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The Effects of Bicameralism on U.S. Appropriations Policies

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THE EFFECTS OF BICAMERALISM ON U.S. APPROPRIATIONS POLICIES by
MARK EDWARD OWENS
(Under the Direction of Jamie L. Carson)
ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines how supermajority rules interact with other institutional constraints. I study appropriations policies to better understand how the content of legislation develops in response to bicameral differences over a one-hundred and four year period. As each chamber has developed independently of one another, the institutional differences that have emerged have had a dynamic impact on the lawmaking process. The time frame of the study, 1880 to 1984, is particularly important because it captures the years when the Senate grew to play a more active role in the legislative process and a number of key budgetary reforms. To study this phenomenon empirically, I measure how regular appropriations bills were packaged differently by the House and Senate from 1880 to 1984 and compare the final enactment to the difference in chamber proposals to determine the magnitude of a chamber’s leverage on enacted policy changes. By treating the Senate’s choice to amend the House version as a selection effect, we can examine the effect bicameralism has on policy outcomes. Specifically, I analyze a ratio that represents how close the final bill is to the Senate version, given the size of the bicameral distance. Finally, I complete the study by examining how the president influences bicameral negotiations and how bicameralism complicates our theories of intra-branch relations.

  • INDEX WORDS:
  • Appropriations, Bicameralism, Budgeting, Polarization, Senate

THE EFFECTS OF BICAMERALISM ON U.S. APPROPRIATIONS POLICIES by
MARK EDWARD OWENS
B.A., University of Florida, 2006
M.A., Johns Hopkins University, 2008

A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of The University of Georgia in Partial
Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
ATHENS, GEORGIA
2014
© 2014
Mark Edward Owens All Rights Reserved
THE EFFECTS OF BICAMERALISM ON U.S. APPROPRIATIONS POLICIES by
MARK EDWARD OWENS

Major Professor: Committee:
Jamie L. Carson Keith T. Poole Anthony J. Madonna James E. Monogan, III

Electronic Version Approved: Maureen Grasso Dean of the Graduate School The University of Georgia May 2014
DEDICATION
For my mother and father

iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I must begin by acknowledging my deep appreciation for the many individuals who have invested undocumented hours and support into the completion of this project. My interest in studying political institutions is a combination of the experiences I have had and the mentorship of many individuals along the way. For example, I often reminded of a discussion I had with former U.S. Representative Charles Bass when I was applying to graduate school, where he told me I needed to spend two more years at least in Washington to fully understand the rules. As a slow learner I decided to dedicate an entire doctoral study to learning the intricacies of these institutional rules and dissertation to understanding how policies are affected by these rules.
There are many faculty members that I am indebted to for the time they have invested in my education since I first arrived to Athens, Georgia. My major professor, Jamie Carson, has been an exceptional mentor since I began as his research assistant on my first day. Jamie’s guidance, patience, good humor, and great taste in food have been invaluable to building my confidence in discussing politics and how enjoyable this profession can be. Similarly, the mentorship of Charles Bullock and Anthony Madonna has shown me how I can integrate my experience from working in Washington D.C. and on campaigns by sharing stories that highlight important theoretical concepts about politics. My dissertation committee also included Keith Poole and Jamie Monogan who not only took an interest in my work, but have dedicated their time to the professionalization of all graduate students to prepare us for what is to come once we graduate. I will miss the trivia questions, red suspenders, tall tales of old politicians, and election

vnight parties. But I leave it to the reader to identify which event corresponds with a member of this dynamic group.
This project has also been shaped by conversations with other scholars, including Ryan
Bakker, Sarah Binder, Harold Clarke, Doug Dion, Keith Dougherty, Jim Granato, Michael Lynch, Daniel Magleby, Elizabeth Rybicki, Jim Saturno, and Jason Windett. For a project that is about appropriations and bicameralism in the United States, it may seem odd to mention the importance of my studies in England. However, as a visiting graduate student at the University of Oxford the opportunity to discuss and present my research with Ray Duch, Iain McLean, Nigel Bowles, and Alan Ware was beneficial to make sure this was a worthwhile project to a broader audience. It was also a great opportunity to be challenged by peers like Black Ewing, Richard Johnson, and Ursula Hackett at the Rothermere American Institute and Nuffield College. I am also grateful for the willingness of Sarah Binder, Rod Kiewiet, Mathew McCubbins, Eric Schickler, and Gregory Wawro to make their data available to begin this project.
I also owe particular thanks to a core group of graduate students including, Robert
Cooper, David Gelman, Karen Owen, Stephen Pettigrew, Joel Sievert and Szymon Stojek – each excellent individuals – all kept me accountable through our discussion about research and teaching. They also gave time to the development of this project in addition to their own studies. This project has also benefited from the financial support of the University of Georgia Graduate School, through the Dean’s Award for Social Science Research and the Association of Centers for the Study of Congress, which supported my trips to visit the National Archives in Washington and Briscoe Center in Austin, Texas.
Above all, I must thank my family. My parents have taught me to take interest in and care for the needs of others, as well as reinforced the importance of higher education in my own

vi life. The comfort I have to take risks and venture off in efforts to begin a new career has been possible because of the continuous support I received from my parents and, yes even, my two late-grandmothers. The opportunity to live in my grandmother’s guest bedroom allowed me to take advantage of summer internships in the House of Representatives and the Senate to keep my interest in the political process. Each of those summer experiences made it easy for me to move to Washington D.C. and try to start a career that would give me stories to share in the classroom.

vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.............................................................................................................v LIST OF TABLES........................................................................................................................ xii

LIST OF FIGURES .....................................................................................................................xiii CHAPTER
1 PIVOTAL CHAMBER: THE U.S. SENATE AND APPROPRIATIONS.................... 1

A Difference in the Development of Majority Rule in the House and Senate ................. 3 A Necessary Component of Good Governance: Appropriations...................................... 7 Origination of Appropriations........................................................................................... 9 Annual Consideration of Appropriation Bills................................................................ 11 Isolating the Senate’s Role in the Appropriation Process.............................................. 14 Plan for Dissertation ...................................................................................................... 17
2 BUDGETING VS. APPROPRIATIONS: COMPETING APPROACHES TO
FEDERAL SPENDING...................................................................................... 20

The Early Appropriation Process: Dynamics of Bargaining Under Different Rules..... 23 Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 ........................................................................ 27 Bow Amendment: Institutionalizing Caps on Expenditures as Early as 1967 .............. 30 Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974.................................................. 32

viii
Lessons Learned from Bargains during 1880-1984: Spending Caps and PAYGO....... 34 Spending Caps, Sequestration, and PAYGO................................................................. 35 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 36
3 THE DYNAMIC INFLUENCE OF THE SENATE ON POLICY OUTCOMES........ 39
Studying the Senate’s Influence..................................................................................... 41 Individual Member Policy Influence in the Senate........................................................ 42 Likelihood of Bicameral Disagreement......................................................................... 46 Bicameralism and Policy Outcomes .............................................................................. 47 Chamber Differences ..................................................................................................... 49 Contextual Dynamics..................................................................................................... 52 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 55
4 DEVELOPMENT OF CHAMBER DISAGREEMENT.............................................. 59
Partisanship and Senate Action...................................................................................... 62 Expectations for Different Spending Priorities.............................................................. 64 Frequency....................................................................................................................... 67 Magnitude ...................................................................................................................... 68 How Often Does the Senate Disagree?.......................................................................... 71 Restrictive Rules............................................................................................................ 77 How Much Does the Senate Disagree?.......................................................................... 81 Estimating the Magnitude of the Senate’s Disagreement.............................................. 85

ix
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 88
5 MEASURING THE ROLE OF THE U.S. SENATE ON APPROPRIATIONS IN THE
HISTORICAL ERA 1880-1984.......................................................................... 91

Assessing The Senate’s Leverage Over Policies ........................................................... 92 Bicameralism and Policy Outcomes, 1880-1984........................................................... 95 Measurement and Data .................................................................................................. 98 Chamber Differences and Senate Leverage................................................................. 101 Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 109
6 THE SENATE’S ROLE IN CONGRESSIONAL-PRESIDENTIAL POWER .......... 112
Presidential Budget Request: Detail on the President’s Preferred Policy.................... 116 Value of the Veto in the Appropriations Process......................................................... 118 Partisanship and Presidential Influence in the Appropriations Process....................... 121 Data and Methods ........................................................................................................ 124 Inter-Branch Politics and the Senate’s Leverage......................................................... 126 Assessing Bicameralism’s Effect on Inter-Branch Politics ......................................... 129 President’s Influence on House Senate Differences .................................................... 131 Senate’s Role in Delivering the President’s Agenda ................................................... 132 Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 135
7 IMPLICATIONS OF A STRONG SECOND CHAMBER......................................... 137
Bicameralism and Polarization .................................................................................... 139

x
Economic Factors and Institutional Leverage on Federal Spending ........................... 140 Bicameralism and the Senate’s Workload ................................................................... 141 Future Research to Establish Stronger Substantive Expectations................................ 143 Implications of Which Chamber Has the Most Leverage............................................ 146 REFERENCES ................................................................................................................149 APPENDICES A Identification of the Heckman Model........................................................................162

xi
LIST OF TABLES
Page
Table 1: Appropriation Bills from 1920-1921...............................................................................26 Table 2: Appropriation Bills from 1922-1923...............................................................................26 Table 3: Comparison of All Senate Actions on Appropriations Policies ......................................71 Table 4: Likelihood the Senate Provides a Policy Alternative .....................................................75 Table 5: Senate Action Following a Special Rule in the House....................................................79 Table 6: Senate Action if the House Committee Report Was Not Modified ................................80 Table 7: Instances When the Bicameral Disagreement Exceeded Ten Percent ............................81 Table 8: Effects on the Magnitude of the Senate’s Disagreement.................................................87 Table 9: Senate Influence on Policy Outcomes, 1880-1984 .......................................................103 Table 10: Congressional Budget and Appropriation Process Timetable ....................................113 Table 11: Summary of Vetoes to Regular Appropriations Bills, 1880-1984 .............................120 Table 12: Congressional Deviation from the President’s Request for Federal Spending ...........128 Table 13: House and Senate Effects on Federal Spending: 1880-1984 ......................................130 Table 14: A Check on the Identification of the Heckman Model ...............................................163 Table 15: Results if the Stages of Bicameralism Were Not Accounted For ...............................164 Table 16: Two Stage Selection Using Standardized Measures of Non-Traditional Bargains ....165

xii
LIST OF FIGURES
Page
Figure 1: Sequence of Floor Actions and Responses within the Appropriations Process.............45 Figure 2: Bicameral Differences Across Time .............................................................................66 Figure 3: Comparison of House and Senate Chamber Workload .................................................70 Figure 4: Count of Bills Where the Senate Cut the House Proposal Over Time ..........................72 Figure 5: Count of Times the Senate Tried to Cut the House Proposal by Bill Type ..................73 Figure 6: Effect of Budgetary Era on the Probability of Senate Action by Era ............................76 Figure 7: Number of House Special Rules Given to Appropriations by Bill Type ......................79 Figure 8: Additive Changes in Policy Content Before the Budget and Accountability Act .........82 Figure 9: Additive Changes in Policy Content Between the Budget and Accountability Act and the Legislative Reorganization Act ...................................................................................83
Figure 10: Additive Changes in Policy Content Between the Legislative Reorganization Act and the Budget and Impoundment Act.....................................................................................83
Figure 11: Additive Changes in Policy Content Between the Budget and Impoundment Act and
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings ................................................................................................84
Figure 12: Effect of Senate Workload on Chamber Leverage by Era ........................................107

xiii
CHAPTER 1
PIVOTAL CHAMBER: THE U.S. SENATE AND APPROPRIATIONS
The recent return of polarization between the two governing parties in Washington has been blamed for gridlock. The fact that the U.S. Congress has been passing fewer bills has allowed current congressional scholars to characterize contemporary legislative-executive relations as ineffective. At the conclusion of the first session of the 113th Congress, Sarah Binder spoke directly to the conflict polarization and bicameral differences have brought when she said, “If we look back five or six decades, these are the forces that have mired Congress in a stalemate. And they’ve all come to a head this Congress” (Zillman 2013). Even before the 113th Congress, efforts to determine why Congress was so unproductive focused their attention on the Senate because the polarization of the parties has encouraged senators to obstruct (Mann and Ornstein 2006; 2009 and Packer 2010). The public attention that the effect bicameral differences can have on policy production has been reinforced by attempts to change the Senate’s rules to reduce the threat of obstruction from a minority of the chamber since the 2009 when the 112th Congress convened.1
Many of the suggested rules changes have sought to reduce the length of debate following specific votes, as well as reduce the number of votes necessary to stop a filibuster in

1 On January 5, 2011 Senators Tom Harkin (D-IA), Jeff Merkley (D-OR), and Tom Udall (D-NM) introduced three separate resolutions to alter the Senate’s rules to reduce the threat of a filibuster. S.Res. 8 was sponsored by Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA) and attempted to change paragraph 2 of Rule XXII so that each successive cloture vote on the same question would require a lower threshold of support. The votes required to end debate would be 57 on the second vote, drop to 54 on the third vote, and then only require a simple majority vote thereafter. Senator Udall (D- NM) sponsored S.Res. 10 which attempted to eliminate filibusters to motions to proceed and the anonymity of senators who place holds on nominations. Senator Merkley (D-OR) sponsored S.Res. 21 which proposed that cloture could be invoked by a simple majority if no senator asked the chair to be recognized for debate (Congressional Record, vol. 157, January 26, 2011, page S265; also see Heitshusen 2013).

1the Senate as outlined in Rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate. However, the difficulty of the Senate majority to pass legislation and confirm nominees is not just the ability of senators to obstruct, but how the effects of obstruction combine with other differences between the House and Senate. Senator Udall identified the problem by saying:
“the rules as they exist today make an effort to change them a daunting process. Under the current Standing Rules of the Senate, Rule V states that quote, ‘the Rules of the Senate shall continue from one Congress to the next unless they are changed as provided in these rules.’ As adopted in 1975, Rule XXII requires two-thirds of Senators present and voting to agree to end debate on a change to the Senate rules – in most cases 67 votes.

Taken together these two rules effectively deny the Senate the opportunity to exercise its constitutional right to determine the Rules of its Proceedings … and serve to bind this body to rules adopted by its predecessors.”

  • -
  • Senator Tom Udall (D-NM)2

Arguments raised about the procedures for debate in the House and Senate are rooted in the belief that rules can determine who has power over the development of policy. Equally important to the rules of a chamber are the number of votes needed to enforce then, because decisions made by a majority vote do not need to meet the demands of all the legislators. The concern that majorities may overlook the concerns of a minority has led to constitutional mandates on votes relating to inter-branch relations and how each chamber manages its membership.3
The importance of Senator Udall’s emphasis on the Standing Rules of the Senate is that the Rules and Expulsion Clause (Article 1, Section 5, Clause 2) states, “Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings...” Therefore in the U.S. Congress we find two chambers

2 Udall, Tom. 2010. “The Constitutional Option.” Speech on the Senate floor January 25, 2010. Accessible: http://www.tomudall.senate.gov/files/documents/Speeches/TheConstitutionalOption.pdf. 3 The United States Constitution, Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 mandates that two-thirds of the Senate must vote to ratify a treaty. Article I, Section 3, Clause 3 outlines the requirement of another two-thirds majority requirement in the Senate to remove federal officers with a conviction of impeachment. Both the House and the Senate are subject to a supermajority requirement in order to override a presidential veto (Article I, Section 7, Clause 2), expel members from their chamber (Article I, Section 5, Clause 2), or propose constitutional amendments (Article V).

2operating under different rules with the goal of passing identical versions of each bill before it can be enacted. The uniquely different legislative bodies we see today, with the House and Senate, reflect the changing nature of each chamber and how each has adapted in an attempt to reduce the frustration and delay in the legislative process.

A Difference in the Development Majority Rule in the House and Senate

The ability of the House of Representatives to pass legislation with less obstruction than the Senate is a consequence of the power that was vested within the Speaker of the House. The concentration of power within the Speaker began after Speaker Thomas Reed (R-ME) instructed the Clerk of the House to count all members on the Floor but not responding to the roll-call vote in order to break the disappearing quorum, which the minority used to keep votes from passing. Following this decision the House Republican majority in the 51st Congress also voted to formally change the rules to allow present members to be counted towards quorum and reduced the number of members necessary for the Committee of the Whole to meet to one hundred. The change in the required size of the Committee of the Whole was important because the rules stated that a majority of the Committee of the Whole could end debate, therefore limiting input from the minority (then Democrats). These “Reed’s Rules” were also important in expanding the House majority’s control over scheduling legislation by expanding the influence of special orders from the Committee on Rules and bringing bills to the floor in the order which pleased the majority (Binder 1997; Cooper and Brady 1981; Dion 1997; McConachie 1898; Rohde 1991).
The emphasis by which the House Republicans in 1890 placed on increasing the power of the Speaker of the House and the Committee on Rules was a reaction to the increasing disagreement between the two parties (Binder 1997; Koger 2010). The urgency to limit obstruction from the minority was a reflection of how the delay in handling the dilatory tactics of

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    Oklahoma State House of Representatives District 1 State Representative: Johnny Tadlock Current term ends: 1/8/2018 Address: 2300 N Lincoln Blvd, Room 539B, OklAhomA City, OklAhomA 73105 Main phone: (405)-557-7363 E-mail: [email protected] Counties represented: Le Flore, McCurtain (2) Zip codes represented: 74549, 74571, 74577, 74722, 74724, 74728, 74734, 74736, 74740, 74745, 74750, 74754, 74755, 74764, 74766, 74937, 74939, 74949, 74957, 74963, 74966 (21) PoliticAl AffiliAtion: DemocrAt Committees: Agriculture and Rural Development; County and Municipal Government; General Government Oversight and Accountability; Judiciary – Criminal Justice and Corrections MeAsures Authored in 2017: HB1367, HB1368, HB1369, HB1370, HB1371, HB1372 Tribal Jurisdictions: Choctaw AssistAnt: Leslie Smith-HaddAd District 2 State Representative: John Bennett Current term ends: 1/8/2018 Address: 2300 N Lincoln Blvd, Room 301A, OklAhomA City, OklAhomA 73105 Main phone: (405)-557-7315 E-mail: [email protected] Counties represented: Sequoyah (1) Zip codes represented: 74931, 74936, 74945, 74946, 74948, 74954, 74955, 74962 (8) PoliticAl Affiliation: Republican Committees: A&B Public Safety (Chair); Appropriations and Budget; Joint Committee on Appropriations and Budget; Veterans and Military Affairs; Wildlife MeAsures Authored in 2017: HB1933, HB1934, HB1935, HB1936, HB1937, HB1938, HB2177, HCR1021 Tribal Jurisdictions: Cherokee, United Keetoowah Band of Cherokees AssistAnt: MArthA Perry District 3 State Representative: Rick West Current term ends:
  • Table 3.6 SENATE LEADERSHIP POSITIONS

    Table 3.6 SENATE LEADERSHIP POSITIONS

    STATE LEGISLATURES Table 3.6 SENATE LEADERSHIP POSITIONS: METHODS OF SELECTION State or other majority leader floor Majority whip Majority chair caucus Minority leader Assistant minority leader Minority leader floor Assistant minority leader floor Minority whip Minority chair caucus jurisdiction President President pro tem Majority leader Assistant majority leader Majority leader floor Assistant Alabama (b) ....................... (a) ES (b) . (b) . Alaska ................................. ES . EC . EC EC EC . EC EC Arizona ............................... ES AP EC . EC . EC EC . EC . Arkansas ............................. (a) ES EC . EC . EC . EC . California ........................... (a) ES EC . EC EC EC . EC EC Colorado ............................. ES ES EC EC . EC EC EC EC . EC EC Connecticut (c) .................. (a) ES AP AP AP AP AP AP EC AL AL AL AL AL Delaware ............................ (a) ES EC . EC . EC . EC EC Florida (mm) ...................... EC/ES ES AP AL . EC EC . AL AL Georgia ............................... (a) ES EC . EC EC EC . EC EC Hawaii................................. ES ES (e) EC . EC . EC EC (f) EC . EC . Idaho ................................... (a) ES EC EC . EC EC EC . EC Illinois ................................. ES AP AP AP . AP AP EC AL . AL AL Indiana ................................ (a) ES . AT AT AT EC EC . EC (h) (h) EC Iowa .................................... ES ES EC EC . EC . EC EC . EC . Kansas ................................ ES ES (e) EC EC . EC EC EC EC . EC EC Kentucky (i) ....................... ES ES . EC . EC EC . EC . EC . Louisiana ............................ ES ES . Maine (ll)............................ ES ES EC EC (j) (j) (k) . EC EC (l) (l) (m) . Maryland ............................ ES ES AP (n) AP (n) (n) (n) AP . EC (o) . (o) . EC . Massachusetts .................... EC . AP AP . (p) EC . (p) Michigan (q) ....................... (a) ES EC EC EC EC EC EC EC EC EC EC EC EC Minnesota ..........................
  • Gender-Sensitizing Commonwealth Parliaments

    Gender-Sensitizing Commonwealth Parliaments

    Gender-Sensitizing Commonwealth Parliaments The Report of a Commonwealth Parliamentary Association Study Group Gender-Sensitizing Commonwealth Parliaments The Report of a Commonwealth Parliamentary Association Study Group Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 27 February – 1 March 2001 Published by the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association Secretariat Suite 700, Westminster House, 7 Millbank London SW1P 3JA, United Kingdom This publication is also available online at www.cpahq.org Foreword Without doubt, more and more countries and Parliaments are appreciating that women have a right to participate in political structures and legislative decision-making. However, for the most part, although women may overcome the more general obstacles to their participation in Parliaments, once they reach there they often encounter additional difficulties. In 1998 the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA) collaborated with three Commonwealth legal NGOs in the development of the Latimer House Guidelines on Parliamentary Supremacy and Judicial Independence. Among many other matters, the guidelines point out the need to improve the numbers of women Members in Commonwealth Parliaments and suggest ways in which this goal can be achieved. An earlier CPA study had already identified barriers to the participation of women in public life. The next logical step was to endeavour to identify means by which the task facing women Parliamentarians can be rationalized. Against this background, in February and March 2001 the CPA, with the assistance of the CPA Malaysia Branch and the approval of the CPA Executive Committee, arranged a Study Group in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, on Gender-Sensitizing Commonwealth Parliaments. The aims of the Study Group were set out as: 1. To share analyses, experiences and good practices of Standing Orders in Commonwealth Parliaments; 2.
  • Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Legislative

    Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Legislative

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL MONDAY, OCTOBER 15, 2018 SESSION OF 2018 202D OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY No. 44 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES O divine Master, grant that I may not so much seek to be consoled as to console, The House convened at 11 a.m., e.d.t. to be understood as to understand, to be loved as to love. THE SPEAKER (MIKE TURZAI) For it is in giving that we receive, PRESIDING it is in pardoning that we are pardoned, and it is in dying that we are born to eternal life. MOMENT OF SILENCE In Your name we pray. Amen. FOR HON. MICHAEL H. O'BRIEN The SPEAKER. We were of course deeply saddened to learn PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE of the passing of our friend and colleague, Representative (The Pledge of Allegiance was recited by members and Michael O'Brien. So I would ask everybody to please stand as visitors.) able for a moment of silence as we reflect upon his life and legacy as a public servant. Of course we will be having a memorial at a later date and time. JOURNAL APPROVAL POSTPONED The prayer today will be offered by our friend and colleague, the minority whip, Representative Mike Hanna. Immediately The SPEAKER. Without objection, the approval of the thereafter we will recite the Pledge of Allegiance. Please stand Journal of Thursday, October 11, 2018, will be postponed until for this moment of silence, and then we will have Representative printed. Hanna give the prayer. BILL REPORTED FROM COMMITTEE, (Whereupon, the members of the House and all visitors stood CONSIDERED FIRST TIME, AND TABLED in a moment of silence in solemn respect to the memory of the Honorable Michael H.