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Indonesia's response in the South China Sea disputes: a comparative analysis of the Soeharto and the post-Soeharto era Aplianta, Derry

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Indonesia’s Response in the South China Sea Disputes: A comparative analysis of the Soeharto and the post-Soeharto era

Derry Aplianta Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Indonesia

Abstract

Before it developed into a dispute among China and Southeast Asian nations, the South China Sea has been disputed long before it became what it is today. The post-World War II era brought a fresh start to a new chapter of dispute, as China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei Darussalam laid their claims one by one. This study contends that under Suharto’s iron fist rule, Indonesia’s interest to the South China Sea dispute grew from maintaining Indonesia’s territorial integrity to maintaining domestic stability. The former took shape after being threatened by China’s map which claimed a part of the former’s territorial waters, while the later grew in through establishing deeper trade cooperation with China. Despite the half-hearted normalization with China, Indonesia managed to establish a track-two forum for parties involved in the South China Sea dispute, which is later proven to be instrumental. Under President Yudhoyono, Indonesia gradually played its initial role from a passive into an active honest broker, which brought improvements to the process. This research attempts to show that constraint to Indonesia’s role in the South China Sea dispute originates from both the ideological and historical factors. Indonesia’s long-running ideological constraints set its priorities to its interest to the dispute, while its foreign policy doctrine serves as a pragmatic means to achieve its goals of interests. Indonesia’s past relationship with China also played a part in influencing Indonesia’s response which later evolved as the relations went through ups and downs. Moreover, the unclear integration process of ASEAN sets the task of the honest broker became a one- country-show for Indonesia.

Key words: South China Sea, Dispute, Indonesia, China, ASEAN

Introduction China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam. Although the dispute may The South China Sea (SCS) dispute have developed into a complex ensued as a result of inter-overlapping phenomenon of what it is today, it actually territorial claims from Brunei Darussalam, started as a result of an even more complex

Journal of ASEAN Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2015), pp. 1-21 ©2015 by CBDS Bina Nusantara University and Indonesian Association for International Relations ISSN 2338-1361 print / ISSN 2338-1353 electronic

2 Indonesia’s Response in the South China Sea Disputes

occurring which directly or indirectly Indonesia’s foreign policy during the involved a lot more states. Simply put, the reform and democratic era, and how the dispute is a situation which serves as an transformation alluded Indonesia’s foreign outcome of an ongoing interaction among policy with the country’s ongoing response the entities in perceiving their territories. to the SCS dispute in particular. Although it may give less weight from the international legal perspective, we may trace the beginning of the dispute through Indonesia’s Response to the South China extensive chronological review of any Sea Dispute during Suharto’s Period recorded activities in the SCS, dating from as early as the ancient times to give a better Indonesia and the Normalization of the understanding of the situation which lead Diplomatic Relations with China to the one we currently see today. Another way to trace the origins of the dispute is to Suharto’s reign to power marks the selectively present the historical records era called the ‚New Order‛ for Indonesia. which suggest that there were any The dichotomy was created to serve as a indication of dispute among two or more distinction from the era where Sukarno parties to the area. This study investigates ruled Indonesia for more than two decades, reaction of the Indonesian government and which is dubbed as ‚Old Order‛. This what may cause that reaction since the means aside from Suharto as the new head authoritarian Soeharto until the democratic of state, the ‚new‛ terminology also regime of Susilo B. Yudhoyono. This study brought new faces in Indonesian socio- found that Indonesia’s response to SCS political life, which in turn brought dispute during the New Order Era grew Indonesia to a new style of leadership. The from maintaining over territorial integrity leadership, where Suharto remained in the to actively accommodate peaceful talks center, was an alliance of the armed forces, between claimant countries in the reform intellectuals, religious groups, and political era which might reflect Indonesia’s growing parties, under the political system known as interests of the dispute itself or parties to the Pancasila Democracy. By utilizing such the dispute. It was steadily developing from a system that knows no opposition, Suharto a simpler honest broker role into an active had the complete control of Indonesia’s bridge builder, and ultimately holds domestic and foreign policies. ASEAN’s leadership in preserving inter- During Suharto’s rule from 1968 regional peace and stability. until 1998, the foreign policy of Indonesia This article will discuss the issue in claimed the neutral posture of free and two consecutive sections: the New Order active principal inherited from the previous era and the Reform era. The following reign. In practice, Suharto’s foreign policy section discusses and analyzes Indonesia’s was stealthily sided with the western bloc response to the SCS dispute during the as an attempt to distance Indonesia from the Suharto era and how the archipelagic communist world and while gaining country conveyed its interests into policies financial and technical assistance from the to maintain the dispute. Next, it will discuss Western Bloc. New Order Indonesia’s 3 Journal of ASEAN Studies

economy was engineered by the western- extraction facilities to mine the country’s centric economists, while the country’s abundant natural resources with notable defense assets were geared by arms few including Freeport-McMoran and imported from NATO countries. This Post- International Nickel Company (Pease, Sukarno Indonesia also foresaw the 1996). founding of ASEAN with Southeast Asian countries and the suspension of diplomatic To ensure the process going well as well as relations with communist China. to ensure Suharto’s regime enjoyed The SCS dispute was initially not of sustainable benefits from it, the new regime Indonesia’s concern since the focus of sought political stability. In fact, Suharto’s Suharto was building Indonesia’s economy leadership was well known for its high which was torn by inflation in the mid- regard for stability. His quest for 1960s, however at a certain point Indonesia Indonesia’s development required incessant decided to involve itself to the dispute as a political sustenance and social order, which response. in turn shaped Indonesia as an inward- In the beginning, Indonesia did not looking country for at least two-thirds of put much interest in international issues. New Order era. Suharto’s foremost concern Like most developing countries in the for the stability to support Indonesia’s world, the focus of Indonesia under Suharto development transformed Indonesia into a was to rebuild the country’s economy pseudo-democratic country where political which was collapsed under Sukarno’s aspirations were limited and dissents administration which suffered massive within the society were suppressed. During hyper-inflation (Panglaykim & Thomas, his three decades of rule, Suharto 1967). Since economic recovery was the successfully created and instilled a stable main focus of the country, Suharto set up political culture, whiles his legacy has his men to formulate and carry out shown as a prominent yet inspiring figure initiatives with the aim to recover for the leaders of neighboring countries, Indonesia’s economy. As a result, during namely Mahathir Mohammad of Malaysia the beginning of Suharto’s tenure and Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore (Woolcot, Indonesia’s foreign policy was aimed at 2008). achieving national economic recovery. New Order brought growth and Suharto’s plan to rebuild the economy was development to Indonesia, thus earned carried out with the reinvigoration of the Suharto’s famous nickname of ‚Indonesia’s gear of production by inviting investments Father of Development‛ in the 1980s. With and capitals to Indonesia. For such cause, Indonesia economy’s flourished, it became Suharto and his men began a tour with a inevitable that Indonesia had to expand its mission to promote and introducing new growth through International trade and investment law in Indonesia to countries investments to sustain its growing such as West Germany and Japan. The economy, especially when the world saw effort showed progress; in the initial phase the Oil Crash in 1980s. During that period, Indonesia successfully attracted foreign Suharto was trying to increase non-oil enterprises to establish production and exports to be more competitive since the

4 Indonesia’s Response in the South China Sea Disputes

country saw a decrease of revenue in oil diplomatic relations did not happen until sales (Indonesia Oil – exports, 2013). Apart 1989 (van der Kroef, 1986), when President from making the non-oil exports more Suharto attended the funeral of the late attractive, it was also logical to approach Emperor Hirohito in Tokyo. During the inaccessible markets to increase potential visit Suharto met Chinese Foreign Minister revenues. These underlying conditions then Qian Qichen who was also attending the led to the re-opening trade relations of funeral under his capacity as a statesman. Indonesia with China, which consequently Their rendezvous inevitably led to the paved the way to diplomatic normalization further conversation of normalization of between the two countries. diplomatic relations of the two countries The normalization of the diplomatic year (Indonesia, China, to Normalize, 1989). relation between Indonesia and China was As mentioned earlier, Indonesia displayed seemingly something that China had been reluctance to push the normalization eagerly seeking. Indeed, Indonesia agenda for the process require a lot of time maintained the gesture of the proposed side and preparation, but it was trade, as it was of the offer, hinting that it was the Chinese Indonesia’s main interest that was pushed Government who wished to rekindle the forward into realization almost bilateral relations (van der Kroef, 1986). As immediately. The resumption of the trade reluctant as it seem for Indonesia to relations between the two countries might normalize its bilateral relationship with serve as Beijing’s gambit to appease Suharto China, the archipelagic country needs to who was so adamant in creating an sustain its economic growth through the re- Indonesia free from Chinese influence for establishment of diplomatic relations almost 20 years (van der Kroef, 1986). (Sukma, 2013). If the political stability of Aside from maintaining the current domestic was the one that ensured and socio-political status quo, Indonesia’s sustained Indonesia’s economic reluctance to carry out the normalization development of most of the time during with China was partly caused by Suharto’s rule, the late 1980s saw the need ideological reasons. Indonesia sought of Indonesia to sustain the stability through China’s word on not to support any a wider economic activity (Sukma, 2013). communism causes in Indonesia. Foreign Indonesia and China’s first post- Minister Kusumaatmadja reiterated Sukarno’s official meeting was in 1985 Indonesia’s prerequisite conditions to Asian-African Conference in Bandung, China, as not to offer any kinds of support Indonesia. This meeting of Suharto and the to anything that opposes the legal Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar Government of Indonesia. Formally, this Kusumaatmadja with Chinese Foreign was interpreted as an acknowledgement Minister Wu Xueqian resulted in an of sovereignty from one country to another, immediate progress of the two countries a normative procedure in international which came into motion with the relations. On the other side, this could also normalization of the trade relations in the be interpreted as an official request from same year (Indonesia, China, to Normalize, Indonesia to China, not to do anything that 1989). However, the talks of resuming could harm the current regime. This 5 Journal of ASEAN Studies

confirmed that Indonesia might still bear when diplomatic relations with China was suspicions to China. Although China’s still frozen. At that point Indonesia’s allegation of involvement in the 1965 Military Commander, M. Yusuf commented attempted coup is still debatable, Suharto that there is a possibility of war in the SCS. has made it clear that to resume diplomatic Indonesia responded to the SCS dispute in a relations with Indonesia; China needs to traditional fashion: by the deployment of abide by Indonesia’s terms, something military might in the disputed border as it which China eventually acceded to despite then deployed 35 battalions for military ideological incoherencies between the exercise within waters surrounding the Chinese Communist Party’s ideology and Natuna islands. It is worth noted that the terms (van der Kroef, 1986). Indonesia’s response to the dispute was Nevertheless, the diplomatic arguably because Indonesia was more normalization agenda was already set in concerned to its own domestic security, motion. After the initial encounter in 1985, especially border and territorial issues the process was filled with the exchanging which had the potential for disintegration in visits of Indonesian high officials to their particular. Chinese counterparts. For the second time, Indonesia’s involvement in Suharto met Qian Qichen when the Foreign international disputes was not new to Minister made an official visit to the Suharto’s Indonesia. The country has sent President in Jakarta. As a response, troops known as Garuda Contingents for Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Peace Keeping Operations in a number of visited China later in 1990.Alatas’ visit to Southeast Asian countries. From more than Beijing produced a communiqué of the 68 missions taken by the Garudas, Suharto’s resumption of Indonesia – China’s administration had their share of at least 40 diplomatic relations, which was then missions. It is worth noting that until the followed with Chinese Premier Li Peng’s 1990s most of the contingents for visit to Indonesia then formalized with the peacekeeping operations were deployed to signing of Memorandum of Understanding Middle Eastern countries, while contingents on the Resumption of Diplomatic Relations. to neighboring countries such as Cambodia Indonesia and China have officially and the Philippines were sent after 1991. As reestablished their diplomatic relations in conjecture it may be, these deployments of 1990. contingents showed Indonesia’s grown interest and awareness in maintaining the Suharto’s Indonesia and Its Initial stability of the Southeast Asian region, or in Response to the South China Sea Dispute other words Indonesia began to see the regional instabilities as threat to its national Despite its non-claimant status, interest. But it is also important to point out Indonesia has been aware of the SCS that Indonesia’s involvement with the dispute as the clash of claims is situated in Garuda Contingents is nothing as similar as close proximity to its territorial waters. The the country’s involvement in the SCS earliest Indonesia’s expressed concern of dispute where Indonesia plays the role of SCS dispute ever documented was in 1980, the honest broker for Southeast Asian

6 Indonesia’s Response in the South China Sea Disputes

countries and the diplomatically related to the immediate interest of the reestablished China. country, which is its own territorial integrity. After the successful normalization with According to Satyawan, Indonesia’s Indonesia has taken place, China swiftly national interests in the SCS are security mingle itself with the Southeast Asian and territorial integrity, economic interest, community under the ASEAN. China constitution mandate and ASEAN unity became an official dialogue partner for (Satyawan, 2013). During a stage of ASEAN after Minister for Foreign Affairs Suharto’s administration, Indonesia shifted and State Councilor Qian Qichen attended the course which seemed irregular to the the 24th ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting regime’s resolve to focus on national in Kuala Lumpur in July 1991. This turn of stability. This shift was demonstrated by events brought a new air to Southeast Asia Indonesia’s involvement in international as this enabled both China and ASEAN issues such as the SCS dispute. In 1993 member countries to establish dialogue China laid out the 9 dashed lines map and which was previously hampered by the integrated it effectively as part of its tensions of Cold War. Unfortunately, national law, which covers the entire South China’s inclusion to ASEAN’s forum did China Sea area, including the areas which not suppress the dispute from becoming a the Southeast Asian countries claimed as stumbling block. theirs, and as expected, this course of action Aware of the brewing situation in was then responded negatively from the the SCS, it was in 1991 Foreign Minister Ali claimant countries. At that time, Indonesia Alatas warned that the regional dispute as a country which held their principles could be developing into a conflict with a rigorous fashion under Suharto’s (Johnson, 1997). Amidst Indonesia’s stern leadership, might have felt threatened neutrality in the dispute, the country by China’s unilateral actions. It has been expressed concerns regarding the situation only a few years after the diplomatic in SCS which involved its Southeast Asian relations between Indonesia and China was neighbors. This indicated that Suharto’s normalized, and seeds of wariness and administration recognized the SCS dispute uneasiness against communism were still as a concern to Indonesia. But what kind of deep-planted within Indonesia’s threat did this dispute possess to Indonesia? indoctrinated society, while ethnic Chinese After all, the claims made by Brunei, China, were precariously treated as the second Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam were class buffer citizens by Suharto’s regime revolving an area distant in proximity to design. Indonesia in general was apparently Indonesia. None of the islands claimed were threatened, as they were the main target of actually owned by Indonesia, so how this suspiciousness if there was any indication dispute did actually equate to Indonesia’s of disadvantageous scheme from China interest? Indonesia’s interest to the SCS is which will hurt Indonesia (Sukma, 1999). not a single unitary factor. The archipelagic Should any disruptions occur, this will country’s interest can be interpreted into surely bring an impact to Indonesia’s multiple factors. The first one might be stability and ultimately security. 7 Journal of ASEAN Studies

Figure 1. The Nine-dotted line map

Source: Asia Maps, The University of Texas

The other factor to Indonesia’s Indonesia to suffer a major loss of potential interests is economy. The immediate threat revenues and gas reserve, but also to the region was caused by the nature of something which generate an immense the dashed lines map, which included disadvantage to Indonesia’s strategic policy. Indonesia’s northwestern territory, the seas The SCS issue is a multifaceted of Natuna. The Natuna islands area, which phenomenon to Indonesia, as it does not is rich with gas and minerals, is one of concern only a single tangible aspect. In a Indonesia’s biggest energy assets which strategic perspective, the logic of the SCS supply the country with abundant gas dispute would suggest that should the reserves and revenues from gas exports Southeast Asian countries lost their claimed (Azwar, 2013). The effect of losing such territories to China, then the risk of valuable territory would not only caused territorial loss for Indonesia is amplified.

8 Indonesia’s Response in the South China Sea Disputes

This logic is based on the domino effect and growing dispute in the SCS, it is safe to spillover effect, but rather than ideological assume that Indonesia sought reassurance or economical the argument is based on of stability from its foreign policies by historical jurisprudence from the legal neutralizing the amount of potential threat perspective. Historical jurisprudence refers the Southeast Asian region could bring to to a legal approach which considers the past the country. legal method in resolving an issue as the evidence and legal method are used as the Indonesia’s Response to SCS Dispute: Track benchmark for resolving a similar case. II Diplomacy, Shuttle Diplomacy, and Should the claimant Southeast Asian Defensive Posture Response countries lose their claimed territories to China through international legal procedures; it would possess a threat to As the opinion of two institutions Indonesia’s legal authority over the were divided: the Department of Foreign Natunas’ waters. Affairs (Deplu) which leaned to the Another reason as to why Indonesia accommodation and diplomatic approach to refused to not taking any direct action is engage China; the Indonesian Armed Forces Suharto’s high regard for stability. As a (ABRI) that preferred to terminate and sever country which has enjoyed stability for diplomatic relations with China, the more than three decades, Indonesia was in Government of Indonesia maintained a the midst of developing itself into one of balance of the soft and hard approach to Asia’s emerging economic powers, or manage the dispute. Since Indonesia was commonly known as one of the ‚Tigers of reluctant to do a direct approach and Asia‛. Indonesia’s diplomatic normalization mediate the dispute G-to-G, Deplu with China was intended to sustain the sponsored a series of workshops which domestic development of Indonesia which facilitated talks and dialogues between was considered to be on the verge of stakeholders of the issue. ‚tinggal landas‛ or literally defined as The workshop mechanism was transitioning into a developed country intended to de-escalate the atmosphere (Harian Ekonomi Neraca, 2013). To which was tense from the previous stand- associate itself among the newly emerging offs. Another purpose of the workshop was developing countries, Indonesia felt the also to strengthen and consolidate the need to secure the stability of the region ASEAN unity among member states, through diminishing potential threats namely the Philippines and Malaysia, as the which might arise in the coming periods. two countries not only clashed with China Indonesia’s past hostility with China could on the claimed territories, but also with be an even greater threat whereas the each other. The other purpose was to bring diplomatic absence was to be kept non-member states to the dispute such as suspended while the country’s immense Taiwan to sit together with China and power continues to grow. Although it is discuss the issue among each other. unclear whether the normalization of the Indonesia deliberately constructed an diplomatic relation was also factored by the informal workshop format so that the 9 Journal of ASEAN Studies

respective delegates can attend and category of attendee was the committee participate with ease. Participants should members, mostly consisted of the feel safer to engage in dialogues and individuals from the foreign affairs exchanging views with each other since departments/ministries. everyone attending is within their With de-escalation as one of the respective personal capacities. If the realist workshop’s main concerns, the committee perspective perceives the security dilemma set the condition to be more conducive for and perception of threat as something discussions. For example, to avoid generated from the lack of communication confrontations among the participants, the among states, then the workshop would committee set the agenda of the workshop serve as the bridge which would close the to avoid issues which are too sensitive to gap of information and miscommunication, discuss. Most the time the highlight of the thus foster further understanding and discussions revolves around establishing cooperation. new methods of cooperation between As it was intended, ASEAN member countries in less-political fields such as countries and claimant countries were the environmental protection, navigational ones who participated in this informal safety, and scientific research (Djalal, 2001). forum. These countries served as the main In line with the ASEAN way, ‚pillars‛ of the workshop and addressed as recommendations and conclusions of the Supporting Regional Authorities (SRAs). workshops were agreed upon based on The attendees of the workshop were consensus and not formally enforced. basically divided into four classifications: Should a participant disagree to a point of the first one being the participants, who was discussion, it should hold the discussion appointed by the SRAs to attend under their from having a conclusion which reflects the private capacities. These participants were general idea of the discussion process. from various institutions such as the foreign Since the initiation in 1990, the affairs department/ministry, academicians, workshop has been held annually. The and representatives of private companies. Indonesian-led workshop was considered to The second category of the attendee was the be successful in keeping the dispute from observers. Similar to the participants’ escalating further among claimant category, the observers consisted of countries. In addition that the forum has participants that consisted of academicians successfully made informal discussions and researchers, with the additions of non- approach more familiar to the participants, diplomatic government officials, military the range of issues has also developed over officers, journalists, non-governmental the time as well. For example, after covering organization (NGO) members. The third the basic fields of cooperation as theme of attendee category was the resource persons. discussions for the first three workshops, The individuals belonged in this category the topic of discussion became more specific were appointed by the committee to while the a number of aspects generated provide the workshop with their work and from the discussions were agreed upon and expertise, most of the times to provide became implemented for cooperation points of discussions. While the last (Satyawan, 2013).

10 Indonesia’s Response in the South China Sea Disputes

Excerpts written by Indonesia’s But the military commander, Wiranto, gave senior diplomat Hasjim Djalal entailed a clear message to China that the exercise is points of basic principles of the workshop. conducted within Indonesia’s territorial While the guidelines put forward principles waters and if China or any other countries which reflects flexibility and inclusiveness, considered that such activities might leave a the guidelines also mentioned that different impression, it was entirely beyond managing potential conflicts is a long term control (IMN, 1996). This suggests that the process (Djalal, 2001), which then hints that Indonesian ABRI was fully aware with the it is a continuous, if not gradually ‚inevitable consequences‛ generated from improving process. Indeed, aside from the the large scale drill; however, they still workshop the senior diplomat made efforts conducted the activity and exercise which were known today as the shuttle authority over what they believe is theirs: diplomacy. In 1994 Djalal made a series of Indonesia’s authority over the Natuna visit to ASEAN member countries to Islands and its adjacent waters. introduce a proposal which was later known as the ‚doughnut proposal‛. Djalal proposed that the middle of South China Indonesia’s Response to the South China Sea which consisted of islands should be Sea Dispute during the Post-Suharto’s ‚negotiable for joint development‛. Despite Period the shuttle diplomacy undertaken by Djalal, the proposal was rejected by ASEAN countries. BJ. Habibie’s Administration (1998-1999) In the mean time, Indonesian armed forces responded the dispute in a more With Suharto stepping down from conventional way. During the past decade Presidency, the plea for political reform was of the ‘90s, ABRI have held military clear that the transitional government led trainings in the waters of the Natuna by President B.J. Habibie named his cabinet Islands. This military training was a as the Indonesian Development Reform reaction to China’s unilateral action in 1993 Cabinet. Despite the lukewarm and which included the Natuna’s waters into pessimistic responses generated from the their official map (Republika Online, 1996). general public opinion, Habibie’s Dubbed as ‚loud diplomacy‛, in September administration played its part to initialize 1996 Indonesia deployed 40 combat the transitional period with bringing change aircrafts, 50 warships, and 19,500 armed to Indonesia’s political, social, and legal personnel. While earlier in August, aspects as the precursor to Indonesia’s Indonesia and Malaysia had joint military democratic state. The changes brought by exercise in the Island of Kalimantan. The Habibie gradually changed the face of exercises was conducted in the Natuna Indonesia from a centralized quasi- waters under the pretext of sea as a suitable authoritarian state into a plethora of place for military exercise in larger number openness and freedom, which to an extent and gives a specific vision of defense brought a massive hope for change that was exercise in bordering waters. (IMN, 1996). culminated during the 1999 election. 11 Journal of ASEAN Studies

For certain, the change brought name a few. Indonesia’s transitional positive impacts to Indonesians; rising government led by Habibie focused even transparency, accountability, and efficiency more on domestic issues, most of which are to name a few from the positive changes required active and direct response as the brought by the ‘98 reform movement situation regularly fluctuated. Aside from (Febrian, Setiadi & Suprapto, 1999). But established and regular day-to-day changes also brought other unwanted activities such as the Working Group on the excess from the other side of the coin; SCS, this initial reform period dramatically retroactive allegations of misconducts from reduced Indonesia’s active role in past Suharto’s tenets, Indonesia’s fading international relations (Mulyana, 2011). The prestige and the decline of authority to country tried to allocate more resource and other countries particularly its ASEAN effort for the national recovery of the neighbors, increasing socio-political country, consequently disabling the instabilities, domestic dissents and government to give more attention to the separatist movements were some of the SCS dispute. After more than three decades problems Indonesia faced during the reform living under oppression of Suharto, era. Indonesia sustained a major blow with Indonesia was anticipating for change and the separation of Timor-Leste in 1999, most of the energy and resources was which generated distrust among the allocated and concentrated for the 1999 military higher-ups to the civilian-led General Elections which marked the first government, with the addition that a post-New Order election. number the armed forces personnel were charged with the allegations of human rights abuse (O’Rourke, 2002). Another flaw Abdurrahman Wahid’s Administration to the administration led by Habibie was (1999-2001) the less effort made toward the reconciliation of the ethnic Chinese who The reform which gave rise to the fled for safety after the riot broke out. An demands for transparency, accountability, interview reflected how Habibie’s view to and good practice of politics sparked minor the minority group that controlled most of controversies regarding the results of the Indonesia’s economy as somehow election which pitted two political party ‚dispensable‛ or replaceable by people who giants namely the established Golkar Party stayed in the country (Soebagjo, 2008), and the biggest challenger Indonesian which might reflected how the leader’s Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P). inward looking orientation. Despite the legislative victory of the PDI-P, Indonesia has always been taking an did not manage to inward looking orientation when it comes secure the Presidential throne (KPU, 1999), to foreign policy during Suharto’s rule, and after a grueling voting session in the House Habibie’s era was no exception. When the of Representatives, the Nadhlatul Ulama wave of reform struck the country in May leader Abdurrahman Wahid was elected as 1998, Indonesia faced multi-dimensional the President, with Megawati as Vice crises, with monetary and social crisis to President.

12 Indonesia’s Response in the South China Sea Disputes

Wahid, who was popularly known Suharto’s political prisoners and Chinese- with his nickname ‚Gus Dur‛, launched Indonesians in rehabilitating their names policies to recover Indonesia’s post-crisis- and social integrity to the society. After torn reputation. Wahid traveled the world, decades of living under racial one of his missions was to reach the Middle- discrimination and political oppression by Eastern world, a world he was already the New Order regime, Chinese- familiar with but yet minimum in financial Indonesians enjoy more freedom in socio- contribution to Indonesia, to gather funds political fields while their dominance of the for the republic’s development (Sutiono & national economy proven to be resilient, Akbar, 2001). Aside from ASEAN, he despite a number of notable individuals flee strived to bring more Indonesian exposure the country in reaction to the civil unrest to multilateral forums such as the targeting the Chinese-Indonesians and their Developing Countries (D-8) forum, the assets during the May ’98 Riot (Soebagjo, World Economic Forum, and World 2008). Nevertheless, Wahid’s efforts to Summit for Social Development (Mulyana, integrate and rehabilitate the Chinese- 2011). Although the efforts were carried out Indonesians into the society have proven to extensively, Gus Dur’s expectations and be a success, with most of Sino-phobia objectives of a number his foreign policies sentiments gradually faded and for the first were never made clear. time the Government of Indonesia Domestically, Wahid made efforts to acknowledged the Chinese racial identity as rehabilitate the victims of past regime part of the national identity (Taufik, 2013). ‚misdemeanors‛ such as political prisoners Over a few years after the reform, the and the racially discriminated when the relations of Indonesia – China improved President lifted the communist and Marxist significantly. China’s great economic rise by ban from the national law, which then the end of the 20th century brought the helped smoothed out the rocky path of country’s influence to Indonesia. Paired up ideological antagonism legacy of Suharto with the reformed Indonesia which showed (Taufik, 2013). Moreover, this move helped a friendlier face toward China, the two rectify the historical misunderstandings countries enjoyed a renewed relationship between Indonesia and Communist China (Kyodo News International, 1999). Under which turned sour after the suspension of the reform introduced by Wahid, China’s diplomatic relations. Discussions and influence and culture has become more literatures related to the leftist ideas acceptable and accessible; Mandarin flourished, historical reviews and Chinese language gained larger popularity reinterpretations became a common theme as the Chinese enterprises and investments in the literature and research, while the grows steadily in Indonesia. China itself has scholars and media alike are striving to find become one of Indonesia’s biggest trading the missing links in history which can be partners, (International Trade Center, 2015) utilized in invalidating the past in the name with Chinese commodities flooded of uncovering the truth. Indonesia’s domestic market, Indonesia was As mentioned before, in addition to also aiming at China to sell its products as lifting the ideological ban Gus Dur helped the country’s growth warranted the rise of 13 Journal of ASEAN Studies

the middle and middle-upper class group foreign affairs was a blessing in disguise for which are known for their spending Indonesia since she entrusted the prowess. diplomatic affairs to Hassan Wirajuda, a For some people, Wahid’s figure professional diplomat who succeeded Alwi was considered to be a savior with his Shihab as Minister for Foreign Affairs in domestic and foreign policies (Cooper, 2001. With Wirajuda commandeering the 2010), but his leadership was not without course of Indonesia’s diplomatic vessel, the criticism. Despite his travels abroad which country embarked for a larger role in covered 90 countries, the endeavor were international affairs. considered to be unnecessary while he was The Indonesian foreign minister criticized for his negligence to domestic introduced the term ‚Intermestic‛, a affairs (Mares, 2002). His unconventional confluence between domestic and demeanor received mixed receptions from international aspects (Mulyana, 2011), the public, political allies, rivals, and which means the country wanted to adversaries alike. To his critics, his behavior maintain national interests through the and policies are considered to be from seamless connectivity between its domestic erratic to absurd as they tend to be issues and foreign policy. In a way, the new disorganized, enigmatic, and guidance to foreign policy could be incomprehensible for general public. His understood to improve efficiency of the non-compromise and confrontative attitude foreign policies’ goals in lieu to the essential turned his allies into adversaries who domestic needs. Dissenters to the would later brought his downfall by government may consider the new foreign impeachment. policy jargon was created to minimize criticisms from the public which felt there was a disconnectivity between national Megawati Sukarnoputri’s Administration interests and foreign policy under Wahid (2001-2004) (Tribun News, 2013). This could be

understood from a perspective of accountability of foreign policy, which After Wahid was impeached by the might not bring results which were House of Representatives (MPR) in 2001, expected from the public. This could also Indonesia’s foreign policy has taken an even mean that in case the public was less improved route with Megawati informed about the foreign policies, efforts Sukarnoputri helming the country’s could be made to help the public to obtain presidency. Started from a modest better understanding about the objective of background in politics, Megawati was very Indonesian foreign policies, or what the inexperienced when it came to foreign country’s foreign policies could bring to the affairs and its policies. Her grassroots- lives of ordinary citizens. oriented political party was focusing on In addition to the intermestic domestic barebones issues such as approach, Wirajuda also introduced ‚total regulating basic commodity price, inflation, diplomacy‛. Total diplomacy is an and infrastructure. According to Sukma, approach of diplomacy which incorporated Megawati’s lack of vision concerning

14 Indonesia’s Response in the South China Sea Disputes

the various elements of the society to DOC itself contains points of reaffirmation contribute to the success of diplomacy of both the claimant and non-claimant states (Mulyana, 2011). In other words, total to settle the dispute through peaceful diplomacy is essentially an integrated means, to not partake in any actions which concept of multi-track diplomacy, except could escalate the tension in the disputed instead of having the tracks reserved area, while committing to further exclusively for the respective groups of cooperation which was discussed during individuals and/or institutions; the tracks the informal workshops. Therefore, it could are interchangeably utilized by the groups be said that during Megawati’s to interact which each other and ultimately administration that Indonesia managed to contributing to the goals of the intermestic give a significant improvement in terms of foreign policy. response to the SCS dispute since Suharto’s Indonesia’s role in international reign ended, as it managed to level-up into forums such as ASEAN was expanded the track one multilateral diplomacy in the under Wirajuda’s direction. During the scale of ASEAN countries plus China. Foreign Minister’s tenure, Indonesia helped Regardless of the flaws during her to expand ASEAN to grow into a more tenure, Megawati was lauded as the close-knitted community, thus the concept progenitor of democracy in Indonesia as her of ASEAN Community was born after the administration facilitated the Bali Concord II concluded (Moorthy & transformation of the state into the Benny, 2012). Indonesia’s foreign policy democratic Indonesia the world knows became inseparable to ASEAN, as the today. Despite assertion of her political regional organization’s agenda was closely interest to ensure her victory in the in conjunct with Indonesia’s foreign policy presidential election, Megawati’s concerns that Indonesia’s leadership within administration passed the bill for the ASEAN was considered to be substantial. presidential general election in 2004, which The commitments to adopt the ASEAN symbolized the commitment for change and Community concept has then lead to the conformity to global norms. member states affirmation for democratic values, which arguably led to democratic Democracy: ’s transformation in (Emerson, Era (2004 – 2013) 2005). It was under Wirajuda that previously in 2002, ASEAN member countries successfully brought China Perhaps the biggest challenge to together to agree on the Declaration on the Indonesia’s foreign policy during Conduct of Parties (DOC) in South China Megawati’s administration was to maintain Sea. According to Wirajuda, the DOC as the Indonesia’s resilience to global issues such guideline to accommodate the peaceful as terrorism, something which became the resolution of the dispute is the fruit of the main intention since the country suffered annual track-two informal workshop which the numerous terrorist attacks during has been conducted since 1990 (Dewan Megawati’s presidency. Indonesia also Pertimbangan Presiden). The content of the gained the spotlight since the country is 15 Journal of ASEAN Studies

home to the largest Muslim population in international issues. Yudhoyono himself the world and the hotbed for alleged was already familiar with the executive religious intolerances and terrorist training work environment as he was serving under facilities. To this concern, Wirajuda the previous two administrations as subsequently played the diplomatic cards Minister for Mines and Energy and correctly by building the image of Coordinating Minister for Political and Indonesians Muslims as moderate among Security, in which during his previous equal (Hughes 2010), while Indonesia’s tenure should have gave him the insight counter-terrorism initiative gained about what worked well and what did not commendation for its effectiveness in in the government, and Indeed, Yudhoyono curbing terrorism and cooperativeness with might have entrusted his views on their foreign counterparts. For Indonesia, Indonesia’s expanded foreign policies based after gaining post-reform momentum on such evaluation. Megawati’s administration is the start when In 2004 Yudhoyono picked Wirajuda the country’s foreign policy pendulum to resume his post as the Foreign Minister. began to swing. Wirajuda recommenced his previous work It was until 2004, the world began to and expand Indonesia’s role further which see Indonesia’s leadership in a different remained grounded on strengthening the light when Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was most on bilateral relations with stronger elected as Indonesia’s sixth President. With cooperation and partnerships, thus moving his pre-election rising popularity, combined forward with the expansion and role of with the unexpected coalition with fractions Indonesia in regional and international of Golkar and other parties against organizations (Mulyana, 2011). Indeed, Megawati’s PDI-P (Bulkin, 2013), Indonesia established economic partnership Yudhoyono became the first directly elected agreement (EPA) with Japan during Abe’s President in Indonesia, cementing Administration in 2007, nurtured a Indonesia’s prestige of ‚Democracy‛ which comprehensive partnership with the US in the country later capitalize on. Under this 2009, in which once again Indonesia gained new banner, Indonesia steadily regains and the recognition as the world’s model for even goes beyond the vestige of its former moderate Islam from Secretary of State glory which was tarnished after the ’98 Hillary Clinton (Hughes, 2010). In 2007 Tragedy and the Post-9/11 terrorist attacks. Wirajuda managed to have the ASEAN Yudhoyono’s experience serving in Bosnia member countries to sign for the ASEAN for Peace Keeping operations and studying Charter, the constitution for the regional abroad signified his familiarity with organization which have been drafted since international issues. His close relation with 2005. The signing of the charter by the foreign ministry official which was reflected member states have effectively transformed on his book Harus Bisa! written by his Staff the organization into a legally binding for International Affairs and Presidential entity, a community, while enlist the Spokesperson, Dino Patti Djalal (then commitment of the member states to pursue former Indonesian Ambassador to the US) a mechanism for unresolved disputes. This indicated that he has been briefed on means, through ASEAN mechanism,

16 Indonesia’s Response in the South China Sea Disputes

Indonesia has moved a step further in roles, values, and identities, as opposed to creating a ‚tighter‛ environment for dispute conventional components of power. settlement among ASEAN member With this renewed view of foreign countries which would constitute the politics, Indonesia actively strived to signatories to abide to such mechanism maintain, if not enhance, its role as a bridge when the time arise. However, it is not clear builder among worlds, stabilizer, and peace how the Charter can be implemented to builder. In playing these roles, Yudhoyono’s resolve an inter-regional dispute such as the administration utilized the existing one in the SCS. elements of Indonesia, namely the Muslim Yudhoyono was re-elected to serve population, the country’s role in ASEAN for a second term in 2009. Marty and other international organizations and Natalegawa succeeded Wirajuda’s post as forums. In addition to Non-Aligned the foreign minister and further expand Movement (NAM), the Organization of the Indonesia’s role in ASEAN and Southeast Islamic Conference (OIC), Indonesia gained Asia with his ‚Millions Friends Zero even a bigger role with its inclusion as the Enemies‛ concept, which is in conjunction member of G-20, owing to the US to Yudhoyono’s new reinterpretation of nomination for membership. Sukma argued Indonesia’s free and active doctrine. that Indonesia’s expanding role was Indonesia according to Yudhoyono, has something happened by default and not by succeeded in passing the two reefs which design, or in other words the country’s pointed out that the country should take an active participation was not planned or not even greater challenge, which is intended from the beginning, but rather a ‚navigating the turbulent ocean‛. This new reaction or a response to a condition and point of view hinted that Indonesia shall opportunity (Sukma, 2013). To reinforce this take on a larger role in the world, by argument, perhaps we can see that in terms actively establishing cooperation with other of power Indonesia is rather weaker countries which affiliations and alliances in compared to its neighbors, but due to the nature were rather constructed with development of the international politics, fragmented-power relations which change such as Obama’s administration and the dynamically as it was personified by a SCS dispute, Indonesia managed to secure a turbulent ocean (Mulyana, 2011). In larger role as it is today. addition, Natalegawa introduced the The Yudhoyono’s administration ‚dynamic equilibrium‛ concept, which saw an even more pro-active Indonesia in suggests that the possibility for a country to the efforts of resolving the disputes in rise to power is larger. This concept is a Southeast Asia, particularly during reinterpretation of powers to countries like Indonesia’s ASEAN chairmanship in 2011. Indonesia, which has the means and During its leadership in ASEAN, Indonesia opportunity to play a larger role-if not to successfully mediated the border dispute obtain more power and influence. Should between Thailand and Cambodia which Natalegawa’s concept holds true, this generated tensions among member states. means that the concept of power now has To this cause, Indonesia sent observers to evolved into determined by factors such as monitor the ceasefire, brought the 17 Journal of ASEAN Studies

conflicting parties, and encouraged become the precursor to one of the biggest negotiations which ultimately diffused the rift spikes within ASEAN members. dispute. It was later in July 2012 when the 2nd In the same year, Indonesia was half of the AMM was held in Phnom Penh, actively endorsing ASEAN member when the Chair led by Cambodian Foreign countries and China in implementing the Minister, Hor Nom Hong concluded that a DOC during the ASEAN Ministerial joint communiqué could not be produced Meeting (AMM) with China. Natalegawa as due to a lack of consensus from the ASEAN Chairman urged the members to members. Namhong concluded that the step-up the dispute resolution process by inclusion of the South China Sea paragraph reaching a consensus on the guidelines for in the communiqué will have the potential the implementations of the DOC (Thayer, to escalate the tension since there were 2012). The meeting went successful with the intentions from the member countries to be consensus from the ASEAN countries and more specific with the naming of the China was reached (Khalik & Nurhayati, disputed areas in question, whereas others 2011), furthermore the talks resumed in expressed discontent with the direction the Beijing in January 2012 where the senior Chairman was leading. officials from respective countries have This turn of event drew a tense agreed upon setting up four expert atmosphere among the member countries, committees based on the DOC (Thayer, particularly the Philippines and Cambodia 2012). Before the talks began in Beijing, which blame each other for the failure to there were discussions on setting up the reach a joint communiqué. Natalegawa, Code of Conduct (COC) as the continuation with the intention of preserving the unity of of the DOC, and a number of officials have ASEAN, went for a shuttle diplomacy over already worked on the COC (Thayer, 2012). a two-day period to Manila, Hanoi, Regardless, while China expressed its Bangkok, Phnom Penh and Singapore. The preference to stay clear from discussing the tour started from the Philippines to discuss COC and maintained the original priority of the six-points proposal with the country’s the meeting which was to discuss the Foreign Minister Del Rosario. Once agreed, Guidelines of the DOC, the Philippines Natalegawa went to Vietnam, another resumed producing and circulating the ASEAN claimant country which has shown COC draft agenda among members. When a desire to have a South China Sea ASEAN convened later that year for the paragraph in the joint communiqué which annual Ministerial Meeting, the reflects the event occurred. From Hanoi, Chairmanship was already shifted to Natalegawa went to see his counterpart, Cambodia, which pushed the agenda of Namhong, in Phnom Penh to discuss the having China in the ASEAN discussions; six-point proposal which have been green something which was deemed irregular lit by the previous two. Namhong agreed to considering China is not a member state to Natalegawa’s proposal, and the Indonesian the Southeast Asian organization. The COC Foreign Minister entrusted it with his and China’s interference would later Cambodian counterpart when he left for his final destination of his tour to Singapore.

18 Indonesia’s Response in the South China Sea Disputes

Later in July, Namhong on behalf of maintaining over territorial integrity to the Chair released the six point proposal as actively accommodate peaceful talks the ASEAN’s Six Principles of the South between claimant countries might reflect China Sea. The Six Principles is basically a Indonesia’s growing interests of the dispute substitution for the missing joint itself or parties to the dispute. Indonesia’s communiqué to address the SCS dispute, relation with China is an example how the which exists to reaffirm the member states country’s dynamic of interests influenced its of the ASEAN and China to the existing policies, notwithstanding the fact that there principles of DOC with its implementations were contesting interests between and guidelines, to the early conclusion of Indonesia’s influential decision-making the Regional Code of Conduct (COC), institutions, it was Suharto who gave the respect to the international law with final says to everything. UNCLOS in particular, the commitment to The post-Suharto era brought a self-restraint and non-use of force, and different approach for Indonesia’s response seeking a peaceful resolution to the dispute. to the SCS dispute. The red line which The Six Principles which was originally connects the four administrations would be proposed by Indonesia successfully identified as conditions that would prevented the absence of consensus about determine Indonesia’s response. The first the dispute resolution, which has the condition would be the domestic situation potential widening the rift among ASEAN in Indonesia; as we can see the democratic member states. Indonesia has more room for its foreign policy to maneuver due to a more stable Conclusion domestic situation, while the earliest post- Suharto domestic situation was marred with instabilities and crises, which require This study has attempted to discuss further attention and resources from the how the post-Suharto regime’s approach to authorities; the second condition is the the SCS varies considerably from the authority figure, in this case it would be the Suharto era. The latter was characterized president as the highest executive power with an undisputed ruler to Indonesia’s holder, and the foreign minister as the political aspects during the New Order spearhead, or second-in-command of the Regime, including the country’s foreign foreign policy, after the president; the third policy. Despite Suharto’s ‚ends justifies the condition would be the given role, as in to means‛ principle to govern Indonesia for what extent does Indonesia had the capacity three long decades, the President’s power to execute its foreign policy from its given was not without constraints, as absolute as role in an international environment, such it may seem, Suharto’s control over as ASEAN. everything in Indonesia was surpassed by One thing worth noting about forces beyond the geographical limit: Indonesia’s growing response to the SCS, it economy. was steadily developing from a simpler Indonesia’s response to SCS dispute honest broker role into an active bridge during the New Order Era grew from builder, and ultimately holds ASEAN’s 19 Journal of ASEAN Studies

leadership in preserving inter-regional Reference peace and stability. At a glimpse we might see that Indonesia made its best Books achievements when it was chairing ASEAN, but the events after 2012 AMM shows us Djalal, Dino Patti, 2008, Harus Bisa! Seni that Indonesia can make a proper response Memimpin Ala SBY: Catatan Harian to the SCS dispute regardless it holds the Dino Patti Djalal, Red & White ASEAN chairmanship or not. Publishing, Indonesia. O’Rourke, Kevin, 2002, Reformasi: The About the Author Struggle for Power in Post-Soeharto Indonesia, Allen & Unwin, New Derry Aplianta holds a Master of South Wales, Australia. Arts from the Graduate School of Sukma, Rizal., 1999, Indonesia and China: the International Relations, Ritsumeikan Politics of a Troubled Relationship, University; He is currently a diplomat at Routledge, London, UK. Asia Pacific Section, Center for Policy Soebagjo, Natalia, 2008, ‚Ethnic Chinese Analysis and Development for Asia-Pacific and Ethnic Indonesians‛ in and African Regions, Ministry of Foreign Suryadinata, Leo, 2008, Ethnic Affairs, Republic of Indonesia. Chinese in Contemporary Indonesia, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore.

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20 Indonesia’s Response in the South China Sea Disputes

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