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NEWS RELEASE ISAF Joint Command - Afghanistan NEWS RELEASE ISAF Joint Command - Afghanistan 2009-12-CA–077 For Immediate Release IJC Operational Update, Dec. 22: Militants Killed, Detained in Kandahar, Wardak, Khowst; ISAF Casualty KABUL, Afghanistan (Dec. 22) – An Afghan-international security force killed a few militants and detained another militant in Ghazni province Monday night. The joint force went to a series of compounds in the Andar district near the village of Zara Gerda after intelligence sources confirmed militant activities. The security force encountered armed enemy fighters who resisted and were subsequently killed. Several weapons were found including AK-47 rifles, grenades, 40mm rounds and an anti-personnel mine. Eight women and 16 children were protected during the operation. The compound sustained minor damage. In an operation in Kandahar province today, a joint security force killed a couple of militants and detained additional militants while pursuing a Taliban commander. The joint force searched a series of compounds east of the village of Khaneh Gerdad in the Shah Wali Kot district after intelligence sources reported militant activity. In another operation in Kandahar province today, a joint Afghan-international security force killed a few militants and detained a couple of others while searching for a Taliban commander. The joint force approached a compound in the Zhari district after intelligence sources confirmed militant activities in the area. As the security force moved toward a compound, several militants departed the area. Later, the security force received hostile fire and while returning fire, killed the militants and detained a couple of militants. In an operation in Wardak province, a joint security force detained a handful of suspected militants including a Taliban facilitator today. The security force moved to the Sayyidabad district after intelligence sources suspected militant activity in a compound near the village of Haft Asiab. After searching the compound, a group of suspected militants was detained, including the targeted facilitator. In an operation in Khowst province today, an Afghan-international security force detained a group of suspected militants while searching for a Haqqani commander. The joint security force closed in on a rural area of the Sabari district after intelligence indicated militant activity in a compound. After an extensive search the militants were detained. No civilians were harmed during any of these operations. Weapon caches found In other operations, two Afghan citizens from the Paktika province led Afghan National Police to a 107mm rocket that the police then diffused. In Ghazni province, coalition forces found another 107mm rocket that Polish engineers helped destroy. In Helmand province, a joint force found a cache of IED-making materials that contained six 60mm mortar rounds and other components. In Herat province, coalition forces found unexploded ordnance in two locations, including a 107mm rocket, three 82mm mortars, an 81mm mortar and a hand grenade. ISAF Casualty An ISAF service member from United Kingdom was killed by small arms fire in southern Afghanistan Sunday. -30- _____________________________________________________________________ IJC Public Affairs Office IJC Public Affairs Office – operates 24 hours a day Primary Tel: From Afghanistan 079 951 3999 (wait for voice prompt) 688-4441/4447 or dial 070 113 2000 (wait for dial tone) 318-449-9244/9153/9154 From outside Afghanistan +93 799 51 3999 (wait for voice prompt) 688-4441/4447 E-Mail: [email protected] or [email protected] Website: www.nato.int/isaf Notes for Editors: 1. The latest High Resolution stills can be downloaded for news purposes here 2. Visit us on the Web at ISAFmedia.com or on Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, Flickr or DVIDS .
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