 Antoine Blua, "Turkey Angry At U.S. Armenian 'Genocide' Vote," RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, May 3, 2010, accessed December 23, 2012, http://www.rferl.org/content/Turkey_Angry_At_US_Armenian_Genocide_Vote/1975392.html.

The Turkish ambassador to the United States has since returned, but it is entirely possible that Turkey will do more the next time the United States Congress comes close to recognizing the genocide. Future conflict is a likely prospect, as the Armenian-American community continues to press Congress for genocide recognition.

Case 2 Analysis

This case is distinct from case 1, in that Turkey’s decision to withdraw its ambassador is almost purely a reactive instead of a proactive action on the part of the Turkish government. This action by Turkey is not an attempt to asserts its power through identity as much as it is a defense of its national identity.

Most Turks acknowledge that Armenians were deported, and even murdered, but they have difficulty framing it as genocide. The pejorative nature of the word, mixed in with Turkish national pride, makes the prospect difficult of being a ‘genocidal national’ difficult. They take it personally, and, therefore, any recognition of the Armenian genocide by a foreign country is not only an accusation at a past Ottoman regime, but Turkish identity and personhood as well.

One might hope that Turkey will be able to reconcile its past. Yet, Turkey’s foreign relations with Azerbaijan, one of Turkey’s closest and most important allies, and nationalism prevent even the smallest of gestures from taking hold. Both factors simultaneously prevented

Turkey and Armenia from reconciling their national memories in 2009, both countries decided to thaw relations with each other. Although most of these agreements were economic in nature, the most visible aspect of this détente was the formation of a binational, joint committee of

historians. Their task was to investigate, debate and agree upon a common narrative of the

Armenian genocide.52

However, protests from Azerbaijan and the nationalist right caused Erdogan to rescind

this agreement. Azerbaijan was not angry about the genocide issue. Instead, it does not want

Turkey to relax sanctions against Armenia as long as their army occupies Nagorno-Karabakh.53

Nationalists at home also protested against all of these measures, particularly the genocide

committee.54 The AKP, owing its electoral success to its perceived centrism, did not want to risk

losing votes to the MHP. This added more pressure upon the government to abandon public

reconciliation.55

This places the 2010 affair over potential US recognition of the genocide in a new context. Although it is the Turkish government dislikes external genocide recognition, it is also seeking a form of reconciliation with the past, and demonstrates it is even willing to talk to the

Armenians. With the exception of ultra-nationalists, most Turks seem to agree.56 It is also

expected of them by the people at large to do so. A government protest against the United States

might not only be seen as an insult, but a resentment of a power that is trying to establish moral

legitimacy over it.

It is important to consider this event in the context of Turkey’s democracy and foreign

policy not necessarily because of any change in policy. Although genocide recognition is not an

52 "Zero Progress," Economist, February 18, 2010, accessed January 15, 2013, http://www.economist.com/node/15549523. 53 United States., Congress., House., Turkey's New Foreign Policy Direction: Implications for U.S.-Turkish Relations : Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Eleventh Congress, Second Session, July 28, 2010., by Ross Wilson, Michael Rubin, Ph.D, Ian Lesser, Ph.D, Soner Cagaptay, Ph.D, and Howard L. Berman, 113th ed., vol. 111 (Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 2010), pg. 15. 54 "Zero Progress," Economist, February 18, 2010, accessed January 15, 2013, http://www.economist.com/node/15549523. 55 Ibid. 56 Betül Akkaya, "Poll: Yerevan Visit Applauded by Majority," Today's Zaman, September 9, 2008, accessed February 3, 2013, http://www.todayszaman.com/news-152595-poll-yerevan-visit-applauded-by-majority.html.

important cause of anti-American sentiment in Turkey, as the Iraq wars were, but they

contributes to it. In protests against America, we once again see a people whose perceived

identity has been insulted by a power that is already thought to be antagonistic toward Turkey.

Turkish Reticence: Nuclear Iran

Another conflict in relations between Washington and Ankara is Turkey’s reticence to

participate in the embargo against Iran, whose nuclear program disturbs the United States.

Through the United States Security Council, the United States has put forth four rounds of

sanctions. Officially, Turkey supports these sanctions and various foreign policy officials have

reiterated their support time and again. However, the extent that Turkey has limited trade with

Iran is minimal. Several Turkish financial institutions have stopped helping Iran, but that is only

through coercive measures by the United States.57 On the whole, Ankara leaves it to private

business in upholding these sanctions, so much of the trade between Turkey and Iran has

continued unabated.

On June 9, 2010 The UN Security Council passed Resolution 1929. This imposed a

complete arms embargo on Iran, forbad use of ballistic missiles, froze assets to the Iranian

Revolutionary Guard and Iranian Shipping Lines, and ordered an inspection of all Iranian cargo

and financial institutions.58 A month prior to the vote, Turkey signed, with Iran and Brazil, the

Tehran Declaration, a proposal which would have provided Iran with nuclear fuel developed in

Turkey.59 Although it ultimately failed due to opposition from most of the membership of the

57 Gareth H. Jenkins, "Occasional Allies, Enduring Rivals: Turkey's Relations with Iran," Central Asia- Caucasus Institute Silk Road Studies Program, May 2012, pg. 67, accessed December 23, 2012, http://www.isdp.eu/publications/silk-road-papers.html. 58 "Security Council Imposes Additional Sanctions on Iran, Voting 12 In Favour to 2 Against, with 1 Abstention," UN News Center, June 09, 2010, accessed January 10, 2013, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/sc9948.doc.htm. 59 Sinan Ülgen, "Turkey and the Bomb," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 2012, pg. 4.

security council (including the United States), the proposal generated a small amount of

optimism, and for this time, it was an important consideration.60

Turkish diplomat and representative to the UN security council Ertuğrul Apakan voiced

concerns before the vote. He said that, although his country was committed to preventing the

development of nuclear armaments by Iran, he implored the council to reconsider, as he argued

that the adoption of it would make peace a more distant goal. Apakan wished to retain the

goodwill and hope between Iran and other countries.61 That decision is, of course, entirely

consistent with Turkey’s “Zero Problem with Neighbors” policy.

Although all other NATO members support the embargo against Iran, and Turkey not

only continues trade with Iran, but it has helped Iran evade sanctions through domestic financial

institutions.62 Pew Polling found that most Turks are opposed to stricter sanctions against Iran.63

It is no secret that the sanctions are American led, and the fact they are probably gives the average Turk little incentive to support them. However, is it really the reason why they oppose sanctions?

Case 3 Analysis

In light of other Turkish foreign policy actions, it is tempting to see Turkey’s refusal to embargo Iran in line with its anti-Americanism. However, the proverb, “the enemy of my enemy is my friend,” fails to describe Turkish attitudes towards Iran. A pew poll conducted in spring

60 "Security Council Imposes Additional Sanctions on Iran, Voting 12 InFavour to 2 Against, with 1 Abstention," UN News Center, June 09, 2010, accessed January 10, 2013, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/sc9948.doc.htm. 61 Ibid. 62 Con Coughlin, "Turkey and China 'helping Iran Evade UN Sanctions'" The Telegraph, February 19, 2012, accessed November 17, 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/9091736/Turkey-and- China-helping-Iran-evade-UN-sanctions.html. 63 "A Global “No” To a Nuclear-Armed Iran," Pew Research Center, May 18, 2012, accessed December 10, 2012, http://www.pewglobal.org/.

2012 indicates that well over half the population, 54%, oppose Iran acquiring nuclear weapons.

Turks do not want their government to sanction Iran, but they do not want Iran to have nuclear

weapons either.64 This reflects Turkish society’s indecision over the prospect of a nuclear-armed

Iran. In the same poll, only over a quarter of Turks support using force to prevent Iran from

developing nuclear weapons, 42% would accept a nuclear-armed Iran. A considerable proportion

of responses were either, “Neither / Both / DK (Do not Know)”, at 32% of answers overall.65

While the responses to this matter are far more ambivalent than in other countries, the

Turkish people are clearly not forming solidarity with Iran on this issue. In fact, the majority of

Turkish people view Iran unfavorably. In another poll conduct by Zaman, less than a quarter

view Iran favorably. Most interestingly, only Shi’ite respondents favored Iran. Moreover, the

majority of respondents have sympathy for the concerns of Gulf countries’ concern over Iranian

power.66

Thus, a clear opportunity for for Sunni majority Turkey to act against Shi’ite majority

Iranian interests. However, there is no clamor from the Turkish people themselves to act against

Iran. If Islamism and realist neo-Ottomanism is as pervasive an ideology as some academics

suggest,67 would not the Turkish government actively oppose Iran in the matter of nuclear

weapons?

There are economic factors to consider. Until recently, trade between Turkey and Iran

was minimal, despite being neighbors and each having considerably sized markets. It was not

64 Ibid. 65 Ibid. 66 "Negative Attitudes toward Iran Increasing among Turks, Survey Shows," Negative Attitudes toward Iran Increasing among Turks, Survey Shows, March 6, 2013, accessed March 07, 2013, http://www.todayszaman.com/news-308951-negative-attitudes-toward-iran-increasing-among-turks-survey- shows.html. 67 Sally McNamara, Ariel Cohen, Ph.D, and James Phillips, "Countering Turkey’s Strategic Drift," Heritage Foundation, July 26, 2010, accessed February 7, 2013, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/07/countering-turkey-s-strategic-drift#_ftn6.

until the Welfare Party took over that trade between Iran and Turkey really began to grow. In

2000, the total trade volume between Turkey and Iran was valued at just over a billion. Eleven

years later, total trade volume between Turkey and Iran exceeds $16 billion and continues to

grow.68 At the moment, it accounts for 4.27 percent of Turkey’s total foreign trade.69 This makes

it a substantial trade partner just on volume alone, though commerce with Iran is still well below

that with the United States and many other EU member states.

The most important characteristic of this economic relationship is the large amount of

natural gas Turkey imports from Iran. Over 20 percent of all natural gas that Turkey imports

comes from Iran making it Iran Turkey’s second biggest hydrocarbon source, following only

Russia.70 Turkey does have the option of importing its fuel from elsewhere, but Iran is one of

Turkey larger trading partners and is a growing market for Turkish goods. Naturally, Turkey’s

participation in an embargo would mean the loss of a substantial market for its goods. More

importantly however, is the fuel, would lose its imports from Iran, perhaps the biggest reason

why the Turkish people and their government fear the potential effects sanctions would have on

its own economy.71 As Dr. Oktav indicates, a second reason for Turkey not supporting sanctions

in the fullest is because doing so, in its mind, will only make armed intervention by the United

States or Israel more likely, and this is not good for Turkish business, particularly tourism.72 She also adds that Ankara does not want the carefully cultivated, yet precarious, relationship between it and Tehran to collapse over this single issue.73 There is little regard for how the nation thinks

68 Gareth H. Jenkins, "Occasional Allies, Enduring Rivals: Turkey's Relations with Iran," Central Asia- Caucasus Institute Silk Road Studies Program, May 2012, pg. 6, accessed December 23, 2012, http://www.isdp.eu/publications/silk-road-papers.html. 69 Ibid.53 70 Ibid. 71 Ibid. 72 Özden Zeynep. Oktav, Ph.D, "Regionalism or Shift of Axis? Turkish-Syrian-Iranian Relations," in Turkey in the 21st Century: Quest for a New Foreign Policy (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2011), pg. 88. 73 Ibid.

here, be it Islamic, nationalist or any other. Instead, the biggest concerns for Turkey are

economic and diplomatic in nature.

As for the Turkish public, America’s involvement is not the reason most Turks are

against tougher sanctions. Although Iran’s image is more positive in Turkey than in other NATO

countries, it is only just.74 The majority of Turks view Iran as potential threat and oppose Iran’s

nuclear program. Meanwhile, the same poll indicates does not want to lose a significant market

for their goods or, perhaps more specifically, their largest supply of hydrocarbon energy. Their

views are in line with the political elite. It is clearly not out of Turkey’s attitude towards America

that Turkey refuses to participate in the embargo, but rather, its hydrocarbon dependency on Iran

makes doing so a serious risk to the national economy.

This case also demonstrates how popular attitudes that contradict American interests in

Turkey are not only characterized by anti-Americanism. This is case, people are foremost concerned with the economy, not with American involvement. A negative recognition of

America helps to explain Turkey’s new foreign policy actions, but not always. Policy-impacting national response are ultimately predicated upon a spirit of national sovereignty inherited from a

Kemalist construction of identity. Unless the United States openly forces Turkey to close the embargo, thereby challenging Turkey’s autonomy, anti-americanism will be ineffectual.

On Essentialist Analyses

The above case studies demonstrate the link between the United States foreign policy and the rise of anti-americanism in Turkey, and the extent to which this sentiment has manifested itself in foreign policy. Thus, they do not identify the Turkish people as holding essentially anti-

74 "A Global “No” To a Nuclear-Armed Iran," Pew Research Center, May 18, 2012, accessed December 10, 2012, http://www.pewglobal.org/.

American identities. As illustrated above, collective recognition of another identity is prone to

change.

A well-known essentialist identity conception of international relations is Huntington’s

Clash of Civilizations thesis. It claims that, “state behavior in the post-Cold War period will no

longer reflect primarily power calculations or ideology but, rather, civilizational affiliations.” 75

Furthermore, it is, “along the ‘fault lines’ between the world religions that conflict will be most

prone to erupt.” 76 Although Huntington does incorporate identity into his theory of international

relations, he fails to realize that identity formation is contingent upon history and social structure,

and thus prone to change by circumstance or in interaction with other values.

Whether somebody identifies themselves as a Turk or Muslim does not determine their

attitude towards the United States; how foreign policies conflict with national values must be

observed to explain why most Turks resent Washington’s actions. Identity shapes how Turks

perceive Washington’s actions, but America only becomes an enemy as a result of acting in a

way that allows it to be identified as a foe. However, numerous scholars observe Turkey’s recent

wave of anti-Americanism as resulting from identities that are essentially anti-American, and fail

to acknowledge that it is ultimately the individual, not the identity, that recognizes America as an

enemy. At least two tendencies emerge from an essentialist analysis of Turkish identity and

foreign policy: either to view Turkish identity as being essentially anti-foreigner or having an

Islamic identity that is necessarily anti-Western.

Sally McNamara, Ariel Cohen and James Phillips’s views of Islam and its effect on

Turkish foreign policy presents a example of essentialising Islam to explain deviations in a muslim-majority country’s foreign policy from American interests. Their article, “Countering

75 Lars-Erik Cederman, "Nationalism and Ethnicity," ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse-Kappen, and Beth A. Simmons, in Handbook of International Relations (London: SAGE Publications, 2002), pg. 414. 76 Ibid.

Turkey’s Strategic Drift”, reflects an orientalist understanding of Turkey’s Islamic heritage.

They assume a dichotomy between Kemalist and Islamic values which does not exist, and depict

Turkish foreign policy as having changed its strategy strictly in opposition to the West.

“The AKP’s Islamist ideology, which holds that Muslims are engaged in an endless

conflict with non-Muslims and the West, has prompted striking changes in Turkish

foreign policy. It has led Turkey to distance itself from the United States and Israel while

pressing for closer ties with dictatorships in Muslim countries, including Iran, Syria, and

Sudan.”77

This is not only to ignore completely economic motivations behind Davutoğlu’s strategic drift

policy, but distinctions within political Islam in Turkey as well. The Millî Görüş movement, the

major confrontational model of political Islam in Turkey, lost its preeminent status to the

moderate Islamists in the AK party. Even the RP government, led by Erbakan himself, found

itself renewing security arrangements with Israel, despite all rhetoric of cutting ties with them.

This constructivist analysis will be contrasted with essentialist understandings of Turkish

foreign policy. Although scholars I draw attention to demonstrate the most uncompromising

expressions of a essentialist understandings of Turkish foreign policy, they represent a

widespread tendency to reify collective behavior instead of considering the events and ideas that

societies themselves experience in forming collective memory. Indeed, there are likely as many

of these essentialist understandings of culture’s place in international politics as there are

supporters of Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations thesis. Anti-Americanism exists and

plays a role in foreign policies, but foreign policy analysts and international relations scholars

must not mistakenly conclude that anti-American behavior is endemic to a culture and will repeat

77 Sally McNamara, Ariel Cohen, Ph.D, and James Phillips, "Countering Turkey’s Strategic Drift," Heritage Foundation, July 26, 2010, pg. 10, accessed February 7, 2013, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/07/countering-turkey-s-strategic-drift#_ftn6.

itself because it has once. Cross-national recognition is too prone to change for this to even be possible.

Implications

It becomes apparent from these three case studies that democratization in Turkey has

allowed for popular attitudes to respond to foreign externalities challenging their national

identity through foreign policy. The consequences Anti-Americanism, which has largely

developed along sovereign-nationalistic lines, is something to be duly considered in engaging

Turkey on the international stage.

This is especially so, because effective political power has become much more diffuse in

the last decade. As the case of the Iraq War demonstrates, the government can be forced to cater

to the people’s national identity, even if it means prioritizing identity over perceived strategic

and economic games. The AK party has found an incredibly powerful niche of Turkish identity,

which has propelled it to great electoral success, but it is not capable of redefining Turkish

identity in the way that the early Kemalist regime was able to consolidate Turkish identity via

bureaucratic nationalism.78

For better ties with Turkey, it is important for Washington to consider how its actions are

recognized by the Turkish people. Are they in conflict or do they favor Turkish national values?

The case studies demonstrates that American actions regarding Iraq have conflicted with Turkish

national values deriving from Islam and Kemalism, whereas genocide recognition strictly

conflicts with the latter. However, as the Iran embargo demonstrates, not all deviation between

Ankara and Washington is rooted in a discrepancy between Turkish national values and

Washington’s actions. With that all established, it is time to consider where future obstacles may

lie ahead for the Turkey-United States relations and how Washington can minimize anti-

Americanism generated in Turkey.

78 Peter Sugar, "Nationalism in Eastern Europe," in Nationalism, ed. John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pg. 174-175.

It is also unlikely that tensions between Ankara and the Kurds or Armenians will resolved

anytime soon. Although reconciliation between the PKK and Turkey is distantly feasible with the

declaration of ceasefire on March 21, 2013, there have been ceasefires in the past. Hence,

although Abdullah Ocalan, leader of the PKK, declared a ceasefire and evacuation of soldiers

from their positions in Turkey, he has yet to call a ceasefire.79 The United States should

encourage this reconciliation, perhaps goings as far as to offer the expertise of diplomats with

experience mediating conflict in the Balkans if a third party is lacking and desired.

Meanwhile, the United States Congress should no longer pursue Armenian genocide

recognition. This is not only merely a recommendation for improved ties with Turkey, but also

as to not interfere reconciliation between Armenians and Turks. Although the Armenian diaspora

in the United States is active in lobbying for recognition by, Armenians within Turkey are not

and neither are they interested in it. Armenian activists and community leaders in Turkey are

consistently opposed to diaspora efforts pushing for genocide recognition.80

Besides lacking the consent of the Armenian community in Turkey, external genocide

resolutions contribute little, if at all to reconciliation. As Eric Yamamoto observed, legal

settlement over a conflict in political memory through grass-roots publicity and high-level

lobbying increases resentment between parties if it appears too politicized.81 There is widespread

perception among both Turks and Armenians attempts at external recognitions by Congress are

compelled by campaign contributions and votes instead of principal. When France officially

recognized the Armenian genocide, it was widely perceived to be stunt by President Nicholas

79 Sebnem Arsu, "Jailed Leader of the Kurds Offers a Truce With Turkey," New York Times, March 21, 2013, accessed April 2, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/22/world/europe/kurdish-leader-declares-truce-with- turkey.html?_r=0. 80 Catherine Collins, "Turks, Armenians Protesting Genocide Resolution In U.s.," Chicago Tribune, October 13, 2000, accessed November 05, 2012, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2000-10-13/news/0010130195_1_armenia- and-turkey-armenians-genocide. 81 Martha Minow and Nancy L. Rosenblum, Breaking the Cycles of Hatred: Memory, Law, and Repair (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), pg. 137.

Sarkozy to galvanize support for the upcoming election and momentarily distract the public from

economic hardship.82 It is necessary that Turkey recognize and apologize for the Armenian

Genocide for the sake of psychological healing, the Armenian minority in Turkey and the

normalization of relations between Armenia and Turkey. Yet, ultimate reconciliation between

the Turkish and Armenian peoples must come about through dialogue, albeit, protection of

speech must first come about for this to occur (lest another Hrant Dink perish). If Washington is

to have a role in Armenian genocide recognition, it is be best through promoting the freedom of

speech through giving support to non-governmental organizations dedicated to the fulfillment of

civil liberties in Turkey.

As already discussed, Armenian genocide recognition and Kurdish issues are both very

visible topics in Turkey. However, these are not the only visible foreign policy concerns, not

even where America is concerned. In the past decade, the Turkish government has increasingly

taken to openly criticizing Israeli policies, particularly their embargo of the Gaza strip and

settlement construction in the West Bank.83 Although a recent apology by PM Benjamin

Netanyahu of Israel to Erdogan regarding the Turkish fatalities aboard the Mavi-Marmara indicates the possibility of reconciliation between both countries, widespread anti-Israel sentiment remains and the Turkish government continues to court Hamas.84 Therefore, in regards

to its relations with Turkey, the United States must take added precaution in aligning itself with

82 D. Parvaz, "French 'genocide' Law Infuriates Turkey," Al-Jazeera English, January 25, 2012, accessed April 04, 2013, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/01/20121247581310557.html. 83 United States., Congress., House., Turkey's New Foreign Policy Direction: Implications for U.S.-Turkish Relations : Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Eleventh Congress, Second Session, July 28, 2010., by Ross Wilson, Michael Rubin, Ph.D, Ian Lesser, Ph.D, Soner Cagaptay, Ph.D, and Howard L. Berman, 113th ed., vol. 111 (Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 2010), pg. 10. 84 "Israel's Netanyahu Apologizes to Turkey over Deadly Flotilla Raid," NBC News, March 22, 2013, accessed April 03, 2013, http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/03/22/17416275-israels-netanyahu-apologizes-to- turkey-over-deadly-flotilla-raid?lite.

Israel. If the United States supports, or even permits, an Israeli policy that offended Turkish national values it will also gamble over ties with Israel.

As Iraq demonstrates, Islamic identification greatly contributes to Turkish foreign policy actions. Therefore, it is unfortunate that little known about the Gülen movement, which is not even to speak of their indirect ties to policy making. Investigating Gülenist values and their political aspects will further construct Turkey political identity and introduce a more concise understanding of Turkish foreign policy. As organization structure is virtually non-existent, an is exhaustive study of officials affiliated with Gülen seems to the be only possible way to truly gauge an overarching Gülenist agenda that can identified and compared with Millî Görüş, or even the AK party’s official policy agenda.

In an idealized world, Washington learns from the anti-Americanism it generated through inadvertently challenging Turkish national identity. Yet, besides assuming perfect execution, this is unrealistic because national interests are contingent upon a plethora of factors that almost always prevent a clear cut solution. Moral dilemmas might also arise. An examination into politicized Armenian genocide recognition reveals these actions as insincere and probably counterproductive for Armenians. We can conclude that genocide recognition here constitutes as an unnecessary provocation of Turkish nationalist sovereignty. Yet, for the Kurds in Northern

Iraq, the situation changes because it allowed them to develop free of Saddam Hussein’s genocidal tyranny. As far as U.S. foreign policy actions are concerned, this one is hardly regrettable.

Nevertheless, there are other conflicts between the United States and Turkish identity that the United States could have addressed much better. The Hood event, in which Turkish soldiers illegally operating in northern Iraq were captured by U.S. personnel after being mistaken for

hostile militants and were held in captivity for three days. Because the Turkish soldiers could be

excused as fighting against the PKK, the affair became a matter of national pride, and another

upsurge of anti-Americanism occurred.85

It took over a month for both sides to issue a joint statement of regret, but, by then, the narrative of the wronged Turkish soldiers had been well established.86 Nancy L. Rosenblum

might have offered an alternative that could have changed the ultimate nationalist narrative

which was formed. Had the Turkish and American operatives themselves openly confront with

the other’s past actions. Of course, they would not only be apologizing to each other, as, to quote

Barry O’Neill, “international apologies are . . . more communications to the world than to the

offended party: their point is to restore the other’s face [to the world].” 87 Furthermore, the open

interaction between the actors would have added a personal dimension to this affair, which is

necessary, lest the apology look insincere.

Therein this hypothetical solution lies a possibility for reconciliation in future acts of

identity violation. Public acts of forgiveness are also capable of mitigating violated emotions,

because they allow for a retelling of events by the actors involved.88 Even at their dearth, United

States - Turkish relations need not be entirely antagonistic. The outcome of such events might result in heightened anti-Americanism, but, at the very least, pre-existing anti-Americanism sentiment would not explain American actions alone and Americans would have the opportunity to inform the Turkish public that friendship is possible.

85 United States. Council on Foreign Relations. Independent Task Force. U.S.-Turkey Relations: A New Partnership. Edited by Madeleine K. Albright and Stephen J. Hadley. Compiled by Steven A. Cook. Vol. 69. Independent Task Force Reports. New York: CFR, 2012. Accessed October 25, 2012. http://www.cfr.org. 86 Ibid. 87 Martha Minow and Nancy L. Rosenblum, Breaking the Cycles of Hatred: Memory, Law, and Repair (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), pg. 99. 88 Martha Minow and Nancy L. Rosenblum, Breaking the Cycles of Hatred: Memory, Law, and Repair (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), pg. 100.

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