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Unclassified UNCLASSIFIED Summaryof AdministrativeReview BoardProceedingsfor ISN 1032 TheAdministrativeReviewBoardwas calledto order. The Designated Officer ( DMO was sworn . The Board Reporter was sworn . The Translator was sworn The Detainee entered the proceedings. The PresidingOfficerannouncedtheconveningauthorityandpurpose of the AdministrativeReviewBoardproceedings The Administrative Review Board members were sworn . The Assisting Military Officer was sworn . The Presiding Officer asked the Detainee if hewishes to make a statement under oath . (Muslim oath offered ). The Detaineeaccepted taking the (Muslim ) oath. The Presiding Officerreadthe hearinginstructionsto theDetainee and confirmedthat he understood. The AssistingMilitaryOfficerpresentedtheEnemyCombatantNotificationform , ExhibitEC- A , totheAdministrativeReviewBoard. TheAssistingMilitaryOfficerpresentedtheEnemyCombatantElectionForm , Exhibit EC- B , to theAdministrativeReviewBoard. The PresidingOfficerhadthe Assisting Officer readthe Detainee Comments from theEnemy Combatant Election B . AssistingMilitaryOfficer: The Detainee'sARBinterview on 18 August2005 and lastedfiftyminutes. After a reviewofthe ARB purpose andprocedures, the UnclassifiedSummaryofEvidencewas read inPashtuto the Detainee. When askedifhe wouldliketo attendthe ARB, presenta writtenor oralstatement, or havethe AMO speak onhisbehalf, the Detaineesaidhe wants to attendthe ARB andspeak onhisown behalf. Healso statedhe wouldliketo respondto eachallegation statementas itispresented. The Detaineeelected to submitwritten commentsregardingthe Unclassified SummaryofEvidence. The Detaineeremainedcooperativethroughoutthe interviewand was provideda copy ofthe Pashtutranslationofthe UnclassifiedSummary. ISN 1032 Enclosure( 5 ) Page of9 21674 UNCLASSIFIEDI/ UNCLASSIFIED The DesignatedMilitary Officerpresentedthe UnclassifiedSummary of Evidence, Exhibi - 1 DMO to - 3 to theAdministrative ReviewBoard The Designated Military Officer stated that a copy of these exhibits hadbeen previously distributed to theAssisting Officer andDetainee. The PresidingOfficer noted from theEnemyCombatantElectionFormthat the Detaineewantedto respondto each informationfromthe Unclassified Summaryas itwaspresented The DesignatedMilitary Officer gave a briefdescription ofthe contents of the Unclassified Summary of Evidence, ExhibitDMO - 1to the Administrative Review Board. DesignatedMilitaryOfficer: Commitment, a roadpass filed withthe ConsulateGeneral ofPakistangave HajiAbdulGhafarpermissionto travelto Pakistanfor multiplevisits withHajiAbdul Satar. Detainee: This is not true. I'ma farmer I'venever seenPakistan in allof life I've never seenPakistan DesignatedMilitaryOfficer: The Detainee is suspectedofbeingHajiSatar'sbodyguard and driver. Itis believed that Haji Satar led a group ofTalibanForcesand instructed them to killwesternersinAfghanistan. Detainee: I haven't been a bodyguard or driver for anythone. I've never been with any group like Mujahiden or other groups. DesignatedMilitaryOfficer: MullahSatarwas a leaderon the groundofthe groupwho killedthe InternationalCommitteeofthe RedCrossworker. Hewas a top commanderin NorthernAfghanistanunderthe Taliban. Detainee: I don't know Satar...I have no informationaboutthis . Designated Military Officer: The Detainee claims he was sleeping when his wife and mother woke him to check on helicopters hovering overhead . Detainee: I was havingtomatoes, potatoesand othervegetables with my two sons. I was when my motherwoke me up about some noise. When I woke up there were some planes. I just walkedfrom here tothe door and I sawthe plane. Itwas ( causing very strong winds. I sat down. I saw three people comingwith guns to capture me...I didn'tknowtheir language...I explainto them what was going on and they capturedme DesignatedMilitaryOfficer The DetaineeranfromU.S.Forcesandwas foundhidingin a creekbedawayfromhishome. ISN 1032 Enclosure ( 5) Page 2 of9 21675 Detainee: They werenotthat far...the helicopterwas ( causing . I sat down. It was not a creek Itis likea flood infront ofmehouse. I was sittingwhenthey cameand capturedme Designated Military Officer: The Detainee claims the attack happenedapproximately six hours away from his village. Detainee: The RedCrosspersonhadbeenkilledwhere ? Itwas inDelahood( ph) village whichissix hoursawayfrom myhome. Designated Military Officer: The Detainee claims that he heard about a Red Cross employee being killed and he heard that Satar was the killer Detainee: The interrogatortoldmethat Satarkilledthe guy but I knewthat the Red Cross guyhad been killed. I didn't know that Satar killed him . The interrogator told me Designated Military Officer: Connections and Associations, an American non governmental worker obtained information stating that a group of sixty menattacked the Interational Committee for the Red Cross. The group's leaders included Abdul Hakim and Gut Mullah Satar, Detainee: I don'tknow Abdul Hakim or MullahSatar. DesignatedMilitaryOfficer: AbdulHakimissuedfatwascallingforjihad againstthe U. presenceinAfghanistan. Detainee: I am not aware ofthat. DesignatedMilitaryOfficer: AbdulHakimdeliveredspeeches in Shah Wali Kot inan attempt to rouse the peopleto actionagainst the United States andthe Islamic TransitionalGovernmentofAfghanistan(ITGA). Healso hoardedweapons and ammunition Detainee: I am not aware of this. DesignatedMilitaryOfficer: A Pashtuletter found inAfghanistaninMay 2002 mentionedthe Detainee'sname and a personnamedMullahAbdulHakimAkhundas being connectedwith the InternationalCommitteeofthe RedCross murder. Detainee: I don'tknowAbdulHakimand I amnot aware ofthat story. Designated Military Officer: Mullah Abdul Hakim Akhund is a Taliban facilitator and commander of approximately thirty people and is engaging in anti -United States and anti Islamic Transitional Government of Afghanistan activities. ISN 1032 Enclosure( 5) Page 3 of9 21676 UNCLASSIFIEDI Detainee I don't know Abdul Hakim who is he ? Designated Military Officer: Abdul Hakim may be a Hezbe Islami associate who traveled from Quetta, Pakistan to Kandahar, Afghanistan to recruit personnel to fight against U.S. forces. Detainee: I don't know Abdul Hakim . DesignatedMilitary Officer: The HezbeIslamiGulbuddinhas stagedsmall attacks inits attempt to force U.S.troops to withdraw from Afghanistan, overthrowthe Afghan TransitionalAdministrationand establisha fundamentaliststate. Detainee: I haven't seen the Gulbuddinand I don't know him . I'veheardhis name but I haven't seen him . DesignatedMilitary Officer: Haji Satarhadbeenkilledby U.S. forces, buthe was implicatedinthe March2003 murderofan InternationalCommitteeofthe RedCross worker, Detainee: I don'tknowhim . DesignatedMilitaryOfficer: The group ofInternationalCommitteeofthe RedCross attackers consistedofTalibanandHezbeIslamiGulbuddinpersonnel. Detainee: I have no idea aboutthis. Designated Military Officer: The leaders of the Committee ofthe Red Cross attackers stayed in caves in Takht , which are in the mountains inthe Shah Wali Kot district. Detainee: I don'thave any informationaboutthis. Designated Military Officer: The Detainee resides in the Shah Wali Kot district. Detainee: Yes, I live in Shah Wali Kot. Designated Military Officer Other relevant data, the Detainee may have hidden a satellite phone belonging to Satarjust before detainment. The phone was never found despite extensive searches. Detainee don't know him how could I find the telephone ? DesignatedMilitary Officer: Detainee had a Thuraya satellite phone. Detainee: I haven't seen telephone yet so how could I have it? Designated Military Officer : The Detainee has a history of harassing guards. ISN 1032 Enclosure ( 5) Page4 of 21677 UNCLASSIFIEDIIROU UNCLASSIFIEDI Detainee : I'm a prisoner...I'm in my room sometimes and I throw water which is...they think that I throw water on them that's they think that I harass them . If I spit on him or I throw water on them ( inaudible )...maybe I talk or something. Designated Military Officer : The following factors favor release or transfer, the Detainee claimed he didn't know any details about the murder The Detainee claims his innocence and that he doesn't know Satar The Detainee claims that he's not a Taliban or al Qaida supporter and doesn't know anyone actively involved . Detainee: Yes . Designated Military Officer: The Detainee claims that he was not aware of any other incidents regarding U.S. Forces being fired upon by anyone in the area . Detainee: Yes Designated Military Officer: The Detainee swears to God that he has never fired a Detainee notgoing to lieto you ...when I was a little boy ...when I was wedding and I fired three times. was someone else's gun. Hetoldme to pull the trigger. I didthat. It was a time ago when the SovietUnioninvaded Afghanistan...that why there a wedding. I was a littleboy...theytoldmeto pull the triggerthree times. I cannot swear on that...other than that I swear that I havenot toucheda gun. The Designated Military Officer confirmed that hehad no further unclassified information and requested closed session to present classified information relevant to the disposition ofthe Detainee. The Presiding acknowledgedthe request. The PresidingOfficeropenedtheAdministrativeReviewBoardto the Detaineeto presentinformationwith the assistance of theAssistingMilitaryOfficer. The Detaineemadethefollowingstatement: Detainee: I haven'tbeenwiththe Taliban or the Mujahedin. Myfather diedwhenI was a littleboy andI was responsiblefor littlesister andmy mother. Thenmy mother marriedhadmy sister getmarried(andI marriedher
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