NATIONAL ARCHIVES

IRELAND

Reference Code: 2015/89/65 Creation Date(s): 1 March 1985 Extent and medium: 13 pages Creator(s): Department of the Taoiseach Access Conditions: Open Copyright: National Archives, Ireland. May only be reproduced with the written permission of the Director of the National Archives. • S('te0~ (iJHq~) , VISIT TO SAT 23RD - TUES 26TH F!~/l5.

During his recent visit to Belfast, on which I accompanied him, the Minister met a cross section of SDLP representatives (senior members and party activists) drawn mainly but by no means exclusively from the Belfast area ( out of town SDLP participants included Paddy O'Donoghue and Fergus Mc Qulllan). About sixty party members attended a reception hosted by the , Minister in the Forum Hotel. The Minister was introduced by the new party Chairman Alban Maglnnls who used the occassion to commend the Minister' and the Government for the suPPOt·t, they had given to the SDLP in recent years and in particular for' tl1C strong interest now being taken in the human rights issues facing the northern minority community. The Minister's r'em8t'ks on the oca~sion were well r'ecelved and strongly welcomed in a ve ry pe rsonal conc 1 ud i ng in t e rven tion by Paddy 0' DOllogllUe . F'olJowlng the reception, the Minister hosted a private dinner to wh .1ch senior represcntaLives or the pal'ty were InvltccL 'I'hose attending were

Alban Maginnis Pascal O'Hare Brian Feeney Mary Muldoon 'rom Connolly Ben Caraher Jim Fulton

Paddy O'DoTloghue excused himself because of a prior cOITlllil tment. Dr' ..Jo I!cmj['on was Inable to attend due to tt1e unexpected hospltaliz8tiDn of ' his brother Jjm.

The Minister for StaLe at the Depar'Lrnent or environment, Mr. Fer g u sO' Br' i en, was pr e s en L at bot h the re c e p t ion and the dinner. The text of the Minister" s remarks Lo the SDLP was circulaLf'd to the lrish media, Nor'Lh and SouLh. - ? -

While in Northern Ireland, 1 used the oricasion for discussion of current issues of interest with Michael Canavan (formerly SDLP spokesman on security issues) Derry Mayor John Tierney, Denis Haughey (international secretary of the SDLP). , (North Antrim SDLP representative and former party Chairman) Austin Currie (SDLP representative for South Tyrone), as well as Brian Feeney, Pascal O'Hare and Dr . Joe Hendron of Belfast. ~ (,Q. I aJs'o attended on 26 March the -meeting which tile Minlster for Labour, Mr. Rory Quinn, had with Bob Cooper of the Fair' Employment J.gency and tile dinner which the Minister hosted ror' a group of Norther'n Ireland 'Trust Nationa1 ists. Earlier in

the day Minister Quinn addressed a f~otary group in East Belrast.

A point which emerged clearly boLh at dinner conversation wIth the Minister and in my subsequent pr'lvate discusstons was the

con rid en c e 0 f S DLP flI e In b e r s t hat 1..11 e .Y can h old U) e 1 r g r 0 un d a t the May Local Government Elections against the challenge or

Pr'ovisional Sinn Fein and indeed thp r belief that the party i~, now mov i ng to a pos i t ion of ol'ganj sa t ional and el ec tora 1

recovery. Several reasons were adduced for this but ~he dominant one was undoubtedly a feeling that the contradictions within the ballot box and armalite strategy of Sinn Fein were at last becoming clear to the northern nationalist eler.torate. Having- made a deciston to engage in the cut and ell ~ 1& tl1rur,t of illt~r'-pat'ty

co tI C 1 u s ion 0 f the 0 n - g 0 i n g An g 1 0 - 1 r' Ish d 1 s c u s s ion s . I nth i s cont.ext those met. saw t.rle !'ecent controver'sy involving SDLP .leader alld t.he IBA and the subsequent. unionist

reac:tlon a~) ensuring t.hat the par'Ly held the high ground in fac1ng th' 1f5SU' of' inter'-pa r't.y t.alks in t.he immediate future. - 3 -

There was fairly unanimous support for the initiative taken by

Mr. Hum e . Th 0 sew h 0 m I met a 1 sot end e d to' fee 1 t hat the rhythm of Anglo-Irish discussions and the timing of an Anglo-Irish substantive summit should not be subordinate to local electoral considerations in Northern Ireland.

Michael Canavan: Mr. Canavan has withdrawn from public political debate but remains an important figure in SDLP politics in the Derry area and has deeply invelued himself in the University issue. He maintains a strong interest in the over'all politics of NOI'thern lrelalld and ill parlicular in !lUman rights and security-r'clated issues. Among the pOints he made ~ were: -

(i) the human rights issue is not only of moral importance. It has a strategic political significance in obliging the British Government and

Br' i li s hop 1 n 1 0 n t 0 con r r' 0 tl l the con l r a d i c t ion s bet wee n the high values to which the nat.1on subscribes and the inevitable departures fr'orn civilized standards which arise in the management or: Northern Ireland. What he envisaged was the intensification of policies, aimed at shaming the British in their involvement in Northern Ireland.

(1i) As an individual through perSistence he had accomplished some little redress in the human rights

f'i e] d; (e. g. 1 n reI a t ion tot h e Ben net t Rep 0 r t ). '1'h e ... '-.. . / sovereign Irish Government could accomplish much more, particularly if lt chose to 1nternatlonallse the human rights issue.

(1il) Nothing short of' the disbandmenl of the UDH should be accepted. IL should be replaced by a mixed force which would have Irish (not necessarily Irish al'my) and Bf'1tlsh At'my par'llGipat1on. ------

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(iv) The problems with the RUC would rectify themselves if a framework for jOint responsibility were established between Britain and Ireland. In this context (although there were uncertainties) he felt Catholics could be persuaded to join the RUC and to resist IRA intimidation.

(v) The final content rather than the timing of any

~nglo-Irish package was what was most important. The SDLP could confront the challenge of Provisional S1nn Fein on their over terms in the May elections. They w9uld be assisted in this by the recent initiative of Mr. Hume. Sinn Fein was peaked electorally and could not sustain its current strategy.

(vi) A purely co~sultative role in Northern Ireland for the Irish Government would be intolerable. He had taken the s tan d h e had 0 n t II e P r' i 0 [. i nit i a t i v e bee a use 1 t offered only consultative rights for Northern llationalists. rrhus they wet'c being asked to underwrite an unacceptable system of administration without being given the capability of transforming, it. An executive role for the Irish Government should mean an open and equal say in the running of Northern Ireland and this was required above all 1n relation to security policy.

(vii) The Forum process had helped 1ntegrat~ northern . '"-- nnt.1onal1~3tB into Irish nat10nalism as a whole and t h use n d 1 t s 1 0 n g is 01 a t 1 0 n . Th e Br i t ish (a n d unionists) still hoped to split off northern national1sm from this larger association by maintaining pressure for an internal settlement. An executive role for the Irish Government would s t r'engthen the integra t 1 vc tendency of Irish Nationalism. - 5 -

(viii) lnter-party talks on devolution should follow a successful Anglo-Irish package.

John Tierney, Mayor of Derry: Mr. Tierney is young, articulate, working class; influelltlal with the SOLP in Derry and 910se to the party leader.

(1) lie was confident that the SDLP could mRlntaln and even improve on their position 1n the May elections. Sinn Fein would make their gains at the expense of the lIP and, of existIng lIP members, only Fergus McAteer had a chance of remaining. I'

(li) 'l'he lIP, and particularly the current deputy mayor, continued to play a negative role in Derry politics. Their objective was to embarass the SOLP by cllallenging their nationalist and populist credentials. The "Oerry/Londonderry" debate had been part of this strategy.

(iii) Local SOLP representative~ could not allow the lIP to hold the high ground of nationalism and popullsm., 'l'hey fel t obliged, therefore, to co-opt, where pOSSible, contentious inter-community issues which arose, frame them in the most.; reasonable terms ava11ale and seek to limit any counter-productive impact on unlonis op1nion.

~ .. t._ ~ (lv) GIll' 1'(: C(ltt. Ir;~;uc WelS tilt lIP delllDlld to have t'ptnoved

1'r' olll t.he Guildhall in DE::t'I'y Fl statue of Queen Vl c Lor'ia. 'f'IH ' SDU' were ablp to defuse the issue somewhat. by eventually accepting the emplacement of' a rrnt.1onallsL memorial in the Guildhall viz a plaque to the d ad of' Bloody Sunday (1972) which also marked nom!' comrrlPmot'(ltion of all innocent victims of' the currenL violence. ·-. ' ''' .. _._. __ .- _... ,_._------

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(v) The recent initiative of Mr. H~me reflected popular nationalist feeling in the Derry area. Mr. Hume's subsequent management of the affair (the video controversy) has been correctly judged and would be viewed sympathetically by all reasonable nationalists.

Denis HauglJey: Mr. Haughey was str'ongly supportive of the Bume initiative viz a viz the IRA. The unionist reaction was predictable; they had not been sincere in their' offer of taJks. Furthermore, they were 1n no position to argue a case against the SDLP leaders meeting the IHA in an effor'\" to end the campaign of violence since both nup and OUP representatives had in his "view a record of contac\" and in instances of collusion with paramilitaries. 'l'he SDLP had photographic evidence showing this. 'J'he other pOints made were:-

(i) The SDLP was recovering electoralJy and Sinn Fein was losing credibility through its inability to cope with real politics and was losing control of the issues. Their constItuency activism has been largely a PH ploy, now per'cel ved in the med1 a as such.

(il) An authoratarian fascist party such as Slnn Fein, depends on a myth of invincibility. This had led to an over-inf1ation of prospects for a decisive result

in the European election. 'J'hat elec~ion had checked their momentum and was a bad set-back.

. . "-. ) ( i i 1 ) 'Ihe pan-national ist emphasis had had a certain plausibility with sections of the minority electoratc; however the Hume initiatlve had derailed that particular strategy. Slnn Fein would, of course, continue to draw support in particularly

cJ e pr' e s [j e d u r·1J a n a [. e as, 1 n vcr y srn a 11 Rep u b 1 i can Cat;hollc townships and in adjoining farming areas.

(iv) '1'1le Anglo-It'ish dlalog~e need not ue subject to any p e1 r t 1 c u 1 a r' t 1rn e p res sur' c . Wh i lea nag r e e men t was - 7 - important in the near future, content and not timing was what was really important.

(v) Haughey saw no need for northern nationalists to be over specific on the precise terms of any Anglo-Irish package. The imperative was to obtain the best deal possible, above all in relation to the Irish dImension. However, an important measure of nationalist reaction would be the manner in which the package was received by unionists. An arrangement which unionists could accept without protest or resentment would almost automatically be one that was I unconvincing for the minority. Obviously , also all arrangements must be carefully judged so as to exclude an excessive and dangerous unionist reaction .

(vi) Haughey hoped that in addition to an Irish dimension, an Anglo-Irish arrangement would promote institutions for North-South cooperation and show progress on security-related issues. The SDLP had called for the disbandment of the UDR and he fully supported this

call. However, it could not be achieved in o~bold ( stroke. In the early seventies the r ole of the UDR had been that of protection of vital installations and support for a limited range of army activities. The UDR could again be confined to this role .

( v 1 ) S lJ 0 r t - t e r m I.H' e s sur e r 0 r in t e r' par t y t a:}.. k s had c 1 ear 1 y . '-- ~ abated as a result of the Hume initiative and the unionist response. 'l'hese pressures had risked the SULP being dr'awn again into the exclusively Not'thern 11'eland framework from which the Forum had released them. An lr'lsh dimension (viz a role for the Dublin Gover'nment) would give them the confidence to pursue tHlks on devolu\.,ion with the other par'ties . In the

rneant1llle, it was U I I \"0 Douglas HUI'd to Uve up to his promise.

of' JlI' e s~) ! rJ g l. h· U r J! (; tits L s j Tl t 0 tj I' eat. e [' f'] ex 1 b 1 1 1. t Y . ,." ..._-----,.-_._-- ---

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Sean Farren: Mr. Farren felt that the SDLP were improving their position with the nationalist electorate. In his own area the chief problem was the availability of suitable candidates. He had, however, been working hard with local organisations and thought tpat prospects were now better for the SDLP in Coleraine, Ballymoney and even Ballymena. He was happy also with the interest the SDIP sought to generate among university students. There was a strong SDLP branch in Coler'aine University and in Queens the party had attracted high qual:1ty members. Sinn Fein's support in the Coleraine - North AntrIm area,. was largely confined to a few traditional republ:1can areas.

Other pOints made were:- (i) Farren had once felt that .r.re-talks between the SDLP and other parties in parallel with the Anglo-Irish dialogue should be pursued. Now he saw the merit of awaiting the outcome of the Anglo-Irish dialogue. More than ever, given the reaction of the unionists to the Hume initiative, he felt the spotlight was on - the London-Dublin arrangements.

(1i) The Anglo-Irish dialogue must produce "something tangible and visible" . The Irish Government role had to be much more than an Irish official presence in Belfast

• _ . I } ( 1 1 1 ) 'I'h > t'eaclioTl of his cOflstiLuetlts, were a package to be agreed, would be in parL instinctive and in part based on the response of the press and others. The overall

11'lsh dlrnetl~;jon would, however, be importanL for them. There was signs of' a growing interest in the Jr'lsh language among nationalists in his area (in part et r'esponse to the troubles) and the GAA continued to be important. for the minority in N. Antrim. (Iv) 'I'llr pracL1c(!j pr'oblerns tlHtt arose for const1t.1l«:'!nts - 9 - tended to be other than security related ego housing and other social issueu. 'l'here was ii ttle or no vlole'nce and few enough reports of harassment by security forces. The UDR was not a major concern.

Austin Curry: Mr. Curry sh~red the view of other SDLP representatives that Sinn Fein had peaked. Certainly, the SDLP had difficulty in finding suitable candidates but these were no greater than four years ago. For its part, of course, Slnn Fein 'a] so had difflcul ty in getting good candidates. Furthermore, the SDLP had been successful in taking a number of the issues ,. (eg. the UDR) away from Slnn Fein.

John Hume's initiative would be properly perceived by the minority electorate and that was the important point. It was now up to Douglas Hurd to review his tactics following the abandonment by Paisley and Molyneux of their overtures on inter-party talks.

The two track approach was for Mr. Currle the right way to go. He saw the wisdom nonetheless of a'f-{aiting tlle outcome of the Anglo-Irish talks. If things went according to plan (and he ( was not necessarily confident they would) the unionists would have to confront the fact that there were new political arrangements over Wllich they had no veto and which they could not bring down. Fur'thermore, in so far as deyolution was concerned, the Br'1 t1s11 should impose a powersharing or par t rl e I' s lJ 1 P e x e c 11 t 1 v e, 1 r 11 n ion 1 s t s wc r' e not pr e p a I" e d t 0 ) .. ~~ concede tills 111 their' own right.

What was crucial was the will of the British Government to s tan d - b Y wh cl t.. eve r de c 1 s Ion SOl" a g 1" e e men t.. s 1 t ma de. Hew a s confIdent.. t..hat Mrs. 'l'tlatcher had the determination to support and sustain any new arrangments she entered into and felt this war. Fln 1rnpor'tant new f'nr.tor.

Mr. C\l rT 1 f> f, a 1 rl t h Cl t 1. lJ (' r' c waR con f, 1 rl p r a h 1 e un c e 1" t a 1 n t y a h 0 u t - 10- what was implied by the concept of an executive role for the Irish Government which had been mentioned from time. I got the impression that for his own part he did not have a very rigid position as to what should be achieved in any new Anglo-Irish arrangements. However, he did have a preference to see that arrangement developing in p~ral1el with a partnership - based devolution system to which he continues to attach considerable importance.

He agreed with the view of other. SDLP representatives that the party could confront the local Government elections on its own terms. The timing of any Anglo-Irish package should not be I determined by electoral considerations in Northern Ireland but should develop at is own pace.

On security-related issues, he was concerned at the tendency of Fr. Faul to seek redress directly through the Dublin Channel rather' than using the good off lces of the SDLP leader. He accepted that Fr. Faul had become somewhat more cautious in his political approach but hinted that there was obviously still a major question about his attitude tp the SDLP .

Brian Feeney: Mr. Feeney believed like other SDLP members and for similar reasons, that Sinn Fein were losing momentum. They would make gains at the expense of Peoples Democracy in the local Belfast elections but would not take seats from the SDLP.

A good ou come to the Anglo-Irish talks would l.)e important for .. .. ~~ Belfast Ilal tOllal1stG who felt pal'tic111arly vulnerable and 1so1atecl and for whom the electol'al process tradltiona.lly afforded Illtle or no redress. Unlike their colleagues in j) c n' y a TI d New r y, t. 11 p l) I )L Pin B > 1 r.·L~ l a 1 way s fa c e d the pro b 1 em that they could nevPl' offer their' consLituents the promise or rea1 power through local elections since nationalists are massively outnumbered on the city council (tr)e current ratio is 52-10) . That was not to say, llOwever, that the party in Belfast ",_ .. _... ·...... ,.. , .. _------

- 11- required a sound Anglo-Irish package before the May elections. The results locally wer'e fairly predictable and should leave the SDLP with 7 and Slnn Feln with 5. John Hume's initiative was important and had been well received by Belfast nationalists.

Feeney supported the call for disbandment of the UDR but preferred gr'aduallslTl in the pursuit of this objective. His concern was again the vulnerability of the minority in Belfast. He feared that immediate disbandment would provoke a violent unionist reaction and recalled tJlat the death of Constab'le Arbuckle (the first RUC man to be killed in the pr'esent ~ troubles) was as a result of Protestant r'ioting following the disbandment of the B specials.

The UDR were not engaged in patr'ols or provocative activity within west Belfast itself. There had been some sudsidance of their check-point activity along the boundary roads bordering west Belfast immediately following the shooting dead of the joy-riders. However, the UDR still operates checkpoints on . rlK\ r. 4 c..Lt-\ ~ road ways , al be it on a random and mobile bas is. They had abandoned their provocative checkpoint at th~ Castle Street eTlt.r'Y point into the City centre from West Belfast and seemed to have reduced their role at other' down-town checkpoints (though this remains to be fully confirmed).

Of' the thr'ce secur'ily for'ces (RUC, Br'itish Ar'my and UDR), Mr.

Feeney fe1 t that the J-WC. wer: ~;he mosl sensitiJe to community COTlcerrw and the mosl open 00 polillcal persuasion of all three. Nalional1sts would pr'obably pr'efer' to be stopped at nlght-Ume by the 13r'ltish army. However', in gener'al the ar'my litlle understood the nalionalist community and their day-time fool patr'ols through llaUonallst streets were gr'eatly resented.

Pascal O'Hare: Mr'. O'Hare confirmed his intentions not to go

for' war d H 1) a C Cl no 1 0 ;:1\, (' for the 1 0 c a 1 Go v ern men t e 1 e c t j 0 n s, 1 n ._------..._ _ .... __ .... _.. _-_ ..... __ ...... - .__ ... _-, .. _._-.

- 12- part because he is "fed up with the nonsense and bigatry of City Hall", in part because he wants to concentrate on developing his role as an elected (Assembly) representative, in part because he is confident he has a good replacement in Alban Maginnis who needs electoral exposure.

An "executive role" for the Irish Government in the affairs of Northern Ireland is of great importance for him. Like Michael Canavan, he tended to be maxlnallst in the role he envisaged.

Cons~ltative rights would not suffice.

He hoped that a substantive Anglo-Irish summit with an agreed ~ package would be held soon . He had a preference for such a Summit being held before May, not because the SDLP requires it, but simply because the minority have already been waiting too long for a major change in their political environment.

Devolution was not a major priority. He was happy that the unionists had ltfted the pressure for inter-party talks, though he regarded their anti-Bume protestations as hypocritical and was glad that he had been able to provide what he thought was a 1974 photograph of Molyneux inspecting a platoon of masked f men. The "Irish dimension" established by the forum was "the way to go"; there could be no returning by the nationalists to the isolation of a purely internal Northern Ireland arrangement.

Like others he also argued that the minority were coming to see the hypocricy of Sinn rein and he was confident about SDLP ) .. . ""- ~ prospects in the May elections.

Joe Hendron: Dr. Helldron, whom I met only briefly on this occasion because of other commitments, shared the general confidence about the recovery of the SDLP . For whatever rea son s, HI 0 r f.! 0 vet', h 1 sun d e r t, san d t n g was t hat S 1 n n Fe in we r' e now short of' money atld this would cause them problems.

lIe hoped that, good pt'ugrcn~l would be made tn Anglo-Irish ".- _. __ ..... -----

- 13- discussions; he did not seem too preoccupied about the precise nature of the role to be afforded to the Irish Government in the event of the successful conclusion of an Anglo-Irish package.

He would like an opportunit~ to give up local politics and concentrate on his lar'ger political responsibilities. Unlike Pascal O'llal'e, howeve r, he has nol been able to identify a suItable successor.

He welconlc d ll1e inltlalivc of Johll Hurne and commended his subsequent -management of the affairs. He stressed the '- importance of the in1liative for nationalists in Belfast who would regret that it had not succeeded. He felt, however, John Hume would not be blamed since he had made a courageous try.

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