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Department of Philosophy San Jose State University October, 2006 under Nicholas Rescher and remember with special Nuel Belnap. Her thesis was fondness animated “Conditional Forms: philosophical conversations Assertion, Necessity, with Ruth and several other Obligation, and Commands.” philosophers at a San Jose An article she wrote with dive named Manny’s in the Rescher gave rise to the 1980s. Rita Manning writes Rescher-Manor Mechanism that “Ruth was the soul of the in logic, still used today. department –she was smart, Ruth was born in Addis funny, incredibly generous Adiba, Ethiopia. Her father, and eternally optimistic.” Newsletter: Prof. Moshe Wolman (after Department of whom was named the Ruth Manor Wolman Disease), was Philosophy Emperor Hallie Sallasie’s Scholarship Fund doctor. Tenured at San Jose San Jose State State in 1986, and promoted We are establishing a special to Full Professor in 1988, scholarship fund in the area University Ruth began to teach also at of logic in honor of Ruth October, 2006 Tel Aviv University in 1993, Manor. Please contact spending many of her Professor Manning for semesters there. She retired details. from SJSU in 2004 as a result Editor: Tom Leddy of her illness, but continued Obituary: to teach at Tel Aviv. Alumni and other friends of the Towards the end of her life Philosophy Department who Ruth published a book with Robert Larsen died wish to donate to the Department her father, Doctors’ Errors in Campbell on Step. 17. He should make out a check the and Mistakes of Medicine – was a professor in the “SJSU Foundation” with a note Must Health Care Philosophy Department and memo position “Philosophy Deteriorate? She also in the Humanities Fund for Research.” This continued her work in logic Department. He leaves money will be used to further publishing a chapter “On the behind his wife Virginia faculty and student research projects including travel to Meaning and Use of Larsen. Her address is 774 conferences, visits to libraries, Semantics and Pragmatics” in Fairlands Ave, Campbell research assistantships, and Hebrew in Discourse and 95008. A memorial will be purchase of books. Send to Dialogue: Multiperspective held Christ the Good SJSU Foundation, 1 Philosophy, 2003. Ruth Shepherd Luteran Church on Washington Square, San published over seventy book Sept. 30 at ll:00 am. Jose, California 95192 chapters and articles mainly in logic but sometimes in Our New Obituary: such topics as the middle east conflict and philosophical Philosophy pluralism. (Surprisingly, she Department Web Ruth Manor once revealed during a candidate’s interview that she Site Address: We will all miss our good was first attracted to sjsu.edu/philosophy/ friend and colleague, Ruth philosophy through literary Manor, who died from an existentialism.) She also did autoimmune disease in consulting work for NASA, November, 2005. She had Hewlett Packard, IBM, and started teaching at SJSU in Stanford University. Ruth 1981. Ruth had gained her served as Acting Chair in the Ph.D. in 1971 at the Philosophy Department University of Pittsburgh twice, once in Spring 1988 when 27, having studied and once in Fall 1992. We 1 New Faculty For the Fall semester, Carlos Sara, who received her teaches two sections of MA last Spring, has Introduction to Philosophy as Members well as an upper division been admitted to the graduate program in seminar titled “The Philosophy of History, from Philosophy, University Carlos Sanchez Hegel to (Leopoldo) Zea.” of California at Santa is our new tenure-track When not at work, whether Cruz . professor. Carlos received teaching or writing, Carlos his PhD from the University enjoys watching cartoons, of New Mexico, listening to 80s music, and Letters to the Albuquerque, this past spending time with his very summer and joins us as our young son Julian and his wife Editor new Assistant Professor of Alicia (who, he admits, does Philosophy. Carlos is no all of the actual “work”). Franc Fallico writes that he stranger to SJSU, having “Enjoyed very much the received his Bachelors of article referencing my Science from the School of Phil Williamson father, Arturo B. Fallico, Journalism and Mass who received an MA from who taught at SJS from Communication in 1998 and the Philosophy Department the beginning of the Dept. his Masters in Philosophy in last semester has been hired to the 1970's. I also went 2000. At the University of as a lecturer for the first time to SJS College, as it was New Mexico, Carlos wrote in Fall 2006. called then, graduating in his dissertation on what he 1964. My interests were in calls Husserl’s “theory of science and getting into epistemic justification,” an medical school but did attempt, he says, “to shed OTHER take what was called back light on Husserl’s then the Humanities epistemological worries.” NEWS Program course work for While still working in the my first 2 years of school phenomenological tradition, to satisfy liberal arts Carlos plans to focus his Philosophy Major requirements for intellectual super-powers on graduation. The one pure more contemporary Wins CSU Student philosophy course I took philosophical movements. Research was in my last year of He is currently working on Competition undergrad school with several papers dealing with Herman Shapiro, one of late 20th Century Mexican In a campus-wide my fathers' best friends philosophy, especially the competition, Sara and colleague. My work of Jorge Portilla, Emilio Rettus, one of our memories extend to others Uranga, Luis Villoro, and in the department, some of Leopoldo Zea—a group of graduate students, was whom would visit with our philosophers known as the selected to represent family on social occasions. “Hiperion Group,” thinkers SJSU at the CSU Your article brought back unified in their mission to Student Research old memories. My limited describe, clarify, and Competition, hosted by liberal arts education at interpret contemporary SJSU now gives me great Mexican, and consequently CSU Channel Islands on background for much of Mexican-American, reality May 5 and 6. She also the work I do as the chief using the “methods” of won that contest! Sara medical examiner for structuralism, and her mentor, Prof. Alaska. Sincerely, Franc psychoanalysis, Leddy, were honored at G. Fallico, MD Chief ME, phenomenology, critical Alaska“ theory, and pragmatism. the Annual University [email protected]. Research Forum on ak.us April 4. 2 Sidenote: Franc Fallico searching for what it is were moments where it played himself in the recent that we call was difficult to see acclaimed documentary by globalization. Was it people work so hard for Werner Herzog, Grizzly Man. The New York Times movie when we went to a low wages. Yet, there review, “Exploring One manufacturing company were times where all I Man's Fate in the Alaskan and observed the men could do was smile as I Wilderness” by Manohla and women assembling saw the passion in Dargis, Aug. 12, 2005, the PCs that may appear people’s eyes about the praises Fallico for his skill as on our desks one day? growing opportunities a story-teller. Was it when we went to brought about through Taiwan and saw the technology. The Graduate Student corporations that supply political, economical, Travels to China most of the world’s environmental, and chips? Or was it when cultural aspects of a we saw KFC at every nation all play a role in Graduate Student Krupa corner in Shanghai? globalization. After this Patel received an award The program provided journey, I have come to that allowed her to travel us with a wonderful and realize that what we call in China with SJSU enriching opportunity to globalization is itself a engineering students. enhance our knowledge journey. It is constantly She writes the following of the technological and evolving. It is an account of her industrial growth in evolution of life, yet it experiences in China China and Taiwan. I am includes all lives. and Taiwan, beginning grateful for the with a quote from a opportunity to have been great American thinker part of the GTI program Martin Luther (who, by the way, and would like to thank King as studied philosophy and everyone who made this Philosopher theology at Boston trip possible. The University – see the next hospitality shown to us article). by the corporations was In 1955, two years after he heartwarming. The trip married Coretta Scott (who became not just a died recently and was much All of life is interrelated. learning experience but memorialized), Martin Luther We are all caught in an King received his PhD in a life altering inescapable network of Systematic Theology from experience. Connecting mutuality, tied to a Boston University, The title with the people, eating single garment of of his dissertation was: A the delicious food, and Comparison of God in the destiny. Whatever visiting historical sites Thinking of Paul Tillich and affects one directly were experiences that Henry Wiseman. In 2004 affects all indirectly. Provost David K Campbell words cannot describe. --Martin Luther King of BU wrote: “[at BU] he The trip created many worked with several mentors, opportunities for including Edgar Brightman, reflection about human L. Harold DeWolf, and As I walked the steps of values and the effects of Howard Thurman (Dean of my journey through globalization. There Marsh Chapel), each of China and Taiwan, I was whom had tremendous 3 influence in [his] study of the http://www.stanford.edu/gr I suspect that I too was personalist philosophy. This oup/King/publications/auto influenced by the Personalists system, in which “the biography/chp_4.htm by way of both Kohak and sacredness of the person is Marx Wartofsky who, viewed socially” (Walter G. The same year he received although not a Personalist Meulder) reinforced King’s his PhD, he was elected himself, was a Marxist who idea that all men are equal president of the Montgomery was hired by Personalists and should thus be afforded Improvement Association during the McCarthy era.
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