2 ESTUDIOS PÚBLICOS Introduction T he demise of Chile’s Concertación coalition has been predicted often over the past dozen years during which it has governed. Even the coalition’s leaders have issued premature announcements of its death (Latin America Adviser 2002; El Mercurio 2003a). Some observers of Chilean politics, therefore, might regard the dissolution of the Concertación as both a foregone conclusion and an overdetermined event –that is, as the product of so many factors, all working toward the same end, that it is impossible to assign responsibility among them. We share the opinion that the Concertación may well dissolve before Chile’s next election, but not for the reasons commonly cited. Our argument is based, instead, on the structure of Chilean political careers, which in turn is connected inextricably with Chile’s unusual electoral rules. Harbingers of the Concertación’sSTUDY demise point out that the Chilean economy has slowed somewhat since the coalition’s early years in government during the 1990s.Translated Moreover, by María the Ceciliacoalition Blanco itself was initially galvanized around opposition to the Pinochet regime of the 1970s and 1980s, so as time passes, the compelling force of that initial motivation might naturally weaken. In addition, the Concertación, and even its component parties —most notably the Christian Democrats— are internally divided over social issues, such as the legal status of divorce and access to birth control. Finally, by the 2005 elections, the Concertación will have held the presidency and a majority in the Chamber of Deputies (the legislative house elected bySTRONG popular vote) CANDIDATES for 16 years. INBy THEthe standards “CONCERTACIÓN” of multiparty coalitions anywhere, much less among Latin America’s presidential systems, theAN Concertación INSURANCE is FORgeriatric, RUNNER bearingS-UP the scars OR PREDOMINANCEof miscellaneous * corruption charges againstOF members, THE TWO-THIRDS? including the stripping of parliamentary rights from five of the coalition’s deputies in 2002, and the general disillusionmentCarolina that goes Garridowith holding and Patriciothe reins Naviaof power for so long. One might conclude, then, that the coalition is simply ready to expire. Any of these forces, or some combination of them, could indeed undermine the Concertación, but we do not regard these factors as The authors provide an alternative explanation of an article by necessarily devastatingCarey and toSiavelis the coalition’s which suggests survival that forthe aConcertación number of reasons.presents In the first place,parliamentary the Chilean lists economy with two has strong come candidatesthrough the because, last five as years the in far better shapegoverning than coalition, that of theyany canof itsprovide Southern an “insurance” Cone neighbors, —in the form and employment andof appointments growth figures to Executive rebounded positions- in first to months those candidates of 2003. who, The Concertación acceptingmay well a bepersonal in a positionrisk for thein 2005sake ofto theclaim centre-left credit coalition,for good economic stewardship.fail to win aNext, seat. Because,many of at the the issuestime when surrounding Carey and the Siavelis non- democratic legacywrote their of article,the Pinochet the presidential era —includingelection of 2005 the was renowned expected www.cepchile.cl to be more visibly marked by the uncertainty of the outcome, they argued that “the Concertación will no longer be able to guarantee its candidates (…) a post in the Government structure”. This would CAROLINA GARRIDO SILVA. 4º year student of Political Science, Universidad Diego Portales; President of the Students’ Federation, Universidad Diego Portales, Santiago, Chile. PATRICIO NAVIA. Assistant Professor, General Studies Programme, New York University; Professor, School of Social Sciences and History, Universidad Diego Portales, Santiago, Chile. Has published articles in the following magazines: Comparative Political Studies; Journal of Democracy; Democratisation and Social Science Quarterly. Has also written chapters of several books on democratisation, institutional design and electoral laws. In Chile, his articles have been published in Estudios Públicos, Perspectivas, Revista de Ciencia Política, the FLACSO yearbook. He also writes columns for La Tercera and Revista Capital. He is the author of the book Las Grandes Alamedas. El Chile post Pinochet. * We acknowledge the suggestions and comments of an anonymous referee and the conversations held on this subject with John Carey and Peter Siavelis. Estudios Públicos, 99 (winter 2005). 2 ESTUDIOS PÚBLICOS Introduction T he demise of Chile’s Concertación coalition has been predicted often over the past dozen years during which it has governed. Even the coalition’s leaders have issued premature announcements of its death (Latin America Adviser 2002; El Mercurio 2003a). Some observers of Chilean politics, therefore, might regard the dissolution of the Concertación as both a foregone conclusion and an overdetermined event –that is, as the product of so many factors, all working toward the same end, that it is impossible to assign responsibility among them. We share the opinion that the Concertación may well dissolve before Chile’s next election, but not for the reasons commonly cited. Our argument is based, instead, on the structure of Chilean political careers, which in turn is connected inextricably with Chile’s2 unusual electoral rules. ESTUDIOS PÚBLICOS Harbingers of the Concertación’s demise point out that the Chilean economy has slowed somewhat since the coalition’s early years in mean greater difficulty to present pairs of strong candidates. government during the 1990s. Moreover, the coalition itself was initially Carolina Garrido and Patricio Navia provide two alternative galvanized around opposition to the Pinochet regime of the 1970s and explanations of why the Concertación presents list with a higher 1980s, so as time passes, the compelling force of that initial motivation number of strong candidates than the Alianza. The first explanation might naturallyis weaken.that the ConcertaciónIn addition, the is Concertación,formed by parties and representingeven its comp twoonent of parties —mostthe notably traditional the Christianthree thirds Democrats— in Chilean arepolitics. internally The dividedsecond over social issues,explanation such isas thatthe thelegal Concertación status of divorceis simply and composed access ofto morebirth control. Finally,parties by thethan 2005 the elections,Alianza. Although the Concertación there is enough will have evidence held theto presidency andsupport a majority both inexplanations, the Chamber thereof Deputies is insufficient (the legislative statistical house or elected by popularmethodological vote) for certainty16 years. to By claim the standardsthat these of multipartyalternative coalitions anywhere,explanations much are betterless thanamong those Latin provided America’s by Carey presidentialand Siavelis. systems, the ConcertaciónHowever, it is isalso geriatric, true that bearing their explanationthe scars of is miscellaneousnot, from the corruption chargesstatistical oragainst methodological members, viewpoint, including more plausiblethe stripping than those of described in this essay. parliamentary rights from five of the coalition’s deputies in 2002, and the general disillusionment that goes with holding the reins of power for so long. One might conclude, then, that the coalition is simply ready to expire. n this article we offer an alternative explanation of an article by Carey Any Iof these forces, or some combination of them, could indeed and Siavelis which suggests that the Concertación presents parliamentary lists undermine the Concertación, but we do not regard these factors as with two strong candidates because, as the governing coalition, they can necessarily devastating to the coalition’s survival for a number of reasons. provide an “insurance” —in the form of appointments to Executive positions- In the first place, the Chilean economy has come through the last five years to those candidates who, accepting a personal risk for the sake of the centre- in far better shape than that of any of its Southern Cone neighbors, and left coalition, do not win a seat but still help to increase the vote of the employment and growth figures rebounded in first months of 2003. The coalition at national level. Because, at the time when Carey and Siavelis wrote Concertación may well be in a position in 2005 to claim credit for good their article, the presidential election of 2005 was expected to be more visibly economic stewardship. Next, many of the issues surrounding the non- marked by the uncertainty of the outcome, they argued that “the Concertación democratic legacy of the Pinochet era —including the renowned www.cepchile.cl will no longer be able to guarantee its candidates (…) a post in the Government structure”. This would mean a greater difficulty to present pairs of strong candidates. What follows is, first, a discussion of the incentives of the electoral system, underlining that, although the coalition would rather have two strong candidates per district in order to win more votes, candidates themselves prefer to be paired with a relatively weak partner. Below we will discuss how the Concertación in effect fielded strong candidates in more districts than the Alianza por Chile between 1989 and 2001. After summarising the views of Carey and Siavelis, we offer two alternative explanations,