DOCSLIB.ORG

Ohio's Gerrymandering Problem

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Ohio's Gerrymandering Problem Ohio’s Gerrymandering Problem: Why Haven’t We Fixed This Yet? A Report from the League of Women Voters of Ohio and Common Cause Ohio Contents: What is Gerrymandering?.........p.2 Ohio Redistricting Timeline…...p.3 A Short History of Ohio Redistrict- ing……………………………...…..p.4 1992-2002 The last time Ohio almost passed re- form: the 2010 legislative proposal ……………………….……………...p.6 “The Elephant in the Room” the last time Ohio’s congressional districts were drawn ……………………….p.7 “Predictable Results” and how Ohio’s congressional districts are rigged against voters …………………...p.16 1982-1992 1 What is Gerrymandering? Redistricting 101: Why do we redraw districts? • Every ten years the US Census is conducted to measure population changes. • The US Supreme Court has said all legislative districts should have roughly the same population so that everyone’s vote counts equally. This is commonly referred to as “one person, one vote.” • In the year following the Census, districts are redrawn to account for people moving into or out of an area and adjusted so that districts again have equal population and, for US House districts, may change depending on the number of districts Ohio is entitled to have. • While the total number of state general assembly districts is fixed -- 99 Ohio House and 33 Ohio Senate districts -- the number of US House districts allocated to each state may change follow- ing the US Census depending on that state’s proportion of the total US population. For example, following the 2010 Census, Ohio lost two US House seats, going from 18 US House seats in 2002-2012 to 16 seats in 2012-2022. What is Gerrymandering? • Gerrymandering is the manipulation of political districts to rig the outcome of elections to favor one political party or candidate over another. • Both Republicans and Democrats have done it when they controlled districting. In Ohio, US House districts are drawn by the General Assembly, with a simple majority needed for approval. • This type of map-making reduces voter choices and leads to fewer competitive elections and elected officials who are less accountable to their constituents. • How do map-makers create unfair districts? The two main ways are called “packing” & “cracking.” The party that has the majority can pack voters of the minority party into one district so that they reduce the number of minority party districts. The majority party can also crack voters of the minority party into the re- maining districts to dilute their voting power. 2 3 A Short History of Ohio Redistricting Advocates of fair elections have been working on redistricting reform for more than 35 years. In 1981, a constitutional amendment was placed on the Ohio ballot to change the method of state legislative and congressional redistricting to a more for- mulaic, mathematical approach that favored compact dis- “It wasn’t fun drawing the districts tricts. and moving them through the courts, but it was all worth it when In 1981, David L. Horn, an agricultural engineer from Ath- the results of the 1972 election were ens County, told the Cleveland Plain Dealer, “I was counted. We won the majority in the cleaning out a ditch when I thought about compactness of districts, a mathematical relationship.” [Ohio] House 58-41, an increase of 13 seats for the Democrats. That’s This idea grew to become Issue 2, the Fair and Impartial the power of the pencil.” Redistricting (FAIR) proposal. - Former Speaker Vern Riffe Whatever’s Fair: The Political Autobi- This amendment was supported by good government or- ography of the Ohio House Speaker ganizations such as the League of Women Voters of Vern Riffe Ohio, as well as by the Ohio Republican Party. Joe Elton, the coordinator of the committee, said, “It’s easy for Republicans to be for good government when they’re down and out. However, I honestly believe that the adoption of the FAIR amendment will be in the best interests of both the Republican and Democrat parties over the long run.” This redistricting reform effort was opposed by the Democrats and their allies, who at that time con- trolled the redistricting process and saw no need to change it. It’s hard to fight fairness but Ohioans saw Issue 2 of 1981 as a partisan issue, rather than a change to ensure good government. The opposition questioned the rigid mathematical formula of compact- ness and the amendment was soundly rejected by the voters. Following this defeat, Joan Lawrence, vice chair of the “I support the FAIR constitutional Committee for Fair and Impartial Redistricting comment- amendment. I believe this proposal ed, “Who would try again?” integrates fair play and common The answer to the question was Joan Lawrence and the sense into our election process. League of Women Voters. Gerrymandering is not a Republican or Democrat problem. It is a funda- Representative Joan Lawrence (R-Galena, 1983-1999) mental problem of government that led the way by introducing redistricting reform legislation must be corrected.” every year that she served in the Ohio General Assem- bly. - Former Governor James A. Rhodes in a July 3, 1981 letter to Benson Wolman and Robert S. Graetz 4 Throughout the 1980s and the 1990s the League of Women Voters of Ohio and its allies including David L. Horn tried to keep redistricting on the front burner. In 1999, the League even attempted to collect signatures for a redistricting reform ballot measure focused on compactness but came up short. When Democrats lost control of the Apportionment Board (the body tasked with drawing districts for the state legislature) in 1990, they became more sympathetic to changing the system — but unsur- prisingly, Republicans had lost their enthusiasm for change. The Republicans held on to the Appor- tionment Board, the legislature, and the Governor’s office through the 2000 elections and thus saw no need to change the system for the post-2000 redistricting. In 2005, a coalition of individuals and organizations came together under the rubric of Reform Ohio Now (RON) to promote a package of four constitutional amendments, one of which dealt with state legislative and congressional redistricting. The RON redistricting amendment also took a formulaic, mathematical approach, only this time the main criterion was competitiveness. As the chair of the Ohio Democratic Party, Paul Tipps opposed redistricting reform in 1981. In 2005, following his retirement from a high profile career as a lobbyist—and with the Democrats out of power— Tipps became one of the biggest proponents for ending “pay to play” and gerrymandering. RON included some academics, some good government organizations, some labor unions, and some Democrats — but very few Republicans. Ultimately, the Ohio Republican Party and many prominent Republicans opposed the RON amendments. The Ohio Democratic Party did not en- dorse the amendments, with some county organizations supporting the reform and some opposing. The Reform Ohio Now amendments were overwhelmingly rejected by the voters. The Republican opposition was not surprising since the GOP controlled the existing process. But the tepid Democratic organi- zational support was somewhat surprising. One explanation given for the weak Democratic support was the expectation of many Democrats that they would sweep the 2006 and 2010 elections and thus control the post-2010 redistricting process. Recent legislative efforts began over a decade ago. 2006 saw the emergence of a strong Republican advocate for redistricting reform—Jon Husted. Dur- ing the debate over the RON redistricting amendment in 2005, its leading Republican opponents — then House Speaker Jon Husted (R- Kettering) and then Ohio Representative Kevin DeWine (R- Fairborn) — acknowledged that Ohio’s method of redistricting was flawed. While arguing that the RON amendment was not the solution, they pledged to take up the issue of redistricting reform in 2006, if RON was defeated. 5 Speaker Husted and Representative DeWine kept their word, negotiating with various reform groups and some Democrats. Their 2006 proposal would have placed Ohio in a national leadership position, since it explicitly included competition as a secondary criterion in choosing a redistricting plan, with compactness as the primary goal. When the time came for a legislative vote to approve an amend- ment for the ballot, only one Democrat supported the proposal and it failed. While the reasons for this result are complex, it appears that Democrats did not trust the Republi- cans or did not want the Republicans to get credit for political reform. And—perhaps most important- ly—they believed that there was no need to change a system that might soon benefit them. The last time Ohio almost passed reform: the 2010 legislative proposal Redistricting reform again took center stage at the Statehouse in the 128th General Assembly (2009 -2010) when the Ohio House was dominated by Democrats and the Ohio Senate by Republicans. A redistricting reform measure sponsored by then State Senator Jon Husted was approved by the Re- publican Senate in September 2009. This resolution would have created the Ohio Redistricting Com- mission to draw state legislative and congressional districts with rules focused on compactness, with competitiveness as a secondary goal. Then in May 2010, the Democratic-controlled House passed a different proposal sponsored by then Representatives Tom Letson (D-Warren) and Jennifer Garrison (D-Marietta) and strongly supported by then Speaker Armond Budish (D-Beachwood). This proposal which addressed state legislative and congressional redistricting focused on establishing rules for mapmaking and would have established a public competition for redrawing district lines similar to a 2009 competition sponsored by the Ohio Secretary of State, the League of Women Voters of Ohio, Common Cause Ohio and Ohio Citizen Action. As former Speaker, Husted used his floor privileges to encourage fellow Republicans to support the Democratic proposal with the hope of merging the two redistricting reform measures through negoti- ation and the measure was supported by both Democrats and Republicans 69-28.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Cabinet, President, Referendum: Turkey's Complex Political Calendar | the Washington Institute
    MENU Policy Analysis / PolicyWatch 1271 Cabinet, President, Referendum: Turkey's Complex Political Calendar Aug 10, 2007 Brief Analysis n August 9, the Turkish parliament elected Koksal Toptan, a deputy from the Justice and Development Party O (AKP) as its speaker. The AKP, which won 46 percent of the vote in July 22 parliamentary elections, controls 341 seats in the 550-member Turkish parliament. Thus has Turkey begun a very busy political season, with serious issues put off since the April constitutional crisis over the AKP's attempt to appoint its foreign minister, Abdullah Gul, as president. The new parliament's first order of business will be securing a vote of confidence for the AKP's new cabinet. Then the legislature will face the constitutional mandate of electing a new president, an executive post with important prerogatives such as appointing judges to the secular constitutional court. But while the Turkish parliament prepares to elect a president, Turks will vote in an October 21 referendum on constitutional amendments that would stipulate the direct popular election of the president. What are the timelines for these overlapping political processes and how smoothly will each of them run? Round I: Forming a New Government The next step for the AKP is to form government. According to Article 116 of the Turkish constitution, a new cabinet of ministers must be formed and then approved by the president and the parliament within forty-five days after the president authorizes the leader of the winning party to form government. The process of forming a government commenced on August 6, after Turkish president Ahmet Necdet Sezer commissioned AKP leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan to select a cabinet.
    [Show full text]
  • How Does Corruption Affect the Adoption of Lobby Registers? a Comparative Analysis
    Politics and Governance (ISSN: 2183–2463) 2020, Volume 8, Issue 2, Pages 116–127 DOI: 10.17645/pag.v8i2.2708 Article How Does Corruption Affect the Adoption of Lobby Registers? A Comparative Analysis Fabrizio De Francesco 1 and Philipp Trein 2,3,* 1 School of Government and Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, G42 9RJ, UK; E-Mail: [email protected] 2 Department for Actuarial Sciences, University of Lausanne, 1015 Lausanne, Switzerland; E-Mail: [email protected] 3 Institute of Political Studies, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Lausanne, 1015 Lausanne, Switzerland * Corresponding author Submitted: 14 December 2019 | Accepted: 19 March 2020 | Published: 28 May 2020 Abstract Recent research has demonstrated that some governments in developed democracies followed the OECD and the EU rec- ommendations to enhance transparency by adopting lobby registers, whereas other countries refrained from such mea- sures. We contribute to the literature in demonstrating how corruption is linked to the adoption of lobbying regulations. Specifically, we argue that governments regulate lobbying when they face the combination of low to moderate levels of corruption and a relatively well-developed economy. To assess this argument empirically, we compare 42 developed countries between 2000 and 2015, using multivariate logistic regressions and two illustrative case studies. The statistical analysis supports our argument, even if we include a number of control variables, such as the presence of a second par- liamentary chamber, the age of democracy, and a spatial lag. The case studies illustrate the link between anti-corruption agenda and the adoption of lobby registers.
    [Show full text]
  • The Effects of Bicameralism on U.S. Appropriations Policies
    THE EFFECTS OF BICAMERALISM ON U.S. APPROPRIATIONS POLICIES by MARK EDWARD OWENS (Under the Direction of Jamie L. Carson) ABSTRACT This dissertation examines how supermajority rules interact with other institutional constraints. I study appropriations policies to better understand how the content of legislation develops in response to bicameral differences over a one-hundred and four year period. As each chamber has developed independently of one another, the institutional differences that have emerged have had a dynamic impact on the lawmaking process. The time frame of the study, 1880 to 1984, is particularly important because it captures the years when the Senate grew to play a more active role in the legislative process and a number of key budgetary reforms. To study this phenomenon empirically, I measure how regular appropriations bills were packaged differently by the House and Senate from 1880 to 1984 and compare the final enactment to the difference in chamber proposals to determine the magnitude of a chamber’s leverage on enacted policy changes. By treating the Senate’s choice to amend the House version as a selection effect, we can examine the effect bicameralism has on policy outcomes. Specifically, I analyze a ratio that represents how close the final bill is to the Senate version, given the size of the bicameral distance. Finally, I complete the study by examining how the president influences bicameral negotiations and how bicameralism complicates our theories of intra-branch relations. INDEX WORDS: Appropriations, Bicameralism, Budgeting, Polarization, Senate THE EFFECTS OF BICAMERALISM ON U.S. APPROPRIATIONS POLICIES by MARK EDWARD OWENS B.A., University of Florida, 2006 M.A., Johns Hopkins University, 2008 A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of The University of Georgia in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY ATHENS, GEORGIA 2014 © 2014 Mark Edward Owens All Rights Reserved THE EFFECTS OF BICAMERALISM ON U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Lobbying, Corruption and Other Banes
    IZA DP No. 3693 Lobbying, Corruption and Other Banes Nauro F. Campos Francesco Giovannoni DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES DISCUSSION PAPER September 2008 Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit Institute for the Study of Labor Lobbying, Corruption and Other Banes Nauro F. Campos Brunel University, CEPR and IZA Francesco Giovannoni University of Bristol and CMPO Discussion Paper No. 3693 September 2008 IZA P.O. Box 7240 53072 Bonn Germany Phone: +49-228-3894-0 Fax: +49-228-3894-180 E-mail: [email protected] Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in this series may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit organization supported by Deutsche Post World Net. The center is associated with the University of Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public. IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author. IZA Discussion Paper No. 3693 September 2008 ABSTRACT Lobbying, Corruption and Other Banes* Although the theoretical literature often uses lobbying and corruption synonymously, the empirical literature associates lobbying with the preferred mean for exerting influence in developed countries and corruption with the preferred one in developing countries.
    [Show full text]
  • H.Doc. 108-224 Black Americans in Congress 1870-2007
    “The Negroes’ Temporary Farewell” JIM CROW AND THE EXCLUSION OF AFRICAN AMERICANS FROM CONGRESS, 1887–1929 On December 5, 1887, for the first time in almost two decades, Congress convened without an African-American Member. “All the men who stood up in awkward squads to be sworn in on Monday had white faces,” noted a correspondent for the Philadelphia Record of the Members who took the oath of office on the House Floor. “The negro is not only out of Congress, he is practically out of politics.”1 Though three black men served in the next Congress (51st, 1889–1891), the number of African Americans serving on Capitol Hill diminished significantly as the congressional focus on racial equality faded. Only five African Americans were elected to the House in the next decade: Henry Cheatham and George White of North Carolina, Thomas Miller and George Murray of South Carolina, and John M. Langston of Virginia. But despite their isolation, these men sought to represent the interests of all African Americans. Like their predecessors, they confronted violent and contested elections, difficulty procuring desirable committee assignments, and an inability to pass their legislative initiatives. Moreover, these black Members faced further impediments in the form of legalized segregation and disfranchisement, general disinterest in progressive racial legislation, and the increasing power of southern conservatives in Congress. John M. Langston took his seat in Congress after contesting the election results in his district. One of the first African Americans in the nation elected to public office, he was clerk of the Brownhelm (Ohio) Townshipn i 1855.
    [Show full text]
  • Values, Volatility and Voting: Understanding Voters in England 2015-2019
    VALUES, VOLATILITY AND VOTING: UNDERSTANDING VOTERS IN ENGLAND 2015-2019 Paula Surridge Paula Surridge School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies University of Bristol and UK in a Changing Europe [email protected] Please note: This paper is an early draft and may develop further before publication as new insights become available and modelling is refined. Comments are very welcome via [email protected] 1 ABSTRACT The EU referendum and subsequent general elections in the UK have renewed interest in the influence of values and identity on voting behaviour. This paper uses data from the British Election Study Internet Panel to study the influence of ‘core’ political values on voting behaviour in England at the 2015, 2017 and 2019 general elections. Using a two- dimensional model of political values, the paper shows that both the ‘old’ political values of left and right (associated with economics) and the ‘new’ political values (measured here as ‘liberal-authoritarian’ values) were important in vote choices at each of the three elections. Using the ‘funnel of causality’ model, it shows that values are a more important influence when voters have weaker attachments to political parties and that the interaction between the dimensions is critical for understanding voting patterns. 2 INTRODUCTION Prior to 2016, the study of elections in the UK had largely turned away from values-based models with those based on the ‘valence’ effects of party identity, leadership and competence almost ‘universally accepted’ (Denver and Garnett, 2014). Whilst the EU Referendum (and subsequent general elections in 2017 and 2019) have renewed interest in values and identity as influences on political behaviour, it is a mistake to think of values divides as ‘new’ or as created by the EU referendum.
    [Show full text]
  • Gerrymandering Becomes a Problem
    VOLUME TWENTY FOUR • NUMBER TWO WINTER 2020 THE SPECIAL ELECTION EDITION A LEGAL NEWSPAPER FOR KIDS Gerrymandering Becomes a Problem Battling Over for the States to Resolve How to Elect by Phyllis Raybin Emert a President by Michael Barbella Gerrymandering on a partisan basis is not new to politics. The term gerrymander dates back to the 1800s when it was used to mock The debate on how the President Massachusetts Governor Elbridge Gerry, who manipulated congressional of the United States should be elected lines in the state until the map of one district looked like a salamander. is almost as old as the country itself. Redistricting, which is the redrawing of district maps, happens every Contrary to popular belief, voters 10 years after the U.S. Census takes place. Whatever political party is do not elect the president and vice in power at that time has the advantage since, in most states, they president directly; instead, they choose are in charge of drawing the maps. electors to form an Electoral College “Partisan gerrymandering refers to the practice of politicians where the official vote is cast. drawing voting districts for their own political advantage,” During the Constitutional Convention says Eugene D. Mazo, a professor at Rutgers Law School and of 1787, a an expert on election law and the voting process. few ways to Professor Mazo explains that politicians, with the use of advanced computer elect the chief technology, use methods of “packing” and “cracking” to move voters around to executive were different state districts, giving the edge to one political party.
    [Show full text]
  • Extreme Gerrymandering & the 2018 Midterm
    EXTREME GERRYMANDERING & THE 2018 MIDTERM by Laura Royden, Michael Li, and Yurij Rudensky Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law ABOUT THE BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE The Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law is a nonpartisan law and policy institute that works to reform, revitalize — and when necessary defend — our country’s systems of democracy and justice. At this critical moment, the Brennan Center is dedicated to protecting the rule of law and the values of Constitutional democracy. We focus on voting rights, campaign finance reform, ending mass incarceration, and preserving our liberties while also maintaining our national security. Part think tank, part advocacy group, part cutting-edge communications hub, we start with rigorous research. We craft innovative policies. And we fight for them — in Congress and the states, the courts, and in the court of public opinion. ABOUT THE CENTER’S DEMOCRACY PROGRAM The Brennan Center’s Democracy Program works to repair the broken systems of American democracy. We encourage broad citizen participation by promoting voting and campaign finance reform. We work to secure fair courts and to advance a First Amendment jurisprudence that puts the rights of citizens — not special interests — at the center of our democracy. We collaborate with grassroots groups, advocacy organizations, and government officials to eliminate the obstacles to an effective democracy. ABOUT THE BRENNAN CENTER’S PUBLICATIONS Red cover | Research reports offer in-depth empirical findings. Blue cover | Policy proposals offer innovative, concrete reform solutions. White cover | White papers offer a compelling analysis of a pressing legal or policy issue.
    [Show full text]
  • Elections Director Ohio Democratic Party Columbus, Ohio About Ohio
    Elections Director Ohio Democratic Party Columbus, Ohio About Ohio Over the next two years the Ohio Democratic Party (ODP) will build an organization to win highly consequential elections up and down the ballot. With new leadership comes a new vision for our Party, refocusing on the core fundamentals that move the needle. ODP is building back better as a focused, modern, and nimble force to elect Democrats statewide now and in the future. Ohio is a top tier U.S. Senate pick up opportunity for national Democrats because of retiring Republican incumbents. The battle to save the Senate majority will be fought in Ohio. 2022 offers the chance to take control of the Ohio Supreme Court, make gains under new legislative maps, and win control of state government constitutional including Governor/Lt. Governor, Attorney General, Secretary of State, Treasurer, and Auditor. These opportunities give Democrats in Ohio early and strategic gains in rebuilding the Ohio Democratic Party. About the Opportunity The Ohio Democratic Party is seeking a talented, passionate professional to build an elections operation that will reimagine how we connect with, train, support, and activate volunteers and candidates in Ohio. In partnership with the Chair and the Executive team, the Elections Director will lead a highly integrated team of field, training, data, and digital staff responsible for building a volunteer organization that can be maintained cycle to cycle. They will set strategic goals for 2021, 2022, and manage the engagement of multiple in-state entities (County parties, progressive groups, caucuses) candidate campaigns across the ballot, and a variety of local, statewide, and national stakeholders.
    [Show full text]
  • General Election" Defined -- Offices to Be Filled -- Constitu- Tional Amendments
    TITLE 34 ELECTIONS CHAPTER 1 DEFINITIONS 34-101. "GENERAL ELECTION" DEFINED -- OFFICES TO BE FILLED -- CONSTITU- TIONAL AMENDMENTS. "General election" means the national, state and county election held on the first Tuesday succeeding the first Monday of November in each even-numbered year. At these elections there shall be chosen all congressional, state and county officers, including electors of president and vice-president of the United States, as are by law to be elected in such years. All amendments to the Idaho constitution shall be submitted to the vot- ers for their approval at these elections. [34-101, added 1970, ch. 140, sec. 1, p. 351; am. 1971, ch. 194, sec. 1, p. 881.] 34-102. "PRIMARY ELECTION" DEFINED -- PURPOSES. (1) "Primary elec- tion" means an election held for the purpose of nominating persons as candidates of political parties for election to offices, and for the purpose of electing persons as members of the controlling committees of political parties. Primary elections, with the exception of presidential primaries, shall be held on the third Tuesday of May in each even-numbered year. (2) "Presidential primary" means an election held for the purpose of allowing voters to express their choice of candidate for nomination by a po- litical party for president of the United States. A presidential primary shall be held on the second Tuesday in March in each presidential election year. [34-102, added 1970, ch. 140, sec. 2, p. 351; am. 1971, ch. 194, sec. 2, p. 881; am. 1975, ch. 174, sec. 11, p. 469; am. 1979, ch. 309, sec.
    [Show full text]
  • Standards for Superintendents
    OHIO Standards For Superintendents Excellence • Commitment • Achievement Members of the 2008 State Board of Education Jennifer Sheets President Heather Heslop Licata Pomeroy Akron Ex Officio Members Jennifer Stewart Robin C. Hovis Senator Joy Padgett Vice President Millersburg Ohio Senate Zanesville Stephen M. Millett Coshocton John R. Bender Columbus Representative Arlene J. Setzer Avon Eric Okerson Ohio House of Representatives Virgil E. Brown, Jr. Cincinnati Vandalia Shaker Heights Emerson J. Ross, Jr. Deborah Cain Toledo Uniontown G. R. “Sam” Schloemer Michael Cochran Cincinnati Blacklick Jane Sonenshein Colleen D. Grady Loveland Strongsville Sue Westendorf Lou Ann Harrold Bowling Green Ada Carl Wick Susan Haverkos Centerville West Chester Ann Womer Benjamin Aurora is document is an official publication of the State Board of Education and the Ohio Department of Education. e information within represents official policy of the State Board. Members of the 2008 State Board of Education Members of the Superintendent Standards Writing Team e members of the superintendent standards writing team included many Ohio superintendents, representing districts statewide – large and small; urban, suburban, and rural. e writing team also included representatives from Ohio’s higher education educational leadership programs, from the Jennifer Sheets Buckeye Association of School Administrators (BASA) to the Ohio Educator Standards Board (ESB), and members currently serving on school President Heather Heslop Licata boards for districts in the state of Ohio. In addition, other Ohio stakeholders were provided with opportunities to review and provide feedback Pomeroy Akron Ex Officio Members during various stages of development of the standards. Jennifer Stewart Robin C. Hovis Senator Joy Padgett Vice President Millersburg Ohio Senate Geoffrey Andrews Ted Kowalski Facilitator Superintendent, Oberlin City Schools University of Dayton Zanesville Stephen M.
    [Show full text]
  • OEA/Ser.G CP/Doc. 4115/06 8 May 2006 Original: English REPORT OF
    OEA/Ser.G CP/doc. 4115/06 8 May 2006 Original: English REPORT OF THE ELECTORAL OBSERVATION MISSION IN BOLIVIA PRESIDENTIAL AND PREFECTS ELECTIONS 2005 This document is being distributed to the permanent missions and will be presented to the Permanent Council of the Organization ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES REPORT OF THE ELECTORAL OBSERVATION MISSION IN BOLIVIA PRESIDENTIAL AND PREFECTS ELECTIONS 2005 Secretariat for Political Affairs This version is subject to revision and will not be available to the public pending consideration, as the case may be, by the Permanent Council CONTENTS MAIN ABBREVIATIONS vi CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 1 A. Electoral Process of December 2005 1 B. Legal and Electoral Framework 3 1. Electoral officers 4 2. Political parties 4 3. Citizen groups and indigenous peoples 5 4. Selection of prefects 6 CHAPTER II. MISSION BACKGROUND, OBJECTIVES AND CHARACTERISTICS 7 A. Mission Objectives 7 B. Preliminary Activities 7 C. Establishment of Mission 8 D. Mission Deployment 9 E. Mission Observers in Political Parties 10 F. Reporting Office 10 CHAPTER III. OBSERVATION OF PROCESS 11 A. Electoral Calendar 11 B. Electoral Training 11 1. Training for electoral judges, notaries, and board members11 2. Disseminating and strengthening democratic values 12 C. Computer System 13 D. Monitoring Electoral Spending and Campaigning 14 E. Security 14 CHAPTER IV. PRE-ELECTION STAGE 15 A. Concerns of Political Parties 15 1. National Electoral Court 15 2. Critical points 15 3. Car traffic 16 4. Sealing of ballot boxes 16 5. Media 17 B. Complaints and Reports 17 1. Voter registration rolls 17 2. Disqualification 17 3.
    [Show full text]