Conditional Sentences in the New Testament

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Conditional Sentences in the New Testament CONDITIONAL SENTENCES IN THE NEW TESTAMENT by William E. Elliott Submitted in partial fulfillment of requirements for the degree of Doctor of Theology in Grace Theological Seminary May 1981 Digitized by Ted Hildebrandt, Gordon College 2006 Title: CONDITIONAL SENTENCES IN THE GREEK NEW TESTAMENT Author: William E. Elliott Degree: Doctor of Theology Date: May 1981 Committee: Dr. Charles R. Smith, Dr. John A. Sproule, Dr. Homer A. Kent, Jr. Increasing interest in the grammar of the Greek New Testament has focused attention upon aspects of the language that have, for the most part, been passed over by past grammarians. Among these topics is that of conditional sentences. A superficial survey of the lit- erature indicates that most writers seem to have the data confidently in tow, but closer inspection shows that this is not the case. Modern grammarians are, for the most part, content to follow the lead of A.T. Robertson and classify these clauses in terms of First, Second, Third, and Fourth Class conditions. Others, dissatisfied with Robertson's system and the extension of it by his followers, have returned to the terminology, if not the principles of Classical Greek. The situation is uncoordinated at best, for even in Classical Greek studies there is significant disagreement upon the classification of these sentences. The historical background to the study of conditional sentences is presented from both the Classical and the Koine Greek standpoints. Suggested systems of classification include Time, Fulfillment, Form and Determination. The latter, championed by B.L. Gildersleeve, is the preferred system. Determination is indicated by the mood of the verbs employed in the protasis. Gildersleeve's system entered Koine studies primarily through the work of A.T. Robertson. He employes four classes into which he places these conditional sentences. The Simple Condition, using the indicative mood, states the condition as an assumed reality. There is no necessary connection between actuality and the statement. This condition merely presents the conclusion as a necessary corollary of the condition. The Contrary to Fact Condition also uses the indicative mood to present the condition as one that is assumed not true, i.e., con- trary to fact. Again, there is no necessary connection between actuality and the conditional statement. The Probable Condition presents the condition as one assumed probable, i.e., one that could easily be fulfilled. The hypothetical nature of this condition requires the use of the subjunctive mood. The Possible condition states the condition as one that is assumed possible, i.e., little likelihood of fulfillment. This con- dition utilizes the optative mood, and there is no complete example of it in the New Testament. Two basic concepts underlie all conditional sentences. First, the determining factor is the mood of the verb, not the particle em- ployed. Second, all conditional sentences state their case as an assumption, never as a direct statement of reality. Accepted by the Faculty of Grace Theological Seminary in partial fulfillment of requirements for the degree Doctor of Theology Examining Committee: Charles R. Smith Homer A. Kent Jr. John A. Sproule TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 1 CHAPTER I. A HISTORICAL SURVEY 4 Conditional Sentences in General 4 Conditional Sentences in Classical Greek 8 The Importance of Classical Greek 10 Suggested Classification Systems 10 Classification According to Time 11 Classification According to Fulfillment 18 Classification According to Form 20 Classification According to Determination 23 Conditional Sentences in Koine Greek 33 Early Grammarians 34 George Benedict Winer 34 Alexander Buttmann 37 Samuel G. Green 40 Ernest DeWitt Burton 42 James Hope Moulton 46 Modern Grammarians 49 Archibald Thomas Robertson 49 William Douglas Chamberlain 55 Charles Francis Digby Moule 57 Friedrich Blass - Albert Debrunner 60 Nigel Turner 62 H. E. Dana and Julius R. Mantey 65 Robert W. Funk 67 William Sanford La Sor 65 Summary of Koine Grammarians 71 II. THE SIMPLE CONDITION 73 Introduction 73 The Conditional Particle ei 75 The Significance of ei 75 The Significance of ei with other Particles 77 The Negative Particles in Simple Conditions 81 Ean with the Indicative Mood 84 Significance of Moods and Tenses 88 i ii Meaning of the Simple Condition 95 Particular and General Conditions 95 Degree of Reality 98 Translation of the Simple Condition 105 III. THE CONTRARY TO FACT CONDITION 106 Introduction 106 Significance of Tense 110 Imperfect Tense 110 Aorist Tense 113 Pluperfect Tense 115 The Use of An in Contrary to Fact Conditions 116 The Meaning of the Contrary to Fact Condition 121 The Translation of the Contrary to Fact Condition 123 IV. THE PROBABLE CONDITION 129 Introduction 129 Analysis of the Probable Condition 131 The Protasis 131 The Apodosis 141 Meaning of the Probable Condition 148 Review of the Grammarians 148 Evaluation of the Grammarians 151 Relationship with the Simple Condition 156 Summary 163 Translation of the Probable Condition 165 V. THE POSSIBLE CONDITION 169 Introduction 169 The Optative Mood in General 170 The Optative Mood in Conditional Sentences 174 The Construction 175 The Significance 178 The Grammarians 178 The Specific Examples 180 Those with the Protasis Implied 180 Those with the Protasis Stated 184 Translation of the Possible Condition 191 VI. CONCLUSION 193 Simple Conditions 194 Unreal Conditions 195 Probable Conditions 195 Possible Conditions 196 Summary 196 iii APPENDICES 198 Appendix I: Occurrences of the Simple Condition 198 Appendix II: Occurrences of the Unreal Condition 211 Appendix III: Occurrences of the Probable Condition 215 BIBLIOGRAPHY 226 INTRODUCTION God created man with the potential for abstract reasoning, and his many languages reflect this through their use of the subjunctive mood: the mood of contingency or possibility. Posing questions, exploring possibilities and analyzing logical connections are part of man's reasoning capabilities, and his languages reflect these skills. Among the syntactical tools which accomplish these are conditional sentences. These sentences, usually consisting of two clauses, state a hypothesis and give a conclusion. In English this corres- ponds to the "If . then" formula. This type of sentence, while prevalent in English, is usually listed as one of several subordinate clause relationships.1 By contrast, the Greek language presents a more fully developed system of conditional sentences by means of which a remarkable degree of precision may be obtained in expressing conditional thought. The Greek conditional sentence presents both the condition and certain specific implications about it in one sentence whereas English needs both the conditional statement and qualifying sentences to communicate the same concept. This compactness lends itself to greater precision 1 Porter Perrin and George H. Smith, Handbook of Current English, third edition, edited by Jim W. Corder (Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1968), 48-56, 120-121. 2 in the statement of conditional concepts. Since conditional sentences are basic to the material of the Greek New Testament, a detailed understanding of conditional sentences is vital for an accurate interpretation of its contents. This, then, is the goal of this study: to explore conditional sentences so that the message of the New Testament may be better understood. Though all students of Greek, both Classical and Koine, agree on the importance of conditional sentences, few agree on the analysis of them. A. T. Robertson aptly describes the situation in Koine studies when he writes, "In truth the doctors have disagreed themselves and the rest have not known how to go."1 The Classical scene is likewise muddled, as Blass-Debrunner notes, "The classical grammars are also hope- lessly at variance."2 Some of this confusion is due to the absence of a standard by which to classify conditional sentences. Time, degree of reality and construction have all been suggested by various grammarians as possible classification systems. Further, each grammarian seems to have developed his own terminology in discussing the subject, and each argues that his is best. Indeed, it is possible to trace the influence of major grammarians through succeeding generations by noting who adopts their terminology in dealing with conditional sentences. 1 A. T. Robertson, A Grammar of the Greek New Testament in the Light of Historical Research (Nashville, Tennessee: Broadman Press, 1934), p. 1004. 2 Friedrich Blass and Alvert Debrunner, A Greek Grammar of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature, translated and revised by Robert W. Funk (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1961), p. 189. 3 Another reason for the lack of standardization may be the inherent flexibility of the language itself. Though Classical and Koine Greek may be considered fossilized ancestors of Modern Greek, they were living, functioning languages, complete with the internal syntactical elasticity found in living languages today. Greek, like English, developed through usage, and patterns so developed may refuse to be forced into a logically consistent mold. So, whether through lack of a standard, or lack of accepted terminology, or through syntactical flexibility, conditional sentences have provided grammarians with a fruitful area of contemplation, and students with a frustrating area of concentration. This study seeks to offer help to those involved in the analysis of conditional sentences by summarizing the work of previous
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