Coalitions Are People: Policy Narratives and the Defeat of Ohio Senate Bill 5

COALITIONS ARE PEOPLE: POLICY NARRATIVES AND THE DEFEAT OF OHIO SENATE BILL 5

Dominic Wells

A Thesis

Submitted to the Graduate College of Bowling Green State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

August 2013

Committee:

Andrew Kear, Advisor

David Jackson

ABSTRACT

Andrew Kear, Advisor

Historically, states in the Midwest have enacted policies favorable to organized labor. This has changed in recent years with several Midwest states passing severe restrictions on the collective bargaining rights of workers. This research focuses on one case where collective bargaining restrictions were overturned in the state of Ohio through direct democracy. Coalitions and policy narratives were identified through the scope of the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) and Narrative Policy Framework (NPF) in an attempt to fully understand the repeal of Ohio Senate Bill 5, a law that restricted collective bargaining for public employees. Analysis shows that the coalition in favor of repeal, We Are Ohio, formed a broader coalition and a more general, more effective, narrative than the coalition in favor of the collective bargaining restrictions, Building a

Better Ohio. We Are Ohio argued that Senate Bill 5 was an overreach by greedy politicians that would hurt the middle class. Building a Better Ohio argued that Senate

Bill 5 was a necessary measure that would help balance state and local budgets. This research demonstrates a useful application of the ACF and NPF to direct democracy in hopes that future research will be done using these frameworks on direct democracy.

Furthermore, this research demonstrates how successfully expanding the conflict in direct democracy results in a larger coalition that is needed to win the policy narrative. iii

To my wife, Annette, for her continued support and encouragement iv

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank my committee, Dr. Andrew Kear and Dr. David Jackson

for taking the time to help me progress as a writer and a student. I would have been

lost without your expertise. I would especially like to thank my adviser, Dr. Andrew

Kear, for dedicating much of his time to guiding me in this project. Finally, I would like to thank my father, Dominic T. Wells, for reading every draft of this work and for always stressing the importance of education. v

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

INTRODUCTION ...... 1

CHAPTER I. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS ...... 10

The Advocacy Coalition Framework ...... 10

Narrative Policy Framework ...... 14

CHAPTER II. LITERATURE REVIEW: OHIO SENATE BILL 5 ...... 18

CHAPTER III. METHODOLOGY ...... 21

Newspaper Content Analysis ...... 26

Interviews ...... 29

Research Expectations ...... 30

CHAPTER IV. DATA AND ANALYSIS...... 35

Coalitions ...... 35

Coalition Narratives ...... 39

Narratives and Voting Outcomes ...... 50

Coalition Symbols ...... 56

Coalition Strategy ...... 58

CHAPTER V. CONCLUSIONS ...... 64

REFERENCES ...... 68

APPENDIX A. CODING SCHEME ...... 75

APPENDIX B. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS ...... 76

APPENDIX C. HSRB APPROVAL ...... 77

LIST OF FIGURES/TABLES

Figures Page

1 Factors Leading to Outcome ...... 6

2 Research Design...... 7

Tables

1 Belief Levels and Examples...... 29

2 Coalition Members...... 38

3 Coalition Characters...... 40

4 We Are Ohio Narratives ...... 49

5 Building a Better Ohio Narratives ...... 49

6 Senate Bill 5 Vote ...... 51

7 Voter Turnout (%)...... 53

8 Newspaper Tone ...... 56

9 Newspaper Mentions ...... 59

INTRODUCTION

In March of 2011, Governor Scott Walker of Wisconsin signed a bill that stripped public employees in the state of almost all collective bargaining rights. The law sparked a nationwide debate over collective bargaining rights for public employees. Labor union supporters protested outside the state capital and several Democratic state senators fled Wisconsin in an attempt to prevent a vote on the measure. However, the Republican Party controlled both houses of the state legislature and the governor's office allowing the bill to be passed despite protest and without Democratic Party support (“Wis. gov. officially cuts collective bargaining,” 2011).

Governor Walker was then recalled, but survived the special election challenge for the governorship. Walker became the first governor to ever survive a recall election. His win in a multimillion dollar campaign that drew attention on a national level possibly encouraged governors in other states to attempt similar collective bargaining laws (Keen, 2012, p.1A).

Only a few weeks later, Ohio Governor John Kasich signed Ohio Senate Bill 5 (SB5) into law. The law placed limitations on the collective bargaining rights of public employees similar to the law Governor Walker had signed. The passage of SB5 also led to protests outside the state capital. Democratic Party and labor leaders vowed to collect enough signatures from Ohio voters to place the bill up for referendum. Much like in Wisconsin, the Republican Party controlled both houses in the state legislature and the governor's office as a result of a wave of

Republican support in the gubernatorial election of 2010. This wave of Republican support was caused by several factors. The economy was in poor condition and voters were frustrated with the party in power nationally, the Democratic Party. As a swing state, Ohio voters have a tendency to move with national sentiment. Republican lawmakers passed SB5 through the Ohio

State House of Representatives by a vote of 53 to 44 and passed through the Ohio State Senate 2 by a vote of 17 to 16. The bill received no Democratic Party support and only a few Republican state legislators voted against it (Vardon, 2011). Ultimately, the bill was put up for referendum and it was rejected by Ohio voters by a wide margin.

Wisconsin and Ohio were followed by Indiana and Michigan, states that became Right- to-Work states in 2012. Right-to-Work laws undercut the funding of organized labor and the

Democratic Party (which receives contributions from organized labor) by preventing unions from collecting dues from the paychecks of employees in unionized workplaces. Dues become completely voluntary, which creates a free rider problem where workers can receive the benefits of unionized workplaces without paying for them. In early 2012, Indiana became the first Right- to-Work state in what is known as the “Rust Belt”. Again, the bill passed through a Republican controlled state House of Representatives and state Senate to be signed into law by Republican

Governor Mitch Daniels. The bill sparked protests from labor supporters outside of the Super

Bowl which was held in Indianapolis that year (Schneider & Sikich, 2012). In late 2012,

Michigan became a Right-to-Work state. Republican Governor Rick Snyder signed the Right-to-

Work legislation into law after it passed through a Republican controlled state legislature.

Having learned something from SB5 in Ohio, lawmakers in Michigan attached the measure to an appropriations bill that prevented the law from being eligible for a referendum. Michigan lawmakers also followed Wisconsin by exempting firefighter and police forces, something Ohio lawmakers decided against (Fletcher & Sullivan, 2012).

In Wisconsin, Indiana, and Michigan laws limiting the collective bargaining rights of workers are still in effect. In Ohio, labor allies collected enough signatures to place the law up for referendum and Ohio voters rejected the law overwhelmingly. The wave of anti-organized labor legislation that has swept the Midwest has sparked a regional discussion concerning the 3 rights of workers. In the past, Right-to-Work in Michigan would be unimaginable because of the state's labor friendly history and because the state was the birthplace of the United Auto

Workers. The recent anti-organized labor legislation that has sprung up in state legislatures has marked a turning point in labor policy where states with pro-organized labor laws are adopting anti-organized labor laws. There is a feeling that if Right-to-Work can be passed in Michigan, it can be passed anywhere.

Understanding the recent political context of the region is important, but to fully comprehend the 2011 vote on collective bargaining for public employees some historical context of the labor movement in Ohio is needed. On November 4, 1958 Ohioans voted against Right- to-Work by a margin slightly greater than they voted against SB5 in 2011. Right-to-Work was voted against by approximately 64% to 36% shocking many experts of the time that had predicted the ballot initiative would pass narrowly (Fenton, 1959, p.241).

There were some similarities between the 1958 campaign for Right-to-Work and the 2011 campaign for SB5. Supporters of Right-to-Work in 1958 included businessmen and members of the Republican Party. Just as in 2011, a recession had recently preceded the ballot initiative.

Proponents of Right-to-Work believed that the unemployed would support the bill because of the recession (Fenton, 1959, p.242). Not unlike the characterization of SB5 as an attack on the middle class, Right-to-Work was seen as the common man against the rich man (Fenton, 1959, p.253).

There were also some differences between the 1958 campaign for Right-to-Work and the

2011 campaign for SB5. In 1958, Governor C. William O'Neill was up for reelection. He initially avoided the Right-to-Work issue but came out in support of the ballot initiative late in the campaign because he believed he was trailing his Democratic Party opponent and that the 4 ballot initiative would pass narrowly. Governor O'Neill would lose reelection by a wide margin

(Fenton, 1959, p.243). In 2011, Governor John Kasich was not up for reelection and did not hesitate to support SB5. In fact, he became the main spokesman for the bill once it was placed on the November ballot.

Following the defeat of Right-to-Work, the state remained in political opposition to public sector bargaining. It took two decades of efforts from organized labor to create one of the strongest public sector employee statutes in the United States. In 1983, the state enacted The

Ohio Public Employee Collective Bargaining Act. The law granted public employees the right to collectively bargain, set up the guidelines for mediation and arbitration, and gave most public employees the right to strike (O'Reilly & Gath, 1983, p.891-893). Public employees with a special safety purpose were not granted the right to strike (O'Reilly & Gath, 1983, p.896).

The 1983 law was passed under circumstances analogous to that of SB5, only instead of total Republican Party control the Democratic Party had a strong majority in the Ohio State

House, a slimmer majority in the Ohio State Senate, and control of the Governor's office. The law passed through the Ohio Senate by the same 17 to 16 vote that SB5 passed through the

Senate. Opponents of the 1983 law claimed that it gave too much power to employees and took away too much power from employers (Kelly, 1983, p.1). The reverse was said by opponents of

SB5 in 2011.

It took a long sustained effort from organized labor to obtain collective bargaining rights for public employees in Ohio. The Ohio Public Employee Collective Bargaining Act remained in effect until it was threatened by SB5. Advocates of SB5 argued that the 1983 law gave too much power to employees. Opponents of SB5 argued that SB5 was an attack on the middle class, much like opponents of Right-to-Work in 1958 viewed the constitutional amendment as an 5 attack on the common man. Much of the political context of past labor-management disputes still resonate in the present day.

Some of the components of the narratives from over fifty years ago were still relevant to the 2011 referendum on public employee collective bargaining rights. In 2011, opponents of

SB5 argued that the reforms would be unsafe for workers. In 1958 it was argued that the passage of Right-to-Work would be detrimental to work conditions (“Toastmasters Say 'We Don't Want

Laws for Work,” 1958, p.6). Opponents of SB5 claimed that the law was unfair much like opponents of Right-to-Work argued that the proposal was unfair because it allowed free-riders.

Although the term may not have always been used, the idea of merit pay was just as relevant in

1958 as it was in 2011. Furthermore, the loaded term “union boss” was used to vilify union representatives in 1958 just as it was used in 2011 (“Unionist arguments lacking in validity,”

1958, p.11). Components of narratives, such as symbols and characters , that were relevant in

1958 continued to be relevant in 2011.

Generally, Republican lawmakers have been averse to labor unions. There is little doubt that had the institutional composition of any of these states been different, these laws would have been unlikely to pass. Party control does play an important role in labor policy, but this research does not focus on the effect of party control on labor policy. Instead, this research focuses on the one recent case where collective bargaining restrictions were overturned. Ohio SB5 presents a unique case where voters were able to take the policy process into their own hands when

Republican state lawmakers chose to impose strong limitations on the collective bargaining rights of workers. This research will examine Ohio SB5 through the scope of the Advocacy

Coalition Framework and Narrative Policy Framework. The assumption of this research is that policy narratives and advocacy coalitions play an important role in the policy process and direct 6 democracy. This research asserts that conflict expansion and policy narratives are pivotal to the success or failure of a controversial policy item like collective bargaining.

A comprehensive understanding of the case of Ohio SB5 requires an in depth analysis of the policy narratives and advocacy coalitions involved in the referendum campaign. Several research questions will be answered through qualitative research approaches. The questions include the following: What were the policy narratives used by each coalition? Which narratives were effective and why? How were narratives related to voting outcomes? What were the effective symbols used throughout the campaign? What were the narrative strategies formed by each coalition?

This research aimed to identify the policy narratives of the SB5 campaign and explain why they were effective or ineffective. In this case, quality narratives are those that resonated with voters in Ohio. They did not necessarily have to make the difference in the outcome of the vote, but it is argued in this research that narratives accounted for some part of the final margin of victory for We Are Ohio. Other likely factors in the outcome of the election were party identification, voter turnout, and campaign spending. Figure 1 shows what factors may have led to a victory for the We Are Ohio coalition.

Figure 1. Factors Leading to Outcome

This research focused on the policy narratives component of the factors that led to the outcome of the vote. Several steps were taken to identify policy narratives, determine their validity, and evaluate the effectiveness of those narratives. Following the ACF, valid narratives are those true to the deep core beliefs and policy beliefs of the coalitions. The beliefs and 7 narratives of each coalition were identified through the coding of interviews with coalition members and the coding of newspaper articles from the Cleveland Plain Dealer, Columbus

Dispatch, Toledo Blade, and Cincinnati Enquirer. Narratives identified in the interviews were compared to those identified in newspaper articles. The beliefs and narratives identified in the interviews with coalition members corresponded to the beliefs and narratives identified in newspaper articles. Had the beliefs and narratives not been similar, it would have meant that newspaper articles were not an appropriate tool for the identification of coalition beliefs and narratives. Once the valid beliefs and narratives were identified, they were compared to polling data and voting outcomes by county to determine the effectiveness of the coalition narratives.

The polling data facilitated the analysis of the popularity of Governor Kasich and the use of SB5 to control state and local government budgets, two important themes in the narratives. The voting outcomes were not used to show that the winner of the election had a more effective narrative, but to show that narratives in different regions of the state reflected local sentiment.

Figure 2 below is a visual representation of the research design used in this work.

Figure 2. Research Design

The ACF and the NPF were used in this research to identify the beliefs and narratives of each coalition. The components of these frameworks were used to create a coding scheme. The

ACF required the identification of coalition members and their beliefs. The three-tiered belief system of the ACF was included in the coding scheme. The NPF was used to identify characters and the plot of the coalition narratives. Components of the NPF such as villains, heroes, victims, and symbols were included in the coding scheme.

Newspapers and interviews were not the only option for identifying beliefs and narratives. Television and radio advertisements would have likely been acceptable in the place of newspaper articles. However, the availability of all of the advertisements aired during the examined time-frame was questionable. The time constraints of this research also made newspaper articles a more reasonable option. Given limited resources, the addition of television and radio commercials would have been overwhelming.

This research focused on two coalitions which competed from the time SB5 was signed into law in March of 2011 to the time Ohio voters repealed the law through referendum in

November of 2011. The coalitions were We Are Ohio and Building a Better Ohio. We Are

Ohio was a coalition made up of mostly labor interests that worked to repeal SB5. Building a

Better Ohio was a coalition made up of mostly business interests that worked to keep SB5.

Policy narratives and coalitions were identified through interviews with members of each coalition and through the coding of newspaper articles.

This research argues that We Are Ohio and Building a Better Ohio chose policy narratives that sought to expand their coalitions. This strategy was necessary because of the nature of referendums. Referendums are decided by the largest coalition of voters. Each coalition adopts strategies and policy narratives that expand the conflict in hopes that they build 9 the coalition and win support on Election Day.

We Are Ohio chose a narrative focused on protecting the middle class and defeating greedy politicians. They portrayed SB5 as an overreach and argued in favor of repeal. Building a Better Ohio chose a narrative focused on protecting taxpayers and defeating greedy unions.

They argued that SB5 was necessary to balance the state budget, but Ohio voters did not accept that narrative. Analysis shows that We Are Ohio built a more effective policy narrative, which was reflected in the voting outcome.

This paper begins with a review of the Advocacy Coalition Framework and Narrative

Policy Framework, followed by a review of scholarly research pertaining to Ohio SB5. This is followed by a description of research methodology that details the interview questions and coding schemes applied in this analysis. Several research expectations are tested to help answer the research questions about Ohio SB5. The research expectations are tested and presented in the data and analysis section using information gathered from the coding of newspaper articles and interviews with members of each coalition. The final section includes conclusions and suggestions for future research.

CHAPTER I. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS

Advocacy Coalition Framework

Initially, Paul A. Sabatier created the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) as a way to use technical information to grasp the policy process. In recent decades, the framework has been applied by numerous scholars, some within the United States and others in Europe (Sabatier &

Jenkins-Smith, 1999, p.117-118). The ACF has evolved over time as scholars have contributed new facets to the framework and disregarded other concepts originally included by Sabatier and

Jenkins-Smith.

The ACF is grounded in four basic premises. First, understanding policy oriented learning and the process of policy change requires a decade or more time-frame (Sabatier, 1993, p.16). According to Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, this is necessary partially because altering the belief system of policy makers takes an extended period of time. This extended period also allows for a complete cycle of the policy formation, policy implementation, and policy reformation needed for the understanding of alterations in strategy over time (1999, p.118-119).

Policy may change drastically in a short period of time or remain static for a long period of time.

With an extended time frame, changes in political institutions that may lead to policy change can be observed. Secondly, the most effective way to view policy change is through policy subsystems, where different actors in different institutions attempt to influence decisions in the same policy area (Sabatier, 1993, p.16). These subsystems include administrative agencies, legislative committees, interest groups, researchers, policy analysts, and journalists. Subsystems are complex and actors must specialize in order to influence policy. In addition, policies are not implemented at a single level; they are implemented throughout different levels of government

(Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999, p.119). Actors within a policy subsystem, throughout different 11 levels of government, that have similar policy goals form advocacy coalitions to gain greater influence over policy. Third, the subsystem must include multiple levels of government. Fourth, the ACF requires that public policies be viewed in the same fashion as belief systems (Sabatier,

1993, p.16).

Advocacy coalitions consist of various actors who share normative and causal beliefs.

They work together in some degree of coordinated activity to influence policy in a way that reflects their beliefs and values (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999, p.120). The major unit of analysis in the ACF is the policy subsystems. Policy subsystems are areas of specialization.

Complexities force actors to specialize in a topic, creating policy subsystems (Weible, Sabatier,

& McQueen, 2009, p.123). Policy subsystems include, but are not limited to, energy, the environment, and labor.

Beliefs systems play a major role in the ACF. In the ACF, individuals act based on preferences, beliefs, and moral values (Schlager, 1995, p.253). Public policies reflect value priorities and perceived causal relationships and therefore can be conceptualized much like belief systems. There are three levels of beliefs in the ACF: deep core, policy core, and secondary.

Deep core beliefs are the broadest level, are very general, and reflect fundamental values.

Liberty and equality are excellent examples of deep core beliefs. The following level consists of policy core beliefs, which are located within a policy subsystem. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith state that policy core beliefs “represent the basic normative commitments and causal perceptions across an entire policy domain or subsystem” (1999, p.119-122). These beliefs serve two main functions as motivators and a basis for choice. Motivators result in political action while the basis of choice carries out a series of processes that become public policy (Stewart, 2009, p.24-

25). Examples of policy core beliefs include the beliefs that labor unions strengthen the middle 12 class or labor unions have become too powerful and damage the economy. Secondary beliefs are the final level of beliefs. These beliefs are narrow and more easily changed than deep core and policy core beliefs (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999, p.122). The belief that public employees should pay at least 15% of their health insurance premiums is an example of a secondary belief.

The ACF stresses the importance of beliefs within advocacy coalitions that influence policy-making. The participants within the advocacy coalitions have the goal of influencing public policy in a way that reflects their belief system and aim to achieve this goal before their opponents. These participants search for allies that share similar core policy beliefs (Sabatier,

2007, p.196).

There are four paths for policy change under the ACF. They include policy oriented learning, external shocks, internal shocks, and negotiated agreements. External shocks represent a shift in the properties of a coalition's policy core beliefs. These external shocks can include changes in governing coalitions, public opinion, or socioeconomic conditions. Policy oriented learning is the second path to policy change. This is defined as a change in thought or behavior of an ACF actor as the result of experience or the discovery of new information. The third path for policy change is through internal shocks. These shocks are events that draw attention to faulty practices within a policy subsystem. The final path for policy change under the ACF is negotiated agreements. In the fourth path, members of the coalition are placed in a situation where it is in their best interest to reach an agreement and negotiate policy change within the subsystem (Weible et al., 2009, p.124).

Since the creation of ACF, several scholars have made criticisms and additions to the framework. Mintrom and Vergari criticized ACF for not being useful in determining when policy change will occur. They add that the ACF does not explain changes in the composition of 13 coalitions over time (Mintrom & Vergari, 1996, p.422). Fenger and Klok wrote that the theory focused on content, structure, and evolution of belief systems but never addressed how participants use belief systems to maintain the coalition. They stress the importance of inter- dependencies between participants and believe that different inter-dependencies lead to different behaviors (Fenger & Klok, 2001, p.157). These inter-dependencies arise because of causally related actions or an external actor has linked their activities or other purposes (Fenger & Klock,

2001, p.160). Schlager focuses on maintaining the coalition through collective action. Schlager maintains that cooperation and coordination between members of the coalition is important and that the coalition may deteriorate or never form even if the participants are allies in a subsystem.

For minimal coordination to be effective, the participants must share an understanding of the problem and agree on the policies most favorable to pursue. For more extensive coordination, strategies must be agreed upon. A more complex coalition strategy leads to more complex coordination within the coalition (Schlager, 1995, p.261-262). Schlager states that coalitions are more likely to be maintained if the beneficiaries of the coalition achievements are clearly identified and are members of the coalition. She adds that the benefits need to be related to the cost of maintaining the coalition and the coalition members need to monitor each other’s’ actions to make sure the agreed upon strategies are being implemented (Schlager, 1995, p.264).

Schlager also criticizes the ACF for being unable to identify how shared beliefs lead to coordinated action and political strategy (1995).

The ACF has been applied to many different cases in many ways since the creation of the framework. All versions of the ACF assume that participants have value priorities that drive policy oriented goals (Sabatier & Jenkins, 1999, p.130). Although originally used primarily for environmental policy issues, some scholars have applied the framework to other areas such as 14 higher education (Shakespeare, 2008), child labor (Sarbaugh-Thompson & Zald, 1995), and

Swiss drug policy (Kubler, 2001). The ACF could be applied to many other policy subsystems such as abortion, gun control, human rights, and gay rights (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999, p.152). In recent years, the framework has been applied to social, economic, and environmental policy. The majority of applications continue to be related to environmental policy issues.

Researchers applying the ACF have also used a variety of different research methods including interviews, content analysis, and questionnaires. Most applications of ACF test hypotheses concerning coalition stability, policy oriented learning, or policy change (Weible et al., 2009, p.125-128). According to an article written by Weible, Sabatier, and McQueen which analyzed the applications of ACF, over sixty percent of them found two coalitions within a policy subsystem (2009, p.131). Certain components of the framework have been overlooked, such as devil shift, hurting stalemate, policy brokers, and stable parameters. In many cases, the ACF is applied to a policy issue along with other theories (Weible et al., 2009, p.132-134). ACF can be integrated with Narrative Policy Framework (NPF) to further explain policy change through the study of the nature of narratives.

Narrative Policy Framework

The Narrative Policy Framework (NPF) focuses on how narratives can aid the understanding of policy issues, problems, and definitions. Narratives have been considered the

“lifeblood of politics” (McBeth, Shanahan, Arnell, & Hathaway, 2007, p.88). According to

Stone, they “provide explanations for how the world works” (2002, p.137). Often times, policy problem definition takes the form of a narrative. This is to say that they are narratives with the components of stories. They have a beginning, middle, and end, and include some type of alteration. There are forces of good, forces of evil, heroes, villains, and victims (Stone, 2002, 15 p.138). Many times a policy storyline is not apparent, but what seems to be a conflict of details is actually a disagreement on a broad story. Within policy, two narrative story lines are common: the story of decline and the story of helplessness and control. The story of decline states that in the beginning things were good, but then things changed and got worse; now something needs to be done to return to the times of good (Stone, 2002, p.138). The story of helplessness and control states that things are bad and believed to be out of control, which means things will remain bad, but now there has been a solution discovered and things are no longer out of control (Stone, 2002, p.142).

According to Roe, NPF is used in policy areas of high uncertainty, complexity, and polarization. Narratives and stories are identified and compared. Policy analysts then determine how the new narrative defines the policy problem that makes it conformable to conventional policy analytical tools (Roe, 1994, p.155).

Narrative strategies are chosen in part based on who is winning or losing and they are a product of beliefs. The goal is to define and frame the problem in a way that allows political actors to present their course of action as the course that represents the broadest interest of the public (Stone, 2002, p.129). Narratives are the visible outcomes of political strategies and policy beliefs. These beliefs are stable and the strategies are predictable (McBeth et al., 2007, p.88).

According to Baumgartner and Jones, the losing group attempts to redefine issues with the goal of bringing new groups and citizens into the arena and upset the policy equilibrium, or status quo

(1993, p.19). They expand the issue to increase attention and create policy change (Baumgartner

& Jones, 1993, p.19). In narrative theory, the losing group uses policy narratives to expand the issue or divert attention. This is also an attempt to bring more groups into the coalition. On the other hand, the side that is winning usually attempts to contain the issue (McBeth et al., 2007, 16 p.91).

Beliefs play an important role in NPF, just as they do in ACF. Interest group narratives consist of primary beliefs and political strategies. These primary beliefs do not differ significantly from Sabatier and Jenkin-Smith's concept of core beliefs in the ACF. Primary policy beliefs consist of stable core beliefs and secondary beliefs that are more susceptible to change. Policy narratives can be examined using the same principle of core beliefs and secondary beliefs. Narratives reveal that primary policy beliefs are usually stable over time.

They possess political strategies that reflect secondary beliefs (McBeth et al., 2007, p.89).

A narrative story is a symbolic device that is used to define policy problems. The meanings of symbols depend on how they are responded to, used, or interpreted. If symbols are effective, they capture imaginations, shape perceptions, and have the ability to influence and control (Stone, 2002, p.137). Many public policies are understood in symbolic terms, even by the politically sophisticated (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993, p.26). Symbols are used to define policy issues and characterize opponents. The manner in which symbols are used depends on whether a group is winning or losing. Groups that believe they are winning form narratives that seek to contain their coalition and maintain the status quo while groups that believe they are losing form narratives that seek to expand their coalition and bring in outsiders to help change the status quo (McBeth et al., 2007, p.91).

Post-structuralist and structuralist approaches have been used by scholars when studying narratives. Structuralist approaches operationalize narratives and test specific hypotheses. These studies are quantitative and usually apply some type of statistical analysis (Jones & McBeth,

2010, p.337). The post-structuralist approach assumes that narratives cannot be separated from interpretation. As a result, post-structural research is reliant on the interpretation of narratives by 17 the researcher (Jones & McBeth, 2010, p.332). While Stone (2002) argues that post-structural approaches are superior in the study of narratives because context is important, structuralists, such as Sabatier, argue that science requires clear concepts, testable hypotheses, and falsification.

Most narrative research has been post-structural (Jones & McBeth, 2010, p.331-332).

Some research has taken a structuralist approach and combined NPF with policy change theory, such as ACF. McBeth, Shanahan, Arnell, and Hathaway concluded that NPF could in fact be used effectively in the context of policy change theory. They also concluded that group narratives are indicators of group political strategies (2007, p.102). Jones and McBeth advanced the NPF and argued in favor of the empirical testing of narratives. They claim that the NPF would be a useful tool in studying narratives, especially when coupled with ACF (2010, p.345).

The NPF and ACF can be naturally coupled together for a two reasons. First, narratives are documented and can be tracked for the extended period of time the ACF requires. Second, narratives created by political subsystems contain core policy beliefs, which are part of the ACF

(McBeth et al.,2007, p.88). Finally, Shanahan, Jones, and McBeth use both the ACF and NPF to demonstrate that narratives within ACF research can help explain the policy process (2011).

CHAPTER II. LITERATURE REVIEW: OHIO SENATE BILL 5 .

There has been some scholarly research published concerning Ohio Senate Bill 5 (SB5).

Gelman (2012) focused on the role of public university presidents in the writing of Ohio SB5.

Gelman made a public records request and received documents, such as emails between university presidents, which allowed him to determine the role of public university presidents

(2012, p.512). Slater (2012) focused on the historical and political context of SB5. He made the argument that laws limiting collective bargaining do not improve the private sector. Slater also used data to demonstrate that there is no correlation between collective bargaining rights and budget deficits (2012, p.491). Freeman and Han (2012) focused on the relationship between public sector bargaining and state deficits. Freeman and Han used debt-to-state GDP ratios and compared public sector bargaining states to states without public sector bargaining (2012, p.386).

They concluded that the attempts to reform collective bargaining in the Midwest region have raised concern about inequality and the well-being of the middle class while also increasing political division (Freeman & Han, 2012, p.401). Each of these articles offers valuable background and insight concerning Ohio SB5.

A public records request allowed Sheldon Gelman to discover the role of university presidents in the creation of the Ohio bill. Originally, Ohio SB5 eliminated public sector collective bargaining completely. This was later changed and collective bargaining rights were reinstated, but public employers were given the ability to impose their own final offer on employees. The Yeshiva amendment was proposed by Inter-University Council and classified university professors as supervisors and managerial employees, which prevented them from taking part in collective bargaining (Gelman, 2012, p.512-513). Gelman uncovered the role of state university presidents in the adoption of the Yeshiva amendment. 19

University presidents worked together to draft a detailed plan of specific deregulation recommendations for the Ohio General Assembly. The IUC is a statewide association of university administrators who were in contact with the Governor's office about the content of

SB5 (Gelman, 2012, p.513). The IUC's collective bargaining initiative was to be kept secret from university faculty and presidents were warned that there would be communication issues once the bill was addressed by the assembly (Gelman, 2012, p.517). University presidents wrote newly elected Governor Kasich to voice their support for regulatory reform that would allow for state universities to be exempted from some current state laws (Gelman, 2012, p.519). The IUC proposed an amendment to Ohio SB5 called the Yeshiva amendment. This amendment deemed professors as managers and supervisors, eliminating their ability to collectively bargain. In order to maintain collective bargaining rights, professors would have had to give up power in faculty senate and the ability to make decisions regarding courses, curriculum, personnel, and anything related to academic or institutional policy. (Gelman, 2012, p.527). In short, SB5 would force professors to give up academic freedom if they wished to organize.

Slater also discusses the intentions of public employee collective bargaining reforms such as Ohio SB5. Slater argues that reforms such as SB5 are falsely proposed as a way to manage state budget problems and are actually just partisan political attacks meant to cripple collective bargaining and public employee unions (2012, p.474). While Ohio and Wisconsin passed the most far reaching reforms to public sector collective bargaining, other states such as Idaho,

Indiana, Tennessee, Oklahoma, Nevada, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Hampshire, and Michigan have all passed significant restrictions to public sector collective bargaining rights in recent years

(Slater, 2012, p.483-485).

Slater provides some evidence that Ohio SB5 was not about budgets. First, public sector 20 employees are paid less on average than private sector employees. Second, state budget deficits and collective bargaining rights are not correlated (Slater, 2012, p.490-492). Slater adds that collective bargaining rights have a number of positive effects, such as limiting the number of strikes, improving the efficiency of services, and improving the economy (Slater, 2012, p.493-

498).

Freeman and Han argue that the cause of state budgetary problems was the 2008-2009 recession and not public sector collective bargaining rights. They also state the main motivation of reforms to collective bargaining appear to be political. During the years of 2008 through

2011, there is strong evidence that public sector unions made wage and benefit concessions to save jobs and services. Specifically, Ohio public sector unions had made many concessions during the previous recession (Freeman & Han, 2012, p.398-399). Freeman and Han conclude that reforms to public sector collective bargaining could bring social change far different than originally intended, such as a higher level of income inequality (2012, p.401).

This research is an important addition to the previous research on Ohio SB5. Gelman's discovery of the role of public university presidents draws special attention to the pro-SB5 coalition. University presidents were revealed as powerful coalition members with the ability to draft an amendment delivering the exact reform for which they were lobbying Governor Kasich.

Other research concluded that the reforms of public sector collective bargaining were politically charged. This research focuses on the politics involved in the referendum on Ohio SB5. With a focus on narratives and coalitions, this research will define the political strategies behind Ohio

SB5. In recent years, many states have passed laws restricting public sector collective bargaining. Currently, this issue is politically relevant and demands attention from scholars.

CHAPTER III. METHODOLOGY

We Are Ohio collected nearly 1.3 million signatures to place Ohio Senate Bill 5 (SB5) up for referendum, the most signatures collected for an issue since the Ohio secretary of state began keeping electronic records. Only slightly more than 230,000 signatures were needed to be submitted and verified for the bill to be placed on the ballot (Guillen, 2011). The public outcry as a result of a single bill passed through the Ohio Assembly sparked an intense campaign that is important because it was one of the few times in recent history that labor advocates won. An increasing number of states have passed reforms aimed to weaken labor unions, but Ohio labor was able to form a winning coalition.

In an attempt to contribute to the limited research already completed concerning SB5, this research aimed to answer several research questions. They were the following: What were the policy narratives used by each coalition? Which narratives were effective and why? How were narratives related to voting outcomes? What were the effective symbols used throughout the campaign? What were the narrative strategies formed by each coalition? These questions were answered through the analysis of coalitions and narratives as they appeared in four major Ohio newspapers and a series of interviews with coalition members.

This research focused on the coalitions involved in the referendum on Ohio SB5, a law that made significant changes concerning collective bargaining for public sector employees.

Although ACF is usually applied to policy subsystems over a ten year period, this research applied the framework from the time Ohio SB5 was signed into law to the time Ohio voters repealed the law through referendum, roughly eight months. The policy subsystem in this case was labor policy and this research was focused on the different actors involved in this policy area. More specifically, this research focused on the role of the beliefs of the coalitions and each 22 coalition’s members. The two coalitions identified in the case of Ohio SB5 were We Are Ohio and Building a Better Ohio.

There are four basic premises of the ACF. First, understanding the process of policy change requires a decade or more time-frame. Second, the best way to view policy change is through subsystems. Third, subsystems should include multiple levels of government. Fourth, the ACF requires that public polices be viewed in the same manner as belief systems (Sabatier,

1993, p.16).

The ACF is based on the assumption that actors within a coalition share normative and causal beliefs. These actors work together through coordinated activity to influence policy in a way that reflects their beliefs and values (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999, p.120). In the ACF, individuals act based on preferences, beliefs, and moral values (Schlager, 1995, p.253). There are three levels of beliefs: deep core, policy core, and secondary. The deep core beliefs are very general and reflect fundamental values like liberty and freedom. The policy core belief level consists of beliefs located within a specific policy subsystem. These beliefs often represent causal perceptions (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999, p.119-122). An example of a policy core belief would be that strong labor unions lead to a strong middle class. The final level of beliefs are secondary beliefs. These beliefs are narrow and are more susceptible to change (Sabatier &

Jenkins-Smith, 1999, p.122).

The belief system of the ACF is very important when coupling the framework with the

NPF. It is assumed in the use of both frameworks that the policy narratives formed by each coalition stem from the shared beliefs of the coalition actors. The ACF allows members of each coalition and the beliefs they share to be identified. Once the beliefs and coalitions are identified, valid policy narratives and strategies can be identified. McBeth, Shanahan, Arnell, 23 and Hathaway argue that “narratives are the visible outcome of differences in policy beliefs and the equally visible outcome of political strategizing” (2007, p.88). Narratives and strategies are not random occurrences and beliefs are stable. The similarities between narratives used in the

Right-to-Work case in 1958 and the case of SB5 in 2011 demonstrate stability in narratives and beliefs. The use of the ACF and NPF allows the coalitions, coalition beliefs, and policy narratives to be identified and tested for validity.

The NPF focuses on how narratives aid in the understanding of policy issues. Problem definition often takes the form of a narrative. These narratives have the components of stories.

They have a beginning, middle, and end. They also have forces of good and evil (Stone, 2002, p.138). In the NPF, narratives and stories are identified and compared (Roe, 1994, p.155).

Narrative strategies are a product of beliefs. The goal of the actors is to define the policy problem in a way that allows their course of action to be presented as the action that represents the broad interests of the public (Stone, 2002, p.129).

The ACF and NPF have been used together in research that analyzes the narrative strategies of coalitions. However, these theories have not been applied to a case involving direct democracy. While these theories have not been used in this fashion, this does not mean that the application to direct democracy is inappropriate. The application of the ACF and NPF were appropriate in the case of SB5 because narratives are important to direct democracy. Once the law has been placed at the mercy of the voters strategies within governmental institutions are less important. A party cannot simply refuse to vote on the bill or leave the state to prevent a vote.

The public is left to decide and they do so based partially on their exposure to information.

Narratives are particularly important in direct democracy because they affect how the public views a problem and the public has the opportunity to decide the solution to that problem. 24

Narrative can be the difference between a person casting a vote on the estate tax or the “death tax.” It can be the difference between casting a vote for “traditional marriage and family values” or “marriage equality.” In short, words have consequences.

The policy narratives of coalitions are derived from the shared beliefs of the actors within the coalitions. The ACF and NPF allow these coalitions, beliefs, and narratives to be identified and compared. The comparison of valid narratives along with other contextual information, such as polling numbers, can be used to determine which narratives were effective.

While ACF has been applied to many different policy subsystems, this research is unique in that the ACF was applied to a referendum on a policy. The time frame of roughly eight months is far short of the ten year suggested time frame for the application of ACF. While this could arguably cause problems with this application of the framework, it also eliminated some of the criticisms of the framework. Major criticisms of ACF are that it is not useful in determining how and when policy change will occur and it does not help explain changes in the composition of a coalition (Mintrom & Vergari, 1996). These were not issues in this case study because this application of ACF was focused on a referendum campaign. A predetermined date, Election

Day, determined when policy change would occur or the status quo would be upheld. The outcome of the election had already been determined prior to the completion of this research, which makes the inability of the ACF to predict outcomes irrelevant. Furthermore, while the coalition composition was important because it affected the narratives and strategies chosen to win on Election Day, changes in coalition composition were less of a concern because of the short time frame and narrow goals of We Are Ohio and Building a Better Ohio. Stability would be an unlikely issue for these coalitions over the time frame of eight months. ACF was used in this application to better understand why We Are Ohio prevailed over Building a Better Ohio in 25 persuading voters in forming a narrative strategy that resonated with voters.

We Are Ohio was a coalition made up of labor unions, mostly members of the

Democratic Party, public sector workers, and progressive groups. The goal of We Are Ohio was to defeat Ohio SB5 and protect collective bargaining for public sector workers. Building a Better

Ohio was a coalition made up of business interests, mostly members of the Republican Party, and conservative groups. The goal of Building a Better Ohio was to uphold Ohio SB5 and keep the reforms to public sector collective bargaining.

This research was also focused on the narratives used by the advocacy coalitions surrounding the referendum on Ohio SB5. Narratives, including components such as forces of good, forces of evil, heroes, and villains, were analyzed through the scope of the ACF. The analysis of narratives of the coalitions was also used to help determine the political strategies of the winning and losing coalition. Narratives incorporate strategies by identifying winners and losers and framing who benefits from the policy (McBeth et al., 2007, p.90). As coalition strategies change, narratives also change. This research focused less on how winning and losing affects strategy and more on how each coalition used narratives to form their strategy in general because of the short time frame of this case study. The policy area in this case involved high levels of uncertainty, complexity, and polarization, making the policy area appropriate for the use of NPF. This research used a mixture of post-structural and structural approaches. While quantifying and using operational units is desirable in that it provides a basis for substantial, testable, and replicable findings; context and interpretation remain important. This research aimed to demonstrate how the ACF and NPF can be used in a policy area involving a referendum campaign to identify which coalition narratives were effective and explain why they were effective. 26

Newspaper Content Analysis

A content analysis was completed utilizing newspaper articles from the Cleveland Plain

Dealer, Columbus Dispatch, Toledo Blade, and Cincinnati Enquirer. The coding scheme used is presented as Appendix A. These four newspapers were chosen because they are the most widely circulated newspapers in Ohio and they provide a geographic representation of Ohio. Three of these newspapers were available through a NewsBank database of Ohio newspapers. The

Cincinnati Enquirer was available through the Cincinnati public library. Due to the manageable number of articles about SB5 present in the four newspapers and the short time frame of the case study, all articles that met the criteria were coded for this research. A total of 284 articles were coded. Articles eligible for coding included “Senate Bill 5” or “Issue 2” in the headline or lead paragraph and were printed between the dates of March 31, 2011 and November 8, 2011. The former is the day that Governor John Kasich signed SB5 into law and the latter is the day that

Ohioans vetoed SB5 through referendum. Articles including “Issue 2” were eligible for coding because the ballot issue for SB5 was Issue 2. A “no” vote on Issue 2 would repeal all of SB5 and a “yes” vote would allow SB5 to become law.

Basic aspects of articles selected for the sample were coded first. This included headlines, date published, which newspaper published the article, and whether the article was printed on the editorial page or in the news section. In addition to this information, articles were coded based on tone toward SB5. Articles favorable of SB5 were coded as positive, articles unfavorable to SB5 were coded as negative, and articles that were neutral or balanced between positive and negative were coded as neutral. For example, an editorial selling the positive outcomes Ohioans would likely experience if SB5 became law, such as lower taxes, was coded as positive. An article entirely focused on poll numbers that showed the bill headed for repeal 27 was coded as negative. An article about an event where two city officials debated the merits of

SB5 was coded as neutral.

Articles were coded under the assumption that narratives and coalitions have substantial consequences on public opinion and policy outcomes. While they do not exist in a vacuum, they influence the public agenda and public opinion that are especially important when studying referendums. Undoubtedly, factors outside of coalitions and narrative did influence the outcome of the referendum. However, narratives and coalitions play an important role in the success of campaigns and can have an effect on other important factors. For example, campaign contributions and spending are often seen as benchmarks for the success of a campaign. Money certainly plays a strong role in political campaigns. Forming strong coalitions and effective narratives allow for increased fund raising to some extent. Interests are reluctant to contribute to campaigns that lack coordination and narrative.

Several facets of the narratives surrounding SB5 were identified through coding. We Are

Ohio and Building a Better Ohio included heroes, villains, and victims within their narratives.

An example of a hero in the We Are Ohio narrative was the firefighter. We Are Ohio also included villains such as “greedy politicians” and victims like “middle class Ohioans.” Building a Better Ohio included villains like “powerful unions” and victims like “Ohio taxpayers.” These characters and their roles appeared sporadically in articles. Collectively they formed the narratives of each side of the SB5 campaign. Characters only explain a piece of the narrative.

Articles were also coded for the plots of We Are Ohio and Building a Better Ohio’s narratives.

The plot of each campaign was gathered by answering the following questions: What is the problem? Who is assigned blame? What is the solution? The Building a Better Ohio coalition viewed passing Issue 2 and keeping SB5 as a solution and the We Are Ohio coalition viewed 28 rejecting Issue 2 and SB5 as the solution. Along with characters and plot, narratives are formed through symbols. These symbols included the symbolic devices described by Stone including synechdoche, metaphor, and ambiguity (2002, p.162). While these were coded, they were not differentiated in the research. These devices were treated as if their narrative value was equal.

The coalition members of We Are Ohio and Building a Better Ohio were also identified through the coding process. Coalition members included interest groups, political parties, and elected representatives among others.

Belief systems of the actors play a prominent role in the ACF. Deep core beliefs, policy core beliefs, and secondary beliefs were also identified through the coding of newspaper articles.

Deep core beliefs were coded as broad, general beliefs such as freedom, liberty, and fairness.

Policy core beliefs were coded as general beliefs that represent normative commitments and causal perceptions. For example, the belief that unions lead to a strong middle class would be coded as a policy core belief. Secondary beliefs were coded as narrow and specific beliefs. The idea that public sector workers should pay a minimum percentage of the cost of their health care plans would be considered a secondary belief.

Beliefs like sacrifice, safety, honesty, and fairness were coded as core beliefs because they are broad beliefs that are unlikely to change. They are also ambiguous. The belief may mean completely different things to different people. Beliefs like “unions benefit everyone in the middle class” or “SB5 will save local governments money” were coded as policy core beliefs because they imply a cause and effect relationship. “Policy that empowers unions will result in a shared benefit for the middle class” or “the collective bargaining reforms in SB5 will result in lower costs for local governments and taxpayers” are cause and effect relationships that warrant these beliefs being categorized as policy core beliefs. Beliefs like “public employees should pay 29

at least 15% toward health care premiums” were coded as secondary beliefs because they are

very specific and more likely to change than deep core or policy core beliefs. Examples of the

beliefs coded in newspaper articles are presented in Table 1.

Table 1 Belief Levels and Examples Belief Level Example Core Beliefs Liberty, Fairness, Honesty Policy Core Beliefs SB5 will save local governments money Secondary Beliefs Public employees should pay at least 15% toward health plans

Interviews

In addition to coding major Ohio newspapers, several interviews were conducted with

members of the We Are Ohio and Building a Better Ohio coalitions. The list of interview

questions is presented in Appendix B. Included in these interviews was Sara Kilpatrick, the

Executive Director of the Ohio Conference of the American Association of University Professors

(AAUP), Larry Wicks, the Executive Director of the Ohio Education Association (OEA), Dennis

Murray, a former member of the Ohio State House of Representatives, and Jimmy Stewart, a

former member of the Ohio State Senate. Individual members of the coalitions were sought out

to give their perspective on the coordinated activity and the narratives of the interests involved in

the campaign. Each interviewee was asked the same series of questions to allow for an easy

comparison of perspectives. However, follow up questions varied depending on the responses of

the interviewee. Those interviewed were asked about the role they and their group played

throughout the campaign. They were also asked about the strategies their coalition enacted prior

to the signing of SB5 into law and how those strategies may have changed throughout the

campaign. Much of the previous research involving narratives focuses on winning and losing.

Although this research does not have a specific focus on the importance of the perception of 30 winning and losing, those interviewed were asked if and when they felt like they were winning or losing the narrative. Those interviewed were also asked about why they believe the voters of

Ohio chose to repeal SB5, what messages they believed were effective throughout the campaign, and who their opponents were throughout the campaign. Interviews allowed for an added qualitative component to this research that enabled the comparison of perspectives on the coalitions and narratives involved in the referendum on SB5.

Research Expectations

There were two major goals for this research. The first was to identify the effective narratives and explain why they were effective. This was addressed through the use of the ACF and NPF under the assumption that coalitions and narratives play an important role in the policy process. In this case policy change has occurred through a public referendum. The second goal of this research was to demonstrate a useful application of the ACF and NPF to a referendum campaign. A series of research expectations were tested to help accomplish these goals.

If coalition narratives successfully reached the public, then the narratives found in the newspaper articles coded should match those expressed in the interviews conducted. Each coalition worked to successfully sell their narrative to the public. While this research does not attempt to find a causal relationship between the narrative of the coalition and the narrative coded in newspaper articles, it does attempt to find a correlative relationship. The narrative in newspaper articles may have formed public opinion or the narrative shared by the general public may have formed the narrative reflected in newspaper articles. In this case, a causal relationship between the newspaper articles and the public is not important. We Are Ohio and Building a

Better Ohio had other avenues for building a narrative, such as television ads, radio ads, and volunteer get-out-the-vote efforts. However, it would be expected that the members of the 31 coalition would express the same narratives and beliefs that were found in newspaper articles.

This would provide evidence that coordinated coalition activity formed the narratives accepted by the public.

Research Question: Which narratives were effective?

Research Expectation 1: Narratives and beliefs coded in newspaper articles should coincide with the narratives and beliefs found in the responses of coalition members interviewed.

The newspapers selected for coding represent Ohio geographically. Certain narratives may have been more effective in parts of the state than in others. It is expected that the effective narratives of the region would be reflected in the newspaper articles coded. Articles from a major newspaper in an area where SB5 was defeated soundly should generally reflect an anti-

SB5 narrative and tone. The opposite should also be true. Articles from major newspapers in areas that had higher approval of SB5 should generally reflect a pro-SB5 narrative and tone. If these expectations are confirmed, it would provide evidence that accepted narratives coincided with voter behavior.

Voters in Lucas County, where the Toledo Blade is located, voted overwhelmingly against SB5. Results were similar in Cuyahoga County, the home of the Cleveland Plain Dealer.

The results were different in the middle and southern regions of the state. Voters in Hamilton

County, where the Cincinnati Enquirer is located, voted against the bill by a much slimmer margin than the northern region of the state (“State Impact Ohio,” n.d.). With margins of defeat far greater in the Cleveland and Toledo area than in the Cincinnati area, it would be expected that the articles from the Cleveland Plain Dealer and Toledo Blade would be generally more negative 32 toward SB5 than the articles from the Cincinnati Enquirer. Conversely, it would be expected that articles from the Cincinnati Enquirer would be generally more positive toward SB5 than the articles from the Toledo Blade and Cleveland Plain Dealer.

Voters in Franklin County, where the Columbus Dispatch is located, rejected SB5 by a larger margin than voters in Hamilton County but by a lesser margin than voters in Cuyahoga

County and Lucas County (“State Impact Ohio,” n.d.). The vote in Franklin County falls between two extremes. As a result, it would be expected that articles from the Columbus

Dispatch would be generally more neutral than articles from the Cleveland Plain Dealer,

Cincinnati Enquirer, and Toledo Blade.

Research Question: How were narratives from different geographic locations in Ohio related to voting outcomes?

Research Expectation 2: A higher percentage of articles from the Cleveland Plain Dealer and

Toledo Blade had a negative tone toward Senate Bill 5 than articles from the Cincinnati

Enquirer.

Research Expectation 3: A higher percentage of articles from the Cincinnati Enquirer had a positive tone toward Senate Bill 5 than articles from the Cleveland Plain Dealer and Toledo

Blade.

Research Expectation 4: A higher percentage of articles from the Columbus Dispatch had a neutral tone toward Senate Bill 5 than articles from the Cleveland Plain Dealer, Toledo Blade, and Cincinnati Enquirer. 33

Throughout the campaign, public safety employees played an important symbolic role.

We Are Ohio, the coalition in opposition of SB5, and Building a Better Ohio, the coalition in favor of SB5, released commercials featuring firefighters. While unions representing firefighters were members of the coalition in opposition to SB5, Building a Better Ohio countered anti-SB5 ads featuring firefighters with an ad featuring Toledo Mayor Mike Bell, a former firefighter who endorsed the measure (Provance, 2011). On the surface, both coalitions seemed to recognize the importance of public safety employees throughout the campaign. Also, a similar measure was passed in Wisconsin and signed into law by Governor Scott Walker that excluded firefighters and police forces from many of the changes made to collective bargaining rights (Neaumann,

2011). This law did not suffer the fate of Ohio SB5 and is still law today. While there are other possible explanations for the success of the Wisconsin law and the failure of the Ohio law, it is reasonable to believe that the narratives were affected by the role of public safety employees.

The narrative in Ohio was driven more by public safety employees than in Wisconsin because they were not excluded from the provisions in the law. The inclusion of public safety employees, especially firefighters, in SB5 allowed We Are Ohio to use firefighters as a driving symbol and hero in the anti-SB5 narrative.

Research Question: What were the effective symbols used throughout the campaign?

Research Expectation 5: Firefighters were mentioned in a higher percentage of articles than other members of the We Are Ohio coalition.

Shanahan, Jones, and McBeth hypothesized that when public opinion is congruent with the preferred policy outcome of a coalition, the coalition will choose narratives that attempt to contain the membership of the coalition. Conversely, they hypothesized that when public opinion shocks are in-congruent with the desired policy outcome of a coalition, the coalition will seek a narrative that attempts to expand coalition membership. Shanahan, Jones, and McBeth use the nuclear reactor incident at Three Mile Island as an example of a public opinion shock because support for nuclear energy declined rapidly following the incident (2011, p.551). These hypotheses were used as a basis for one of the research expectations in this research.

Furthermore, this concept of expansion and containment serves as the basis for the contribution this research lends to NPF. The usual expectations of containment and expansion should not be expected to apply to a referendum. In the case of a referendum, both sides wish to expand their coalition. Newspaper articles and interviews should reflect that the narratives of both sides sought to expand the coalition in order to win the policy with voters.

Research Question: What were the narrative strategies formed?

Research Expectation 6: We Are Ohio and Building a Better Ohio formed narratives that sought to expand their coalitions.

By testing these research expectations, this research aimed to explain how advocacy coalitions and narratives played a pivotal role in the defeat of Ohio SB5. With the use of ACF and NPF the understanding of political strategies and policy change through referendum can be expanded. Through qualitative testing and interpretation of these research expectations, it can be determined more clearly which narratives were effective and why they were effective. 35

CHAPTER IV. DATA AND ANALYSIS

Coalitions

Two coalitions were identified in the case of Ohio Senate Bill 5 (SB5). We Are Ohio was in favor of repealing SB5 and Building a Better Ohio was in favor of passing SB5 into law.

The We Are Ohio coalition consisted of mostly labor unions and Democratic Party allies. The

Building a Better Ohio coalition consisted mostly of business interests and Republican Party allies. Allies in each group coordinated to achieve the coalition’s policy goal. Evidence of coordination in We Are Ohio was much clearer than in Building a Better Ohio.

We Are Ohio included private sector and public sector labor groups. There were two committees: the steering committee and the executive committee. The executive committee was more exclusive than the steering committee. There was also a stakeholders' group that consisted of activist groups who may not have contributed much money but were active in the campaign.

Major unions that were on the executive committee included the Service Employees

International Union (SEIU), the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial

Organizations (AFL-CIO), the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees

(AFSCME), the Ohio Association of Public School Employees (OAPSE), the Ohio Education

Association (OEA), the Ohio Federation of Teachers (OFT), and the United Food and

Commercial Workers (UFCW). The steering committee consisted of all of these groups, building trade interests, electrical worker interests, in addition to the American Association of

University Professors (AAUP) and the Communications Workers of America (CWA). The steering committee consisted of any group that contributed $200,000 or more to We Are Ohio and the executive committee included any group that contributed a million dollars or more (S.

Kilpatrick, personal communication, September 20, 2012). 36

The executive and steering committees held the most power in the We Are Ohio coalition. Executive Director at the AAUP, Sara Kilpatrick described these committees as being comprised of those “who had the most skin in the game” (personal communication, September

20, 2012). While members of the executive committee contributed significantly more than members of the steering committee, Kilpatrick stated that she did not believe that there were any decisions made that were not discussed at both committees. Power was described as relatively equal, but had there been a major conflict on the committees, the OEA and SEIU would have the most influence on the direction of the group because they contributed the most money (S.

Kilpatrick, personal communication, September 20, 2012). Executive Director of the OEA and chair of the executive committee of We Are Ohio, Larry Wicks stated, “Essential strategies [for] moving forward and the decisions about all the logistics that had to take place were made by the executive committee” (personal communication, October 11, 2012). While decisions were inclusive of the many groups involved, no decisions were made without the approval from the executive committee of We Are Ohio.

Building a Better Ohio consisted of business interests and Republican Party allies, but was more difficult to define than We Are Ohio. Support for the group came from the Ohio

Chamber of Commerce, the National Federation of Independent Business, the Republican

Governors Association, along with conservative groups such as the Tea Party and the National

Right-to-Work Foundation. Details concerning decision making within the group were unable to be obtained. When asked about the opposition, Kilpatrick said that Building a Better Ohio received the most support from the Republican Party and Ohio Chamber of Commerce.

Kilpatrick added that there was not a lot of investment in Building a Better Ohio because “people from the outside saw very early on that it was probably going to be a losing cause” (personal 37 communication, September 20, 2012).

Ohio State Senator Jimmy Stewart voted in favor of SB5 months prior to accepting a job at the Ohio Gas Association. When asked about his communication with Building a Better Ohio he could not confidently identify anyone he communicated with from the organization. Stewart did provide some names of who he thought was involved with Building a Better Ohio (personal communication, March 4, 2013). Former Ohio State Representative Dennis Murray voted against SB5 prior to the end of his term and had this to say about the opposition, “Building a

Better Ohio wasn't a coalition of people. It was a coalition of money and bank accounts”

(personal communication, January 31, 2013). A list of identified coalition members is presented in Table 2.

Table 2 Coalition Members

We Are Ohio Building a Better Ohio AAUP AK Steel AFL-CIO Alliance for America's Future AFSCME Alt Air Learning Catholics United Americans for Prosperity Cincinnati Labor Council Association of Building Contractors Cleveland Teachers Union Block Communities Communications Workers of America Buckeye Association of School Administrators Democratic Governors Association Citizens United East Side Cleveland Church Discount Drugmart Innovation Ohio Eaton Corp. International Association of Firefighters Governor John Kasich International Brotherhood of Teamsters Greater Cleveland Partnership National Labor Table Jones Day NEA Make Ohio Great OAPSE Motorists Mutual Insurance Occupy Cincinnati National Federation of Independent Business Occupy Toledo National Right-to-Work Foundation OEA Officials of BGSU Ohio Association of Professional Firefighters Ohio Auto Dealership Association Ohio Civil Service Employees Association Ohio Business Round Table Ohio Democratic Party Ohio Chamber of Commerce Ohio Fraternal Order of Police Ohio Farm Bureau Federation Ohio Legislative Black Caucus Ohio Liberty Council Plumbers and Pipe Fitters Local 189 Ohio Manufacturers Association Plumbers, Steamfitters, Service Mechanics Ohio Republican Party Local 50 Owens Corning Police Patrolman's Association Partnership for Ohio's Future Progress Ohio Procter and Gamble Regional Council of Carpenters Restoring America Service Employees International Union Strategy Group for America Sylvania Education Association Team Wendy Teamsters Local 20 Toledo Area Small Business Association Toledo Federation of Teachers Toledo Firefighters Local 92 Union Grove Baptist Church We Believe Ohio

Coalition Narratives

Coalition narratives were obtained in part through the coding of newspaper articles from the Cleveland Plain Dealer, Cincinnati Enquirer, Toledo Blade, and the Columbus Dispatch.

Narratives were also identified from transcripts of interviews with key actors involved in each coalition. We Are Ohio and Building a Better Ohio used heroes, villains, and victims to aid in conveying their coalition policy narrative. Some of the same characters were portrayed in both coalitions. Each side attempted to paint the middle class as the victim if their policy goals were not met. However, We Are Ohio focused much more on the middle class than did Building a

Better Ohio. For example, one supporter of We Are Ohio said that the defeat of SB5 was needed to let union workers “stay in the middle class,” adding that SB5 would destroy the middle class

(Vardon, 2011, p.1A). Other victims in the We Are Ohio narrative included the working class, organized labor, public sector workers, African Americans, and students.

Taxpayers were the primary victim in the Building a Better Ohio narrative. SB5, if upheld, would increase the burden on taxpayers struggling to pay the taxes necessary to provide public services. A common argument that portrayed the taxpayers as the victims was that “too much government spending was costing the taxpayers too much money” (Rowland & Stuckey,

2011, p.1A). Other groups portrayed as victims included public schools, state and local governments, working families, and private sector workers. A list of identified coalition characters is presented in Table 3.

Table 3 Coalition Characters

We Are Ohio Building a Better Ohio

Villains: Extreme Politicians, Governor Kasich, Villains: Union Bosses, Unions, Both Political Big Corporations, Big Business, Republican Parties Lawmakers, Right Wingers, Wall Street Victims: Middle Class, Taxpayers, Hard Victims: Middle Class, Working Class, Working Families, Public Schools, Local Organized Labor, Public Sector Workers, Governments, Private Sector Workers, Voters Workers, Students, Working Families Heroes: Governor Kasich Heroes: Firefighters, Police, Public Workers

There were numerous villains in each coalition narrative. The villains in the We Are

Ohio narrative included extreme politicians, Governor John Kasich, corporations, Republican lawmakers, right-wingers, and Wall Street. Extreme politicians were the most dominant villains in the narrative. Kilpatrick of the AAUP stated that the wider narrative was that “these extreme politicians were out of control” (personal communication, September 20, 2012). Former

Democratic State Representative Murray did not appreciate the coalition's anti-politician narrative. Murray stated, “I did not appreciate that part of their argument. I don't think it does society any good. We have to have political figures and demonizing the group with a broad brush just undermines public confidence in the system, and that doesn't do us any good in the end” (personal communication, January 31, 2013).

Governor Kasich made a particularly effective villain for We Are Ohio. He could be portrayed as an extreme politician and he grew unpopular among Ohioans very early in his term.

In May of 2011, Quinnipiac released a poll showing that Governor Kasich had an approval rating of 38% (“Ohio (OH) Poll,” May 18, 2011). This was early in the campaign. Some of this low 41 approval rating may have been an effect of initial anger from Ohioans over the signing of SB5 into law in March. We Are Ohio recognized the low popularity of the Governor and used it to their advantage. By late October of 2011, Governor Kasich's approval rating had slipped to 36%

(“Ohio (OH) Poll,” October 25, 2011). Kasich's approval rating never recovered during the campaign, making him a wise choice for a villain.

The primary villains in the Building a Better Ohio narrative were union leaders and public sector unions in general. They were portrayed as dishonest. Senator Stewart said that on many occasions he had to tell constituents, “What you're hearing from your union boss is not exactly the truth” (personal communication, March 4, 2013). Building a Better Ohio reinforced this narrative in the newspapers making statements that people should not accept “the misinformation that's being spread by union bosses and their political allies” (Provance, 2011, p.A3).

The heroes of We Are Ohio were firefighter and police forces. SB5 was framed as an attack on the very people who keep the public safe, the public's heroes. Firefighters were mentioned in 40.5% and police were mentioned in 33.5% of the newspaper articles coded.

Public safety employees were a major focus of the campaign. The hero of the Building a Better

Ohio story was Governor John Kasich. As a spokesman for SB5, Governor Kasich held events throughout the campaign and argued in favor of the reforms to put Ohio back on the right track.

Governor Kasich was mentioned in 54.9% of the articles coded.

Policy narratives consist of plots that define a problem, assign blame, and propose a solution. We Are Ohio defined SB5 as the problem. Specifically, the We Are Ohio narrative claimed that SB5 was an overreach by Governor Kasich and the Republican Party. It was a bill meant to destroy organized labor that would place the public and public safety employees in 42 danger. We Are Ohio defined SB5 as unfair and unsafe. Larry Wicks of the OEA said that the basic message We Are Ohio brought to the voters was that SB5 was “unfair, unsafe, and hurts us all” (personal communication, October 11, 2012). Kilpatrick of the AAUP repeated the same sentiment and the terms were also found in many newspaper articles. The unsafe claim stems from a provision in the bill that made it illegal for firefighters to negotiate staffing levels. The fear was that the law would prevent labor unions from negotiating for enough on duty firefighters to do the job, placing the firefighters and public at risk (Guillen, 2011, p.B1).

Representative Murray disagreed with the messaging of the coalition stating that the bill made firefighters potentially less safe, but would not have made the general public less safe. Murray did however agree with that the bill was an overreach and unfair (personal communication,

January 31, 2013).

Building a Better Ohio defined the problem as a budget issue along with imbalance in the current collective bargaining system. The coalition argued that there was too much government spending and unsustainable labor costs. Local governments were strained and the taxpayers could no longer afford the cost of generous labor union contracts. A spokesman for the campaign pointed to “a heavier tax burden as local communities struggle to balance their budgets” as the problem (Suddes, 2011, p.G1). Senator Stewart also framed the issues as a budget issue. Stewart stated that SB5 aimed to give local governments and school districts “the tools they need to be able to reign in their spending growth” (personal communication, March 4,

2013). This was a dominant theme in the major Ohio newspapers throughout the campaign.

One obstacle Building a Better Ohio faced was that the public never bought into their main narrative that SB5 was necessary to balance state and local budgets. In a poll conducted in

May by Quinnipiac University, only six weeks after Governor Kasich signed the bill into law, 43

52% of respondents said they did not believe SB5 was needed to balance the Ohio budget and only 38% said it was necessary to balance the budget (Naymik, 2011, p.B1). In October

Quinnipiac University released another poll showing that 57% of voters believed SB5 was not needed to balance the budget and 34% believed it was needed (“Ohio (OH) Poll,” October 25,

2011). At no point did the public accept the primary narrative of the Building a Better Ohio coalition. It also appears that as time elapsed, the anti-SB5 narrative refuting the constrained budget argument became more accepted by the public.

Blame was assigned by each coalition to the villains of their narrative stories. We Are

Ohio assigned blame to Governor Kasich and politicians and Building a Better Ohio assigned blame to organized labor in the public sector. The solutions proposed in the case of SB5 were simple. We Are Ohio argued that the solution to the problem was to repeal SB5 through a 'no' vote on ballot Issue 2 and Building a Better Ohio argued that the solution was to allow SB5 to become law by voting 'yes' on Issue 2.

The We Are Ohio narrative was a story of decline. In the beginning things were good.

Something bad happened and things have gotten bad. Now something needs to be done to return to the days of good. We Are Ohio argued that things were good for working families in Ohio until greedy politicians overreached and created policy that hurt the middle class. One woman criticized the politicians responsible for SB5 stating that they “don't care about the middle class”

(Siegel, 2011, p.1B). We Are Ohio also argued that that the politicians responsible for SB5 were dishonest and untrustworthy. In an editorial, one person stated that the supporters of SB5 should not “try to change the rules and cheat these people (public workers) now because the budget doesn't work out” (Webster, 2011, p.10A). Kilpatrick of the AAUP stated that “part of the wider narrative was that there [were] these extreme politicians that were out control” (personal 44 communication, September 20, 2012). In the beginning of the We Are Ohio narrative things were good, but in the middle of the narrative extreme politicians passed legislation that would hurt the middle class. In the We Are Ohio narrative, extreme politicians were assigned the blame for the decline.

The problem in the case of SB5, according to the We Are Ohio narrative, was that the law was not about balancing budgets, but about attacking political enemies. We Are Ohio defined

SB5 as a political attack on unions. One article described opponents of SB5, We Are Ohio supporters, as people who believed workers were under attack (Vardon, 2011, p.1A). We Are

Ohio also connected public sector unions with the middle class by claiming that the entire middle class was under attack. The coalition painted the law as too extreme, like the politicians who introduced it. One article stated that Democrats in the legislature chose not to offer amendments because the bill was “too extreme to be fixed” (Siegel, 2011, p.1A). We Are Ohio also claimed that SB5 was unsafe. Firefighters played an important role in this part of the narrative. The claim was that by taking the rights of Firefighters to collectively bargain for working conditions and staffing levels SB5 would make the public and firefighters less safe. This claim was not taken lightly. One person opposed to SB5 stated that “Fewer firefighters can mean the difference between life or death” (Siegel, 2011, p.1B). Wicks of the OEA agreed that SB5 was unsafe. He stated that the We Are Ohio message to voters was that SB5 was “unfair, unsafe, and hurts us all” (personal communication, October 11, 2012). The We Are Ohio narrative defined the problem using these arguments.

In the conclusion of a narrative there is a proposed solution. In the case of SB5, the proposed solutions were very clear. One side wanted to keep the law and the other wanted to repeal it. We Are Ohio offered the solution of repealing the law. In their narrative, repeal would 45 return the state to the good days. It would prevent extreme actions by politicians from hurting the middle class and union workers. The repeal would protect everyone from the unsafe and extreme law.

The Building a Better Ohio narrative was also a story of decline. In the beginning things were good, but then public sector labor unions became greedy and took advantage of the taxpayers. Now something needs to be done to be done to restore balance and protect the taxpayers. In this story of decline, Building a Better Ohio placed the blame on unions. Labor union members and their representatives were accused of “ripping off the working taxpayers and residents of Ohio for their personal benefit” (Keller, 2011, p.4G). Another article claimed that unions would benefit from the repeal of SB5 and “Ohioans will pay higher taxes for every contract negotiated with public employee and teachers unions” (Alexander, 2011, 10A). State

Senator Jimmy Stewart stated that SB5 was not as damaging as union leaders made their union members believe and that there was a lot of misinformation spread by union leaders (personal communication, March 4, 2013). Much like We Are Ohio did when it came to politicians,

Building a Better Ohio made union leaders appear untrustworthy. Public sector unions were accused of demanding excessive wages and benefits (Wade, 2011, p.12A). In the Building a

Better Ohio narrative, unions were awarded the blame.

According to the Building a Better Ohio narrative, the problem was excessive government spending and unbalanced state and local budgets. The Building a Better Ohio narrative argued that SB5 was a law that was necessary given poor economic conditions. In one article it was argued that SB5 offered “common sense changes” that would address “out of control government spending” (Wade, 2011, p.12A). Building a Better Ohio claimed that

“public unions push for raises and benefits that [cities] cannot afford” (Siegel, 2011, p.4A). 46

Building a Better Ohio also argued that the status quo prior to SB5 gave local governments’ too little power and public unions too much power (“Necessary Change,” 2011, p.4G). Building a

Better Ohio formed an economic based narrative that argued that union power was too great to properly address state and local budgetary issues without reforms. Their narrative also focused on a balance of power problem.

The proposed solution of the Building a Better Ohio narrative was to uphold SB5.

Building a Better Ohio argued that SB5 would return the states to balanced budgets and good economic times. They argued that SB5 included necessary reforms that would help local communities and restore balance.

The We Are Ohio and Building a Better Ohio narratives were both what Stone considered stories of decline (2002, p.138). These stories of decline also line up well with the rescue narrative described by George Lakoff. The characters are like those identified in the NPF. They include heroes, villains, and victims. In the rescue narrative there is also the role of the helper.

The heroes are always good. The villains are always evil. In the end, the hero rescues the victim and the villain is punished. In a variation of the rescue narrative, the hero rescues himself. This variation is referred to as the self-defense narrative (Lackoff, 2008, p.24).

The We Are Ohio narrative fits the rescue narrative well. Public sector workers, firefighters and police especially, are the heroes. The heroes come to the rescue to save the middle class from the damage SB5 would inflict. The extreme politicians would be punished by losing favor among the public and seeing a key policy of theirs defeated. This narrative could also be a self-defense narrative. While the middle class was often identified as the victim, public sector workers were also under attack according to the We Are Ohio narrative. Public sector workers collaborated to defeat SB5 and save themselves. The We Are Ohio narrative was a 47 story of decline that could be considered a rescue narrative and a self-defense narrative.

The Building a Better Ohio narrative also fit the rescue narrative. In the Building a Better

Ohio narrative Governor Kasich and the Republican representatives in the Ohio Assembly were the heroes. The union leaders and union members were the villains. The taxpayers of Ohio were the victims. The heroes rescued Ohio from unsustainable labor costs and higher taxes by passing

SB5. Public sector unions would be punished by losing power in collective bargaining. The taxpayers would be saved from an unbearable tax burden. The Building a Better Ohio narrative was a story of decline and a rescue narrative.

Narratives are formed based on deep core beliefs, policy core beliefs, and secondary beliefs. Some deep core beliefs were identified in both coalition narratives. We Are Ohio used the deep core beliefs of liberty, fairness, honesty, compromise, and safety. They argued that their desired policy outcome advanced these deep core beliefs. We Are Ohio used fairness to describe the collective bargaining system prior to SB5 and focused on portraying SB5 as a simply unfair law. Wicks of the OEA stated that one of the main messages of We Are Ohio was that SB5 was unfair (personal communication, October 11, 2012). Fairness was also a theme found in coding newspaper articles. It was argued that SB5 was unfair to public sector workers, especially firefighter and police forces.

Building a Better Ohio also used deep core beliefs such as liberty, fairness, honesty, compromise, and safety. They used these deep core beliefs differently from We Are Ohio because they used them to forward an argument in favor of SB5. Fairness was a common deep core belief used by the Building a Better Ohio coalition. They argued that the bill was based on

“common sense and fairness” to the taxpayers who could no longer afford the increasing price of government services (Boyd-Barrett, 2011, p.B1). 48

Competing policy core beliefs and secondary beliefs were identified through the coding of newspaper articles and interviews. We Are Ohio argued that SB5 would not fix the budget and would possibly lead to larger class sizes in schools, too few firefighters, and the destruction of public sector unions. These were the dominant cause and effect policy arguments of the We

Are Ohio coalition. The secondary beliefs identified were more specific. We Are Ohio proposed a narrative that opposed the banning of strikes and favored the negotiation of healthcare benefits.

Building a Better Ohio argued that SB5 would save local governments money, save jobs, and help taxpayers in troubled economic times. These were the cause and effect policy arguments made by the Building a Better Ohio coalition. Senator Stewart described the strategy of including firefighters and police in the bill as politically risky, but necessary to create a bill that would be effective in reducing costs. He stated that police and fire protection were a “big chunk of any city's budget” and including them in the bill would “save a lot of money on the local level” (J.Stewart, personal communication, March 4, 2013). The secondary beliefs of

Building a Better Ohio also competed with those of We Are Ohio. Building a Better Ohio used specific components of SB5 to make an argument in favor of the bill. For example, they highlighted popular provisions such as the requirement that workers pay a minimum of 15% of their health insurance premiums and 10% of their pensions (Troy, 2011, p.A1). A demonstration of the congruence between policy narratives identified in newspaper articles and key actor interviews is presented in Table 4 and Table 5.

Table 4 We Are Ohio Narratives

Newspaper Articles Interviews What is the problem? -SB5 is an overreach/too “Senate Bill 5 was ultimately extreme defeated because it went too far -SB5 is unfair to workers and the public saw that...it was -SB5 destroys collective unfair.” -Dennis Murray bargaining -SB5 puts public at risk “Unions have done an awful lot -SB5 hurts middle class for non-union workers...a lot of things that have benefited everyone else.” -Dennis Murray Who is to blame? -Politicians “They [Republican lawmakers] -Republican Lawmakers just kept putting everything -Governor Kasich they could on top of the legislation making it worse and worse and worse.” -Dennis Murray What is the solution? -Defeat SB5 Defeat SB5

Table 5 Building a Better Ohio Narratives

Newspaper Articles Interviews What is the problem? -Unsustainable labor costs “We're trying to give the local -State and local communities districts, the cities, the are strained townships, the county -Elected officials have too little governments and the school control over budgets districts the tools to be able to -Unions have excessive rein in their spending growth.” demands -Jimmy Stewart Who is to blame? -The current system “[SB5]was not nearly as -Unions damaging as the labor union bosses played it up to be.” - Jimmy Stewart What is the solution? -Uphold SB5 Uphold SB5

The policy narratives and beliefs expressed in interviews corresponded with those identified through the coding of newspaper articles. This was determined by coding transcripts of the interviews and matching responses in the interviews with the narratives, symbols, and beliefs found in the newspaper articles. Each coalition was effective in conveying these narratives and beliefs to the public. Although the public received narratives from both coalitions, they did not accept that SB5 was needed to balance local government budgets. The relationship between the narratives and beliefs identified in newspaper articles and those described by coalition members confirms the first research expectation.

Narratives and Voting Outcomes

Voters in Lucas County, where the Toledo Blade is located, voted against SB5 by a margin of approximately 34 points. Also, none of the neighboring counties voted in favor of

SB5. There were similar results in the Cleveland area. Voters in Cuyahoga County, where the

Cleveland Plain Dealer is located, voted against SB5 by a margin of approximately 38 points with none of the neighboring counties voting in favor of the bill. The results were slightly different in the middle of the state and the southern region of the state. Voters in Franklin

County, where the Columbus Dispatch is located, voted against SB5 by a margin of approximately 28 points. However, neighboring Delaware County was one of only six counties in Ohio to vote in favor of the bill. Voters in Hamilton County, where the Cincinnati Enquirer is located, voted against SB5 by a margin of approximately 16 points. Warren County, which neighbors Hamilton County, was one of the six counties that voted in favor of the bill (“State

Impact Ohio”). Research expectations stated that areas where SB5 was defeated by a larger margin would have more negative newspaper coverage than areas where SB5 was defeated by a smaller margin. The voting outcomes for SB5 by County are presented in Table 6. 51

Table 6 Senate Bill 5 Vote

Keep Repeal Cuyahoga County 31.08% 68.92% Delaware County 53.62% 46.38% Franklin County 36.09% 63.91% Hamilton County 41.80% 58.20% Lucas County 32.64% 67.36% Warren County 51.60% 48.40% Ohio 38.41% 61.59%

While this research argues that policy narratives played an important role in case of SB5, party identification was also a factor in the referendum outcome. When compared to the voter registration data from 2008, voter registration appears to be related with vote on SB5. Data from

2008 was chosen because it was the closest major election year prior to the referendum on SB5 in 2011. Generally, members of the Democratic Party support labor unions and members of the

Republican Party do not support labor unions. In Cuyahoga County, where SB5 was overwhelmingly defeated, 75% of registered voters that choose to declare a party affiliation were

Democrats. Similar numbers were found in Lucas County, where 77% of registered voters that chose to declare a party affiliation were Democrats. The Republican Party held a small advantage in voter registration in Delaware County and Warren County, two counties that voted to uphold SB5. In the entire state of Ohio as of 2008, the Democratic Party held a 62% to 38% voter registration advantage over the Republican Party. Interestingly, these numbers are virtually identical to the vote to repeal SB5. It is important to note that as of 2008, approximately 55% of registered voters in Ohio chose not to declare any party affiliation (“Blue Ohio,” n.d.). The large number of unaffiliated voters in Ohio is one reason why party identification alone should not be 52 used to explain the outcome of the vote on SB5. Also, Ohio is known as a swing state, but the vote on SB5 was not close. This means that the issue must have cut across party lines and other factors, such as narratives, may have had an impact on vote choice.

Voter turnout is just as important as party identification. A party identification advantage means little if the registered voters do not cast ballots. In 2010, there was low turnout among

Democrats. The ten counties that saw the largest decline from the 2006 to 2010 elections accounted for 57% of Democrats in the state (Hallet & Niquette, 2010, p.1A). The result was a

Republican sweep in the state. Overall turnout was slightly lower in 2011 than it was in 2010.

However, a direct comparison is unfair because 2010 was an election year for Governor of Ohio.

The turnout in 2011 was up about 2.5% from turnout in 2009, which offers a more appropriate comparison because both were election years without statewide or national races. Of the six counties highlighted in this research, all of them showed increases in voter turnout from 2009 to

2011. Voter turnout was even up in Delaware and Warren counties which voted in favor of SB5

(“Election Results,” n.d.). The slight rise in turnout likely helped the We Are Ohio campaign, but certainly would not explain the wide margin in which SB5 was defeated. A rise in turnout of

2.5% from 2009 to 2011 would not explain why a state known as a swing state, with a recent history of electing Republicans at the state level, would vote overwhelmingly with the interests of organized labor. The slight increase in turnout may have been the result of a spending advantage that allowed We Are Ohio to hire staff and buy advertisement space on television and radio. This may have motivated supporters to go to the polls.

A closer look at turnout in the six counties that were focused on in this research does not provide a clear picture, which suggests that voter turnout would not be particularly helpful in explaining the outcome of the vote on SB5. All of the six counties analyzed in this research 53 showed a decrease in turnout from 2010 to 2011, but as previously stated, the comparison is not fair. Voter turnout increased in the six counties from 2009 to 2011, including two counties that voted to uphold SB5. Voter turnout in each county, as well as statewide turnout, is presented in

Table 7.

Table 7 Voter Turnout (%)

2009 2010 2011 Cuyahoga County 39.5 44.16 43.38 Delaware County 42.12 58.07 54.37 Franklin County 31.4 47.88 44.84 Hamilton County 42.32 51.25 46.74 Lucas County 37.77 46.37 43.8 Warren County 42.15 60.25 51.86 Ohio 44.64 49.22 47.06

Campaign contributions and spending played a role in the outcome of the vote. Early speculation led many involved in the campaign to believe that Building a Better Ohio would raise and spend more money trying to uphold SB5 than We Are Ohio would trying to defeat it.

Kilpatrick of the AAUP noted that the large sum of outside investment in support of collective bargaining restrictions in Ohio led people to believe that Building a Better Ohio would have a substantial amount of support. This was not the case. By November We Are Ohio had raised about 30 million dollars and Building a Better Ohio had raised about 10 million. Kilpatrick explained the lack of contributions to Building a Better Ohio stating, “I think people from the outside saw very early that [the Building a Better Ohio campaign] was probably going to be a losing cause.” She alluded to how unique this case was stating, “It's not typical that labor vastly 54 outspends big business on issues” (S.Kilpatrick, personal communication, September 20, 2012).

According to campaign finance reports filed before, during, and after the election, We Are Ohio spent $29,131,733.85 (“Campaign Finance: We Are Ohio,” n.d.). Building a Better Ohio spent

$10,929,026.96 (“Campaign Finance: Building a Better Ohio,” n.d.).

We Are Ohio received far more in contributions than Building a Better Ohio. These contributions gave We Are Ohio the ability to flood the airwaves with television and radio advertisements. It gave them the ability to hire more staff and gave them a significant edge over their competition. The advantage in contributions and spending likely had an impact on the outcome of the election.

While strong Democratic Party identification, slightly higher turnout for an off year election, and a large campaign contribution advantage for We Are Ohio likely made the difference between winning and losing, policy narratives were an important factor in the size of the victory for We Are Ohio. The party identification advantage and turnout increase were not large enough to explain the Election Day vote margin of greater than 20 points. A large contribution advantage helped We Are Ohio flood the airwaves with their narrative and accomplish what labor activists in neighboring states were unable to accomplish. Their narrative may have been effective in maintaining enough support among Ohioans to prevent Building a

Better Ohio from raising the money they needed to effectively reach the people with their narrative. While Building a Better Ohio was searching for donors, We Are Ohio was already effectively painting firefighters and police as heroes under attack by extreme politicians. It was hard for Building a Better Ohio to raise money for a campaign that was losing and was seen as anti-firefighter and policemen.

Information pertaining to newspaper tone is presented in Table 8. Several research 55 expectations dealt with newspaper tone. In research expectation 2, it was stated that a higher percentage of articles from the Cleveland Plain Dealer and Toledo Blade would have a negative tone toward SB5 than the articles from the Cincinnati Enquirer. The tone of the articles from the

Cleveland Plain Dealer and Toledo Blade were in fact more negative than the articles from the

Cincinnati Enquirer. In addition to this, a higher percentage of articles from the Columbus

Dispatch were also more negative than those from the Cincinnati Enquirer. Research expectation

2 was confirmed. Research expectation 3 stated that a higher percentage of articles from the

Cincinnati Enquirer would have a positive tone toward SB5 than in the Cleveland Plain Dealer and Toledo Blade. This expectation was not met. The Cincinnati Enquirer coverage was no more positive toward SB5 than the coverage in the Cleveland Plain Dealer and Toledo Blade. It is important to note that, while all papers had a majority of articles that were neutral, the

Cincinnati Enquirer had a higher percentage of neutral articles than the Cleveland Plain Dealer and the Toledo Blade. This indicates a stronger attempt to remain unbiased. The Cleveland

Plain Dealer and Toledo Blade had more articles with a negative tone toward SB5, which indicates that the newspaper coverage reflected the local sentiment and local voting results.

Research expectation 4 stated that a higher percentage of articles from the Columbus

Dispatch would be neutral in tone than the other three newspapers. This was not the case. In fact, the Columbus Dispatch had the lowest percentage of neutral newspaper articles among all four newspapers. Analysis of newspaper tone could not confirm research expectation 4. The

Columbus Dispatch had the highest percentage of positive articles among all four newspapers.

This may have been because the paper is located in the capital of Ohio and would be expected to cover the actions of Governor Kasich, the main proponent of SB5, more often than the newspapers located in other areas of the state. 56

Table 8 Newspaper Tone

Positive Negative Neutral Total Articles Cleveland Plain 14.3% 33.3% 52.4% 42 Dealer Cincinnati 9.7% 16.1% 74.2% 31 Enquirer Columbus 28.9% 25.4% 45.8% 142 Dispatch Toledo Blade 8.7% 21.7% 69.6% 69

Coalition Symbols

Symbols were used by We Are Ohio and Building a Better Ohio to advance each coalition's policy narratives. Symbols identified in newspaper articles that advanced the We Are

Ohio narrative included characterizing SB5 as an attack on the middle class, unions, collective bargaining, workers, and worker's rights. Attack references helped portray SB5 as the overreach that We Are Ohio wished voters to accept it as. One editorial characterized the reforms in SB5 as similar to using a “sledgehammer to solve a problem a scalpel could achieve more efficiently”

(Westwood, 2011, p.4G). Another article quoted a man who described SB5 as a “nuclear bomb”

(Rowland & Siegel, 2011, p.A1).

The symbols of the Building a Better Ohio narrative included leveling the playing field, tightening belts, tilting the balance of power, and giving local governments the tools they need to balance budgets. Leveling the playing field and tilting the balance of power advanced the narrative that current collective bargaining laws were favorable to organized labor and SB5 was needed to correct the imbalance. While We Are Ohio characterized SB5 as an attack on the middle class and workers in turn making proponents of the bill the villains, Building a Better

Ohio used symbolism to portray unions as the villains. One editorial described public employee 57 unions as “too strong and too fat” (Hallett, 2011, p.5G). Another spoke of unfair “Cadillac health insurance plans that unions have required the city to provide” (Wade, 2011, p.12A).

Firefighters and police were portrayed as heroes by the We Are Ohio coalition. They were used as symbols of the work done by public employees. Lawmakers allowed firefighters and police to become the focus of the campaign by choosing not to exempt them from the bill.

As a result, We Are Ohio chose to focus on public safety employees throughout the campaign because they would draw more sympathy than other public employees. The fifth research expectation stated that firefighters would be mentioned in a higher percentage of articles than other coalition members. It is difficult to cast firefighters in a negative light. The nature of the profession allows them to rarely be in a negative position. They have the advantage of almost always playing the role of hero, while police officers occasionally make headlines for police brutality and whose jobs require them to carry out the pesky task of handing out speeding tickets.

Table 9 shows the percentage of newspaper articles in which key coalition members were mentioned. As expected, firefighters were mentioned in a higher percentage of newspaper articles than other We Are Ohio coalition members including police, teachers, nurses, and

Democrats. Primary spokesman for SB5, John Kasich, was mentioned in a higher percentage of articles than firefighters. He was the hero to one coalition and the villain to the other, making it understandable that he would receive a great deal of newspaper coverage. While this confirms the fifth research expectation, Representative Murray warned not to underestimate the importance of police officers throughout the campaign. He stated, “As frustrated as the public can get sometimes with the abuse of police authority, I think that most people know the overwhelming majority of police officers just do their job. They do a great job. I think the police were just as important to the process as the firefighters” (D. Murray, personal 58 communication, January 31, 2013).

Table 9 Newspaper Mentions

Coalition Member Mentions as Percentage John Kasich 54.9% Firefighters 40.5% Police 33.5% Republicans 32.0% Teachers 31.0% Democrats 30.3% Nurses 8.5% Tea Party 4.9%

Throughout the campaign, firefighters and police were used effectively as heroic symbols by the We Are Ohio coalition. By portraying SB5 as an attack on everyday heroes and the middle class, We Are Ohio built a winning coalition of voters. Voters were exposed to firefighter and police opposition to SB5 and went to the polls knowing that public safety employees, the heroes of the We Are Ohio narrative, were largely against SB5. A vote in favor of SB5 was a vote against firefighters and police officers.

Coalition Strategy

While it is expected in most cases that the coalition working to protect the status quo attempts to constrain the coalition membership and the coalition working to change the status quo attempts to expand their coalitions, the nature of this research allowed for the creation of an exception to the usual expectations. In the case of a referendum, the larger coalition of voters that turnout to the polls wins the policy. The sixth research expectation was that both coalitions would form narratives that seek to expand their coalitions. 59

We Are Ohio and Building a Better Ohio did form narratives that attempted to expand their coalitions. We Are Ohio portrayed SB5 as an assault on the middle class and average working people. While many articles expressed this sentiment, one quoted a man who went as far as to say that union workers just wanted to “stay in the middle class” and “SB5 is going to destroy that” (Vardon, 2011, p.1A). We Are Ohio argued that SB5 needed to be defeated in order to protect the middle class. Building a Better Ohio took a similar narrative strategy. They argued that SB5 was necessary to protect taxpayers. It was argued that the public sector was holding the taxpayers “hostage” and that the solution for the greatest number of people was to allow SB5 to become law (Brown, 2011, p.16A). Each of these narrative strategies seeks to expand the coalition to everyone who identifies as a member of the middle class and an average taxpaying citizen. Analysis of these narratives confirms the sixth research expectation.

The role of the middle class in the narratives for We Are Ohio and Building a Better Ohio demonstrates the convergence of narratives over time. Sarah B. Pralle hypothesized that advocacy groups begin by talking past each other in attempts to appeal to different audiences.

She states that as the conflict matures advocacy groups begin competing for the same audiences

(Pralle, 2006, p.222). As We Are Ohio became successful in using the middle class in an argument against SB5, Building a Better Ohio was forced to use the middle class to argue in favor of SB5 in an attempt to slow the momentum of the We Are Ohio coalition.

A noticeable difference in narrative strategy was discovered in interviews of members from each coalition. Senator Stewart tried to break down details of the bill into parts that his constituents could relate. When explaining the bill he would tell constituent groups, “Don't believe me and don't take my word for it. Go read the bill. Go read third party analysis of the bill” (J. Stewart, personal communication, March 4, 2013). Newspaper coverage also 60 highlighted popular details in SB5. Late in the campaign Governor Kasich stated, “The problem with the campaign- they've been emotional and we've been factual. And in campaigns, emotion usually wins” (Siegel, 2011). Factual validity aside, Building a Better Ohio spent much of the campaign discussing details while We Are Ohio focused on grand themes and messages.

Kilpatrick of the AAUP had this to say about the We Are Ohio narratives, “[We] almost never said collective bargaining and we really didn't explain much about what Senate Bill 5 was...It wasn't that we didn't want to, it was just that when you start to explain things to voters, they just don't like it” (personal communication, September 20, 2012). We Are Ohio focused on a broader message pertaining to SB5 while Building a Better Ohio focused more on details.

Speaking of the We Are Ohio narrative Senator Stewart said, “You've got to get your folks mobilized...You've got to have something dramatic. You've got to have your death panels.

You've got to have something that motivates people” (personal communication, March 4, 2013).

We Are Ohio formed a broader and more general narrative than Building a Better Ohio that effectively motivated people to lend them support.

Ohio lawmakers made the decision to include firefighters and police officers in SB5.

Wisconsin lawmakers successfully passed similar reforms by excluding firefighters and police officers. The decision to include these public safety employees shaped the characters and narratives used throughout the campaign. Senator Stewart noted that the public has a higher opinion of police officers and firefighters than other public employees. He stated that there was discussion of exempting the firefighters and police officers from the bill, but there was also a fear that had they been exempted the bill would lose support of local mayors and be less effective (J. Stewart, personal communication, March 4, 2013). In hindsight, Stewart added that had police and firefighters been exempted “our chances would have been somewhat better at the 61 ballot box” (personal communication, March 4, 2013). Representative Murray called the inclusion of police and firefighters a huge mistake on the part of the proponents of SB5.

Discussions of exempting them were some of the tensest discussions during the legislative process. In the end, including them was a mistake because “everybody sees the individual and collective valor of people in those two callings” and the public was not willing to support legislation that harms those people (D. Murray, personal communication, January 31, 2013).

A controversial commercial made by Building a Better Ohio created some stir and helped forward the narrative of We Are Ohio. We Are Ohio created a television ad featuring a 78 year old great-grandmother discussing how firefighters saved her great-granddaughter and voicing her opposition to SB5. Building a Better Ohio used the woman's statements to make it appear that she was in favor of the reforms in SB5 (Siegel, 2011). The Building a Better Ohio commercial received much attention from major newspapers in the state and allowed We Are Ohio to portray their opposition as untrustworthy and deceptive.

The We Are Ohio narrative was more effective than the Building a Better Ohio narrative for several reasons presented in no particular order. First, history of the state was on the side of

We Are Ohio. The 1958 vote on Right-to-Work consisted of some familiar narrative components. It was argued that Right-to-Work was unfair and unsafe. We Are Ohio used these same themes to successfully repeat history. Some of the terms they chose had proven track records. Second, Building a Better Ohio chose a narrative similar to that of the proponents of

Right-to-Work in 1958. They falsely believed that poor economic conditions would lead people to vote for SB5 based on budgetary and tax considerations. The economic approach did not work in 1958 either, showing that some narrative components show signs of consistent failure over time. 62

A third reason that We Are Ohio formed a more effective narrative was that the coalition narrative did not rely on details. As Kilpatrick of the AAUP pointed out, people do not like complex details. We Are Ohio formed a narrative that was believable and simple to understand, while Building a Better Ohio spent much of the campaign trying to explain the details of SB5 and combat misconceptions. The simple narrative of We Are Ohio was easy to understand and appealed to emotions. Building a Better Ohio had the task of defending SB5. While some portions of SB5 were popular, voters rejected the law as a whole because of confusion over other parts of the law. Early in the campaign it was considered a victory for We Are Ohio that the language on the ballot made a “no” vote mean repeal of the law. It takes less detail and explanation to get voters to reject a law than it does to get them to accept it. Confusion and complexity usually leads to a default “no” vote.

A fourth reason that We Are Ohio formed a more effective narrative was that the coalition chose more believable villains and heroes than Building a Better Ohio. Governor

Kasich was unpopular from the beginning of his term. His approval ratings were low and sunk lower throughout the campaign on SB5. Painting him, and his fellow Republican lawmakers, as extreme politicians worked to the advantage of We Are Ohio. They were able to capitalize off of the low approval ratings of Governor Kasich. Kasich was the main spokesman for SB5. He was the default hero of the Building a Better Ohio campaign. He traveled Ohio in support of the law and tried to convince Ohioans that SB5 would lead Ohio down a path of fiscal responsibility.

Building a Better Ohio had a more difficult task with the narrative they chose. They had to convince voters that a politician could be a hero. This is not impossible, but much more difficult than convincing voters that firefighters and police are heroes.

We Are Ohio chose firefighters and police as the primary heroes of their narrative. 63

Representative Murray recognized the importance of firefighters and police to the campaign. It was a controversial strategy on the part of Republican lawmakers to include them in the law. It may have been a costly strategy because it gave We Are Ohio an easy hero to sell to the public.

Firefighters and police are public servants who risk their lives to protect the public. It was very politically risky for Republicans to include them in the law. We Are Ohio was able to use firefighters and police to demonstrate to the public how the extreme politicians in Columbus were attacking Ohio's everyday heroes. Firefighters were especially easy for the public to accept as heroes in the We Are Ohio narrative. Their profession literally involves rescuing people from life threatening situations.

A fifth reason that the We Are Ohio narrative was more effective than the Building a

Better Ohio narrative was that the latter made a major campaign error that played into their opponent’s narrative. We Are Ohio demonized politicians in Columbus. Their anti-politician message even led to the coalition distancing themselves from politicians that were supportive of their cause. We Are Ohio portrayed politicians as untrustworthy. When Building a Better Ohio made a controversial commercial that made a great-grandmother opposed to SB5 appear to be a supporter, they played right into the We Are Ohio narrative. Their own actions made them seem deceptive and untrustworthy, just as We Are Ohio claimed. The mistake on the part of Building a Better Ohio made the We Are Ohio narrative appear more true to reality.

CHAPTER V. CONCLUSIONS

We Are Ohio and Building a Better Ohio chose different policy narratives that sought to expand their coalitions. We Are Ohio chose a narrative where public sector workers, especially firefighters and police, were the heroes. Governor Kasich, Republican lawmakers, and politicians in general were the villains of the We Are Ohio narrative. The victims of the narrative were members of the middle class, especially unionized workers. The We Are Ohio narrative told a story of how things were good until greedy politicians over-reached for political reasons. When things got bad they argued that the only solution, the only way to return to the good days, was to reject SB5 in a public referendum. We Are Ohio sought to expand their coalition by focusing on how SB5 would hurt the middle class.

Building a Better Ohio chose a narrative where Governor John Kasich was the hero. He acted as a spokesman for the legislation. He was seen as the person who was going to get the state's fiscal house in order. The villains of the Building a Better Ohio narrative were public sector unions and greedy union bosses. Ohio taxpayers played the role of the victims in the

Building a Better Ohio narrative. Taxpayers, much like the middle class, are a group that is broad enough for most people to identify with and allows the coalition to seek to expand their coalition and bring more voters to their side. Building a Better Ohio told a story about how things were good until greedy unions and greedy union bosses held local governments hostage through collective bargaining. They forced local governments to make huge concessions leading to budget deficits and high taxes. The narrative of Building a Better Ohio offered SB5 as the solution. SB5 was going to give more power back to the local governments and taxpayers. It was going to fix the budget deficit and benefit Ohioans through lower taxes and more efficient services. The We Are Ohio and Building a Better Ohio narratives were both stories of decline, a 65 type of narrative story identified by Deborah Stone (2002, p.138).

The We Are Ohio policy narrative was more effective than the Building a Better Ohio policy narrative. Polls throughout the campaign showed that Ohio voters did not accept SB5 as a solution to the state budget deficit. In May of 2011, polls showed that 52% of Ohioans did not believe SB5 was needed to control the budget (Naymik, 2011, p.B1). By October of that year that number had grown to 57% of Ohioans (“Ohio (OH) Poll,” 2011). Ohioans did not feel that

SB5 was a policy aimed at solving the state's budget problems, which was the main argument in support of the Building a Better Ohio narrative. By rejecting the Building a Better Ohio narrative, Ohio voters were inclined to accept the We Are Ohio narrative. The We Are Ohio narrative was also effective because of the high number of public employees in the state and the ability to frame SB5 as an attack on friends, family, and neighbors. On Election Day, Ohio voters rejected SB5 by a 61.59% to 38.41% vote (“State Impact Ohio,” n.d.).

We Are Ohio used effective war symbols depicting SB5 as an attack on unions, workers' rights, and the middle class. They used these symbols to convince the public SB5 was an unfair over-reach. Firefighters and police officers were the most effective symbols in the We Are Ohio narrative. They were depicted as public heroes that risked their lives every day and SB5 was going to make it more difficult for them to do their jobs. They represented everything good about public workers. Firefighters played a slightly more important role in the campaign due to the controversial ad released by Building a Better Ohio involving firefighters and the great- grandmother from the Toledo area. Building a Better Ohio argued that SB5 gave local governments the tools they needed to manage costs. The coalition focused on the need to give local governments these tools throughout the campaign. It was the primary symbol of the campaign and was part of the larger narrative that SB5 was about controlling budget deficits. 66

This symbol was not effective because Ohio voters rejected the broader narrative that offered

SB5 as the solution to Ohio's budget problems.

This research found that the policy narratives and beliefs identified in newspaper articles largely matched the policy narratives and beliefs found in interviews with coalition members. It also found that narratives and beliefs identified in newspaper coverage generally coincided with public sentiment which was ultimately expressed through voting. Articles from the Cleveland

Plain Dealer and Toledo Blade were more negative in tone toward SB5 than articles in the

Cincinnati Enquirer. This pattern was reflected in voting outcomes where areas near Cleveland and Toledo rejected SB5 by greater margins than areas near Cincinnati. This suggests that narratives were at the very least loosely tied to voting outcomes in the case of SB5.

There were undoubtedly other factors, such as party identification, campaign spending, and voter turnout, that helped determine the fate of SB5. This research was not meant to discount the importance of factors unrelated to coalition building and narrative forming, like campaign finances. However, this research has made the argument that coalition building and the formation of effective narratives played a significant role in the fate of SB5. We Are Ohio built a more effective narrative which was reflected in polls showing the rejection of the

Building a Better Ohio narrative. We Are Ohio also built a larger coalition which was reflected in the overwhelming defeat of SB5 at the polls. A larger coalition and effective narratives helped lead to the repeal of SB5 through direct democracy.

This research demonstrated the application of ACF and NPF to a referendum campaign.

The nature of a public referendum required both coalitions to form policy narratives that aimed to expand the coalitions. Also, the nature of public referendum campaigns forced a smaller time- frame of eight months to be examined. These exceptions aside, the important elements of ACF 67 and NPF hold firm when applied to the referendum on SB5. Future research should apply ACF and NPF to referendums in states other than Ohio and/or to policy issues other than labor issues.

Research in other states and in other policy areas may lend some external validity to the findings of this research. Further case study research may also lead to the creation of a framework specific to coalitions and policy narratives within public referendum campaigns.

REFERENCES

Alexander, D. (2011, August 10). Repeal of SB5 will mean higher taxes. Columbus Dispatch, p.

10A. Retrieved June 14, 2013, from the Newsbank database.

Baumgartner, Frank R., and Bryan D. Jones. 1993. Agendas and instability in American politics.

Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Blue Ohio: More counties lean Democratic than Republican in voter affiliation | cleveland.com.

(2008, October). Cleveland OH Local News, Breaking News, Sports & Weather –

cleveland.com. Retrieved May 8, 2013, from http://www.cleveland.com/datacentral

/index.ssf/2008 10/more_ohio_counties_trend_democ.html

Boyd-Barrett, C. (2011, September 6). Marchers condemn Issue 2; thousands show unity against

law up for Nov. vote. Toledo Blade, p. B1. Retrieved February 18, 2011, from the

Newsbank database.

Brown, R. (2011, October 20). State Issue 2 would loosen union control. Columbus

Dispatch, p. 16A. Retrieved February 8, 2013, from the Newsbank database.

Campaign Finance: Building a Better Ohio. (n.d.). John Husted Ohio Secretary of State.

Retrieved June 3, 2013, from www2.sos.state.oh.us/pls/cfonline/f

p=119:39:0::NO:RP:P39_ENTITY_ID,P3

Campaign Finance: We Are Ohio. (n.d.). John Husted Ohio Secretary of State. Retrieved June 3,

2013, from www2.sos.state.oh.us/pls/cfonline/f

p=119:39:0::NO:RP:P39_ENTITY_ID,P3

Election Results. (n.d.). John Husted Ohio Secretary of State. Retrieved June 1, 2013, from

www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/elections/Research/electResultsMain.aspx

Gelman, S. (2012). Adopting Ohio senate bill 5: the role of university presidents. Albany Law 69

Review, 75(1), 511-557.

Guillen, J. (2011, June 30). 1.3 million SB5 'veto' signatures turned in. The Plain Dealer, p. 1.

Guillen, J. (2011, September 9). Issue 2 opponents' claim in ad correct. Cleveland Plain Dealer,

p. B1. Retrieved January 18, 2013, from the Newsbank database.

Hallett, J. (2011, October 30). Poll shows that Ohioans see SB5 as egregious overreach.

Columbus Dispatch, p. 5G. Retrieved February 8, 2013, from the Newsbank database.

Hallett, J., & Mark Niquette. (2010, November 4). ELECTION 2010 - Turnout tells the tale.

Columbus Dispatch, The (OH) (Home Final ed.), 1A. Retrieved June 1, 2013, from

NewsBank on-line database.

Fenton, J. (1959). The Right-to-Work vote in Ohio. Midwest Journal of Political Science, 3(3),

241-253. Retrieved May 29, 2013, from the JSTOR database.

Fletcher, M., & Sullivan, S. (2012, December 13). Michigan Enacts Right-to-Work Law, Dealing

Blow to Unions. The Washington Post. Retrieved May 8, 2013, from http://articles.was

ington\ post.com/2012-12-11/business/35767869_1_public-sector-unions-union-shop-l

bor

Freeman, R., & Han, E. (2012). The war against public sector collective bargaining in the US.

Journal of Industrial Relations, 54(3), 386-408.

Jones, M. D., & McBeth, M. K. (2010). A narrative policy framework: clear enough to be

wrong?. Policy Studies Journal, 38(2), 329-353.

Keen, J. (2012, June 6). Walker Survives Recall Election. USA Today, p. 1A.

Keller, S. (2011, September 18). Government unions costly to taxpayers. Columbus Dispatch, p.

4G. Retrieved June 14, 2013, from the Newsbank database. 70

Kelly, R. (1983, April 22). Bill on collective bargaining ok'd by Ohio senate. The Toledo Blade,

p. 1. Retrieved May 29, 2013, from the Access Newspaper Archive database.

Kubler, D. (2001). Understanding policy change within the advocacy coalition framework: an

application to Swiss drug policy. Journal of European Public Policy, 8(4), 623-641.

Lakoff, G. (2008). The political mind: why you can't understand 21st-century politics with an

18th-century brain. New York: Viking.

McBeth, M.D., Shanahan, E. A., Arnell, R. J., & Hathaway, P.L. (2007) The intersection of

Narrative Policy Frameworkand policy change theory. The Policy Studies Journal, 35(1)

87-108.

Mintrom, M., & Vergari, S. (1996). Advocacy coalitions, policy entrepreneurs, and policy

change. Policy Studies Journal, 24(3), 420-434.

Naymik, M. (2011, May 19). Survey says Ohio voters oppose new collective bargaining law.

Cleveland Plain Dealer, p. B1.

Necessary change. (2011, April 3). Columbus Dispatch, p. 4G. Retrieved June 14, 2013, from the

Newsbank database.

Neumann, J. (2011, March 11). Amid states' union cuts, police and firefighters are a tricky target

- WSJ.com. The wall street journal - breaking news, business, financial and economic

news. Retrieved January 12, 2013, from

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703726904576192952

Ohio (OH) Poll - May 18, 2011 - Ohio Gov's Approval Up, But Mo | Quinnipiac University

Connecticut. (n.d.). Quinnipiac University Connecticut. Retrieved June 16, 2013, from

http://www.quinnipiac.edu/institutes-and-centers/polling-institute/ohio/release-detail

ReleaseID=1601 71

Ohio (OH) Poll - October 25, 2011 - Opposition To Ohio's SB 5 Grow | Quinnipiac

University Connecticut. (n.d.). Quinnipiac University Connecticut. Retrieved March 18,

2013, from http://www.quinnipiac.edu/institutes-centers/pollinginstitute/ohio/release

detail?ReleaseID=1665

O'Reilly, J., & Gath, N. (1983). Structures and conflicts: Ohio's collective bargaining law for

public employees. Ohio State Law Journal, 44, 891-1125. Retrieved May 29, 2013, from

the Lexis Nexis database.

Pralle, S. B. (2006). Branching out, digging in environmental advocacy and agenda setting.

Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.

Provance, J. (2011, July 21). Poll: Ohio voters likely to reject SB5; electorate split on amendment

to health-care plan. Toledo Blade, p. A3. Retrieved February 18, 2013, from the

Newsbank database.

Provance, J. (2011, September 8). Senate Bill 5 backers defend Bell ad timing - Toledo Blade.

Home - Toledo Blade. Retrieved January 11, 2013, from

http://www.toledoblade.com/Politics/2011/09/08/Senate-Bill-5-backers-defend-Bell-ad

timing.html

Roe, E. (1994). Narrative policy analysis: Theory and practice. Durham,CT: Duke University

Press.

Rowland, D., & Stuckey, A. (2011, October 8). Building a Better Ohio campaign private groups

back supporters of SB5. Columbus Dispatch, p. 1A. Retrieved February 8, 2013, from the

Newsbank database.

Rowland, D., & Siegel, J. (2011, October 30). Analysis-there's no clear path if voters reject SB5.

Columbus Dispatch, p. 1A. Retrieved February 8, 2013,from the Newsbank database. 72

Sabatier, Paul (1993). 'Policy change over a decade or more,' in Paul Sabatier and Hank Jenkins

Smith, eds. Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach. Boulder:

Westview Press, pp. 13-39.

Sabatier, P. A., & Jenkins-Smith, H. (1999). The advocacy coalition framework: an assessment.

Theories of the policy process (pp. 117-152). Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.

Sabatier, P.A. (2007). Theories of the policy process. (2nd ed.). Westview Press.

Sarbaugh-thompson, M., & Zald, M. (1995). Child labor laws: a historical case for public policy

implementation. Administration & Society, 27(1), 25-53.

Schlager, E. (1995). Policy making and collective action: defining coalitions within the advocacy

coalition framework. Policy Sciences, 28(3), 249-270.

Schneider, M. B., & Sikich, C. (2012, February 2). Indiana becomes rust belt's first right-to-work

state. USA Today. Retrieved May 8, 2013, from http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news /n

tion/story/2012-02-01/indiana-right-to-work-bill/52916356/1

Shakespeare, C. (2008). Uncovering information’s in the state higher education policy making

process. Educational Policy, 22(6), 875-899.

Shanahan, E., Jones, M., & McBeth, M. (2011). Policy narratives and policy processes. Policy

Studies Journal, 39(3), 535-561.

Siegel, J. (2011, August 23). Fall referendum- SB5 war may have similar soldiers. Columbus

Dispatch, p. 1A. Retrieved June 13, 2013, from the Newsbank database.

Siegel, J. (2011, October 18). Former officials weigh merits of Issue 2. Columbus Dispatch, p.

4A. Retrieved June 13, 2013, from the Newsbank database.

Siegel, J. (2011, October 12). Recut television ad turns SB5 opponent into backer. Columbus

Dispatch, p. 1B. Retrieved February 8, 2013, from the Newsbank database. 73

Slater, J. (2012). The rise and fall of sb-5: the rejection of an anti-union law in historical and

political context. University of Toledo Law Review, 43, 473-502.

State Impact Ohio | Ohio Issue 2 Election Map. (n.d.). NPR StateImpact: issues that matter.

Close to home.. Retrieved January 12, 2013, from

http://stateimpact.npr.org/maps/ohio/ohio-issue-2-election/#7.00/39.732/-83.061

Stewart, J. (2009). Public policy values. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Stone, D. A. (2002). Policy paradox: the art of political decision making (Rev. ed.). New York:

Norton.

Suddes, T. (2013, September 4). Hard-pressed Ohio coddles big business. Cleveland Plain

Dealer, p. G1. Retrieved January 18, 2013, from the Newsbank database.

Toastmasters say 'we don't want laws for work'. (1958, January 7). The Times Recorder, p. 6.

Retrieved May 29, 2013, from the Access Newspaper Archive database.

Troy, T. (2011, September 30). Kasich, Bell campaign for labor-law support; SB5 to help area

prosper, crowd near UT told. Toledo Blade, p. A1. Retrieved February 18, 2013, from

the Newsbank database.

Unionist arguments lacking in validity. (1958, March 24). The Lima News, p. 11.

Retrieved May 30, 2013, from the Access Newspaper Archive database.

Vardon, J. (2011, March 31). Kasich signs SB5, opponents plan referendum. Columbus

Dispatch. Retrieved May 8, 2013, from http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local

2011/03/31/31-kasich-sign-sb5.html

Vardon, J. (2011, June 30). Making a statement. Columbus Dispatch, p. 1A. Retrieved February

8, 2013, from the Newsbank database.

Webster, N. (2011, September 14). Conditions changed for public workers. Columbus Dispatch, 74

p. 10A. Retrieved June 14, 2013, from the Newsbank database.

Weible, C., Sabatier, P., & McQueen, K. (2009). Themes and variations: taking stock of the

advocacy coalition framework. Policy Studies Journal, 37(1), 121-140.

Westwood, V. (2011, October 23). Senate Bill 5 raises safety concerns. Columbus Dispatch, p.

4G. Retrieved February 8, 2013, from the Newsbank database.

Wis. gov. officially cuts collective bargaining - USATODAY.com. (n.d.). USA TODAY: Latest

World and US News - USATODAY.com. Retrieved May 8, 2013, from http://usat

day30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2011-03-11-wisconsin-budget-unions_N.htm

APPENDIX A: CODING SCHEME

Article Headline: ______

Date: ______Newspaper: CD CPD TB CE (circle one)

Editorial? Yes No (circle one) SB5 Tone: Positive Negative Neutral (circle one)

Characters (list first 3)

We Are Ohio Building a Better Ohio

Villains: ______

______

Heroes: ______

______

Victims: ______

______

Plot

What is the problem?

______

Who is assigned blame?

______

What is the solution?

______

Symbols

______

Coalitions (circle)

Firefighters Police Teachers Democrats Gov. Kasich Republicans Tea Party Rep. Gov. Assoc.

Unions (general) Nurses

Others: ______

Beliefs

Deep Core:______

Policy Core:______

Secondary:______

APPENDIX B: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

1. What was your role in the Senate Bill 5 campaign? Where and when have you participated? Describe your participation.

2. What was the strategy leading up to the signing of Senate Bill 5 into law? How did the strategy change once Governor Kasich signed the bill? How (in what ways) did the strategy evolve through time?

3. Was there a time prior to the referendum when you felt like your side was winning and/or losing? Why?

4. Why do you think Ohio voters strongly rejected Senate Bill 5 at the polls? Or What are some of the reasons that Ohio voters rejected SB 5?

5. What was the pro-Senate Bill 5 (or anti-Senate Bill 5) message to voters throughout the campaign? How did you frame your message and did that change?

6. What message(s)/frames were most effective in your campaign?

7. Who were you competing against and did that competition change over time? What message(s)/frames did they employ to convince voters to vote for SB 5?

APPENDIX C: HSRB APPROVAL

DATE: September 4, 2012

TO: Dominic Wells FROM: Bowling Green State University Human Subjects Review Board

PROJECT TITLE: [314307-2] Narrative, Coalitions, and the Referendum on Ohio Senate Bill 5 SUBMISSION TYPE: Revision

ACTION: APPROVED APPROVAL DATE: September 2, 2012 EXPIRATION DATE: May 21, 2013 REVIEW TYPE: Expedited Review

REVIEW CATEGORY: Expedited review category # 7

Thank you for your submission of Revision materials for this project. The Bowling Green State University Human Subjects Review Board has APPROVED your submission. This approval is based on an appropriate risk/benefit ratio and a project design wherein the risks have been minimized. All research must be conducted in accordance with this approved submission.

The final approved version of the consent document(s) is available as a published Board Document in the Review Details page. You must use the approved version of the consent document when obtaining consent from participants. Informed consent must continue throughout the project via a dialogue between the researcher and research participant. Federal regulations require that each participant receives a copy of the consent document.

Comment to Researcher: In the fourth parapraph of the consent form, "fee" shoudl be replaced with "free."

Please note that you are responsible to conduct the study as approved by the HSRB. If you seek to make any changes in your project activities or procedures, those modifications must be approved by this committee prior to initiation. Please use the modification request form for this procedure.

You have been approved to enroll 7 participants. If you wish to enroll additional participants you must seek approval from the HSRB.

All UNANTICIPATED PROBLEMS involving risks to subjects or others and SERIOUS and UNEXPECTED adverse events must be reported promptly to this office. All NON-COMPLIANCE issues or COMPLAINTS regarding this project must also be reported promptly to this office.

This approval expires on May 21, 2013. You will receive a continuing review notice before your project expires. If you wish to continue your work after the expiration date, your documentation for continuing review must be received with sufficient time for review and continued approval before the expiration date.

Good luck with your work. If you have any questions, please contact the Office of Research Compliance at 419-372-7716 or [email protected]. Please include your project title and reference number in all correspondence regarding this project.