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Nuel Belnap: Curriculum Vitae NUEL BELNAP: CURRICULUM VITAE PRESENT POSITION: Alan Ross Anderson Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, Professor of Sociology, Professor of History and Philosophy of Science, and Professor of the Intelligent Systems Program, University of Pittsburgh. PERSONAL: born Evanston, Illinois, May 1, 1930. EDUCATION: B. A., University of Illinois, 1952; M. A., Yale University, 1957; Ph. D., Yale University, 1960. EMPLOYMENT: Yale University, Department of Philosophy, Instructor, 1958-1960; Assistant Professor, 1960--1963. University of Pittsburgh, Department of Philosophy, Associate Professor, 1963- 1966; Professor, 1966 to date; Professor of Sociology, 1967 to date; Professor of History and Philosophy of Science, 1971 to date; Alan Ross Anderson Lecturer, 1983-84; Alan Ross Anderson Distinguished Professor, 1984 to date; Professor in the Intelligent Systems Program, 1988 to date. University of California at Irvine, Visiting Professor of Philosophy, Winter, 1973. Indiana University, Visiting Oscar R. Ewing Professor of Philosophy, Fall, 1977, Fall, 1978, and Fall, 1979. PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS: American Philosophical Association; Associa­ tion for Symbolic Logic (Program Committee Chairman, 1961; Executive Com­ mittee, 1970--1973; representative to Section L ofthe AAAS, 1974-84; Commit­ tee on reviews policy, 1974-1976; Oversight Committee 1988-1989; Nomination Committee 1989); American Association for the Advancement of Science; So­ ciety for Exact Philosophy (Vice president, 1971-1974; President, 1974-1976; Program coordinator, 1978; treasurer, 1979-80); Mind Association (U. S. trea­ surer, 1974 to date). FELLOWSHIPS AND PRIZES: Predoctoral: Tew Prize, Yale, 1955; Sterling Junior Fellow, Yale, 1955-1956; Fulbright Fellow, Louvain, Belgium, 1957-1958. Postdoctoral: Morse Research Fellow, 1962-1963; Guggenheim Fellow, 1975- 1976; National Endowment for the Humanities Fellow (declined), 1975- 1976; Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences Fellow (partially funded by the National Endowment for the Humanities), 1982-1983; Fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1988-. 357 358 NUEL BELNAP: CURRICULUM VITAE EDITORIAL BOARDS: American Philosophical Quarterly, 1966-1978; Journal of Philosophical Logic, 1970 to date (treasurer, 1970-1976; vice president, 1976- 82; chairman of the Board of Governors, 1982-1988); Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 1970 to date; Philosophy of Science, 1975 to date; StudiaLogica, 1976 to date; Philosophical Research Archives, 1976 to date. GRANTS, CONSULTANTSHIPS, AND RESEARCH FELLOWSHIPS: Director of a program of Summer Undergraduate Research and Independent Study, sponsored by the National Science Foundation (National Science Foun­ dation Grants 11848 and G21871), 1960-63. Consultant, Office of Naval Research (Group Psychology Branch) Contract SAR! Nonr-609(16), "Problem solving and social interaction," 1960-63. Consultant, System Development Corporation, Santa Monica, California, c. 1961-1967. Associate investigator, National Science Foundation Grant No. GS-190, "An investigation of some non-classical systems of mathematical logic," 1963-65. Consultant, University of Pittsburgh Knowledge Availability Center, 1963-66. Senior research associate, Center for the Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, 1964-1978; Fellow, 1979 to date. Principal investigator, National Science Foundation Grant No. GS-689, "An investigation of some non-classical systems of mathematical logic," 1965-68. Co-designer, under a grant from International Business Machines to the Univer­ sity of Pittsburgh, of a course on the use of computers for research in the humanities, 1965-67. Working Group 2.2 (Formal Description of computer languages), International Federation of Information Processors, 1967-1976. Travel to meetings in Vienna (1967), Sardinia (1968), Copenhagen (1968), and Vienna (1969) was supported by the University of Pittsburgh. Senior Research Fellow, Programming Research Group, Oxford University, Hi­ lary Term, 1970. Sabbatical from Pittsburgh. Principal investigator, National Science Foundation Grant GS-28478, 1971- 1976. Visiting Fellow, Australian National University, January-March, 1976. Consultant, Westinghouse Research Laboratory, May, 1981. NUELBELNAP:DOCTORALSTUDENTS Giannoni, Carlos 1966 Conventionalism in logic Meyer, Robert 1966 Topics in modal and many-valued logics Dunn, J. Michael 1966 The algebra of intensional logics Woodruff, Peter 1969 Foundations of three-valued logic Garson, James 1969 The logics of space and time Wilson, Kent 1969 Are modal statements really metalinguis- tic? Grover, Dorothy 1970 Topics in propositional quantification Manor, Ruth 1971 Conditional forms: Assertion, necessity, obligation, and commands Urquhart, Alasdair 1972 The semantics of entailment Pottinger, Garrel 1972 A theory of implications Broido, Jonathan 1974 Generalization of model theoretic notions and the eliminabilityof quantification into modal contexts Vandernat, Arnold 1974 First-order indefinite & generalized se- mantics for weak systems of strict-impli- cation Birmingham, Robert L. 1976 Law as cases Helman, Glen 1977 Restricted Lambda Abstraction and the in- terpretation of some non-classical logics Parks, R. Zane 1977 Studies in philosophical logic & its history Gupta, Anil 1977 The logic of common nouns: an investi- gation in quantified modal logic 359 360 NUEL BELNAP: DOCTORAL STUDENTS Cohen, Daniel 1983 The logic of conditional assertion (Indiana University; J. Michael Dunn, co-director) Horty, John 1986 Some aspects of meaning in non-con­ tingent language Garfield, Jay 1986 Cognitive science and the ontology of mind Kremer, Michael 1986 Logic and truth NUEL BELNAP: PUBLICATIONS Articles (except reprintings) are *'d. Monographs and books are **'d. Unmarked items are abstracts, reviews, reprints, etc. 1955 *1. ''Two components of existence," Ideas, vol. 5 (1955), pp. 21-26. 1958 2. "A modification of Ackermann's 'rigorous implication'" [by A. R. Anderson and NOB] (abstract), Journal of symbolic logic, vol. 23 (1958), pp. 457-458. 1959 *3. "EQ and the first order functional calculus," appendix to Completeness­ theorems for the systems E of entailment and EQ of entailment with quan­ tification by A. R. Anderson, Technical report No.6, Office of Naval Research (Group Psychology Branch) Contract SAR/Nonr-609(16), New Haven, 1959, pp. 25-27. Also appears in Zeitschriftfilr mathematische Logik, vol. 6 (1960), pp.217-218. *4. "Modalities in Ackermann's 'rigorous implication'" [by A. R. Anderson and NOB], Journal of symbolic logic, vol. 24 (1959), pp. 107-111. 5. "Pure rigorous implication as a 'Sequenzen-kalkiil '" (abstract),Journal of sym­ bolic logic, vol. 24 (1959), pp. 282-283. 6. "A proof of the Lowenheim-Skolem theorem" [by A. R. Anderson and NOB] (abstract), Journal of symbolic logic, vol. 24 (1959), pp. 285-286. 7. "Tautological entailments" (abstract), Journal ofsymbolic logic, vol. 24 (1959), p.316. *8. "A simple treatment of truth functions" [by A. R. Anderson and NOB],Journal of symbolic logic, vol. 24 (1959), pp. 301-302. 9. "A simple proof of GOdel's completeness theorem" [by A. R. Anderson and NOB] (abstract), Journal of symbolic logic, vol. 24 (1959), pp. 320--321. 1960 ** 10. A formal analysis of entailment, Technical report No.7, Office of Naval Re­ search (Group Psychology Branch) Contract SAR/Nonr-609(16),New Haven, 1960,pp. viii, 107. * 11. "Independent axiom schemata for the pure theory of entailment" [by A. R. Anderson, NDB and J. R. Wallace], Zeitschriftfilr mathematische Logik, vol. 6 (1960), pp. 93-95. 361 362 NUEL BELNAP: PUBLICATIONS 12. Book note: Axiomatic set theory (New York, 1960) by P. Suppes, Review of metaphysics, vol. 14 (1960-61),p. 175. 13. Review of "Existential presuppositions and existential commitments" (Journal ofphilosophy, 1959) by J. Hintikka,Journal of symbolic logic, vol. 25 (1960), p.88. 14. Review of ''Nondesignating singular terms" (Philosophical review, 1959) by H. Leblanc and T. Hailperin, Journal of symbolic logic, vol. 25 (1960), pp. 87-88. 15. Review of ''Towards a theory of definite descriptions" (Analysis, 1959) by J. Hintikka,Journal of symbolic logic, vol. 25 (1960),pp. 88-89. *16. "Entailment and relevance," Journal ofsymbolic logic, vol. 25 (1960),pp. 144- 146. 17. "First degree formulas" (abstract), Journal of symbolic logic, vol. 25 (1960), pp.388-389. 1961 *18. ''First degree entailments" [by A. R. Anderson and NOB], Technical report No. 10, Office of Naval Research (Group Psychology Branch) Contract SARI Nonr-609(16), New Haven, 1961, pp. iv, 35. * 19. "A decision procedure for the system EI- of entailment with negation" [by NOB and J.R. Wallace], Technical report No. 11, Office of Naval Research (Group Psychology Branch), Contract SAR/Nonr-609(16), New Haven, 1961, pp. 31. 20. Book note: Leviathan: a simulation of behavioral systems, to operate dynam­ ically on a digital computer (Santa Monica, 1959) by B. K. Rome and S. C. Rome,Review of metaphysics, vol. 15 (1961-62),p. 195. 21. Book note: Formal representation of intentionally structured systems (Santa Monica, 1959) by B. K. Rome and S. C. Rome, Review ofmetaphysics, vol. 15 (1961-62), p. 195. 22. Book note: Markov learning models for multiperson interactions (Stanford, 1960) by P. Suppes andR. C. Atkinson,Review ofmetaphysics, vol. 15 (1961- 62),p.196. *23. ''Enthymemes'' [by A. R. Anderson and NOB], Journal of philosophy, vol. 58 (1961),pp.713-723. *24. ''Tonk, Plonk and Plink," Analysis, vol. 22 (1961-62),pp. 130-134. 1962 *25. ''Tautological entailments" [by A.
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