Www .Cepchile.Cl

2 ESTUDIOS PÚBLICOS

Introduction

CAROLINA GARRIDO SILVA. 4º year student of Political Science, Universidad Diego Portales; President of the Students’ Federation, Universidad Diego Portales, Santiago, Chile. PATRICIO NAVIA. Assistant Professor, General Studies Programme, New York University; Professor, School of Social Sciences and History, Universidad Diego Portales, Santiago, Chile. Has published articles in the following magazines: Comparative Political Studies; Journal of Democracy; Democratisation and Social Science Quarterly. Has also written chapters of several books on democratisation, institutional design and electoral laws. In Chile, his articles have been published in Estudios Públicos, Perspectivas, Revista de Ciencia Política, the FLACSO yearbook. He also writes columns for La Tercera and Revista Capital. He is the author of the book Las Grandes Alamedas. El Chile post Pinochet. * We acknowledge the suggestions and comments of an anonymous referee and the conversations held on this subject with John Carey and Peter Siavelis.

Estudios Públicos, 99 (winter 2005). 2 ESTUDIOS PÚBLICOS

Introduction

general disillusionment that goes with holding the reins of power for so

long. One might conclude, then, that the coalition is simply ready to expire. n this article we offer an alternative explanation of an article by Carey Any Iof these forces, or some combination of them, could indeed and Siavelis which suggests that the Concertación presents parliamentary lists undermine the Concertación, but we do not regard these factors as with two strong candidates because, as the governing coalition, they can necessarily devastating to the coalition’s survival for a number of reasons. provide an “insurance” —in the form of appointments to Executive positions- In the first place, the Chilean economy has come through the last five years to those candidates who, accepting a personal risk for the sake of the centre- in far better shape than that of any of its Southern Cone neighbors, and left coalition, do not win a seat but still help to increase the vote of the employment and growth figures rebounded in first months of 2003. The coalition at national level. Because, at the time when Carey and Siavelis wrote Concertación may well be in a position in 2005 to claim credit for good their article, the presidential election of 2005 was expected to be more visibly economic stewardship. Next, many of the issues surrounding the non- marked by the uncertainty of the outcome, they argued that “the Concertación democratic legacy of the Pinochet era —including the renowned www.cepchile.cl will no longer be able to guarantee its candidates (…) a post in the Government structure”. This would mean a greater difficulty to present pairs of strong candidates. What follows is, first, a discussion of the incentives of the electoral system, underlining that, although the coalition would rather have two strong candidates per district in order to win more votes, candidates themselves prefer to be paired with a relatively weak partner. Below we will discuss how the Concertación in effect fielded strong candidates in more districts than the Alianza por Chile between 1989 and 2001. After summarising the views of Carey and Siavelis, we offer two alternative explanations, check them against empirical data, and finally conclude that, even if our explanations do not provide greater predictability than those offered by Carey and Siavelis, they are at least equally valuable as potential explanations of why the Concertación has presented a greater number of strong candidates in Chilean parliamentary elections from 1989 to 2001. 2 ESTUDIOS PÚBLICOS

Introduction

T he demise of Chile’s Concertación coalition has been predicted often over the past dozen years during which it has governed. Even the coalition’s leaders have issued premature announcements of its death (Latin America Adviser 2002; El Mercurio 2003a). Some observers of Chilean politics, therefore, might regard the dissolution of the Concertación as both a foregone conclusion and an overdetermined event –that is, as the product of so many factors, all working toward the same end, that it is impossible to assign responsibility among them. We share the opinion that the Concertación may well dissolve before Chile’s next election, but not for the reasons commonly cited. Our argument is based, instead, on the structure of Chilean political careers, which in turn is connected inextricably with Chile’sCAROLINA unusual GARRIDO electoral AND rules. PATRICIO NAVIA 3 Harbingers of the Concertación’s demise point out that the Chilean economy has slowed somewhat since the coalition’s early years in government 1.during The two-memberthe 1990s. Moreover, district system the coalition and the itselftwo-candidate was initially lists galvanized around opposition to the Pinochet regime of the 1970s and 1980s, so as Thetime Constitution passes, the ofcompelling 1980 states force that theof Chamberthat initial of motivationDeputies has 120 might naturallymembers, weaken. whereas In the addition, Senate thehas Concertación,38 democratically and evenelected its compsenators.onent Because parties each—most senatorial notably constituency the Christian and Democrats—each deputy-electing are internally district fillsdivided two seats, the Chilean electoral system is known as a binominal or two-member district over social issues, such as the legal status of divorce and access to birth1 control.system. Finally, This by thesystem 2005 enableselections, part theies Concertación to form electoral will have coalitions held the. Each presidencycoalition and ais majority entitled into the present Chamber lists ofwith Deputies a maximum (the legislative of two candidateshouse to electedcompete by popular for the vote) two forseats 16 available years. Byin eachthe standardselectoral district. of multiparty Because these coalitionslists areanywhere, open, each much elector less states among his/he Latinr preference America’s for a particularpresidential candidate systems,on theany Concertaciónlist. The total isnumber geriatric, of votes bearing garnered the scars by both of miscellaneouscandidates on the list corruptionis added charges up to determine against themembers, number ofincluding seats the Coalitionthe stripping will fill. of For this parliamentaryreason, althoughrights from the five votes of arethe countedcoalition’s individually deputies infor 2002, each andcandidate, the the generalseats disillusionment are allocated thatto the goes coalitions. with holding Therefore, the reinsthe important of power thing for sois to win long. Onethe highestmight conclude, possible number then, that of thevotes coalition for each is list simply in order ready to doubleto expire. the vote of theAny second of these list andforces, win bothor some seats. combination of them, could indeed undermine theThis Concertación, is because both but candidates we do noton the regard same listthese are factors elected ifas the list necessarilywins devastatingthe highest numberto the coalition’s of votes andsurvival also doublesfor a number the vote of reasons.of the list that In the firstcomes place, second. the Chilean If the mosteconomy voted has list come does through not “double” the last fivethe yearsvote of the in far secondbetter shape list, each than of that the of lists any obtaini of itsng Southern the two Conelargest neighbors, majorities and will each employmentwin one and seat, growth to be figures filled byrebounded the candidates in first who months won ofmost 2003. votes The on their Concertaciónrespective may lists. well be in a position in 2005 to claim credit for good economic stewardship.The negotiation Next, to many form ofpairs the of issuescandidates surrounding in each coalitionthe non- (for 60 democraticdistricts legacy electing of deputies the Pinochet and 9 or era10 electing—including senators) the is renowned a crucial time to www.cepchile.cl predict the electoral performance of each group. When list are drawn up, the coalitions have a choice of two possible strategies: they may seek to win both seats or just one. In the first case, a coalition may field two strong candidates who will be able to double the vote of the runner-up list or just one strong candidate who they think will win enough votes to double the other lists and win a seat for his partner on the list with his own votes. In the second case, a coalition may present one strong candidate who can secure a seat by himself or two weak candidates who, together, may garner enough votes to win one seat. A strong candidate will prefer to be paired with a weak partner in order to secure his own seat in Congress. Even if the candidate’s intention is to help his list win both seats, it is always better for him to have a partner who is

1 The authorization to form multi-party coalitions dates back to Law No. 18.799 of April 1989, which amended the Organic Electoral Law on Popular Voting and Vote- Counting (No. 18.700). See Allamand (1999). 2 ESTUDIOS PÚBLICOS

Introduction

T he demise of Chile’s Concertación coalition has been predicted often over the past dozen years during which it has governed. Even the coalition’s leaders have issued premature announcements of its death (Latin America Adviser 2002; El Mercurio 2003a). Some observers of Chilean politics, therefore, might regard the dissolution of the Concertación as both a foregone conclusion and an overdetermined event –that is, as the product of so many factors, all working toward the same end, that it is impossible to assign responsibility among them. We share the opinion that the Concertación may well dissolve before Chile’s next election, but not for the reasons commonly cited. Our argument is based, instead, on the structure of Chilean political careers, which in turn is connected inextricably with Chile’s4 unusual electoral rules. ESTUDIOS PÚBLICOS Harbingers of the Concertación’s demise point out that the Chilean economy has slowed somewhat since the coalition’s early years in governmentlikely toduring obtain the fewer 1990s. votes Moreover, in order to the ensure coalition he gets itself the firstwas ofinitially the two seats galvanizedat stake. around However, opposition if the coalitionto the Pinochetseeks to “double”regime ofthe thevote 1970s of the andcompeting 1980s, listsso asin astime many passes, districts the as compelling possible, in force order ofto havethat initiala majority motivation of seats in the might naturallyHouse, the weaken. coalition In addition,will be forced the Concertación, to find a pair and of even candidates its comp whoonent are both parties strong—most enough notably to garnerthe Christian the number Democrats— of votes required are internally to double divided all other lists over socialand thus issues, secure such both as seatsthe legalin each status district. of divorceThis is whereand access the clash to birthof interests control.between Finally, coalitions by the 2005 and elections,individual the candidate Concertacións arises. will Coalitions have held will the prefer to presidencyhave andtwo astrong majority candidates in the Chamber in order toof doubleDeputies the (the vote legislative of the competing house lists, electedwin by bothpopular seats vote) and hopefor 16 to years.achieve By the the majority standards in theof multipartyHouse. But each coalitionscandidate anywhere, will favour much and less work among for his Latinown aim America’s of securing presidential a seat for himself, systems,making the Concertación it preferable foris geriatric,him to be bearingpaired with the ascars weaker of partner.miscellaneous The presence corruptionof two chargesstrong candidates against on members, a list encourages including intra-list the competition, stripping regardlessof parliamentaryof whether rights the fromcoalition five isof capable the coalition’s of gaining deputies a two-seat in 2002, victory and in thea district. generalUnderstandably, disillusionment all that candidates goes with would holding rather the have reins no competitorsof power for on sotheir lists long. Onein order might to conclude,make sure then, they thatwin the seatcoalition that the is simplycoalition ready is likely to expire. to obtain. Any ofIn these an attempt forces, to or explain some thiscombination contradiction, of them, Carey couldand Siavelis indeed (2003) underminestate thatthe theConcertación, Concertación buthas solvedwe do the not clash regard of interests these factorsby introducing as an necessarily“insurance” devastating for those to the candidates coalition’s who survival put their for own a number interests of atreasons. stake for the In the firstsake place,of the thecoalition. Chilean This economy insurance has takes come the through form ofthe a lastpost five in Government. years in far Becausebetter shape the Concertaciónthan that of anyhad ofclear its chancesSouthern of Cone success neighbors, in the presidentialand employmentelection and of growth1989 and figures 1993 rebounded and was alreadyin first inmonths power of at 2003. the time The of the Concertaciónparliamentary may well elections be in ofa 1997,position it wasin 2005 in a positionto claim to credit offer thisfor good“insurance” economicto congressional stewardship. candidates Next, many who ofaccepted the issues the risk surrounding of competing the and non- failing to democraticwin a seat.legacy of the Pinochet era —including the renowned www.cepchile.cl Unlike the Right, the Concertación was in a position to offer relatively certain compensation to defeated candidates (runners-up, in the words of Carey and Siavelis) in the form of a post in the Executive. In their essay, Carey and Siavelis provide evidence that the Concertación rewarded its runners-up with posts in the Executive Power during the 1993-1997 period. By comparing the votes obtained by each candidate, Carey and Siavelis also showed that, the closer they were to victory, the higher their chances of receiving “insurance” from the Government, then in the hands of the Concertación. Before moving on to the discussion of the arguments presented by Carey and Siavelis, we have some more evidence of the phenomenon that they have studied: the presence of a higher number of strong candidates in the Concertación than in the Alianza por Chile. Table No. 1 shows details of all districts where both coalitions presented two candidates for election (Carey and Siavelis have only looked at elections during the period 1989- 1997). To analyse the presence of strong candidates, we have used the 2 ESTUDIOS PÚBLICOS

Introduction

T he demise of Chile’s Concertación coalition has been predicted often over the past dozen years during which it has governed. Even the coalition’s leaders have issued premature announcements of its death (Latin America Adviser 2002; El Mercurio 2003a). Some observers of Chilean politics, therefore, might regard the dissolution of the Concertación as both a foregone conclusion and an overdetermined event –that is, as the product of so many factors, all working toward the same end, that it is impossible to assign responsibility among them. We share the opinion that the Concertación may well dissolve before Chile’s next election, but not for the reasons commonly cited. Our argument is based, instead, on the structure of Chilean political careers, which in turn is connected inextricably with Chile’sCAROLINA unusual GARRIDO electoral AND rules. PATRICIO NAVIA 5 Harbingers of the Concertación’s demise point out that the Chilean economy has slowed somewhat since the coalition’s early years in governmentsame duringtool as the Carey 1990s. and Moreover, Siavelis: thethe coalitionmathematical itself wasratio initially between the galvanizedcandidate around with opposition more votes to andthe Pinochetthe candidate regime with of fewer the 1970svotes withinand the 1980s, coalition,so as time i.e. passes, we have the divided compelling the votes force of of the that more initial successful motivation candidate might naturallyby the votes weaken. of the In addition,less successful the Concertación, candidate andin the even coalition. its comp onentThis figure parties varies—most from notably a minimum the Christian that is just Democrats— above 1 (when are bothinternally candidates divided obtained over socialvirtually issues, the suchsame asnumber the legal of votes) status toof anydivorce whole and positive access number. to birth Please control.note Finally, that the by definitionthe 2005 elections,of “strong” the may Concertación be misleading. will Thehave tool held used the by the presidencyauthors and enablesa majority a list in thewhere Chamber one candidate of Deputies gets (the 10% legislative of the votehouse and the electedother by popularone 1% vote)to have for the 16 same years. value By asthe another standards list whereof multiparty one candidate coalitionswins anywhere,40% of the votemuch and less the amongother one Latin 4%. America’s presidential systems, the ConcertaciónAs shown in Tableis geriatric, Nº 1, thebearing ratio first:the scars second of wasmiscellaneous always higher in corruptionthe Alianza charges por Chileagainst than members,in the Concertación. including While the in thestripping Concertación of this parliamentaryaverage rightsvalue wasfrom above five 3of only the incoalition’s 2001, in thedeputies Aianza in it 2002, was always and the above 3, generalreaching disillusionment the highest that goesfigure with in holding1997. This the reinsmeans of that,power in for effect, so the long. OneConcertación might conclude, presented then, athat greater the coalition number is ofsimply strong ready candidates to expire. than the AlianzaAny of inthese every forces, parliamentary or some electioncombination held afterof them, democracy could indeedwas restored. undermineHowever, the Concertación,Table No. 1 alsobut showswe do thatnot theregard number these of factors strong aspairs of necessarilycandidates devastating presented to the by coalition’seach coalition survival varied for through a number the yearsof reasons. (this will be In the firstdiscussed place, in the detail Chilean below). economy has come through the last five years in far better shape than that of any of its Southern Cone neighbors, and TABLE Nº 1: RATIO FIRST: SECOND PLACE IN LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS employment and growth1989-2001 figures rebounded in first months of 2003. The Concertación may well be in a position in 2005 to claim credit for good economicElection stewardship. Number ofNext, manyAverage of the issuesAverage surrounding Minimum the non- Maximum Year districts w/ ratio1st:2nd Standard Value Value democratic legacy 2 candidates of the Pinochet era Deviation—including the renowned www.cepchile.cl Alianza 1989 59 3.67 4.73 1.02 25.25 1993 60 4.29 3.91 1.04 18.76 1997 59 5.24 5.91 1.02 29.07 2001 59 4.74 4.97 1.03 24.52 1989-2001 237 4.49 4.93 1.02 29.07 Concertación 1989 56 2.45 2.50 1.03 13.34 1993 60 2.47 2.40 1.00 16.12 1997 60 2.19 1.66 1.01 10.46 2001 60 3.05 4.28 1.00 30.30 1989-2001 236 2.54 2.88 1.00 30.30 Source: Compiled by the authors with data collected from www.elecciones. gov.cl It should be noted that, while the Concertación recorded, in general, a lower average in the ratio first: second (i.e. the Concertación presented a 2 ESTUDIOS PÚBLICOS

Introduction

T he demise of Chile’s Concertación coalition has been predicted often over the past dozen years during which it has governed. Even the coalition’s leaders have issued premature announcements of its death (Latin America Adviser 2002; El Mercurio 2003a). Some observers of Chilean politics, therefore, might regard the dissolution of the Concertación as both a foregone conclusion and an overdetermined event –that is, as the product of so many factors, all working toward the same end, that it is impossible to assign responsibility among them. We share the opinion that the Concertación may well dissolve before Chile’s next election, but not for the reasons commonly cited. Our argument is based, instead, on the structure of Chilean political careers, which in turn is connected inextricably with Chile’s6 unusual electoral rules. ESTUDIOS PÚBLICOS Harbingers of the Concertación’s demise point out that the Chilean economy has slowed somewhat since the coalition’s early years in governmentgreater during number the of 1990s. strong Moreover,pairings than the the coalition Alianza), itself the wasAlianza’s initially standard galvanizeddeviation around was oppositionhigher than tothe theConcertación’s, Pinochet regime showing of thatthe there1970s was and a greater 1980s, variationso as time in passes,the Alianza the compellingbetween strong force pairings of that initialand pairings motivation where one might naturallycandidate weaken.was weak. In addition, While thein theConcertación, Alianza the and average even its ratiocomp foronent the four parties parliamentary—most notably elections the Christian was 4.49 Democrats— with a standard are internally deviation divided of 4.93, the over socialaverage issues, ratio suchin the as Concertación the legal status was 2.54,of divorce with a andstandard access deviation to birth of only control.2.88. Finally, This bymeans the 2005that, whileelections, in two-thirds the Concertación of the contests will have in the held 236 the districts presidencythe Concertación and a majority obtained in the Chamber figures between of Deputies 1 and (the 5.42, legislative in two-thirds house of the electedcontests by popular the Alianza vote) recordedfor 16 years.figures Bybetween the standards1 and 9.42. of multiparty coalitions anywhere,Carey and much Siavelis less (2003:10) among showLatin that America’s the Concertación presidential managed to systems,gain the two-seat Concertación victories is in geriatric, 31 districts bearing in elections the scars held of between miscellaneous 1989 and 1997 (11 in 1989 and 1993, 10 in 1997), while the Right won both seats in one corruption charges against members,2 including the stripping of parliamentarydistrict inrights 1993 from and five 1972. of theWe coalition’s might add deputies that in in2001 2002, the and Concertación the general“doubled” disillusionment in 4 districts,that goes while with holdingthe Alianza the reinsachieved of power this infor 1so district. long. OneTherefore, might conclude, the number then, of that runners-up the coalition in isthe simply Concertación ready to expire.has fluctuated betweenAny of athese minimum forces, of 45or insome 1989 combination and a maximum of them, of 58 incould 2001. indeed undermine theWe Concertación, suggest that the but argument we do based not onregard the ‘insurance’ these factors for runners-up as necessarilyis not devastating necessary —and to the neithercoalition’s is it sufficient—survival for toa numberexplain theof reasons.pairing of two In the firststrong place, candidates the Chilean by economythe Concertación. has come throughThere are the otherlast five historical years and in far empiricalbetter shape variables than thatthat explainof any justof its as Southernwell the reasons Cone neighbors,why the Concertación and employmentfinds it and easier growth and isfigures in a better rebounded position in than first the months Alianza of to2003. present The a larger Concertaciónnumber mayof strong well candidates.be in a position The number in 2005 of partiesto claim forming credit thefor coalitiongood and economicthe characteristicsstewardship. ofNext, these many parties of as therepresentatives issues surrounding of the political the non- Centre and democraticLeft can legacy explain of bythe themselves Pinochet why era the—including Concertación the presents renowned two strong www.cepchile.cl candidates in each district. What follows is, first, an analysis of the historical explanation of the Concertación as a coalition of the Left and the Centre. Then we will discuss how the number of parties in the Concertación —larger than the number of parties in the Alianza por Chile— is positively associated with the number of strong candidates presented by each of the coalitions.

2 There are three errors in Table 1 by Carey and Siavelis (2003:10), where they report that the Right did not “double” in any district in 1997. In fact, the right-wing coalition doubled in district 23 in 1993 and in 1997 (also in 2001, but this election was not taken into account by these authors). The Concertación doubled in 10 districts in 1997, not in 11 as stated by Carey and Siavelis. 2 ESTUDIOS PÚBLICOS

Introduction

over social issues, such as theDoubles legal Does status not ofWins divorce a seat Runners- and accessTotal to birth win a seat (the other one up number of control. Finally, by the 2005 elections, the Concertacióngoes to a non- will haveseats held the rightist presidency and a majority in the Chamber of Deputiescandidate) (the legislative house electedCámara by popular 1989 vote) 0 for 1116 years. 2 By the 1 standards 45 of 69multiparty 56* coalitions anywhere,1993 1much 11less among1 Latin0 America’s48 presidential70 50 systems, the Concertación1997 1 is geriatric,10 2 bearing 4the scars47 of miscellaneous69 50 corruption charges2001 1against 4 members,1 including0 the58 stripping62 of50 parliamentary rights from five of the coalition’s deputies in 2002, and the generalSenado disillusionment 1989 0 that goes 3 with 0 holding 0the reins 16 of power 22 for 19**so 1993 0 0 0 0 9 9 9 long. One might conclude, then, that the coalition is simply ready to expire. 1997 0 1 0 0 9 11 10 Any of these forces, or some combination of them, could indeed * In 4 districts the Concertación presented only one candidate. undermine the** InConcertación, 1989 there were butelections we indo 19 notsenatorial regard constituencies; these factors in 1993 as and necessarily devastating2001 there towere the elections coalition’s in 9 survivalsenatorial forconstituencies, a number ofwhile reasons. in 1997 there In the firstwere place,elections the in Chilean10 constituencies. economy has come through the last five years in far better shapeSource :than Carey that and Siavelisof any (2003)of its andSouthern own research Cone neighbors, and employment and growth figures rebounded in first months of 2003. The Concertación may well be in a position in 2005 to claim credit for good economic stewardship. Next, many2. Firstof the hypothesis issues surrounding the non- democratic legacyThe Concertaciónof the Pinochet is the sumera —includingof the Centre andthe therenowned Left www.cepchile.cl Literature on the evolution of the political system and political parties in Chile is rich and varied, though surprisingly lacking in major debates on the nature and characteristics of the political party situation in the country until the interruption of democracy in 1973 (Scully, 1992; Tironi and Agüero, 1999; Valenzuela, 1978; Valenzuela, 1995; Valenzuela, 1999; Valenzuela and Scully, 1997; Urzúa Valenzuela, 1992). Although there have been some debates on the characteristics of the political party system after the plebiscite of 1988 (please see particularly Tironi and Agüero, 1999; Valenzuela, 1999), there is a wide consensus on the nature of a moderate, multi-party political system with a tendency towards polarization before the interruption of democratic rule (Gil, 1969; Sartori, 1976; Garretón, 1983). The division of the party system into three thirds (the Right, the Centre and the Left) is widely accepted by all those who have studied the Chilean party system and democracy before 1973. 2 ESTUDIOS PÚBLICOS

Introduction

T he demise of Chile’s Concertación coalition has been predicted often over the past dozen years during which it has governed. Even the coalition’s leaders have issued premature announcements of its death (Latin America Adviser 2002; El Mercurio 2003a). Some observers of Chilean politics, therefore, might regard the dissolution of the Concertación as both a foregone conclusion and an overdetermined event –that is, as the product of so many factors, all working toward the same end, that it is impossible to assign responsibility among them. We share the opinion that the Concertación may well dissolve before Chile’s next election, but not for the reasons commonly cited. Our argument is based, instead, on the structure of Chilean political careers, which in turn is connected inextricably with Chile’s8 unusual electoral rules. ESTUDIOS PÚBLICOS Harbingers of the Concertación’s demise point out that the Chilean economy has slowed somewhat since the coalition’s early years in government duringAgainst the this 1990s. general Moreover, background, the coalition different itself explanations was initially have been galvanizedgiven aroundto account opposition for the politicalto the developmentsPinochet regime of the of secondthe 1970s half ofand the 20th 1980s, century.so as time For passes,instance, the Scullycompelling (1992) force argues of thatthat initialthe transformation motivation and might naturallypolarization weaken. of the In party addition, system the Concertación,between 1952 and and even 1958 its resultedcomponent from the parties clerical-anticlerical—most notably the conflict Christian and Democrats—the class struggle are internally in the rural divided and urban over socialsectors. issues, As a resultsuch asof thisthe legalconflict, status a new of partydivorce emerged and access as a Centre to birth party: the control.PDC Finally, (Christian by the Democratic2005 elections, Party). the WithConcertación the emergence will have of heldthis theparty, the presidencycountry and temporarilya majority in split the Chamberinto four of groups: Deputies the (the Left, legislative represented house by the electedcoalition by popular PS-PC vote) (under for the16 acronymyears. By FRAP the standardsin the presidential of multiparty election of coalitions1958); anywhere, the Christian much Centre less represented among Latin by the America’s PDC; a lay presidentialCentre represented systems,by thethe ConcertaciónPR and a traditional is geriatric, right-wing bearing sector the scarsdivided of miscellaneousinto two groups: the corruptionLiberal charges Party and against the Conservative members, Party. including In 1962, thethe PR stripping moved towards of the parliamentaryright (although rights from eventually five of athe good coalition’s number deputies of its members,in 2002, and including the its generalleadership, disillusionment left the that party goes to joinwith Allende’sholding theleftist reins group), of power leaving for theso centre long. Onesector might free conclude, to be filled then, by the that PDC the coalitionwhich, in is the simply presidential ready to elections expire. of 1964 andAny the of parliamentary these forces, elections or some of combination 1965 established of them, itself ascould a highly indeed polarized undermineand ideological the Concertación, Centre party. but Aswe a doresult not of regardthis change these in factorsthe Centre as and a necessarilymass devastatingmobilization to of the voters, coalition’s among survival other variables, for a number the country of reasons. was divided In the firstinto 3place, major the groups Chilean (or thirds):economy the has Left, come the Centrethrough (PDC) the last and five the yearsRight. in far better shapeAfter 1970,than thatas a ofresult any ofof theits ambitiousSouthern Conerevolutionary neighbors, programme and of employmentthe leftist and governmentgrowth figures headed rebounded by Salvador in first Allende months (Unidad of 2003. Popular), The the Concertacióntraditional may division well be of in thea position political in system 2005 tointo claim three credit groups for goodchanged to economicbecome, stewardship. at least in Next,the parliamentary many of the elections issues ofsurrounding 1973 and during the non-the months democraticpreceding legacy the militaryof the coup,Pinochet a dichotomous era —including division between the renowned those in favour www.cepchile.cl of Allende’s socialist revolution and those who opposed it (Arriagada, 1974; De Vylder, 1976). In spite of this, the party system at the time of the interruption of democratic rule was made up of three large groups with a particular identity and different ideologies. The Right was represented by the National Party (PN), the Centre by the PDC and the Left by the PS (Socialist Party), the PC (Communist Party) and other smaller parties (like MAPU, the Leftist Christians and a faction of the PR). But, as Valenzuela and Scully say (1993: 198-199), “the Chilean party political spectrum was characterized since the mid-30’s until the interruption of democratic rule in 1973, not only by its division into a right wing, a centre sector and a left wing, but also, and at the same time, by its multi-party structure (…) Even if, at certain times, there were up to thirty competing parties, there were never more than five or six important ones”. The three big thirds of the Chilean political system remained generally unchanged, and were each represented by one or two leading parties. 2 ESTUDIOS PÚBLICOS

Introduction

T he demise of Chile’s Concertación coalition has been predicted often over the past dozen years during which it has governed. Even the coalition’s leaders have issued premature announcements of its death (Latin America Adviser 2002; El Mercurio 2003a). Some observers of Chilean politics, therefore, might regard the dissolution of the Concertación as both a foregone conclusion and an overdetermined event –that is, as the product of so many factors, all working toward the same end, that it is impossible to assign responsibility among them. We share the opinion that the Concertación may well dissolve before Chile’s next election, but not for the reasons commonly cited. Our argument is based, instead, on the structure of Chilean political careers, which in turn is connected inextricably with Chile’sCAROLINA unusual GARRIDO electoral AND rules. PATRICIO NAVIA 9 Harbingers of the Concertación’s demise point out that the Chilean economy has slowed somewhat since the coalition’s early years in government duringHowever, the the1990s. division Moreover, into three the largecoalition groups itself began was to initially fade in 1973, galvanizedwhen aroundthe Right opposition and the PDC to thejoined Pinochet forces inregime a coalition of the against 1970s the andUP. In the 1980s, parliamentaryso as time passes, elections the of compelling 1973, the traditional force of divisionthat initial into motivation three groups was might naturallyreplaced withweaken. a confrontation In addition, thebetween Concertación, the Left and and even an electoralits comp onentcoalition of parties the—most Centre notably and the ChristianRight. However, Democrats— with arethe internallyarrival of divided the military over socialdictatorship, issues, thesuch division as the intolegal three status groups of divorce reemerged, and access with a to Left birth that was control.openly Finally, opposed by the to2005 the elections, military governmethe Concertaciónnt, a Centre will havethat washeld willingthe to presidencysupport and the a majority dictatorship in the (or Chamber at least s howedof Deputies signs (theof accepting legislative it), house and a Right electedthat by openly popular supported vote) forthe new16 years. de facto By government. the standards of multiparty coalitions anywhere,Afterwards, much more less precisely among since Latin 1983, America’s a wide Opposition presidential began to systems,form the against Concertación Pinochet’s is geriatric,regime, which bearing put anthe end scars to theof miscellaneoustraditional order that, corruptionfor ideological charges reasons, against separated members, the third including represented the by stripping the Centre offrom the parliamentarythird represented rights from by thefive Left. of the One coalition’s of the first deputies initiatives in that2002, managed and the to bring generaltogether disillusionment the leaders that of goesthe Left with and holding the Centre the reins was ofthe power so-called for Groupso of long. OneConstitutional might conclude, Studies then, (the that Group the coalitionof 24), where is simply most ready political to expire. groups of the CentreAny of and these the Leftforces, were or represented,some combination except the of Communiststhem, could andindeed Pinochet’s undermineRight. the Later Concertación, on, the rise tobut the we presidency do not regardof the PDCthese of factors Frei Montalva’s as necessarilyformer devastating foreign minister, to the coalition’s Gabriel Valdés survival, made for mucha number easier of thereasons. decision of In the firstthat partyplace, —and the Chilean the political economy Centre— has come to become through a militant the last Oppositionfive years to the in far dictatorshipbetter shape and than seek that a oflarge any front of itswith Southern all democratic Cone neighbors,groups —particularly and employmentthe Left— and whichgrowth eventually figures rebounded put an end in to firstthe dictatorshipmonths of 2003.and succeeded The in Concertaciónrestoring may democracy. well be in (Cavallo, a position Sepúlveda in 2005 toand claim Salazar, credit 1997:for good 341-380; economicConstable stewardship. and Valenzuela, Next, many 1991: of 271-295). the issues surrounding the non- democratic legacyAlter failed of theattempts Pinochet to negotiate era —including with Pinochet’s the government, renowned in the www.cepchile.cl midst of a wave of popular protest demonstrations motivated by the economic crisis that the country was going through, the democratic forces formed a coalition named Alianza Democrática, which included the PDC, several factions of the then broken-up PS, various factions associated with the PR, the Social Democratic Party and other groups, even some that had been traditionally associated with the Right. This was the first formal manifestation of what would later become the coalition of left-wing and centre parties (Boeninger, 1997: 292-346). By the time when the plebiscite took place in 1988, and with the aspiration to oust Pinochet from power, the then weak and difficult coalition between the PDC and the PS the two most important and best-organized parties of the Centre and the democratic Left-gained enough strength to become a formal political coalition. The aim of the coalition was to restore democracy using the mechanisms provided by the Constitution designed by the dictatorship itself and adopted in the plebiscite of 1980 (Ortega Frei,1992; Walker, 1990). In addition, several leaders associated with socialism and other 2 ESTUDIOS PÚBLICOS

Introduction

T he demise of Chile’s Concertación coalition has been predicted often over the past dozen years during which it has governed. Even the coalition’s leaders have issued premature announcements of its death (Latin America Adviser 2002; El Mercurio 2003a). Some observers of Chilean politics, therefore, might regard the dissolution of the Concertación as both a foregone conclusion and an overdetermined event –that is, as the product of so many factors, all working toward the same end, that it is impossible to assign responsibility among them. We share the opinion that the Concertación may well dissolve before Chile’s next election, but not for the reasons commonly cited. Our argument is based, instead, on the structure of Chilean political careers, which in turn is connected inextricably with Chile’s10 unusual electoral rules. ESTUDIOS PÚBLICOS Harbingers of the Concertación’s demise point out that the Chilean economy has slowed somewhat since the coalition’s early years in governmentmoderate during groups the 1990s.decided Moreover, to create the whatcoalition they itself then was regarded initially as an galvanized“instrumental around oppositionparty”, capable to the of overcomPinocheting regime the existing of the legal 1970s restriction and for 1980s, theso creationas time ofpasses, a truly the socialist compelling party. forceThis isof howthat theinitial Party motivation for Democracy might naturally(PPD) emerged, weaken. which In addition, eventually the Concertación,became one of and the even two leadingits comp partiesonent in the parties leftist—most sector notably of the theConcertación. Christian Democrats— are internally divided over social issues,Together such with as the PDC,legal thestatus PR ofand divorce several andsocialist access factions, to birth the PPD control.formed Finally, the by Concertación the 2005 elections, de Partidos the porConcertación el No prior willto the have plebiscite held the of 1988. presidencyThey and were a majoritya total of in 17 the parties Chamber and groupsof Deputies representing (the legislative both the houseLeft and the electedCentre by popular (although vote) there for were 16 alsoyears. some By right-wing the standards groups) of which multiparty joined forces coalitionsto put anywhere, an end to Pinochet’smuch less dictatorship among Latin through America’s the people’s presidential vote in October systems,1988. the AlthoughConcertación Chile is had geriatric, in the past bearing experimented the scars with of miscellaneous coalitions formed by corruptionthe Centre charges and theagainst Left (formembers, example including the radical thegovernments stripping of of Aguirre parliamentaryCerda and rights Ríos), from since five ofthe the emergence coalition’s of deputies the PDC in 2002,in the and 50’s the and its generalconsolidation disillusionment as an that hegemonic goes with party holding of the Centrethe reins from of thepower 60’s foronwards, so the long. OneCentre might and conclude, the Left had then, never that managedthe coalition to form is simply a coalition. ready As to expire.an example, let usAny recall of justthese how forces, difficult or someit was combinationfor the PDC toof make them, the could decision indeed to vote for undermineSalvador the AllendeConcertación, after the Nationalbut we Congressdo not regard was forced these to electfactors the Presidentas necessarilyfollowing devastating an election to the where coalition’s the people survival had not for given a number a majority of reasons. vote to any of In the firstthe three place, candidates the Chilean running economy for president has come in through 1970. This the lastis why five the years formation in far ofbetter the Alianzashape than Democrática that of any first of and its theSouthern Concertación Cone neighbors,de Partidos andpor el No employmentlater represented and growth a substantial figures rebounded change to inthe first political months practices of 2003. followed The in the Concertacióncountry maysince well the second be in ahalf position of the 20thin 2005 century. to claim credit for good economic stewardship.After the victory Next, ofmany the “No” of the vote issues in the surroundingplebiscite of 1988,the non- the parties democraticof the Concertaciónlegacy of the quickly Pinochet agreed era on the—including convenience the of renownedmaintaining their www.cepchile.cl political partnership and turning it into an electoral coalition to compete in the presidential and parliamentary elections of 1989 as a united front. And so, the Concertación de Partidos por el No changed, evolved, became stronger and adopted a new name: Concertación de Partidos Por la Democracia (Otano, 1995: 54-87). Following the presidential and parliamentary elections of 1989, and after the adoption of the constitutional reforms of June 1989 which eliminated restrictions to the existence of socialist and communist parties, the number of parties in the Concertación became considerably smaller. The unification of various wings into a single party (as in the case of the PS and the PR) and the disappearance of other smaller groups as a result of their poor electoral performance helped to substantially reduce the number of parties in the Concertación. In fact, since 1994, this coalition is formed by 4 parties with parliamentary representation: PDC, PS, PPD and PRSD. Therefore, we might say, in agreement with Scully and Valenzuela (1993) and Valenzuela (1999) that the Concertación de Partidos por la 2 ESTUDIOS PÚBLICOS

Introduction

T he demise of Chile’s Concertación coalition has been predicted often over the past dozen years during which it has governed. Even the coalition’s leaders have issued premature announcements of its death (Latin America Adviser 2002; El Mercurio 2003a). Some observers of Chilean politics, therefore, might regard the dissolution of the Concertación as both a foregone conclusion and an overdetermined event –that is, as the product of so many factors, all working toward the same end, that it is impossible to assign responsibility among them. We share the opinion that the Concertación may well dissolve before Chile’s next election, but not for the reasons commonly cited. Our argument is based, instead, on the structure of Chilean political careers, which in turn is connected inextricably with Chile’sCAROLINA unusual GARRIDO electoral AND rules. PATRICIO NAVIA 11 Harbingers of the Concertación’s demise point out that the Chilean economy has slowed somewhat since the coalition’s early years in governmentDemocracia during includes the 1990s. two Moreover,of the three the thirds coalition that madeitself upwas the initially party system galvanizeduntil around1973. Even opposition from a toviewpoint the Pinochet opposed regime to Valenzuela’s, of the 1970s presented and by 1980s, Tironiso as andtime Agüeropasses, (1999),the compelling we may forceconclude of thatthat, initial ironically, motivation because the might naturallyelections ofweaken. 1988 wereIn addition, like a plebiscitethe Concertación, in nature, and Pinochet’s even its comp Governmentonent left parties as—most a legacy notably a division the inChristian the country Democrats— where two are of theinternally traditional divided three thirds over socialjoined issues, forces suchto constitute as the legal a democratic status of Oppositiondivorce and to access the military to birth régime. control.Whether Finally, it by is thebecause 2005 theelections, Concertación the Concertación represents willa coalition have held of thethe Centre presidencyand the and Left a majority or because in the the ChamberYes-No division of Deputies enabled (the the legislative Centre and house the Left to electedunite by aspopular a single vote) bloc, for the 16presence years. of By a greater the standards number of of strong multiparty candidates in coalitionsthe Concertaciónanywhere, muchcould lessbe explainedamong Latinby historical America’s facts, presidential regardless of the systems,ability the Concertaciónto offer insurance is geriatric, to any bearinglosing candidates the scars ofthe miscellaneous Concertación might corruptionhave. charges against members, including the stripping of parliamentaryIndeed, rights fromthe fact five that of the Concertacióncoalition’s deputies is formed in 2002,by the and Centre the and a generalgood disillusionment part of the traditionalthat goes withLeft bornholding from the the reins old ofparty power system for sonot only long. Onemakes might it easier conclude, but also then, virtually that the inevitable coalition that is simply the union ready between to expire. both parties shouldAny of lead these the forces,Concertación or some to presentcombination a greater of numberthem, could of candidates indeed in the undermineparliamentary the Concertación, elections, butregardless we do ofnot the regard pattern these formed factors by as voters’ necessarilypreferences devastating (i.e. a tocontinuation the coalition’s of the survival 3/3 or afor new a number2/2 structure). of reasons. This should In the firstalso place,help the the Concertación Chilean economy to have has more come chances through than the the last Right five of years presenting in far strongbetter pairsshape of than candidates. that of any of its Southern Cone neighbors, and employment andTo verifygrowth the figures consistency rebounded in the inChilean first months vote, we of compared 2003. The the vote Concertaciónobtained may by wellthe leadingbe in a politicalposition inparties 2005 into everyclaim parliamentarycredit for good election economicbetween stewardship. 1961 and Next, 2001. many TABLE of the No. issues 3 showssurrounding a surprising the non- level of democraticconsistency legacy in electoralof the Pinochetpreferences era for the—including three groups. the Although renowned the right- www.cepchile.cl wing group has clearly experienced an increase after 1989, while the Centre has experienced a decline since 1965, it is still easy to associate the Chilean people’s electoral preferences with the old three-thirds structure. The leftist third has fluctuated between 22.2% in 1961 and 43.9% in 1973.

2 ESTUDIOS PÚBLICOS

Introduction

Sources: 1961-1965: Urzúa Valenzuela (1992: 622); 1969-73: Valenzuela (1978:85); 1989-2001: http://www.elecciones.gov.cl

2 ESTUDIOS PÚBLICOS

Introduction

T he demise of Chile’s Concertación coalition has been predicted often over the past dozen years during which it has governed. Even the coalition’s leaders have issued premature announcements of its death (Latin America Adviser 2002; El Mercurio 2003a). Some observers of Chilean politics, therefore, might regard the dissolution of the Concertación as both a foregone conclusion and an overdetermined event –that is, as the product of so many factors, all working toward the same end, that it is impossible to assign responsibility among them. We share the opinion that the Concertación may well dissolve before Chile’s next election, but not for the reasons commonly cited. Our argument is based, instead, on the structure of Chilean political careers, which in turn is connected inextricably with Chile’sCAROLINA unusual GARRIDO electoral AND rules. PATRICIO NAVIA 13 Harbingers of the Concertación’s demise point out that the Chilean economy has slowed somewhat since the coalition’s early years in government duringIf we takethe the1990s. averages Moreover, for the the 8 parliamentary coalition itself elections was initially held between galvanized1961 aroundand 2001, opposition we will weto bethe quite Pinochet close toregime the three of thethirds. 1970s In fact, and even if 1980s, weso takeas time the averagespasses, the only compelling for the elections force ofheld that after initial 1989, motivation the figures are might naturally38.4% for weaken. the Right, In addition, 28.4% thefor Concertación, the Centre and and 29.5%even its forcomp theonent Left. The parties persistence—most notably and endurance the Christian of the Democrats— of the three thirdsare internally for the purposes divided of the over socialvarious issues, electoral such laws as theand legaldifferent status forms of ofdivorce political and coalitions access to —which birth have control.been Finally, described by the in 2005 brief elections, here, but the have Concertación been extensively will have demonstrated held the in presidencyliterature— and a majority should bein thetaken Chamber into accoun of Deputiest at the (the time legislative of assessing house electoral electedbehaviour by popular in Chile. vote) The for presence 16 years. of twoBy ofthe the standards three thirds of in multiparty the Concertación coalitionsde Partidosanywhere, por muchla Democracia less among should Latin not America’s be ignored presidential as an alternative systems,explanation the Concertación of why thisis geriatric, government bearing coalition the scarspresents of miscellaneousmore pairs of strong corruptioncandidates charges in legislative against elections members, than theincluding right-wing the coalition. stripping of parliamentaryNaturally, rights from an fiveassessment of the coalition’sbased exclusively deputies on inaggregate 2002, and electoral the data generalat disillusionment national level would that goesbe too with simplistic. holding However, the reins ifof we power combine for sothis with long. Onethe mightresults conclude,of regular then, surveys that carried the coalition out during is simply the 1990’s, ready to these expire. results will clearlyAny of show these that forces, the theory or some of thecombination survival of ofthe them, three couldthirds shouldindeed not be undermineruled theout tooConcertación, quickly. In butthe regularwe do surveysnot regard conducted these byfactors the Centroas de necessarilyEstudios devastating Públicos to(we the are coalition’s only considering survival here for athe number surveys of carried reasons. out after In the firstthe return place, of the democracy Chilean economy in 1990) therehas come is a question through where the last people five yearsare asked to in far identifybetter shape themselves than that with of one any of ofthe its three Southern thirds intoCone which neighbors, parties and voters employmenthave traditionally and growth been figures divided rebounded in the incountry. first months As shown of 2003.by Figure The Nº 1, Concertaciónbetween may June1990 well beand in June a position 2004, the in nu2005mber to of claim people credit who claimfor good to identify economicthemselves stewardship. with theNext, Left manyhas fluctuat of theed issues between surrounding a little over the 35% non- and just democraticunder 20%.legacy Those of thewho Pinochet say they eraidentify —including themselves the with renowned the Right have www.cepchile.cl fluctuated between a little under 15% and a little over 25%, with a clear rising tendency after 1990. Those who say they identify themselves with the Centre have shown a declining tendency after 1990, reaching a peak just above 30% at the beginning of the 90’s and fluctuating between 10 and 15% after 1998 (see also CERC tables in Huneeus, 2003: 238). Although we could well say that the number of people who do not identify themselves with any of the three groups has risen from less than 30% in 1990 to more than 40% in the most recent surveys, more than two thirds of the people surveyed still recognize that the traditional division into three thirds is a valid reference. If any, the only trend that has strengthened during the post-dictatorship period is the decline of the Centre, which has gone from being the strongest group at the beginning of the 90’s to being the weakest in the last few years. Nevertheless, a wide majority of the people surveyed continue to identify themselves with one of the three thirds in national politics, showing that the Right, Centre and Left categories should not be so easily ignored or rejected. 2 ESTUDIOS PÚBLICOS

Introduction

T he demise of Chile’s Concertación coalition has been predicted often over the past dozen years during which it has governed. Even the coalition’s leaders have issued premature announcements of its death (Latin America Adviser 2002; El Mercurio 2003a). Some observers of Chilean politics, therefore, might regard the dissolution of the Concertación as both a foregone conclusion and an overdetermined event –that is, as the product of so many factors, all working toward the same end, that it is impossible to assign responsibility among them. We share the opinion that the Concertación may well dissolve before Chile’s next election, but not for the reasons commonly cited. Our argument is based, instead, on the structure of Chilean political careers, which in turn is connected inextricably with Chile’s14 unusual electoral rules. ESTUDIOS PÚBLICOS Harbingers of the Concertación’s demise point out that the Chilean economy has slowed somewhat since the coalition’s early years in FIGURE Nº 1 IDENTIFICATION WITH A POLITICAL GROUP government during the 1990s. Moreover, the coalition itself was initially galvanized around opposition to the Pinochet regime of the 1970s and 1980s, so as time passes, the compelling force of that initial motivation might naturally weaken. In addition, the Concertación, and even its component parties —most notably the Christian Democrats— are internally divided over social issues, such as the legal status of divorce and access to birth control. Finally, by the 2005 elections, the Concertación will have held the presidency and a majority in the Chamber of Deputies (the legislative house elected by popular vote) for 16 years. By the standards of multiparty coalitions anywhere, much less among Latin America’s presidential systems, the Concertación is geriatric, bearing the scars of miscellaneous corruption charges against members, including the stripping of parliamentary rights from five of the coalition’s deputies in 2002, and the general disillusionment that goes with holding the reins of power for so long. One might conclude, then, that the coalition is simply ready to expire. Any of these forces, or some combination of them, could indeed undermine theSource Concertación,: Own work, based but on we data do from not www.cepchile.cl regard these factors as necessarily devastating to the coalition’s survival for a number of reasons. In the first place,The thewidely Chilean publicized economy hasargument come throughthat the the lastdichotomy five years between in far Concertaciónbetter shape andthan Alianza that of has any replaced of its Southernthe traditional Cone three neighbors, thirds is andalso based employmenton the evidenceand growth of surveys.figures Asrebounded shown in in Figure first No.months 2, a ofconsiderable 2003. The number Concertaciónof Chileans may identifywell be themselvesin a position either in 2005with theto claimConcertación credit foror thegood Alianza. economicHowever, stewardship. the number Next, of many people of whothe issuesclaim tosurrounding support either the non-one of the democraticcountry’s legacy two mostof the important Pinochet coalitions era —includinghas been falling the since renowned 1990. In fact, www.cepchile.cl while in 1990 more than 65% of those surveyed claimed to identify themselves with the Concertación or the Alianza, towards 2004 only a little more than 50% of those surveyed said they identified themselves with either one of the two coalitions. If we compare the percentage of those who still identify themselves with one of the two coalitions, with the number of people who still define their preferences on the basis of the traditional three thirds, we will see this historical division seems to persist through the times with more strength than the division that originated in the plebiscite of 1988. In 1990, 70% of the population identified themselves with one of the two leading coalitions while just under 70% identified themselves with one of the three thirds. By 2004, more than 60% still identified themselves with one of the three thirds, but only about 50% identified themselves with either the Concertación or the Alianza. This means that the three thirds have managed to remain as a reference for political identification with greater success than the division into Concertación 2 ESTUDIOS PÚBLICOS

Introduction

3. Second hypothesis: Number of parties in the Concertación and the Alianza

Apart from the historical explanation discussed above, we believe that another possible reason why the Concertación presents lists with two strong candidates is that the coalition is formed by a greater number of parties than 2 ESTUDIOS PÚBLICOS

Introduction

T he demise of Chile’s Concertación coalition has been predicted often over the past dozen years during which it has governed. Even the coalition’s leaders have issued premature announcements of its death (Latin America Adviser 2002; El Mercurio 2003a). Some observers of Chilean politics, therefore, might regard the dissolution of the Concertación as both a foregone conclusion and an overdetermined event –that is, as the product of so many factors, all working toward the same end, that it is impossible to assign responsibility among them. We share the opinion that the Concertación may well dissolve before Chile’s next election, but not for the reasons commonly cited. Our argument is based, instead, on the structure of Chilean political careers, which in turn is connected inextricably with Chile’s16 unusual electoral rules. ESTUDIOS PÚBLICOS Harbingers of the Concertación’s demise point out that the Chilean economy has slowed somewhat since the coalition’s early years in governmentthe right-wing during the coalition. 1990s. That Moreover, is to say, the maybe coalition the Concertaciónitself was initially presents lists galvanizedwith aaround higher opposition number of tostrong the Pinochetcandidates regime simply of because the 1970s there and are more 1980s, partiesso as timein this passes, coalition the compellingthan in the forceright-wing of that coalition. initial motivation The hypothesis might naturallydiscussed weaken.in this section In addition, is that, the the Concertación, greater the number and even of partiesits comp inonent a coalition, parties the—most greater notably the number the Christianof strong pairsDemocrats— of candidates. are internally divided over social issues, such as the legal status of divorce and access to birth control.3.1 Finally, Insurance by thefor 2005runners-up elections, in the the Concertación Concertación will have held the presidency and a majority in the Chamber of Deputies (the legislative house elected by popularTo be vote)able tofor determine 16 years. whetherBy the onlystandards the numberof multiparty of parties is coalitionssignificant anywhere, at the muchtime of less forming among pair Latins of candidates, America’s we presidential have developed a systems,data the base Concertación that is similar is geriatric,to the one bearing used by theCarey scars and of Siavelis. miscellaneous Our data base corruptionincludes charges all pairs againstof candidates members, in the Concertaciónincluding thefor allstripping the elections of to the parliamentaryChamber rights of Deputies from five between of the 1989 coalition’s and 2001. deputies We have in 2002, created and the the variable general“Concertación disillusionment Ratio”, that consistinggoes with in holding the division the reins of the of votes power of thefor candidateso long. Onereceiving might conclude,the first majority then, that by the the coalition vote of is the simply candidate ready whoto expire. received the secondAny of majority these forces, on the or same some list. combination Based on thisof them, variable could we indeedcan find the undermineaverage the difference Concertación, between but pairs we of docandi notdates regard presented these by factors the Concertación as necessarilyfor each devastating district. At to thethe samecoalition’s time, wesurvival reported for the a number number ofof reasons.parties making In the firstup this place, coalition the Chilean for each economy of the specif has comeied elections. through Tothe prlastove five our years hypothesis, in far thebetter Concertación shape than Ratio that ofshould any beof itshigher Southern when theCone number neighbors, of parties and in the employmentcoalition and is lower,growth i.e. figures with a rebounded higher number in first of parties months in theof 2003.Concertación, The we Concertaciónshould havemay awell higher be chancein a position of the coalitionin 2005 presentingto claim credit more forthan good one strong economiccandidate stewardship. in each electoralNext, many district of and the constituency. issues surrounding the non- democratic legacyTable Nº of 4 showsthe Pinochet the average era Con —includingcertación Ratio the for renowned each election to www.cepchile.cl the Chamber of Deputies held since 1989, together with the number of parties making up the Concertación in each year. In 1989, the Concertación was composed of 7 parties that presented candidates for election to the Chamber of Deputies: PDC, PR, PPD, PH (Humanist Party), PV (Green Party), PS (although some of its candidates ran as members of the PPD, a good number ran as independent candidates on the Concertación list) and independent candidates (militant members of smaller parties who, for the purposes of this essay, are placed in a single category). With 7 parties competing in the 1989 election, this coalition presented a figure of 2.451 as the result of the Concertación Ratio (vote of the candidate who came first divided by the vote of the candidate who came second).

2 ESTUDIOS PÚBLICOS

Introduction

coalitions anywhere, much less among Latin America’s presidential In 1993, the Concertación changed its party base. That year, both the systems, the Concertación is geriatric, bearing the scars of miscellaneous PH and the PV (then allied under the name of Alianza Humanista Verde) corruption charges against members, including the stripping of broke away from the Concertación, while the PSD (Social Democratic Party) parliamentary rights from five of the coalition’s deputies in 2002, and the joined the Concertación and the PS became a formal member of the coalition. general disillusionment that goes with holding the reins of power for so The double party membership of the PS and PPD came to an end in 1992, and long. One might conclude, then, that the coalition is simply ready to expire. so the parties in the government coalition that year were the PDC, PR, PSD, Any of these forces, or some combination of them, could indeed PPD, PS and the Independents. Although there was one party less, the undermine the Concertación, but we do not regard these factors as Concertación Ratio in 1993 increased slightly in relation to 1989. However, necessarily devastating to the coalition’s survival for a number of reasons. towards the end of 1997, two years from the end of the Christian Democrat In the first place, the Chilean economy has come through the last five years Eduardo Frei’s term as president, the Concertación, with one party less in the in far better shape than that of any of its Southern Cone neighbors, and coalition as a result of the union between the PR and the PSD, saw the employment and growth figures rebounded in first months of 2003. The Concertación Ratio fall to 2.198. Finally, in 2001, four years from the end of Concertación may well be in a position in 2005 to claim credit for good the presidential term of Ricardo Lagos (PS-PPD) and with the same number economic stewardship. Next, many of the issues surrounding the non- of parties as in 1997, the coefficient rose again, reaching its highest figure in democratic legacy of the Pinochet era —including the renowned

www.cepchile.cl the 4 elections held since the return of democracy. Although, at first sight, we might conclude the existence of a rising tendency, statistically speaking the differences between ratios in each election are not significant. Table Nº 5 shows T-tests for a sample for the 4 parliamentary elections of the period. Given the high variance between districts where two strong candidates competed and districts where only one strong candidate stood for election, confidence intervals (95%) are quite high. Therefore, in 1989, with a 95% confidence interval, we can say that the real Concertación Ratio stood between a minimum of 1.78 and a maximum of 3.12. As can be expected, the confidence intervals for the 4 elections overlap, i.e. we cannot conclude with statistical certainty that the lower number of parties in the Concertación had a significant influence in increasing the number of districts where there were not two strong candidates. However, as discussed above, the fact that the number of strong candidates has fallen with the passage of time does seem to be associated with the lower number of parties in the Concertación. 2 ESTUDIOS PÚBLICOS

Introduction

T he demise of Chile’s Concertación coalition has been predicted often over the past dozen years during which it has governed. Even the coalition’s leaders have issued premature announcements of its death (Latin America Adviser 2002; El Mercurio 2003a). Some observers of Chilean politics, therefore, might regard the dissolution of the Concertación as both a foregone conclusion and an overdetermined event –that is, as the product of so many factors, all working toward the same end, that it is impossible to assign responsibility among them. We share the opinion that the Concertación may well dissolve before Chile’s next election, but not for the reasons commonly cited. Our argument is based, instead, on the structure of Chilean political careers, which in turn is connected inextricably with Chile’s18 unusual electoral rules. ESTUDIOS PÚBLICOS Harbingers of the Concertación’s demise point out that the Chilean economy has slowed somewhat since the coalition’s early years in TABLE NO. 5 T-TESTS FOR A SAMPLE OF CONCERTACIÓN RATIO, 1989-2001 government during the 1990s. Moreover, the coalition itself was initially galvanized around opposition T-Value Degrees to the of Pinochet Sig. regime Difference of the 1970s Average and 1980s, so as time passes, the freedomcompelling (2-tailed) force of Intervalsthat initial 95%motivation confidence might naturally weaken. In addition, the Concertación, and even itsLow comp onentHigh parties Concertación—most notably 89 7.310the Christian 55 Democrats— 0.000 are 2.4468 internally 1.7760 divided 3.1175 over socialConcertación issues, 93 such 7.962 as the legal 59 status 0.000 of divorce 2.4715 and access 1.8504 to birth 3.0926 control.Concertación Finally, by 97 the 10.221 2005 elections, 59 the 0.000Concertación 2.1938 will have 1.7643 held the 2.6233 presidencyConcertación and a majority 01 5.527 in the Chamber 59 of 0.000 Deputies 3.0525(the legislative 1.9473 house 4.1577 elected by popularSource: vote)Calculations for 16 madeyears. by By the the authors standards with ofdata multiparty collected from coalitionswww.elecciones.gov.cl anywhere, much less among Latin America’s presidential systems, the Concertación is geriatric, bearing the scars of miscellaneous corruption chargesEven if weagainst cannot members, assert with including statistical thecertainty stripping that theof lower parliamentarynumber rightsof parties from in five the ofConcertación the coalition’s has deputiesreduced inthe 2002, number and of the districts generalwhere disillusionment the government that goescoalition with presentsholding thetwo reinsstrong of candidates,power for thereso are long. Onesome might important conclude, considerations then, that the that coalition are worth is simplyhighlighting ready toand expire. underline the existenceAny of these of a relationshipforces, or somebetween combination the number of of them, parties could in the indeed government underminecoalition the andConcertación, the number ofbut districts we do where not theregard coalition these presents factors two as strong necessarilycandidates. devastating to the coalition’s survival for a number of reasons. In the first place,Both the in Chilean1989 and economy 1993, the has Concertación’s come through victory the last in five the yearspresidential in far electionsbetter shape was than taken that for of grantedany of itseven Southern months Cone before neighbors, the registration and of employmentcandidates and forgrowth the parliamentary figures rebounded elections in thatfirst were months to be of held 2003. simultaneously The Concertaciónwith the may presidential well be inelection. a position In 1997,in 2005 there to claimwere creditjust two for yearsgood to the economicpresidential stewardship. election Next, of 1999many and of itthe was issues already surrounding clear that the the non-right-wing democraticcoalition legacy would of attempt the Pinochetfor the first era time —including since the returnthe renownedof democracy to www.cepchile.cl present a candidate that was strong enough to run for president. For this reason, the potential Concertación candidates knew that, if defeated, they would only have 2 years where they would be guaranteed to receive an “insurance” from the Executive. Because they could not be sure of who would win the presidential election of 1999, the potential candidates could not rely on the Government to guarantee that their “insurance” would be “paid” beyond President Frei’s term. But in 2001 there were still tour years to the end of President Ricardo Lagos’s term. Although surveys then showed that the right-wing opposition was clearly ahead in the race for the next presidency, Lagos’s Government still had 4 years to pay the alleged “insurance” to any Government candidates defeated in December 2001. In addition, the perception that the presidential race for 2005 was already decided so far ahead of the elections was clearly more widespread in the press than in the strategic considerations of shrew politicians. 2 ESTUDIOS PÚBLICOS

Introduction

parliamentary rights from five of the coalition’s deputies in 2002, and the (highest certainty) 2001 > 1993 > 1989 > 1997 (lowest certainty) general disillusionment that goes with holding the reins of power for so long. One mightThe conclude, perception then, of thatthe Concertación’sthe coalition is chancessimply ready of remaining to expire. in power beyondAny of thethese end forces,of the presidentialor some combination term in progress of them, probably could varied indeed from one underminecandidate the toConcertación, another in each but election. we do Therefore,not regard there these may factors have been as more necessarilycandidates devastating who thought to the coalition’sit more likely survival that the for Concertación a number of would reasons. remain in In the firstpower place, in 1997 the Chileanfollowing economy Frei’s term has thancome those through who thehad last the fivesame years perception in far inbetter relation shape to thanLagos’s that successorof any of inits 2001. Southern However, Cone ourneighbors, analysis andis simply employmentbased onand the growth number figures of years rebounded left to complete in first the months presidential of 2003. term Theand on the Concertacióncertainty may that well the Executivebe in a position could offer in 2005 that toit wouldclaim providecredit for “insurance” good to economicrunners-up, stewardship. regardless Next, of themany result of ofthe the issues next presidential surrounding election. the non- democratic legacyTherefore, of 1997the wouldPinochet be the era year —including where there thewas renownedthe least certainty www.cepchile.cl and as a result, there must have been fewer incentives for the Concertación to present two strong candidates in most districts. But, as Table No. 5 shows, in 1997, the Concertación presented a larger number of strong pairings in the country. Conversely, fewer strong pairs were presented for the parliamentary elections of 2001, when the certainty of remaining in power was highest. Now then, as already stated, the difference between the average number of strong pairs in 1997 and 2001 is not statistically significant. Although it is worth noting that Carey and Siavelis do not include the parliamentary elections of 2001 in their research, the evidence of the greater difficulty that the Concertación apparently experienced that year to find strong pairs of candidates challenges the argument that the offer of “insurance to runners-up” induces strong candidates to stand for election as part of the Concertación lists.

2 ESTUDIOS PÚBLICOS

Introduction

T he demise of Chile’s Concertación coalition has been predicted often over the past dozen years during which it has governed. Even the coalition’s leaders have issued premature announcements of its death (Latin America Adviser 2002; El Mercurio 2003a). Some observers of Chilean politics, therefore, might regard the dissolution of the Concertación as both a foregone conclusion and an overdetermined event –that is, as the product of so many factors, all working toward the same end, that it is impossible to assign responsibility among them. We share the opinion that the Concertación may well dissolve before Chile’s next election, but not for the reasons commonly cited. Our argument is based, instead, on the structure of Chilean political careers, which in turn is connected inextricably with Chile’s20 unusual electoral rules. ESTUDIOS PÚBLICOS Harbingers of the Concertación’s demise point out that the Chilean economy has slowed somewhat since the coalition’s early years in TABLE NO. 6 RE-ELECTION TO THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES, 1993-2001 government during the 1990s. Moreover, the coalition itself was initially galvanizedYear around Re-electedopposition to the Pinochet Non-re-elected regime of the Deputies 1970s who and 1980s, so as time passes, Deputies the compelling Deputies force of that initial stood for motivation re-election might naturally1993 weaken. 71 (80.1%) In addition, the Concertación, 17 (19.9%) and even 88its out comp of 120onent parties 1997—most notably 72 (85.7%) the Christian Democrats— 12 (14.3%) are internally 84 out ofdivided 120 over social2001 issues, such 74 (80.4%) as the legal status 18 (19.1%) of divorce and access 92 out ofto 120 birth control.Total Finally, by 217the (82.2%) 2005 elections, the 47 Concertación(17.8%) will 264 have out heldof 360 the presidency andSource a majority: Calculations in the by Chamber the authors of withDeputies data from (the www.congreso.cl legislative house elected by popular vote) for 16 years. By the standards of multiparty coalitions anywhere,Actually, onemuch possible less amongreason whyLatin the America’s number of presidential strong pair in the systems,Concertación the Concertación has fallen is geriatric,may have bearing to do with the thescars high of re-electionmiscellaneous rate in the corruptionHouse. charges Table No. against 6 shows members, re-election raincludingtes for the thethree stripping legislative ofelections parliamentarywhere deputies rights from stood five for ofre-election. the coalition’s Although deputies the numberin 2002, of and deputies the that generalhave disillusionment stood for and thatachieved goes re-electionwith holding has theremained reins stable,of power the forfact sothat over long. One80% might of deputies conclude, seeking then, that re-election the coalition are successfulis simply ready may towell expire. represent a sufficientlyAny of these strong forces, obstacle or some to detercombination potential of candidates them, could from indeed competing, undermineregardless the Concertación,of any “insurances” but thewe Concertación do not regard might these offer. factors as necessarily devastating to the coalition’s survival for a number of reasons. In the first3.2. ‘Insuranceplace, the Chileanfor runners-up’ economy in hasthe Alianzacome through the last five years in far better shape than that of any of its Southern Cone neighbors, and employment andAnother growth way figures of looking rebounded at Carey in and first Siavelis’s months argumentof 2003. Theis to study Concertaciónwhat happens may well with be the in Alianza’s a position electoral in 2005 lists. to claimIf true, credit the explanation for good based economicon ‘insurancesstewardship. for Next,runners-up” many shouldof the also issues be consistent surrounding with thethe non-presence of democraticstrong pairslegacy of candidatesof the Pinochet in the right-wing era —including coalition. To the determine renowned whether or www.cepchile.cl not this is true, we use the same method applied to the Concertación, reversing the hypothesis. If the Concertación presents more pairs of strong candidates when it has more chances of guaranteeing an “insurance for runners-up”, then the Alianza should present more pairs of strong candidates when the Concertación has less chance of remaining in power. Table No. 7 contains t-tests for a sample of the results obtained by the Alianza in the 4 parliamentary elections of the period. Again, given the high variance between districts where two strong candidates were presented and districts where only one of the candidates was strong, confidence intervals (95%) are quite high. Therefore, in 1989, with a 95% confidence interval we may say that the true Alianza Ratio stood between a minimum of 2.44 and a maximum of 4.91. As can be expected, confidence intervals for the 4 elections overlap in the same ways as observed in the Concertación, i.e. we cannot conclude with statistical certainty that the variance observed in the average reflects substantive differences in the districts where the Alianza presented 2 ESTUDIOS PÚBLICOS

Introduction

T he demise of Chile’s Concertación coalition has been predicted often over the past dozen years during which it has governed. Even the coalition’s leaders have issued premature announcements of its death (Latin America Adviser 2002; El Mercurio 2003a). Some observers of Chilean politics, therefore, might regard the dissolution of the Concertación as both a foregone conclusion and an overdetermined event –that is, as the product of so many factors, all working toward the same end, that it is impossible to assign responsibility among them. We share the opinion that the Concertación may well dissolve before Chile’s next election, but not for the reasons commonly cited. Our argument is based, instead, on the structure of Chilean political careers, which in turn is connected inextricably with Chile’sCAROLINA unusual GARRIDO electoral AND rules. PATRICIO NAVIA 21 Harbingers of the Concertación’s demise point out that the Chilean economy has slowed somewhat since the coalition’s early years in governmenttwo candidates. during the Although, 1990s. Moreover, in fact, if wethe comparecoalition the itself values was in initially TABLE Nº 7 galvanized(results around obtained opposition by strong to theAlianza Pinochet pairings) regime with of those the 1970sin TABLE and Nº 5 1980s, (strongso as timepairings passes, in the the Concertación), compelling forcethe values of that also initial overlap motivation within the 95% might naturallyconfidence weaken. interval, In withaddition, the exceptionthe Concertación, of 1997. and We even may its say comp withonent statistical parties confidence—most notably that in 1997the Christian the number Democrats— of strong pairings are internally in the Concertación divided was over socialhigher issues, than insuch the asAlianza, the legal i.e thestatus year of indivorce which andthe Concertaciónaccess to birth had less control.time Finally, to provide by the insurance 2005 elections, to its runners-upthe Concertación was the will time have when held the the greatest presidencydifference and a majoritywas recorded in the Chamberbetween ofthe Deputies number (theof legislativestrong pairings house in the electedConcertación by popular andvote) in thefor Alianza 16 years. for electionsBy the tostandards the Chamber of multiparty of Deputies. coalitions anywhere,The uncertainty much aboutless theamong prospect Latin of receivingAmerica’s insurance presidential for runners- systems,up thedoes Concertación not seem to influenceis geriatric, the bearinglikelihood the of scars the Concertación of miscellaneous presenting a corruptionhigher chargesnumber ofagainst strong pairingsmembers, in the including period. Similarly, the stripping the “uncertainty” of parliamentaryvariable rightsabout fromthe election five of results the coalition’s does not seemdeputies to influence in 2002, theand presence the of generalstrong disillusionment pairings in thatthe Alianza.goes with In 1989,holding the the Alianza reins presentedof power morefor so pairs of long. Onestrong might candidates conclude, than then, in anythat otherthe coalition year. Conversely, is simply ready in 1997 to expire. the number of strongAny of pairings these wasforces, the lowestor some in thecombination 4 elections. of them, could indeed undermine theAlthough Concertación, these differences but we are do not not statistically regard thesesignificant, factors they as seem to necessarilyreflect devastating the Right’s to low the expectations coalition’s aboutsurvival winning for a thenumber presidential of reasons. election. In In the firstaddition, place, this the figureChilean may economy also reflect has come the throughlower number the last offive parties years in the in far Alianza.better shape In 1989, than thisthat coalition of any ofwas its formed Southern by twoCone main neighbors, parties andand several employmentsmaller and parties, growth apart figures from a rebounded considerable in numberfirst months of independents of 2003. The(which we Concertaciónhave grouped may well together be in as a aposition single partin 2005y). As to the claim RN creditand the for UDI good began to economicestablish stewardship. themselves Next, as manythe two of strongthe issues parties surrounding in the Alianza, the non- and most democraticcandidates legacy started of thecoming Pinochet from thoseera —includingtwo parties, thethe numberrenowned of strong www.cepchile.cl pairings began to fall because both parties were able to negotiate candidate omissions in favour of privileged candidates. Similarly, the presence of deputies who stood for re-election may have contributed to reduce the number of strong challengers in the Alianza, thereby reducing intra-coalitional competition.

TABLE NO. 7 T-TESTS FOR A SAMPLE OF ALIANZA RATIO, 1989-2001

T-value Degrees of Sig. Difference Average95% freedom (2-tailed) intervals confidence Low High

Alianza 89 5.965 58 0.000 3.676 2.4426 4.9098 Alianza 93 8.489 59 0.000 4.291 3.2798 5.3028 Alianza 97 6.821 58 0.000 5.247 3.7072 6.7868 Alianza 01 7.350 58 0.000 4.753 3.4587 6.0478 Source: Calculations by the authors with data from www.elecciones.gov.cl 2 ESTUDIOS PÚBLICOS

Introduction

T he demise of Chile’s Concertación coalition has been predicted often over the past dozen years during which it has governed. Even the coalition’s leaders have issued premature announcements of its death (Latin America Adviser 2002; El Mercurio 2003a). Some observers of Chilean politics, therefore, might regard the dissolution of the Concertación as both a foregone conclusion and an overdetermined event –that is, as the product of so many factors, all working toward the same end, that it is impossible to assign responsibility among them. We share the opinion that the Concertación may well dissolve before Chile’s next election, but not for the reasons commonly cited. Our argument is based, instead, on the structure of Chilean political careers, which in turn is connected inextricably with Chile’s22 unusual electoral rules. ESTUDIOS PÚBLICOS Harbingers of the Concertación’s demise point out that the Chilean economy has slowed somewhat since the coalition’s early years in government duringAll the the same, 1990s. unless Moreover, the Alianza the and coalition the Concertación itself was took initially for granted galvanizedthat thearound Concertación opposition would to thealways Pinochet remain regime in power, of thethe expectations1970s and about 1980s, theso electoralas time passes,results andthe thecompelling Government’s force ofremaining that initial time motivation in power do not might naturallyseem to haveweaken. had In any addition, effect the on Concertación, the RN’s and and UDI’s even itsconsiderations. component We parties believe—most that notably this evidencethe Christian challenges Democrats— Carey and are Siavelis’s internally argument. divided If the over socialparties issues, in the such Concertación as the legal actedstatus ofrationally, divorce andoffering access their to birthcandidates control.“insurances” Finally, by tothe persuade 2005 elections, them to run the foConcertaciónr election as partwill of have strong held pairings, the the presidencycertainty and aabout majority who inwould the Chamber rule the country of Deputies in the (the years legislative following house the election electedmust by havepopular had vote)an effect for on16 the years. number By of the strong standards pairing ofpresented. multiparty Similarly, coalitionsthe possibilityanywhere, of much rising lessto power among in theLatin next America’s election shouldpresidential have had an systems,influence the Concertación on the number is geriatric, of strong bearing pairings the presented scars of by miscellaneous the Alianza, but in corruptionpractice charges it did not. against members, including the stripping of parliamentary rights from five of the coalition’s deputies in 2002, and the general3.3. disillusionment Strong parties thatand stronggoes with pairs holding of candidates: the reins the ofConcertación power for so long. One might conclude, then, that the coalition is simply ready to expire. Any ofNow these then, forces, not all or parties some havecombination the same electoralof them, weight could orindeed importance. undermineFor this the reason, Concertación, we are repeating but we the do whole not analysisregard includingthese factors only candidates as necessarilyfrom devastating“strong parties” to the in coalition’sorder to determine survival whether for a number the presence of reasons. of a greater In the firstnumber place, of thestrong Chilean parties economy in each has coalition come throughhas an effectthe last on five the years number of in far strongbetter pairsshape standing than that for of election. any of Weits haveSouthern polished Cone our neighbors, initial hypothesis and for employmentthis analysis. and growth The newfigures hypothesis rebounded is that, in firstthe greatermonths the of number2003. The of strong Concertaciónparties inmay the wellcoalition, be in the a positionhigher the in number2005 to of claim strong credit pairings for thegood coalition economicwill stewardship.present for election Next, to many Congress. of the We issues define surroundingstrong parties the as thosenon- parties democraticwith most legacy votes of and the a leadingPinochet presence era —including at national levelthe inrenowned each coalition. www.cepchile.cl Therefore, in the Concertación there are three strong parties: PDC, PPD and PS. In the Alianza por Chile there are 2 strong parties: RN and UDI. Apart from being the five parties that collected most votes at national level, they are the parties with the largest presence in the 60 districts. We believe that perhaps the higher number of strong parties in the Concertación may account for the greater presence of strong pairings in this coalition. An alternative way of addressing this issue would be through the analysis of subpacts inside the Concertación instead of analyzing the stronger parties. Traditionally, one of the subpacts in the Concertación has been the occasional alliance between the PDC and other independent parties and candidates, while the other subpact has been the occasional partnership between the PS-PPD and other independent parties and candidates. However, if we consider the subpacts as units of analysis, we will simply confirm, through the initial hypothesis (that the Concertación subpacts repeat the partnership between the Centre and the Left), the point that we wish to 2 ESTUDIOS PÚBLICOS

Introduction

T he demise of Chile’s Concertación coalition has been predicted often over the past dozen years during which it has governed. Even the coalition’s leaders have issued premature announcements of its death (Latin America Adviser 2002; El Mercurio 2003a). Some observers of Chilean politics, therefore, might regard the dissolution of the Concertación as both a foregone conclusion and an overdetermined event –that is, as the product of so many factors, all working toward the same end, that it is impossible to assign responsibility among them. We share the opinion that the Concertación may well dissolve before Chile’s next election, but not for the reasons commonly cited. Our argument is based, instead, on the structure of Chilean political careers, which in turn is connected inextricably with Chile’sCAROLINA unusual GARRIDO electoral AND rules. PATRICIO NAVIA 23 Harbingers of the Concertación’s demise point out that the Chilean economy has slowed somewhat since the coalition’s early years in governmentconsider: during whether the 1990s.the Concertación Moreover, is thein fact coalition made upitself by thewas 33% initially represented by the Centre and the 33% represented by the Left. This is why we have galvanized around opposition to the Pinochet regime3 of the 1970s and 1980s, chosenso as timeto study passes, parties the rather compelling than subpacts force of. It that is worth initial mentioning motivation that, on might naturallythe right, weaken.each party In addition, is actually the Concertación,a subpact, which and even is whyits comp the onentanalysis of parties subpacts—most willnotably only thebe relevant Christian in theDemocrats— Concertación. are internally divided over social issues,Table suchNº 8 showsas the thelegal average status Conof divorcecertación and Ratio access for each to birth election to control.the Finally, Chamber by theof Deputies 2005 elections, held since the 1989.Concertación We are onlywill haveconsidering held the districts presidencywhere and both a majority candidates in thein all Chamber pairings of were Deputies members (the oflegislative the PDC, house PPD or PS. electedIn by 1989, popular the Concertación vote) for 16 recorded years. anBy average the standards ratio of 1.427, of multiparty bearing in mind coalitionsthat itanywhere, only presented much lists less with among strong Latin pairs ofAmerica’s candidates presidential in 18 districts. In systems,1993, the theConcertación Concertación is presentedgeriatric, strongbearing pairs the inscars 41 districts,of miscellaneous with an average corruptionratio of charges 2.074. In against1997, the members,Concertación including presented strongthe stripping pairs in 50 of districts, parliamentarywith 2.345 rights as itsfrom average five of ratio. the coalition’sFinally, in 2001,deputies the inaverage 2002, ratioand theof strong generalpairs disillusionment was 2.523, in that40 districts. goes with holding the reins of power for so long. One mightAlthough, conclude, in then,1989, that candidates the coalition from isthe simply PPD readyand the to PDCexpire. competed onlyAny inof 18 these districts forces, (the orPS some was notcombination officially registered of them, oncould that occasion),indeed the undermineConcertación the Concertación, Ratio was the but lowest we fordo thenot four regard elections. these When factors the PSas joined necessarilythe competition devastating into 1993the coalition’s as an official survival party for within a number the ofConcertación, reasons. the In the firstConcertación place, the ratio Chilean rose economy slightly (althoughhas come wethrough should the remember last five yearsthat the PS in far andbetter PPD shape have than never that faced of any each of other its Southern in the same Cone district neighbors, in parliamentary and employmentelections). and growth figures rebounded in first months of 2003. The Concertación may well be in a position in 2005 to claim credit for good TABLE NO. 8 CONCERTACIÓN RATIO AND STRONG PARTIES IN THE economic stewardship.CONCERTACIÓN Next, many 1989-2001 of the issues surrounding the non- democratic legacy of the Pinochet era —including the renowned www.cepchile.cl Conc. Ratio Conc. Ratio Conc. Ratio Conc. Ratio 1989 1993 1997 2001 Average 1.427 2.074 2.345 2.523 No. of strong 2 3 3 3 parties No. of districts 1 8 4 1 5 0 5 0 Source: Calculations by the authors with data from www.elecciones.gov.cl

Table Nº 9 shows T-tests for a sample for the 4 parliamentary elections of the period. The only election where results are statistically different is the 1989 election, which showed substantially higher intra-list competition in the

3 The adoption in 1989 of an electoral reform which enabled the formation of coalitions, and a subsequent reform in 1991 which enabled subpacts for the local elections may also be interpreted as evidence of the persistence of distinguishable parties inside each coalition, as well as the survival of the three major groups (Right, Centre and Left) which became stronger during the 60’s. 2 ESTUDIOS PÚBLICOS

Introduction

T he demise of Chile’s Concertación coalition has been predicted often over the past dozen years during which it has governed. Even the coalition’s leaders have issued premature announcements of its death (Latin America Adviser 2002; El Mercurio 2003a). Some observers of Chilean politics, therefore, might regard the dissolution of the Concertación as both a foregone conclusion and an overdetermined event –that is, as the product of so many factors, all working toward the same end, that it is impossible to assign responsibility among them. We share the opinion that the Concertación may well dissolve before Chile’s next election, but not for the reasons commonly cited. Our argument is based, instead, on the structure of Chilean political careers, which in turn is connected inextricably with Chile’s24 unusual electoral rules. ESTUDIOS PÚBLICOS Harbingers of the Concertación’s demise point out that the Chilean economy has slowed somewhat since the coalition’s early years in governmentConcertación. during theThis 1990s. is probably Moreover, due theto the coalition absence itself of deputieswas initially seeking re- galvanizedelection, around which opposition made intra-list to the compe Pinochettition regime in the ofcoalition the 1970s fiercer and in many 1980s, moreso as districts. time passes, However, the compelling for the rest force of theof thatelections, initial the motivation values are not might naturallystatistically weaken. different In oneaddition, from thethe Concertación,other. and even its component parties —mostA notablycomparison the withChristian the values Democrats— in TABLE are Nº internally5 shows that divided when we do over socialnot consider issues, smallersuch as partythe legal candidates status inof thedivorce Concertación, and access the tovalues birth for the control.Concertación Finally, by theRatio 2005 fall elections, substantially the Concertaciónin all the elections. will have This held means the that, presidencywhen and candidates a majority from in the the Chamber PS-PPD ofsub-pact Deputies face (the PDC legislative candidates house there is electedmore by popularcompetition vote) than for when 16 oneyears. of theBy Concertaciónthe standards candidates of multiparty is a member coalitionsof another anywhere, party (PRSDmuch orless independent). among Latin This America’ssupports the presidential hypothesis that the systems,Concertación the Concertación has a greater is geriatric, number bearing of strong the pairs scars of of candidates miscellaneous because it is corruptionmade upcharges by two ofagainst the traditional members, three includingthirds into whichthe stripping the Chilean of political parliamentarysystem usedrights to frombe divided. five of the coalition’s deputies in 2002, and the general disillusionment that goes with holding the reins of power for so TABLE NO. 9 T-TESTS FOR A SAMPLE OF CONCERTACIÓN RATIO, 1989-2001 long. One might conclude,(STRONG then, PARTIES) that the coalition is simply ready to expire. Any of these forces, or some combination of them, could indeed Degrees of Sig. (2- difference Average 95% undermine the Concertación,T-test but we do not regard these factors as freedom tailed) intervals Confidence necessarily devastating to the coalition’s survival for a number of reasons. Low High In the first place, the Chilean economy has come through the last five years Concertación 89 11.485 17 0.000 1.425 1.163 1.687 in far better shape than that of any of its Southern Cone neighbors, and employmentConcertación and growth93 9.056figures rebounded 40 0.000 in first months 2.09€1 of 2003. 1.624 The 2.557 ConcertaciónConcertación may 97 well be 9.362 in a position 49 in 0.0002005 to claim 2.345 credit 1.842for good 2.849 economicConcertación stewardship. 01 Next, 5.527 many 39 of the 0.000 issues surrounding 2.523 1.872the non- 3.173 democratic legacySource: Calculationsof the Pinochet by the authors era w ith—including data from www.elecciones.gov.cl the renowned www.cepchile.cl As we did before, we may apply to these data the same criterion of “certainty about remaining in power” to analyze the presence of strong parties in pairings. In 1989 and 1993 the Concertación’s victory in the presidential election had been widely predicted even before the establishment of lists for the parliamentary elections. In 1989 there were high chances -though not absolute certainty- that the Concertación would remain in power for another 4-year term and, in 1993, for another 6-year term.1997 was the year when the Concertación had the least certainty about remaining in power because there were only two years to the election. As in 2001 there were still four years to the presidential election, the Concertación should have had a larger number of strong pairings, since that was the year when it was best placed to guarantee ‘insurances’ to potential runners-up. However, in 2001, the highest Concertación Ratio was recorded, contrary to all expectations. 2 ESTUDIOS PÚBLICOS

Introduction

T he demise of Chile’s Concertación coalition has been predicted often over the past dozen years during which it has governed. Even the coalition’s leaders have issued premature announcements of its death (Latin America Adviser 2002; El Mercurio 2003a). Some observers of Chilean politics, therefore, might regard the dissolution of the Concertación as both a foregone conclusion and an overdetermined event –that is, as the product of so many factors, all working toward the same end, that it is impossible to assign responsibility among them. We share the opinion that the Concertación may well dissolve before Chile’s next election, but not for the reasons commonly cited. Our argument is based, instead, on the structure of Chilean political careers, which in turn is connected inextricably with Chile’sCAROLINA unusual GARRIDO electoral AND rules. PATRICIO NAVIA 25 Harbingers of the Concertación’s demise point out that the Chilean economy has slowed somewhat since the coalition’s early years in government duringEven thoughthe 1990s. there Moreover,is no meaningful the coalition statistical itself difference was initially between the galvanizedaverage around ratios opposition per year, there to the seems Pinochet to be aregime rising tendencyof the 1970s in the andnumber of 1980s, strongso as pairingstime passes, in the the Concertación’s compelling force list whenof that we initial exclude motivation smaller party might naturallycandidates weaken. and consider In addition, only thethe Concertación, PDC and PS-PPD and even candidates. its component These data parties show—most how notably the presence the Christian of stronger Democrats— party candidates are internallyin parliamentary divided pairings over socialenables issues, the coalition such as to the field legal stronger status electoral of divorce lists. and access to birth control. Finally, by the 2005 elections, the Concertación will have held the presidency3.4. Strongand a majorityparties and in thestrong Chamber pairings of inDeputies the Alianza (the porlegislative Chile house elected by popular vote) for 16 years. By the standards of multiparty coalitions anywhere,We have alsomuch analyzed less among the presence Latin of America’s candidate pairingspresidential from strong systems,parties the Concertación(RN and UDI) is ingeriatric, the Alianza bearing por theChile. scars TABLE of miscellaneous No. 10 shows the corruptionaverage charges Alianza Ratioagainst for eachmembers, election including to the Chamber the ostripping Deputies heldof since parliamentary1989, considering rights from only five the of districtsthe coalition’s where pairsdeputies formed in 2002, by candidates and the from generalRN disillusionment and UDI were that presented. goes with In holding1989, the the right-wing reins of power coalition for presentedso long. Onestrong might pairings conclude, in 37 then,districts that and the obtainedcoalition an is simplyaverage ready ratio ofto expire.3.492. In 1993, itAny fielded of these strong forces, pairings or insome 17 districtscombination and achievedof them, andcould average indeed ratio of undermine4.448. the In 1997,Concertación, in 40 districts, but thewe averdo agenot ratioregard of strongthese candidatefactors as pairings necessarilywas 6.126.devastating Finally, to thein coalition’sthe 2001 elections,survival for it apresented number ofstrong reasons. candidate In the firstpairings place, in 39the districts Chilean and economy the average has come ratio wasthrough 5.285. the The last Alianza’s five years average in far ratiosbetter withshape candidates than that fromof any strong of its parties Southern increase Cone in neighbors, comparison and with the employmentresults andin TABLEgrowth figuresNo.7, when rebounded all districts in first in months the country of 2003. are Thetaken into Concertaciónaccount. may This well shows be that,in a contraryposition toin what 2005 happens to claim with credit the Concertación,for good it economicis the stewardship. independents Next, and representatives many of the ofissues smaller surrounding right-wing partiesthe non- who help democraticthe Alianza legacy to formof the a larger Pinochet number era of strong—including pairings. the This renowned may well be due www.cepchile.cl to the fact that, despite the apparent differences and disputes existing between the RN and the UDI, both parties tend to reach agreement on privileged candidates and candidate omissions in districts where deputies stand for re- election, so that there is less of a real competition between candidates from both parties than might be perceived. In fact, if there is more competition when smaller party or independent candidates face RN and UDI candidates, then we may conclude that actual confrontations between candidates from both parties are less frequent than confrontations between right-wing independents and RN or UDI members, or even that competition between candidates from the RN and UDI is not as fierce as it is between candidates from the PDC and the PS/PPD partnership in the Concertación.

2 ESTUDIOS PÚBLICOS

Introduction

www.cepchile.cl TABLE NO. 11 T-TESTS FOR A SAMPLE OF ALIANZA RATIO, 1989-2001 (STRONG PARTIES)

T-value Degrees of Sig. difference Average freedom (2-tailed) intervals 95% Confidence Low High Alianza 89 4.446 36 0.000 3.491 1.898 5.084 Alianza 93 3.566 16 0.003 4.448 1.804 7.092 Alianza 97 5.832 39 0.000 6.122 3.999 8.245 Alianza 01 5.948 38 0.000 5.285 3.486 7.085 Source: Calculations by the authors with data from www.elecciones.gov.cl

The evidence seems to be conclusive. While the presence of strong party candidate pairings (DC vs. PS-PPD) tends to increase intra-list competition in the Concertación, the presence of strong party candidate pairings in the Alianza tends to reduce competition in this coalition. This 2 ESTUDIOS PÚBLICOS

Introduction

T he demise of Chile’s Concertación coalition has been predicted often over the past dozen years during which it has governed. Even the coalition’s leaders have issued premature announcements of its death (Latin America Adviser 2002; El Mercurio 2003a). Some observers of Chilean politics, therefore, might regard the dissolution of the Concertación as both a foregone conclusion and an overdetermined event –that is, as the product of so many factors, all working toward the same end, that it is impossible to assign responsibility among them. We share the opinion that the Concertación may well dissolve before Chile’s next election, but not for the reasons commonly cited. Our argument is based, instead, on the structure of Chilean political careers, which in turn is connected inextricably with Chile’sCAROLINA unusual GARRIDO electoral AND rules. PATRICIO NAVIA 27 Harbingers of the Concertación’s demise point out that the Chilean economy has slowed somewhat since the coalition’s early years in governmentcould wellduring show the that, 1990s. despite Moreover, their fights the andcoalition disputes, itself the was two initiallyleading parties galvanizedin the around Alianza opposition do not reallyto the in Pinochet confrontation regime and of insteadthe 1970s tend and to reach 1980s, agreementso as time on passes, displaced the andcompelling privileged force candidates of that whichinitial resultsmotivation in a lower might naturallylevel of intra-list weaken. competition In addition, in the the Concertación, Alianza than and in the even Concertación. its component parties —mostAgain, notably the theghost Christian of “the Democrats— three thirds” areseems internally to reemerge divided here to over socialaccount issues, for the such fiercer as the competition legal status within of divorce the Concertación. and access Rather to birth than the control.possibility Finally, byof theoffering 2005 ‘insuranceelections, theto runners-up’Concertación —whose will have variance held the does not presidencyseem and to affect a majority the number in the ofChamber strong candidatesof Deputies who (the are legislative brave enough house to stand electedfor by election popular representing vote) for 16the years.Concertación’s By the list—standards it seems of multiparty that the existing coalitionscompetition anywhere, between much the less PDC among and Latinthe Left America’s (PS-PPD) presidential is what actually systems,accounts the Concertación for fiercer intra-listis geriatric, competition bearing thebetween scars Concertaciónof miscellaneous candidates. corruptionAs for charges the Alianza, against although members, it is composed including of twothe differentstripping parties, of this parliamentarycoalition rights represents from fivea single of the political coalition’s sector, deputies formed in by 2002, two andparties the which, generaldespite disillusionment their differences, that goes avoid with open holding confrontation. the reins ofThe power number for ofso parties long. Oneseems might to haveconclude, some then, relevance, that the but coalition the presence is simply of readycandidates to expire. from strong partiesAny of would these seemforces, to or be some the reasoncombination why thereof them, is more could intra-coalitional indeed underminecompetition the Concertación, (lower Concertación but we Ratio) do not in theregard government these factors coalition as than in necessarilythe Alianza. devastating This toagain the coalition’sreinforces thesurvival argument for athat number the Concertación of reasons. has a In the firsthigher place, level the of Chileanintra-coalitional economy competition has come becausethrough itthe is lastformed five by years two of the in far threebetter thirdsshape rather than thatthan ofbecause any of it itshas Southern the ability Cone to offerneighbors, ‘insurance’ and to its employmentdefeated and candidates. growth figures rebounded in first months of 2003. The Concertación may well be in a position in 2005 to claim credit for good economic stewardship. Next, many 4.of Conclusion the issues surrounding the non- democratic legacy of the Pinochet era —including the renowned www.cepchile.cl In this essay, we have suggested two alternative explanations to those provided by Carey and Siavelis to account for the presence of a larger number of strong candidates in the Concertación than on the right for the parliamentary elections held in Chile since 1989. Siavelis and Carey suggest that the Concertación presents lists with two strong candidates because they are able to offer “insurances” —in the form of presidential appointments— to those candidates who, accepting a personal risk for the sake of the Centre-Left coalition, fail to win a seat. Because, at the time when they wrote their article, a great level of uncertainty was expected about the outcome of the presidential election of 2005, Carey and Siavelis argued that the Concertación would find it more difficult to present strong pairs of candidates. Regardless of the existing level of uncertainty about the 2005 presidential election, we have suggested two alternative explanations of why the Concertación presents lists with a larger number of strong candidates than the Alianza. The first one is that the Concertación is formed by parties representing two of the historical “three thirds” in Chilean politics. The second claims that the Concertación is 2 ESTUDIOS PÚBLICOS

Introduction

in far better shape than that of any of its Southern Cone neighbors, and REFERENCES employment and growth figures rebounded in first months of 2003. The

ConcertaciónAllamand, may Andrés: well “Lasbe in Paradojas a position de unin 2005Legado”. to claimIn Paul credit Drake for and good Iván Jaksic economic stewardship.(compilers), Next, many of the issues surrounding the non- democraticEl Modelo legacy Chileno. of Democracia the Pinochet y Desarrollo era en —including los Noventa. Santiago: the renowned LOM, 1999. www.cepchile.cl Arriagada, Genaro: De la Vía Chilena a la Vía Insurreccional. Santiago: Editorial del Pacífico, 1974. Boeninger, Edgardo: Democracia en Chile. Lecciones para la Gobernabilidad. Santiago: Editorial Andrés Bello, 1997. Carey, John M. and Peter Siavelis: “El ‘Seguro’ para los Subcampeones Electorales y la Sobrevivencia de la Concertación”. In Estudios Públicos, 90, 2003, pp. 5-27. Cavallo, Ascanio, Óscar Sepúlveda and Manuel Salazar: La Historia Oculta del Régimen Militar. 1973-1988. Santiago: Grijalbo, 1997. Constable, Pamela and Arturo Valenzuela: A Nation of Enemies. Chile Under Pinochet. New York: Norton, 1991. De Vylder, Stefan: Allende’s Chile: The Political Economy of the Rise and Fall of the Unidad Popular. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976. Garretón, Manuel Antonio: El Proceso Político Chileno. Santiago: FLACSO, 1983. Gil, Federico: El Sistema Político de Chile. Santiago: Editorial Andrés Bello, 1969. Huneeus, Carlos: Chile, un País Dividido. La Actualidad del Pasado. Santiago: Catalonia, 2003. Otano, Rafael: Crónica de la Transición. Santiago: Planeta, 1995. Ortega Frei, Eugenio: Historia de una Alianza. Santiago: CED-CESOC, 1992. Sartori, Giovanni: Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976. 2 ESTUDIOS PÚBLICOS

Introduction

T he demise of Chile’s Concertación coalition has been predicted often over the past dozen years during which it has governed. Even the coalition’s leaders have issued premature announcements of its death (Latin America Adviser 2002; El Mercurio 2003a). Some observers of Chilean politics, therefore, might regard the dissolution of the Concertación as both a foregone conclusion and an overdetermined event –that is, as the product of so many factors, all working toward the same end, that it is impossible to assign responsibility among them. We share the opinion that the Concertación may well dissolve before Chile’s next election, but not for the reasons commonly cited. Our argument is based, instead, on the structure of Chilean political careers, which in turn is connected inextricably with Chile’sCAROLINA unusual GARRIDO electoral AND rules. PATRICIO NAVIA 29 Harbingers of the Concertación’s demise point out that the Chilean economy has slowed somewhat since the coalition’s early years in Scully, Timothy: Rethinking the Center. Party Politics in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century government duringChile. Stanford: the 1990s. Standford Moreover, University the Press, coalition 1992. itself was initially galvanizedScully, around Timothy oppositionand J. Samuel to Valenzuela: the Pinochet “De la regimeDemocracia of athe la Democracia. 1970s and 1993”. In 1980s, so as Estudiostime passes, Públicos, the 51 compelling(invierno), 1993, force pp. 195-228.of that initial motivation Tironi, Eugenio and Felipe Agüero: “¿Sobrevivirá el Nuevo Paisaje Político Chileno?” In might naturallyEstudios weaken. Públicos, In addition, 74 (otoño), the 1999,Concertación, pp. 151-168. and even its component parties Urzúa—most Valenzuela, notably Germán: the Christian Historia Política Democrats— de Chile y suare Evolución internally Electora dividedl. Desde 1810 over social issues,a 1992 .such Santiago: as theEditorial legal Jurídica status de of Chile, divorce 1992. and access to birth control.Valdés, Finally, Juan by Gabriel: the 2005 Pinochet’s elections, Economists: the Concertación The Chicago willSchool have in Chileheld. theNew York: Cambridge University Press, 1995. presidencyValenzuela, and a majorityArturo: The in theBreakdown Chamber of ofDemocratic Deputies Regimes. (the legislative Chile. Baltimore: house John elected by popularHopkins vote)University for Press, 16 years.1978. By the standards of multiparty coalitionsValenzuela, anywhere, J. Samuel: much “Orígenes less y amongTransformaciones Latin America’s del Sistema de presidential Partidos en Chile”. In Estudios Públicos, 58, 1995, pp. 5-80. systems,Valenzuela, the Concertación J. Samuel: “Respuesta is geriatric, a Eugenio bearing Tironi the y Felipescars Agüero.of miscellaneous Reflexiones sobre el corruption chargesPresente y Futuroagainst del Paisajemembers, Político includingChileno a la Luzthe de stripping su Pasado”. Inof Estudios parliamentaryPúblicos, rights from 75 (invierno), five of 1999, the coalition’spp. 273-290. deputies in 2002, and the Valenzuela, J. Samuel y Timothy Scully: “Electoral Choices and the Party System in Chile”. general disillusionmentIn Comparative that Politics goes, 29:with (4) (July),holding 1997, the pp. reins 511-527. of power for so long. OneWalker, might Ignacio: conclude, Socialismo then, y Democracia that the coalition. Santiago: is CIEPLAN, simply ready 1990. to expire. Any of these forces, or some combination of them, could indeed undermine the Concertación, but we do not regard these factors as necessarily devastating to the coalition’s survival for a number of reasons. In the first place, the Chilean economy has come through the last five years in far better shape than that of any of its Southern Cone neighbors, and employment and growth figures rebounded in first months of 2003. The Concertación may well be in a position in 2005 to claim credit for good economic stewardship. Next, many of the issues surrounding the non- democratic legacy of the Pinochet era —including the renowned www.cepchile.cl