The Scientific Image (Clarendon Library of Logic & Philosophy)
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Haecceitism, Chance
HAECCEITISM, CHANCE, AND COUNTERFACTUALS Boris Kment Abstract. Anti-haecceitists believe that all facts about specific individuals—such as the fact that Fred exists, or that Katie is tall—globally supervene on purely qualitative facts. Haecceitists deny that. The issue is not only of interest in itself, but receives additional importance from its intimate connection to the question of whether all fundamental facts are qualitative or whether they include facts about which specific individuals there are and how qualitative properties and relations are distributed over them. Those who think that all fundamental facts are qualitative are arguably committed to anti-haecceitism. The goal of this paper is to point out some problems for anti-haecceitism (and therefore for the thesis that all fundamental facts are qualitative). The article focuses on two common assumptions about possible worlds: (i) Sets of possible worlds are the bearers of objective physical chance. (ii) Counterfactual conditionals can be defined by appeal to a relation of closeness between possible worlds. The essay tries to show that absurd consequences ensue if either of these assumptions is combined with anti-haecceitism. Then it considers a natural response by the anti-haecceitist, which is to deny that worlds play the role described in (i) and (ii). Instead, the reply continues, we can introduce a new set of entities that are defined in terms of worlds and that behave the way worlds do on the haecceitist position. That allows the anti-haecceitist to formulate anti-haecceitist friendly versions of (i) and (ii) by replacing the appeal to possible worlds with reference to the newly introduced entities. -
Curriculum Vitae
BAS C. VAN FRAASSEN Curriculum Vitae Last updated 3/6/2019 I. Personal and Academic History .................................................................................................................... 1 List of Degrees Earned ........................................................................................................................................................ 1 Title of Ph.D. Thesis ........................................................................................................................................................... 1 Positions held ..................................................................................................................................................................... 1 Invited lectures and lecture series ........................................................................................................................................ 1 List of Honors, Prizes ......................................................................................................................................................... 4 Research Grants .................................................................................................................................................................. 4 Non-Academic Publications ................................................................................................................................................ 5 II. Professional Activities ................................................................................................................................. -
Philosophical Analysis on the Nature and Forms of Information—From the Perspective of Marxist Philosophy †
Proceedings Philosophical Analysis on the Nature and Forms of Information—From the Perspective of Marxist Philosophy † Mingfang Feng 1 and Liang Feng 2,* 1 School of Economics & Law, Shaanxi University of Technology, No.1, First Eastern Ring Road, Hanzhong 723001, China; [email protected] 2 School of Marxism Studies, Xi’an Jiaotong University, No.28 Xianning West Road, Xi’an 710049, China * Correspondence: [email protected] † Presented at the IS4SI 2017 Summit DIGITALISATION FOR A SUSTAINABLE SOCIETY, Gothenburg, Sweden, 12–16 June 2017. Published: 8 June 2017 Abstract: The aim of this research essay attempt to reveal the nature of information form the perspective of Marxist Philosophy. The nature of Information is the first question that philosophy of information science and technology research must be answered, thus the problem is still debated. According to Marxist dialectical materialism method to the essence of information has made the analysis and argumentation, points out the essence of information between what is and its internal contact things, and this contact information is presented. Due to the connection between the protean and endless things, thus produce the endless, full of beautiful things in eyes, each are not identical information. To grasp the nature of information, must pay attention to and the specific form of information and information processing, the reorganization, transmission, storage, use and so on. Keywords: information; nature; connection; philosophy of information 1. Introduction The development of information science and technology has spar ked the nature of information exploration after World War II. The question that ‘What is the nature of information?’ is always unable to avoid in information science and philosophical technology research. -
The Tyranny of Method: a Pragmatic Defense of Philosophical Pluralism
THE TYRANNY OF METHOD: A PRAGMATIC DEFENSE OF PHILOSOPHICAL PLURALISM Vincent M. Colapietro Abstract: The history of philosophy is in no small measure a series of attempts to institute a fail-safe method. In response to what they take to be the scandal of disagreement (disagreement itself being judged as scandalous), a number of historically influential philosophers (e.g., Descartes, Peirce, Husserl, and Carnap) have time and again tried to craft a method for guaranteeing agreement. In light of the failure of these attempts, this tendency might be seen as remotely analogous to what is called in psychoanalytic parlance a “repetition compulsion.” In any event, historical reflections on this repeated tendency promise to be illuminating. But there is a polemical purpose animating these historical reflections. The author tries, in light of these reflections, to render plausible the suggestion that this tendency amounts to a tyranny of method and, in turn, such tyranny results in an inevitable impoverishment of philosophical thought. THE TOPIC of my essay is best brought into focus by recalling a central figure in the history of Western philosophy. 1 This recollection is, however, far from methodologically innocent. My deliberate turn toward a pivotal moment in our intellectual history – in brief, my turn toward history – will provide the basis for my critique of what I am disposed to identify as the tyranny of method. This tyranny is not so much exercised by any particular method as by the repeated impulse to institute a philosophical method of allegedly revolutionary significance. Most often, this impulse is bound up with the hope that philosophy can transform itself into a science (an unquestionable form of certain knowledge) either by adopting the method of science itself (e.g., the efforts of C. -
Donna E. West Myrdene Anderson Editors Before and Beyond Consciousness
Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics Donna E. West Myrdene Anderson Editors Consensus on Peirce’s Concept of Habit Before and Beyond Consciousness Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics Volume 31 Series editor Lorenzo Magnani, University of Pavia, Pavia, Italy e-mail: [email protected] Editorial Board Atocha Aliseda Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM), Coyoacan, Mexico Giuseppe Longo Centre Cavaillès, CNRS—Ecole Normale Supérieure, Paris, France Chris Sinha Lund University, Lund, Sweden Paul Thagard Waterloo University, Waterloo, ON, Canada John Woods University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada About this Series Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics (SAPERE) publishes new developments and advances in all the fields of philosophy, epistemology, and ethics, bringing them together with a cluster of scientific disciplines and technological outcomes: from computer science to life sciences, from economics, law, and education to engineering, logic, and mathematics, from medicine to physics, human sciences, and politics. It aims at covering all the challenging philosophical and ethical themes of contemporary society, making them appropriately applicable to contemporary theoretical, methodological, and practical problems, impasses, controversies, and conflicts. The series includes monographs, lecture notes, selected contributions from specialized conferences and workshops as well as selected Ph.D. theses. Advisory Board A. Abe, Chiba, Japan A. Pereira, São Paulo, Brazil H. Andersen, Copenhagen, Denmark L.M. Pereira, Caparica, Portugal O. Bueno, Coral Gables, USA A.-V. Pietarinen, Helsinki, Finland S. Chandrasekharan, Mumbai, India D. Portides, Nicosia, Cyprus M. Dascal, Tel Aviv, Israel D. Provijn, Ghent, Belgium G.D. Crnkovic, Västerås, Sweden J. Queiroz, Juiz de Fora, Brazil M. -
Plato's Symposium: the Ethics of Desire
Plato’s Symposium: The Ethics of Desire FRISBEE C. C. SHEFFIELD 1 Contents Introduction 1 1. Ero¯s and the Good Life 8 2. Socrates’ Speech: The Nature of Ero¯s 40 3. Socrates’ Speech: The Aim of Ero¯s 75 4. Socrates’ Speech: The Activity of Ero¯s 112 5. Socrates’ Speech: Concern for Others? 154 6. ‘Nothing to do with Human AVairs?’: Alcibiades’ Response to Socrates 183 7. Shadow Lovers: The Symposiasts and Socrates 207 Conclusion 225 Appendix : Socratic Psychology or Tripartition in the Symposium? 227 References 240 Index 249 Introduction In the Symposium Plato invites us to imagine the following scene: A pair of lovers are locked in an embrace and Hephaestus stands over them with his mending tools asking: ‘What is it that you human beings really want from each other?’ The lovers are puzzled, and he asks them again: ‘Is this your heart’s desire, for the two of you to become parts of the same whole, and never to separate, day or night? If that is your desire, I’d like to weld you together and join you into something whole, so that the two of you are made into one. Look at your love and see if this is what you desire: wouldn’t this be all that you want?’ No one, apparently, would think that mere sex is the reason each lover takes such deep joy in being with the other. The soul of each lover apparently longs for something else, but cannot say what it is. The beloved holds out the promise of something beyond itself, but that something lovers are unable to name.1 Hephaestus’ question is a pressing one. -
Before Refraining: Concepts for Agency Author(S): Nuel Belnap Source: Erkenntnis (1975-), Vol
Before Refraining: Concepts for Agency Author(s): Nuel Belnap Source: Erkenntnis (1975-), Vol. 34, No. 2 (Mar., 1991), pp. 137-169 Published by: Springer Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20012334 Accessed: 28/05/2009 14:40 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=springer. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Springer is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Erkenntnis (1975-). http://www.jstor.org NUEL BELNAP BEFORE REFRAINING: CONCEPTS FOR AGENCY ABSTRACT. A structure is described that can serve as a foundation for a semantics for a modal agentive construction such as "a sees to it that Q" ([a sur.Q]). -
Metaphysical Perspectives by Nicholas Rescher (Review) J
Metaphysical Perspectives by Nicholas Rescher (review) J. P. Moreland The Review of Metaphysics, Volume 72, Number 1 (Issue No. 285), September 2018, pp. 151-153 (Review) Published by The Philosophy Education Society, Inc. For additional information about this article https://muse.jhu.edu/article/736129 [ This content has been declared free to read by the pubisher during the COVID-19 pandemic. ] SUMMARIES AND COMMENTS 151 easy to spot a wolf in sheep’s clothing.” Rescher cites as examples the cases involving Alger Hiss, Claus Fuchs, and Anthony Blunt. Rescher concludes with the acknowledgment that evaluating reports prepared for state purposes is a complex business. There is an inevitable gap between the supporting evidence provided and the objective factual claims often based upon it. The information actually at our disposal in many matters confirms our claims but does not always demonstrate them. One is reminded of Plato’s discussion in the Meno where, in introducing the notion of “true opinion,” Plato has Socrates speak of the value of such knowledge. True opinion, although supported by fact, falls short of demonstrative knowledge but is nevertheless required by those who would govern. “Men,” says Socrates, “become good and useful to states not only because they have knowledge, but because they have right opinion.” Given the practical wisdom offered in this volume, it could well be required reading for any high school or college journalism class, and promoted for principled guidance to others, especially those who report on matters of state.—Jude P. Dougherty, The Catholic University of America RESCHER, Nicholas. Metaphysical Perspectives. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2017. -
Abduction, Reason, and Science Abduction, Reason, and Science Processes of Discovery and Explanation
Abduction, Reason, and Science Abduction, Reason, and Science Processes of Discovery and Explanation Lorenzo Magnani University of Pavia Pavia, Italy, and Georgia Institute of Technology Atlanta, Georgia Springer Science+Business Media, LLC Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Magnani, Lorenzo Abduction, reason, and ,cience: processes of discovcry and explanation/Lorenzo Magnani. p. cm. IncIudes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-4613-4637-1 ISBN 978-1-4419-8562-0 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-1-4419-8562-0 1. Science-Philosophy. 2. Abduction (Logic). 3. Discoveries in science. I. Tirle. Q175.32.A24 M34 2001 501-dc21 00-052061 Front cover: Descartes's explanation of the rainbow (from his Meteora, 1656). ISBN 978-1-4613-4637-1 © 2001 Springer Science+Business Media New York Originally published by Kluwer Academic / Plenum Publishers, New York in 2001 Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1990 http://www.wkap.nl/ 1098765432 A c.I.P. record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. AII rights reserved No par! of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording, or otherwise, without wrilten permis sion from the Publisher To my daughter Giovanna Science does not rest upon solid bedrock. The bold structure of its theories rises, as it were, above a swamp. It is like a building erected on piles. The piles are driven down from above into the swamp, but not down to any natural or "given" base; and if we stop driving the piles deeper, it is not because we have reached firm ground. -
293145618.Pdf
Leaders in Educational Research LEADERS IN EDUCATIONAL STUDIES Volume 7 Series Editor: Leonard J. Waks Temple University, Philadelphia, USA Scope: The aim of the Leaders in Educational Studies Series is to document the rise of scholarship and university teaching in educational studies in the years after 1960. This half-century has been a period of astonishing growth and accomplishment. The volumes in the series document this development of educational studies as seen through the eyes of its leading practitioners. A few words about the build up to this period are in order. Before the mid-twentieth century school teaching, especially at the primary level, was as much a trade as a profession. Schoolteachers were trained primarily in normal schools or teachers colleges, only rarely in universities. But in the 1940s American normal schools were converted into teachers colleges, and in the 1960s these were converted into state universities. At the same time school teaching was being transformed into an all-graduate profession in both the United Kingdom and Canada. For the first time, school teachers required a proper university education. Something had to be done, then, about what was widely regarded as the deplorable state of educational scholarship. James Conant, in his final years as president at Harvard in the early 1950s, envisioned a new kind of university-based school of education, drawing scholars from mainstream academic disciplines such as history, sociology psychology and philosophy, to teach prospective teachers, conduct educational research, and train future educational scholars. One of the first two professors hired to fulfil this vision was Israel Scheffler, a young philosopher of science and language who had earned a Ph.D. -
Concrete Possible Worlds (Final)
CONCRETE POSSIBLE WORLDS Phillip Bricker 1. INTRODUCTION. Open a book or article of contemporary analytic philosophy, and you are likely to find talk of possible worlds therein. This applies not only to analytic metaphysics, but to areas as diverse as philosophy of language, philosophy of science, epistemology, and ethics. Philosophers agree, for the most part, that possible worlds talk is extremely useful for explicating concepts and formulating theories. They disagree, however, over its proper interpretation. In this chapter, I discuss the view, championed by David Lewis, that philosophers’ talk of possible worlds is the literal truth.1 There exists a plurality of worlds. One of these is our world, the actual world, the physical universe that contains us and all our surroundings. The others are merely possible worlds containing merely possible beings, such as flying pigs and talking donkeys. But the other worlds are no less real or concrete for being merely possible. Fantastic? Yes! What could motivate a philosopher to believe such a tale? I start, as is customary, with modality.2 Truths about the world divide into two sorts: categorical and modal. Categorical truths describe how things are, what is actually the case. Modal truths describe how things could or must be, what is possibly or 1 The fullest statement of Lewis’s theory of possible worlds is contained in his magnum opus, Lewis (1986), On the Plurality of Worlds. Lewis’s view is sometimes called “modal realism.” 2 Historically, it was the attempt to provide semantics for modal logic that catapulted possible worlds to the forefront of analytic philosophy. -
Thought Experiments Considered Harmful. Perspectives on Science
THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS CONSIDERED HARMFUL Paul Thagard University of Waterloo Draft 4, May, 2013 Thagard, P. (forthcoming). Thought experiments considered harmful. Perspectives on Science. Abstract: Thought experiments can be useful in suggesting new hypotheses and in identifying flaws in established theories. Thought experiments become harmful when they are used as intuition pumps to provide evidence for the acceptance of hypotheses. Intuitions are neural processes that are poorly suited to provide evidence for beliefs, where evidence should be reliable, intersubjective, repeatable, robust, and causally correlated with the world. I describe seven ways in which philosophical thought experiments that purport to establish truths are epistemically harmful. In the philosophy of mind, thought experiments support views that run contrary to empirically supported alternatives. Introduction Thought experiments have been influential in philosophy at least since Plato, and they have contributed to science at least since Galileo. Some of this influence is appropriate, because thought experiments can have legitimate roles in generating and clarifying hypotheses, as well as in identifying problems in competing hypotheses. I will argue, however, that philosophers have often overestimated the significance of thought experiments by supposing that they can provide evidence that supports the acceptance of beliefs. Accepting hypotheses merely on the basis of thinking about them constitutes a kind of epistemic hubris with many negative consequences, including the acquisition of false beliefs and the blocking of more promising avenues of inquiry. May 9, 2013 I will not attempt to review the extensive literature on thought experiments, which is summarized well by Brown and Fehige (2011). I begin by acknowledging the legitimate contributions that thought experiments can make to scientific and philosophical development.