Switzerland and Cooperative Threat Reduction

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Switzerland and Cooperative Threat Reduction Russia and other countries of the former GCSP Occasional Paper Series, No 43 Soviet Union.2 Switzerland and Cooperative Threat This paper provides an overview of recent Reduction and current involvement of Switzerland in CTR-type activities in the countries of the CIS and Central and Eastern Europe. CTR Derek Lutterbeck has traditionally been seen as issue Geneva Centre for Security Policy concerning first and foremost the two (former) superpowers, a view which seems Introduction1 justified given that the US has been by far the most important actor and donor country in this area, and that by far the largest weapons An increasingly prominent item or concept disposal projects have been carried out in on the international security and arms control Russia. However, also other, including agenda of the post-Cold War world is the one smaller, countries have been engaged in of ‘Cooperative Threat Reduction’ or CTR. WMD disarmament assistance and other CTR programmes have their origins in the CTR-type efforts, and these have been immediate aftermath of the cold war, when conducted in other countries as well. As this the so-called Nunn-Lugar threat reduction paper will suggest, this is even true for programme was launched to safeguard Switzerland, despite the fact that Swiss weapons of mass destruction on the territory security policy — under the traditional of the collapsing Soviet Union. Recently, doctrine of ‘armed neutrality’ — was long however, such threat reduction efforts have considered to have practically no gained much in salience with the emergence international or cooperative dimension, and of international terrorism as a prime security as being concerned almost exclusively with concern among ‘western’ countries, ensuring the autonomous defence of the subsequent to the terrorists attacks on the US national territory. However, even though at on 11 September 2001. One core objective in least some smaller countries have made the fight against terror, at least from the sizeable contributions to CT-typeR projects, perspective of western countries, is to very little attention has thus far been paid in prevent terrorist and similar organisations the literature to their activities in this area.3 from gaining access to weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Arguably the most The paper is structured as follows. I begin telling sign of the growing importance with a few conceptual remarks on the notion attributed to CTR in this regard has been the of CTR. Second, I briefly outline the Global Partnership Against the Spread of evolution of Swiss arms control and Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, disarmament policy since the end of the cold an initiative which was launched by the G8 war more generally, so as to provide a in June 2002, and which was subsequently broader context for discussing Switzerland’s joined by a number of other countries as well, such as Sweden, Norway or 2 Information on the various efforts undertaken within this Switzerland. Under the Global Partnership, framework can be found on the website of the CSIS-led the participating states have pledged a total project Strengthening the Global Partnership, at: of 20 billion USD for threat reduction and http://www.sgpproject.org/. 3 Vol. 3 of the CSIS publication Protecting Against the WMD disposal projects to be carried out in Spread of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons (Washington: CSIS Press, 2003) contains brief overviews of CTR-type activities of all member countries (except 1 The author would like to thank Vitaly Fedchenko, Switzerland) of the Global Partnership, which now also Vladimir Orlov and Fred Tanner for their comments on includes a number of non-G8 countries. To date, no earlier versions of this paper. literature exists on Swiss activities in this area. 1 CTR-type activities. The bulk of the paper is countries other then the US have been then devoted to Swiss disarmament involved in CTR-type programmes (even if assistance and other CTR-like policies since these have not necessarily been formally the beginning of the 1990s. These can be labelled as such) but also in that CTR-type roughly divided into two main areas: support projects have also been carried in pursuit of for chemical disarmament on the one hand, objectives other than non-proliferation and and nuclear safety efforts, on the other. I military security in the traditional sense of argue that throughout the 1990s, the term. One other significant area where Switzerland’s involvement in disarmament CTR-type projects have been carried is assistance, at least if compared to the efforts environmental protection. In particular of other small countries within the Global (smaller) European countries, for example Partnership, have overall been rather modest, within the ‘Northern Dimension’ of the EU’s and largely confined to ‘soft’, i.e. external relations, have tended to focus their environmental and social, aspects of WMD policies towards the countries of the former demilitarisation. By contrast, Switzerland has Soviet Union more on ‘soft’ security issues been rather active in the area of nuclear which have no military dimension in the safety—which too underscores its traditional sense, such as ensuring safe traditionally main focus on non-military — disposal of nuclear waste, dismantling of in this case: environmental — aspects. With nuclear-powered submarines, which no Switzerland’s most recent initiative on longer pose any military threat, or upgrading support for chemical weapons disarmament the safety and emergency preparedness of launched in 2002, however, its efforts in the nuclear power reactors.5 field of WMD demilitarisation have been stepped up considerably, so that at least in In addition, it can be noted that even in the the area of chemical weapons disposal context of actual weapons destruction Switzerland is set to play an increasingly projects, there is often a need to address important role. environmental and social problems which are related to disposal efforts. For example, chemical and other WMD demilitarisation A Conceptual Note on CTR activities might pose, or might be perceived The term ‘cooperative threat reduction’ or as posing, a serious health risk for the local CTR, as already suggested above, was first population, which in turn could generate used in reference to the Nunn-Lugar threat considerable resistance on the part of the reduction programme, whose principal aim local community against weapons disposal was to improve the safety of WMDs in the projects. Hence, a number of ‘soft tools’ countries of the former Soviet Union and to might thus become necessary to successfully prevent their diversion to potentially hostile implement a project, such as information states and other ‘rogue’ actors. A distinctive campaigns and other measures aimed at feature of CTR is thus the element of mediating between the local population and cooperation in that CTR projects typically those engaged in constructing and running of 6 involve activities carried out by one (or disposal facilities. several) state(s) in support and on the territory of another state, with the consent of Given this multi-faceted nature of CTR, and the recipient state.4 However, the concept of the rather diverse objectives which have been CTR can also be said to have a broader pursued by CTR-type projects, this paper will meaning—not only in the sense that also adopt a broad definition of CTR which takes 4 Ian Anthony, Reducing Threats at the Source. A European 5 Anthony, Reducing the Threats at Source, pp. 16-20. Perspective on Cooperative Threat Reduction (Oxford: 6 This is one of the main fields of activity of the Green Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 6. Cross, which is discussed below. 2 into account not only directly weapons- During the cold war, Switzerland did related activities but also efforts aimed at participate in multilateral arms control and alleviating non-military — e.g. disarmament processes, but it pursed a environmental — challenges, or at largely defensive and reactive strategy in this addressing the social and environmental respect. At times, it was even outright aspects of WMD disarmament. opposed to international arms control initiatives. This was the case, for instance, for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Evolution of Swiss Arms Control and (NPT). Although Switzerland did eventually Disarmament Policy ratify this treaty, the country’s military In order to put Switzerland’s disarmament establishment was very critical of the assistance and other CTR-type activities in a agreement, as it did not want to rule out the acquisition of nuclear weapons by broader context, it is useful to briefly 8 consider the evolution of Swiss arms control Switzerland. Switzerland’s limited interest and disarmament policy more generally since in arms control and disarmament issues was the end of the cold war. also evident in the lack of arms control experts within the Swiss administration. Throughout the post-world war II period, and Thus, in the late 1980s, there was only one up to the beginning of the 1990s, Switzerland expert on disarmament issues in the Swiss generally adopted a rather passive and Ministry of Defence, and the situation in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not much sceptical stance towards arms control and 9 disarmament issues—an attitude which can better. As a consequence, it often proved be traced to Switzerland’s traditional difficult for Switzerland to take part in conception of security policy and in international arms control negotiations, and its contributions tended to be limited to particular its doctrine of ‘armed neutrality’. 10 Under this doctrine, Swiss security policy general statements of policy. was geared almost exclusively towards ensuring the autonomous defence of the Over the 1990s, however, Switzerland’s national territory against military aggressions stance towards arms control and disarmament through mass mobilisation of the entire evolved considerably, and it began to play an (male) population. Within this framework, increasingly active role in this area.
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