AMIA CASE Report on the Judicial Activity
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AMIA CASE Report on the judicial activity 1994-2015 (EXCERPTS) Foreword It is not uncommon to hear people claim that the twenty years of judicial inves- tigation into the AMIA bombing did not produce any concrete results. This men- dacious assumption is not only the consequence of a certain widespread skepticism, which is perhaps justified by the chaotic evolution of a good deal of our country’s history, but in recent times has also been lent tendentious support by a political sector that, in a somewhat paranoid manner, believed ideological perspectives should take precedence over manifest facts 1. Certainly, it would be impossible to deny that from the start the case was beset with immense difficulties that seriously affected its scope. But it is also true that, de- spite all the obstacles that came to hinder the development of the investigation, the AMIA case produced results that cannot be underestimated or downplayed. Suffice it to recall that it was precisely on the basis of the facts substantiated in the AMIA case that on March 14, 2007 the Executive Committee of Interpol unanimously ordered the issuance of red notices against those accused of the bombing and that this decision was approved by a vote of the General Assembly in November of that year. The AMIA case is a story of advances and setbacks on a path strewn with lies. The “innocent” lies told by employees of a parking lot where the van used as a car bomb had been left at least 48 hours before the attack, who lied about their working hours because they did not want to let it be known that they were being paid “under the counter”; lies told by police officers who tried to hide their illicit activities and the protection they afforded to a wide variety of common crimes; lies told by leaders and politicians who, by announcing supposedly marvelous findings or providential discoveries (that usually took place shortly before the anniversary of the bombing, 1 “Memory is relatively easy to deal with, from the totalitarian point of view. There is always some agency like the Ministry of Truth to deny the memories of others, to rewrite the past. It has become com- monplace circa 2003 for government employees to be paid more than the rest of us to debase history, trivialize truth and annihilate the past on a daily basis.” Thomas Pynchon, Foreword to George Orwell’s “1984”. 3 on July 18), sought to win from society the favor and credibility that their insipid governments denied them; lies told by journalists or writers or pseudo ones who, by constructing the most tangled conspiracy theories, tried to sell books to make a quick profit that patient and honest work could not offer them. We believe that it would not be out of place to state that the AMIA case is not only the investigation into the most heinous terrorist attack suffered by our country but is also in a sense a mirror that reflects back a significant portion of Argentina’s history. A tumultuous history plagued with socio-economic crises that have eroded the existing social structures or prevented the construction of a strong state capable of responding appropriately to the needs of the population. One of the sectors most af- fected by this process of deterioration was the judiciary: made up of personnel scarcely trained to deal with complex cases, given scant material and financial support and subject to intrusion by the political branch. In the context of the Jewish Tradition, “Ethics of the Fathers” I–18 states that “Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: By virtue of three things does the world endure: truth, justice and peace, as it is said: “You shall administer truth and the justice of peace in your gates”. The simplest and most obvious explanation of this wise quotation is that, since it occupies an intermediate position between the other two terms, justice feeds on truth to establish peace. In contrast, when justice fails, truth becomes corrupted within the convoluted circumstances in which it exists and breaks down into a set of relativiza- tions that, unable to engender anything but conflicts and disagreements, threaten the very pillars on which society is based. In light of these reflections, we wish to express that the exploits of those who did so much to clarify the AMIA case were also a way of affirming the foundations of a better society. We are referring to the relatives of the victims, who never gave up striv- ing to discover the truth; to so many community leaders who were sincerely commit- ted to the advancement of the case; to AMIA’s lawyers and numerous judicial officials who remained loyal to their convictions and were able to overcome their reasonable fears. We do not wish to idealize; we all made mistakes ... as fallible beings it could not have been otherwise. Despite this, it remains true that we are referring to honest and well-intentioned people who, according to their means and based on the position they occupied, contributed to the advancement of the case. It is true that over the years there has been much talk of the AMIA case, but very little has been said about the essence of it: the evidence arrived at. We have already re- ferred to the decisions taken by Interpol in 2007, and we would now like to emphasize that these decisions were taken based on the findings firmly established in the AMIA case, which include the following: 4 It is known who ordered the bombing. It is known what the motives for the bombing were. It is known where and when the decision was taken to attack Argentina. It is known who was responsible for carrying out the bombing. It is known who coordinated the bombing. It is known when the operative team tasked with carrying it out entered the country. It is known when that operative team left the country. All the points we have just mentioned are findings of the judicial investigation, the detailed analysis of which can be found in this monumental work by Mr Bronfman. However, despite the achievements, much remains to be discovered about the local connection: we still do not know who the middlemen were (who transferred the Renault van) between Telleldín and the terrorists. In the last statements he made, Telleldín accused members of the Buenos Aires Provincial Police, so we still cannot understand why, despite repeated requests from AMIA and DAIA, an appeal was not launched at the time against the sentence issued by Federal Oral Court No. 3 to de- mand that the new trial should not be limited to just Telleldín but instead be extended to the rest of the accused (these same Buenos Aires provincial police officers), thereby wasting one of the most invaluable opportunities to clarify the case. It is also true that, despite the results of the investigation, it was not possible for the accused Iranians to be brought to trial and much less convicted; but it would be unfair to attribute this result to the case itself when the real motives are to be found in the continual refusal by the Islamic Republic of Iran to cooperate with the Argentine judiciary and in its clear intention to shield the accused. On the other hand, we do contend that the Argentine judiciary was incapable of investigating the bombing of the Israeli Embassy and that many of the obstacles that had to be endured in the AMIA case, and perhaps the bombing itself, were due to the fact that the Israeli Embassy case, entrusted by constitutional mandate to the Supreme Court, ended in a huge failure. The conclusion one is forced to reach is that what has happened once can happen again. That, as a society, the risk implicit in the inability to modify the conditions that enabled the terrorist attacks is huge. It is as simple and obvious as learning from past experiences. When more than a year and a half after the event we see that it has not yet been possible to determine the circumstances surrounding the death of Alberto Nisman, none other than a federal prosecutor, we must conclude that there are many important things that have not been able to be corrected and that, as a result, we re- main enormously vulnerable. It was the task of the lawyers in the AMIA case to try to mitigate many of the ef- fects of those constituent shortcomings of the state, from navigating the obstacles aris- 5 ing from procedural criminal legislation that was inadequate and outdated for dealing with international terrorism to undertaking the work necessary to neutralize the false leads introduced by both common criminals and political operators who frequently responded to those same intelligence services that, under normal conditions, should have constituted one of the main tools in the investigation. We cannot fail, then, at this point to express our recognition of the work of many counsel who in these twenty-two years have displayed the necessary courage and deter- mination to work toward the elucidation of the AMIA Case: Luis Dobniewsky, Juan José Avila, Marta Nercellas, Carolina Fernández Blanco, Mariano Fridman and, of course, the author of this enormous work that we are prefacing here, Miguel Bronfman, who became involved in the AMIA case while still very young, as a collaborator of Mr Dobniewsky in 1998 and continued to work non-stop on the case until 2008, when he was appointed as AMIA’s legal representative, a position he held until the end of 2015. I met Mr Bronfman shortly before becoming president of AMIA in 2013.