Democracy, Identity and Anti-Americanism in Turkey: Implications for United States-Turkey Relations Jeff Easterling Honor Scholar April 9, 2013 2 Abstract In light of persistent anti-American in Turkey and nascent populism in Turkish foreign policy, this article will investigate how anti-Americanism is created in Turkey and it's meaning for Turkish-American bilateral relationship. Because anti-Americanism is generated by conflicts in national values, this article historically and socially constructs the two predominant political culture types in Turkey: Kemalism and Islam. This article will then identify the governmental, societal, and systemic factors contribute to antagonization of Turkish national identity by American foreign policy.1 In turn the article will offer methods as to how the United States can confront anti-Americanism and reconcile its actions with Turkish society. In my findings, anti- Americanism does not dictate all policy actions that are against American positions, but the current government, accountable to a newly emergent national identity, is susceptible to this sentiment. 1 Three of five levels of Rosenau’s International relations pre-theory. 3 A Paradigm Shift People trying to label the United States-Turkey bilateral relationship will find it more difficult to do so than they expect. All White House administrations since Bush senior have given special titles to the country, considering it a valuable ‘strategic partner’, ‘model country’, an example of ‘Muslim democracy’, etc. Both countries have significant military uses for the other. Turkey imports many of its arms from America and earns money renting out valuable military bases to the United States.2 Yet, beyond the military needs of both countries, it is a partnership without much depth. Economic ties are substantial in and of themselves, but neither country is a truly a significant trading partner of the other. Institutional links are likewise rather scarce. In America, Turkey only occasionally registers in the mass media is not subject of common discussion or debate. For Americans, it is only a rather distant country. But the United States is not very far away from the thoughts of Turks. American events in the Middle East concern them all too well, and American soldiers are stationed in their own land. There is no proof for any takeover of Turkey by the United States, but as their fears are supplied by past American behavior in the region and reinforced through sensational rumors of American conspiracy against Turkey, and both of these factors are reinforced by a political culture that developed largely out of opposition to foreign powers. By several estimates, most of the Turkish people regard the United States as their greatest security threat. However extraordinary these beliefs might seem to an American reader, who would know of their country’s war weariness, one cannot be patronizing. The assumption that Turkish fears have, that American power can be effectively projected throughout the world, and therefore at Turkey, is 2 United States, Congressional Research Service, Turkey Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti ([Washington, D.C.]: Congressional Research Service, 2012), pg. 33. 4 mostly correct. They only need to travel the massive American Airbase outside of Adana, Incirlik, within their own borders to confirm their beliefs of America as a global power that can project its power throughout the world. More troublingly, a number of politicians even harbor these beliefs.3 Of course, there is a difference between capability and intention. While Washington can project its power into Europe and the Middle East, there is no reason to suppose that it is actively working against Turkish interests. Nevertheless, because many Turkish people consider the United States a legitimate threat, it is important to consider why a security dilemma is assumed. A strict realist reading of the situation fails to explain the situation: Turkey is a member of NATO and military ally of the United states, and while the Soviet Union no longer borders Turkey, Russia is not very far away. If Turkish perceptions are not strictly realist, how do they rationalize the international system? Many Turks began to assume a security dilemma against the United States when United States policy inadvertently lead the to the creation of a Kurdish safe zone in northern Iraq, out of which an autonomous Kurdish majority polity has emerged. As the United States unintentionally offended the idea of the Turkish Anatolian homeland, Turkish fears were informed by their country’s foundational history, in which the West tried to extinguish the newly formed republic.() This triggered what Katzenstein and Keohane term as sovereign-nationalist anti- Americanism. According to them, “sovereign nationalists focus on two values: the importance of not losing control over the terms by which polities are inserted in world politics and the inherent 3 Claire Berlinski, "A Nation of Conspiracies," Wall Street Journal, March 13, 2010, accessed November 4, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870413140457. 5 importance and value of collective national identities.” 4 In the case of Turkey, the latter has occurs. Ankara and Washington are not strategic rivals. They are not locked against each other for regional political supremacy, so Turks do not resent The United States as the Germans resented the British empire in years prior to the first world war. However, the United States has inadvertently offended both of the predominant sets of political values in Turkey, and has thus confronted the Turkish people’s collective identity. In the past, this might have led to a conflict with the military establishment alone, as it was the highest political power in the country. This would have made it an easier situation to handle diplomatically, as demonstrated by the Cyprus dispute, in which the United States needed only to contend with the attitudes. Yet, now the United States must contend with a foreign policy that is, to significant measure, popularly determined, as democratization in Turkey has placed legitimacy in the majority, rather than a political ideal. Washington must now mind how the majority of Turks think in conducting its policy with Turkey. Likewise, the Turkish government must do the same. The people of Turkey did not always fear the United States as it does now. There was a time in which U.S military presence elucidated praise instead of spite. Istanbulites could hardly be any happier to see the USS Missouri, delivering the body of a respected Turkish ambassador to America drop anchor on April 5, 1946. For the Turks at harbor, the popular attitude was that the Russians were still their chief threat after hundreds of years and America was an esteemed protector that respected its allies’ territorial integrity. Despite Turkey’s distrust of foreign 4 Robert O. Keohane and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Anti-Americanisms," Policy Review 139 (October/November 2006): pg. 5, accessed February 4, 2013, GALE. 6 powers, America was very far away and did not have the imperial notoriety that the Russians, British or French had.5 Yet, as cold war politics ensued for another forty years, Turkish attitudes changed as America was no longer a distant friend as much as an interfering, but necessary, security partner. However, Turkey and the United States merely disagreed upon a few security matters. The United States did little to offend Turkish national psyche, and, also importantly, the people themselves had little means of airing these grievances. However, political developments in the Middle East through the 1990s and early 2000s changed this. The establishment of de facto independent Kurdish-majority polity in Northern Iraq was made possible by the U.S. enforced no-fly zone. As conflict against the Kurdistan Worker’s Party persisted in Turkey, both the Turkish state and its people felt threatened by the presence of this polity that seemed a plausible foundation for an irredentist Kurdish state.6 United States’ actions, and many began to suspect that America actively worked against Turkish interests. Yet, it was not until the historical 2002 parliamentary elections were held that the people’s views were more integrated into government policy. Thus, the AK party, the victorious party of the 2002 elections, would act more in line with the people’s wishes. Although this would not be the first time elections have occurred in Turkey, it can be characterized as a regime change. The established general and officer political class, which had long dominated Turkish politics, lost legitimacy in the eyes of the Turkish people. The Kemalist principles they used as a mandate by which they ruled the country, are still elemental features of Turkish politics, but Islam and democracy gained traction. Although a major economic downturn greatly contributed to the AK party’s electoral victory, other 5 Stephen Kinzer, Reset: Iran, Turkey, and America's Future (New York: Times Books, 2010). 6 United States, Congressional Research Service, Iraq Regional Perspectives and U.S. Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard ([Washington, D.C.]: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2007), pg. 12. 7 oppositional parties, most notably the CHP, did not perform nearly as spectacularly as the AK party in areas that secularist parties tended to perform well. The legitimacy of the current government, unlike past governments, is not founded upon the memory of Atatürk, but unprecedented popular mandate. Civil liberties remain weak. The current government blatantly resorts to widespread media repression. Yet it is still the strongest civilian government Turkey has ever had and widespread support remains. By and large, Turkey has become more democratic.7 This is not to ignore that a rather large number of journalists have been jailed in the last several years for speaking out against government policies against the Kurdish minority, and many other persistent issues remain.8 Civil liberties, thus, continue to suffer as they did prior to the AK government, but for the first time, legitimacy lies in how the people vote.