MAHMUT HALEF CEVR˙IOGLUˇ OTTOMAN FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE THIRTY YEARS WAR It wouldn’t be unfair to regard the Thirty Years War as an early mod- ern precursor to the World Wars with regards to its political dimension, social effects and devastating results within the European Continent. However, it is not justified to leave the non-European actors of the war neglected in modern historiography. This study, therefore, is an attempt to measure to what extent the Ottoman Empire was getting involved in European politics between the years 1618 and 1648.1 The major stages of war in which the military and diplomatic relations were taking place in the early modern era corresponded to the Ottoman western frontier. Central Europe at the time was actually a neighbouring geography for the Ottoman Empire due to the Ottoman suzerainty over the Hungarian territories of the empire since 1541. This area was a con- tentious zone of interest between the Austrian Habsburg and Ottoman dynasties for the rest of the century and it took a relatively stable final form after the conclusion of the so called Long Wars between 1593 and 1606. Mahmut Halef Cevrioğlu, İzmir Kâtip Çelebi Üniversitesi, History Department, (İzmir/ TURKEY). [email protected] 1 This is a revised and extended version of the second chapter of my M.A. thesis conducted in 2015. I must express my profound gratitude for the reviewers for their accu- rate remarks, necessary corrections and kind manners in moulding the text into its ultimate shape. And since it is beyond the scope of this study, general themes and chronology of the war can be consulted from Parker’s (1997) and Wedgwood’s (1992) seminal works provided in the bibliography below. Turcica, 49, 2018, p. 195-235. doi: 10.2143/TURC.49.0.3285082 © 2018 Turcica. Tous droits réservés. 196 MAHMUT HALEF CEVRİOĞLU The military and diplomatic setback experienced by the Ottoman Empire with the Zsitvatorok Treaty (1606) rendered the Ottoman western front silent for half a century. Moreover, the intermittent wars against the Safavids between 1603 and 1639 kept the Ottomans busy on their eastern front. During this period, the official Ottoman policy in the west was to preserve the peace concluded with the Habsburgs at all costs despite the small-scale cross-border military activities (Kleinkrieg) over the Hungar- ian territory.2 However, the opportunity to benefit from the plight of their arch enemy, the Habsburgs, couldn’t be squandered: The anti-Habsburg pow- ers were constantly favoured by the Ottoman ruling cadres and some- times did even receive covert support. Even though there were no major campaigns undertaken under the command of the grand vizier or the sultan, the Ottoman vassal Transylvanian princes were from time to time allowed to have their own way in their conflicts against the Habsburg Kaiser; moreover, they sometimes even received the support of the fron- tier paşas. FIRST PHASE: THE PORTE AND GÁBOR BETHLEN IN EUROPEAN POLITICS A relatively unassuming revolt in Bohemia against the Habsburg gov- ernors in May 1618 drew the first circle of a giant whirlpool that would soon swallow the whole European Continent. In the long run, almost all the major powers of the continent would be involved in the struggle, directly or indirectly. But before the war spread far and wide in Europe, it was the Ottoman vassal prince of Transylvania, Gábor Bethlen (r. 1613-1629), who turned out to be among the fastest to get himself involved in the conflict. Transylvania, under the one and a half century Ottoman over-lordship in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, had a quite peculiar situation on the political stage of Central Europe. Due to its proximity to the Royal Hungarian territory (which was under Habsburg rule), it was stuck between two considerable powers of the time: the Habsburgs on the one hand, the Ottomans on the other. In this respect, the limited amount of space for political action enjoyed by Transylvanian voivodes was under 2 Ágoston, “Macaristan’da Osmanlı-Habsburg Serhaddi,” p. 204. OTTOMAN FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE THIRTY YEARS WAR 197 Ottoman control since any wrong Transylvanian foreign policy decision could entail a massive clash between the two dynasties. For that reason, Transylvanian foreign policy decisions, in theory, had to take into account Ottoman checks all the time. In short, the Transylvanian cross-border activities could stretch only as far as Constantinople would let it during this time period. The Transylvanian voivode of the time, Gábor Bethlen (r. 1613-1629), also found himself subject to this sort of balance. However, as a keen politician and a true opportunist, he was quick to sniff out the possibili- ties in the Ottoman capital as soon as the hostilities in Bohemia broke out in 1618. His representatives at the Porte started their efforts to inform themselves about the Ottoman attitude toward the revolt in Bohemia and also toward a possible Transylvanian intervention in the conflict as early as July and mid-August3. The initial position of the Ottoman statesmen was to “by no means interfere in the Central European conflict.”4 How- ever, there were always two parties of hawks and doves among the Otto- man top officials, and hence, the policy making could be adjusted in accordance with turns of fortune.5 By the end of 1618 and during early 1619, the Bohemian rebels had received the help of the Duchy of Savoy and of Elector Palatine Friedrich V. 6 Since the two Habsburg armies were shut out of war by quick Bohe- mian manoeuvres, Vienna was besieged in May 1619 for a brief period by Count Thurn, the leader of the Protestant rebels of Bohemia7. In the meantime, the Protestants in the remaining Habsburg dominions were likewise in distress during spring 1619 due to the infringement of their religious rights by the Catholic Habsburgs, and viewing the time as ripe for action, the Transylvanian Prince Gábor Bethlen launched his attack into Royal (Habsburg) Hungary in the summer of the same year8. Moreo- ver, on the last day of July, the aforementioned rebellious Habsburg dominions (namely, Upper and Lower Lusatia, Silesia and Moravia) agreed to a confederation with the revolting Bohemia, whose numbers were later crowded with the addition of Lower and Upper Austria two 3 Feneşan, “Die Pforte und das Eingreifen Siebenbürgens,” p. 63. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid, p. 63-64. 6 Wedgwood, The Thirty Years War, p. 82-83. 7 Ibid, p. 91. 8 Ibid, p. 91, 94. 198 MAHMUT HALEF CEVRİOĞLU weeks later9. On the 26th August, the rebellious Bohemians deposed their Catholic Habsburg King Ferdinand (who would also be elected the Holy Roman Emperor two days later, as the second of the name, and reign until 1637) and enthroned instead a Protestant, Friedrich V, the Elector Palatine, as the new King of Bohemia. The repercussions of these developments were favourable to the Tran- sylvanian cause at the Porte. The brisk spread of the revolt over the Habsburg domains and the death of the Holy Roman Emperor Matthias in March led to a positive resonance among some of the Ottoman states- men with regard to Bethlen’s campaign10. During July 1619, the strictly neutral stance of Grand Vizier Öküz Kara Mehmed Paşa (January- December 1619) slowly melted into well boding neutrality, and eventu- ally turned into passive advocacy of Bethlen’s intervention in the war11. This was also the beginning of the long run strategy that the Ottomans would adopt in the years to come until the end of the war: Whereas the actions against the Habsburgs of the Transylvanian prince, an Ottoman vassal, were officially deplored for the sake of keeping the peace (estab- lished by the 1606 Zsitvatorok Treaty, and renewed in 1615) in the west- ern front, partial help would be offered to Bethlen by the Ottomans and his actions in foreign policy would be tolerated in order to undermine the Habsburg power12. Bethlen’s incursion into Royal Hungary attained a surprising success: In September 1619, he had occupied Košice, the capital of Upper Hun- gary, where he was elected “chief and protector of the land” by the Estates General13. On 14th October, Bratislava (Hun. Pozsony; Ger. Pressburg; Ott. Pojun), the capital of the Royal Hungary, surrendered to Bethlen. There, the Bohemian leader Thurn and Bethlen united forces and furthered the campaign into Austria, besieging Vienna with 30.000 troops on 24th November14. But since heavy artillery was lacking and the intelligence arrived that György Hommonay-Drugeth, an enemy of Gábor Bethlen, was attacking Transylvania with the support of Polish troops, Bethlen was left with no choice but to hastily retreat home five days 9 Wilson, The Thirty Years’ War, p. 282. 10 Feneşan, “Die Pforte und das Eingreifen Siebenbürgens,” p. 63. 11 Ibid, p. 65. 12 Ibid, p. 67. 13 Angyal, “Gabriel Bethlen,” p. 29-30. 14 Ibid, p. 30. OTTOMAN FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE THIRTY YEARS WAR 199 later.15 Although Hommonay-Drugeth’s threat was already thwarted before Bethlen could appear in person, the latter didn’t go back to unite with Friedrich V’s troops in Austria, but chose to continue occupying the major cities in Royal Hungary16. At this point, Bethlen’s attention was actually directed to Hungarian inner politics in Bratislava: The city was the seat of St. Stephen’s Crown, the symbol of the traditional Hungarian Kingdom, and hence the Hungar- ian Diet could very well crown him as the King of Hungary. Herein, however, was Bethlen face to face with a bitter dilemma: The Grand Mufti had made it clear that “the Sultan ‘would never allow him to pos- sess Transylvania along with Hungary, since Transylvania was a creation of Sultan Süleyman’”17.