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Chinese Taipei" in the 1984 Winter Olympics

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Chinese Taipei CHINESE CREATED 1910 NATIONAL - OLYMPIC COMMITTEE 1960 Republic of China 1912 – 49 TPE-001 TPE-002 58 x 21 32 x 36 Golden / Cloisonne Golden / Cloisonne 1936 Berlin 1948 London The Republic of China (ROC) participated in its first Summer Olympics in 1932 under the name of "China". After the Chinese Civil War the ROC retreated to the island of Taiwan, only Taiwan-based athletes have now competed on behalf of the country. The ROC protested the 1979 Nagoya Resolution by boycotting the 1976 Summer Olympics; this continued until the ROC competed under the made-up name as "Chinese Taipei" in the 1984 Winter Olympics. China also took part in the Opening Ceremony of the 1924 Summer Olympics, but its four athletes (all tennis players) withdrew from competition. Chinese Taipei CHINESE TAIPEI OLYMPIC COMMITTEE ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: CREATED 1960 RECOGNITION DATE 01 JANUARY 1960 TPE-003 TPE-004 TPE-005 TPE-006 TPE-007 TPE-008 17,9 x 17,6 17,9 x 17,6 16 x 19 21 x 21 21 x 26 12,1 x 11,3 Screw Silver / Cloisonne Silver / Cloisonne Silver / Cloisonne Silver / Cloisonne Golden / Cloisonne Golden / 1960´s 1960´s 1960´s 1960 Squaw Walley 1960´s 1960´s 2 TPE-009 TPE-010 TPE-011 TPE-012 TPE-013 TPE-014 15 x 18 15,2 x 18,1 15 x 18 22 x 19 21 x 20 18,4 x 17,8 Screw Silver / Cloisonne Silver / Cloisonne Golden / Golden / Cloisonne Silver / Cloisonne Silver / Cloisonne 1964 Tokyo 1960´s 1970´s 1970´s Blue variation TPE-015 TPE-016 TPE-017 TPE-018 TPE-019 20 x 20 25 x 25 25 x 25 24 x 19 14 x 13 Golden / Cloisonne Silver / Cloisonne Silver / Cloisonne Silver / Golden / EPKS 1970´s 1972 Sapporo 1970´s Ski Team TPE-020 TPE-021 TPE-022 TPE-023 TPE-024 33 x 24 20,1 x 17,5 Ø 21,6 Ø 21,6 18 x 18 Silver / Cloisonne Silver / Cloisonne Golden / Cloisonne Silver / Cloisonne Silver / Cloisonne 1972 Munich Red variation TPE-025 TPE-026 TPE-027 TPE-028 TPE-029 15 x 17 Ø 17 Ø 17 Ø 14 Ø 23 Silver / Plast / Plast / Plast / Golden / Cloisonne 1972 Munich 1970´s 1970´s 1970´s 1974 3 TPE-030 TPE-031 TPE-032 47 x 25 48,3 x 25,8 14 x 18 Silver / Silver / Golden / 1976 Innsbruck 1976 Montreal TPE-033 TPE-034 TPE-035 20 x 19 47,1 x 25,3 47 x 25 A-Cu./ Silver / Silver / 1980 1980 Lake Placid 1980 – IAAF Congress Did not go on Games TPE-036 TPE-037 TPE-038 TPE-039 TPE-040 TPE-041 13 x 12 12 x 11 19 x 18 19,4 x 18,9 12,8 x 12,6 12,6 x 12,3 Golden / EPKS Golden / Golden / EPKS Silver / EPKS Golden / EPKS Silver / 1980´s 1980´s 1980´s 1980´s 1980´s 1980´s TPE-042 TPE-043 TPE-044 18 x 18 46 x 25 46 x 25,1 A-Ni. / EPKS Golden / EPKS Golden / EPKS 1980´s 1984 Sarajevo 1984 Los Angeles With compliments of Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee 4 TPE-045 TPE-046 TPE-047 TPE-048 TPE-049 TPE-050 15 x 15 15 x 15 21 x 20,5 22,4 x 22 12 x 8 12 x 8 Golden / EPKS Golden Golden / EPKS Golden / EPKS Golden Silver 1980´s 1980´s 1980´s 1980´s 1980´s 1980´s HO HO INTL TPE-051 TPE-052 TPE-053 46,8 x 25,7 48,5 x 26,3 25,2 x 24,8 Golden / EPKS Golden / EPKS Golden / EPKS 1988 Calgary 1988 Seoul HO HO INTL HO HO INTL TPE-054 TPE-055 TPE-056 57 x 56 60 x 59 60 x 59 Silver / EPKS Golden / EPKS Golden / EPKS 1980´s 1980´s 1980´s 5 TPE-057 TPE-058 TPE-059 60,4 x 58,8 60,4 x 58,8 60,4 x 58,8 Golden Silver Bronze 1980´s 1980´s 1980´s Yoleen Yoleen Yoleen TPE-060 TPE-061 TPE-062 60,4 x 58,8 60,4 x 58,8 42,8 x 60,21 Golden / EPKS Silver / EPKS Silver / 1980´s 1980´s 1980´s Yoleen Yoleen TPE-063 TPE-064 TPE-065 48,7 x 26,7 49,9 x 27,4 49,9 x 27,4 Golden / EPKS Golden / EPKS Golden / EPKS 1990 Asian Games Beijing 1992 Albertville 1992 Barcelona Yoleen Yoleen 6 TPE-066 TPE-067 TPE-068 50,01 x 27,7 50 x 27,8 21,1 x 29,1 Golden / EPKS Golden / EPKS Golden / Semi cloisonne 1994 Lilehammer 1996 Atlanta Yoleen Yoleen TPE-069 TPE-070 TPE-071 50,1 x 27,7 50 x 27,8 18,9 x 17,5 Golden / EPKS Golden / EPKS Golden / Semi cloisonne 1998 Nagano 1998 Moscow 1990´s Yoleen Yoleen TPE-072 TPE-073 TPE-074 50,1 x 27,7 50,1 x 27,7 51,2 x 28,7 Golden / EPKS Golden / EPKS Golden / EPKS 2000 Sydney 2002 Salt Lake 2004 Athens Yoleen Yoleen Yoleen TPE-075 TPE-076 TPE-077 51 x 28,4 50 x 27,5 50 x 28 Golden / EPKS Golden / Golden / 2006 Turin 2008 Beijing 2009 Kaohsiung Yoleen Yoleen Yoleen 7 TPE-078 TPE-079 TPE-080 TPE-081 TPE-082 17 x 23 24,4 x 23,7 25 x 24,2 25,2 x 24,4 23,3 x 23,1 Golden / Cloisonne Golden / EPKS Golden / Golden / Golden / Semi cloisonne 2000´s 2010´s 2010´s 2010´s 2010´s Yoleen Yoleen Yoleen Yoleen TPE-083 TPE-084 TPE-085 50,1 x 28 50 x 28 29,5 x 25,3 Golden / Golden / Silver / EPKS 2010 Vancouver 2010 Guangzhou 2010´s Yoleen Yoleen TPE-086 TPE-087 TPE-088 50,4 x 27,8 50,4 x 27,8 36,2 x 24,2 Golden / Golden / Golden / 2012 Innsbruck 2012 London Yoleen Yoleen Yoleen TPE-089 TPE-090 TPE-091 51,1 x 27,7 50,2 x 27,6 50 x 27,6 Golden / Golden / Golden / 2013 Nanjing Asian Youth Games 2014 Sochi 2014 Nanjing Yoleen Yoleen Yoleen 8 TPE-092 TPE-093 TPE-094 50,1 x 27,6 50 x 27,5 50 x 27,5 Golden / Golden / Golden / 2014 Incheon Asian Games 2016 Lillehammer 2016 Rio Yoleen Yoleen Yoleen TPE-095 TPE-096 TPE-097 50,3 x 27,8 50 x 27,6 50,1 x 27,5 Golden / Golden / Golden / 2017 Sapporo Asian Winter Games 2018 PyeongChang 2018 Buenos Aires Yoleen Yoleen Yoleen TPE-098 TPE-099 TPE-100 50,2 x 27,6 Golden / 2020 Lausanne Yoleen .
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