Coalitions Are People: Policy Narratives and the Defeat of Ohio Senate Bill 5
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COALITIONS ARE PEOPLE: POLICY NARRATIVES AND THE DEFEAT OF OHIO SENATE BILL 5 Dominic Wells A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate College of Bowling Green State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION August 2013 Committee: Andrew Kear, Advisor David Jackson ii ABSTRACT Andrew Kear, Advisor Historically, states in the Midwest have enacted policies favorable to organized labor. This has changed in recent years with several Midwest states passing severe restrictions on the collective bargaining rights of workers. This research focuses on one case where collective bargaining restrictions were overturned in the state of Ohio through direct democracy. Coalitions and policy narratives were identified through the scope of the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) and Narrative Policy Framework (NPF) in an attempt to fully understand the repeal of Ohio Senate Bill 5, a law that restricted collective bargaining for public employees. Analysis shows that the coalition in favor of repeal, We Are Ohio, formed a broader coalition and a more general, more effective, narrative than the coalition in favor of the collective bargaining restrictions, Building a Better Ohio. We Are Ohio argued that Senate Bill 5 was an overreach by greedy politicians that would hurt the middle class. Building a Better Ohio argued that Senate Bill 5 was a necessary measure that would help balance state and local budgets. This research demonstrates a useful application of the ACF and NPF to direct democracy in hopes that future research will be done using these frameworks on direct democracy. Furthermore, this research demonstrates how successfully expanding the conflict in direct democracy results in a larger coalition that is needed to win the policy narrative. iii To my wife, Annette, for her continued support and encouragement iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank my committee, Dr. Andrew Kear and Dr. David Jackson for taking the time to help me progress as a writer and a student. I would have been lost without your expertise. I would especially like to thank my adviser, Dr. Andrew Kear, for dedicating much of his time to guiding me in this project. Finally, I would like to thank my father, Dominic T. Wells, for reading every draft of this work and for always stressing the importance of education. v TABLE OF CONTENTS Page INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................. 1 CHAPTER I. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS ............................................................... 10 The Advocacy Coalition Framework ......................................................................... 10 Narrative Policy Framework ...................................................................................... 14 CHAPTER II. LITERATURE REVIEW: OHIO SENATE BILL 5 .................................... 18 CHAPTER III. METHODOLOGY ...................................................................................... 21 Newspaper Content Analysis ..................................................................................... 26 Interviews ............................................................................................................ 29 Research Expectations ............................................................................................... 30 CHAPTER IV. DATA AND ANALYSIS............................................................................ 35 Coalitions ............................................................................................................ 35 Coalition Narratives ................................................................................................... 39 Narratives and Voting Outcomes ............................................................................... 50 Coalition Symbols ...................................................................................................... 56 Coalition Strategy ...................................................................................................... 58 CHAPTER V. CONCLUSIONS .......................................................................................... 64 REFERENCES ...................................................................................................................... 68 APPENDIX A. CODING SCHEME .................................................................................... 75 APPENDIX B. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS ........................................................................ 76 APPENDIX C. HSRB APPROVAL ..................................................................................... 77 vi LIST OF FIGURES/TABLES Figures Page 1 Factors Leading to Outcome ...................................................................................... 6 2 Research Design......................................................................................................... 7 Tables 1 Belief Levels and Examples....................................................................................... 29 2 Coalition Members..................................................................................................... 38 3 Coalition Characters................................................................................................... 40 4 We Are Ohio Narratives ............................................................................................ 49 5 Building a Better Ohio Narratives ............................................................................. 49 6 Senate Bill 5 Vote ...................................................................................................... 51 7 Voter Turnout (%)...................................................................................................... 53 8 Newspaper Tone ........................................................................................................ 56 9 Newspaper Mentions ................................................................................................. 59 1 INTRODUCTION In March of 2011, Governor Scott Walker of Wisconsin signed a bill that stripped public employees in the state of almost all collective bargaining rights. The law sparked a nationwide debate over collective bargaining rights for public employees. Labor union supporters protested outside the state capital and several Democratic state senators fled Wisconsin in an attempt to prevent a vote on the measure. However, the Republican Party controlled both houses of the state legislature and the governor's office allowing the bill to be passed despite protest and without Democratic Party support (“Wis. gov. officially cuts collective bargaining,” 2011). Governor Walker was then recalled, but survived the special election challenge for the governorship. Walker became the first governor to ever survive a recall election. His win in a multimillion dollar campaign that drew attention on a national level possibly encouraged governors in other states to attempt similar collective bargaining laws (Keen, 2012, p.1A). Only a few weeks later, Ohio Governor John Kasich signed Ohio Senate Bill 5 (SB5) into law. The law placed limitations on the collective bargaining rights of public employees similar to the law Governor Walker had signed. The passage of SB5 also led to protests outside the state capital. Democratic Party and labor leaders vowed to collect enough signatures from Ohio voters to place the bill up for referendum. Much like in Wisconsin, the Republican Party controlled both houses in the state legislature and the governor's office as a result of a wave of Republican support in the gubernatorial election of 2010. This wave of Republican support was caused by several factors. The economy was in poor condition and voters were frustrated with the party in power nationally, the Democratic Party. As a swing state, Ohio voters have a tendency to move with national sentiment. Republican lawmakers passed SB5 through the Ohio State House of Representatives by a vote of 53 to 44 and passed through the Ohio State Senate 2 by a vote of 17 to 16. The bill received no Democratic Party support and only a few Republican state legislators voted against it (Vardon, 2011). Ultimately, the bill was put up for referendum and it was rejected by Ohio voters by a wide margin. Wisconsin and Ohio were followed by Indiana and Michigan, states that became Right- to-Work states in 2012. Right-to-Work laws undercut the funding of organized labor and the Democratic Party (which receives contributions from organized labor) by preventing unions from collecting dues from the paychecks of employees in unionized workplaces. Dues become completely voluntary, which creates a free rider problem where workers can receive the benefits of unionized workplaces without paying for them. In early 2012, Indiana became the first Right- to-Work state in what is known as the “Rust Belt”. Again, the bill passed through a Republican controlled state House of Representatives and state Senate to be signed into law by Republican Governor Mitch Daniels. The bill sparked protests from labor supporters outside of the Super Bowl which was held in Indianapolis that year (Schneider & Sikich, 2012). In late 2012, Michigan became a Right-to-Work state. Republican Governor Rick Snyder signed the Right-to- Work legislation into law after it passed through a Republican controlled state legislature. Having learned something from SB5 in Ohio, lawmakers in Michigan attached the measure to