DOCSLIB.ORG

Incursion at Howz-E Madad: an Afghanistan Vignette

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Incursion at Howz-E Madad: an Afghanistan Vignette Canadian Military History Volume 17 Issue 1 Article 6 2008 Incursion at Howz-e Madad: An Afghanistan Vignette Sean M. Maloney Royal Military College of Canada, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh Part of the Military History Commons Recommended Citation Maloney, Sean M. "Incursion at Howz-e Madad: An Afghanistan Vignette." Canadian Military History 17, 1 (2008) This Feature is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Maloney: Incursion at Howz-e Madad Incursion at Howz-e Madad An Afghanistan Vignette Sean M. Maloney n 20 June 2007, Canadian and Afghan links the entire southern part of Afghanistan ONational Army forces supported by Dutch with Spinboldak and then to Quetta in Pakistan. and American air forces conducted one of a series Insurgent forces occupying Zharey can of incursions into the Zharey District west of theoretically interfere with commerce on Highway Kandahar City. This incursion, called Operation 1 which can have detrimental economic effects SEASONS, was representative of operations on the region, not just the province. undertaken in the summer of 2007 by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in South of Highway 1 can only be described this area and is an evolution from how Canadian in military terms as complex terrain. Though ground forces have been employed since they Zharey District is fairly small compared to were re-introduced to the region in 2005. This other provincial districts, it consists of a dense- account is based on the personal experiences of packed array of grape-growing ditches, walled the author who observed these combat operations compounds, walled fields, irrigation streams while they were in progress.1 covered with foliage, and narrow tracks. Grape drying huts, in the middle of the trench-like rows of grape ditches, are made of mud that has dried The Terrain into concrete which effectively turns them into ready-made bunkers with firing ports. t has become a media cliché to use the phrase I“the volatile Zharey District,” but it is fairly South of the Arghandab River lies Panjwayi accurate. Zharey District occupies what amounts District which for the most part resembles to a triangle of well-cultivated land north of the Zharey District in terms of complex terrain. A Arghandab river, west of Kandahar C i t y . steep hill line separates most of Panjwayi from The top of the triangle parallels the Arghandab River: the combination of the two Highway 1, the main and presents a significant obstacle and discourages only paved east-west north-south traffic with two exceptions: there are h i g h w a y b e t w e e n fords at Bazaar-e Panjwayi, a significant town K a n d a h a r C i t y, and market place; and another to the west. The Helmand province, terrain north of Highway 1 and to the west of and then to Herat. Zharey is open and arid. The Reg Desert lies to Highway 1 meets the south and south west of Panjwayi District. Highway 4 east of Kandahar City, What of the human w h i c h i n t u r n t e r r a i n ? Z h a r e y District is the product of a redistricting process conducted © Canadian Military History, Volume 17, Number 1, Winter 2008, pp.63-78. 63 Canadian Forces Joint Imagery Centre (CFJIC) IS2007-7230 Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2008 1 Maloney - Incursion at Howz-e Madad.indd 63 14/02/2008 12:58:44 PM Canadian Military History, Vol. 17 [2008], Iss. 1, Art. 6 Throughout the spring of 2006, it was more and more apparent that the Quetta Shura, the council leading the anti- Afghanistan and anti- coalition effort out of Pakistan, had shifted its operational approach to RC South. A steady increase in infiltration of both personnel and weapons was detected and by the summer several pre - emptive actions were conducted Map drawn by Mike Bechthold ©2008 by Task Force ORION, the in 2003 designed to rationalize the physical Canadian battlegroup based on 1st Battalion, conformation of the land to provincial district Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry (1 administration. Consequently, Zharey was PPCLI). One of these operations was the first full carved out of several other districts: Panjwayi, battalion-sized combat operation since Korea. Arghandab, and Maywand. The tribal overlay, The enemy was forced to either reinforce Zharey of course, does not conform to the artificial or pull out and leave a small presence. The Quetta administrative overlay. Zharey District is Shura decided to make a stand and massively completely dominated by Pashtuns, though they re-infiltrated Zharey in August 2006. This led to come from both Pashtun Confederations: the Operation MEDUSA, a Canadian-led, brigade- Durrani and Ghilzai which have competed for sized multinational operation that inflicted dominance of the area for centuries. At least six significant damage on the enemy forces in Zharey tribal groups are present in Zharey District. and Panjwayi districts. There were, however, not enough resources to garrison Zharey with Afghan Canada’s involvement with Zharey District police or paramilitary forces. dates from 2005-06 when the Canadian-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) working The follow-on operation, BAAZ TSUKA, was with the US 173rd Airborne Brigade attempted mounted in December 2006. This was a Dutch- to assess the area for aid and reconstruction led multinational operation (RC South had purposes. At that time American forces were changed from Canadian to Dutch command) attacked along Highway 1 on a regular basis designed in part to sweep through Zharey once by small numbers of Taliban forces operating again and then leave an Afghan security force from Zharey. Task Force BAYONET, which was presence behind to facilitate development and understrength, focused on the Shah Wali Kot aid activities. For the most part, enemy forces district of Kandahar Province and did not have melted away in the face of the ISAF onslaught the resources to deal with Zharey. At this time, and reverted to pre-2006 tactics. Again, there most of the action was in Oruzgan Province were simply not enough police or paramilitary north of Kandahar and Zabol Province to the forces to exert control over the entire district northeast. The Shah Wali Kot district operations and the development effort stalled in the western were supporting this effort. In effect, Zharey was parts of the district. The decision was made to a no-go area for the PRT, which instead focused focus the police and aid effort on the quieter its efforts on Panjwayi District and elsewhere. Panjwayi District and to contain Zharey as much These contacts led to better information on as possible. activities in Zharey and when the Canadians took over Regional Command South (RC South) This effort was called Operation BAAZ TSUKA in January-February 2006, there was increased Phase III. NATO ISAF forces established an interest in the district. enduring presence in the area in the form of several 64 https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol17/iss1/6 2 Maloney - Incursion at Howz-e Madad.indd 64 14/02/2008 12:58:45 PM Maloney: Incursion at Howz-e Madad Far right: Lieutenant-Colonel Rob Walker, commanding officer of the CFJIC IS2007-7251 Canadian battlegroup. Right: Major David Quick, officer commanding India Company, 2 RCR. firebases to supplement existing ones. Forward Operating Base Masum Ghar (called FOB MSG by the troops) was constructed on the hills south of the river AR2007-T-006-01 CFJIC overwatching Zharey District. To the north along Highway 1 was Patrol Base The everlasting issue of what constituted Wilson (PBW) which had been established by enemy activity in the district caused some TF ORION the previous year to assist with route problems. When Canadian forces built a combat control activities in order to facilitate the British road (Route SUMMIT) from Bazaar-e Panjwayi to deployment to Helmand Province. Other ISAF Highway 1, there were unintended consequences. forces operated from Maywand district west of The construction of this road diverted water in Zharey along Highway 1. the east end of Zharey. Age-old and intricate tribal agreements over water use were now disrupted. Certain communities now had the potential The Plan upper hand over others and resentments built up bordering on violence. A Canadian solution was n the spring of 2007, the Canadian battlegroup, to put in culverts to restore the water use patterns Ibased on 2nd Battalion, The Royal Canadian – but the culverts made ideal locations for IED Regiment (2 RCR), deployed to Zharey and (improvised explosive device) attack against Panjwayi districts. India Company, 2 RCR and “A” forces using Route SUMMIT. When culverts Squadron, The Lord Strathcona’s Horse (LdSH were blown up, was this Taliban activity or not? (RC)) based out of MSG, while “C” Company, 3 If one community resorted to AK-47 use over a PPCLI and a detachment of M-777 guns from “D” diverted stream, was this Taliban action? What Battery, 2nd Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse if Canadian troops were caught in the crossfire? Artillery (2 RCHA) operated from the Sperwan Or, what if Afghan police from one area were Ghar (SWG) FOB located in Panjwayi. At this conducting activities on behalf of someone else for time, the Canadian Operational Mentoring and pay because they had not received monies from Liaison Team (OMLT), led by Lieutenant-Colonel their own chain of command for months? These (LCol) Ken Eyre, worked closely with elements factors complicated any Canadian response to from the Afghan National Army 205 Corps that activity in Zharey District.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The United States and Other Donor Countries Have Reportedly Invested $4 Billion in Afghan Roads
    June 6, 2014 Mr. William Hammink USAID Mission Director for Afghanistan Dear Director Hammink: The United States and other donor countries have reportedly invested $4 billion in Afghan roads. As you know, the United States provided a significant proportion of those funds. USAID alone invested over a billion dollars in road projects in addition to hundreds of millions of dollars provided by the Department of Defense (DOD). Following conversations that I had during my trip to Afghanistan last fall, I’m concerned that the U.S. government may be supporting road projects in Afghanistan that will be unsustainable due to not being properly maintained. In Kabul, a senior U.S. government official expressed his misgivings to me regarding the efficacy of U.S. and Afghan road maintenance efforts and stated that he believed maintenance problems pose a major challenge to the sustainability of Afghanistan’s transportation network. A recent report in the Washington Post stated that Highway 1, a critical piece of Afghanistan’s transport infrastructure, is nearly impassible at certain points due to damage caused by insurgent activity, coupled with a lack of road maintenance by the Afghan government.1 It’s reported that this road was built by U.S. and coalition partners at a cost of approximately $3 billion. The Washington Post article stated that USAID ceased funding Afghan government road maintenance programs in 2012, when the agency determined that Afghan government’s road maintenance efforts were inadequate. I am concerned that roads built at great risk and expense by the U.S. and other donors are not and will not be properly maintained.
    [Show full text]
  • AFGHANISTAN South
    AFGHANISTAN Weekly Humanitarian Update (25 – 31 January 2021) KEY FIGURES IDPs IN 2021 (AS OF 31 JANUARY) 3,430 People displaced by conflict (verified) 35,610 Received assistance (including 2020 caseload) NATURAL DISASTERS IN 2020 (AS OF 31 JANUARY) 104,470 Number of people affected by natural disasters Conflict incident UNDOCUMENTED RETURNEES Internal displacement IN 2021 (AS OF 21 JANUARY) 36,496 Disruption of services Returnees from Iran 367 Returnees from Pakistan 0 South: Hundreds of people displaced by ongoing Returnees from other countries fighting in Kandahar province HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE Fighting between Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and a non-state armed PLAN (HRP) REQUIREMENTS & group (NSAG) continued in Hilmand, Kandahar and Uruzgan provinces. FUNDING In Kandahar, fighting continued mainly in Arghandab, Zheray and Panjwayi 1.28B districts. Ongoing fighting displaced hundreds of people in Kandahar province, but Requirements (US$) – HRP the exact number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) is yet to be confirmed. 2021 Humanitarian actors with coordination of provincial authorities are assessing the needs of IDPs and will provide them with immediate assistance. Farmers and 37.8M agricultural activities continued to be affected by ongoing fighting. All movements 3% funded (US$) in 2021 on the main highway-1 connecting Hilmand to Kandahar provinces reportedly AFGHANISTAN resumed, however improvised explosive devices (IEDs) along the highway HUMANITARIAN FUND (AHF) continue to pose a threat. 2021 In Uruzgan province, clashes between ANSF and an NSAG continued along with the threat of IED attacks in Dehrawud, Gizab and Tirinkot districts. Two civilians 5.72M were reportedly killed and eight others wounded by an IED detonation in Tirinkot Contributions (US$) district.
    [Show full text]
  • 19 October 2020 "Generated on Refers to the Date on Which the User Accessed the List and Not the Last Date of Substantive Update to the List
    Res. 1988 (2011) List The List established and maintained pursuant to Security Council res. 1988 (2011) Generated on: 19 October 2020 "Generated on refers to the date on which the user accessed the list and not the last date of substantive update to the list. Information on the substantive list updates are provided on the Council / Committee’s website." Composition of the List The list consists of the two sections specified below: A. Individuals B. Entities and other groups Information about de-listing may be found at: https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ombudsperson (for res. 1267) https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/delisting (for other Committees) https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/2231/list (for res. 2231) A. Individuals TAi.155 Name: 1: ABDUL AZIZ 2: ABBASIN 3: na 4: na ﻋﺒﺪ اﻟﻌﺰﻳﺰ ﻋﺒﺎﺳﯿﻦ :(Name (original script Title: na Designation: na DOB: 1969 POB: Sheykhan Village, Pirkowti Area, Orgun District, Paktika Province, Afghanistan Good quality a.k.a.: Abdul Aziz Mahsud Low quality a.k.a.: na Nationality: na Passport no: na National identification no: na Address: na Listed on: 4 Oct. 2011 (amended on 22 Apr. 2013) Other information: Key commander in the Haqqani Network (TAe.012) under Sirajuddin Jallaloudine Haqqani (TAi.144). Taliban Shadow Governor for Orgun District, Paktika Province as of early 2010. Operated a training camp for non- Afghan fighters in Paktika Province. Has been involved in the transport of weapons to Afghanistan. INTERPOL- UN Security Council Special Notice web link: https://www.interpol.int/en/How-we-work/Notices/View-UN-Notices- Individuals click here TAi.121 Name: 1: AZIZIRAHMAN 2: ABDUL AHAD 3: na 4: na ﻋﺰﯾﺰ اﻟﺮﺣﻤﺎن ﻋﺒﺪ اﻻﺣﺪ :(Name (original script Title: Mr Designation: Third Secretary, Taliban Embassy, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates DOB: 1972 POB: Shega District, Kandahar Province, Afghanistan Good quality a.k.a.: na Low quality a.k.a.: na Nationality: Afghanistan Passport no: na National identification no: Afghan national identification card (tazkira) number 44323 na Address: na Listed on: 25 Jan.
    [Show full text]
  • Canada in Kandahar: No Peace to Keep
    CANADA IN KANDAHAR: NO PEACE TO KEEP A CASE STUDY OF THE MILITARY COALITIONS IN SOUTHERN AFGHANISTAN London June 2006 Photos on front cover and page 21 from the Canadian Department of National Defence. Index Field Report Conclusions i Report Recommendations vi Executive Summary ix 1. Profile: The Troubled Province of Kandahar 1 1.1 Geography: a harsh environment 1.2 The history of a volatile province 1.3 Ethnic composition contributes to instability 1.4 A collapsed and poppy-dependent economy 1.5 Limited government authority in Kandahar 1.5.1 A US-friendly governor: Asadullah Khalid 1.5.2 Weak Afghan National Army and National Police 1.5.3 Strong traditional governance structures 2. Canada in Kandahar: Confusion over Objectives 8 2.1 Canada in Afghanistan: a response to an American call to arms 2.2 Conflicting objectives of military operations 2.2.1 Legal bases 2.2.2 Objectives 2.2.3 Confusion over Rules of Engagement 2.2.4 Areas of operation 2.2.5 Counter-narcotics mandates 2.3 Canada’s failing mission in Kandahar 2.4 Canadians at war: paying the price for following the US 2.5 The treatment of prisoners: a breakdown of Canadian ideals? 2.6 Collateral Damage: the death of Nasrat Ali Hassan 3. The Disastrous Legacy of Poppy Eradication in Kandahar 24 3.1 The failure to connect security and development policies 3.2 Counter-productive drug policies and public disillusionment 3.3 Poppy eradication fuelling support for insurgents 4. Major Challenges for Canadian Forces in Kandahar 29 4.1 Canada bearing the brunt of America’s mission failures 4.2 In the face of looming Canadian mission failure, a new approach is needed 4.3 Growing insurgency threats 4.3.1 Insurgency evolution and trends 4.3.2 Insurgent groups operating in Kandahar 4.3.3 Civilian deaths 4.4 Phantom borders: the Durand line 4.5 Pakistan’s influence on security in Kandahar Appendices 40 I.
    [Show full text]
  • Länderinformationen Afghanistan Country
    Staatendokumentation Country of Origin Information Afghanistan Country Report Security Situation (EN) from the COI-CMS Country of Origin Information – Content Management System Compiled on: 17.12.2020, version 3 This project was co-financed by the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund Disclaimer This product of the Country of Origin Information Department of the Federal Office for Immigration and Asylum was prepared in conformity with the standards adopted by the Advisory Council of the COI Department and the methodology developed by the COI Department. A Country of Origin Information - Content Management System (COI-CMS) entry is a COI product drawn up in conformity with COI standards to satisfy the requirements of immigration and asylum procedures (regional directorates, initial reception centres, Federal Administrative Court) based on research of existing, credible and primarily publicly accessible information. The content of the COI-CMS provides a general view of the situation with respect to relevant facts in countries of origin or in EU Member States, independent of any given individual case. The content of the COI-CMS includes working translations of foreign-language sources. The content of the COI-CMS is intended for use by the target audience in the institutions tasked with asylum and immigration matters. Section 5, para 5, last sentence of the Act on the Federal Office for Immigration and Asylum (BFA-G) applies to them, i.e. it is as such not part of the country of origin information accessible to the general public. However, it becomes accessible to the party in question by being used in proceedings (party’s right to be heard, use in the decision letter) and to the general public by being used in the decision.
    [Show full text]
  • Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper Afghanistan: Return of the Warlords June 2002
    Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper Afghanistan: Return of the Warlords June 2002 I. Introduction As Afghan and United Nations officials prepare for the forthcoming loya jirga (grand national assembly), as called for in the 2001 Bonn Agreement to choose Afghanistan’s next government, ordinary Afghans are increasingly terrorized by the rule of local and regional military commanders – warlords – who are reasserting their control over large areas of Afghanistan. A mission by Human Rights Watch to southern Afghanistan in late May 2002 uncovered credible evidence of the reemergence of figures associated with the Taliban as well as the extremist Islamist movement led by former Afghan Prime Minister Gulbuddin Hekmatyar in several southern provinces.1 These warlords have been able to consolidate power because of the vacuum created when the U.S.-led military coalition and the U.N. Security Council refused to expand the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) beyond Kabul. Although U.S. forces are operating in these areas, they seem to be doing little if anything to address the insecurity experienced by ordinary Afghans. Indeed, according to persistent though unconfirmed reports received by Human Rights Watch, U.S. cooperation with certain of the local warlords seems to be aggravating the problem. Unconfirmed reports were also received of involvement in the region by Iran and Pakistan. Regardless of their ideology and the source of their support, these warlords are creating a climate of repression that once again threatens the security and well-being of the Afghan people. This return of the warlords is especially painful to Afghans committed to rebuilding civil society who now face the possible end of the hopeful respite that followed the fall of the Taliban at the hands of the U.S.-led military coalition.
    [Show full text]
  • Afghanistan INDIVIDUALS
    CONSOLIDATED LIST OF FINANCIAL SANCTIONS TARGETS IN THE UK Last Updated:01/02/2021 Status: Asset Freeze Targets REGIME: Afghanistan INDIVIDUALS 1. Name 6: ABBASIN 1: ABDUL AZIZ 2: n/a 3: n/a 4: n/a 5: n/a. DOB: --/--/1969. POB: Sheykhan village, Pirkowti Area, Orgun District, Paktika Province, Afghanistan a.k.a: MAHSUD, Abdul Aziz Other Information: (UK Sanctions List Ref):AFG0121 (UN Ref): TAi.155 (Further Identifiying Information):Key commander in the Haqqani Network (TAe.012) under Sirajuddin Jallaloudine Haqqani (TAi.144). Taliban Shadow Governor for Orgun District, Paktika Province as of early 2010. Operated a training camp for non Afghan fighters in Paktika Province. Has been involved in the transport of weapons to Afghanistan. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: https://www.interpol.int/en/How-we- work/Notices/View-UN-Notices-Individuals click here. Listed on: 21/10/2011 Last Updated: 01/02/2021 Group ID: 12156. 2. Name 6: ABDUL AHAD 1: AZIZIRAHMAN 2: n/a 3: n/a 4: n/a 5: n/a. Title: Mr DOB: --/--/1972. POB: Shega District, Kandahar Province, Afghanistan Nationality: Afghan National Identification no: 44323 (Afghan) (tazkira) Position: Third Secretary, Taliban Embassy, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates Other Information: (UK Sanctions List Ref):AFG0094 (UN Ref): TAi.121 (Further Identifiying Information): Belongs to Hotak tribe. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 29 Jul. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: https://www.interpol.int/en/How-we-work/ Notices/View-UN-Notices-Individuals click here. Listed on: 23/02/2001 Last Updated: 01/02/2021 Group ID: 7055.
    [Show full text]
  • Unclassified
    UNCLASSIFIED Summaryof AdministrativeReview BoardProceedingsfor ISN 1032 TheAdministrativeReviewBoardwas calledto order. The Designated Officer ( DMO was sworn . The Board Reporter was sworn . The Translator was sworn The Detainee entered the proceedings. The PresidingOfficerannouncedtheconveningauthorityandpurpose of the AdministrativeReviewBoardproceedings The Administrative Review Board members were sworn . The Assisting Military Officer was sworn . The Presiding Officer asked the Detainee if hewishes to make a statement under oath . (Muslim oath offered ). The Detaineeaccepted taking the (Muslim ) oath. The Presiding Officerreadthe hearinginstructionsto theDetainee and confirmedthat he understood. The AssistingMilitaryOfficerpresentedtheEnemyCombatantNotificationform , ExhibitEC- A , totheAdministrativeReviewBoard. TheAssistingMilitaryOfficerpresentedtheEnemyCombatantElectionForm , Exhibit EC- B , to theAdministrativeReviewBoard. The PresidingOfficerhadthe Assisting Officer readthe Detainee Comments from theEnemy Combatant Election B . AssistingMilitaryOfficer: The Detainee'sARBinterview on 18 August2005 and lastedfiftyminutes. After a reviewofthe ARB purpose andprocedures, the UnclassifiedSummaryofEvidencewas read inPashtuto the Detainee. When askedifhe wouldliketo attendthe ARB, presenta writtenor oralstatement, or havethe AMO speak onhisbehalf, the Detaineesaidhe wants to attendthe ARB andspeak onhisown behalf. Healso statedhe wouldliketo respondto eachallegation statementas itispresented. The Detaineeelected to submitwritten commentsregardingthe
    [Show full text]
  • Related Detainees in Afghan Custody: Accountability and Implementation of Presidential Decree 129
    Update on the Treatment of Conflict- Related Detainees in Afghan Custody: Accountability and Implementation of Presidential Decree 129 United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights February 2015 Kabul, Afghanistan Contents Glossary ........................................................................................................................................................ iii UNAMA’s Mandate ...................................................................................................................................... v I. Background ....................................................................................................................................... v II. Methodology .................................................................................................................................. vii Map 1: 128 Detention Facilities Visited by UNAMA ...................................................................... xv III. Executive Summary ..................................................................................................................... 16 Map 2: Detention Facilities where Incidents Occurred .............................................................. 42 IV. Treatment of Detainees by the National Directorate of Security ................................ 43 Map 3: Sufficiently Credible and Reliable Incidents in NDS Custody ................................................. 53 V. Treatment of Detainees by the Afghan
    [Show full text]
  • Canada in Afghanistan: 2001-2010 a Military Chronology
    Canada in Afghanistan: 2001-2010 A Military Chronology Nancy Teeple Royal Military College of Canada DRDC CORA CR 2010-282 December 2010 Defence R&D Canada Centre for Operational Research & Analysis Strategic Analysis Section Canada in Afghanistan: 2001 to 2010 A Military Chronology Prepared By: Nancy Teeple Royal Military College of Canada P.O. Box 17000 Stn Forces Kingston Ontario K7K 7B4 Royal Military College of Canada Contract Project Manager: Mr. Neil Chuka, (613) 998-2332 PWGSC Contract Number: Service-Level Agreement with RMC CSA: Mr. Neil Chuka, Defence Scientist, (613) 998-2332 The scientific or technical validity of this Contract Report is entirely the responsibility of the Contractor and the contents do not necessarily have the approval or endorsement of Defence R&D Canada. Defence R&D Canada – CORA Contract Report DRDC CORA CR 2010-282 December 2010 Principal Author Original signed by Nancy Teeple Nancy Teeple Approved by Original signed by Stephane Lefebvre Stephane Lefebvre Section Head Strategic Analysis Approved for release by Original signed by Paul Comeau Paul Comeau Chief Scientist This work was conducted as part of Applied Research Project 12qr "Influence Activities Capability Assessment". Defence R&D Canada – Centre for Operational Research and Analysis (CORA) © Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2010 © Sa Majesté la Reine (en droit du Canada), telle que représentée par le ministre de la Défense nationale, 2010 Abstract …….. The following is a chronology of political and military events relating to Canada’s military involvement in Afghanistan between September 2001 and March 2010.
    [Show full text]
  • Afghanistan ORBAT
    CoaLITION COMbaT AND ADVISORY FoRCES IN AFGHANISTAN AFGHANISTAN ORDER OF BATTLE BY WESLEY MoRGAN MARCH 2014 This document describes the composition and placement of U.S. and other Western combat and advisory forces in Afghanistan down to battalion level. It includes the following categories of units: maneuver (i.e. infantry, armor, and cavalry) units, which in most cases are responsible for advising or partnering with Afghan troops in particular provinces or regions; artillery units; aviation units, both rotary and fixed-wing; military police units; most types of engineer and explosive ordnance disposal units; and “white” special operations forces. It does not include “black” special operations units or other units such as logistical, transportation, medical, and intelligence units or Provincial Reconstruction Teams. International Security Assistance Force / United States Forces Afghanistan (Gen. Joseph Dunford, USMC) ISAF Headquarters, Kabul Kabul Support Unit / Royal Scots Dragoon Guards (Lt. Col. Ben Cattermole, UK) Kabul; security force supporting ISAF Headquarters and British facilities1 TF 1-Fury / 1-508 Parachute Infantry (USA) U/I location Special Operations Joint Task Force Afghanistan / NATO Special Operations Component Command Afghanistan (Maj. Gen. Scott Miller, USA) Camp Integrity, Kabul2 Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force Afghanistan (USA) Bagram Airfield; village stability operations, advisors to Afghan Defense Ministry special operations forces, and other missions3 Special Operations Task Force East (USA) Bagram
    [Show full text]
  • Asian Highway Handbook
    ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMISSION FOR ASIA AND THE PACIFIC ASIAN HIGHWAY HANDBOOK UNITED NATIONS New York, 2003 ST/ESCAP/2303 The Asian Highway Handbook was prepared under the direction of the Transport and Tourism Division of the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific. The team of staff members of the Transport and Tourism Division who prepared the Handbook comprised: Fuyo Jenny Yamamoto, Tetsuo Miyairi, Madan B. Regmi, John R. Moon and Barry Cable. Inputs for the tourism- related parts were provided by an external consultant: Imtiaz Muqbil. The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. This publication has been issued without formal editing. CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION TO THE ASIAN HIGHWAY………………. 1 1. Concept of the Asian Highway Network……………………………… 1 2. Identifying the Network………………………………………………. 2 3. Current status of the Asian Highway………………………………….. 3 4. Formalization of the Asian Highway Network……………………….. 7 5. Promotion of the Asian Highway……………………………………... 9 6. A Vision of the Future………………………………………………… 10 II. ASIAN HIGHWAY ROUTES IN MEMBER COUNTRIES…... 16 1. Afghanistan……………………………………………………………. 16 2. Armenia……………………………………………………………….. 19 3. Azerbaijan……………………………………………………………... 21 4. Bangladesh……………………………………………………………. 23 5. Bhutan…………………………………………………………………. 27 6. Cambodia……………………………………………………………… 29 7. China…………………………………………………………………... 32 8. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea……………………………… 36 9. Georgia………………………………………………………………... 38 10. India…………………………………………………………………… 41 11. Indonesia………………………………………………………………. 45 12. Islamic Republic of Iran………………………………………………. 49 13 Japan…………………………………………………………………..
    [Show full text]