Canadian Military History Volume 17 Issue 1 Article 6 2008 Incursion at Howz-e Madad: An Afghanistan Vignette Sean M. Maloney Royal Military College of Canada, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh Part of the Military History Commons Recommended Citation Maloney, Sean M. "Incursion at Howz-e Madad: An Afghanistan Vignette." Canadian Military History 17, 1 (2008) This Feature is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Maloney: Incursion at Howz-e Madad Incursion at Howz-e Madad An Afghanistan Vignette Sean M. Maloney n 20 June 2007, Canadian and Afghan links the entire southern part of Afghanistan ONational Army forces supported by Dutch with Spinboldak and then to Quetta in Pakistan. and American air forces conducted one of a series Insurgent forces occupying Zharey can of incursions into the Zharey District west of theoretically interfere with commerce on Highway Kandahar City. This incursion, called Operation 1 which can have detrimental economic effects SEASONS, was representative of operations on the region, not just the province. undertaken in the summer of 2007 by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in South of Highway 1 can only be described this area and is an evolution from how Canadian in military terms as complex terrain. Though ground forces have been employed since they Zharey District is fairly small compared to were re-introduced to the region in 2005. This other provincial districts, it consists of a dense- account is based on the personal experiences of packed array of grape-growing ditches, walled the author who observed these combat operations compounds, walled fields, irrigation streams while they were in progress.1 covered with foliage, and narrow tracks. Grape drying huts, in the middle of the trench-like rows of grape ditches, are made of mud that has dried The Terrain into concrete which effectively turns them into ready-made bunkers with firing ports. t has become a media cliché to use the phrase I“the volatile Zharey District,” but it is fairly South of the Arghandab River lies Panjwayi accurate. Zharey District occupies what amounts District which for the most part resembles to a triangle of well-cultivated land north of the Zharey District in terms of complex terrain. A Arghandab river, west of Kandahar C i t y . steep hill line separates most of Panjwayi from The top of the triangle parallels the Arghandab River: the combination of the two Highway 1, the main and presents a significant obstacle and discourages only paved east-west north-south traffic with two exceptions: there are h i g h w a y b e t w e e n fords at Bazaar-e Panjwayi, a significant town K a n d a h a r C i t y, and market place; and another to the west. The Helmand province, terrain north of Highway 1 and to the west of and then to Herat. Zharey is open and arid. The Reg Desert lies to Highway 1 meets the south and south west of Panjwayi District. Highway 4 east of Kandahar City, What of the human w h i c h i n t u r n t e r r a i n ? Z h a r e y District is the product of a redistricting process conducted © Canadian Military History, Volume 17, Number 1, Winter 2008, pp.63-78. 63 Canadian Forces Joint Imagery Centre (CFJIC) IS2007-7230 Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2008 1 Maloney - Incursion at Howz-e Madad.indd 63 14/02/2008 12:58:44 PM Canadian Military History, Vol. 17 [2008], Iss. 1, Art. 6 Throughout the spring of 2006, it was more and more apparent that the Quetta Shura, the council leading the anti- Afghanistan and anti- coalition effort out of Pakistan, had shifted its operational approach to RC South. A steady increase in infiltration of both personnel and weapons was detected and by the summer several pre - emptive actions were conducted Map drawn by Mike Bechthold ©2008 by Task Force ORION, the in 2003 designed to rationalize the physical Canadian battlegroup based on 1st Battalion, conformation of the land to provincial district Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry (1 administration. Consequently, Zharey was PPCLI). One of these operations was the first full carved out of several other districts: Panjwayi, battalion-sized combat operation since Korea. Arghandab, and Maywand. The tribal overlay, The enemy was forced to either reinforce Zharey of course, does not conform to the artificial or pull out and leave a small presence. The Quetta administrative overlay. Zharey District is Shura decided to make a stand and massively completely dominated by Pashtuns, though they re-infiltrated Zharey in August 2006. This led to come from both Pashtun Confederations: the Operation MEDUSA, a Canadian-led, brigade- Durrani and Ghilzai which have competed for sized multinational operation that inflicted dominance of the area for centuries. At least six significant damage on the enemy forces in Zharey tribal groups are present in Zharey District. and Panjwayi districts. There were, however, not enough resources to garrison Zharey with Afghan Canada’s involvement with Zharey District police or paramilitary forces. dates from 2005-06 when the Canadian-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) working The follow-on operation, BAAZ TSUKA, was with the US 173rd Airborne Brigade attempted mounted in December 2006. This was a Dutch- to assess the area for aid and reconstruction led multinational operation (RC South had purposes. At that time American forces were changed from Canadian to Dutch command) attacked along Highway 1 on a regular basis designed in part to sweep through Zharey once by small numbers of Taliban forces operating again and then leave an Afghan security force from Zharey. Task Force BAYONET, which was presence behind to facilitate development and understrength, focused on the Shah Wali Kot aid activities. For the most part, enemy forces district of Kandahar Province and did not have melted away in the face of the ISAF onslaught the resources to deal with Zharey. At this time, and reverted to pre-2006 tactics. Again, there most of the action was in Oruzgan Province were simply not enough police or paramilitary north of Kandahar and Zabol Province to the forces to exert control over the entire district northeast. The Shah Wali Kot district operations and the development effort stalled in the western were supporting this effort. In effect, Zharey was parts of the district. The decision was made to a no-go area for the PRT, which instead focused focus the police and aid effort on the quieter its efforts on Panjwayi District and elsewhere. Panjwayi District and to contain Zharey as much These contacts led to better information on as possible. activities in Zharey and when the Canadians took over Regional Command South (RC South) This effort was called Operation BAAZ TSUKA in January-February 2006, there was increased Phase III. NATO ISAF forces established an interest in the district. enduring presence in the area in the form of several 64 https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol17/iss1/6 2 Maloney - Incursion at Howz-e Madad.indd 64 14/02/2008 12:58:45 PM Maloney: Incursion at Howz-e Madad Far right: Lieutenant-Colonel Rob Walker, commanding officer of the CFJIC IS2007-7251 Canadian battlegroup. Right: Major David Quick, officer commanding India Company, 2 RCR. firebases to supplement existing ones. Forward Operating Base Masum Ghar (called FOB MSG by the troops) was constructed on the hills south of the river AR2007-T-006-01 CFJIC overwatching Zharey District. To the north along Highway 1 was Patrol Base The everlasting issue of what constituted Wilson (PBW) which had been established by enemy activity in the district caused some TF ORION the previous year to assist with route problems. When Canadian forces built a combat control activities in order to facilitate the British road (Route SUMMIT) from Bazaar-e Panjwayi to deployment to Helmand Province. Other ISAF Highway 1, there were unintended consequences. forces operated from Maywand district west of The construction of this road diverted water in Zharey along Highway 1. the east end of Zharey. Age-old and intricate tribal agreements over water use were now disrupted. Certain communities now had the potential The Plan upper hand over others and resentments built up bordering on violence. A Canadian solution was n the spring of 2007, the Canadian battlegroup, to put in culverts to restore the water use patterns Ibased on 2nd Battalion, The Royal Canadian – but the culverts made ideal locations for IED Regiment (2 RCR), deployed to Zharey and (improvised explosive device) attack against Panjwayi districts. India Company, 2 RCR and “A” forces using Route SUMMIT. When culverts Squadron, The Lord Strathcona’s Horse (LdSH were blown up, was this Taliban activity or not? (RC)) based out of MSG, while “C” Company, 3 If one community resorted to AK-47 use over a PPCLI and a detachment of M-777 guns from “D” diverted stream, was this Taliban action? What Battery, 2nd Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse if Canadian troops were caught in the crossfire? Artillery (2 RCHA) operated from the Sperwan Or, what if Afghan police from one area were Ghar (SWG) FOB located in Panjwayi. At this conducting activities on behalf of someone else for time, the Canadian Operational Mentoring and pay because they had not received monies from Liaison Team (OMLT), led by Lieutenant-Colonel their own chain of command for months? These (LCol) Ken Eyre, worked closely with elements factors complicated any Canadian response to from the Afghan National Army 205 Corps that activity in Zharey District.