The European Campaign: Its Origins and Conduct
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The European Campaign: Its Origins and Conduct Visit our website for other free publication downloads http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/ To rate this publication click here. Samuel J. Newland Clayton K.S. Chun About the Cover: The backdrop of the cover is a photograph of the 28th Infantry Division on August 29, 1944, as they marched down the Avenue des Champs-Élysées, Paris, France, with the Arc de Triomphe de l’Étoile in the background. Their celebration was short, because upon the conclusion of the parade, they proceeded through Paris and moved eastward to main- tain contact with the retreating Wehrmacht. The inset photograph is of the key leadership of the European Campaign. It was originally released by the Office of War Information in 1945 and it was captioned: “This is the Brass that Did It.” The photo was taken at the 12th Army Group Headquarters, Bad Wildlungen, Germany, May 11, 1945, three days after the German surrender. Front row left to right, William H. Simpson, George S. Patton Jr., Carl A Spaatz, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Omar N. Bradley, Courtney H. Hodges, Leonard T. Gerow. Rear row, left to right, Ralph F. Stearley, Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Walter B. Smith, Otto P Wey- land, Richard E. Nugent Source: U.S. Army Military History Institute THE EUROPEAN CAMPAIGN: ITS ORIGINS AND CONDUCT Samuel J. Newland Clayton K. S. Chun June 2011 The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the -De partment of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publica- tions enjoy full academic freedom, provided they do not disclose classified information, jeopardize operations security, or mis- represent official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empow- ers them to offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited. ***** This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code, Sec- tions 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be copyrighted. ***** Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 632 Wright Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5046. ***** This book is dedicated to all Soldiers, Airmen, Sailors, Ma- rines, and civilians who fought in the European Campaign. These fighting men and women were truly America’s “greatest generation.” We also want to recognize those on the home front to include the families and workers in a multitude of businesses and industries that supported them. ***** All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications may be downloaded free of charge from the SSI website. Hard cop- ies of this report may also be obtained free of charge by plac- ing an order on the SSI website. The SSI website address is: www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil. ***** The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail newsletter to update the national security community on the re- search of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newslet- ter also provides a strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you are interested in receiving this newsletter, please subscribe on the SSI website at www.StrategicStudiesInstitute. army.mil/newsletter/. ISBN 1-58487-494-5 ii CONTENTS Foreword……………………………………..........vii About the Authors...................................................ix Introduction……………...........................................1 Chapter 1. The European Campaign: Origins.....13 Chapter 2. Was Europe First?................................53 Chapter 3. 1943: Frustrations and Successes .....101 Chapter 4. D-Day: Planning and Execution......137 Chapter 5. Toward the German Border: Operations COBRA, The Falaise Pocket, and Operation ANVIL .....................189 Chapter 6. Operation MARKET GARDEN....... 229 Chapter 7. The Hürtgen Campaign…................271 Chapter 8. The Ardennes Offensive….........…..305 Chapter 9. The Ruhr or Berlin…….....................359 Chapter 10. Conclusions and Observations…. .377 Bibliography……………………….…..................389 Appendix I. Developing Strategy: A Look at the Other Side...............407 Appendix II. To Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force…...…453 iii FIGURES Figure 4-1. The SHAEF Chain of Command.................149 Figure 5-1. "Busting the Bocage".....................................197 MAPS Map 5-1. Normandy Map.................................................190 Map 5-2. Breakout after Operation COBRA.................. 208 Map 6-1. Operation MARKET GARDEN...................... 245 Map 7-1. The Western Front, Fall 1944...........................275 Map 7-2. The 9th Infantry’s Attack.................................284 Map 7-3. The Hürtgen Area.............................................289 Map 7-4. Showing the Area where 28th Division Attacked .............................................................293 Map 8-1. The Western Front: December 15, 1944 .........317 Map 8-2. Ardennes Offensive..........................................321 Map 8-3. Allied Counteroffensive Against the Bulge ..336 Map 9-1. The double envelopment concept for the Ruhr as planned and executed.......................368 PHOTOS AND ILLUSTRATIONS Lieutenant General Albert Wedemeyer............................33 Admiral Karl Dönitz............................................................61 U.S. Army General Dwight Eisenhower...........................80 General George C. Marshall.............................................103 Admiral Ernest King.........................................................107 German U-Boat ..................................................................111 American B-17...................................................................119 Morgan & Burrough..........................................................140 Eisenhower & Tedder........................................................150 P-51 Mustang......................................................................156 Rommel’s obstacles...........................................................166 American assault troops...................................................170 "Rhino" .............................................................................. 200 iv Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery.............................234 V-2 rocket...........................................................................243 Hans von Seeckt.................................................................414 German shortage of mechanized equipment.................418 Hitler...................................................................................419 Groβadmiral Erich Raeder..................................................427 Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring.....................................434 Waffen-SS.............................................................................441 TABLES Table 8-1. 9th Infantry Division Casualties...................306 Table Appendix 1-1. The "Z-Plan" .................................430 v FOREWORD Since the end of World War II, there has been a stream of publications about the War in Europe, but despite the volume of literature, interest in the topic remains high. Given the significance of this conflict and the interest in this campaign, the Strategic Stud- ies Institute offers a fresh look at the campaign in Eu- rope. This publication begins with an examination of prewar planning for various contingencies, then moves to the origins of “Germany first” in American war planning. The authors then focus on the concept, favored by both George C. Marshall and Dwight D. Eisenhower, that the United States and its Allies had to conduct a cross-channel attack and undertake an of- fensive aimed at the heartland of Germany. Following the background provided in these initial chapters, the remainder of the book provides a comprehensive dis- cussion outlining how the European Campaign was was carried out. The authors, Dr. Samuel J. Newland and Dr. Clayton K. S. Chun, conclude that American politi- cal leaders and war planners established logical and achievable objectives for the nation’s military forces. Conversely, in the campaign’s execution, American military leaders were slow to put into practice what would later be called operational level warfare. For comparisons sake, an appendix is included that cov- ers German efforts at war planning in the tumultuous 1920s and 1930s. DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR. Director Strategic Studies Institute vii ABOUT THE AUTHORS SAMUEL J. NEWLAND is a faculty member in the Department of Military Studies at Washburn Univer- sity and a lecturer at the University of Kansas. Prior to accepting these positions, he was a faculty member at the U.S. Army War College for 20 years and he also served as a strategic research analyst at the Strategic Studies Institute. In 2005, Dr. Newland served as a vis- iting Professor at the George C. Marshall Institute in Garmisch, Germany. Dr. Newland is a modern mili- tary historian, to include the 20th century American experience, and a modern German historian. He is the author of numerous publications on military history to include two books on the history of the Pennsylvania Militia and National Guard, a book entitled Cossacks in the German Army, 1941-1945, and the author of the lead chapter in the commemorative volume, The D- Day Companion. Dr. Newland holds a B.A. from